The applicant points out that this objection is based on no criterion enabling the concept of a collection of measures to foe defined and enabling that collection to foe distinguished from an individual measure. Furthermore the objection does not specify the provisions by virtue of which an application directed against a collection of measures is inadmissible. In any event, the present application seeks the annulment of specific measures by which the vacant post was awarded to Mrs Louwage, despite the fact that her qualifications were inferior to those of the applicant.

The defendant emphasizes that under the terms of Article 91 of the Staff Regulations disputes between officials and their institutions must concern the legality of an act adversely affecting them, that is to say, a decision of the appointing authority prejudicing the applicant. A competition procedure cannot foe regarded as such, all the more so as the Count has on many occasions asserted that only acts capable of directly affecting a specific situation can be considered as having an adverse effect.

In the applicant s opinion, on the other hand, the fact that Mrs Louwage was appointed to the vacant post while possessing qualifications inferior to his own and that that appointment is based on the result of a competition which is criticized as being irregular clearly brings out the submissions forming the basis of the application in so far as it is directed against the said appointment.

The applicant objects to this claiming that it cannot foe admitted that the Selection Board for a competition has unfettered discretion and that its decisions cannot be challenged, without thereby taking away an essential matter from the jurisdiction of the Court and thus depriving officials of all possibility of appeal, as in the case of a flagrant act of injustice by the Selection Board. Further, such an argument is in contradiction with Article 91 of the Staff Regulations which recognizes the Court's unlimited jurisdiction in appeals by officials and which applies necessarily to the provisions of the Staff Regulations (Article 30) instituting the Selection Board.

Finally the request for the applicant's qualifications to be examined and his offer of proof are in complete conformity with the case-law of the Court (Cases 10/55, 1/56 and 27/63).

The defendant replies, on the one hand, that Article 91 of the Staff Regulations provides for applications for annulment and not applications in respect of unlimited jurisdiction and, on the other hand, claims .that the case-law cited by the applicant is not relevant to this case, or in no way justifies his arguments.

The applicant maintains, on the other hand, that his legal interest is well founded in this case. In fact:

either that appointment was made by way of promotion, in which case, if it is ruled that the application is well founded, the applicant would be classified in Category B within which category he would be eligible for promotion,

The defendant insists that the subsequent promotion of Mrs Louwage, supposing it to have occurred, does not constitute an act adversely affecting the applicant.

in fact, supposing that the Court were to rule in favour of the applicant, he would not find himself classified in Category B simply for that reason. The Parliament would be obliged to rehold the internal competition, in which event, even if the applicant appeared better placed than Mrs Louwage in the new list of suitable candidates drawn up by the Selection Board, his appointment in Category B would only be ensured by a discretionary decision of the appointing authority.

The applicant emphasizes that the disputed competition was a competition on the basis of qualifications and that, consequently, the essential criterion for classification of the candidates was that of the value of their qualifications. As this criterion was not applied, the competition and Mrs Louwage's appointment which followed are irregular.

In support of this conclusion the applicant gives a detailed enumeration of his qualifications, abilities, conduct in the service and the assessments made of him in carrying out the duties with which he was entrusted, at the same time comparing them with the wording of the notice of the disputed competition (application, pp. 3 and 4). He refers,inter alia, to a report from the Assistant Director of Parliamentary Documentation and Information which describes him as an intelligent and assiduous colleague who deserves promotion.

Taking these factors into account, he claims that his qualifications were better than those of Mrs Louwage and that in order to be convinced of this it is enough to compare them with hers; but Mrs Louwage's personal file must be produced. The defendant's refusal to produce this file, even though the applicant has voluntarily produced his own, is contrary to the principle that there is a right to the production of any document having a bearing on the case.

Having taken note of the report of the Selection Board, which was lodged by the defendant shortly before the opening of the oral procedure, the applicant attempted at the hearing to demonstrate the allegedly contradictory or arbitrary nature of that report.

The defendant states that the applicant wrongly relies on two reports, the first from his Director dated 5 November 1962 and the second from the Assistant Director dated 22 November 1961. It is this second report which contains the words deserves promotion, whilst the other merely asserts that for these reasons he was promoted in 1962.

As for the production of Mrs Louwage's personal file, the applicant's request is unfounded. On the one hand, the assessment of qualifications is within the exclusive domain of the Selection Board and, on .the other hand, the official's personal file referred to in the last paragraph of Article 26 of the Staff Regulations is in this case quite clearly the applicant's file.

Finally, with regard to the applicant's criticisms of the report of the Selection Board, the defendant maintains that the Selection Board's assessment is based on correct findings of fact and on logical considerations and that, in any event, those criticisms are inadmissible, since they were made for the first time during the oral procedure.

The applicant objects to this, stating that the reason why it was impossible to make the criticisms earlier was simply that the defendant refused to produce during the written procedure all the documents requested by the applicant in his application and reply.

The applicant states that he learnt on 5 February 1965 of Mrs Louwage's promotion to Grade B4 with retroactive effect to 1 December 1964, the date of her appointment to Grade B5. If .that appointment is to be considered as following upon the competition in dispute, it is contrary to .the conditions of the competition which expressly stipulated that the post to be filled was a post in Grade B5. If, on the other hand, it is to be considered as a promotion, it is contrary to the second subparagraph of Article 45(1) of the Staff Regulations, since it occurred less than six months after the date of Mrs Louwage's establishment in Grade B5.

The defendant, alter admitting that the competition in dispute was announced to be for career bracket B5-B4, explains that, before her appointment to the vacant post, Mrs Louwage was classified in Grade C1 which, at each step, provides for a salary equal to that of Grade B4. In order to avoid her financial demotion, it was necessary, after appointing her to Category B, to place her in Grade 4. The Official Journal of the European Communities published the detailed list of posts for 1964 only on 1 December 1964 and it was at that date in fact that a post in Grade B4, which was not then available at the time of Mrs Louwage's appointment to Grade B5, was allocated to the Parliament. Since that appointment to Grade B5, although having been decided upon in November, took effect only from 1 December 1964, it was logical and not irregular to grant Mrs Louwage, also from that date, the B4 post which had just been allocated to the Parliament.

The applicant contests this, stating that, if it was a question of avoiding the financial demotion of Mrs Louwage, the Parliament could and should have had recourse to a perfectly legal method, conforming to the administrative practice of the institutions and consisting of granting Mrs Louwage a compensatory allowance ad personam for the six months for which she should have waited before being able to be promoted to Grade B4 in accordance with Article 45 of the Staff Regulations.

In its rejoinder the defendant merely insists upon the inadmissibility of the conclusions seeking the annulment of that appointment.

Although the defendant complied on 10 July 1965 with the Court's request to produce all the documents relating to the appointment of Mrs Louwage to Grade B4, the applicant maintains that the documents so produced are incomplete and that the decisive documents are not before the Court.

The defendant asserts on the contrary that it has produced all the required documents and declares that it remains entirely at the Court's disposal as regards the execution of its orders.