<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><CONCLUSION NNC="YES" xmlns:fmx="http://opoce" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://formex.publications.europa.eu/schema/formex-05.58-20161101.xd"><BIB.CONCLUSION><REF.CASE FILE="n.a."><NO.CASE>C-18/18</NO.CASE></REF.CASE><NO.CELEX>62018CC0018</NO.CELEX><NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2019:458">EU:C:2019:458</NO.ECLI><NO.SEQ>0001</NO.SEQ><PAGE.FIRST.ECR>1</PAGE.FIRST.ECR><PAGE.SEQ>1</PAGE.SEQ><PAGE.LAST.ECR>19</PAGE.LAST.ECR><PAGE.TOTAL>19</PAGE.TOTAL></BIB.CONCLUSION><CURR.TITLE><PAGE.HEADER><P><HT TYPE="SC">Opinion of Mr Szpunar — Case C‑18/18</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="SC">Glawischnig-Piesczek</HT></P></PAGE.HEADER></CURR.TITLE><TITLE><TI><P><HT TYPE="UC">Opinion of Advocate General</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="UC">Szpunar</HT></P><P>delivered on <DATE ISO="20190604">4 June 2019</DATE><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0001"><P>Original language: French.</P></NOTE></P></TI><STI><P><HT TYPE="BOLD">Case C‑18/18</HT></P><P>Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek</P><P>v</P><P>Facebook Ireland Limited</P><P><HT TYPE="NORMAL">(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria))</HT></P></STI></TITLE><INTERMEDIATE><INDEX IDX.CLOSE=")" SEPARATOR=" — " IDX.OPEN="("><KEYWORD>Reference for a preliminary ruling</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Freedom to provide services</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Directive 2000/31/EC</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Information society services</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Liability of intermediary service providers</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Obligation of an internet site hosting services provider (Facebook) to delete illegal information</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Scope</KEYWORD></INDEX></INTERMEDIATE><CONTENTS.CONCLUSION><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">I.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Introduction</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0001"><NO.P>1.</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The internet’s not written in pencil, it’s written in ink</HT>, says a character in an American film released in 2010. I am referring here, and it is no coincidence, to the film <HT TYPE="ITALIC">The Social Network</HT>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0002"><NO.P>2.</NO.P><TXT>In fact, the key issue in the present case is whether a host which operates an online social network platform may be required to delete, with the help of a metaphorical ink eraser, certain content placed online by users of that platform.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0003"><NO.P>3.</NO.P><TXT>More specifically, by its questions for a preliminary ruling, the referring court asks the Court to specify the personal scope and the material scope of the obligations that may be imposed on a host provider without a general monitoring obligation, which is prohibited under Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31/EC,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0002"><P>Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20000608">8 June 2000</DATE> on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0001" REF.END="QE0001"/>Directive on electronic commerce<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0001" CODE="2019" ID="QE0001"/>) (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="178" PAGE.FIRST="1" DATE.PUB="2000">OJ 2000 L 178, p. 1</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> being thus imposed on that host provider. The referring court also asks the Court to rule on whether, in the context of an injunction issued by a court of a Member State, a host provider may be ordered to remove certain content not only for internet users in that Member State but also worldwide.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">II.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Legal framework</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">A.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">EU law</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0004"><NO.P>4.</NO.P><TXT>Articles 14 and 15 of Directive 2000/31 are in Section 4, entitled <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0002" REF.END="QE0002"/>Liability of intermediary service providers<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0002" CODE="2019" ID="QE0002"/>, of Chapter II of that directive.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="2"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0005"><NO.P>5.</NO.P><TXT>Article 14(1) and (3) of Directive 2000/31, entitled <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0003" REF.END="QE0003"/>Hosting<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0003" CODE="2019" ID="QE0003"/>, provides:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><PARAG IDENTIFIER="014.001"><NO.PARAG><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0004" REF.END="QE0004"/>1.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA><P>Where an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on condition that:</P><LIST TYPE="alpha"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(a)</NO.P><TXT>the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent; or</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(b)</NO.P><TXT>the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST><P>…</P></ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="014.003"><NO.PARAG>3.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member States’ legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement, nor does it affect the possibility for Member States of establishing procedures governing the removal or disabling of access to information.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0004" CODE="2019" ID="QE0004"/></ALINEA></PARAG></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0006"><NO.P>6.</NO.P><TXT>Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31, entitled <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0005" REF.END="QE0005"/>No general obligation to monitor<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0005" CODE="2019" ID="QE0005"/>, provides:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><ALINEA><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0006" REF.END="QE0006"/>Member States shall not impose a general obligation on providers, when providing the services covered by Articles 12, 13 and 14, to monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0006" CODE="2019" ID="QE0006"/></ALINEA></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">B.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Austrian law</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0007"><NO.P>7.</NO.P><TXT>According to Paragraph 18(1) of the E-Commerce-Gesetz (Law on electronic commerce), whereby the Austrian legislature transposed Directive 2000/31, providers of hosting services are under no general obligation to monitor the information which they store, transmit or make accessible, or to seek themselves facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0008"><NO.P>8.</NO.P><TXT>In accordance with Paragraph 1330(1) of the Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (General Civil Code, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0007" REF.END="QE0007"/>the ABGB<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0007" CODE="2019" ID="QE0007"/>), anyone who has sustained actual harm or loss of profit owing to an injury to his honour is to be entitled to claim compensation. Under subparagraph 2 of that paragraph, the same is to apply when a person reports facts prejudicial to the reputation, material situation and future prospects of a third party which he knew or ought to have known to be inaccurate. In that case, a denial and publication thereof may be required.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0009"><NO.P>9.</NO.P><TXT>Pursuant to Paragraph 78(1) of the Urheberrechtsgesetz (Law on copyright, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0008" REF.END="QE0008"/>the UrhG<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0008" CODE="2019" ID="QE0008"/>), images representing a person must not be displayed publicly or disseminated in another way that makes them accessible to the public if such publication or dissemination harms the legitimate interests of the person concerned or, if that person has died without having authorised or ordered such publication, the legitimate interests of a close relative.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">III.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">The facts of the main proceedings</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0010"><NO.P>10.</NO.P><TXT>Ms Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek was a member of the Nationalrat (National Council, Austria), chair of the parliamentary party <HT TYPE="ITALIC">die Grünen</HT> (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0009" REF.END="QE0009"/>the Greens<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0009" CODE="2019" ID="QE0009"/>) and the federal spokesperson of that party.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="3"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0011"><NO.P>11.</NO.P><TXT>Facebook Ireland Limited, a company registered in Ireland having its headquarters in Dublin, is a subsidiary of the United States corporation Facebook Inc. Facebook Ireland operates, for users outside the United States and Canada, an online social network platform accessible at the address www.facebook.com. That platform enables users to create profile pages and to publish comments.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0012"><NO.P>12.</NO.P><TXT>On <DATE ISO="20160403">3 April 2016</DATE> a user of that platform shared on their personal page an article from the Austrian online news magazine <HT TYPE="ITALIC">oe24.at</HT> entitled <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0010" REF.END="QE0010"/>Greens: Minimum income for refugees should stay<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0010" CODE="2019" ID="QE0010"/>. That publication had the effect of generating on the platform a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0011" REF.END="QE0011"/>thumbnail<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0011" CODE="2019" ID="QE0011"/> of the original site, containing the title and a brief summary of the article, and a photograph of the applicant. That user also published, in connection with that article, an accompanying disparaging comment about the applicant accusing her of being a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0012" REF.END="QE0012"/>lousy traitor of the people<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0012" CODE="2019" ID="QE0012"/>, a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0013" REF.END="QE0013"/>corrupt oaf<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0013" CODE="2019" ID="QE0013"/> and a member of a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0014" REF.END="QE0014"/>fascist party<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0014" CODE="2019" ID="QE0014"/>. The content placed online by that user could be consulted by any user of the platform in question.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0013"><NO.P>13.</NO.P><TXT>By letter of <DATE ISO="20160707">7 July 2016</DATE>, the applicant, inter alia, asked Facebook Ireland to delete that comment.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0014"><NO.P>14.</NO.P><TXT>As Facebook Ireland did not remove the comment in question, the applicant brought an action before the Handelsgericht Wien (Commercial Court, Vienna, Austria) and requested that court to issue an injunction ordering Facebook Ireland to cease publication and/or dissemination of the photographs of the applicant if the accompanying message disseminated the same allegations and/or <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0015" REF.END="QE0015"/>equivalent content<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0015" CODE="2019" ID="QE0015"/>, namely that the applicant was a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0016" REF.END="QE0016"/>lousy traitor of the people<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0016" CODE="2019" ID="QE0016"/> and/or a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0017" REF.END="QE0017"/>corrupt oaf<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0017" CODE="2019" ID="QE0017"/> and/or a member of a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0018" REF.END="QE0018"/>fascist party<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0018" CODE="2019" ID="QE0018"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0015"><NO.P>15.</NO.P><TXT>On <DATE ISO="20161207">7 December 2016</DATE> the Handelsgericht Wien (Commercial Court, Vienna) made the interlocutory order applied for.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0016"><NO.P>16.</NO.P><TXT>Facebook Ireland subsequently disabled access in Austria to the content initially published.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0017"><NO.P>17.</NO.P><TXT>On appeal, the Oberlandesgericht Wien (Higher Regional Court, Vienna, Austria) upheld the order made at first instance as regards the identical allegations. In doing so, it did not grant Facebook Ireland’s request that the interlocutory order be limited to the Republic of Austria. On the other hand, it held that the obligation to cease the dissemination of allegations of equivalent content related only to those brought to the knowledge of Facebook Ireland by the applicant in the main proceedings, by third parties or otherwise.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0018"><NO.P>18.</NO.P><TXT>The courts of first and second instance based their decisions on Paragraph 78 of the UrhG and Paragraph 1330 of the ABGB, and took the view, in particular, that the public comment contained statements which were excessively harmful to the applicant’s reputation and gave the impression that she was involved in unlawful conduct, without providing the slightest evidence in that regard. Nor, according to those courts, was it permissible to rely on the right to freedom of expression for statements relating to a politician if there was no connection with a political debate or a debate that was in the public interest.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0019"><NO.P>19.</NO.P><TXT>The two parties to the main proceedings brought actions before the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria), which considered that the statements at issue were intended to damage the applicant’s reputation, to insult her and to defame her.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0020"><NO.P>20.</NO.P><TXT>The referring court is required to adjudicate on the question whether the cease and desist order made against a host provider which operates a social network with a large number of users may also be extended, worldwide, to statements with identical wording and/or having equivalent content of which it is not aware.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="4"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0021"><NO.P>21.</NO.P><TXT>In that regard, the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) states that, according to its own case-law, such an obligation must be considered to be proportionate where the service provider was already aware that the interests of the person concerned had been harmed on at least one occasion as a result of the contribution of a recipient of the service and where the risk that other infringements would be committed is thus demonstrated.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">IV.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">The questions for a preliminary ruling and the procedure before the Court</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0022"><NO.P>22.</NO.P><TXT>It was in those circumstances that the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court), by decision of <DATE ISO="20171025">25 October 2017</DATE>, received at the Court on <DATE ISO="20180110">10 January 2018</DATE>, decided to stay proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court:</TXT><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><LIST TYPE="OTHER"><ITEM><NP><NO.P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0019" REF.END="QE0019"/>(1)</NO.P><TXT>Does Article 15(1) of Directive [2000/31] generally preclude any of the obligations listed below of a host provider which has not expeditiously removed illegal information, specifically not just this illegal information within the meaning of Article 14(1)(a) of [that] directive, but also other identically worded items of information:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="alpha"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(a)</NO.P><TXT>worldwide?</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(b)</NO.P><TXT>in the relevant Member State?</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(c)</NO.P><TXT>of the relevant user worldwide?</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(d)</NO.P><TXT>of the relevant user in the relevant Member State?</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></P></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(2)</NO.P><TXT>In so far as Question 1 is answered in the negative: Does this also apply in each case for information with an equivalent meaning?</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(3)</NO.P><TXT>Does this also apply for information with an equivalent meaning as soon as the operator has become aware of this circumstance?<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0019" CODE="2019" ID="QE0019"/></TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></QUOT.S></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0023"><NO.P>23.</NO.P><TXT>Written observations were lodged by the applicant, Facebook Ireland, the Austrian, Latvian, Portuguese and Finnish Governments and also by the European Commission. Those parties, with the exception of the Portuguese Government, were represented at the hearing on <DATE ISO="20190213">13 February 2019</DATE>.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">V.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Analysis</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">A.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">The first and second questions</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0024"><NO.P>24.</NO.P><TXT>By its first and second questions, which should be examined together, the referring court asks the Court to determine the material scope and the personal scope of a monitoring obligation which may be imposed, in the context of an injunction, on the provider of an information society service consisting in storing information provided by a recipient of that service (a host provider), without a general monitoring obligation, which is prohibited by Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31, thus being imposed.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0025"><NO.P>25.</NO.P><TXT>Admittedly, these first two questions are concerned with the removal of information disseminated via an online social network platform rather than with the monitoring or filtering of that information. It should be observed, however, that social network platforms are media the content of which is generated principally not by their founding and managing companies but by their users. In addition, that content, which in the meantime is reproduced and altered, is constantly being exchanged between users.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="5"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0026"><NO.P>26.</NO.P><TXT>In order to be able to delete information disseminated via such a platform or to disable access to it, irrespective of the author of the information and whatever its content, a host provider must first be able to identify that particular information among all the information stored on its servers. In order to do so, it must, in one way or another, monitor or filter that information. However, according to Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31, to which the questions for a preliminary ruling refer, a Member State may not impose a general monitoring obligation on a host provider. All of that means that, by its first two questions, the referring court is seeking, in essence, to ascertain the personal scope and the material scope of such an obligation, which are consistent with the requirements laid down in Directive 2000/31.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0027"><NO.P>27.</NO.P><TXT>By its first question, the referring court also asks the Court to clarify whether a host provider may be ordered to remove, worldwide, information disseminated via a social network platform.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0028"><NO.P>28.</NO.P><TXT>In order to answer those two questions, I shall examine, in the first place, the scheme of Directive 2000/31 applicable to Facebook Ireland in its capacity as a host provider and then the implications of its being characterised as a host provider as regards the injunctions addressed to that service provider. In the second place, I shall then analyse the requirements laid down by EU law as regards the material scope and the personal scope of a monitoring obligation that may be imposed on a host provider in the context of an injunction, without a general monitoring obligation in that respect being thus imposed. Last, in the third place, I shall address the question of the territorial scope of a removal obligation.</TXT></NP.ECR><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">1.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The injunctions addressed to host providers in the light of Directive 2000/31</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0029"><NO.P>29.</NO.P><TXT>It should be borne in mind that, in order for the storage effected by the provider of an information society service to come within Article 14 of Directive 2000/31, that service provider’s conduct must be limited to that of an <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0020" REF.END="QE0020"/>intermediary service provider<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0020" CODE="2019" ID="QE0020"/> within the meaning intended by the legislature in the context of Section 4 of that directive. In addition, according to recital 42 of that directive, such a service provider’s conduct is purely technical, automatic and passive, which implies that it has neither knowledge of nor control over the data which it stores and that the role which it plays must therefore be neutral.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0003"><P>See, in particular, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20100323">23 March 2010</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Google France and Google</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑236/08 to C‑238/08</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2010:159">EU:C:2010:159</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0112">112</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0113">113</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0030"><NO.P>30.</NO.P><TXT>The Court has already had occasion to make clear that the owner of a social network platform which stores on its services information provided by the users of that platform, relating to their profile, is a hosting service provider within the meaning of Article 14 of Directive 2000/31.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0004"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20120216">16 February 2012</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">SABAM</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑360/10</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2012:85">EU:C:2012:85</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0027">27</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> Irrespective of the doubts that one might have in that regard, it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that in the referring court’s view it is common ground that Facebook Ireland is a host provider whose conduct is limited to that of an intermediary service provider.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0031"><NO.P>31.</NO.P><TXT>Under Directive 2000/31, a host provider whose conduct is limited to that of an intermediary service provider enjoys relative immunity from liability for the information which it stores. In fact, that immunity is granted only if such a host provider was not aware of the illegal nature of the information stored or of the activity carried out by means of that information and on condition that, once made aware of that illegality, it acts expeditiously to remove the information or to disable access to it. Conversely, if that host provider does not fulfil those conditions, that is to say, if it was aware of the illegality of the information stored but did not take action in order to remove it or to disable access to it, Directive 2000/31 does not preclude its being held indirectly liable for that information.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0005"><P>See Article 14 of Directive 2000/31. See also my Opinion in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Stichting Brein</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑610/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2017:99">EU:C:2017:99</NO.ECLI>, points <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0067">67</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0068">68</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="6"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0032"><NO.P>32.</NO.P><TXT>Furthermore, it is apparent from Article 14(3) of Directive 2000/31 that the immunity granted to an intermediary service provider does not prevent a court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member States’ legal systems, from requiring that service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement. It follows from that provision that an intermediary service provider may be the addressee of injunctions, even though, according to the conditions set out in Article 14(1) of that directive, that service provider is not itself liable for the information stored on its servers.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0006"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20180807">7 August 2018</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">SNB-REACT</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑521/17</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2018:639">EU:C:2018:639</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0051">51</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>). See, also, to that effect, Lodder, A.R., Polter, P., <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0021" REF.END="QE0021"/>ISP blocking and filtering: on the shallow justifications in case law regarding effectiveness of measures<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0021" CODE="2019" ID="QE0021"/>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">European Journal of Law and Technology</HT>, 2017, Vol. 8, No 2, p. 5.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0033"><NO.P>33.</NO.P><TXT>The conditions and detailed procedures applicable to such injunctions are matters for national law.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0007"><P>See my Opinion in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Mc Fadden</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑484/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:170">EU:C:2016:170</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>). See also Husovec, M., <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Injunctions Against Intermediaries in the European Union. Accountable But Not Liable</HT>?, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, pp. 57 and 58.</P></NOTE> However, the rules laid down by the Member States must comply with the requirements laid down in EU law, in particular in Directive 2000/31.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0034"><NO.P>34.</NO.P><TXT>All of that reflects the EU legislature’s intention to strike a balance, by means of that directive, between the different interests of host providers whose conduct is limited to that of an intermediary service provider, of users of their services and of persons harmed by any infringement committed in the use of those services. Consequently, it is for the Member States, when they implement the measures to transpose Directive 2000/31, not only to comply with the requirements laid down in that directive, but also to ensure that they do not rely on an interpretation that would be inconsistent with the fundamental rights involved or with the other general principles of EU law, such as the principle of proportionality.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0008"><P>See to that effect, concerning respect for fundamental rights and for the principle of proportionality, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20080129">29 January 2008</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Promusicae</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑275/06</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2008:54">EU:C:2008:54</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0068">68</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">2.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The requirements laid down with regard to the personal scope and the material scope of a monitoring obligation</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(a)</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The prohibition of a general monitoring obligation</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0035"><NO.P>35.</NO.P><TXT>It should be observed that Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31 prohibits Member States from imposing a general obligation on, among others, providers of services whose activity consists in storing information to monitor the information which they store or a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity. Furthermore, it is apparent from the case-law that that provision precludes, in particular, a host provider whose conduct is limited to that of an intermediary service provider from being ordered to monitor all<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0009"><P>See judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20110712">12 July 2011</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">L’Oréal and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑324/09</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:474">EU:C:2011:474</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0139">139</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0144">144</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20111124">24 November 2011</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Scarlet Extended</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑70/10</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:771">EU:C:2011:771</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0036">36</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0040">40</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> or virtually all<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0010"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20120216">16 February 2012</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">SABAM</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑360/10</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2012:85">EU:C:2012:85</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0037">37</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0038">38</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> of the data of all users of its service in order to prevent any future infringement.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0036"><NO.P>36.</NO.P><TXT>If, contrary to that provision, a Member State were able, in the context of an injunction, to impose a general monitoring obligation on a host provider, it cannot be precluded that the latter might well lose the status of intermediary service provider and the immunity that goes with it. In fact, the role of a host provider carrying out general monitoring would no longer be neutral. The activity of that host provider would not retain its technical, automatic and passive nature, which would imply that that host provider would be aware of the information stored and would monitor it.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0037"><NO.P>37.</NO.P><TXT>Furthermore, even if such a risk did not exist, a host provider carrying out general monitoring could, as a matter of principle, be held liable for any illegal activity or information even if the conditions laid down in Article 14(1)(a) and (b) of that directive were not actually fulfilled.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="7"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0038"><NO.P>38.</NO.P><TXT>Admittedly, Article 14(1)(a) of Directive 2000/31 makes the liability of an intermediary service provider subject to actual knowledge of the illegal activity or information. However, having regard to a general monitoring obligation, the illegal nature of any activity or information might be considered to be automatically brought to the knowledge of that intermediary service provider and the latter would have to remove the information or disable access to it without having been aware of its illegal content.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0011"><P>See to that effect Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">L’Oréal and</HT> <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑324/09</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2010:757">EU:C:2010:757</NO.ECLI>, point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0143">143</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> Consequently, the logic or relative immunity from liability for the information stored by an intermediary service provider would be systematically overturned, which would undermine the practical effect of Article 14(1) of Directive 2000/31.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0039"><NO.P>39.</NO.P><TXT>In short, the role of a host provider carrying out such general monitoring would no longer be neutral, since the activity of that host provider would no longer retain its technical, automatic and passive nature, which would imply that the host provider would be aware of the information stored and would monitor that information. Consequently, the implementation of a general monitoring obligation, imposed on a host provider in the context of an injunction authorised, prima facie, under Article 14(3) of Directive 2000/31, could render Article 14 of that directive inapplicable to that host provider.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0040"><NO.P>40.</NO.P><TXT>I thus infer from a reading of Article 14(3) in conjunction with Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31 that an obligation imposed on an intermediary service provider in the context of an injunction cannot have the consequence that, by reference to all or virtually all of the information stored, the role of that intermediary service provider is no longer neutral in the sense described in the preceding point.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(b)</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The monitoring obligation applicable in a specific case</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0041"><NO.P>41.</NO.P><TXT>As stated in recital 47 of Directive 2000/31, the prohibition on imposing general obligations, laid down in Article 15(1) of that directive, does not concern monitoring obligations <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in a specific case</HT>. In fact, it follows from the wording of Article 14(3) of Directive 2000/31 that a host provider may be ordered to <HT TYPE="ITALIC">prevent</HT> an infringement, which, as the Commission claims, logically implies a certain form of monitoring in the future, without that monitoring being transformed into a general monitoring obligation.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0012"><P>See, also, to that effect, Rosati, E., <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Copyright and the Court of Justice of the European Union</HT>, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019, p. 158.</P></NOTE> Under Article 18 of that directive, moreover, Member States are required to ensure that court actions available under their national law concerning information society services’ activities allow for the rapid adoption of measures designed, inter alia, to <HT TYPE="ITALIC">prevent any further impairment</HT> of the interests involved.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0042"><NO.P>42.</NO.P><TXT>Furthermore, it follows from the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">L’Oréal and Others</HT><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0013"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20110712">12 July 2011</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑324/09</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:474">EU:C:2011:474</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0144">144</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> that a host provider may be ordered to take measures to prevent the occurrence of any <HT TYPE="ITALIC">further infringements</HT> of the same nature by the same recipient.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0043"><NO.P>43.</NO.P><TXT>In that judgment, the Court did not interpret solely the provisions of Directive 2000/31, but also the provisions of Directive 2004/48/EC.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0014"><P>Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20040429">29 April 2004</DATE> on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="157" PAGE.FIRST="45" DATE.PUB="2004">OJ 2004 L 157, p. 45</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> In doing so, the Court defined a monitoring obligation consistent with the requirements imposed by those directives as opposed to the obligation prohibited under Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31 to <HT TYPE="ITALIC">actively monitor all or virtually all</HT> of the data in order to prevent any further infringement.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0015"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20110712">12 July 2011</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">L’Oréal and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑324/09</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:474">EU:C:2011:474</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0139">139</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0144">144</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> Independently of the specific context of the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">L’Oréal and Others</HT><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0016"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20110712">12 July 2011</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑324/09</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:474">EU:C:2011:474</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> and of the references to Directive 2004/48, the reasoning in that judgment in relation to the obligations of host providers consistent with EU law, depending on their general or specific nature, is of a cross-cutting nature and is therefore in my view capable of being transposed to the present case.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="8"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0044"><NO.P>44.</NO.P><TXT>Consequently, in order to prevent any further infringement, a host provider may be ordered, in the context of an injunction, to remove illegal information which has not yet been disseminated at the time when that injunction is adopted, without the dissemination of that information being brought, again and separately from the original removal request, to its knowledge.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0045"><NO.P>45.</NO.P><TXT>However, in order not to result in the imposition of a general obligation, a monitoring obligation must, as seems to follow from the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">L’Oréal and Others</HT>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0017"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20110712">12 July 2011</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">L’Oréal and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑324/09</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:474">EU:C:2011:474</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0141">141</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0144">144</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> satisfy additional requirements, namely it must concern infringements of the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">same nature</HT> by the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">same recipient of the same rights</HT>, in that particular case trade mark rights.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0046"><NO.P>46.</NO.P><TXT>Thus, I infer from that judgment that active monitoring is not irreconcilable with Directive 2000/31, unlike active monitoring the subject of which is not targeted at the specific case of an infringement.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0047"><NO.P>47.</NO.P><TXT>Along the same lines, I pointed out in my Opinion in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Mc Fadden</HT>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0018"><P><REF.DOC.ECR><NO.CASE>C‑484/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:170">EU:C:2016:170</NO.ECLI>, point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0132">132</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> which concerned a provider of access to a communication network within the meaning of Article 12 of Directive 2000/31, taking inspiration from the preparatory work for Directive 2000/31, that in order for an obligation to be able to be considered to be applicable <HT TYPE="ITALIC">to a specific case</HT> it must, in particular, be limited in terms of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">the subject</HT> and <HT TYPE="ITALIC">the duration</HT> of the monitoring.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0048"><NO.P>48.</NO.P><TXT>Those general requirements, formulated in the abstract, seem to me to be capable of being transposed to circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, in spite of the fact that, when the reasoning concerning the monitoring obligation relating to providers of access to a communications network such as the internet is applied, by analogy to host providers such as Facebook Ireland, the roles carried out by those intermediary service providers are different. To take, for example, a host provider such as Facebook Ireland, the contents of its platform seem to constitute all of the data stored, while for an internet access provider those contents represent only a tiny proportion of the data transmitted. Conversely, the nature and the intensity of the involvement of such a host provider in the processing of the digital content differ significantly from those of an internet access provider. As the Commission observes, a host provider is better placed than an access provider to take measures to seek and remove illegal information.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0049"><NO.P>49.</NO.P><TXT>Furthermore, the requirement that a monitoring obligation be limited in time reflects a number of judgments of the Court.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0019"><P>More specifically, the Court stated, in the judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20110712">12 July 2011</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">L’Oréal and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑324/09</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:474">EU:C:2011:474</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0140">140</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), that an injunction designed to prevent possible infringements of trade marks in the context of an information society service, namely an online market place, cannot have as its object or effect a general and <HT TYPE="ITALIC">permanent</HT> prohibition on the selling of goods bearing those trade marks. Likewise, the Court stated, in the judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20120216">16 February 2012</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">SABAM</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑360/10</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2012:85">EU:C:2012:85</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0045">45</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), that EU law precludes a monitoring obligation, imposed in the context of an injunction addressed to a service provider, having <HT TYPE="ITALIC">no limitation in time</HT>.</P></NOTE> Although it is apparent from the case-law that the limitation in time of an obligation imposed in the context of an injunction relates more to the problem of the general principles of EU law,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0020"><P>This was the approach taken by Advocate General Jääskinen in his Opinion in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">L’Oréal and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑324/09</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2010:757">EU:C:2010:757</NO.ECLI>, point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0181">181</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), which in my view strongly influenced the wording of the passages in question of the judgment delivered by the Court in that case.</P></NOTE> I consider that a permanent monitoring obligation would be difficult to reconcile with the concept of an obligation applicable in a specific case, within the meaning of recital 47 of Directive 2000/31.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0050"><NO.P>50.</NO.P><TXT>Accordingly, the targeted nature of a monitoring obligation should be envisaged by taking into consideration the duration of that monitoring and the information relating to the nature of the infringements in question, their author and their subject. Those elements are all interdependent and linked with each other. A global assessment is therefore required in order to answer the question whether an injunction does or does not comply with the prohibition laid down in Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="9"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(c)</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Intermediate conclusions</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0051"><NO.P>51.</NO.P><TXT>To recapitulate this part of my analysis, in the first place, it is apparent from a reading of Article 14(3) in conjunction with Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31 that an obligation imposed on an intermediary service provider in the context of an injunction cannot lead to a situation in which, by reference to all or virtually all of the information stored, the role of that intermediary service provider would no longer be technical, automatic and passive, which would imply that the host provider concerned would be aware of that information and would monitor it.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0021"><P>See point 39 of this Opinion.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0052"><NO.P>52.</NO.P><TXT>In the second place, active monitoring is not irreconcilable with Directive 2000/31, unlike active monitoring the subject of which is not targeted at the specific case of an infringement.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0022"><P>See point 46 of this Opinion.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0053"><NO.P>53.</NO.P><TXT>In the third place, the targeted nature of a monitoring obligation should be envisaged by taking into consideration the duration of that monitoring and the information relating to the nature of the infringements in question, their author and their subject.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0023"><P>See point 50 of this Opinion.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0054"><NO.P>54.</NO.P><TXT>It is in the light of those considerations that it is appropriate to address the personal scope and the material scope of a monitoring obligation of a service provider operating a social network platform, which amounts, in the present case, to seeking and identifying, among the information stored, information identical to that characterised as illegal by the court seised and also to seeking information equivalent to that information.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(d)</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Application in the present case</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(1)</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Information identical to the information characterised as illegal</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0055"><NO.P>55.</NO.P><TXT>With the exception of Facebook Ireland, all the interested parties maintain that it must be possible to order a host provider to remove or block access to statements identical to the statement characterised as illegal that are published by the same user. The applicant, the Austrian and Latvian Governments and the Commission are, in essence, of the view that the same applies to statements published by other users.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0056"><NO.P>56.</NO.P><TXT>It is apparent from the order for reference that the court at second instance considered that the reference to <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0022" REF.END="QE0022"/>identically worded items of information<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0022" CODE="2019" ID="QE0022"/> was to publications of photographs of the applicant <HT TYPE="ITALIC">with the same accompanying text</HT>. Likewise, the referring court explains that its doubts relate in particular to whether the injunction issued against Facebook Ireland may be extended to <HT TYPE="ITALIC">statements (accompanying texts) that are word for word the same</HT> and to those with equivalent content. I thus take that reference to <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0023" REF.END="QE0023"/>identically worded items of information<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0023" CODE="2019" ID="QE0023"/> to mean that the referring court has in mind precise manual reproductions of the information which it has characterised as illegal and, as the Austrian Government submits, automated reproductions, made through the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0024" REF.END="QE0024"/>share<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0024" CODE="2019" ID="QE0024"/> function.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0057"><NO.P>57.</NO.P><TXT>In that regard, I am of the view that a host provider that operates a social network platform may, for the purpose of enforcing an injunction issued by a court of a Member State, be ordered to seek and identify all the information identical to the information that has been characterised as illegal by that court.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="10"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0058"><NO.P>58.</NO.P><TXT>In fact, as is clear from my analysis, a host provider may be ordered to prevent any further infringement of the same type and by the same recipient of an information society service.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0024"><P>See points 42 and 45 of this Opinion.</P></NOTE> Such a situation does indeed represent a specific case of an infringement that has actually been identified, so that the obligation to identify, among the information originating from a single user, the information identical to that characterised as illegal does not constitute a general monitoring obligation.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0059"><NO.P>59.</NO.P><TXT>To my mind, the same applies with regard to information identical to the information characterised as illegal which is disseminated by other users. I am aware of the fact that this reasoning has the effect that the personal scope of a monitoring obligation encompasses every user and, accordingly, all the information disseminated via a platform.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0060"><NO.P>60.</NO.P><TXT>Nonetheless, an obligation to seek and identify information identical to the information that has been characterised as illegal by the court seised is always targeted at the specific case of an infringement. In addition, the present case relates to an obligation imposed in the context of an interlocutory order, which is effective until the proceedings are definitively closed. Thus, such an obligation imposed on a host provider is, by the nature of things, limited in time.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0061"><NO.P>61.</NO.P><TXT>Furthermore, the reproduction of the same content by any user of a social network platform seems to me, as a general rule, to be capable of being detected with the help of software tools, without the host provider being obliged to employ active non-automatic filtering of all the information disseminated via its platform.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0062"><NO.P>62.</NO.P><TXT>In addition, imposing the obligation to seek and identify all the information identical to the information that was characterised as illegal makes it possible to ensure a fair balance between the fundamental rights involved.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0063"><NO.P>63.</NO.P><TXT>First of all, seeking and identifying information identical to that which has been characterised as illegal by a court seised does not require sophisticated techniques that might represent an extraordinary burden. Such an obligation therefore does not appear to entail an excessive breach of the right to freedom to conduct a business which a host provider operating a social network platform such as Facebook Ireland enjoys under Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0025" REF.END="QE0025"/>the Charter<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0025" CODE="2019" ID="QE0025"/>).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0064"><NO.P>64.</NO.P><TXT>Next, in view of the ease with which information can be reproduced in the internet environment, the seeking and identification of information identical to that which has been characterised as illegal is necessary in order to ensure the effective protection of private life and personality rights.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0065"><NO.P>65.</NO.P><TXT>Last, such an obligation respects internet users’ fundamental right to freedom of expression and information, guaranteed in Article 11 of the Charter, in so far as the protection of that freedom need not necessarily be ensured absolutely, but must be weighed against the protection of other fundamental rights. As regards the information identical to the information that was characterised as illegal, it consists, prima facie and as a general rule, in repetitions of an infringement actually characterised as illegal. Those repetitions should be characterised in the same way, although such characterisation may be nuanced by reference, in particular, to the context of what is alleged to be an illegal statement. Incidentally, it should be noted that third parties who may be indirectly affected by injunctions are<?PAGE NO="11"?> not parties to the proceedings in which those injunctions are issued. It is for that reason, in particular, that it is necessary to ensure that those third parties are able to challenge, before a court, the implementing measures adopted by a host provider on the basis of an injunction,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0025"><P>See, by analogy, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20140327">27 March 2014</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">UPC Telekabel Wien</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑314/12</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:192">EU:C:2014:192</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0057">57</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> and that possibility must not be conditional on being characterised as a party to main proceedings.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0026"><P>See, by analogy, judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20160525">25 May 2016</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Meroni</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑559/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:349">EU:C:2016:349</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>,-paragraphs 49 and 50), and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20161221">21 December 2016</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Biuro podróży <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0026" REF.END="QE0026"/>Partner</HT><QUOT.END REF.START="QS0026" CODE="2019" ID="QE0026"/></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑119/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:987">EU:C:2016:987</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0040">40</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>). On the problem area of the principle of effective judicial protection vis-à-vis third parties, see, also, Kalėda, S.L., <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0027" REF.END="QE0027"/>The Role of the Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in Relation to Website Blocking Injunctions<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0027" CODE="2019" ID="QE0027"/>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law</HT>, 2017, pp. 222 and 223.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(2)</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Equivalent information</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0066"><NO.P>66.</NO.P><TXT>As regards the material scope of a monitoring obligation, the applicant maintains that a host provider may be subject to the obligation to remove statements that have equivalent content to that characterised as illegal and are published by the same user. The Austrian Government and the Commission, on the other hand, submit that the possibility of imposing such an obligation depends on the outcome of the weighing of the interests involved. Only the applicant contends that it is possible to order a host provider to remove statements that have content equivalent to the statement that was characterised as illegal and are published by other users.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0067"><NO.P>67.</NO.P><TXT>The reference to <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0028" REF.END="QE0028"/>equivalent information<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0028" CODE="2019" ID="QE0028"/> or to information <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0029" REF.END="QE0029"/>having equivalent content<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0029" CODE="2019" ID="QE0029"/> gives rise to difficulties of interpretation, since the referring court does not state the meaning of those expressions. It may however be inferred from the reference for a preliminary ruling that the reference to information <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0030" REF.END="QE0030"/>having equivalent content<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0030" CODE="2019" ID="QE0030"/> is to information that <HT TYPE="ITALIC">scarcely diverges</HT> from the original information or to situations in which <HT TYPE="ITALIC">the message remains essentially unaltered</HT>. I take those indications to mean that a reproduction of the information that was characterised as illegal containing a typographical error and a reproduction having slightly altered syntax or punctuation constitutes <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0031" REF.END="QE0031"/>equivalent information<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0031" CODE="2019" ID="QE0031"/>. It is not clear, however, that the equivalence referred to in the second question does not go further than such cases.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0068"><NO.P>68.</NO.P><TXT>Admittedly, it is apparent from the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">L’Oréal and Others</HT><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0027"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20110712">12 July 2011</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑324/09</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:474">EU:C:2011:474</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> that an information society service provider may be ordered to take measures that help to prevent <HT TYPE="ITALIC">new infringements</HT> of the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">same kind</HT> of the same rights.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0069"><NO.P>69.</NO.P><TXT>However, it is important not to lose sight of the factual context in which the relevant case-law was developed, namely the context of infringements of intellectual property law. Generally, such infringements consist in the dissemination of the same content as that protected or, at least, a content resembling the protected content, any changes in that content, which are sometimes difficult to make, requiring specific intervention.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0070"><NO.P>70.</NO.P><TXT>On the other hand, it is unusual for a defamatory act to use the precise terms of an act of the same type. That is, in part, the result of the personalised nature of the way in which ideas are expressed. In addition, unlike infringements of intellectual property law, defamatory acts subsequent to the original defamatory act reproduce rather the fact of uttering words that harm a person’s reputation than the form of the original act. For that reason, in connection with defamation, a mere reference to acts of the same nature could not play the same role as in connection with infringements of intellectual property law.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="12"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0071"><NO.P>71.</NO.P><TXT>In any event, the interpretation given to the reference to <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0032" REF.END="QE0032"/>equivalent information<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0032" CODE="2019" ID="QE0032"/> is liable to affect the scope of a monitoring obligation and the exercise of the fundamental rights involved. A court adjudicating, in the context of an injunction, on the removal of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0033" REF.END="QE0033"/>equivalent information<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0033" CODE="2019" ID="QE0033"/> must thus respect the principle of legal certainty and ensure that the effects of that injunction are clear, precise and foreseeable. In doing so, that court must weigh up the fundamental rights involved and take account of the principle of proportionality.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0072"><NO.P>72.</NO.P><TXT>Without prejudice to those considerations, and again taking inspiration from the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">L’Oréal and Others</HT>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0028"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20110712">12 July 2011</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑324/09</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:474">EU:C:2011:474</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> I am of the view that, for even more compelling reasons, a host provider may be ordered to identify information equivalent to that characterised as illegal and originating from the same user. Incidentally, in that case also, that user should be guaranteed the possibility of challenging before a court the implementing measures adopted by a host provider in order to comply with an injunction.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0073"><NO.P>73.</NO.P><TXT>Conversely, the identification of information equivalent to that characterised as illegal originating from other users would require the monitoring of all the information disseminated via a social network platform. Unlike information identical to that characterised as illegal, information equivalent to that information cannot be identified unless a host provider employs sophisticated solutions. Consequently, not only would the role of a service provider carrying out general monitoring no longer be neutral, in the sense that it would not be merely technical, automatic and passive, but that service provider, by exercising a form of censorship, would become an active contributor to that platform.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0074"><NO.P>74.</NO.P><TXT>Furthermore, an obligation to identify information equivalent to that characterised as illegal originating from any user would not ensure a fair balance between the protection of private life and personality rights, the protection of freedom to conduct a business and the protection of freedom of expression and information. On the one hand, seeking and identifying such information would require costly solutions, which would have to be developed and introduced by a host provider. On the other hand, the implementation of those solutions would lead to censorship, so that freedom of expression and information might well be systematically restricted.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0075"><NO.P>75.</NO.P><TXT>In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the answer to the first and second questions, in so far as they relate to the personal scope and the material scope of a monitoring obligation, should be that Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31 must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude a host provider operating a social network platform from being ordered, in the context of an injunction, to seek and identify, among all the information disseminated by users of that platform, the information identical to the information that was characterised as illegal by a court that has issued that injunction. In the context of such an injunction, a host provider may be ordered to seek and identify the information equivalent to that characterised as illegal only among the information disseminated by the user who disseminated that illegal information. A court adjudicating on the removal of such equivalent information must ensure that the effects of its injunction are clear, precise and foreseeable. In doing so, it must weigh up the fundamental rights involved and take account of the principle of proportionality.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="13"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">3.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Removal worldwide</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(a)</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Preliminary observations</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0076"><NO.P>76.</NO.P><TXT>I shall now address the referring court’s doubts in respect of the territorial scope of a removal obligation. Those doubts relate, in essence, to whether a host provider may be ordered to remove content which has been characterised as illegal under the national law of a Member State not only in that Member State but also worldwide.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0077"><NO.P>77.</NO.P><TXT>As a preliminary point, it is true that Facebook Ireland, as a subsidiary of Facebook, operates an electronic platform solely for users outside the United States and Canada. However, that circumstance does not seem to be such as to preclude the removal worldwide of the information disseminated via that platform. In fact, Facebook Ireland does not deny that it is in a position to ensure such removal worldwide.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0078"><NO.P>78.</NO.P><TXT>It should be observed, however, that the EU legislature has not harmonised the material rules on harm to private life and personality rights, including defamation.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0029"><P>See Savin, A., <HT TYPE="ITALIC">EU Internet law</HT>, Elgar European Law, Cheltenham — Northampton, 2017, p. 130.</P></NOTE> Nor, in the absence of consensus at EU level,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0030"><P>See Van Calster, G., <HT TYPE="ITALIC">European Private International Law</HT>, Hart Publishing, Oxford, Portland, 2016, pp. 248 to 251.</P></NOTE> has the EU legislature harmonised the conflict-of-law rules in that field.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0031"><P>See Article 1(2) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20070711">11 July 2007</DATE> on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="199" PAGE.FIRST="40" DATE.PUB="2007">OJ 2007 L 199, p. 40</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> Thus, when hearing actions in defamation, each court in the European Union applies the law designated as applicable under the national conflict rules.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0079"><NO.P>79.</NO.P><TXT>The situation at issue in the main proceedings is, prima facie, different from that which constituted the starting point of my analysis concerning the territorial scope of a de-referencing of the results of a search engine in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Google (Territorial scope of de-referencing)</HT>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0032"><P>I am referring here to my Opinion in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Google (Territorial scope of de-referencing)</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑507/17</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2019:15">EU:C:2019:15</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> cited by Facebook Ireland and the Latvian Government. That case concerns Directive 95/46/EC,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0033"><P>Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="19951024">24 October 1995</DATE> on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="281" PAGE.FIRST="31" DATE.PUB="1995">OJ 1995 L 281, p. 31</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> which harmonises, at Union level, certain material rules on data protection. It was, notably, the fact that the applicable material rules are harmonised that led me to conclude that a service provider had to be required to delete the results displayed following a search carried out not only from a single Member State but from a place within the European Union.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0034"><P>See my Opinion in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Google (Territorial scope of de-referencing)</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑507/17</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2019:15">EU:C:2019:15</NO.ECLI>, points <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0047">47</REF.NP.ECR>, <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0055">55</REF.NP.ECR>, <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0076">76</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0077">77</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> However, in my Opinion in that case I did not exclude the possibility that there might be situations in which the interest of the Union requires the application of the provisions of that directive beyond the territory of the European Union.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0035"><P>See my Opinion in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Google (Territorial scope of de-referencing)</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑507/17</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2019:15">EU:C:2019:15</NO.ECLI>, point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0062">62</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0080"><NO.P>80.</NO.P><TXT>Consequently, as regards defamatory infringements, the imposition in one Member State of an obligation consisting in removing certain information worldwide, for all users of an electronic platform, because of the illegality of that information established under an applicable law, would have the consequence that the finding of its illegality would have effects in other States. In other words, the finding of the illegal nature of the information in question would extend to the territories of those other States. However, it is not precluded that, according to the laws designated as applicable under those States’ national conflict rules, that information might be considered legal.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0081"><NO.P>81.</NO.P><TXT>As the discussion between the interested parties illustrates, the reluctance to afford such extraterritorial effects to injunctions reflects the position of Facebook Ireland and that of the Latvian, Portuguese and Finnish Governments. With the exception of the Portuguese Government, moreover, those parties also seem to entertain doubts as to the territorial extent of the jurisdiction of the courts<?PAGE NO="14"?> of a Member State. In essence, those parties seem to consider that the court of a Member State may not adjudicate, in the context of an injunction addressed to a host provider, on the removal of content outside the territory of that Member State. It is therefore appropriate to analyse those two questions, namely the territorial scope of a removal obligation and the extent of the jurisdiction of the courts of a Member State, addressing first of all the question of jurisdiction, which, as a general rule, precedes the question of substance.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(b)</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The territorial scope of the jurisdiction</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0082"><NO.P>82.</NO.P><TXT>Directive 2000/31 does not regulate jurisdiction to adjudicate on injunctions. On the other hand, as is clear from the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">eDate Advertising and Others</HT>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0036"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20111025">25 October 2011</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑509/09 and C‑161/10</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:685">EU:C:2011:685</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0043">43</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0044">44</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> in the event of an alleged infringement of personality rights through content placed online on an internet site, a person who considers that he has been harmed has the option to bring the matter before the competent courts of the Member States under Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0037"><P>Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20121212">12 December 2012</DATE> on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="351" PAGE.FIRST="1" DATE.PUB="2012">OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> In fact, while the conflict rules relating to defamation are not harmonised at EU level, the position is different for the rules on jurisdiction.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0083"><NO.P>83.</NO.P><TXT>In that regard, it is appropriate to add that the jurisdiction rules in Regulation No 1215/2012 also apply to disputes concerning the removal of defamatory content placed online.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0038"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20171017">17 October 2017</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑194/16</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2017:766">EU:C:2017:766</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0044">44</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> It is immaterial in the present case, moreover, that such a request is directed not against a publisher but against the host provider of the content placed online. That being the case, I shall not propose that the Court reformulate the questions referred to it, since only the interested parties entertain doubts as to the territorial extent of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, I should like to make a few observations on the subject.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0084"><NO.P>84.</NO.P><TXT>According to the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">eDate Advertising and Others</HT>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0039"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20111025">25 October 2011</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑509/09 and C‑161/10</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:685">EU:C:2011:685</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0048">48</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> a person who considers that he has been harmed may bring proceedings before, in particular, the courts of the Member State in which his centre of interests is located. Those courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate on all the damage caused. It seems that, in the present case, the court before which the applicant brought proceedings is the court of the place of her centre of interests.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0040"><P>Consequently, in spite of the fact that the referring court is called upon to adjudicate on an interlocutory order, there is no need to consider the implications of Article 35 of Regulation No 1215/2012 on the territorial extent of jurisdiction and on the territorial scope of a removal obligation imposed in the context of an injunction.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0085"><NO.P>85.</NO.P><TXT>It is true that, in the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">eDate Advertising and Others</HT>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0041"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20111025">25 October 2011</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑509/09 and C‑161/10</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:685">EU:C:2011:685</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0048">48</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> the Court indicated that a person who considers that he has been harmed may bring an action in one forum in respect of all the damage caused, depending on the place in which the damage caused in the European Union occurred. Admittedly, that may give the impression that the territorial extent of the jurisdiction of that forum does not encompass the facts relating to the territories of third States. However, that consideration reflects rather the fact that, in order to have jurisdiction under Regulation No 1215/2012, on the basis<?PAGE NO="15"?> of the place in which the damage occurred, that forum must be a court of a Member State. Furthermore, with the exception of that consideration, the Court stated on numerous occasions in that judgment that that forum had jurisdiction to adjudicate on all the damage resulting from the defamation.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0042"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20111025">25 October 2011</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">eDate Advertising and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑509/09 and C 161/10</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:685">EU:C:2011:685</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0048">48</REF.NP.ECR>, <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0051">51</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0052">52</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>). See also judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20171017">17 October 2017</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑194/16</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2017:766">EU:C:2017:766</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0038">38</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0047">47</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>). Furthermore, according to the interpretations put on that judgment in the literature, the forum of the centre of interests may adjudicate throughout the world on the damage caused. See Mankowski, P., in Magnus, U., and Mankowski, P. (Eds), Brussels I bis Regulation – Commentary, Otto Schmidt, Cologne, 2016, Art. 7, paragraph 364. The same applies to the territorial extent of the general jurisdiction of the forum of the defendant. In the judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20050301">1 March 2005</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Owusu</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑281/02</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2005:120">EU:C:2005:120</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0026">26</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), the Court considered that the Brussels [Convention of <DATE ISO="19680927">27 September 1968</DATE> on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="304" PAGE.FIRST="36" DATE.PUB="1978">OJ 1978 L 304, p. 36</REF.DOC.OJ>)] may apply when the claimant and the defendant are domiciled in one Member State while the facts at issue occurred in a third country. I infer that in such a case the forum of the debtor has jurisdiction to adjudicate on such disputed facts. See also Van Calster, G., Luks, C., Extraterritoriality and private international law, Recht in beweging – 19de VRG Alumnidag 2012, MAKLU, Antwerp, Apeldoorn, 2012, p. 132.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0086"><NO.P>86.</NO.P><TXT>I infer that, contrary to Facebook Ireland’s contention, and that of the Latvian and Finnish Governments, the court of a Member State may, as a general rule, adjudicate on the removal of content outside the territory of that Member State, as the territorial extent of its jurisdiction is universal.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0043"><P>It is therefore a matter here of jurisdiction known as <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0034" REF.END="QE0034"/>global<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0034" CODE="2019" ID="QE0034"/> or <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0035" REF.END="QE0035"/>general<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0035" CODE="2019" ID="QE0035"/>. See Larsen, T.B., <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0036" REF.END="QE0036"/>The extent of jurisdiction under the forum delicti rule in European trademark litigation<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0036" CODE="2019" ID="QE0036"/>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Journal of Private International Law</HT>, 2018, Vol. 14, No 3, pp. 550 and 551.</P></NOTE> A court of a Member State may be prevented from adjudicating on a removal worldwide not because of a question of jurisdiction but, possibly, because of a question of substance.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0087"><NO.P>87.</NO.P><TXT>It is now appropriate to analyse the question of the extraterritorial effects of injunctions addressed to host providers, which, as I observed in point 81 of this Opinion, amounts to the question of the territorial scope of a removal obligation.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(c)</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The territorial scope of a removal obligation</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0088"><NO.P>88.</NO.P><TXT>First of all, it should be observed that, as the Finnish Government acknowledges, Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31 does not regulate the territorial effects of injunctions addressed to information society service providers. In addition, provided that they satisfy the requirements laid down in Directive 2000/31, removal obligations imposed on those service providers in the context of injunctions are a matter for national law.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0089"><NO.P>89.</NO.P><TXT>Next, it is difficult, in the absence of regulation by the Union with respect to harm to private life and personality rights, to justify the territorial effects of an injunction by relying on the protection of fundamental rights guaranteed in Articles 1, 7 and 8 of the Charter. In fact, the scope of the Charter follows the scope of EU law and not vice versa,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0044"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20130226">26 February 2013</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Åkerberg Fransson</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑617/10</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2013:105">EU:C:2013:105</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0019">19</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>). See also my Opinion in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Google (Territorial scope of de-referencing)</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑507/17</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2019:15">EU:C:2019:15</NO.ECLI>, point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0055">55</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> and, in the present case, as regards its substance, the applicant’s action is not based on EU law.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0090"><NO.P>90.</NO.P><TXT>In that regard, it should be observed that the applicant does not appear to be relying on rights relating to the protection of personal data and that she does not take issue with Facebook Ireland for having <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0037" REF.END="QE0037"/>carried out<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0037" CODE="2019" ID="QE0037"/> an illegal processing of her data, as her claim is based on the general provisions of civil law. Nor does the referring court rely on the legal instruments of EU law relevant to data protection. It relies only on Directive 2000/31. However, it follows from Article 1(5)(b) thereof that that directive is not to apply to questions relating to information society services covered by the directives concerning the protection of personal data.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="16"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0091"><NO.P>91.</NO.P><TXT>Last, although Regulation No 1215/2012 may prove helpful as regards the effects of injunctions in the Member States, that is not the case as regards the effects produced outside the Union. In fact, that regulation does not require that an injunction issued by the court of a Member State also produce effects in third States. In addition, the fact that a court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on the substance under a jurisdiction rule of EU law does not mean that in doing so it is applying only material rules which come within the scope of EU law and therefore of the Charter.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0092"><NO.P>92.</NO.P><TXT>For those reasons, both the question of the extraterritorial effects of an injunction imposing a removal obligation and the question of the territorial scope of such an obligation should be analysed not by reference to EU law but, in particular, by reference to public and private international law, which is not harmonised at EU level.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0045"><P>As regards the extraterritorial effects of judicial decisions, it is sometimes difficult to draw a line between public and private international law. See Maier, H.G, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0038" REF.END="QE0038"/>Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection between Public and Private International Law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0038" CODE="2019" ID="QE0038"/>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">The American Journal of International Law</HT>, Vol. 76, No 2, p. 280, and Svantesson, D.J.B., <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Solving the Internet Jurisdiction Puzzle</HT>, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, p. 40.</P></NOTE> In fact, there is nothing to indicate that the situation forming the subject matter of the main proceedings may come within the scope of EU law and therefore of the rules of international law that influence the interpretation of EU law.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0046"><P>See to that effect order of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20120712">12 July 2012</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Currà and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑466/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2012:465">EU:C:2012:465</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0019">19</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0093"><NO.P>93.</NO.P><TXT>Consequently, as regards the territorial scope of a removal obligation imposed on a host provider in the context of an injunction, it should be considered that that obligation is not regulated either by Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31 or by any other provision of that directive and that that provision therefore does not preclude that host provider from being ordered to remove worldwide information disseminated via a social network platform. Nor is that territorial scope regulated by EU law, since in the present case the applicant’s action is not based on EU law.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0094"><NO.P>94.</NO.P><TXT>That being so, both in the interest of completeness and in case the Court should not follow my proposal, I shall make a few additional observations as regards the removal of information disseminated worldwide via a social network platform.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0095"><NO.P>95.</NO.P><TXT>In international law, it is not precluded that an injunction may have what are known as <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0039" REF.END="QE0039"/>extraterritorial<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0039" CODE="2019" ID="QE0039"/> effects.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0047"><P>See Douglas, M., <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0040" REF.END="QE0040"/>Extraterritorial injunctions affecting the internet<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0040" CODE="2019" ID="QE0040"/>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Journal of Equity</HT>, 2018, Vol. 12, p. 48; Riordan, J., <HT TYPE="ITALIC">The Liability of Internet Intermediaries</HT>, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, p. 418.</P></NOTE> As I stated in point 80 of this Opinion, such an approach would have the consequence that the finding that the information concerned was illegal would be extended to the territories of other Member States, irrespective of whether or not that information was legal under the law designated as applicable according to the conflict-of-law rules of those Member States.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0096"><NO.P>96.</NO.P><TXT>It might therefore be argued that the Court has already implicitly accepted such an approach in the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan</HT>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0048"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20171017">17 October 2017</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑194/16</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2017:766">EU:C:2017:766</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0044">44</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> It is true that in that judgment the Court did not adjudicate on the law applicable to a request to remove content placed online. However, it held that, in the light of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">the ubiquitous nature of the information and content placed online on a website</HT> and the fact that <HT TYPE="ITALIC">the scope of their distribution is, in principle, universal</HT>, an application for, inter alia, the removal of such content must be made before a court with jurisdiction to rule on the entirety of an application for compensation for damage. In doing so, in my view, that court would apply the law or laws designated under its conflict rules.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0049"><P>See, also, as regards the implications of that judgment, Lundstedt, L., <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0041" REF.END="QE0041"/>Putting Right Holders in the Centre: Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan (C‑194/16): What Does It Mean for International Jurisdiction over Transborder Intellectual Property Infringement Disputes?<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0041" CODE="2019" ID="QE0041"/>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law</HT>, 2018, Vol. 49, No 9, p. 1030, and Svantesson, D.J.B., <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0042" REF.END="QE0042"/>European Union Claims of Jurisdiction over the Internet — an Analysis of Three Recent Key Developments<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0042" CODE="2019" ID="QE0042"/>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law</HT>, 2018, Vol. 9, No 2, p. 122, paragraph 59.</P></NOTE> It cannot be precluded that a court of a Member State would apply, in that context, a single law designated as applicable.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="17"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0097"><NO.P>97.</NO.P><TXT>However, if such a court could not adjudicate on the removal of content placed online at worldwide level, the question would then arise as to which court would be better placed to rule on such removal. In fact, each court would be faced with the inconveniences described in the preceding point. Furthermore, should a claimant be required, in spite of the practical difficulties, to prove that the information characterised as illegal according to the law designated as applicable under the conflict rules of the Member State in which he brought the action is illegal according to all the potentially applicable laws?</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0098"><NO.P>98.</NO.P><TXT>Even if it were accepted that the considerations relating to the territorial nature of the protection available under the material rules on harm to the private life and to personality rights do not preclude such a requirement, it would still be necessary to take into account the fundamental rights recognised throughout the world.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0099"><NO.P>99.</NO.P><TXT>As I have pointed out in a different context, the legitimate public interest in having access to information will necessarily vary, depending on its geographic location, from one third State to another.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0050"><P>See my Opinion in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Google (Territorial scope of de-referencing)</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑507/17</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2019:15">EU:C:2019:15</NO.ECLI>, point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0060">60</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> Thus, as regards removal worldwide, there is a danger that its implementation will prevent persons established in States other than that of the court seised from having access to the information.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0100"><NO.P>100.</NO.P><TXT>To conclude, it follows from the foregoing considerations that the court of a Member State may, in theory, adjudicate on the removal worldwide of information disseminated via the internet. However, owing to the differences between, on the one hand, national laws and, on the other, the protection of the private life and personality rights provided for in those laws, and in order to respect the widely recognised fundamental rights, such a court must, rather, adopt an approach of self-limitation. Therefore, in the interest of international comity,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0051"><P>See, in particular, on the practical implications of that international comity, Maier, H.G, op. cit., p. 283.</P></NOTE> to which the Portuguese Government refers, that court should, as far as possible, limit the extraterritorial effects of its junctions concerning harm to private life and personality rights.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0052"><P>See the literature cited in footnote 47. See, also, in contexts very different from that of the present case, Scott, J., <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0043" REF.END="QE0043"/>The New EU <QUOT.START CODE="201C" ID="QS0044" REF.END="QE0044"/>Extraterritoriality<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0044" CODE="201D" ID="QE0044"/><QUOT.END REF.START="QS0043" CODE="2019" ID="QE0043"/>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Common Market Law Review</HT>, 2014, Vol. 51, No 5, p. 1378.</P></NOTE> The implementation of a removal obligation should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the protection of the injured person. Thus, instead of removing the content, that court might, in an appropriate case, order that access to that information be disabled with the help of geo-blocking.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0101"><NO.P>101.</NO.P><TXT>Those considerations cannot be called into question by the applicant’s argument that the geo-blocking of the illegal information could be easily circumvented by a proxy server or by other means.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0102"><NO.P>102.</NO.P><TXT>To take an observation formulated in the context of situations coming under EU law: the protection of private life and of personality rights need not necessarily be ensured in absolute terms but must be weighed against the protection of other fundamental rights.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0053"><P>See, by analogy, as regards the balance to be struck between intellectual property law and the right to respect for private and family life, guaranteed in Article 7 of the Charter, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20181018">18 October 2018</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Bastei</HT> <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Lübbe</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C-149/17</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2018:841">EU:C:2018:841</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0044">44</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0047">47</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>). See also my Opinion in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Bastei</HT> <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Lübbe</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C-149/17</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2018:400">EU:C:2018:400</NO.ECLI>, points <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0037">37</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0039">39</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> It is thus necessary to avoid excessive measures that would disregard the need to strike a fair balance between the different fundamental rights.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0054"><P>See to that effect, as regards the protection of intellectual property, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20140327">27 March 2014</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">UPC Telekabel Wien</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C-314/12</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:192">EU:C:2014:192</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0058">58</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0063">63</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>). See also Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">UPC Telekabel Wien</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C-314/12</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2013:781">EU:C:2013:781</NO.ECLI>, points <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0099">99</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0101">101</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), and also my Opinion in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Stichting Brein</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C-610/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2017:99">EU:C:2017:99</NO.ECLI>, points <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0069">69</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0072">72</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0103"><NO.P>103.</NO.P><TXT>Without prejudice to the foregoing additional observations, as regards the territorial scope of a removal obligation, I maintain the position which I put forward in point 93 of this Opinion.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="18"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">B.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">The third question</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0104"><NO.P>104.</NO.P><TXT>By its third question, the referring court seeks to ascertain whether Article 15 of Directive 2000/31 precludes an injunction being addressed to a host provider that imposes on the latter an obligation to remove from its platform information equivalent to the information that was held to be illegal in the context of judicial proceedings after it has become aware of that information.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0105"><NO.P>105.</NO.P><TXT>The applicant and the Austrian, Latvian, Portuguese and Finnish Governments maintain, in essence, that Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31 does not preclude a host provider from being ordered to remove information having content equivalent to that held to be illegal, where it has become aware of that information. Having regard to its analysis of the first question, Facebook Ireland maintains that there is no need to answer the third question.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0106"><NO.P>106.</NO.P><TXT>I support the viewpoint shared, in essence, by the applicant and all of the governments.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0107"><NO.P>107.</NO.P><TXT>In fact, since a removal obligation does not imply the general monitoring of the information stored by a host provider, but is the consequence of awareness resulting from the notification made by the person concerned or by third parties, there is no breach of the prohibition laid down in Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0108"><NO.P>108.</NO.P><TXT>I therefore propose that the answer to the third question be that Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31 must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude a host provider from being ordered to remove information equivalent to the information characterised as illegal, provided that a removal obligation does not entail general monitoring of the information stored, and is the consequence of awareness resulting from the notification made by the person concerned, third parties or another source.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">VI.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Conclusion</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0109"><NO.P>109.</NO.P><TXT>In the light of all of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court answer the questions referred by the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria) as follows:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="ARAB"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(1)</NO.P><TXT>Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20000608">8 June 2000</DATE> on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0045" REF.END="QE0045"/>the Directive on electronic commerce<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0045" CODE="2019" ID="QE0045"/>) must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude a host provider which operates a social network platform from being ordered, in the context of an injunction, to seek and identify, among all the information disseminated by users of that platform, the information identical to the information that has been characterised as illegal by a court that issued that injunction. In the context of such an injunction, a host provider may be ordered to seek and identify the information equivalent to that characterised as illegal only among the information disseminated by the user that disseminated that illegal information. A court adjudicating on the removal of such equivalent information must ensure that the effects of its injunction are clear, precise and foreseeable. In doing so, it must weigh up the fundamental rights involved and take account of the principle of proportionality.</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(2)</NO.P><TXT>As regards the territorial scope of a removal obligation imposed on a host provider in the context of an injunction, it should be considered that that obligation is not regulated either by Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31 or by any other provision of that directive and that that provision therefore does not preclude that host provider from being ordered to remove worldwide information disseminated via a social network platform. Nor is that territorial scope regulated by EU law, since in the present case the applicant’s action is not based on EU law.</TXT></NP></ITEM><?PAGE NO="19"?><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(3)</NO.P><TXT>Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31 must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude a host provider from being ordered to remove information equivalent to the information characterised as illegal, provided that a removal obligation does not entail general monitoring of the information stored, and is the consequence of awareness resulting from the notification made by the person concerned, third parties or another source.</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></P></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></CONTENTS.CONCLUSION></CONCLUSION>