(2a)

According to the 2019 Final Report in the context of the ‘Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States’  (44a) prepared for the Commission, the VAT gap, that is to say, the difference between the expected VAT revenue and the amount actually collected, in the Union amounted to EUR 137,5 billion in 2017, representing EUR 267 of lost revenue per person in the Union. There are, however, big differences between Member States, with VAT gaps ranging from under 0,7  % of the total expected revenue in some Member States to 35,5  % in others. That highlights the need for more transnational cooperation in order to better combat VAT e-commerce fraud in particular, as well as VAT fraud more generally (including carousel fraud).

(2b)

The strategy for combatting VAT fraud should evolve in parallel with the increasing modernisation and digitalisation of our economy while rendering the VAT system as simple as possible for businesses and citizens. It is therefore particularly important that Member States continue to invest in technology-led tax collection, notably by automatically linking corporate cash registers and sales systems to VAT returns. In addition, tax authorities should continue their efforts towards closer cooperation and exchange of best practices, including through the Tax Administration EU Summit (TADEUS), a network of Member States’ heads of tax administrations that seeks better coordination at strategic level between tax administrations. In that regard, tax authorities should work towards an effective communication and interoperability between all databases regarding fiscal matters at Union level. Blockchain technology could also be used in order to better protect personal data and improve the online exchange of information between tax authorities.

(3a)

At present, given that payments are executed only in a limited number of cases through virtual currencies exchange platforms, such platforms are not considered to be payment services providers as defined in Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council  (1a) . The risk of VAT fraud, although currently limited, does however exist. The Commission should therefore evaluate within three years whether virtual currencies exchange platforms should be included in the scope of this Directive.

(7)

In accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (46), it is important that the obligation on a payment service provider, to retain and provide information in relation to a cross-border payment transaction, should be proportionate and should only be what is necessary for Member States to fight e-commerce VAT fraud. Furthermore, the only information relating to the payer that should be retained is where the payer is located. With regard to information relating to the payee and the payment transaction itself, payment service providers should only be required to retain and transmit to tax authorities information which is necessary for tax authorities to detect possible fraudsters and to carry out VAT controls. Therefore, payment service providers should only be required to retain records on cross-border payment transactions which are likely to indicate economic activities. The introduction of a ceiling based on the number of payments received by a payee over the course of a calendar quarter would give a reliable indication that those payments were received as part of an economic activity, thereby excluding payments for non-commercial reasons. Where such a ceiling is reached, the accounting obligation of the payment service provider would be triggered.

(7)

In accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (46), it is important that the obligation on a payment service provider, to retain and provide information in relation to a cross-border payment transaction, should be proportionate and should only be what is necessary for Member States to fight e-commerce VAT fraud. Furthermore, the only information relating to the payer that should be retained is where the payer is located. With regard to information relating to the payee and the payment transaction itself, payment service providers should only be required to retain and transmit to tax authorities information which is necessary for tax authorities to detect possible fraudsters and to carry out VAT controls. Therefore, payment service providers should only be required to retain records on cross-border payment transactions which are likely to indicate economic activities. The introduction of a ceiling based either on the number of payments received by a payee over the course of a calendar quarter or on a minimum amount per payment would give a reliable indication that those payments were received as part of an economic activity, thereby excluding payments for non-commercial reasons. Where such a ceiling is reached, the accounting obligation of the payment service provider would be triggered.

(8)

Due to the significant volume of information and its sensitivity in terms of the protection of personal data, it is necessary and proportionate that payment service providers retain records of the information in relation to cross-border payment transactions for a  two -year period in order to assist Member States fight e-commerce VAT fraud and detect fraudsters. This period constitutes the minimum necessary for Member States to carry out controls effectively and to investigate suspected VAT fraud or to detect VAT fraud.

(8)

Due to the significant volume of information and its sensitivity in terms of the protection of personal data, it is necessary and proportionate that payment service providers retain records of the information in relation to cross-border payment transactions for a  three -year period in order to assist Member States fight e-commerce VAT fraud and detect fraudsters. This period constitutes the minimum necessary for Member States to carry out controls effectively and to investigate suspected VAT fraud or to detect VAT fraud.

(8a)

The record keeping and reporting obligation should also arise in cases where a payment service provider receives funds or acquires payment transactions on behalf of the payee and not only where a payment service provider transfers funds or issues payments instruments for the payer.

(8b)

It is necessary to adopt an ambitious mandate for the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) in collaboration with national judicial authorities in order to ensure the efficient prosecution of fraudsters before the national courts. Organised cross-border VAT fraud should be duly prosecuted and the fraudsters should be penalised.

(b)

in respect of the transfer of funds referred to in point (a), where a payment service provider executes more than 25 payment transactions to the same payee in the course of a calendar quarter.

(b)

in respect of the transfer of funds referred to in point (a), where a payment service provider executes more than 25 payment transactions to the same payee in the course of a calendar quarter or executes a transfer of funds having a monetary value of at least EUR 2 500 in a single payment transaction .

(a)

be kept by the payment service provider in electronic format for a period of two years from the end of the year during which the payment transaction was executed;

(a)

be kept by the payment service provider in electronic format for a period of three years from the end of the year during which the payment transaction was executed;

(a)

the IBAN of the payer’s payment account;

(a)

the IBAN of the payer’s payment account or any other identifier which unambiguously identifies the payer and the payer’s location ;

(h)

any executed payment refunds for payment transactions referred to in point (g);

(h)

any executed payment refunds for payment transactions referred to in point (g) , if available ;

(1a)