Provisional text
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
RIMVYDAS NORKUS
delivered on 10 September 2026 (1)
Case C‑108/26 RX
D S.A.
v
P S.A.
( Review of the judgment of the General Court of the European Union in D (Air traffic management decision) (T‑134/25, EU:T:2026:35) – Reference for a preliminary ruling – Air transport – Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 – Compensation to passengers in the event of a long delay to a flight – Conditions – Article 5(3) – Concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ – Air traffic management decision – Allocation of delayed departure slots due to adverse weather conditions )
I. Introduction
1. On a proposal from the First Advocate General, the Reviewing Chamber of the Court of Justice decided, on the basis of the second paragraph of Article 62 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 194(5) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, to review the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 21 January 2026 in D (Air traffic management decision) (T‑134/25, ‘the judgment under review’, EU:T:2026:35).
2. The Court of Justice stated, in paragraph 2 of the operative part of that decision:
‘The review shall concern the question whether, having regard in particular to the judgments of the Court of Justice of 31 January 2013, McDonagh (C‑12/11, EU:C:2013:43), and of 23 March 2021, Airhelp (C‑28/20, EU:C:2021:226), [the judgment of the General Court] adversely affects the unity or consistency of EU law inasmuch as the General Court ruled that:
– an air traffic management decision is not inherent, by its nature or origin, in the normal exercise of the activity of the air carrier concerned, since it does not form part of that carrier’s activity but falls within the activities and competence of the air traffic management services;
– such a decision, irrespective of the reason for it, is beyond the actual control of that carrier, provided that the carrier did not contribute to that decision; and
– consequently, Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, (2) must be interpreted as meaning that such a decision may constitute an “extraordinary circumstance”, within the meaning of that provision, irrespective of the duration of the delay entailed and the reason for it, if it is established that that decision was beyond the actual control of the air carrier concerned, in particular where it can be ruled out that that carrier contributed to that decision.’
II. Legal context
3. Recitals 1, 14 and 15 of Regulation No 261/2004 state:
‘(1) Action by the Community in the field of air transport should aim, among other things, at ensuring a high level of protection for passengers. Moreover, full account should be taken of the requirements of consumer protection in general.
…
(14) As under the [Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (the Montreal Convention) (OJ 2001 L 194, p. 39)], obligations on operating air carriers should be limited or excluded in cases where an event has been caused by extraordinary circumstances which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken. Such circumstances may, in particular, occur in cases of political instability, meteorological conditions incompatible with the operation of the flight concerned, security risks, unexpected flight safety shortcomings and strikes that affect the operation of an operating air carrier.
(15) Extraordinary circumstances should be deemed to exist where the impact of an air traffic management decision in relation to a particular aircraft on a particular day gives rise to a long delay, an overnight delay, or the cancellation of one or more flights by that aircraft, even though all reasonable measures had been taken by the air carrier concerned to avoid the delays or cancellations.’
4. Article 5 of that regulation, entitled ‘Cancellation’, provides, in paragraph 1(c) and in paragraph 3 thereof:
‘1. In case of cancellation of a flight, the passengers concerned shall:
…
(c) have the right to compensation by the operating air carrier in accordance with Article 7, unless [they are informed of the cancellation]
…
3. An operating air carrier shall not be obliged to pay compensation in accordance with Article 7, if it can prove that the cancellation is caused by extraordinary circumstances which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken.’
5. Article 7 of that regulation, entitled ‘Right to compensation’, provides for standardised compensation for passengers, the amount of which varies, inter alia, according to the distance of the flight.
III. Background to the case for review
A. The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
6. A was a passenger on flight LO 6110 which was operated on 25 July 2023 by the airline P.
7. The aircraft scheduled to operate that flight was due to take off from Izmir (Türkiye) airport at 18:20 UTC and land in Warsaw (Poland) at 21:10 UTC.
8. In actual fact, that aircraft took off at 21:40 UTC and landed the next day at 00:17 UTC, thus with a delay in arrival of more than three hours.
9. Flight LO 6110 was preceded by flight LO 6111, which was operated by the same aircraft in ‘rotation’. The aircraft scheduled to operate flight LO 6111 was due to take off from Katowice (Poland) at 14:55 UTC and land in Izmir at 17:20 UTC. At 12:55 UTC, the air carrier concerned received a Slot Allocation Message (SAM) from the air traffic control services, stating that flight LO 6111 had finally been allocated a take-off slot at 16:30 UTC. The allocation decision was based on an Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) measure relating to airspace restrictions in Hungary and Romania implemented due to adverse weather conditions. At 15:04 UTC, the same carrier sent a message indicating that it was ready to depart (REA), requesting permission to take off earlier. However, that message did not lead the air traffic control services to change their slot allocation decision, nor did it result in flight LO 6111 departing earlier. Ultimately, that flight took off at 16:02 UTC and landed at 18:32 UTC, that is to say, arriving 1 hour and 12 minutes late.
10. After landing in Izmir, a technical fault was found on the aircraft. It took two hours and eight minutes to repair it.
11. On 26 July 2023, A assigned her right to flat-rate compensation to D, a company specialised in the recovery of claims.
12. D therefore brought before the Sąd Rejonowy dla m.st. Warszawy w Warszawie (District Court for the Capital city of Warsaw, Poland) an action seeking payment from P in the amount of EUR 400, plus statutory default interest from 17 August 2023 until the date of payment.
13. The referring court notes that, if the loss of time resulting from the air traffic management measures imposed on the carrier concerned were to be deducted from the total duration of the delay, flight LO 6110 would have been delayed by less than three hours. It is uncertain, however, whether it is possible to classify decisions relating to delayed slot allocations as ‘extraordinary circumstances’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004.
14. In those circumstances, the Sąd Rejonowy dla m.st. Warszawy w Warszawie (District Court for the Capital city of Warsaw) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1) Must Article 5(3) of [Regulation No 261/2004], be interpreted as meaning that every air traffic management decision, irrespective of its duration, constitutes an extraordinary circumstance, even if it does not of itself cause a delay of at least three hours?
(2) If not every air traffic management decision constitutes an extraordinary circumstance, should the national court examine what the basis for the air traffic management decision was, for example adverse weather conditions resulting in limited sector capacity on the route of the flight, and is it then entitled to assess whether or not it constituted an extraordinary circumstance?
(3) If a passenger’s flight is delayed for more than three hours, including as a result of an air traffic management decision imposed on the flight immediately preceding the passenger’s flight, in view of limited sector capacity [on] the route of the flight resulting from adverse weather conditions, does that air traffic management decision constitute an extraordinary circumstance?
(4) In that situation, must the air traffic management decision concern directly the delayed flight or may it also concern an earlier flight in the rotation?’
B. The judgment under review
15. In the judgment under review, the General Court first of all answered the first and second questions to the effect that Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004 must be interpreted as meaning that an air traffic management decision may constitute an ‘extraordinary circumstance’, within the meaning of that provision, irrespective of the duration of the delay entailed and the reason for it, if it is established that that decision was beyond the actual control of the air carrier concerned, in particular where it can be ruled out that that carrier contributed to that decision, which it is for the referring court to ascertain. (3)
16. In support of that answer, the General Court, first, ruled out the proposition that every air traffic management decision constitutes an ‘extraordinary circumstance’. That conclusion is based on the finding that the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ must be interpreted strictly and requires the fulfilment of two cumulative conditions, which must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. According to those conditions, such circumstances include events which, by their nature or origin, are not inherent in the normal exercise of the activity of the air carrier concerned and are beyond that carrier’s actual control. (4)
17. The General Court then assessed those two cumulative conditions.
18. As regards the first of those conditions, it considered that an air traffic management decision is not inherent in the normal exercise of the activity of an air carrier, since it falls within the activities and competence of the air traffic management services. (5)
19. As regards the second condition, the General Court held that, irrespective of the reason for it, such a decision is beyond the actual control of the air carrier concerned unless that carrier contributed to that decision. It stated that, in that context, the relevant circumstance is not the reason for the air traffic management decision, but the decision itself, in so far as it is that decision that externally affects the performance of the scheduled flight, unless the air carrier contributed to that decision. (6)
20. The General Court added, moreover, that an event such as an air traffic management decision may constitute an ‘extraordinary circumstance’, even if it did not of itself lead to a delay of at least three hours. (7)
21. Secondly, the General Court answered the third and fourth questions to the effect that Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004 must be interpreted as meaning that, if it is also established that that decision was beyond its actual control, an air carrier may rely, as an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ within the meaning of that provision, on an air traffic management decision that affected a previous flight that it operated using the same aircraft, provided that there is a direct causal link between the occurrence of that circumstance and the delay or cancellation of the flight that it subsequently operated, which it is for the referring court to assess, taking into account, inter alia, the conditions of operation of the aircraft in question by that carrier. (8)
IV. Legal analysis
A. Preliminary remarks
22. The present case is of particular institutional significance, in that it constitutes the first opportunity for the Court of Justice to implement the review procedure provided for in the third subparagraph of Article 256(3) TFEU in respect of a judgment delivered by the General Court in the exercise of the jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings transferred to it, in certain specific areas of EU law, in the context of the most recent reform of the European Union’s judicial architecture. (9) Those specific areas of law include that relating to compensation and assistance for passengers in the event of denied boarding, delay or cancellation of transport services, an area in which the Court of Justice has developed extensive case-law.
23. In accordance with the applicable provisions, it falls to the designated Advocate General to carry out a detailed examination of the judgment of the General Court in order to assist the Court of Justice in determining what action should be taken on the present review. In that regard, it is important to note that the review procedure cannot be treated as an ordinary means of challenging decisions given by the General Court in the exercise of that transferred jurisdiction. It serves a specific purpose, namely to enable the Court of Justice to intervene where the judgment under review raises issues likely to affect the unity or consistency of EU law. While the General Court is called upon to rule autonomously in the areas entrusted to it, including by clarifying and developing the case-law in those areas, that judicial autonomy is necessarily exercised in a manner consistent with the case-law of the Court of Justice and with the general scheme of EU law.
24. The review mechanism thus appears to be the corollary of the partial transfer of jurisdiction effected by the reform, in that it makes it possible to reconcile the objective of the sound administration of justice with the requirement for a uniform interpretation of EU law. In that context, it is not for the Court of Justice to carry out a general review of all the assessments made by the General Court. It is, however, for the Court of Justice to determine whether the issues raised by the judgment under review are of such significance as to justify its intervention in the light of the criterion, laid down by the Treaty, relating to the unity or consistency of EU law being affected, in particular where compliance with essential principles established by its case-law is at issue. The Court of Justice thus intervenes only as a last resort, in the interests of the proper functioning of the EU legal order.
25. The present review therefore calls for a three-stage examination. First, it is necessary to identify the aspects of the judgment under review that are capable of raising serious doubts in the light of the case-law of the Court of Justice concerning Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004. (10) Next, it is necessary to determine whether those aspects are such as to affect the unity or consistency of EU law, in particular if they reflect a significant departure from the essential principles established by that case-law. (11) Lastly, it is necessary to draw the appropriate conclusions as regards the answers that the Court of Justice may, where appropriate, have to substitute for those of the General Court. (12) It is in the light of those considerations that the judgment under review must be examined.
B. The methodology applied in the case-law of the Court of Justice
26. Since the present case concerns a possible shift in the methodology followed by the Court of Justice in assessing the existence of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004, it appears to me useful, in the interests of clarity, to recall the main elements of that methodology briefly before examining the judgment of the General Court in detail. On the basis of that overview of the relevant legal framework, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, I will then set out the aspects of the judgment under review which, in my view, give rise to serious doubts as to its compatibility with EU law.
27. Under Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004, an operating air carrier is not obliged to pay compensation in accordance with Article 7 of that regulation if it can prove that the cancellation or long delay is caused by ‘extraordinary circumstances’ which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken. The Court of Justice has derived from this a two-stage analytical framework, the first stage of which itself comprises two cumulative conditions. (13)
28. It is necessary, first, to determine whether the event relied on is by its nature an ‘extraordinary circumstance’. According to settled case-law, arising in particular from the judgment in Wallentin-Hermann and subsequently taken up by the Grand Chamber in the judgment in Airhelp, that is the case only if the event in question, first, is not inherent, by its nature or origin, in the normal exercise of the activity of the air carrier concerned and, second, is beyond that carrier’s actual control. Since those two conditions are cumulative, it is not sufficient for an event not to be inherent in the carrier’s activity or for it to be, in practice, beyond the carrier’s control. Both conditions must be satisfied simultaneously. (14)
29. As regards the first of those conditions, the Court of Justice carries out an assessment based on the nature or origin of the event in question. In other words, it seeks to determine whether the situation at issue is inherent in the normal exercise of the activity of the air carrier concerned or constitutes a genuine deviation from that activity. Thus, a common technical problem, even if unexpected, does not, in principle, constitute an extraordinary event, since it is among the hazards inherent in the normal operation of an aircraft. (15) Conversely, certain events which are not intrinsically linked to the normal operation of the undertaking, such as a collision between an aircraft and a bird or a volcanic eruption leading to the closure of airspace, may constitute extraordinary circumstances. (16)
30. The second condition relates to the event being beyond the air carrier’s actual control. Here, the Court of Justice draws a clear distinction between events which are internal to that carrier and events arising from external circumstances. In the judgment in Airhelp, it emphasised that distinction between events that are ‘internal’ to the activity of the air carrier and those that are ‘external’ to that activity. (17) An event may thus be unexpected without necessarily being extraordinary, if it remains rooted in the organisation or operation of the undertaking. Conversely, an event arising from a natural cause, from the intervention of a third party or from a decision imposed by an external authority may, depending on the circumstances, be regarded as being beyond the carrier’s actual control.
31. Secondly, it is necessary to ascertain whether the consequences of the extraordinary circumstance could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken. That requirement is autonomous in nature. It is therefore not sufficient for the carrier to establish the existence of an extraordinary event; it must also show that it took, or was not reasonably able to take, measures to avoid the cancellation or long delay of a flight. In the judgment in Wallentin-Hermann, the Court of Justice emphasised that the carrier must establish that it took measures appropriate to the situation, without, however, being required to make intolerable sacrifices in the light of the capacities of its undertaking. (18)
32. Moreover, the Court of Justice interprets that requirement in a concrete and causal manner. In the judgment in Pešková and Peška, it acknowledged that an extraordinary event – in that case a collision between an aircraft and a bird – could justify an exemption, but it also stated that it was necessary to determine the exact amount of time attributable to that event and to determine whether, despite the reasonable measures taken, the long delay remained unavoidable. (19) The carrier cannot therefore rely on an extraordinary circumstance in the abstract; it must establish the specific link between that circumstance, the delay at issue and the impossibility of avoiding its effects.
33. Finally, the case-law of the Court of Justice shows that the existence of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ does not release the carrier from all of its obligations. In the judgment in McDonagh, the Court of Justice held that the volcanic eruption and closure of airspace did indeed constitute ‘extraordinary circumstances’, but that the obligations to provide assistance laid down in Regulation No 261/2004 remained in place. It follows that Article 5(3) of that regulation exempts the carrier only from the obligation to pay compensation laid down in Article 7 thereof and does not, in itself, remove the other obligations placed on the carrier. (20)
34. It follows from the foregoing that, according to the methodology developed by the Court of Justice, the carrier must demonstrate, first, that a particular event was not inherent in the normal exercise of its activity and was beyond its actual control and, second, that the effects of that event could not have been avoided even if it had taken all reasonable measures. The concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ must, moreover, be interpreted strictly, since it constitutes an exception to the principle that passengers are entitled to compensation.
C. The aspects of the judgment under review raising serious doubts
1. The questionable equating of the air traffic management decision with a circumstance not inherent in the activity of the air carrier
35. The first aspect of the judgment under review warrants particular attention in that it concerns the identification of the circumstance that is legally relevant for the purposes of applying Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004. The General Court appears, in essence, to have found that, whilst not every air traffic management decision automatically constitutes an ‘extraordinary circumstance’, such a decision may nevertheless, in itself, constitute the circumstance that must be scrutinised in the analysis of the extraordinary nature of the event relied on. (21) Such an approach amounts, in practice, to treating the decision adopted by the air traffic management services as the decisive factor in the legal classification of the event, even though such a decision may merely reflect, at an operational level, a deeper underlying factual situation, and it is only by examining that situation that the true cause of the disruption at issue can be identified.
36. That approach gives rise to serious reservations. Even the wording of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004 makes it clear that the cancellation or long delay must be ‘caused’ by extraordinary circumstances in order for the exemption to apply. Such wording suggests that it is necessary to identify an actual event or situation that gave rise to the disruption, rather than stopping at the administrative or operational measure through which that disruption is reflected in the operation of the flight. It seems to me, therefore, that neither the wording nor the scheme of that provision suggests that the legal classification should be concerned solely with the air traffic management decision. In other words, the analysis should not focus primarily on the form taken by the external intervention, but on the actual event relied on and the place it occupies in the causal chain that led to the delay or cancellation. (22)
37. A clear distinction must be drawn between the cause of the disruption and the measure through which that disruption is reflected in the actual course of the flight. An air traffic management decision most often constitutes a response to a given situation – be it meteorological conditions, capacity restrictions, airspace constraints or other operational difficulties. By treating that decision as the relevant circumstance itself, the judgment under review has the effect of substituting the regulatory consequence of the disruption for its true cause. (23) Such an approach seems to me, furthermore, to be difficult to reconcile with the requirement for an autonomous and uniform interpretation of the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ in EU law. (24) If the assessment of that concept were, in practice, to depend solely on the existence of an administrative or operational measure adopted by air traffic management services, the application of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004 would risk being determined less by the substantive criteria established by the Court of Justice than by the external form taken, in a given case, by the response of the air traffic management system. Such a reading seems to me to be all the more unsatisfactory in that it is liable to cut short the examination of the causal chain, by focusing the analysis on the final link in that chain rather than on the event to which the disruption is actually attributable. (25)
38. It seems to me difficult to dispute that air carriers are, in the day-to-day exercise of their activities, regularly confronted with decisions issued by air traffic management services. The allocation of slots, capacity restrictions, air traffic adjustments and decisions affecting the order and timing of departures and arrivals form part of the day-to-day operation of air transport and fall within the ordinary operational framework within which airlines carry out their activities. (26) The mere fact that such a decision is issued by an authority external to the carrier cannot, therefore, suffice to establish that it is not inherent in the normal exercise of that carrier’s activity. In the light of that finding, it is necessary to distinguish carefully between, on the one hand, the fact of an air traffic management decision being adopted by an external institution and, on the other, the question whether the situation to which that decision responds is, by its nature or origin, not inherent in the normal exercise of the air carrier’s activity. Equating the two would amount to making the application of the first condition dependent solely on the finding that a third party has intervened in the actual organisation of the flight. However, such an approach would risk shifting the focus of the analysis away from the true nature of the situation relied on and onto the author of the decision. (27)
39. Such an approach appears, moreover, marked by a degree of formalism, in that it attaches decisive importance to the mere existence of a decision issued by the air traffic management services, whereas such a decision constitutes, in reality, no more than an administrative or operational measure taken in response to a given situation. The situations capable of giving rise to such a decision can be extremely diverse and are not necessarily extraordinary in nature. A reading based solely on the existence of that decision does not therefore appear capable of accounting for the diversity of the causes that may underlie that decision. (28) Such a reading appears all the more questionable given that, while the General Court does take into consideration the possibility that the air carrier may itself have contributed to an air traffic management decision, it does so only to rule out its classification as an ‘event of external origin’, without calling into question the prior shift of the analysis towards the decision itself rather than towards the factual situation giving rise to that decision. (29)
40. It is true that the carrier itself does not decide on such a measure. The fact remains that, within the operational functioning of the network, the carrier may influence, at least indirectly, the conditions under which such a decision is taken, in particular through the timely communication of accurate information concerning the flight’s readiness to depart. Similarly, it cannot be ruled out that an initial disruption attributable to the carrier, such as a delay specific to its own operations, may have contributed to the flight concerned being subject to a subsequent regulatory measure or restriction. In such a case, the mere fact that a decision is ultimately taken by an external authority cannot suffice to remove the disruption at issue from the carrier’s sphere of activity.
41. Contrary to what is suggested by some of the national case-law, to which the parties to the main proceedings also referred in their written observations, recital 15 of Regulation No 261/2004 cannot, in my view, properly be relied on in support of the interpretation adopted by the General Court. It is true that that recital expressly refers to air traffic management decisions. It does not, however, appear possible to infer from this that such a decision should, in itself and regardless of the basis for that decision, be classified as an ‘extraordinary circumstance’. In the first place, a recital cannot be interpreted as having the effect of overriding the conditions laid down by the operative provision itself. Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004 still requires that the cancellation or long delay be caused by extraordinary circumstances which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken. That wording therefore still calls for an assessment of the nature and origin of the situation relied on and of its actual impact on the flight concerned. (30)
42. In the second place, recital 15 of Regulation No 261/2004 does not appear to lay down a general rule that every air traffic management decision constitutes, in itself, an extraordinary circumstance. It should be noted, in that regard, that the General Court also does not explicitly adopt that automatic classification approach. On the contrary, it describes a specific situation, namely one in which a decision in relation to a particular aircraft on a particular day gives rise to a long delay, an overnight delay, or the cancellation of one or more flights by that aircraft, even though all reasonable measures had been taken. That wording, far from providing for the automatic classification of such decisions in the abstract, suggests, on the contrary, that they should be assessed in context, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case.
43. In the third place, interpreting recital 15 of Regulation No 261/2004 in a way that supports the approach adopted by the General Court would amount to dissociating the air traffic management decision from the factual situation that gave rise to it. Such a decision is often no more than an operational response to an underlying situation which may, depending on the circumstances, stem either from a genuinely exceptional event or, conversely, from more common constraints which are part of the day-to-day operation of air traffic. It is precisely because the same category of decisions may arise from very different causes that it is difficult to accept that such a decision may, as such and irrespective of the reasons for those decisions, systematically be regarded as extraordinary. (31)
44. In the fourth place, a broad interpretation of recital 15 of Regulation No 261/2004 appears difficult to reconcile with the purpose of that regulation. Since Article 5(3) of that regulation constitutes an exception to the principle that passengers are entitled to compensation, that exception must be interpreted strictly. To accept that the mere existence of an air traffic management decision is sufficient, as a matter of principle, to pave the way for exemption risks significantly broadening the scope of that exception and thus reducing the practical effect of the right to compensation. However, Regulation No 261/2004 pursues an objective of ensuring a high level of protection for air passengers, which supports a measured and contextualised reading of recital 15 thereof.
45. It should be noted, in that regard, that the Court of Justice did not intend the examples mentioned in recital 14 of Regulation No 261/2004 to be understood as capable, in themselves, of automatically classifying events as ‘extraordinary circumstances’. (32) On the contrary, those examples are merely indicative and must be read in the light of the general criteria established by case-law for the application of Article 5(3) of that regulation. The same must apply to recital 15 of that regulation, which cannot be understood as dispensing with the need to examine the nature or origin of the situation which led to the adoption of the air traffic management decision. (33) Such clarification appears all the more necessary since a broader interpretation of recital 15 thereof has occasionally been relied on in national case-law (34) and in some legal literature in support of a more automatic classification of air traffic management decisions.
46. That interpretation is, moreover, supported by the case-law of the Court of Justice itself. When the Court of Justice is confronted with a flight disruption reflected, at an operational level, in a measure external to the carrier, it tends to assess the existence of extraordinary circumstances by reference to the underlying factual situation rather than by reference solely to the measure that constitutes its immediate consequence. Accordingly, in the context of the closure of airspace following the eruption of the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull, the Court of Justice examined the situation by reference to the natural event at issue and its effects, and not only to the closure measure as such. (35) That approach is also apparent from the judgment in Moens, in which, even though the closure of the runway resulted from a decision by the airport authorities that was binding on the carrier, the Court of Justice took into consideration the presence of fuel on the runway, the fact that it did not originate from the carrier and the fact that runway maintenance was not within that carrier’s competence. (36) Similarly, the judgment in Pešková et Peška also confirms that approach, since the classification as an extraordinary circumstance was assessed by reference to the actual event relied on, namely the collision with a bird, and the security measures taken as a result thereof. (37) That approach seems to me to confirm that, even where an external decision directly affects the performance of the flight, the analysis cannot disregard the factual situation that led to the adoption of that decision.
47. It follows that recital 15 of Regulation No 261/2004 cannot be understood as dispensing with the need to examine the nature or origin of the situation which led to the adoption of the air traffic management decision. Read in conjunction with Article 5(3) of that regulation, it therefore calls for a specific and detailed assessment, rather than a classification of every air traffic management decision in the abstract. It follows, more broadly, that the mere existence of an air traffic management decision cannot, in itself, lead to the conclusion that the event in question is not inherent in the normal exercise of the air carrier’s activity. Depending on the circumstances, such a decision may be no more than the operational consequence of a factual situation stemming either from a genuinely exceptional event or, conversely, from more common constraints which are part of the day-to-day operation of air traffic. It is therefore in the light of the nature and origin of that underlying situation that it is necessary to determine whether the first of the two cumulative conditions is satisfied.
48. An interpretation which attaches decisive importance to the existence of an air traffic management decision appears, moreover, difficult to reconcile with the structure of the burden of proof under Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004. It is for the air carrier to establish not only the existence of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ but also the fact that their consequences could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken. (38) However, the approach adopted by the General Court would have the effect of significantly reducing that burden of proof, since the existence of an air traffic management decision combined with the absence of any contribution by the carrier to the adoption of that decision would, in practice, tend to suffice. The requirement to substantively demonstrate the existence of an extraordinary event would thus risk being replaced by a requirement merely to cite an essentially formal element, namely an external measure affecting the performance of the flight. (39)
49. That first difficulty raises a broader question as to how the judgment under review handles the interplay between the two cumulative conditions established by the case-law of the Court of Justice.
2. The risk of confusion between the two cumulative conditions established by the case-law of the Court of Justice
50. The second aspect of the judgment under review calls for a particularly close examination in so far as it concerns the interplay between the two cumulative conditions that characterise the existence of ‘extraordinary circumstances’, namely, first, that the event in question is not inherent in the normal exercise of the activity of the air carrier concerned and, second, that it is beyond the actual control of that carrier. Those two conditions, as defined in the case-law of the Court of Justice, are based on different rationales and each fulfils a specific function within the scheme of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004. It therefore seems to me to be essential to ensure that the two conditions are kept clearly separate in their implementation. (40)
51. There are serious doubts as to whether the reasoning adopted by the General Court preserves the autonomy of those two conditions in a sufficiently clear manner. The judgment under review appears to attach decisive importance to the fact that an air traffic management decision is issued by a service external to the air carrier and is binding on that carrier. Such a consideration is, without doubt, relevant to the second condition, relating to the event being beyond the carrier’s actual control. (41) However, it is not sufficient in itself to establish that the event in question is not inherent in the normal exercise of the carrier’s activity. The fact that an event is beyond an air carrier’s control does not, in itself, mean that that event, by its nature or origin, falls outside the scope of the normal exercise of its activity.
52. It appears, in that regard, that, by placing such emphasis on the external origin of the air traffic management decision, the General Court in effect makes the first condition dependent, at least in part, on the second. Such an interpretation is problematic. If the intervention of a third party or an external authority were, in practice, sufficient for the event relied on to be regarded as not being inherent in the normal exercise of the carrier’s activity, the first condition would, to a significant extent, cease to function as an independent test. However, the very purpose of that condition is to avoid situations in which every event that is beyond the carrier’s control would automatically be elevated to the status of extraordinary circumstance, even though it may arise from the common constraints that are an inherent part of how air transport operates, and to which all carriers are exposed.
53. Such a development would risk significantly weakening the structure of the case-law test. Many events external to the carrier may arise from the common constraints to which it is exposed in the day-to-day operation of air traffic. The fact that those events originate from an external source does not necessarily mean that, by their nature or origin, they fall outside the scope of the normal exercise of the carrier’s activity. That is why it appears to be necessary to maintain a clear separation between those two criteria: the first condition calls for an assessment of the nature or origin of the situation relied on, while the second concerns the question whether that situation was beyond the air carrier’s actual control. (42)
54. It seems to me, moreover, that the method adopted by the General Court, in effect, blurs the different stages of the examination required under Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004. The identification of the relevant circumstance, the assessment of the non-inherent nature of the event relied on, the question whether it was beyond the carrier’s actual control and, subsequently, the examination of reasonable measures appear, in that approach, to be insufficiently distinguished from one another. Yet the methodology developed by the Court of Justice is based precisely on rigorously assessing those various factors one by one. (43)
55. It is only by maintaining that distinction that the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’, which constitutes an exception to the principle that passengers are entitled to compensation, can continue to be interpreted strictly. If the two conditions were to become conflated, the scope of the exemption available to the carrier could expand considerably, undermining the consistency of the methodology developed by the Court of Justice and, more generally, the balance of the scheme established by Regulation No 261/2004.
56. That conflation is particularly evident from the importance that the General Court attaches to the reason which led to the adoption of the air traffic management decision.
3. Inadequate consideration of the reason for the air traffic management decision
57. The third aspect of the judgment under review calls for careful examination in so far as it concerns the importance which the General Court attaches to the reason for the adoption of the air traffic management decision. The judgment under review appears, on this point, to attach decisive importance to the decision itself, irrespective of the reason for it. Such reasoning appears problematic in that it risks downplaying a factor which, far from being ancillary, may, on the contrary, prove decisive in assessing whether or not the situation at issue is extraordinary.
58. Such an approach gives rise, in that regard, to serious reservations. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the reason for the air traffic management decision could be treated as wholly irrelevant to the assessment of whether the situation at issue is extraordinary. Depending on whether that decision stems from an exceptional natural event, a serious security risk, meteorological conditions incompatible with the operation of the flight concerned or, conversely, a more common constraint which is part of day-to-day air traffic management, the assessment of the nature or origin of the event may vary considerably. It is precisely the nature or origin of that event which makes it possible to determine whether or not it is an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004.
59. To treat, as a matter of principle, the reason for the air traffic management decision as having no decisive relevance would amount to equating situations that are not, in fact, comparable either in severity or in significance for the purposes of that provision. A decision adopted as a result of a volcanic eruption, the exceptional closure of airspace or particularly severe meteorological conditions cannot, without further examination, be equated with a decision dictated by more common air traffic control constraints. (44) If the reason for the decision is not given adequate consideration, the analysis might focus exclusively on the external form of the intervention, while disregarding the true nature of the event relied on.
60. It should be noted, in that regard, that not all air traffic management decisions stem from situations of an extraordinary nature. Some may result from common constraints inherent in the air transport system, such as traffic congestion, routine capacity adjustments or other commonplace operational restrictions. Others may, by contrast, originate from genuinely exceptional circumstances, such as extreme weather conditions or particular security risks. If the reason for the decision were to be regarded as having no decisive relevance, as the judgment under review appears to accept in the application of the two cumulative conditions, it would no longer be possible to draw a satisfactory distinction between those different scenarios. Yet it is precisely such a distinction which appears to be essential for the application of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004.
61. Such inadequate consideration of the reason for the decision also appears difficult to reconcile with the purpose of Regulation No 261/2004. The Court of Justice has, indeed, repeatedly pointed out, relying in particular on recital 1 in the preamble to that regulation, that the aim of that regulation is to ensure a high level of protection for air passengers. (45) Since Article 5(3) of that regulation constitutes an exception to the principle that passengers are entitled to compensation, that provision cannot be understood as permitting the carrier to be too easily exempted from the obligation to pay compensation, solely on the basis of a decision which is formally external to the carrier, without the actual cause which led to the adoption of that decision being substantively demonstrated. Such an approach would have the effect of increasing the scope of the exemption provided for in that provision and of correspondingly reducing the scope of the protection afforded to passengers.
62. It follows that the assessment of whether an air traffic management decision is extraordinary cannot be dissociated from the circumstances that led to its adoption. The reason for that decision constitutes a relevant, indeed necessary, factor in that assessment, since it is precisely what makes it possible to determine whether or not the underlying situation is inherent in the normal exercise of the air carrier’s activity. It is therefore in the light of those circumstances, and not merely of the existence of the decision issued by a service external to the carrier, that it is necessary to determine whether the conditions laid down by the case-law are satisfied. (46)
63. Lastly, those considerations call for an examination of the broader scope of the General Court’s interpretation in the scheme of Regulation No 261/2004.
4. The scope of the interpretation in the general scheme of Regulation No 261/2004
64. The doubts that have arisen from the judgment under review cannot be assessed independently of the general scheme of Regulation No 261/2004. Article 5(3) of that regulation is not a stand-alone provision, but the exemption clause limiting the compensation obligation laid down in Article 7 of that regulation. The interpretation of the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ is therefore not without effect on the overall architecture of the system established by that regulation. This is a factor which must be taken into account in the examination of the judgment under review.
65. It is, moreover, necessary to avoid a situation in which, precisely because air transport is subject to extensive external regulation, air carriers are granted, de facto, a more extensive right of exemption than that which follows from the exception laid down in Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004. The fact that the operation of air transport necessarily takes place within an environment heavily coordinated by external authorities cannot, by itself, justify an extension of the category of ‘extraordinary circumstances’. To accept the contrary would mean allowing that sector to bear a lighter burden than that which the exception actually entails, even though that burden must be maintained strictly in the light of the regulation’s objective of passenger protection.
66. That conclusion is, moreover, borne out on a systemic level. In other passenger transport sectors, notably rail transport and sea and inland waterway transport, EU law also has protection and compensation mechanisms with exceptions that must be interpreted strictly. It would, therefore, be difficult to justify allowing the mere fact that air transport is subject to extensive external regulation to result, in itself, in an extension of the scope of the exception provided for in Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004. (47)
67. That consideration is all the more important since the compensation obligation is one of the fundamental elements of the system of protection which the EU legislature has established for air passengers. It follows that the interpretation of the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ has a direct effect on the practical scope of the right to compensation and, therefore, on the overall balance of the system established by Regulation No 261/2004. If the interpretation of Article 5(3) of that regulation were to lead to air traffic management decisions being too readily recognised as ‘extraordinary circumstances’, that would significantly broaden the scope of the exemption available to the air carrier (48) and thus afford that sector more favourable treatment than that established, in essence, by other passenger protection regimes established by EU law.
68. Such a development would risk upsetting the balance which the EU legislature sought to strike between passenger protection and the grounds for exemption available to the carrier. The difficulties raised by the judgment under review are not, therefore, limited to an isolated question of legal classification. They concern, more broadly, the way in which the overall consistency of the system established by Regulation No 261/2004 must be preserved when interpreting Article 5(3) of that regulation. It is also in the light of that requirement that the compatibility of the approach adopted by the General Court with EU law must be assessed.
5. Interim conclusion
69. Beyond the diversity of the issues examined, the foregoing analysis points to two main sets of errors of law. While the General Court neither stated that every air traffic management decision automatically constitutes an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ nor overlooked the possibility that the carrier may have contributed to the taking of such a decision, the fact remains that the judgment under review is affected by an internal inconsistency in its method of analysis. Indeed, even though it expressly rejects the automatic classification approach, the General Court partially applies that same logic by treating the air traffic management decision itself as the legally relevant circumstance.
70. The first error thus concerns the identification of the relevant circumstance for the purposes of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004, since the General Court essentially substituted the air traffic management decision for the factual situation that gave rise to the disruption, even though the decision was merely the immediate operational reflection of that situation. The second error concerns the application of the methodology developed by the Court of Justice for the interpretation of that provision, in that the judgment under review, in effect, blurs the different stages of the examination required and weakens the interplay between the two cumulative conditions relating to extraordinary circumstances. Those two main errors are, moreover, incompatible with the methodology developed by the Court of Justice in that they lead to giving inadequate consideration to the reason for the decision at issue and have a bearing on the scope of the interpretation adopted, within the general scheme of that regulation.
71. It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the judgment under review does not merely raise several serious problems as regards how the General Court interpreted the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004. The approach adopted by the General Court appears, in several closely related respects, to be incompatible with the methodology developed by the Court of Justice for the application of that provision.
D. Whether the unity or consistency of EU law is affected
1. Proposed assessment criteria applicable in the context of the present review
72. Having identified the errors of law affecting the judgment under review, it is necessary to examine whether those errors are sufficiently serious to affect the unity or consistency of EU law. That assessment is an autonomous step in the analysis, distinct from the mere finding of an error of law. Indeed, in the context of the present review, the mere finding of such an error cannot suffice to justify the intervention of the Court of Justice. The scope of the General Court’s interpretation must also be likely to affect, beyond the main proceedings alone, the uniform application or overall consistency of EU law.
73. In that regard, it should first be noted that the review mechanism provided for in the third subparagraph of Article 256(3) TFEU is set out, as regards its purpose, in terms very similar to those of the review mechanism provided for in Article 256(2) TFEU. That similarity of wording reflects, more fundamentally, the analogous function performed by those two mechanisms in the judicial architecture of the European Union, in that both are intended to enable the Court of Justice to intervene where necessary in order to preserve the unity and consistency of EU law. It should therefore be borne in mind that a review should be conducted as an exception, and is not intended to correct every error of law, but only those the scope of which is likely to affect the unity or consistency of EU law.
74. The case-law developed in connection with the mechanism provided for in Article 256(2) TFEU therefore remains clearly relevant for the purposes of interpreting the present review mechanism. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, while the provisions relating to the review mechanisms provided for in Article 256(2) and (3) TFEU do not contain a precise definition of the concepts of ‘unity’ and ‘consistency’ of EU law, that case-law requires instead an assessment based on a range of factors, without it being necessary to make a clear-cut distinction between those two concepts. Those factors relate, in particular, to the seriousness and scope of the errors of law identified, their capacity to produce effects beyond the dispute in question and the importance, in the EU legal order, of the rule, principle or method at issue.
75. Thus, in the context of the review mechanism provided for in Article 256(2) TFEU, and in relation to judgments of the General Court delivered on appeal in proceedings relating to the EU civil service, the Court of Justice has, in essence, adopted four main assessment criteria to determine whether the unity or consistency of EU law is affected. First, the judgment of the General Court must be capable of constituting a precedent for future cases; secondly, the General Court must have departed from the settled case-law of the Court of Justice; thirdly, the General Court’s errors must concern a concept which does not pertain solely to the law relating to the employment of EU officials but is applicable regardless of the subject matter of the case; and fourthly, the rules or principles which the General Court has failed to comply with must occupy an important position in the EU legal order. (49) Those criteria have since been consistently adopted and applied by Advocates General in several cases. (50)
76. That said, those criteria cannot simply be carried over unchanged to the present review. On the contrary, those criteria must be adapted to the particular nature of the review mechanism provided for in the third subparagraph of Article 256(3) TFEU. The specific nature of that review mechanism lies, first, in the fact that it concerns judgments given by the General Court in the exercise of the jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings transferred to it, in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 256(3) TFEU, under the procedure referred to in Article 267 TFEU. It lies, secondly, in the fact that that mechanism forms part of a renewed judicial context, in which the General Court has had a number of specific areas of EU law transferred to it, and no longer has just one specialised area of litigation. (51) Unlike judgments given on appeal, such judgments are not confined to the parties to the dispute at issue, but produce effects beyond that dispute as regards the interpretation and application of EU law by national courts.
77. It is precisely on that point that it differs from the review mechanism provided for in Article 256(2) TFEU. While judgments given by the General Court on appeal are principally concerned with reviewing a decision already adopted in the course of contentious proceedings between parties, the preliminary ruling procedure has, by its nature, the object of securing uniform interpretation of EU law across all the Member States. (52) Consequently, an error of law affecting a preliminary ruling of the General Court is more readily capable of producing effects beyond the dispute in the main proceedings alone and of influencing the future practice of national courts.
78. It follows that, in the context of the third subparagraph of Article 256(3) TFEU, the assessment of whether the unity or consistency of EU law is affected must attach particular importance to whether the judgment of the General Court could exercise a significant guiding influence within the transferred area of law, to whether it departs from the settled case-law of the Court of Justice or from the methods of interpretation which it has established, to whether it concerns a concept, criterion or method that is fundamental to the transferred area of law, and to whether it affects a rule, principle or normative balance that occupies an important position in the EU legal order.
79. In that regard, it is necessary to clarify the scope of the criterion relating to the existence of a departure from the settled case-law of the Court of Justice or from the methods of interpretation which it has established. That criterion cannot be understood as making the finding that the unity or consistency of EU law is affected dependent, in every case, on the identification of a directly applicable precedent from which the judgment under review is claimed to have departed. Indeed, while the existence of a substantial body of case-law in the areas concerned constituted one of the factors justifying the partial transfer of the jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings to the General Court, (53) it cannot be ruled out that new questions may arise in those areas, or that, on a particular point, there is no case-law of the Court of Justice that is capable of directly guiding the General Court. In such a situation, it is important to verify whether the reasoning adopted by the General Court remains compatible both with the methods of interpretation established by the Court of Justice and with the general scheme of EU law.
80. Those criteria must be assessed as a whole. They are not cumulative in nature, so it is not necessary for all of them to be satisfied in order to find that the unity or consistency of EU law is affected. (54) Their function is to inform the assessment, carried out by the Court of Justice, of the seriousness and scope of the errors of law identified in the judgment under review. It is in the light of those criteria that it is necessary to examine, in the following points, whether the errors of law affecting the judgment of the General Court are such as to affect the unity or consistency of EU law.
2. Application of the proposed criteria to this review
(a) Whether the judgment of the General Court is capable of exercising a significant guiding influence within the transferred area of law
81. The first criterion relates to whether the General Court’s judgment is capable of exercising a significant guiding influence within the transferred area of law. That criterion is satisfied in the present case. (55) The judgment under review does not confine itself to providing an answer closely tied to the specific circumstances of the dispute in the main proceedings, but adopts a general analytical framework for how air traffic management decisions are to be approached in the light of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004. It thus affects more than just the outcome of the present case and may influence, within the transferred area of law, the way in which the analysis of the extraordinary nature of a flight disruption is carried out.
82. That judgment’s capacity to exercise a guiding influence stems from the very subject matter of the interpretation adopted. The judgment under review does not concern a minor aspect of the system established by Regulation No 261/2004, but rather the method to be followed in order to classify, in the light of Article 5(3) thereof, a category of situations likely to arise regularly in air transport, namely those in which the performance of the flight is affected by an air traffic management decision. Since the question being asked is whether such a decision can, in itself and irrespective of the basis for that decision, be regarded as an ‘extraordinary circumstance’, the judgment under review is capable of serving as a methodological point of reference for a potentially significant number of future cases.
83. That guiding influence appears to be reinforced by the very nature of the reference for a preliminary ruling. (56) The interpretation given by the General Court is intended to guide the application of EU law by national courts called upon to rule on similar questions. Given that the criterion of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ is so frequently invoked, the method of analysis adopted by the EU judicature necessarily exerts significant guiding force, particularly since the judgment under review appears to lay down a position of principle capable of being applied in other disputes falling within the transferred area of law.
84. In those circumstances, the first criterion must be regarded as satisfied.
(b) Whether the judgment of the General Court departs from the settled case-law of the Court of Justice or from the methods of interpretation which it has established
85. The second criterion concerns whether the judgment of the General Court departs from the settled case-law of the Court of Justice or from the methods of interpretation which it has established. That criterion is also satisfied in the present case. As is apparent from the foregoing analysis, the judgment under review does not merely apply the case-law of the Court of Justice in a questionable manner, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, but adopts an approach which departs from that case-law on several essential points, which must now be examined in more detail.
86. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the General Court neither stated that every air traffic management decision automatically constitutes an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ nor overlooked the possibility that the carrier may have contributed to the taking of such a decision. Those clarifications do not, however, dispel the methodological error affecting the judgment under review.
87. In the first place, that approach departs from the method followed by the Court of Justice in that, in effect, it substitutes the air traffic management decision alone for the examination of the factual situation that gave rise to the disruption, even though the decision was merely the operational reflection of that situation. The General Court’s error therefore lies in the fact that, even though it expressly rejects the automatic classification approach, it partially applies that same logic by treating the decision itself, rather than the factual situation underlying it, as the circumstance that is legally relevant for the purposes of applying Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004. (57) However, the case-law of the Court of Justice relating to that provision turns on identifying the nature and origin of the event relied on in order to determine whether it is not inherent in the normal exercise of the air carrier’s activity and whether it is beyond that carrier’s actual control. (58)
88. In the second place, the judgment under review, in effect, blurs the distinction between the two cumulative conditions relating to ‘extraordinary circumstances’. (59) By focusing, above all, on the external nature of the air traffic management decision and on the fact that it is binding on the carrier, the General Court allows factors that relate primarily to the second condition – concerning the carrier’s lack of actual control – to affect the assessment of the first condition, concerning the non-inherent nature of the event. Such an approach departs from the methodology developed by the Court of Justice, which is based on rigorously assessing those various factors one by one. (60)
89. In the third place, the judgment under review gives inadequate consideration to the reason for the adoption of the air traffic management decision. (61) While the General Court does not entirely exclude the relevance of the circumstances surrounding that decision, it nevertheless, in effect, sidelines the nature and origin of the underlying situation when applying the two cumulative conditions. However, Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, specifically requires an examination of the nature and origin of the event relied on. By making the external decision alone the central focus of the analysis, the judgment under review, in effect, collapses the distinction between situations which, depending on their specific cause, may arise either from common constraints of air transport or from genuinely extraordinary circumstances.
90. It follows from the foregoing that the judgment under review does not merely depart from the case-law of the Court of Justice on an isolated point, but calls into question, in several converging aspects, the method of analysis which the Court of Justice has established for the application of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004. It can therefore be considered that the second criterion is also satisfied
(c) Whether the judgment of the General Court concerns a concept, criterion or method that is fundamental to the transferred area of law
91. The third criterion concerns whether the concept, criterion or method at issue is fundamental to the transferred area of law. That criterion is also satisfied in the present case. The judgment under review does not concern a marginal concept or an ancillary aspect of the system established by Regulation No 261/2004, but the very determination of the conditions under which an air carrier may be exempted from the obligation to pay compensation by relying on the existence of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of that regulation.
92. The method of analysis applicable to that concept is evidently fundamental. It defines, at the outset, the entire reasoning which the courts called upon to apply that regulation will have to follow in order to identify the relevant event, to distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary situations, to handle the interplay between the two cumulative conditions relating to ‘extraordinary circumstances’ and to assess, where appropriate, the significance of external decisions affecting the performance of the flight. Therefore, the issue at hand does not concern a secondary element of the system established by Regulation No 261/2004, but the very framework within which that system is to be applied by the courts in litigation which is likely to arise repeatedly.
93. That fundamental dimension is all the more apparent given that the distinction between common constraints of air transport and genuinely extraordinary circumstances is of essential importance for the application of the system provided for by that regulation. A judgment that alters, even implicitly, the way in which that distinction is drawn necessarily affects a fundamental element of the area of law concerned.
94. It follows that the third criterion must also be regarded as satisfied.
(d) Whether the judgment of the General Court affects a rule, principle or normative balance that occupies an important position in the EU legal order
95. The fourth criterion concerns the important position occupied, in the EU legal order, by the rule, principle or normative balance affected by the judgment under review. That criterion is also satisfied in the present case. The interpretation at issue concerns Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004, a provision that determines the conditions under which the air carrier may be exempted from the obligation to pay compensation laid down in Article 7 of that regulation.
96. That provision is central to the scheme of Regulation No 261/2004. According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, that regulation establishes that passengers have a right to flat-rate and standardised compensation in the event of cancellation or long delay in arrival, and Article 5(3) is merely a derogation from that principle which must be interpreted strictly. (62) That provision is not confined to governing a secondary aspect of the system established by that instrument, but actually determines where the limit of the obligation to pay compensation lies and, therefore, draws the dividing line between the protection afforded to passengers and the grounds for exemption available to the carrier. The interpretation of Article 5(3) of that regulation thus has a direct effect on the normative balance sought by the EU legislature between ensuring a high level of protection for air passengers and taking into account genuinely exceptional circumstances capable of justifying an exemption.
97. Moreover, the judgment under review not only affects a particular provision but, through its interpretation of that provision, touches on methodological principles which themselves occupy an important position in the EU legal order. The matters at issue here are, in particular, the strict interpretation of derogations from a system of protection, the correct identification of the legally relevant event and compliance with the method of analysis developed by the Court of Justice for the application of an autonomous concept of EU law. Consequently, the impact of the judgment under review cannot be measured solely by reference to the provision applied, but must also be assessed in the light of the methodological and normative balance that it is liable to affect.
98. That conclusion is all the more compelling since the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ lies at the heart of a considerable body of litigation liable to arise in a significant number of concrete situations. A shift in the interpretation of that provision, especially where that shift entails the adoption of an essentially formal approach resulting in an expansion of the scope of the exemption available to the carrier, may thus have significant effects on the future application of Regulation No 261/2004.
99. It follows that the fourth criterion must also be regarded as satisfied.
3. Interim conclusion
100. It follows from the application of the foregoing criteria that the errors of law affecting the judgment under review are, in the present case, sufficiently serious to affect the unity or consistency of EU law. The judgment of the General Court exercises a significant guiding influence in the transferred area of law, departs from the case-law of the Court of Justice and from the methods of interpretation which it has established, concerns a method that is fundamental to the area of law concerned and affects a normative balance which is central to the scheme of Regulation No 261/2004.
101. In those circumstances, it must be held that the conditions required to justify the intervention of the Court of Justice in the present review are satisfied.
E. Conclusions to be drawn from the present review
102. Since it must be held that the judgment under review is such as to affect the unity and consistency of EU law, it is necessary to draw the appropriate conclusions from that judgment. In accordance with the second paragraph of Article 62b of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the answers given by the Court of Justice to the questions subject to review are to be substituted for those given by the General Court, without there being any provision for referral back to the General Court under the mechanism provided for in Article 256(3) TFEU. It is therefore appropriate to propose to the Court of Justice the answers which should be substituted for those given by the General Court to the questions submitted by the referring court.
1. The answers to be substituted for those of the General Court
(a) The first and second questions
103. It is necessary, in the first place, to determine the answer to be given to the first and second questions referred for a preliminary ruling, which constitute, in essence, the subject matter of the present review. Those questions should be answered together. They concern, in essence, whether an air traffic management decision may, as such and irrespective of the basis for that decision, be regarded as an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004. As is apparent from the foregoing analysis, that question cannot be answered without having regard to the factual situation that gave rise to such a decision.
104. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, under Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004, the cancellation or long delay must be caused by ‘extraordinary circumstances’. According to the wording of that provision, it is necessary to identify the actual event or situation that gave rise to the disruption, rather than stopping at the administrative or operational measure through which that disruption is reflected in the performance of the flight. An air traffic management decision is, in most cases, the operational consequence of a given situation. Therefore, the mere fact that a decision is external to the carrier is not sufficient to establish that that decision falls, in itself, within the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’.
105. It follows that such a decision can be taken into consideration under Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004 only if the reason which led to its adoption and, more broadly, the nature and origin of the underlying situation are examined. It is in the light of that situation that it is necessary to determine whether the event relied on is not inherent in the normal exercise of the air carrier’s activity and whether it is beyond that carrier’s actual control.
106. The answer to the first and second questions is therefore that Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004 must be interpreted as meaning that an air traffic management decision cannot, as such and irrespective of the basis for that decision, be regarded as an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ within the meaning of that provision. Such a decision may be taken into consideration for the purposes of applying that provision only in so far as it constitutes the operational reflection of a situation the nature and origin of which must be assessed by the referring court in order to determine whether it is not inherent in the normal exercise of the activity of the air carrier concerned and whether it is beyond that carrier’s actual control.
(b) The third and fourth questions
107. In the second place, it is important to determine the answer to be given to the third and fourth questions referred for a preliminary ruling. Those questions concern, in essence, whether an air traffic management decision which affected a previous flight may be taken into consideration in respect of a subsequent flight operated by the same air carrier using the same aircraft and, if so, under what conditions.
108. In that regard, it should be recalled that the Court of Justice has held that in order to be exempted from its obligation to compensate passengers, an air carrier may rely on an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ which affected a previous flight which it operated using the same aircraft, provided that there is a direct causal link between the occurrence of that circumstance and the long delay or cancellation of the subsequent flight, which is for the referring court to determine, having regard in particular to the conditions of operation of the aircraft in question. It is thus apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ need not necessarily have directly affected the flight at issue, provided that it continues to produce its effects in the context of the operation of the same aircraft. (63)
109. The General Court was therefore right to refer, in principle, to that case-law. However, the answer to be given to the third and fourth questions must be clarified in the light of the answer to the first and second questions. Indeed, an air traffic management decision that affected a previous flight cannot be taken into account in relation to a subsequent flight merely because it concerned a previous flight in the same rotation operated using the same aircraft. It is also necessary, as a prior condition, for that decision to constitute an operational reflection of a situation which has been established, in the light of its nature and origin, to fall within the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004.
110. Moreover, the existence of a direct causal link between that situation and the long delay or cancellation of the subsequent flight cannot be presumed. It is for the referring court to assess, in the light of all the relevant circumstances, whether the initial disruption did in fact continue to produce its effects on the flight concerned. To that end, it is necessary to take into account, in particular, the conditions of operation of the aircraft in question, the actual rotation sequence, the period of time between the flights at issue and the question whether the air carrier had, in the circumstances of the particular case, sufficient leeway to limit the effects of the initial disruption by means of the reasonable measures that it could be required to take. (64)
111. The answer to the third and fourth questions is therefore that Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004 must be interpreted as meaning that an air carrier may rely, in respect of a subsequent flight, on an air traffic management decision that affected a previous flight which it operated using the same aircraft, provided that that decision constitutes the operational reflection of a situation which, in the light of its nature and origin, falls within the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’, and that there is a direct causal link between that situation and the long delay or cancellation of the subsequent flight, which it is for the referring court to assess in the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account, inter alia, the conditions of operation of the aircraft in question.
V. Conclusion
112. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, it is appropriate to propose that the Court of Justice rule that the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 21 January 2026 in D (Air traffic management decision) (T‑134/25, EU:T:2026:35) under review affects the unity and consistency of EU law and to substitute the answers given by the General Court with the following answers:
Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 must be interpreted as meaning that:
– an air traffic management decision cannot, as such and irrespective of the basis for that decision, be regarded as an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ within the meaning of that provision. Such a decision may be taken into consideration for the purposes of applying that provision only in so far as it constitutes the operational reflection of a situation the nature and origin of which must be assessed by the referring court in order to determine whether it is not inherent in the normal exercise of the activity of the air carrier concerned and whether it is beyond that carrier’s actual control;
– an air carrier may rely, in respect of a subsequent flight, on an air traffic management decision that affected a previous flight which it operated using the same aircraft, provided that that decision constitutes the operational reflection of a situation which, in the light of its nature and origin, falls within the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’, and that there is a direct causal link between that situation and the long delay or cancellation of the subsequent flight, which it is for the national court to assess in the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account, inter alia, the conditions of operation of the aircraft in question.
1 Original language: French.
2 OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1.
3 Paragraph 41 and paragraph 1 of the operative part of the judgment under review.
4 Paragraphs 17 to 25 of the judgment under review.
5 Paragraphs 28 and 29 of the judgment under review.
6 Paragraphs 33 to 36 of the judgment under review.
7 Paragraph 40 of the judgment under review.
8 Paragraphs 42 to 45 of the judgment under review.
9 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2019 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (OJ L, 2024/2019) provided for the partial transfer of jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings from the Court of Justice to the General Court. That transfer covers six specific areas, namely the common system of value added tax, excise duties, the Customs Code, the tariff classification of goods under the Combined Nomenclature, compensation and assistance of passengers in the event of denied boarding or of delay or cancellation of transport services and the system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading.
10 See point 35 et seq. of this Opinion.
11 See point 72 et seq. of this Opinion.
12 See point 102 et seq. of this Opinion.
13 See judgment of 22 December 2008, Wallentin-Hermann (C‑549/07, ‘the judgment in Wallentin-Hermann’, EU:C:2008:771, paragraphs 17 to 23).
14 See the judgments in Wallentin-Hermann (paragraph 23); of 23 March 2021, Airhelp (C‑28/20, ‘the judgment in Airhelp’, EU:C:2021:226, paragraphs 23 and 24); and of 13 June 2024, D. (Engine design defect) (C‑411/23, EU:C:2024:498, paragraph 27).
15 See the judgments in Wallentin-Hermann (paragraphs 23 to 26); of 4 April 2019, Germanwings (C‑501/17, EU:C:2019:288, paragraph 22); and of 13 June 2024, D. (Engine design defect) (C‑411/23, EU:C:2024:498, paragraphs 31 and 32).
16 See judgments of 4 May 2017, Pešková and Peška (C‑315/15, EU:C:2017:342, paragraphs 23 and 24), and of 31 January 2013, McDonagh (C‑12/11, EU:C:2013:43, paragraphs 29 to 34).
17 See the judgments in Airhelp (paragraphs 31 and 39 to 41), and of 7 July 2022, SATA International – Azores Airlines (Failure of the refuelling system) (C‑308/21, EU:C:2022:533, paragraph 25).
18 See the judgment in Wallentin-Hermann (paragraphs 39 to 41).
19 See judgment of 4 May 2017, Pešková and Peška (C‑315/15, EU:C:2017:342, paragraph 54).
20 See judgment of 31 January 2013, McDonagh (C‑12/11, EU:C:2013:43, paragraphs 38 to 44).
21 See the judgments in Wallentin-Hermann (paragraph 23), and in Airhelp (paragraphs 23, 24 and 31 to 45).
22 See, to that effect, Schmid, R., in: BeckOK Fluggastrechte-VO, 38th ed., Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004, paragraph 176, according to which the classification of measures taken by air traffic control services as ‘extraordinary circumstances’ must always be assessed on a case-by-case basis. According to that author, recitals 14 and 15 provide only a general guide, so the court seised must be able to ascertain and assess the specific reasons which led to the air traffic management decision. The wide variety of reasons that may form the basis of such measures thus precludes any general answer to the question whether they constitute ‘extraordinary circumstances’.
23 See the judgments in Wallentin-Hermann (paragraphs 23 to 26), and of 26 June 2019, Moens (C‑159/18, EU:C:2019:535, paragraphs 17 to 20).
24 See, in that regard, Opinion of Advocate General Pikamäe in Airhelp (C‑28/20, EU:C:2021:203, point 140).
25 See also, in an indicative sense, the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations Nos 261/2004 and 2027/97, finally adopted by the Council on 13 July 2026 (PE-CONS 39/1/26 REV 1). That regulation introduces an explicit definition, in Article 2(r) of Regulation No 261/2004, of the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’, which includes the two cumulative criteria arising from the established case-law of the Court. It also provides a non-exhaustive list of such circumstances which, as regards air traffic management, refers to restrictions connected with such management, provided that the event arises from a decision that is beyond the actual control of the operating air carrier (Annex I, point 3(d)). It should be pointed out that in the Commission’s initial proposal (COM(2013) 130 final), air traffic management restrictions were included in the list of circumstances considered as extraordinary circumstances without that category being accompanied as such, in the annex, by such a specific condition. The fact that the wording developed in such a manner thus tends to confirm that an air traffic management decision alone is not sufficient to amount to an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ and that it is necessary to carry out a concrete assessment of whether the required conditions in relation thereto are met. That regulation is not applicable ratione temporis to the main proceedings.
26 See, to that effect, Bischof, C., ‘Slot Postponements as Extraordinary Circumstances of EU261’, Air and Space Law, 2023, Vol. 48, No 1, p. 85.
27 See the judgment in Airhelp (paragraphs 23, 24 and 31 to 45).
28 See the judgments in Wallentin-Hermann (paragraph 23), and in Airhelp (paragraphs 36 to 41).
29 See by analogy judgment of 26 June 2019, Moens (C‑159/18, EU:C:2019:535, paragraphs 18 to 20).
30 See judgments of 10 January 2006, IATA and ELFAA (C‑344/04, EU:C:2006:10, paragraph 76), and of 17 April 2018, Krüsemann and Others (C‑195/17, C‑197/17 to C‑203/17, C‑226/17, C‑228/17, C‑254/17, C‑274/17, C‑275/17, C‑278/17 to C‑286/17 and C‑290/17 to C‑292/17, EU:C:2018:258, paragraph 34).
31 See the judgments in Wallentin-Hermann (paragraph 23), and in Airhelp (paragraphs 23, 24 and 36 to 41).
32 See judgment of 17 April 2018, Krüsemann and Others (C‑195/17, C‑197/17 to C‑203/17, C‑226/17, C‑228/17, C‑254/17, C‑274/17, C‑275/17, C‑278/17 to C‑286/17 and C‑290/17 to C‑292/17, EU:C:2018:258, paragraph 34).
33 See, to that effect, Markova, P., ‘Consumer Protection while Travelling – Enforcement of Air Passenger Rights during “Extraordinary Circumstances” in Light of Regulation (EC) No261/2004’, Journal of European Consumer and Market Law, 2019, Vol. 8, No 3, p. 115; Pantazi, T., ‘“I Know that I Know Nothing”: Extraordinary Circumstances in Air Passenger Rights Regulation’, European Review of Private Law, 2020, Vol. 28, No 5, p. 1096 et seq..
34 See, for example, judgment of the Court of Appeal (England and Wales), 6 February 2019, Blanche v easyJet Airline Company Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 69, which adopted an interpretation of recital 15 of Regulation No 261/2004 in favour of classifying an air traffic management decision as an ‘extraordinary circumstance’.
35 See judgment of 31 January 2013, McDonagh (C‑12/11, EU:C:2013:43, paragraphs 29 to 34).
36 Judgment of 26 June 2019, Moens (C‑159/18, EU:C:2019:535, paragraphs 17 to 20).
37 See judgment of 4 May 2017, Pešková and Peška (C‑315/15, EU:C:2017:342, paragraphs 23 to 24).
38 Blankenburg, D., ‘10 Jahre Art. 5 Abs. 3 VO (EG) Nr. 261/2004 – bisherige und aktuelle Probleme im Rahmen der außergewöhnlichen Umstände’, ReiseRecht aktuell, 2015, p. 175, observes that, in the light of the burden of allegation, it is for the air carrier to set out precisely what extraordinary circumstances actually occurred. In that regard, merely referring to an air traffic control instruction or decision cannot suffice.
39 See the judgments in Wallentin-Hermann (paragraphs 39 to 41), and of 4 May 2017, Pešková and Peška (C‑315/15, EU:C:2017:342, paragraph 54).
40 See the judgments in Wallentin-Hermann (paragraph 23); in Airhelp (paragraphs 23 and 24); and of 13 June 2024, D. (Engine design defect) (C‑411/23, EU:C:2024:498, paragraphs 27 and 28).
41 See the judgment in Airhelp (paragraphs 31 to 45).
42 See the judgment in Airhelp (paragraphs 23, 24 and 36 to 41).
43 See the judgments in Wallentin-Hermann (paragraphs 22, 23 and 40); of 4 May 2017 in Pešková and Peška (C‑315/15, EU:C:2017:342, paragraph 54); and in Airhelp (paragraphs 23 and 24).
44 See judgments of 31 January 2013, McDonagh (C‑12/11, EU:C:2013:43, paragraphs 29 to 34), and of 4 May 2017, Pešková and Peška (C‑315/15, EU:C:2017:342, paragraphs 23 and 24).
45 See judgments of 4 October 2012, Finnair (C‑22/11, EU:C:2012:604, paragraph 23), and of 13 June 2024, D. (Engine design defect) (C‑411/23, EU:C:2024:498, paragraphs 26 and 41). See also my Opinion in Verein für Konsumenteninformation (Commission collected by an intermediary) (C‑45/24, EU:C:2025:468, point 35).
46 See the judgments in Wallentin-Hermann (paragraph 23); in Airhelp (paragraphs 23, 24 and 36 to 41); and of 17 April 2018, Krüsemann and Others (C‑195/17, C‑197/17 to C‑203/17, C‑226/17, C‑228/17, C‑254/17, C‑274/17, C‑275/17, C‑278/17 to C‑286/17 and C‑290/17 to C‑292/17, EU:C:2018:258, paragraph 34).
47 See, as regards rail transport, Regulation (EU) 2021/782 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 on rail passengers’ rights and obligations (OJ 2021 L 172, p. 1), in particular Article 19(1) and (10) thereof, and, as regards sea and inland waterway transport, Regulation (EU) No 1177/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 concerning the rights of passengers when travelling by sea and inland waterway and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 (OJ 2010 L 334, p. 1), in particular Articles 19 and 20(4) thereof.
48 Delpech, X., ‘Retard de vol: une décision relative à la gestion du trafic aérien est susceptible de constituer une “circonstance extraordinaire”’, Dalloz actualité, 10 February 2026, rightly observes that the judgment under review is favourable to the air carrier.
49 See judgments of 17 December 2009, Review of M v EMEA (C‑197/09 RX-II, EU:C:2009:804, paragraphs 62 to 65); of 28 February 2013, Review of Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB (C‑334/12 RX-II, EU:C:2013:134, paragraphs 50 to 53); and of 26 March 2020, Review of Simpson v Council and HG v Commission (C‑542/18 RX-II and C‑543/18 RX-II, EU:C:2020:232, paragraphs 84 to 90).
50 See View of Advocate General Mengozzi in Review of Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB (C‑334/12 RX-II, EU:C:2012:733, points 69 to 76); View of Advocate General Kokott in Review of Commission v Strack (C‑579/12 RX-II, EU:C:2013:573, point 58); View of Advocate General Wathelet in Review of Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission (C‑417/14 RX-II, EU:C:2015:593, point 54); and Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Review of Simpson v Council and HG v Commission (C‑542/18 RX-II and C‑543/18 RX-II, EU:C:2019:977, point 144).
51 See point 22 of this Opinion.
52 See, to that effect, Opinion 2/13 (Accession of the EU to the ECHR) of 18 December 2014 (EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 176), and judgments of 6 March 2018, Achmea (C‑284/16, EU:C:2018:158, paragraph 37); of 6 October 2021, Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi (C‑561/19, EU:C:2021:799, paragraph 27); and of 15 October 2024, KUBERA (C‑144/23, EU:C:2024:881, paragraph 35).
53 See recital 6 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2019 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (OJ L, 2024/2019).
54 See, concerning the review mechanism provided for in Article 256(2) TFEU, judgments of 28 February 2013, Review of Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB (C‑334/12 RX-II, EU:C:2013:134, paragraphs 50 to 54); of 19 September 2013, Review of Commission v Strack (C‑579/12 RX-II, EU:C:2013:570, paragraph 58); and of 10 September 2015, Review of Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission (C‑417/14 RX-II, EU:C:2015:588, paragraph 57).
55 Heger, A., ‘Fluggastrechte: Entbindung von Ausgleichszahlungspflicht aufgrund Zuweisung verspäteter Zeitnische’, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 2026, p. 306; Delpech, X., ‘Retard de vol: une décision relative à la gestion du trafic aérien est susceptible de constituer une “circonstance extraordinaire”’, Dalloz actualité, 10 February 2026. According to the authors, the judgment under review is of considerable practical importance as regards air traffic management measures imposed on account of weather conditions. They state that the judgment further clarifies the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ and provides an answer to a question of law which has long been the subject of controversy in case-law and in academic literature.
56 See points 76 and 77 of this Opinion.
57 See points 35 to 37 and points 69 to 71 of this Opinion.
58 See points 38 to 49 and points 69 to 71 of this Opinion.
59 See points 49 to 55 and points 69 to 71 of this Opinion.
60 See, in that regard, Bobek, M., ‘Preliminary Rulings before the General Court: What Judicial Architecture for the European Union?’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 60, No 6, 2023, p. 1540. In contrast to the scenario which that author envisaged as being liable to arise before the EU Courts, the present case does not concern solely the question whether a given situation, such as meteorological conditions or technical failures, must be classified as an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004. The present review concerns, rather, the correct application of the method which makes it possible, precisely, to carry out such a classification. It thus raises a question of principle on which the Court of Justice must decide.
61 See points 57 to 62 and points 69 to 71 of this Opinion.
62 See, as regards the right of passengers to flat-rate and standardised compensation in the event of cancellation or long delay in arrival, and as regards the strict interpretation of the derogation provided for in Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004, the judgments in Wallentin-Hermann (paragraph 23); of 19 November 2009, Sturgeon and Others (C‑402/07 and C‑432/07, EU:C:2009:716, paragraphs 51, 52 and 61); of 23 October 2012, Nelson and Others (C‑581/10 and C‑629/10, EU:C:2012:657, paragraphs 38 to 40); of 29 July 2019, Rusu (C‑354/18, EU:C:2019:637, paragraph 28); of 11 June 2020, Transportes Aéreos Portugueses (C‑74/19, EU:C:2020:460, paragraph 37); in Airhelp (paragraphs 23 and 24); and of 13 June 2024, D. (Engine design defect) (C‑411/23, EU:C:2024:498, paragraphs 25 and 26).
63 See judgments of 11 June 2020, Transportes Aéreos Portugueses (C‑74/19, EU:C:2020:460, paragraphs 51 to 58), and of 22 April 2021, Austrian Airlines (C‑826/19, EU:C:2021:318, paragraphs 51 to 57).
64 See judgments of 11 June 2020, Transportes Aéreos Portugueses (C‑74/19, EU:C:2020:460, paragraphs 51 to 55).