EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 4.11.2026
COM(2026) 690 final
ANNEXES
to the
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
2026 Communication on EU enlargement policy
{SWD(2026) 690 final} - {SWD(2026) 691 final} - {SWD(2026) 692 final} - {SWD(2026) 693 final} - {SWD(2026) 694 final} - {SWD(2026) 695 final} - {SWD(2026) 696 final} - {SWD(2026) 697 final} - {SWD(2026) 698 final} - {SWD(2026) 699 final} - {SWD(2026) 700 final}
ANNEX I
A roadmap for the accession negotiations with Montenegro
An outlook for 2027
In the light of the overall progress to date in the accession negotiations, the Commission presents the below roadmap for finalising the accession negotiations with Montenegro. The roadmap presented below offers clear sequencing for the provisional closure of the remaining individual negotiating chapters as well as the main steps following the conclusion of accession negotiations. By the nature of the accession negotiations, the pace of which depends on Montenegro’s progress in meeting the requirements for membership, this indicative timetable prejudges neither the outcome, nor the pace of negotiations or any decision taken by the Council, the Commission or the European Parliament.
The Commission will continue to support Montenegro in its preparations for accession, and will continue to help it with expertise, including by making full use of instruments such as TAIEX and twinning, and through well targeted financial assistance, including assistance available under the Reform and Growth Facility, based on the Reform Agenda.
***
Phase I: From now until the conclusion of negotiations
Milestone: final intergovernmental conference - indicative date: December 2026
Following the IGC on 12 October 2026, 14 chapters remain to be closed in the accession negotiations, which requires Council agreement that Montenegro has met the closing benchmarks as well as agreement on transitional arrangements in certain chapters, on the financial package for Montenegro and the respective institutional and other arrangements related to the country’s accession.
The Commission considers that Montenegro has met all the closing benchmarks in the accession negotiations and by mid-November the Commission intends to provide all remaining draft EU common positions to the Council. The Commission therefore considers that accession negotiations could be completed as soon as December 2026 according to the below priority schedule for the closure of the chapters:
IGC in November
-Energy
-Transport
-Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
-Taxation
-Free movement of goods
IGC in December
-Financial services
-Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
-Environment and climate change
-Foreign and security policy
-Financial and budgetary provisions
-Institutions
-Other issues
-Judiciary and fundamental rights
-Justice, freedom and security.
Phase II. Between the conclusion of negotiations and signature of the accession treaty
Without prejudice to the outcome of any decision of the Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament in the process leading to Montenegro’s accession to the European Union, the Commission would foresee the following steps following the conclusion of the accession negotiations at the last intergovernmental conference in December 2026:
1. Progressive association with the Union’s institutions and working structures – phase 1
Milestone: final intergovernmental conference – indicative date December 2026
The Commission proposes that appropriate information arrangements be put in place in the Council and in the Commission already after the final intergovernmental conference, ahead of signature of the accession treaty. Such arrangements would aim to ensure that Montenegro is kept adequately informed of proposals, communications, recommendations or initiatives.
2. Completing the work on the draft accession treaty
Indicative date: spring of 2027
Requirements
-the Commission to continue to submit to the Council the remaining draft texts at the beginning of 2027;
-the draft accession treaty is agreed by the Member States and Montenegro;
-the draft accession treaty is translated into the current EU treaty languages and Montenegrin.
3. Signature of the accession treaty with Montenegro
Indicative date: June 2027
Requirements
-EU primary law is translated into Montenegrin and revised by the Council;
-the Commission issues a positive opinion on Montenegro’s accession to the EU;
-the European Parliament gives its consent to Montenegro’s accession;
-the Council adopts a Council decision on the admission of Montenegro to the European Union.
Phase III: Interim period between signature and Montenegro’s accession to the European Union
Progressive association with the Union’s institutions and working structures – phase 2
Milestone: signature of the accession treaty - indicative date: June 2027
The European Parliament may invite the parliament of the acceding country to appoint observers. The Commission will examine structured political participation in relevant Commission activities, in full respect of the Treaties, the Commission’s institutional autonomy and the principle of collegiality.
Following signature of the accession treaty, all Member States and Montenegro will need to ratify the accession treaty according to their constitutional procedures.
***
Pre-accession monitoring
The Commission will continue to asses all the way to accession whether commitments, including those related to the fundamentals, are being implemented by Montenegro and maintained and will report regularly to the European Parliament and the Council. The Commission will continue to make use of regular peer assessment missions, the bi-annual monitoring tables as well as of all other available tools and measures. As in the past, the Commission stands ready to report to the Council and the European Parliament regularly on Montenegro’s progress in meeting its commitments from the accession negotiations. The monitoring should identify shortcomings early and specify the corrective action required. Where serious issues of concern arise, the Accession Treaty should enable the Council, acting on a Commission proposal, to adopt appropriate measures focused on those commitments. Where monitoring identifies backsliding before the first day of membership and targeted measures would be insufficient, a postponement clause in the Accession Treaty could provide a last resort instrument.
ANNEX II
A roadmap for the accession negotiations with Albania
An outlook for 2027
I. Introduction
In line with the negotiating framework for the accession negotiations, which foresees that the intergovernmental conferences take stock of the overall accession process and set out an indication for the year ahead of which clusters / chapters could potentially be opened or closed, as well as in light of the overall progress achieved to date in the negotiations, the Commission presents the below roadmap for accession negotiations with Albania for 2027.
The roadmap offers a sequencing for the provisional closure of negotiating chapters and cluster 1, as a whole. It therefore provides both a pathway and an anchor for the accession negotiations for both Albania and the Member States.
Given the nature of accession negotiations, the pace of which depends on Albania’s progress in meeting the requirements for membership, this indicative timeline neither prejudges the outcome, nor the pace of negotiations. This roadmap is a living document, which the Commission will update regularly, based on the progress made by Albania.
In line with the negotiating framework, progress in the negotiations remains measured in particular against the requirements of the Copenhagen criteria, including the meeting of the closing benchmarks set for the individual chapters and for cluster 1, the fulfilment of Albania’s obligations under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, as well as Albania's progress in addressing the key areas identified in the Commission's reports and relevant Council conclusions. Progress under the fundamentals’ cluster determines the overall pace of negotiations, Albania needs to devote substantial further efforts to complete the work on the closing benchmarks set out in the negotiating clusters to be able to provisionally close the chapters. Progressing along the timelines set out in this roadmap will therefore depend upon the pace of reforms in Albania.
II. Outlook for the year ahead
1. Priority schedule for provisional closure of chapters
Following the IGC on 13 October 2026, 31 chapters of the accession negotiations remain to be closed. In order to reach the ambition of the Albanian authorities to close accession negotiations by the end of 2027, it would be necessary for Albania to complete its work on the closing benchmarks sufficiently in time as to allow for the closure of the remaining chapters, after verification of the fulfilment of the closing benchmarks by the EU, and for the EU and Albania to reach agreement on the transitional arrangements. Taking into consideration the relative complexity and level of preparation in each chapter, as well as the relevant reform plans of the authorities, the following initial priority schedule could be envisaged for the remainder of 2026 and 2027 for provisional closure of chapters:
Priority schedule for the remainder of 2026: intellectual property law; economic and monetary policy; company law; fisheries and aquaculture; Trans-European networks; foreign and security policy
Priority schedule for the first semester of 2027: public procurement; right of establishment and freedom to provide services; free movement of capital; digital transformation and media; Customs Union; financial control; transport policy; social policy and employment; financial services; consumer and health protection.
Priority schedule for the second semester of 2027: freedom of movement of workers; competition policy; agriculture and rural development; taxation; free movement of goods; food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy; statistics; regional policy and coordination of structural instruments; energy; environment and climate change; judiciary and fundamental rights; justice, freedom and security; financial and budgetary provisions; institutions; other issues; cluster 1 (the fundamentals), closed last.
Where the pace of reforms allows, the Commission will revise the priority schedule to reflect the possibility of earlier provisional closure of chapters, subject to the relevant conditions being met.
2. Other milestones of the accession negotiations
Subject to Albania making the necessary progress in its preparations, the Commission will present a Communication in due course on a financial package for the accession of Albania.
The Commission further recommends that the Council starts the arrangements for drafting the Accession Treaty with Albania in the course of 2027. In the meantime, Albania needs to ensure the timely availability of the translation of the acquis in Albanian.
III. Gradual integration
Accession preparation must go hand in hand with progressively deeper integration of Albania into Union policies, programmes, systems, agencies and working structures before membership. This includes advancing participation in strategic sectors, expanding access to parts of the Single Market where conditions are met, strengthening energy, transport and digital connectivity, deepening security and defence cooperation, and delivering concrete benefits for citizens and businesses. This will bring Albania closer to the EU and the Single Market already ahead of membership. Bearing in mind Albania’s advanced stage of negotiations, which brings membership closer, further areas of cooperation for gradual integration prior to accession will be identified through the gradual integration dialogue to be launched in the first quarter of 2027. Deeper integration requires sustained alignment with the Union’s values, acquis and strategic interests.
***
The Commission will continue to support Albania in its preparations for accession and will continue to help it with expertise, including by making full use of instruments such as TAIEX and twinning, and through well targeted financial assistance, including assistance available under the Reform and Growth Facility, based on the Reform Agenda.
The Commission will closely monitor that the commitments undertaken by Albania in the negotiations in particular in the area of the fundamentals, are fulfilled and will report on its findings regularly to the Council. It will make use of monitoring tables, regular peer assessment missions, including as regards the rule of law, as well as of all other available tools.
ANNEX III
A roadmap for the accession negotiations with Moldova
An outlook for 2027
I. Introduction
In line with the negotiating framework for the accession negotiations, which foresees that the intergovernmental conferences take stock of the overall accession process and set out an indication for the year ahead of which clusters / chapters could potentially be opened or closed, as well as in light of the overall progress achieved to date in the negotiations, the Commission presents the below roadmap for the accession negotiations with Moldova for 2027.
The roadmap outlines the main deliverables of the accession negotiations by the end of 2027, starting with opening the remaining two negotiating clusters, the meeting the interim benchmarks on the rule of law chapters, followed by the provisional closure of a number of individual negotiating chapters. It therefore provides both a pathway and an anchor for the accession negotiations for both Moldova and the Member States.
Given the nature of accession negotiations, the pace of which depends on Moldova’s progress in meeting the requirements for membership, this indicative timeline neither prejudges the outcome, nor the pace of negotiations. This roadmap is a living document, which the Commission will update regularly, based on the progress made by Moldova.
In line with the negotiating framework, progress in the negotiations remains measured in particular against the requirements of the Copenhagen criteria, including the meeting of the benchmarks set for the individual chapters and for cluster 1, the fulfilment of Moldova’s obligations under the Association Agreement, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, as well as Moldova's progress in addressing the key areas identified in the Commission's reports and relevant Council conclusions. Progress under the fundamentals’ cluster determines the overall pace of negotiations. Moldova needs to devote substantial further efforts to complete the work on the closing benchmarks set out in the negotiating clusters. Progressing along the timelines set out in this roadmap will therefore depend upon the pace of reforms in Moldova.
II. Outlook for the year ahead
1. Opening of the remaining clusters
The Commission considers that Moldova has met the necessary conditions and urges the accession conference to make every effort to open the outstanding clusters - cluster 4 (The green agenda and sustainable connectivity) and cluster 5 (Resources, agriculture, and cohesion) by the end of 2026.
2. Meeting the interim benchmarks on the rule of law
In order to reach the next phase of accession negotiations where negotiating chapters can be provisionally closed, it would be necessary for Moldova to complete its work on the interim benchmarks on the rule of law chapters. The Commission considers that Moldova is well advanced in its preparations to meet the interim benchmarks and will present the interim benchmark assessment report together with the draft interim common position to the Council, allowing Member States to process this assessment.
3. Initial priority schedule for provisional closure of chapters
All 35 chapters and cluster 1 of the accession negotiations remain to be closed. Work on the closing benchmarks for all chapters should continue without delay. A chapter can be provisionally closed after the EU has verified that the closing benchmarks have been fulfilled and once the EU and Moldova have reached an agreement on the transitional arrangements, if any. Taking into consideration the relative complexity of and Moldova’s level of preparation in each chapter, as well as the relevant reform plans of the authorities, the following initial priority schedule could be envisaged for 2027 for provisional closure of chapters:
-Priority schedule for the first semester of 2027: science and research; education and culture; free movement of capital; intellectual property law; digital transformation and media; Customs Union; fisheries and acquaculture; external relations; foreign, security and defence policy
-Priority schedule for the second semester of 2027: right of establishment and freedom to provide services; economic and monetary policy; social policy and employment; free movement of goods; freedom of movement of workers; company law; competition policy; financial services; consumer and health protection; taxation; enterprise and industrial policy; transport; Trans-European networks; energy; environment and climate change; food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
Where the pace of reforms allows, the Commission will revise the priority schedule to reflect the possibility of earlier or additional provisional closure of chapters, subject to the relevant conditions being met.
III. Gradual integration
Accession preparation must go hand in hand with progressively deeper integration of Moldova into Union policies, programmes, systems, agencies and working structures before membership. This includes advancing participation in strategic sectors, expanding access to parts of the Single Market where conditions are met, strengthening energy, transport and digital connectivity, deepening security and defence cooperation, and delivering concrete benefits for citizens and businesses. This will bring Moldova closer to the EU and the Single Market already ahead of membership. Moldova is encouraged to take full advantage of the opportunities for internal market treatment offered under the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Further areas of cooperation, possibly including wider market access, will be identified through the gradual integration dialogue to be launched in the first quarter of 2027. Deeper integration requires sustained alignment with the Union’s values, acquis and strategic interests.
***
The Commission will continue to support Moldova in its preparations for accession and will continue to help it with expertise, including by making full use of instruments such as TAIEX and twinning, and through well targeted financial assistance, including assistance available under the Reform and Growth Facility, based on the Reform Agenda.
The Commission will closely monitor that the commitments undertaken by Moldova in the negotiations in particular in the area of the fundamentals, are fulfilled and will report on its findings regularly to the Council. It will make use of monitoring tables, regular peer assessment missions, including as regards the rule of law, as well as of all other available tools.
ANNEX IV
A roadmap for the accession negotiations with Ukraine
An outlook for 2027
I. Introduction
In line with the negotiating framework for the accession negotiations, which foresees that the intergovernmental conferences take stock of the overall accession process and set out an indication for the year ahead of which clusters / chapters could potentially be opened or closed, as well as in light of the overall progress achieved to date in the negotiations, the Commission presents the below roadmap for the accession negotiations with Ukraine for 2027.
The roadmap outlines the main deliverables of the accession negotiations by the end of 2027, starting with opening the remaining two negotiating clusters, the meeting of the interim benchmarks on the rule of law chapters, followed by the provisional closure of a number of individual negotiating chapters. It therefore provides both a pathway and an anchor for the accession negotiations for both Ukraine and the Member States.
Given the nature of accession negotiations, the pace of which depends on Ukraine’s progress in meeting the requirements for membership, this indicative timeline neither prejudges the outcome, nor the pace of negotiations. This roadmap is a living document, which the Commission will update regularly, based on the progress made by Ukraine.
In line with the negotiating framework, progress in the negotiations remains measured in particular against the requirements of the Copenhagen criteria, including the meeting of the benchmarks set for the individual chapters and for cluster 1, the fulfilment of Ukraine’s obligations under the Association Agreement, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, as well as Ukraine's progress in addressing the key areas identified in the Commission's reports and relevant Council conclusions. Progress under the fundamentals’ cluster determines the overall pace of negotiations. Ukraine needs to devote substantial further efforts to complete the work on the interim and the closing benchmarks set out in the negotiating clusters. Progressing along the timelines set out in this roadmap will therefore depend upon the pace of reforms in Ukraine.
II. Outlook for the year ahead
1. Opening of the remaining clusters
The Commission considers that Ukraine has met the necessary conditions and urges the accession conference to make every effort to open the outstanding clusters - cluster 4 (The green agenda and sustainable connectivity) and cluster 5 (Resources, agriculture, and cohesion) by the end of 2026.
2. Meeting the interim benchmarks on the rule of law
In order to reach the next phase of accession negotiations where negotiating chapters can be provisionally closed, it would be necessary for Ukraine to complete its work on the interim benchmarks on the rule of law chapters. The Commission welcomes the intention of Ukraine to urgently and significantly step up the pace of the rule of law reforms, which are often complex and require broad consultations with various stakeholders, allocating sufficient time and resources to this effort to meet the established targets in the first semester of 2027. In order to guide Ukraine towards this objective, the Commission has set up a dedicated task-force for an enhanced coordinated support.
3. Initial priority schedule for provisional closure of chapters
All 35 chapters and cluster 1 of the accession negotiations remain to be closed. Work on the closing benchmarks for all chapters should continue without delay in parallel with the fulfilment of the interim benchmarks. A chapter can be provisionally closed after the EU has verified that the closing benchmarks have been fulfilled and once the EU and Ukraine have reached an agreement on the transitional arrangements, if any. Taking into consideration the relative complexity of and Ukraine’s level of preparation in each chapter, as well as the relevant reform plans of the authorities, the following initial priority schedule could be established for 2027 for provisional closure of chapters:
-Priority schedule for the first semester of 2027: education and culture
-Priority schedule for the second semester of 2027: intellectual property law; social policy and employment; enterprise and industrial policy; science and research; external relations; foreign, security and defence policy
Where the pace of reforms allows, the Commission will revise the priority schedule to reflect the possibility of earlier or additional provisional closure of chapters, subject to the relevant conditions being met.
III. Gradual integration
Accession preparation must go hand in hand with progressively deeper integration of Ukraine into Union policies, programmes, systems, agencies and working structures before membership. This includes advancing participation in strategic sectors, expanding access to parts of the Single Market where conditions are met, strengthening energy, transport and digital connectivity, deepening security and defence cooperation, and delivering concrete benefits for citizens and businesses. This will bring Ukraine closer to the EU and the Single Market already ahead of membership. Ukraine is encouraged to take full advantage of the opportunities for internal market treatment offered under the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Building on the progress already achieved under the Priority Action Plan for the implementation of the DCFTA, gradual integration in 2027 should focus in particular on concluding the Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA), on Ukraine’s integration in the Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA) and on achieving electricity market coupling with the EU, within the legal framework of the Energy Community Treaty and in line with the Electricity Integration Package. This will reduce compliance costs and further integrate Ukrainian industry into EU value chains and financial system. Further areas of cooperation will be identified through the gradual integration dialogue to be launched in the first quarter of 2027. Deeper integration requires sustained alignment with the Union’s values, acquis and strategic interests.
***
The Commission will continue to support Ukraine in its preparations for accession and will continue to help it with expertise, including by making full use of instruments such as TAIEX and twinning, and through well targeted financial assistance, including assistance available under the Ukraine Facility.
The Commission will closely monitor that the commitments undertaken by Ukraine in the negotiations, in particular in the areas of the fundamentals, are fulfilled and will report on its findings regularly to the Council. It will make use of monitoring tables, regular peer assessment missions, including as regards the rule of law, as well as of all other available tools.
ANNEX V
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Indexes
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Third Party Indicators related to the status of Democracy, Good Governance and the Rule of Law in Candidate Countries and Potential Candidates
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Albania
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Bosnia and Herzegovina
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Kosovo
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North Macedonia
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Montenegro
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Serbia
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Türkiye
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Georgia
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Moldova
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Ukraine
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Freedom in the World 2026 - Global Freedom Score, Freedom House
Countries and Territories | Freedom House
|
Total score: 69/100
(2025: 68/100)
Status: Partly free
(2025: Partly free)
|
Total score: 54/100
(2025: 52/100)
Status: Partly free
(2025: Partly free)
|
Total score: 61/100
(2025: 60/100)
Status: Partly free
(2025: Partly free)
|
Total score: 67/100
(2025: 67/100)
Status: Partly free
(2025: Partly free)
|
Total score: 68/100
(2025: 69/100)
Status: Partly free
(2025: Partly free)
|
Total score: 53/100
(2025: 56/100)
Status: Partly free
(2025: Partly free)
|
Total score:
32/100
(2025: 33/100)
Status: Not free (2025: Not free)
|
Total score: 51/100
(2025: 55/100)
Status: Partly free
(2025: Partly free)
|
Total score: 60/100
(2025: 60/100)
Status: Partly free
(2025: Partly free)
|
Total score: 51/100
(2025: 51/100)
Status: Partly free
(2025: Partly free)
|
|
Democracy Index 2025 - The Economist Intelligence Unit
Democracy Index 2025 - Economist Intelligence Unit
|
Overall Score: 6.20/10
(2024: 6.20/10)
Rank: 67/167 (2024: 66/167)
Regime type: Flawed democracy
(2024: Flawed democracy)
|
Overall Score: 5.23/10
(2024: 5.06/10)
Rank: 85/167 (2024: 88/167)
Regime type: Hybrid regime
(2024: Hybrid regime)
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n/a
|
Overall Score: 6.28/10
(2024: 6.28/10)
Rank: 64/167 (2024: 62/167)
Regime type: Flawed democracy
(2024: Flawed democracy)
|
Overall Score: 6.73/10
(2024: 6.73/10)
Rank: 53/167 (2024: 50/167)
Regime type: Flawed democracy
(2024: Flawed democracy)
|
Overall Score: 6.30/10
(2024: 6.26/10)
Rank: 63/167 (2024: 64/167)
Regime type: Flawed democracy
(2024: Flawed democracy)
|
Overall Score: 4.26/10
(2024: 4.26/10)
Rank: 102/167 (2024: 104/167)
Regime type: Hybrid regime
(2024: Hybrid regime)
|
Overall Score: 4.36/10
(2024: 4.70/10)
Rank: 99/167 (2024: 94/167)
Regime type: Hybrid regime (2024: Hybrid
regime)
|
Overall Score: 5.86/10
(2024: 6.04/10)
Rank: 77/167 (2024: 71/167)
Regime type: Flawed democracy
(2024: Flawed democracy)
|
Overall Score: 4.79/10
(2024: 4.90/10)
Rank: 93/167 (2024: 92/167)
Regime type: Hybrid regime
(2024: Hybrid regime)
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World Press Freedom Index 2026 - Reporters without borders
https://rsf.org/en/index
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Global Score: 56.52/100 (2025:
58.18/100)
Rank: 83/180 (2025: 80/180)
|
Global Score: 54.29/100
(2025: 56.33/100)
Rank: 90/180 (2025: 86/180)
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Global Score: 55.89/100
(2025: 52.73/100)
Rank: 84/180 (2025: 99/180)
|
Global Score: 69.49/100
(2025: 70.44/100)
Rank: 45/180 (2025: 42/180)
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Global Score: 71.80/100
(2025: 72.83/100)
Rank: 41/180 (2025: 37/180)
|
Global Score: 50.79/100
(2025: 53.55/100)
Rank: 104/180 (2025: 96/180)
|
Global Score: 27.94/100
(2025: 29.40/100)
Rank: 163/180 (2025: 159/180)
|
Global Score: 40.77/100 (2025:
50.53/100)
Rank: 135/180 (2025: 114/180)
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Global Score: 74.77/100
(2025: 73.36/100)
Rank: 31/180 (2025: 35/180)
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Global Score: 66.10/100
(2025: 63.93/100)
Rank: 55/180 (2025: 62/180)
|
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Rule of Law Index 2025 - World Justice Project
https://worldjusticeproject.org/
rule-of-law-index/global/
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Overall Score: 0.49/1
(2024: 0.48/1)
Global Rank: 87/142
(2024: 89/140)
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Overall Score: 0.52/1
(2024: 0.52/1)
Global Rank: 70/142
(2024: 71/140)
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Overall Score: 0.56/1
(2024: 0.56/1)
Global Rank: 59/142
(2024: 58/140)
|
Overall Score: 0.54/1
(2024: 0.53/1)
Global Rank: 64/142
(2024: 67/140)
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Overall Score: 0.57/1
(2024: 0.57/1)
Global Rank: 55/142
(2024: 56/142)
|
Overall Score: 0.47/1
(2024: 0.47/1)
Global Rank: 96/142
(2024: 94/140)
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Overall Score: 0.41/1
(2024: 0.42/1)
Global Rank: 118/142
(2024: 117/140)
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Overall Score: 0.58/1
(2024: 0.60/1)
Global Rank: 52/142
(2024: 49/140)
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Overall Score: 0.53/1
(2024: 0.54/1)
Global Rank: 68/142
(2024: 64/140)
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Overall Score: 0.48/1
(2024: 0.49/1)
Global Rank: 90/142
(2024: 88/140)
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Worldwide Governance Indicators 2025 - Rule of Law, The World Bank Group
https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators
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Score:
2025: 57.99/100
2024: 56.86/100
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Score:
2025: 53.03/100
2024: 52.41/100
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Score:
2025: 0.44/100
2024: 0.05/100
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Score:
2025: 56.30/100
2024: 54.94/100
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Score:
2025: 62.06/100
2024: 61.67/100
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Score:
2025: 53.34/100
2024: 55.17/100
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Score:
2025: 45.25/100
2024: 44.94/100
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Score:
2025: 60.20/100
2024: 60.83/100
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Score:
2025: 56.12/100
2024: 56.01/100
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Score:
2025: 45.64/100
2024: 46.13/100
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Worldwide Governance Indicators 2025 - Government Effectiveness, The World Bank Group
https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators
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Score:
2025: 61.98/100
2024: 53.97/100
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Score:
2025: 42.60/100 2024: 42.01/100
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Score:
2025: 49.86/100
2024: 50.49/100
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Score:
2025: 56.37/100 2024: 54.88/100
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Score:
2025: 61.98/100
2024: 62.57/100
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Score:
2025: 53.02/100
2024: 54.04/100
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Score:
2025: 52.94/100 2024: 51.27/100
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Score:
2025: 59.53/100
2024: 58.74/100
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Score:
2025: 56.73/100
2024: 56.30/100
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Score:
2025: 40.15/100 2024: 40.65/100
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Worldwide Governance Indicators 2025 - Control of Corruption, The World Bank Group
https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators
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Score:
2025: 41.97/100 2024: 41.00/100
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Score:
2025: 38.35/100
2024: 38.10/100
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Score:
2025: 42.80/100
2024: 44.40/100
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Score:
2025: 42.04/100 2024: 41.38/100
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Score:
2025: 49.57/100
2024: 46.87/100
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Score:
2025: 35.90/100
2024: 36.94/100
|
Score:
2025: 37.39/100
2024: 36.83/100
|
Score:
2025: 45.22/100
2024: 56.21/100
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Score:
2025: 42.92/100
2024: 42.15/100
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Score:
2025: 34.11/100 2024: 34.25/100
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Corruption Perceptions Index 2025 - Transparency International
https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2025
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Score: 39/100 (2024: 42/100)
Rank: 91/182 (2024: 80/180)
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Score: 34/100 (2024: 33/100)
Rank: 109/182 (2024:114/180)
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Score: 43/100 (2024: 44/100)
Rank: 76/182 (2024: 73/180)
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Score: 40/100 (2024: 40/100)
Rank: 84/182 (2024: 88/180)
|
Score: 46/100 (2024: 46/100)
Rank: 65/182 (2024: 65/180)
|
Score: 33/100 (2024: 35/100)
Rank: 116/182 (2024: 105/180)
|
Score: 31/100 (2024: 34/100)
Rank: 124/182 (2024: 107/180)
|
Score: 50/100 (2024: 53/100)
Rank: 56/182 (2024: 53/180)
|
Score: 42/100 (2024: 43/100)
Rank: 80/182 (2024: 76/180)
|
Score: 36/100 (2024: 35/100)
Rank: 104/182 (2024: 105/180)
|
|
Civicus Monitor 2025 - Global Civil Society Alliance
https://monitor.civicus.org/globalfindings_2025/
|
Score: 68/100 (2024: 64/100)
Rating: Narrowed
(2024: Narrowed)
|
Score: 57/100 (2024: 56/100)
Rating: Obstructed (2024: Obstructed)
|
Score: 67/100 (2024: 62/100)
Rating: Narrowed
(2024: Narrowed)
|
Score: 69/100 (2024: 74/100)
Rating: Narrowed
(2024: Narrowed)
|
Score: 77/100 (2024: 76/100)
Rating: Narrowed
(2024: Narrowed)
|
Score: 38/100 (2024: 49/100)
Rating: Repressed
(2024: Obstructed)
|
Score: 23/100 (2024: 24/100)
Rating: Repressed
(2024: Repressed)
|
Score: 34/100 (2024: 54/100)
Rating: Repressed
(2024: Obstructed)
|
Score: 72/100 (2024: 71/100)
Rating: Narrowed
(2024: Narrowed)
|
Score: 52/100 (2024: 50/100)
Rating: Obstructed
(2024: Obstructed)
|
ANNEX VI
Statistical Annex
|
STATISTICAL DATA (as of 14/09/2026), part 1 (Albania – Montenegro)
|
|
|
|
|
Demography
|
Note
|
Albania
|
Bosnia and Herzegovina
|
Kosovo
|
North Macedonia
|
Montenegro
|
EU-27
|
|
|
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Total population (thousands)
|
|
2 762 i
|
2 391 i
|
3 441 pi
|
3 417 pi
|
:
|
:
|
1 830 i
|
1 826 i
|
617 i
|
624 i
|
447 806 bi
|
449 490 pi
|
|
Share of 15-64 in total population (%)
|
|
67.5 i
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
65.5 i
|
65.2 i
|
65.7 i
|
65.1 i
|
63.8 bpi
|
63.8 pi
|
|
Crude rate of natural population change (per 1 000 inhabitants)
|
|
0.9
|
0.5
|
- 2.8 p
|
- 3.2 p
|
:
|
:
|
-1.9
|
-2.3
|
1.1
|
1.0
|
- 2.6 bep
|
- 2.8 ep
|
|
Life expectancy at birth, males (years)
|
|
:
|
78.4 b
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
75.1
|
75.2 b
|
78.6 bep
|
78.9 ep
|
|
Life expectancy at birth, females (years)
|
|
:
|
82.4 b
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
80.2
|
80.1 b
|
83.9 bep
|
84.1 ep
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Labour market
|
Note
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Economic activity rate for persons aged 20-64: proportion of the population aged 20-64 that is economically active (%)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total
|
|
81.4 w
|
81.6 w
|
64.3
|
66.6
|
45.1 w
|
47.9 w
|
71
|
71.3
|
76.3 w
|
78.2 w
|
80.0
|
80.3
|
|
Males
|
|
88.1 w
|
88.9 w
|
77.7
|
79.8
|
64.1 w
|
67.5 w
|
82.5
|
82.5
|
82.0 w
|
84.4 w
|
85.2
|
85.5
|
|
Females
|
|
75.1 w
|
74.7 w
|
50.6
|
53.1
|
26.8 w
|
28.4 w
|
59.4
|
60.2
|
70.6 w
|
71.8 w
|
74.8
|
75.2
|
|
Employment rates, aged 20-64 (% of the population)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total
|
|
73.4 w
|
74.1 w
|
55.9
|
58.2
|
40.3 w
|
42.9 w
|
61.7
|
62.7
|
66.5 w
|
69.7 w
|
75.3
|
75.7
|
|
Males
|
|
79.6 w
|
81.2 w
|
69.5
|
71.9
|
59.4 w
|
62.5 w
|
70.7
|
71.7
|
72.0 w
|
76.1 w
|
80.4
|
80.7
|
|
Females
|
|
67.5 w
|
67.4 w
|
42.1
|
44.3
|
22.0 w
|
23.5 w
|
52.7
|
53.7
|
61.0 w
|
63.3 w
|
70.2
|
70.7
|
|
Persons aged 15-24 not in employment, education or training, % of the population in the age group
|
|
22.8 w
|
20.9 w
|
16.5
|
14.7
|
33.4 w
|
31.4 w
|
18.8
|
18.2
|
17.3 w
|
14.2 w
|
9.2
|
9.2
|
|
Labour market (cont.)
|
Note
|
Albania
|
Bosnia and Herzegovina
|
Kosovo
|
North Macedonia
|
Montenegro
|
EU-27
|
|
|
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Persons aged 15-29 not in employment, education or training, % of the population in the age group
|
|
25.0 w
|
22.2 w
|
22.2
|
20.1
|
37.6 w
|
35.4 w
|
24.2
|
22.6
|
20.3 w
|
16.5 w
|
11.3
|
11.2
|
|
Employment by main sectors
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%)
|
|
37.2 w
|
36.7 w
|
7.6 i
|
7.7 i
|
2.4 w
|
2.8 w
|
7.8 i
|
9.0 i
|
4.5 w
|
4.3 w
|
3.6 i
|
3.3 i
|
|
Industry (%)
|
|
12.2 w
|
12.5 w
|
25.1 i
|
24.2 i
|
12.9 w
|
14.4 w
|
23.7 i
|
23.9 i
|
9.8 w
|
10.4 w
|
17.4 i
|
17.2 i
|
|
Construction (%)
|
|
7.4 w
|
7.9 w
|
9.2 i
|
9.5 i
|
11.8 w
|
12.6 w
|
7.3 i
|
6.7 i
|
8.6 w
|
8.7 w
|
6.8 i
|
6.9 i
|
|
Services (%)
|
|
43.2 w
|
42.8 w
|
58.0 i
|
58.6 i
|
72.9 w
|
70.2 w
|
61.2 i
|
60.4 i
|
77.1 w
|
76.6 w
|
72.0 i
|
72.1 i
|
|
People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20-64 (%)
|
1)
|
18.2 w
|
19.0 w
|
19.0 w
|
19.0 w
|
27.4 w
|
26.1 w
|
:
|
:
|
28.3 w
|
29.8 w
|
:
|
:
|
|
People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20-64 (%)
|
|
81.8 w
|
81.0 w
|
81.0 w
|
81.0 w
|
72.6 w
|
73.9 w
|
:
|
:
|
68.4 w
|
66.7 w
|
:
|
:
|
|
Unemployment rates (% of the labour force)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total
|
|
9.6 w
|
8.5 w
|
13.2
|
12.6
|
10.8 w
|
10.9 w
|
13.1
|
12.3
|
13.1 w
|
11.4 w
|
6.1
|
6.0
|
|
Males
|
|
9.3 w
|
8.0 w
|
10.9
|
10.1
|
7.6 w
|
7.7 w
|
14.3
|
13.3
|
12.2 w
|
10.8 w
|
5.8
|
5.8
|
|
Females
|
|
9.9 w
|
9.2 w
|
16.7
|
16.6
|
18.2 w
|
18.5 w
|
11.4
|
11.0
|
14.0 w
|
12.2 w
|
6.4
|
6.2
|
|
Youth, aged 15-24
|
|
24.5 w
|
22.8 w
|
30.1
|
30.2
|
17.3 w
|
19.5 w
|
29.4
|
28.9
|
23.3 w
|
26.0 w
|
14.6
|
15.0
|
|
Long-term (>12 months)
|
|
6.8 w
|
6.5 w
|
9.6
|
9.0
|
7.7 w
|
8.5 w
|
9.4
|
8.0
|
9.4 w
|
8.5 w
|
2.1
|
1.9
|
|
Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (EUR)
|
2)
|
648 iw
|
769 iw
|
646 iw
|
706 iw
|
570 iw
|
639 iw
|
595 iw
|
670 iw
|
792 iw
|
876 iw
|
:
|
:
|
|
Education
|
Note
|
Albania
|
Bosnia and Herzegovina
|
Kosovo
|
North Macedonia
|
Montenegro
|
EU-27
|
|
|
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%)
|
|
2.9 iw
|
3.0 piw
|
:
|
:
|
4.1 iw
|
4.3 iw
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
4.7 d
|
:
|
|
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over)
|
3)
|
82.9 w
|
94.2 w
|
43.6 w
|
45.0 w
|
:
|
:
|
46.1
|
48.3
|
78.3
|
78.6
|
94.6 d
|
94.9 d
|
|
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), males
|
3)
|
84.3 w
|
93.8 w
|
44.1 w
|
45.3 w
|
:
|
:
|
46.2
|
47.3
|
78.4
|
78.6
|
94.5 d
|
94.8 d
|
|
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), females
|
3)
|
81.5 w
|
94.6 w
|
43.2 w
|
44.7 w
|
:
|
:
|
46.1
|
49.4
|
78.2
|
78.5
|
94.7 d
|
95.0 d
|
|
Low achieving 15-year-olds in reading
|
4)
|
73.7
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
73.6
|
:
|
52.9
|
:
|
26.2
|
:
|
|
Low achieving 15-year-olds in mathematics
|
4)
|
73.9
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
66.2
|
:
|
59.5
|
:
|
29.5
|
:
|
|
Low achieving 15-year-olds in science
|
4)
|
67.4
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
65.3
|
:
|
54.9
|
:
|
24.2
|
:
|
|
Early leavers from education and training: percentage of the population aged 18-24 with at most a lower secondary education and not in further education or training (%)
|
|
15.7 w
|
15.4 w
|
4.2
|
3.8
|
7.7 w
|
6.2 w
|
8.4
|
8.0
|
6.8 w
|
4.9 w
|
9.6
|
9.6
|
|
Male early leavers from education and training: proportion of men aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or training
|
|
:
|
:
|
5.2
|
5.0
|
:
|
:
|
8.6
|
8.9
|
:
|
:
|
11.3
|
11.2
|
|
Female early leavers from education and training: proportion of women aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or training
|
|
:
|
:
|
3.1
|
2.5
|
:
|
:
|
8.2
|
7.0
|
:
|
:
|
7.7
|
7.9
|
|
Education
|
Note
|
Albania
|
Bosnia and Herzegovina
|
Kosovo
|
North Macedonia
|
Montenegro
|
EU-27
|
|
|
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks)
|
|
0.7 w
|
1.6 w
|
1.8
|
1.6
|
4.5 w
|
2.3 w
|
2.5
|
2.8
|
2.8 w
|
3.6 w
|
12.8
|
13.5
|
|
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks), men
|
|
0.6 w
|
1.3 w
|
1.5
|
1.2
|
4.3 w
|
2.0 w
|
2.7
|
2.4
|
2.2 w
|
2.6 w
|
11.6
|
12.2
|
|
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks), women
|
|
0.8 w
|
1.9 w
|
2.0
|
2.0
|
4.8 w
|
2.5 w
|
2.4
|
3.1
|
3.5 w
|
4.6 w
|
14.0
|
14.7
|
|
Exposure of vocational education and training (VET) graduates to work-based learning (% of population aged 20-34)
|
|
1.6 w
|
1.9 w
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
4.4
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
64.4
|
65.2
|
|
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with at most lower secondary education, total
|
|
17.4 w
|
16.5 w
|
8.1
|
8.2
|
8.8 w
|
7.6 w
|
12.9
|
7.5
|
3.8 w
|
4.7 w
|
15.0
|
15
|
|
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with at most lower secondary education, males
|
|
19.0 w
|
19.9 w
|
8.8
|
10.2
|
8.1 w
|
7.1 w
|
11.8
|
7.3
|
4.6 w
|
6.0 w
|
17.5
|
17.4
|
|
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with at most lower secondary education, females
|
|
16.0 w
|
12.9 w
|
7.5
|
6.2
|
9.6 w
|
8.2 w
|
14
|
7.7
|
3.0 w
|
3.2 w
|
12.3
|
12.5
|
|
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with upper secondary or post secondary non-tertiary education, total
|
|
57.8 w
|
55.9 w
|
86.1
|
85.4
|
77.5 w
|
79.1 w
|
78.1
|
85.0
|
86.2 w
|
83.9 w
|
65.9
|
65.6
|
|
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with upper secondary or post secondary non-tertiary education, males
|
|
65.0 w
|
63.0 w
|
87.2
|
84.8
|
83.0 w
|
83.6 w
|
81.0
|
88.1
|
84.5 w
|
84.1 w
|
66.3
|
66.1
|
|
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with upper secondary or post secondary non-tertiary education, females
|
|
51.0 w
|
48.5 w
|
85.1
|
86
|
71.7 w
|
74.3 w
|
75.1
|
81.7
|
88.0 w
|
83.6 w
|
65.4
|
65.1
|
|
Percentage of the population aged 30-34 with tertiary education, total
|
|
36.5 w
|
37.8 w
|
28.2
|
26.7
|
30.6 w
|
29.1 w
|
35.5
|
39.3
|
40.9 w
|
41.3 w
|
43.8
|
44.5
|
|
Education
|
Note
|
Albania
|
Bosnia and Herzegovina
|
Kosovo
|
North Macedonia
|
Montenegro
|
EU-27
|
|
|
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Percentage of the population aged 30-34 with tertiary education, males
|
|
31.2 w
|
34.0 w
|
23.5
|
21.3
|
23.9 w
|
23.6 w
|
31.4
|
32.5
|
37.7 w
|
41.4 w
|
38.4
|
39.2
|
|
Percentage of the population aged 30-34 with tertiary education, females
|
|
42.0 w
|
42.5 w
|
33.1
|
32.6
|
37.4 w
|
34.8 w
|
39.8
|
46.3
|
44.1 w
|
41.3 w
|
49.4
|
50
|
|
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74)
|
|
23.3
|
:
|
30.1
|
36.3 w
|
52.5 pw
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
52.0
|
:
|
55.6
|
:
|
|
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), males
|
|
25.1
|
:
|
30.8
|
41.1 w
|
52.8 pw
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
53.5
|
:
|
56.7
|
:
|
|
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), females
|
|
21.6
|
:
|
29.3
|
34.1 w
|
52.3 pw
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
50.0
|
:
|
54.5
|
:
|
|
National accounts
|
Note
|
Albania
|
Bosnia and Herzegovina
|
Kosovo
|
North Macedonia
|
Montenegro
|
EU-27
|
|
|
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Gross domestic product
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In current prices (EUR million)
|
|
21 739
|
24 995
|
25 524
|
27 483
|
9 680
|
10 350
|
14 667
|
15 672 p
|
7 069
|
7 645
|
17 259 390
|
18 043 410
|
|
Per capita (EUR)
|
|
7 868 iw
|
:
|
7 460
|
8 050
|
:
|
:
|
8 020 e
|
8 590 e
|
11 340
|
12 260
|
38 450
|
40 110
|
|
In purchasing power standards (PPS) per capita
|
|
:
|
:
|
13 600
|
13 800
|
:
|
:
|
15 837 e
|
16 932 e
|
19 903
|
21 365
|
38 366
|
39 985
|
|
In purchasing power standards (PPS) per capita, relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100)
|
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
41.3 e
|
42.3 e
|
51.9
|
53.4
|
100
|
100
|
|
Real (volume) annual rate of change, compared with the previous year (%)
|
|
4.0
|
4.0 p
|
2.0
|
3.2
|
4.1
|
4.6
|
2.6
|
3.0 p
|
6.5
|
3.2
|
0.4
|
1.2
|
|
Gross value added by main sectors
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%)
|
|
18.4
|
17.7
|
5.5
|
5.4
|
9.0
|
9.3
|
7.1
|
7.0 p
|
4.7
|
4.4
|
1.8
|
1.8
|
|
Industry (%)
|
|
13.6
|
12.8
|
22.7
|
21.2
|
22.8
|
22.8
|
20.6
|
20.6 p
|
11.1
|
10.5
|
20.2
|
19.4
|
|
Construction (%)
|
|
13.8
|
14.1
|
5.4
|
5.6
|
10.1
|
10.0
|
7.0
|
7.2 p
|
4.8
|
4.9
|
5.5
|
5.5
|
|
Services (%)
|
|
54.1 i
|
55.4 i
|
66.3 i
|
67.8 i
|
58.2 i
|
57.9 i
|
65.4 i
|
65.1 pi
|
79.4 i
|
80.3 i
|
72.5 i
|
73.4 i
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Balance of payments
|
Note
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Net (inward - outward) foreign direct investment (FDI) (million euro)
|
|
1 253.6 i
|
1 337.3 i
|
949.8 i
|
816.1 i
|
650.1 w
|
569.2 w
|
488.1 w
|
1 036.8 w
|
434.0 i
|
491.0 i
|
- 60 215.5 i
|
- 150 086.3 i
|
|
Net (inward - outward) foreign direct investment (FDI) (% of GDP)
|
|
5.77 i
|
5.35 i
|
3.72 i
|
2.97 i
|
6.72 i
|
5.50 i
|
3.33 i
|
6.62 pi
|
6.14 i
|
6.42 i
|
- 0.35 i
|
- 0.83 i
|
|
Net (inward - outward) foreign direct investment (FDI) in relation to EU-27 (million euro)
|
|
813.4 i
|
762.5 i
|
451.5 i
|
676.5 i
|
352.0 i
|
304.1 i
|
402.2 i
|
642.0 i
|
95.0 i
|
79.0 i
|
- 25 748.0 i
|
113 753.6 i
|
|
Net (inward - outward) foreign direct investment (FDI) in relation to EU-27 (% of GDP)
|
|
3.74 i
|
3.05 i
|
1.77 i
|
2.46 i
|
3.64 i
|
2.94 i
|
2.74 i
|
4.10 pi
|
1.34 i
|
1.03 i
|
- 0.15 i
|
0.63 i
|
|
Remittances as % of GDP
|
|
4.26 i
|
4.18 i
|
7.59 i
|
7.75 i
|
13.80 i
|
0.00 i
|
2.32 i
|
2.11 pi
|
5.52 i
|
5.38 i
|
0.14 i
|
0.14 i
|
|
External trade in goods
|
Note
|
Albania
|
Bosnia and Herzegovina
|
Kosovo
|
North Macedonia
|
Montenegro
|
EU-27
|
|
|
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%)
|
|
70.8 iw
|
71.6 iw
|
73.0 iw
|
73.1 iw
|
32.3 iw
|
33.1 iw
|
78.7 iw
|
76.9 iw
|
36.1 iw
|
29.1 iw
|
:
|
:
|
|
Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%)
|
|
50.9 iw
|
51.4 iw
|
59.0 iw
|
59.2 iw
|
43.0 iw
|
44.7 iw
|
49.2 iw
|
50.5 iw
|
45.8 iw
|
45.7 iw
|
:
|
:
|
|
Trade balance (EUR million)
|
|
- 3 994
|
- 5 191
|
- 5 659
|
- 6 432
|
- 5 044
|
- 5 437
|
- 2 826
|
- 3 282
|
- 3 136
|
- 3 453
|
35 331
|
133 115
|
|
International trade in goods and services relative to GDP
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Imports (% of GDP)
|
|
43.9
|
43.2
|
55.7
|
54.1
|
70.3
|
72
|
80.4
|
74.6 p
|
67.6
|
66.2
|
48.1
|
46.3
|
|
Exports (% of GDP)
|
|
38
|
36.3
|
43.9
|
40.7
|
39.6
|
41.7 p
|
67.4
|
61.7 p
|
49.2
|
43.7
|
51.7
|
50.4
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Public finance
|
Note
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
General government surplus (+) / deficit (-) (%)
|
|
-0.8 wd
|
-0.3 wd
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
-3.4
|
-3.1
|
|
General government debt (%)
|
|
54.6 wd
|
51.5 wd
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
80.5
|
80.7
|
|
Financial indicators
|
Note
|
Albania
|
Bosnia and Herzegovina
|
Kosovo
|
North Macedonia
|
Montenegro
|
EU-27
|
|
|
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Annual change in consumer prices (%)
|
5)
|
6.6 d
|
5.3 d
|
14.0 w
|
6.1 w
|
11.6 d
|
4.9 d
|
14.0 d
|
9.0 d
|
11.9 d
|
8.7 d
|
9.2
|
6.4
|
|
Total external debt, relative to GDP (%)
|
6)
|
54.1 iw
|
46.3 piw
|
51.6 iw
|
47.4 iw
|
38.6 iw
|
39.6 iw
|
81.5 iw
|
77.9 piw
|
158.7 iw
|
130.1 iw
|
:
|
:
|
|
Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro)
|
|
-71.8
|
911.5
|
72.8
|
26.5
|
67.6
|
-44
|
271.6
|
603.1
|
164
|
-482
|
:
|
:
|
|
International reserves - equivalence in months of imports
|
6)
|
6.9 iw
|
7.3 iw
|
6.8 iw
|
7.0 iw
|
2.2 iw
|
2.0 iw
|
3.7 iw
|
4.6 iw
|
5.2 iw
|
3.6 iw
|
:
|
:
|
|
Business
|
Note
|
Albania
|
Bosnia and Herzegovina
|
Kosovo
|
North Macedonia
|
Montenegro
|
EU-27
|
|
|
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Industrial production index (2021 = 100)
|
|
94
|
87
|
97
|
93.1
|
:
|
:
|
100.4
|
96.8
|
103
|
102.9
|
101.1
|
98.7
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Infrastructure
|
Note
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²)
|
|
8.8 i
|
8.8 i
|
19.9 iw
|
19.9 iw
|
30.5 iw
|
30.5 iw
|
26.9 i
|
26.9 i
|
18.0 i
|
18.0 i
|
47.7 i
|
47.7 i
|
|
Length of motorways (kilometres)
|
|
25
|
49
|
231
|
242
|
:
|
:
|
335
|
335
|
0
|
0
|
76 515
|
:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Energy
|
Note
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Net energy imports in relation to GDP
|
|
1.1 i
|
1.6 i
|
4.2 i
|
4.6 i
|
7.5 i
|
6.9 i
|
7.5 i
|
6.6 pi
|
2.1 i
|
3.5 i
|
3.2 i
|
2.6 i
|
|
STATISTICAL DATA (as of 14/09/2026), part 2 (Serbia – Ukraine)
|
|
|
|
|
Demography
|
Note
|
Serbia
|
Türkiye
|
Georgia**
|
Moldova***
|
Ukraine
|
EU-27
|
|
|
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Total population (thousands)
|
|
6 641 i
|
6 605 i
|
85 280 i
|
85 372 i
|
3 736 i
|
3 695 i
|
2 513 pi
|
2 423 pi
|
:
|
:
|
447 806 bi
|
449 490 pi
|
|
Share of 15-64 in total population (%)
|
|
63.4 bi
|
63.1 i
|
68.1 i
|
68.3 i
|
63.8 i
|
64.3 i
|
65.9 pi
|
65.1 pi
|
:
|
:
|
63.8 bpi
|
63.8 pi
|
|
Crude rate of natural population change (per 1 000 inhabitants)
|
|
-5.4
|
-5.7
|
5.1
|
5.2
|
-0.7
|
-1.2
|
- 3.9 ep
|
- 4.1 ep
|
:
|
:
|
-2.6 bep
|
- 2.8 ep
|
|
Life expectancy at birth, males (years)
|
|
73.8 b
|
73.9 b
|
74.8
|
76.4 b
|
69.9
|
70.5 b
|
67.5 ep
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
78.6 bep
|
78.9 ep
|
|
Life expectancy at birth, females (years)
|
|
78.6 b
|
78.5 b
|
79.8
|
81.7 b
|
77.5
|
79.3 b
|
76.4 ep
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
83.9 bep
|
84.1 ep
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Labour market
|
Note
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Economic activity rate for persons aged 20-64: proportion of the population aged 20-64 that is economically active (%)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total
|
7)
|
76.8
|
78
|
63.1
|
64.0
|
68.7 w
|
70.8 w
|
58.4 w
|
59.1 w
|
:
|
:
|
80.0
|
80.3
|
|
Males
|
7)
|
83.3
|
84.2
|
82.7
|
83.3
|
80.3 w
|
81.5 w
|
61.9 w
|
60.9 w
|
:
|
:
|
85.2
|
85.5
|
|
Females
|
7)
|
70.5
|
71.8
|
43.5
|
44.6
|
57.9 w
|
60.5 w
|
55.3 w
|
57.5 w
|
:
|
:
|
74.8
|
75.2
|
|
Employment rates, aged 20-64 (% of the population)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total
|
7)
|
69.6
|
71.3
|
57.3
|
58.5
|
56.9 w
|
60.4 w
|
55.7 w
|
56.8 w
|
:
|
:
|
75.3
|
75.7
|
|
Males
|
7)
|
75.9
|
77.2
|
76.5
|
77.5
|
64.9 w
|
67.8 w
|
58.8 w
|
58.6 w
|
:
|
:
|
80.4
|
80.7
|
|
Females
|
7)
|
63.4
|
65.5
|
38.0
|
39.4
|
49.4 w
|
53.3 w
|
53.0 w
|
55.1 w
|
:
|
:
|
70.2
|
70.7
|
|
Persons aged 15-24 not in employment, education or training, % of the population in the age group
|
7)
|
12.4
|
12.9
|
22.4
|
22.9
|
21.0 w
|
17.5 w
|
13.8 w
|
13.5 w
|
:
|
:
|
9.2
|
9.2
|
|
Labour market (cont.)
|
Note
|
Serbia
|
Türkiye
|
Georgia**
|
Moldova***
|
Ukraine
|
EU-27
|
|
|
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Persons aged 15-29 not in employment, education or training, % of the population in the age group
|
7)
|
15.2
|
14.9
|
25.8
|
25.9
|
26.9 w
|
24.1 w
|
23.1 w
|
21.9 w
|
:
|
:
|
11.3
|
11.2
|
|
Employment by main sectors
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%)
|
7) 8)
|
13.1 i
|
12.8 i
|
14.6 i
|
14.6 i
|
16.5 w
|
16.0 w
|
20.9 w
|
18.1 w
|
:
|
:
|
3.6 i
|
3.3 i
|
|
Industry (%)
|
7) 8)
|
23.5 i
|
23.0 i
|
21.3 i
|
20.7 i
|
12.2 w
|
12.9 w
|
14.4 w
|
13.4 w
|
:
|
:
|
17.4 i
|
17.2 i
|
|
Construction (%)
|
7) 8)
|
5.9 i
|
6.0 i
|
6.3 i
|
6.6 i
|
8.8 w
|
8.9 w
|
7.1 w
|
7.5 w
|
:
|
:
|
6.8 i
|
6.9 i
|
|
Services (%)
|
7) 8)
|
57.4 i
|
58.2 i
|
57.8 i
|
58.1 i
|
62.4 w
|
62.2 w
|
57.6 w
|
61.0 w
|
:
|
:
|
72.0 i
|
72.1 i
|
|
People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20-64 (%)
|
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
23.3 w
|
22.0 w
|
28.5 w
|
30.7 w
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
|
People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20-64 (%)
|
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
76.7 w
|
78.0 w
|
71.5 w
|
69.3 w
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
|
Unemployment rates (% of the labour force)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total
|
7) 9)
|
9.5
|
8.6
|
9.4
|
8.8
|
16.4 w
|
13.9 w
|
4.6 w
|
4.0 w
|
:
|
:
|
6.1
|
6
|
|
Males
|
7) 9)
|
9.1
|
8.4
|
7.7
|
7.1
|
18.3 w
|
16.1 w
|
5.0 w
|
3.8 w
|
:
|
:
|
5.8
|
5.8
|
|
Females
|
7) 9)
|
9.9
|
8.9
|
12.7
|
11.8
|
14.0 w
|
11.1 w
|
4.2 w
|
4.1 w
|
:
|
:
|
6.4
|
6.2
|
|
Youth, aged 15-24
|
7)
|
25
|
23
|
17.5
|
16.4
|
34.5 w
|
28.9 w
|
11.5 w
|
9.8 w
|
:
|
:
|
14.6
|
15
|
|
Long-term (>12 months)
|
7) 9)
|
3.8
|
3.4
|
2.0
|
1.7
|
6.5 w
|
5.0 w
|
0.8 w
|
0.6 w
|
:
|
:
|
2.1
|
1.9
|
|
Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (EUR)
|
7) 10) 11) 12)
|
1 011 iw
|
1 156 iw
|
333 iw
|
491 iw
|
622 iw
|
669 iw
|
622 iw
|
727 iw
|
441 iw
|
494 iw
|
:
|
:
|
|
Education
|
Note
|
Serbia
|
Türkiye
|
Georgia**
|
Moldova***
|
Ukraine
|
EU-27
|
|
|
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%)
|
13)
|
3.4 piw
|
3.5 piw
|
:
|
4.0 iw
|
3.7 iw
|
3.9 iw
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
4.7 d
|
:
|
|
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over)
|
11)
|
71.6 b
|
79.5 bd
|
54.9
|
55
|
:
|
:
|
98.9 w
|
:
|
87.1 w
|
87.1 w
|
94.6 d
|
94.9 d
|
|
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), males
|
11)
|
71.4 b
|
79.2 bd
|
55.3
|
55.3
|
:
|
:
|
99.2 w
|
:
|
87.3 w
|
87.3 w
|
94.5 d
|
94.8 d
|
|
Participation in early childhood education (children aged 3 and over), females
|
11)
|
71.8 b
|
79.8 bd
|
54.5
|
54.7
|
:
|
:
|
98.6 w
|
:
|
86.9 w
|
86.0 w
|
94.7 d
|
95.0 d
|
|
Low achieving 15-year-olds in reading
|
4) 11)
|
36.4
|
:
|
29.3
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
41.0 w
|
:
|
26.2
|
:
|
|
Low achieving 15-year-olds in mathematics
|
4) 11)
|
43.1
|
:
|
38.7
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
42.4 w
|
:
|
29.5
|
:
|
|
Low achieving 15-year-olds in science
|
4) 11)
|
35.1
|
:
|
24.7
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
34.0 w
|
:
|
24.2
|
:
|
|
Early leavers from education and training: percentage of the population aged 18-24 with at most a lower secondary education and not in further education or training (%)
|
|
5.8
|
6.2
|
19.5
|
18.7
|
5.3 w
|
6.4 w
|
17.5 w
|
16.4 w
|
:
|
:
|
9.6
|
9.6
|
|
Male early leavers from education and training: proportion of men aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or training
|
|
5.8
|
6.8
|
20.1
|
19.6
|
5.1 w
|
6.4 w
|
18.6 w
|
16.6 w
|
:
|
:
|
11.3
|
11.2
|
|
Female early leavers from education and training: proportion of women aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education (at most ISCED 2011 level 2) who are not in further education or training
|
|
5.9
|
5.7
|
19.0
|
17.8
|
5.4 w
|
6.5 w
|
16.4 w
|
16.1 w
|
:
|
:
|
7.7
|
7.9
|
|
Education
|
Note
|
Serbia
|
Türkiye
|
Georgia**
|
Moldova***
|
Ukraine
|
EU-27
|
|
|
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks)
|
7)
|
6.1
|
5.5
|
7.4
|
8.0
|
1.7 w
|
1.6 w
|
2.2 w
|
2.9 w
|
:
|
:
|
12.8
|
13.5
|
|
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks), men
|
7)
|
5.5
|
4.9
|
7.0
|
7.3
|
1.6 w
|
1.4 w
|
1.6 w
|
2.1 w
|
:
|
:
|
11.6
|
12.2
|
|
Proportion of persons aged 25-64 having participated in education and training (last 4 weeks), women
|
7)
|
6.7
|
6.1
|
7.8
|
8.6
|
1.8 w
|
1.7 w
|
2.7 w
|
3.6 w
|
:
|
:
|
14.0
|
14.7
|
|
Exposure of vocational education and training (VET) graduates to work-based learning (% of population aged 20-34)
|
|
21.4
|
21.0
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
64.4
|
65.2
|
|
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with at most lower secondary education, total
|
7) 14)
|
6.3
|
6.7
|
23.5
|
21.5
|
5.3 w
|
4.5 w
|
22.4 w
|
21.9 w
|
:
|
:
|
15.0
|
15
|
|
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with at most lower secondary education, males
|
7)
|
5.9
|
7.1
|
24.6
|
22.4
|
4.3 w
|
4.1 w
|
22.5 w
|
22.2 w
|
:
|
:
|
17.5
|
17.4
|
|
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with at most lower secondary education, females
|
7)
|
6.7
|
6.2
|
22.4
|
20.5
|
6.4 w
|
5.0 w
|
22.2 w
|
21.7 w
|
:
|
:
|
12.3
|
12.5
|
|
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with upper secondary or post secondary non-tertiary education, total
|
7)
|
85.9
|
84.6
|
53.8
|
54.4
|
76.4 w
|
78.5 w
|
65.2 w
|
67.5 w
|
:
|
:
|
65.9
|
65.6
|
|
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with upper secondary or post secondary non-tertiary education, males
|
7)
|
87.5
|
87.7
|
58.0
|
59.8
|
79.4 w
|
81.4 w
|
67.4 w
|
68.6 w
|
:
|
:
|
66.3
|
66.1
|
|
Percentage of the population aged 20-24 with upper secondary or post secondary non-tertiary education, females
|
7)
|
84.2
|
81.3
|
49.4
|
48.7
|
72.9 w
|
75.1 w
|
63.0 w
|
66.4 w
|
:
|
:
|
65.4
|
65.1
|
|
Percentage of the population aged 30-34 with tertiary education, total
|
7)
|
38.2
|
40.0
|
39.9
|
41.7
|
35.6 w
|
38.8 w
|
31.3 w
|
35.3 w
|
:
|
:
|
43.8
|
44.5
|
|
Education
|
Note
|
Serbia
|
Türkiye
|
Georgia**
|
Moldova***
|
Ukraine
|
EU-27
|
|
|
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Percentage of the population aged 30-34 with tertiary education, males
|
7)
|
29.8
|
32.3
|
39.2
|
40.3
|
31.2 w
|
33.3 w
|
23.5 w
|
27.2 w
|
:
|
:
|
38.4
|
39.2
|
|
Percentage of the population aged 30-34 with tertiary education, females
|
7)
|
46.9
|
48.0
|
40.5
|
43.1
|
40.3 w
|
44.5 w
|
38.1 w
|
42.5 w
|
:
|
:
|
49.4
|
50
|
|
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74)
|
|
33.6
|
:
|
33.1
|
:
|
34.5 w
|
36.3 w
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
55.6
|
:
|
|
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), males
|
|
35.5
|
:
|
36.8
|
:
|
33.5 w
|
35.9 w
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
56.7
|
:
|
|
Share of individuals having at least basic digital skills (% of population aged 16-74), females
|
|
31.8
|
:
|
29.4
|
:
|
35.4 w
|
36.6 w
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
54.5
|
:
|
|
National accounts
|
Note
|
Serbia
|
Türkiye
|
Georgia**
|
Moldova***
|
Ukraine
|
EU-27
|
|
|
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Gross domestic product
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In current prices (EUR million)
|
11) 13)
|
75 205 p
|
83 258 p
|
1 051 700
|
1 253 387
|
28 464 w
|
31 597 w
|
15 454
|
16 825
|
167 632
|
176 270
|
17 259 390
|
18 043 410
|
|
Per capita (EUR)
|
7) 11) 13)
|
11 350 p
|
12 640 p
|
11 860
|
14 140
|
7 661 w
|
8 541 w
|
6 360
|
7 000
|
:
|
:
|
38 450
|
40 110
|
|
In purchasing power standards (PPS) per capita
|
11) 15)
|
18 600 p
|
20 593 p
|
25 721
|
27 621
|
:
|
:
|
20 910 w
|
23 195 w
|
:
|
:
|
38 366
|
39 985
|
|
In purchasing power standards (PPS) per capita, relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100)
|
11) 15)
|
48.5 p
|
51.5 p
|
67.0
|
69.1
|
:
|
:
|
34.9 ew
|
36.5 ew
|
:
|
:
|
100
|
100
|
|
Real (volume) annual rate of change, compared with the previous year (%)
|
11) 13) 15)
|
3.7 p
|
3.9 p
|
5.0
|
3.3
|
7.8 w
|
9.7 w
|
1.2 w
|
0.3 w
|
5.5
|
3.2
|
0.4
|
1.2
|
|
Gross value added by main sectors
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%)
|
13)
|
4.4 p
|
3.7 p
|
7.2
|
6.6
|
6.9 w
|
6.3 w
|
8.2
|
8.5
|
8.6
|
8.4
|
1.8
|
1.8
|
|
Industry (%)
|
13)
|
22.0 p
|
21.2 p
|
25.6
|
22.2
|
14.1 w
|
14.0 w
|
12.2
|
11.3
|
19.9
|
20
|
20.2
|
19.4
|
|
Construction (%)
|
13)
|
5.9 p
|
5.9 p
|
6.1
|
6.6
|
7.6 w
|
8.5 w
|
8.3
|
8.3
|
1.8
|
2
|
5.5
|
5.5
|
|
Services (%)
|
12)
|
67.8 pi
|
69.1 pi
|
60.9 i
|
64.7 i
|
71.4 w
|
71.2 w
|
71.3 i
|
72.0 i
|
69.7 i
|
69.6 i
|
72.5 i
|
73.4 i
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Balance of payments
|
Note
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Net (inward - outward) foreign direct investment (FDI) (million euro)
|
7) 11)
|
4 261.6 w
|
4 602.5 w
|
4 228.3 i
|
4 737.0 i
|
1 515.7 w
|
1 058.7 w
|
323.3 w
|
332.6 w
|
4 037.3 w
|
3 393.4 w
|
- 60 215.5 i
|
- 150 086.3 i
|
|
Net (inward - outward) foreign direct investment (FDI) (% of GDP)
|
11) 13) 15)
|
5.67 pi
|
5.55 pi
|
0.40 i
|
0.38 i
|
5.32 iw
|
3.35 iw
|
2.09 iw
|
1.98 piw
|
2.45 iw
|
:
|
- 0.35 i
|
- 0.83 i
|
|
Net (inward - outward) foreign direct investment (FDI) in relation to EU-27 (million euro)
|
7) 11)
|
2 123.0 i
|
1 721.0 i
|
1 373.4 i
|
2 020.2 i
|
480.9 w
|
262.6 w
|
:
|
:
|
3 228.5 w
|
2 540.8 w
|
- 25 748.0 i
|
113 753.6 i
|
|
Net (inward - outward) foreign direct investment (FDI) in relation to EU-27 (% of GDP)
|
11) 13)
|
2.82 pi
|
2.07 pi
|
0.13 i
|
0.16 i
|
1.69 iw
|
0.83 iw
|
:
|
:
|
1.98 iw
|
:
|
- 0.15 i
|
0.63 i
|
|
Remittances as % of GDP
|
11) 13)
|
5.25 pi
|
4.58 pi
|
0.02 iw
|
0.01 iw
|
7.92 iw
|
6.40 iw
|
6.71 diw
|
5.66 dpiw
|
0.99 iw
|
:
|
0.14 i
|
0.14 i
|
|
External trade in goods
|
Note
|
Serbia
|
Türkiye
|
Georgia**
|
Moldova***
|
Ukraine
|
EU-27
|
|
|
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%)
|
11)
|
65.7 iw
|
64.4 iw
|
40.8 iw
|
41.9 iw
|
11.6 iw
|
8.7 iw
|
65.4 iw
|
67.3 iw
|
71.1 iw
|
64.4 iw
|
:
|
:
|
|
Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%)
|
11)
|
53.6 iw
|
53.1 iw
|
29.0 iw
|
32.0 iw
|
24.5 iw
|
27.1 iw
|
48.3 iw
|
50.2 iw
|
51.2 iw
|
50.5 iw
|
:
|
:
|
|
Trade balance (EUR million)
|
11)
|
- 8 178
|
- 9 159
|
- 97 406
|
- 77 291
|
- 8 809 iw
|
- 9 544 iw
|
- 4 275 iw
|
- 5 099 iw
|
- 29 005 iw
|
- 32 214 iw
|
35 331
|
133 115
|
|
International trade in goods and services relative to GDP
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Imports (% of GDP)
|
11) 13)
|
59.4 p
|
58.1 p
|
33.8
|
27.0
|
57.9 w
|
55.6 w
|
58.9
|
57.3
|
49.2
|
50
|
48.1
|
46.3
|
|
Exports (% of GDP)
|
11) 13)
|
55.1 p
|
53.6 p
|
31.9
|
27.6
|
49.3 w
|
47.8 w
|
35.1
|
31.6
|
28.3
|
29.7
|
51.7
|
50.4
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Public finance
|
Note
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
General government surplus (+) / deficit (-) (%)
|
11) 13) 16)
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
- 2.3 w
|
- 2.2 w
|
- 5.1 ew
|
- 3.9 ew
|
- 19.5 w
|
- 17.7 w
|
-3.4
|
-3.1
|
|
General government debt (%)
|
11) 13)
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
38.8 w
|
35.6 w
|
35.4 ew
|
38.0 ew
|
83.3 w
|
91.1 w
|
80.5
|
80.7
|
|
Financial indicators
|
Note
|
Serbia
|
Türkiye
|
Georgia**
|
Moldova***
|
Ukraine
|
EU-27
|
|
|
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Annual change in consumer prices (%)
|
11)
|
12.1 d
|
4.8 d
|
54.0 d
|
58.5 d
|
2.1 w
|
1.7 w
|
13.4 w
|
4.7 w
|
12.9 w
|
6.5 w
|
6.4
|
2.6
|
|
Total external debt, relative to GDP (%)
|
11) 13) 15) 17)
|
58.7 piw
|
58.6 piw
|
43.3 iw
|
38.1 iw
|
77.7 iw
|
76.3 iw
|
59.0 iw
|
58.7 piw
|
86.8 iw
|
:
|
:
|
:
|
|
Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro)
|
11)
|
5 104.0
|
2 834.0
|
- 1 949.6
|
691.1
|
4 528.2 w
|
4 260.6 w
|
4 903.5 w
|
5 247.5 w
|
36 459.0 w
|
41 913.1 w
|
:
|
:
|
|
International reserves - equivalence in months of imports
|
11)
|
6.7 iw
|
7.3 iw
|
4.4 iw
|
5.0 iw
|
3.3 iw
|
2.9 iw
|
6.5 iw
|
6.5 iw
|
5.3 iw
|
5.7 iw
|
:
|
:
|
|
Business
|
Note
|
Serbia
|
Türkiye
|
Georgia**
|
Moldova***
|
Ukraine
|
EU-27
|
|
|
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Industrial production index (2021 = 100)
|
11)
|
104.8
|
107.7
|
106.1
|
106.5
|
:
|
:
|
92.8 w
|
92.5 w
|
67.6
|
70.7
|
101.1
|
98.7
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Infrastructure
|
Note
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²)
|
18)
|
38.2 iw
|
38.2 iw
|
14.6 i
|
14.6 i
|
16.0 iw
|
16.0 iw
|
34.0 iw
|
34.0 iw
|
32.7 iw
|
:
|
47.7 i
|
47.7 i
|
|
Length of motorways (kilometres)
|
11)
|
963
|
999
|
3 726
|
3 796
|
271
|
358
|
0
|
0
|
15
|
:
|
76 515
|
:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Energy
|
Note
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
2023
|
2024
|
|
Net energy imports in relation to GDP
|
13) 15)
|
4.6 pi
|
4.1 pi
|
4.7 i
|
3.6 i
|
1.1 iw
|
1.2 iw
|
6.0 iw
|
6.3 piw
|
:
|
:
|
3.2 i
|
2.6 i
|
Source: Eurostat and/or the statistical authorities of the enlargement countries
|
: = not available
|
|
b = break in time series
|
|
d = definition differs
|
|
e = estimated
|
|
p = provisional
|
|
i = Eurostat estimate
|
|
w= data supplied by and under the responsibility of the national statistical authority and published on an "as is" basis and without any assurance as regards their quality and adherence to EU statistical methodology
|
|
** = Data shown for Georgia exclude the occupied breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia over which the government of Georgia does not exercise control.
|
|
*** = The data managed by the National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova does not include data from the Transnistrian region over which the government of the Republic of Moldova does not exercise control, unless otherwise indicated.
|
|
|
|
|
Footnotes:
|
|
1)
|
Bosnia and Herzegovina: The public sector includes NACE Rev. 2 Sections O, P and Q while the private sector includes other NACE Sections.
|
|
2)
|
Albania: Public sector only.
|
|
3)
|
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Since 2023, children who attended a preschool programme prior to enrolling in school and who did not regularly attend preschool are also included.
|
|
4)
|
2022 data instead of 2023.
|
|
5)
|
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Consumer price inflation
|
|
6)
|
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Based on IMF balance of payments manual, sixth edition.
|
|
7)
|
Ukraine: Official statistics for 2022–2025 were not fully produced due to the martial law. It will gradually be produced and disseminated as defined by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, taking into account the specific conditions of producing statistics during Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
|
|
8)
|
Georgia**: Since 2020 - NACE Rev.2, before 2020 - NACE Rev.1.1.
|
|
9)
|
Georgia**: Persons aged 15 years and older.
|
|
10)
|
Moldova***: Includes units with one and more employees.
|
|
11)
|
Ukraine: Since 2014, data for Ukraine generally exclude the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol and the territories which are not under control of the Ukrainian government.
|
|
12)
|
Serbia: Wages and salaries paid to employees of legal entities and of unincorporated enterprises. Wages and salaries are obtained from administrative sources (tax administration records). Average earnings are calculated on the basis of the total amount of accrued earnings for the reporting month and the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) employees.
|
|
13)
|
Georgia**: Based on 2008 SNA.
|
|
14)
|
Georgia**: Persons without education are excluded.
|
|
15)
|
Moldova***: Based on 2008 SNA.
|
|
16)
|
Ukraine: Cash data (Government finance statistics manual 2014, IMF).
|
|
17)
|
Serbia: Official external debt of the Republic of Serbia.
|
|
18)
|
Moldova***: Including data from the Transnistrian region.
|
|
|
|