In Joined Cases T-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95, T-31/95, T-32/95, T-34/95, T-35/95, T-36/95, T-37/95, T-38/95, T-39/95, T-42/95, T-43/95, T-44/95, T-45/95, T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95, T-51/95, T-52/95, T-53/95, T-54/95, T-55/95, T-56/95, T-57/95, T-58/95, T-59/95, T-60/95, T-61/95, T-62/95, T-63/95, T-64/95, T-65/95, T-68/95, T-69/95, T-70/95, T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95 and T-104/95,
T-25/95
T-26/95
T-30/95
T-31/95
T-32/95
T-34/95
T-35/95
T-36/95
T-37/95
T-38/95
T-39/95
T-42/95
T-43/95
T-44/95
T-45/95
T-46/95
T-48/95
T-50/95
T-51/95
T-52/95
T-53/95
T-54/95
T-55/95
T-56/95
T-57/95
T-58/95
T-59/95
T-60/95
T-61/95
T-62/95
T-63/95
T-64/95
T-65/95
T-68/95
T-69/95
T-70/95
T-71/95
T-87/95
T-88/95
T-103/95
and
T-104/95
APPLICATION for annulment in whole or in part of Commission Decision 94/815/EC of
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition),
composed of: P. Lindh, President, R. Garcia-Valdecasas, K. Lenaerts, J. Azizi and M. Jaeger, Judges,
Registrar: I. Maselis, Legal Secretary,
gives the following
Cembureau — The European Cement Association, the Fédération de l'Industrie Cimentière ASBL, Aalborg Portland A/S, the Syndicat Français de l'Industrie Cimentière, the Bundesverband der Deutschen Zementindustrie, the Association of the Greek Cement Industry, Irish Cement Ltd, Italcementi — Fabbriche Riunite Cemento SpA, Unicem SpA, Cementir — Cementerie del Tirreno SpA, SA des Ciments Luxembourgeois, the Vereniging Nederlandse Cement-Industrie and the British Cement Association, from The following undertakings infringed the provisions of Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty by participating in agreements and concerted practices designed to deflect the Greek production surplus and to curb Greek cement imports into the Member States, and in particular: The following fines are hereby imposed on the associations and undertakings concerned, in respect of the infringement found in Article 1, which was put into effect, in particular, by the conduct set out in Articles 2 to 6: The following fines are hereby imposed pn the undertakings named herein in respect of the infringements found in Article 7:
annul Articles 1, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the contested decision; in the alternative, annul or at least reduce the fines imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul the contested decision in so far as it concerns it; order the Commission to pay the costs; and order any measures of inquiry that it may consider necessary.
annul Articles 1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 of the contested decision in so far as they concern it; in the alternative, annul or at least reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul the contested decision, at least in so far as it concerns it; in the alternative, reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs, together with interest on the fine wrongly paid.
annul the contested decision, at least in so far as it concerns it; in the alternative, reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs, together with interest on the fine wrongly paid.
annul, in so far as they concern it, Article 1, Article 2(1) and (2) and Article 9 of the contested decision; in the alternative, reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul, in so far as they concern it, Article 1, Article 3(3)(a), Article 4(1), (2), and 3(a), and Articles 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the contested decision; in the alternative, reduce the fines imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
question the Commission and, if necessary, the Advisory Committee as to the nature and extent of the information which was available and which was provided to the members of that committee, in particular in relation to the amount of the fines envisaged; question the Commission as to the validity of the deliberation of the college of its members, in particular with regard to the conditions under which the latter were granted access or informed as to the arguments relied upon in defence by the applicant and the other addressees of the SO; find that the Advisory Committee was not in a position to rule in full knowledge of the facts; find that the principle of collegiality of the Commission was not observed; annul in whole or in part Articles 1, 2, 3(3), 4(1) and (2), 5 and 9 of the contested decision in so far as those articles concern the applicant; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul Articles 1,3(1)(c), and 9 of the contested decision, in so far as those articles concern it; in the alternative, annul or at least reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul in whole or in part Articles 1, 3(3)(a) and 9, point 20, of the contested decision, in so far as those articles concern it; in the alternative, annul or at least reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul the contested decision; in the alternative, reduce the fines imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul the contested decision in so far as it concerns it; in the alternative, annul or at least reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul the contested decision or, at the very least, Article 1, Article 3(l)(a), Article 3(3)(a), Article 4(1), (2) and (3)(a), Article 4(4)(e) and (f), and Articles 6 and 7 thereof; in the alternative, annul or, at the very least, reduce the fines imposed on it; adopt any appropriate measure; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul Articles 1, 2, 4(1) and (3)(a), 5, 8 and 12 of the contested decision, in so far as those articles concern it; in the alternative, annul or at least reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul the contested decision in so far as it concerns it; in the alternative, annul or at least reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul the contested decision in so far as it concerns it; in the alternative, annul or at least reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul Article 1, Article 2, Article 3(3), Article 4(1), (2) and (3)(a) and Article 9(5) of the contested decision; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul the contested decision, at least in so far as it concerns it; in the alternative, annul or reduce the fine imposed on it; order the defendant to pay the costs and to reimburse to the applicant the expenses and interest incurred in providing a guarantee either wholly or in respect of the amount by which the fine is reduced.
annul in whole or in part the contested decision in so far as it concerns it; in the alternative, annul or reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs; order the Commission to reimburse the whole of the costs incurred by it during the administrative procedure; order the Commission to reimburse the whole of the costs incurred in lodging a security for the payment of the fine imposed; authorise it to summon Franco Buzzi, its managing director, to appear before the Court.
annul in whole or in part the contested decision, in so far as it concerns it; in the alternative, reduce the fines imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul Articles 1, 2, 4, 8, and 9 of the contested decision, in so far as they concern it; in the alternative, annul or reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul the contested decision in so far as it concerns it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul in whole or in part the contested decision; in the alternative, annul or reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs, including the costs and interest incurred in lodging a security or for the possible payment in full or in part of the fine.
annul in whole or in part the contested decision in so far as it concerns it; annul or reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul the contested decision; in the alternative, annul or reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to produce all internal notes, memoranda and draft documents prepared by Members of the Commission or officials of the Commission, minutes of the Commission's meetings and opinions of the Advisory Committee, meetings relating to the dissemination of the applicant's defence, as set out in its Response to the SO and minutes of the oral hearing, within the Commission and the Advisory Committee, in languages other than the original Greek version; the calculation of the applicant's fine, in particular the Commission's draft Decisions presented to the Advisory Committee, in which it is understood but cannot be proven by the applicant, that the following paragraph appears (which does not appear in the contested decision): order that the Commission pay the costs.
annul at the very least Articles 1, 4(1), 4(2) and 4(3)(a) and 9 of the contested decision; in the alternative, reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs, including the costs arising from the lodging and maintenance of the security for the fine.
annul the contested decision in so far as it concerns it; in the alternative, annul at least Articles 1, 2, 3(2), 4(1), 4(2), 4(3)(a), 5 and 9 thereof in so far as they concern it; in the further alternative, annul or reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs, including the expenses of lodging and maintaining the security for the fine.
annul the contested decision; annul or reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul the contested decision in so far as it concerns it and, accordingly, annul the fine imposed upon it; in the alternative, reduce that fine; order the Commission to pay the costs; order any necessary measures of inquiry.
annul the contested decision in so far as it concerns it and, accordingly, annul the fine imposed upon it; in the alternative, reduce that fine; order the Commission to pay the costs; order any necessary measures of inquiry and, in particular, order the Commission to place on the file copies of the chapters of the SO which were not sent to it and all the necessary information to assess the legality of Article 9 of the contested decision.
annul the contested decision in so far as it concerns it and, in particular, Article 1, Article 2(1) and (2)(b), and Article 5 thereof; in the alternative, reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul or modify the contested decision in so far as it concerns it, by annulling or reducing the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs; order such alternative or additional measures as justice may require.
annul in whole or in part the contested decision in so far as it concerns it; in the alternative, annul or reduce the fines imposed on it; annul the Commission's decision of order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul the contested decision in so far as it concerns it; in the alternative, annul or reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul the contested decision in so far as it concerns it; in the alternative, annul or reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs; request the Commission to produce the complete file and all the documents on which it relied in order to justify the contested decision and, in particular, any analysis of the worldwide cement market situation, as well as any study carried out by the Commission on the economic reasons which prompted the applicant to participate in the EPC; authorise the applicant to examine those documents, in so far as they do not contain any business secrets concerning other parties or do not refer to Commission internal documents.
annul in whole or in part the contested decision in so far as it concerns it; annul or reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul in whole or in part the contested decision in so far as it concerns it; annul or reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul in whole or in part the contested decision; in the alternative, annul or reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul the contested decision; in the alternative, annul in part, and accordingly reduce, the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
annul or modify the contested decision at least in so far as it concerns it, so as to cancel or reduce the fine imposed on it; order the Commission to pay the costs; order any other necessary measures.
give a judgment on the present action irrespective of any other related action brought against the contested decision which could cloud the facts as well as the legal assessment of the pleas in law in support of the action brought by the applicant; annul the contested decision or, at the very least, vary it; order the Commission to pay the costs.
declare the application inadmissible in so far as it concerns the rules on fair competition; dismiss the remainder of the application; order the applicant to pay the costs.
dismiss the application as unfounded; order the applicant to pay the costs.
declare the application inadmissible in so far as it is directed at the Commission's decision of dismiss it as unfounded in so far as it is directed at the contested decision; order the applicant to pay the costs.
Section 1 — Cembureau ... ... Section 2 — ...
All the documents obtained during the investigation show that the European cement producers adopted and accepted the
... [The agreement on the establishment of the EPC has] the object of restricting, through the implementation of the home market rule, the scope for the members of [the EPC] to sell within the common market.
It is evident from the above that Europe is the relevant market, consisting of a set of juxtaposed and interdependent markets.
The general recession affecting the industry's domestic sales meant that cement transfers between member countries could have harmful consequences for our industry if appropriate measures were not taken in time as in the case, for example, of the trade between Belgium and the Netherlands which is to be regulated by a protocol shortly to be published in the Official Journal of the EEC.
...
... ...
Exports from Germany to the United Kingdom and Ireland; Exports from France to Germany; Exports from Spain to Ireland and the United Kingdom. A new hot spot is exports from Italy to Switzerland.
... World market developments Situation ... Greek/Spanish Agreement This is unanimously considered as the basic criterion if better export prices are to be achieved, and the risk of a déstabilisation in Europe avoided. Negotiations have been proceeding for several months between four Spanish and three Greek companies, though the mechanism of the discussions was not described. Some results have been achieved, but there has been no effect so far on prices. Discussions have already been held also with Japan and Korea. The general sentiment, however, is that the main problem is to achieve a firm understanding between the major European exporters. ... General conclusions The situation was serious and export prices damagingly low. There was surplus capacity both in West Europe and the Far East, which had to be used in a responsible manner. The Greek and Spanish cement industries were to be congratulated on their efforts to reach understanding, and other member countries were prepared, if requested, to support fully their endeavours. Small quantities expected by other countries would not disturb the market if mutual confidence prevailed.
The reference to a
It is evident from the above that Europe is the relevant market, consisting of a set of juxtaposed and interdependent markets.
The reference to a
... Organisation of Crossborder Trade ... Control Intratrade ... Justification of reasonable price agreements...
Ciments Français, Heracles, Irish Cement, Cementir and Blue Circle: the Cembureau, Lafarge, Irish Cement and Unicem: the document entitled Cembureau (annex 3.17 to its application) and Aalborg (annex 13 to its application): draft minutes of the meeting of the CLC held on Aalborg and Unicem: untitled document relating to the Head Delegates meeting held on Cembureau (annex 3.1 to its application), Irish Cement (point 3.2.5.2.1. of its application) and Cementir (annex 14 to its application): draft minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee held on Cembureau (annex 3.16 to its application) and Irish Cement (paragraph 3.2.5.2.2. of its application): draft minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee held on Cembureau and Irish Cement: letter from Irish Cement to Cembureau dated Cembureau, Unicem, Cementir and Blue Circle: data distributed at the Head Delegates meeting held on Unicem: document entitled Cembureau: letter dated FIC (annex 15 to its application): letter dated
the fact that at the meeting on the fact that at that same meeting a number of participants considered that it was
the first task, with your help, is to set out all the data we have in the three fields in question [namely the three items set down in the agenda for the meeting, including inter-European trade and, in particular, the national price situation]. we shall thus be able to assess the risks entailed by an increase in certain imports coupled with a sharp reduction in certain prices, before this phenomenon has had time to spread in extent and gravity. our objective is..., with your assistance, to identify possible solutions capable of modifying market developments and to propose, at least in regard to principles, certain rules of the game which it is in the interests of all of us to follow. ...
the price levels indicated are approximate but none the less significant. ... the gap between extremes which is between 1 and 2 inevitably constitutes a temptation. it is therefore desirable gradually to reduce the gap, essentially by increasing the lowest prices (two thirds of output are sold at under $50, i.e. well below Japanese and US domestic prices), and also by moderating high price trends.
The Cembureau memorandum sent to the Commission along with the documents on the circulation of price lists between members contains a number of comments, some of which are quoted here: [ The memorandum adds: The memorandum concludes:
Belgium Photocopies of the prices from 1984 to 1986 — more price increases after 1986 System of prices (full control until 1986, public price list sent on to Cembureau) Confirmation over telephone of prices once a year ... Netherlands Photocopies of the prices from 1984 to 1986 System of prices (practically free since 1985) ENCI's public price list.
Luxembourg Photocopies of the prices from 1984 to 1986 (last price change received) System of prices (control) Prices communicated by Ciments Luxembourgeois, the only cement producer.
... Bagged: ...
As pointed out in paragraph 1 above, the discussions at the meetings of Head Delegates related essentially to the need to avoid the risks of any increase in imports, to check the causes of conflicts and to reduce price differences so as to prevent any temptation to export.
Photocopies of the prices from 1984 to 1986 — more price increases after 1986 System of prices (full control until 1986, public price list sent on to Cembureau) Confirmation over telephone of prices once a year Photocopies of the prices from 1984 to 1989— Prices communicated by Aalborg, sole producer System of prices (control) Prices changes approximately once a year, ordinary cement prices supplied to Cembureau Photocopies of the prices for 1985 (no price changes since then, and nothing in 1984) System of prices (practically free since 1986).
transport costs in setting cement prices, relying on documents 33.126/5038 to 5051, 11119 17905 to 17917 et 4869 to 4910, mentioned in paragraphs 1761 and 1/65, as well as documents 33.126/9659, 8155, 9672, 9673 and 4994 to 5000; rebates, relying on documents 33.126/4982, 11221 to 11241 and 17437, mentioned in paragraphs 1761 and 1765; the quality of the product, relying on documents 33.126/17624, 17625 and 17641 to 17646, mentioned in paragraphs 1760 and 1761; conditions of sales and delivery, referring to documents 33.126/4850 and 4853, mentioned in paragraphs 1761 and 1765.
Article 2( 1 ) of the contested decision must be annulled in its entirety in so far as it concerns Unicem, Oficemen and ATIC; Article 2( 1 ) of the contested decision must be annulled with regard to Italcementi in so far as it finds that it participated in the infringement in question before and after Article 2( 1 ) of the contested decision must be annulled with regard to Cementir in so far as it finds that it participated in the infringement in question before and after Article 2(1) must be annulled with regard to FIC, VNC, Ciments Luxembourgeois, SFIC, Aalborg, BDZ, BCA, Irish Cement and AGCI in so far as it finds that they participated in agreements on the exchange of price information intended to facilitate the implementation of the agreement referred to in Article 1 of the contested decision at Head Delegates meetings subsequent to the meeting of Article 2(2)(a) of the contested decision must be annulled with regard to all the applicants concerned in so far as it finds that the circulation of information which took place between them related, so far as concerns Belgian and Netherlands prices, to those two countries' producers' minimum prices for supplies of cement by lorry and, so far as concerns Luxembourg, the prices, inclusive of rebates, of that country's producer; Article 2(2) of the contested decision must be annulled with regard to Unicem in so far as it finds that it participated in the infringement in question before Article 2(2) of the contested decision must be annulled with regard to Italcementi in so far as it finds that it participated in the infringement in question before
Emmanuello understood (following meeting with G. Liduena) that he had three possibilities: Build a clinker plant near the sea Build a grinding plant Close the plant. Negotiate markets. Set up supply company, for supplies either from La Malie, or from Robilante, or through imports (e.g. Greece). I said there was no urgency as we had 15 or 20 years of reserves. The problem was chiefly the operating licence. Buzzi's position: The market belonged to Ciments Lafarge. No desire to enter Côte d'Azur to upset the market. They have had only two or three customers in 20 years. A war is pointless. Agreements must be concluded to avoid conflict. Prepared to consider joint venture.
in so far as it finds in subparagraph (a) that from in so far as it finds in subparagraph (c) that Vicat and Buzzi infringed Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty after
the three last sentences of document 33.322/2901 used in the contested decision, recital 21, paragraph 2, second subparagraph, and recital 49, paragraph 2 (see paragraphs 369 to 372 above) as inadmissible evidence against the three applicants; documents 33.322/512, 513, 549, 550, 566 and 567, telexes sent by or addressed to Cimpor in 1988 and 1989, used in the contested decision, recital 21, paragraph 8 (see paragraph 373 above), as inadmissible evidence against Oficemen; and document 33.322/1399 concerning the meeting of
The agreement constitutes an infringement as from
... The single and continuous infringement relating to the restriction of cross-frontier flows between France and Germany was committed, from
The existence of this agreement is confirmed by the statement made by Dyckerhoff to Ciments Français at the meeting on
Following the exports by Cedest to the German
... In the period 1947-1959, cement was supplied by French (Thionville and Hagondange) and German steelmakers under a specific quota system. Thus, until recently, deliveries were broken down as follows: SCF [Ciments Français] = Cedest = German producers (Dyckerhoff from the Gommel plant and Heidelberger) = ... This generally accepted situation was considerably altered some five years ago by Cedest which, not content with supplying the Saarland market, acquired an entire section of German consumers representing an annual share of some
... Furthermore, Cedest is spoiling the climate which can only result in conflict, a conflict that is liable to spread at a time when we are endeavouring to increase our tonnage. The problem remains unsolved, however, as regards the tonnes taken on the French market by German producers, owing to the attitude of Cedest.
Two years ago, opportunity to speak to G d'A. about Laf. [Lafarge] in Germany Cedest's relations — South Germany The first disruption was Saarland. Rule of the game sharing. France the result being Germany That worked Towards 1970 the Thionvillaise began to supply 20- ...
Talks with Fr. syn. [SFIC] and let's suppose that tonnage increased to the point at which the market was disrupted CLK 25/HOZ 25 and PZ 35 mixture by RMC. Publicity Waited a very long time without doing anything...
It will be noted that the discussions will not concern traditional or even structural interstate trade, e.g. exports from Germany and Belgium to the Netherlands. The hot spots are still: Exports from Germany to the United Kingdom and Ireland; Exports from France to Germany; Exports from Spain to Ireland and the United Kingdom. A new hot spot is exports from Italy to Switzerland.
Ground slag dangerous for mixtures.
JM [Mr J. Marichal] tf [no doubt meaning no... CK to Cedest if no result we are pleasing an in refusing those whom W [Wössingen] we must try to manage without it costing us anything
I believe, if we look at the situation facing us in 1984, that what we discussed at those meetings has worked well. The second problem concerns the future. Ted Brenke expressed during our last meeting the opinion that, if we were to renew our agreement, there would be a demand from the German side that the gap existing since 1984 between French and German deliveries be reduced. I told him that, if this demand were to be maintained, I saw very little hope in our reaching a further agreement. As you remember, there was no logical and, even less, ethical justification for this gap, which was not, in fact, the result of bilateral discussions between French and German interests, but resulted from a far more complicated pattern of discussion which included conflicts between the French parties, and would probably have included conflicts on the German side had we not agreed then to leave Wössingen aside for the time being. I do not believe that we can have so many people agree on something new unless they are under pressure, and the very purpose of a renewal is not to let such a pressure develop...
as regards Cedest, in its entirety; as regards Dyckerhoff, Ciments Français and Lafarge, in so far as it finds that they participated in an agreement on sharing the Saarland market and in an infringement of Article 85(1) of the Treaty after as regards SFIC, in so far as it finds that it participated in an agreement on the sharing of the Saarland market, in a concerted practice with BDZ before 1984, in a concerted practice aimed at exerting pressure on Cedest and in an infringement of Article 85(1) of the Treaty after as regards Heidelberger, in so far as it finds that it participated in an agreement on the sharing of the Saarland market and in an infringement of Article 85(1) of the Treaty between as regards BDZ, in so far as it finds that it participated in an agreement on the sharing of the Saarland market, in a concerted practice with SFIC before 1984 and in an infringement of Article 85(1) of the Treaty after
This system of data exchange is a means of monitoring the implementation of the agreement on regulating sales between French and German enterprises (see paragraph 10 above). A comparison of these data shows that
Defence of European domestic markets by various means, e.g. administrative obstacles, imposition of quality standards, action by Associations, penalising of customers purchasing imported cement. Attacking the export markets of producers destabilising the market by taking the place of Greek suppliers in various countries (Algeria, United States, West Africa, Egypt and Saudi Arabia) or by making Greek exports unprofitable. Boycott of shipping companies controlled by the producers destabilising the market; Studying the possibility of exporting cement to Greece and, if the cost is too high, studying the possibility of Studying the situation of floating silos and intermediaries. Seeking the assistance of international banks to Persuasive measures ( Purchase of available tonnage from producers destabilising the market and its channelling towards the United States (Blue Circle, Holderbank, Lafarge, Cementa/Norcem and others could do this), West Africa (France could be responsible for this), other countries (complex solutions are envisaged if necessary).
the meeting on working party meetings from meeting on eight meetings of the ETF: on meeting of the ETF working subgroup on meeting of the meeting of a meeting at the end of May 1987, connected with Cembureau's general assembly (paragraph 48).
meeting in Rome on meetings of the Zurich/Céligny working group on meeting in Stockholm on meeting of the ETF in London on meeting of the ETF in Milan on meeting of the ETF in Geneva on meeting of the ETF in Geneva on meeting of the ETF in Baden-Baden on meeting of the Head Delegates and representatives of the ETF at Baden-Baden on meeting of the ETF in Geneva on meeting of the ETF on meeting of the ETF in Geneva on meeting of the subgroup
the meeting in Rome on the meeting of the Zurich/Céligny working group on the meeting in Stockholm on the meeting of the ETF on the meeting of the ETF on the meeting of the ETF on the meeting of the ETF on the meeting of the ETF on the meeting of the Head Delegates and representatives of the ETF in Baden-Baden on the meeting of the ETF on the meeting of EEC cement industry representatives on the meeting of the ETF on the meeting of the ETF on
to capture the orders of the principal export markets supplied by the countries threatening the stability of the member countries' markets; to purchase cement and clinker from the countries threatening the stability of the member countries' markets; to market the quantities purchased through market intervention; to export cement and clinker to the countries threatening the stability of the member countries.
conceited practices designed to withdraw Calcestruzzi as a customer from the Greek producers, and from Titan in particular (Article 4(3)(a)); an agreement relating to the contract and agreements signed on
Ferruzzi will in return for its compliance receive the tidy sum of US$ 15 million a year for five years. The sum will be paid partly in securities (Montedison) and partly in cash: Ferruzzi will have to use part of the money to purchase BPE companies or holdings in BPE companies so as to put the coast under lock and key. Two problems remain to be solved: In order to solve these problems, Italcementi requests the aid of its European colleagues. The Italian cement producers will request EEC agreement for application of the Italian Law providing for the introduction of They ask their European colleagues to apprise their EEC representatives so that they will not oppose the request.
the meeting of the ETF on the meeting of Head Delegates and representatives of the ETF in Baden-Baden on the meeting of the ETF of the meeting of the subgroup
a concerted practice between Blue Circle, Castle and Rugby designed to prevent and/or reduce Greek cement imports into the United Kingdom (Article 4(4)(a)); an agreement between Blue Circle and Titan designed to deflect quantities of cement and clinker produced by Titan to the United States and Nigeria and to prevent direct sales of such products by Titan on the European markets (Article (4)(4)(b)); an agreement between Holderbank and Titan designed to deflect quantities of cement and clinker produced by Titan to the United States and Africa and to prevent direct sales of such products by Titan on the European markets (Article 4(4) (c)); an agreement between Holderbank and Heracles designed to prevent direct sales of cement by Heracles on the European markets and to deflect quantities of cement and clinker produced by Heracles to other markets (Article 4(4)(d)); an agreement between Lafarge and Titan designed to deflect quantities of clinker produced by Titan to Canada and to prevent direct sales by Titan on the European markets (Article 4(4)(e)); an agreement between Lafarge and Heracles designed to deflect quantities of cement and clinker produced by Heracles outside Europe and to prevent direct sales of such products by Heracles on the European markets (Article 4(4)(f)); a concerted practice between CBR, Heracles and Titan designed to prevent direct sales by the two Greek producers on the European markets (Article 4(4)(g)); an agreement between Aker, EUROC and Titan designed to deflect quantities of cement and clinker produced by Titan to Africa, the United States and the Bahamas and to prevent direct sales of such products by Titan on the European markets (Article 4(4)(h)).
Item 1 Bulk Freighters
Item 2 Hego
Item 3 Marcon
Item 4 Cebo
Item 5 BCM (UK)
Item 6 East German Cement
Item 7 Cementa
Item 8 White Mountain
Item 9 MHS Cement Sales.
Consequently, all the contracts must be deemed to be agreements in breach of Article 85, not only those concerning supplies in Europe, but also those concerning supplies outside Europe. Such latter contracts also restrict competition since, by virtue of their contractual obligations, the Greek producers selling outside Europe have lost the possibility of marketing all or a large proportion of their goods within the common market, where they were entitled to hope to be able to market them in the light of circumstances and in particular the prices which they could have charged. This applies all the more as the Greek producers had already begun to export to the Community countries which they considered most vulnerable and as the declared aim of the contracts was to halt such exports.
They respect the way we have dealt with them in the USA and feel that their supplying Northern Ireland is not as emotive as to the mainland.
The purpose of the contracts was to prevent direct sales by the two Greek producers on the European markets and to deflect part of the quantities concerned to other markets, and this was known to the parties in question (see paragraphs 1 to 7 and 16 and 17 of recital 28).
Holderbank has also bought
The purpose of the contracts was to prevent direct sales by the two Greek producers on the European markets and to deflect part of the quantities concerned to other markets, and this was known to the parties in question (see paragraphs 1 to 7 and 16 and 17 of recital 28).
The purpose of the contracts was to prevent direct sales by the two Greek producers on the European markets and to deflect a part of the quantities concerned to other markets, and this was known to the parties in question (see paragraphs 1 to 7 and 18 and 19 of recital 28).
... negotiation with Titan is more difficult, Lafarge is looking to incorporate its contract with the contract for the exchange of Dassault aircraft, which would yield a commission (?) of 3% for them. Many bilateral talks between Mr Liduena and the Greeks of course, but also with Hispacement.
The purpose of [that] contrac [t] was to prevent direct sales by the two Greek producers on the European markets and to deflect a part of the quantities concerned to other markets, and this was known to the parties in question (see paragraphs 1 to 7 and 18 and 19 of recital 28).
The Heracles talks seem settled (Lafarge must provide them with a supply timetable next month, once their 1989 budgets are drawn up). Many bilateral talks between Mr Liduena and the Greeks of course, but also with Hispacement.
The purpose of the contract was to prevent direct sales by the two Greek producers on the Benelux markets, and this was known to the parties in question (see paragraphs 1 to 7, 16, 17, 20 and 21 of recital 28).
The purpose of the contracts was to deflect the quantities concerned to markets other than the European markets, and this was known to the two parties (see paragraph 1 to 7 and 22 of recital 28).
The opportunity exists in a number of markets for European Producers to arrange to place tonnage with the For example: USA — 1st priority ...
The concurrence of wills on the part of each participant was expressed at various meetings and, in particular, at the meetings of the Head Delegates as well as through participation in the various actions undertaken. The agreement has the following features: (1) a Task Force, set up by common agreement by the participants in the infringement, examined and prepared the various dissuasive and persuasive measures and the market regulation measures (see paragraphs 2 to 6 of recital 25); (2) the measures were put for decision to the Head Delegates, who adopted some of them (see paragraph 10, 24 to 32 and 40 and 41 of recital 25); (3) the measures were then implemented by the various participants in the Task Force (see recitals 26, 27 and 28).
These agreements and practices constitute clear infringements of Article 85(1). Their object is to partition national markets despite the removal of economic frontiers and to prevent consumers from taking advantage of supply from another Community country. The infringements committed by the undertakings in question as from 1986 are all the more serious as they were of long duration...
Article 4(1) of the contested decision must be annulled in its entirety so far as it concerns Cementir; Article 4(1) must be annulled with regard to CBR, BDZ, Oficemen, Aker and EUROC in so far as it finds that they participated in the agreement on the setting-up of the ETF before Article 4(1) must be annulled with regard to Aalborg, Unicem, Uniland and Irish Cement in so far as it finds that they participated in the agreement on the setting-up of the ETF before Article 4(1) must be annulled with regard to Cembureau, Dvckerhoff, SFIC, Ciments Français, Heidelberger, Lafarge, Asland, Italcementi, Holderbank, and Blue Circle in so far as it finds that they participated in the agreement on the setting-up of the ETF after Article 4(3)(a) must be annulled with regard to CBR, Dyckerhoff, Aalborg, BDZ, Unicem, Uniland, Oficemen, Irish Cement, Aker, EUROC and Cementir in so far as it finds that they participated in concerted practices designed to withdraw Calcestruzzi as a customer from the Greek producers, ana from Titan in particular, before Article 4(4)(a) must be annulled in its entirety so far as it concerns Rugby, Castle and Blue Circle; Article 4(4)(b) must be annulled in its entirety so far as it concerns Titan and Blue Circle; Article 4(4)(c) must be annulled in its entirety so far as it concerns Titan and Holderbank; Article 4(4)(d) must be annulled in its entirety so far as it concerns Heracles and Holderbank; Article 4(4)(e) must be annulled in its entirety so far as it concerns Lafarge and Titan; Article 4(2) must be annulled in its entirety so far as it concerns Heidelberger, Uniceni, Asland and Cementir; Article 4(2) must be annulled with regard to Uniland in so far as it finds that it participated in the agreement on the setting-up of the joint trading company Interciment before Article 4(2) must be annulled with regard to CBR, Dyckerhoff, SFIC, Ciments Français, Lafarge, BDZ, Oficemen, Italcementi, Holderbank, Aker, EUROC and Blue Circle in so far as it finds that they participated in the agreement on the setting-up of the joint trading company Interciment after Article 4(3)(a) must be annulled in its entirety so far as it concerns Ciments Français, Heidelberger and Asland; Article 4(4) (f) must be annulled in its entirety so far as it concerns Lafarge and Heracles; Article 4(4)(g) must be annulled in its entirety so far as it concerns CBR, Heracles and Titan; Article 4(4)(h) must be annulled in its entirety so far as it concerns Titan, Aker and EUROC.
the setting-up of the ETF (contested decision, Article 4(1); see paragraphs 2682 and 2683 above); concerted practices designed to withdraw Calcestruzzi as a customer from the Greek producers, and from Titan in particular (contested decision, Article 4(3)(a); see paragraphs 3252 and 3253 above); an agreement having as its aim the prevention of imports of Greek cement by Calcestruzzi (contested decision, Article 4(3)(b); see paragraph 3396 above).
the memorandum to the Chairman of Cembureau for the Head Delegates meeting of the notes on the Head Delegates meeting of the undated Blue Circle internal memorandum entitled the statement by Mr Schuhmacher recorded in the handwritten note relating to the Head Delegates meeting of
CBR before Vicat before Unicem before Asland before Uniland before Italcementi before Blue Circle before Halkis before
establishes the existence of an agreement concluded on accepts as proof of an agreement not to tranship to home markets concluded on sees in the existence of alleged bilateral or multilateral relations between certain undertakings proof of an agreement linking all the associations which are members of Cembureau and the members of those associations; accepts as proof of an agreement concluded on maintains that the associations which are members of Cembureau and the members of those associations are parties to a Cembureau agreement, since they take part in the considers that the purchase of Greek clinker by CBR formed part of the ETF's activities, whereas the ETF had been dissolved a year earlier; considers that cooperation on exports outside the Community is contrary to Article 85 of the Treaty, without examining the actual effects which that cooperation might have on the Community market.
CBR, before Cembureau, after FIC, after VNC, after Ciments Luxembourgeois, after Dyckerhoff, after SFIC, after Vicat, before Ciments Français, after Heidelberger, after Lafarge, after Aalborg, after BDZ, after Unicem, before Valenciana, after BCA, after Asland, before Uniland, before Oficemen, after Irish Cement, after Cimpor, after SECIL, after ATIC, after Italcementi, before Holderbank, after Hornos Ibéricos, after Aker, after EUROC, after Cementir, after Blue Circle, before AGCI, after Halkis, before
The members of the WCC established close cooperation and a community of interests in which the division of the Community markets forms the basis of a general consensus amongst them. To make it effective, the division of markets was reinforced by the practice of channelling for export to third countries that part of production that was not absorbable by the markets of the countries in which each member is established. The protection of home markets and the channelling of production surpluses for export are thus two inseparable aspects of one and the same obligation.
Most white-cement manufacturers have an easy life within their national borders... Respecting the home market does not suit us, because de facto it limits our natural market in the Benelux.
(Aalborg)
(Ciments Français)
The information exchange system is liable to affect trade between Member States to the extent that it contributes to the implementation of agreements and concerted practices having as their object or effect the prevention or restriction of trade in white cement between Member States. Trade between Member States is also affected because each of the undertakings involved in the exchange of information is induced to define its policies on prices and sales on the basis of those of the other participating producers and, consequently, the natural flows of trade between Member States are artificially influenced to an appreciable extent.
Respecting the home market does not suit us, because de facto it limits our natural market in the Benelux.
the meeting in January 1984, during which it was agreed to set up the new WCC because it was impossible to continue cooperating with Aalborg (contested decision, recital 39, paragraph 7; documents 33.126/2850 to 2852); the meeting on the meeting on the seminar on the meeting on
The Commission must therefore not only find that infringements have been committed, but also require the undertakings to terminate them.
Article 9 sets out the fines Article 10 sets out the fines
inadequate or contradictory statement of reasons in the contested decision as regards the fines; infringements of Article 190 of the Treaty, Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17, and the principle of equal treatment, inasmuch as the Commission imposed a single fine for the group of infringements found in relation to the grey cement market; infringements of Article 190 of the Treaty, Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17, and the principle of proportionality in the assessment of the intentional nature of the infringements; infringement of Regulation No 2988/74 on limitation periods; infringements of Article 190 of the Treaty, Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17, the principles of equal treatment and proportionality, and manifest errors of assessment as regards the duration of the infringement found in relation to the grey cement market; infringements of Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and the principle of proportionality so far as concerns the duration of the infringement found in relation to the white cement market; infringements of Article 190 of the Treaty, Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17, the principles of proportionality and equal treatment, and manifest errors of assessment in assessing the gravity of the infringement found in relation to the grey cement market; infringements of Article 190 of the Treaty, Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17, the principles of proportionality and equal treatment, and manifest errors of assessment in assessing the responsibility of individual undertakings in respect of the infringement found in relation to the grey cement market; infringements of Article 190 of the Treaty, Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and of the principle of proportionality in assessing the responsibility of individual undertakings in respect of the infringement found in relation to the white cement market; infringements of Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17, the principles of proportionality and equal treatment, and manifest errors of assessment as regards the turnover taken into account for the purpose of calculating the fines; infringements of Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and the principles of equity, proportionality and equal treatment in relation to the fixing of the fines in ecus and the choice of conversion rate; infringements of various general principles of Community law; infringement of rights of the defence owing to incomplete access to the Commission file during the administrative procedure.
as against CBR, from as against Ciments Luxembourgeois, Aalborg and Irish Cement, from as against Dyckerhoff, from as against Vicat, from as against Ciments Français, from as against Heidelberger, from as against Lafarge, from as against Unicem, from as against Valenciana, from as against Asland, from as against Uniland, from as against Cimpor and SECIL, from as against Italcementi, from as against Holderbank, from as against Hornos Ibéricos, from as against Aker and EUROC, from as against Cementir, from as against Blue Circle, from as against Halkis, from
the collusion on market-sharing and the associated exchange of information is in itself a very serious restriction of competition; the cement market is a basic industrial sector that is highly important to the building and construction industry and to the economy in general; the undertakings and associations of undertakings participating in the infringements account for virtually the whole of the Community cement market, in which there are moreover no new market entrants; the collusion was institutionalised in a system of international organisations or bilateral or multilateral meetings or contacts designed to regulate and organise the cement market; despite the fact that the collusion took place within an institutional framework that also had legitimate objectives, the undertakings took care, in the case of conduct that might infringe the competition rules, to shroud their actions and/or decisions in secrecy (see in particular recitals 19 and 24 to 28). Although there was discussion of notifying certain practices to the Commission, such notification did not take place (see recital 26).
the infringement with which CBR is charged in Article 4(4)(g) is not established (see paragraphs 3619 to 3646 above); in Article 2(2)(a) the Commission was wrong to find that the system of periodic exchange of price information in which Ciments Luxembourgeois, Aalborg, Unicem, Irish Cement, Itatcementi and Cementir participated related, so far as concerned the Belgian and Netherlands prices, to those two countries' producers' minimum prices for supplies of cement by lorry and, so far as concerns Luxembourg, that country's producer's prices, inclusive of rebates (see paragraphs 1584 to 1593 above); in Article 3(3)(a) the Commission was wrong to accuse Dyckerhoff, Ciments Français, Heidelberger and Lafarge of an agreement to share the Saarland market (see paragraphs 2172 to 2225 above); the infringement with which Dyckerhoff, Aalborg, Unicem, Irish Cement, Italcementi and Cementir are charged in Article 5 is not established (see paragraphs 3771 to 3850 above); the participation of Ciments Français in the infringement found in Article 4(3)(a) is not established (see paragraphs 3208 to 3215 above); the participation of Heidelberger and Asland in the infringement found in Article 4(2) and (3)(a) is not established (see paragraphs 3039 to 3046, 3057 to 3065, 3216 to 3223 and 3254 to 3263 above); in Article 3(1 )(a) the Commission was wrong to accuse Lafarge of participating in a concerted practice with Buzzi involving the sharing of the market in southern France and the restriction of their autonomy of conduct with regard to production sources (see paragraphs 1831 to 1835 above); the infringements with which Lafarge is charged in Article 4(4)(e) and (f) are not established (see paragraphs 3570 to 3617 above); the participation of Unicem in the infringement found in Article 2(1) and in Article 4(2) is not established (see paragraphs 1549 to 1555 and 3047 to 3056 above); the infringements with which Holderbank is charged in Article 4(4)(c) and (d) are not established (see paragraphs 3515 to 3569 above); the infringement with which Aker and EUROC are charged in Article 4(4) (h) is not established (see paragraphs 3648 to 3678 above); the participation of Cementir in the infringements found in Article 4(1) and (2) is not established (see paragraphs 2767 to 2782 and 3076 to 3080 above); the infringements with which Blue Circle is charged in Article 4(4)(a) and (b) are not established (see paragraphs 3402 to 3513).
... according to the information received by the Commission, those agreements and/or concerted practices had [in particular] as their object: ... ...
the fine imposed on CBR in Article 9 is reduced to EUR the fine imposed on Ciments Luxembourgeois in Article 9 is reduced to EUR the fine imposed on Dyckerhoff in Article 9 is reduced to EUR the fine imposed on Vicat in Article 9 is reduced to EUR the fines imposed on Ciments Français in Articles 9 and 10 are reduced to EUR the fine imposed on Heidelberger in Article 9 is reduced to EUR the fine imposed on Lafarge in Article 9 is reduced to EUR the fine imposed on Aalborg in Article 9 is reduced to EUR the fine imposed on Unicem in Article 9 is reduced to EUR the fines imposed on Valenciana in Articles 9 and 10 are reduced to EUR the fine imposed on Asland in Article 9 is reduced to EUR the fine imposed on Uniland in Article 9 is reduced to EUR the fine imposed on Irish Cement in Article 9 is reduced to EUR the fine imposed on Cimpor in Article 9 is reduced to EUR the fine imposed on SECIL in Article 9 is reduced to EUR the fine imposed on Italcementi in Article 9 is reduced to EUR the fine imposed on Holderbank in Article 9 is reduced to EUR the fine imposed on Hornos Ibéricos in Article 9 is reduced to EUR the fine imposed on Aker in Article 9 is reduced to EUR the fine imposed on EUROC in Article 9 is reduced to EUR the fine imposed on Cementir in Article 9 is reduced to EUR the fine imposed on Blue Circle in Article 9 is reduced to EUR the fine imposed on Halkis in Article 9 is reduced to EUR
On those grounds,
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition),
hereby:
annuls Article 1 of Commission Decision 94/815/EC of annuls Article 4(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 4(2) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 4(3)(a) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 4(4)(g) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear two thirds of its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that there were agreements on the exchange of price information at the meetings of the Executive Committee of Cembureau — The European Cement Association, and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(2) of Decision 94/815 as regards the applicant in so far as it finds that the periodic circulation of information between the applicant and its members related, so far as concerns Belgian and Netherlands prices, to those two countries' producers' minimum prices for supplies of cement by lorry and, so far as concerns Luxembourg, the prices, inclusive of rebates, of that country's producer; annuls Article 4(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 9 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; dismisses the remainder of the application; orders each party to bear its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that there were agreements on the exchange of price information at the meetings of the Executive Committee of Cembureau — The European Cement Association, and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(2) of Decision 94/815 as regards the applicant in so far as it finds that the periodic circulation of information between Cembureau — The European Cement Association and its members related, so far as concerns the Belgian and Netherlands prices, to those two countries' producers' minimum prices for supplies of cement by lorry and, so far as concerns Luxembourg, the prices, inclusive of rebates, of that country's producer; annuls Article 5 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; annuls Article 9 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; dismisses the remainder of the application; orders each party to bear its own costs.
annuls Articles 1, 5 and 9 of Decision 94/815 in so far as they concern the applicant; orders the Commission to pay the costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that there were agreements on the exchange of price information at the meetings of the Executive Committee of Cembureau — The European Cement Association, and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(2) of Decision 94/815 as regards the applicant in so far as it finds that the periodic circulation of information between Cembureau — The European Cement Association and its members related, so far as concerns the Belgian and Netherlands prices, to those two countries' producers' minimum prices for supplies of cement by lorry and, so far as concerns Luxembourg, the prices, inclusive of rebates, of that country's producer; annuls Article 9 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; dismisses the remainder of the application; orders each party to bear its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that there were agreements on the exchange of price information at the meetings of the Executive Committee of Cembureau — The European Cement Association, and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(2) of Decision 94/815 as regards the applicant in so far as it finds that the periodic circulation of information between Cembureau — The European Cement Association and its members related, so far as concerns the Belgian and Netherlands prices, to those two countries' producers' minimum prices for supplies of cement by lorry and, so far as concerns Luxembourg, the prices, inclusive of rebates, of that country's producer; fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear two thirds of its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 3(3)(a) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in an agreement on the sharing of the Saarland market and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in an infringement of Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty (now Article 81(1) EC) after annuls Article 4(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 4(2) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 4(3)(a) of,Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 5 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear two thirds of its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that there were agreements on the exchange of price information at the meetings of the Executive Committee of Cembureau — The European Cement Association, and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(2) of Decision 94/815 as regards the applicant in so far as it finds that the periodic circulation of information between Cembureau — The European Cement Association and its members related, so far as concerns the Belgian and Netherlands prices, to those two countries' producers' minimum prices for supplies of cement by lorry and, so far as concerns Luxembourg, the prices, inclusive of rebates, of that country's producer; annuls Article 3(3)(a) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in an agreement on the sharing of the Saarland market, a concerted practice with Bundesverband der Deutschen Zementindustrie eV before 1984 and in a concerted practice designed to exert pressure on Cedest SA and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in an infringement of Article 85(1) of the Treaty after annuls Article 3(3)(b) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds the existence of a concerted practice between the applicant and Bundesverband der Deutschen Zementindustrie eV designed to monitor the destination of French exports to Germany according to the Land of destination and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in an infringement of Article 85(1) of the Treaty after annuls Article 4(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 4(2) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 5 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; annuls Article 9 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; dismisses the remainder of the application; orders each party to bear its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 3(1)(c) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear two thirds of its own costs.
annuls Articles 1, 3(3)(a) and 9 of Decision 94/815 in so far as they concern the applicant; orders the Commission to pay the costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 3(3)(a) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in an agreement on the sharing of the Saarland market and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in an infringement of Article 85(1) of the Treaty after annuls Article 4(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 4(2) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 4(3)(a) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; annuls Article 6 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 10 of Decision 94/815 at EUR dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear two thirds of its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 3(3)(a) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in an agreement on the sharing of the Saarland market and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in an infringement of Article 85(1) of the Treaty before annuls Article 4(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 4(2) and (3)(a) of Decision 94/815 in so far as they concern the applicant; fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear two thirds of its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 3(1)(a) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in a concerted practice with Fratelli Buzzi SpA involving the restriction of their autonomy of conduct with regard to production sources; annuls Article 3(3)(a) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in an agreement on the sharing of the Saarland market and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in an infringement of Article 85(1) of the Treaty after annuls Article 4(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 4(2) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 4(4)(e) and (f) of Decision 94/815 in so far as they concern the applicant; annuls Article 6 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear two thirds of its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that there were agreements on the exchange of price information at the meetings of the Executive Committee of Cembureau — The European Cement Association, and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(2) of Decision 94/815 as regards the applicant in so far as it finds that the periodic circulation of information between Cembureau — The European Cement Association and its members related, so far as concerns the Belgian and Netherlands prices, to those two countries' producers' minimum prices for supplies of cement by lorry and, so far as concerns Luxembourg, the prices, inclusive of rebates, of that country's producer; annuls Article 4(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 4(3)(a) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 5 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear two thirds of its own costs.
annuls Articles 1, 5 and 9 of Decision 94/815 in so far as they concern the applicant; orders the Commission to pay the costs.
annuls Articles 1, 5 and 9 of Decision 94/815 in so far as they concern the applicant; orders the Commission to pay the costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that there were agreements on the exchange of price information at the meetings of the Executive Committee of Cembureau — The European Cement Association, and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(2) of Decision 94/815 as regards the applicant in so far as it finds that the periodic circulation of information between Cembureau — The European Cement Association and its members related, so far as concerns the Belgian and Netherlands prices, to those two countries' producers' minimum prices for supplies of cement by lorry and, so far as concerns Luxembourg, the prices, inclusive of rebates, of that country's producer; annuls Article 3(3)(a) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in an agreement on the sharing of the Saarland market and a concerted practice with the Syndicat National de l'Industrie Cimentière (SFIC) before 1984, and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in an infringement of Article 85(1) of the Treaty after annuls Article 3(3)(b) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that there was a concerted practice between the applicant and Syndicat National de l'Industrie Cimentière (SFIC) designed to monitor the destination of French exports to Germany according to the Land of destination and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in an infringement of Article 85(1) of the Treaty after annuls Article 4(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 4(2) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 4(3)(a) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 9 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; dismisses the remainder of the application; orders each party to bear its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 2(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; annuls Article 2(2) of Decision 94/815 as regards the applicant in so far as it finds that the periodic circulation of information between Cembureau — The European Cement Association and its members related, so far as concerns the Belgian and Netherlands prices, to those two countries' producers' minimum prices for supplies of cement by lorry and, so far as concerns Luxembourg, the prices, inclusive of rebates, of that country's producer and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 4(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 4(2) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; annuls Article 4(3)(a) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 5 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear two thirds of its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; annuls Article 3(1)(a) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in a concerted practice with Lafarge Coppée SA involving the restriction of their autonomy of conduct with regard to production sources; annuls Article 3(1)(c) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 9 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear one third of its own costs; orders the Commission to bear its own costs and two thirds of the costs incurred by the applicant.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 6 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 10 of Decision 94/815 at EUR dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear two thirds of its own costs.
annuls Articles 1, 4(4)(a) and 9 of Decision 94/815 in so far as they concern the applicant; orders the Commission to pay the costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that there were agreements on the exchange of price information at the meetings of the Executive Committee of Cembureau — The European Cement Association, and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(2) of Decision 94/815 as regards the applicant in so far as it finds that the periodic circulation of information between Cembureau — The European Cement Association and its members related, so far as concerns the Belgian and Netherlands prices, to those two countries' producers' minimum prices for supplies of cement by orry and, so far as concerns Luxembourg, the prices, inclusive of rebates, of that country's producer; annuls Article 9 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one quarter of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear three quarters of its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 4(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 4(2) and (3)(a) of Decision 94/815 in so far as they concern the applicant; fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one quarter of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear three quarters of its own costs.
annuls Articles 1, 4(4)(a), 5 and 9 of Decision 94/815 in so far as they concern the applicant; orders the Commission to pay the costs.
annuls Articles 1, 4(4)(d), (f) and (g), 6 and 9 of Decision 94/815 in so far as they concern the applicant; orders the Commission to pay the costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 4(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 4(2) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 4(3)(a) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear two thirds of its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; annuls Article 2(2) of Decision 94/815 as regards the applicant in so far as it finds that the periodic circulation of information between Cembureau — The European Cement Association and its members related, so far as concerns the Belgian and Netherlands prices, to those two countries' producers' minimum prices for supplies of cement by lorry and, so far as concerns Luxembourg, the prices, inclusive of rebates, of that country's producer; annuls Article 4(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 4(2) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 4(3)(a) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 5 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; annuls Article 9 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; dismisses the remainder of the application; orders each party to bear its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that there were agreements on the exchange of price information at the meetings of the Executive Committee of Cembureau — The European Cement Association, and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(2) of Decision 94/815 as regards the applicant in so far as it finds that the periodic circulation of information between Cembureau — The European Cement Association and its members related, so far as concerns the Belgian and Netherlands prices, to those two countries' producers' minimum prices for supplies of cement by lorry and, so far as concerns Luxembourg, the prices, inclusive of rebates, of that country's producer; annuls Article 4(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 4(3)(a) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 5 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear two thirds of its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear two thirds of its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear two thirds of its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; annuls Article 2(2) of Decision 94/815 as regards the applicant in so far as it finds that the periodic circulation of information between Cembureau — The European Cement Association and its members related, so far as concerns the Belgian and Netherlands prices, to those two countries' producers' minimum prices for supplies of cement by lorry and, so far as concerns Luxembourg, the prices, inclusive of rebates, of that country's producer; annuls Article 5 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; annuls Article 9 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; dismisses the remainder of the application; orders each party to bear its own costs.
annuls Articles 1, 4(4)(b), (c), (e), (g) and (h), 6 and 9 of Decision 94/815 in so far as they concern the applicant; orders the Commission to pay the costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 2(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that there were agreements on the exchange of price information at the meetings of the Executive Committee of Cembureau — The European Cement Association, and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 2(2) of Decision 94/815 as regards the applicant in so far as it finds that the periodic circulation of information between Cembureau — The European Cement Association and its members related, so far as concerns the Belgian and Netherlands prices, to those two countries' producers' minimum prices for supplies of cement by lorry and, so far as concerns Luxembourg, the prices, inclusive of rebates, of that country's producer, and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 4(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 4(2) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 5 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear two thirds of its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 4(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 4(2) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 4(4)(c) and (d) of Decision 94/815 in so far as they concern the applicant; fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear two thirds of its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear two thirds of its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 4(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 4(2) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 4(3)(a) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 4(4)(h) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear two thirds of its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 4(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 4(2) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 4(3)(a) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 4(4)(h) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear two thirds of its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that there were agreements on the exchange of price information at the meetings of the Executive Committee of Cembureau — The European Cement Association, and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(2) of Decision 94/815 as regards the applicant in so far as it finds that the periodic circulation of information between Cembureau — The European Cement Association and its members related, so far as concerns the Belgian and Netherlands prices, to those two countries' producers' minimum prices for supplies of cement by lorry and, so far as concerns Luxembourg, the prices, inclusive of rebates, of that country's producer; annuls Article 4(1) and (2) of Decision 94/815 in so far as they concern the applicant; annuls Article 4(3)(a) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 5 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear two thirds of its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 4(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 4(2) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 4(4)(a) and (b) of Decision 94/815 in so far as they concern the applicant; annuls Article 6 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear two thirds of its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that there were agreements on the exchange of price information at the meetings of the Executive Committee of Cembureau — The European Cement Association, and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after annuls Article 2(2) of Decision 94/815 as regards the applicant in so far as it finds that the periodic circulation of information between Cembureau — The European Cement Association and its members related, so far as concerns the Belgian and Netherlands prices, to those two countries' producers' minimum prices for supplies of cement by lorry and, so far as concerns Luxembourg, the prices, inclusive of rebates, of that country's producer; annuls Article 5 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; annuls Article 9 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; dismisses the remainder of the application; orders each party to bear its own costs.
annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before annuls Article 6 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one half of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear one half of its own costs.
Lindh
García-Valdecasas
Lenaerts
Azizi
Jaeger
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on
H. Jung
Registrar
P. Lindh
President