1

By their respective appeals, the European Commission (Case C‑266/24 P), Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV (‘KLM’) (Case C‑269/24 P), and Société Air France SA (‘Air France’) and Air France-KLM SA (‘the Air France-KLM holding’) (Case C‑289/24 P) seek annulment of the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 7 February 2024, Ryanair v Commission(KLM II; COVID-19) (T‑146/22, the judgment under appeal, EU:T:2024:68), by which the General Court annulled Commission Decision C(2021) 5437 final of 16 July 2021 on State Aid SA.57116 (2020/N) – The Netherlands – COVID-19: State loan guarantee and State loan for KLM (‘the decision at issue’).

2

The background to the dispute, as set out in the judgment under appeal, may be summarised as follows.

3

KLM is part of the Air France-KLM group, headed by the Air France-KLM holding. It is apparent from the decision at issue that that group also includes, inter alia, the following companies, namely Air France, Air France-KLM International Mobility, established in Switzerland, Blueteam V, BigBlank, Air France-KLM Finance and Transavia Company, the latter four being established in France.

4

It is also apparent that the French Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands hold 14.3% and 14% of the capital of the Air France-KLM holding, respectively. In turn, that holding company holds 100% of the shares in Air France and, directly and indirectly, 93.84% of KLM’s share capital. That holding company also holds 99.7% of the economic rights, that is to say, dividend rights, and 49% of voting rights in KLM. That holding company holds 100% of the shares in the other subsidiaries.

5

The decision at issue forms part of a series of other State aid measures aimed at supporting the aviation sector in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and, in the present case, the companies forming part of the Air France-KLM group.

6

In particular, by Commission Decision C(2020) 2983 of 4 May 2020 on State Aid SA.57082 (2020/N) – France – COVID-19 – Temporary Framework [Article 107(3)(b) TFEU] – Guarantee and shareholder loan for Air France, as corrected in the last instance by Commission Decision C(2021) 5701 of 26 July 2021 (‘the Air France decision’), that institution authorised individual aid granted by the French Republic to Air France in the form of (i) a State loan guarantee covering 90% of a loan of EUR 4 billion granted by a consortium of banks and (ii) a shareholder loan of up to EUR 3 billion. By the Air France decision, the Commission considered that the beneficiaries of the aid measure which was the subject of that decision were Air France and the subsidiaries which it controls. By contrast, neither the Air France-KLM holding nor its other subsidiaries, including KLM and the companies controlled by that company, were considered to be beneficiaries of that measure.

7

On 26 June 2020, the Kingdom of the Netherlands notified the Commission, in accordance with Article 108(3) TFEU, of a proposed individual aid measure in favour of KLM consisting of (i) a State guarantee for a loan granted to it by a consortium of banks, and (ii) a State loan; the total amount of the aid was EUR 3.4 billion (‘the measure at issue’).

8

Based on Article 107(3)(b) TFEU and on the Communication from the Commission of 19 March 2020, entitled ‘Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak’ (OJ 2020 C 91 I, p. 1), as amended by the Communication from the Commission of 29 June 2020 (OJ 2020 C 218, p. 3) (‘the Temporary Framework’), the measure at issue was intended to provide temporary liquidity to KLM, which it needed to deal with the adverse effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. In that connection, the Kingdom of the Netherlands considered that, in view of the importance of KLM for its economy and air transport connectivity, the failure of that company would have exacerbated the serious disturbance in its economy caused by that pandemic.

9

On 13 July 2020, by Decision C(2020) 4871 final on State Aid SA.57116 (2020/N) – The Netherlands – COVID-19: State loan guarantee and State loan for KLM, the Commission took the view that the measure at issue, first, constituted ‘State aid’ within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU and, second, was compatible with the internal market.

10

By that decision, the Commission considered that KLM was the sole beneficiary of the measure at issue, to the exclusion of the other companies in the Air France-KLM group.

11

On 5 April 2021, the Commission adopted Decision C(2021) 2488 final on State aid SA.59913 – France – COVID-19 – Recapitalisation of Air France and the Air France-KLM holding (‘the Air France-KLM and Air France decision’), by which it concluded that individual aid granted by the French Republic in the form of a recapitalisation of Air France and the Air France-KLM holding totalling EUR 4 billion was compatible with the internal market pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU and the Temporary Framework. That aid included (i) the participation by the French Republic in a planned share capital increase of up to EUR 1 billion and (ii) the conversion of the EUR 3 billion shareholder loan, referred to in paragraph 6 of the present judgment, into a hybrid instrument equivalent to an equity participation. According to the Air France-KLM and Air France decision, the beneficiaries of that aid were Air France and its subsidiaries, as well as the Air France-KLM holding and the subsidiaries which it controls, to the exclusion of KLM and its subsidiaries.

12

By judgment of 19 May 2021, Ryanair v Commission (KLM; Covid-19) (T‑643/20, EU:T:2021:286), the General Court annulled Commission Decision C(2020) 4871 final of 13 July 2020 on the ground that it was vitiated by a failure to state reasons as regards the determination of the beneficiary of the measure at issue. In addition, it ordered that the effects of the annulment of that decision be suspended pending the adoption of a new decision by the Commission under Article 108 TFEU.

13

On 16 July 2021, the Commission adopted the decision at issue, by which, after finding that the measure at issue constituted ‘State aid’, within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, and assessing its compatibility with the internal market in the light of the Temporary Framework, it decided that that measure was compatible with the internal market under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU; therefore, it did not raise any objections to it.

14

By that decision, the Commission took the view, in particular, that KLM and its subsidiaries were the sole beneficiaries of the aid, to the exclusion of the other companies of the Air France-KLM group.

15

By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 16 March 2022, Ryanair DAC brought an action for annulment of the decision at issue.

16

In support of its action, it relied on five pleas in law, alleging, (i) an error of law and a manifest error of assessment in that the decision at issue excluded the Air France-KLM holding and Air France from the scope of the beneficiaries of the measure at issue; (ii) infringement of the provisions of the FEU Treaty and of the general principles of EU law relating to non-discrimination, the freedom to provide services and the freedom of establishment; (iii) misapplication of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU; (iv) infringement of its procedural rights; and (v) infringement of the duty to state reasons.

17

Ruling, in the first place, in paragraphs 15 to 47 of the judgment under appeal, on the plea of inadmissibility raised by the French Republic, alleging Ryanair’s lack of standing to bring proceedings, the General Court held that Ryanair had demonstrated to the requisite legal standard that the measure at issue was liable to have a substantial effect on its competitive position on the market concerned and adversely affected its right not to be subject to competition distorted by that aid. On that basis, the General Court concluded that the action was admissible.

18

In the second place, in paragraphs 49 to 164 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court ruled on the first plea, alleging that the Commission incorrectly excluded the Air France-KLM holding and Air France from the scope of the beneficiaries of the measure at issue.

19

In that connection, the General Court noted, inter alia, in paragraphs 63 to 77 of the judgment under appeal, that the capital and organic links within the Air France-KLM group indicated that the Air France-KLM holding actually exercised control over Air France and KLM by involving itself, directly or indirectly, in the management of those companies and, accordingly, took part in their economic activity.

20

The General Court also held, in paragraphs 78 to 97 of the judgment under appeal, that significant or strategic decisions on financing, investment and fleet were coordinated, or even approved, by the Air France-KLM holding and that the carrying out of joint activities confirmed the existence of a certain degree of integration between that holding company, Air France and KLM, as well as the existence of functional cooperation between those various entities, thereby calling into question the conclusion reached by the Commission that Air France and KLM enjoyed functional autonomy.

21

In paragraphs 98 to 107 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held that the economic links between the Air France-KLM holding, Air France and KLM, relating in particular to the acts of that holding company in favour of its subsidiaries, and to the existence of a certain degree of integration and economic cooperation between those entities, contributed to demonstrating that those entities formed a single economic entity.

22

As regards the agreements on the basis of which the measure at issue had been granted, the General Court pointed out, in paragraphs 108 to 139 of the judgment under appeal, that the Air France-KLM holding was a contracting party to the framework agreement which laid down the general conditions governing the grant of that measure and that several conditions for its grant were expressly subject to the approval of that holding company or were the subject of a commitment on its part. In that context, it considered that the contractual mechanisms referred to in the decision at issue did not support the conclusion that the sole beneficiaries of that measure were KLM and its subsidiaries, to the exclusion of the Air France-KLM holding and Air France, and the subsidiaries controlled by them.

23

In addition, the General Court noted, in paragraphs 140 to 146 of the judgment under appeal, that the decision at issue should have been examined by the Commission in the light of the aid measure which was the subject of the Air France-KLM and Air France decision.

24

Lastly, in paragraphs 147 to 158 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court rejected the Commission’s argument that the aid measure which is the subject of the decision at issue had, at most, merely secondary economic effects vis-à-vis the Air-France-KLM holding and its other subsidiaries. In that regard, it considered, in particular, that the foreseeable effects of the measure at issue, from an ex ante perspective, suggested that that financing solution was likely to benefit the Air France-KLM group as a whole, by improving its overall financial position, which indicated the existence, at the very least, of an indirect advantage in favour of ‘[an] identifiable [group] of undertakings’, for the purposes of paragraph 116 of the Commission Notice on the notion of State aid referred to in Article 107(1) [TFEU] (OJ 2016 C 262, p. 1) (‘the Notice on the notion of State aid’), and not mere secondary economic effects.

25

In the light of all of the foregoing, the General Court held, in paragraph 159 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission had committed a manifest error of assessment in considering that the beneficiaries of the measure at issue were KLM and its subsidiaries, to the exclusion of the Air France-KLM holding and its other subsidiaries, including Air France and its subsidiaries. Accordingly, it upheld the first plea in law and, consequently, without examining its other pleas, annulled the decision at issue.

26

By their respective appeals, the Commission (Case C‑266/24 P), KLM (Case C‑269/24 P) and Air France and the Air France-KLM holding (Case C‑289/24 P) claim that the Court should:

27

The French Republic asks the Court to set aside the judgment under appeal.

28

The Kingdom of the Netherlands asks the Court to:

29

Ryanair submits that the Court should:

30

By decision of the President of the Court of 17 May 2024, Cases C‑266/24 P, C‑269/24 P and C‑289/24 P were joined, in accordance with Article 54 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, for the purposes of the written and oral part of the procedure and of the judgment.

31

In support of their respective appeals in the Joined Cases, the Commission, KLM and Air France and the Air France-KLM holding raise two common grounds of appeal. The first alleges that the General Court’s decision was vitiated by an error of law in that it applied an incorrect criterion for determining the identity of the beneficiary of State aid within a group of companies. The second alleges that the General Court erred in law by substituting its own assessment of the identity of the beneficiary of the measure at issue for that of the Commission, without establishing to the requisite legal standard that the decision at issue was vitiated by a manifest error of assessment in that regard.

32

In addition, in support of their appeals in Cases C‑269/24 P and C‑289/24 P, KLM and Air France and the Air France-KLM holding raise a third ground of appeal, alleging that the General Court erred in law by misinterpreting the concepts of ‘indirect advantages’ and ‘secondary economic effects’.

33

By their first ground of appeal in each of the Joined Cases, which concerns paragraphs 54 to 159 of the judgment under appeal, the appellants complain that the General Court erred in law by applying an incorrect criterion for assessing the identity of the beneficiary of the aid within a group of companies, with the result that it incorrectly concluded that the Air France-KLM holding and its subsidiaries, including Air France and its subsidiaries, could not be excluded from the scope of the beneficiaries of the measure at issue.

34

More specifically, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law in determining the beneficiary of the aid on the basis of the sole criterion of ‘economic unit’. That legal criterion is excessively restrictive and binding and does not take into account mechanisms for distributing aid to a separate legal entity within an economic unit, such as allocation clauses. If that criterion were to be applicable in the field of State aid, it would become practically impossible to distribute the aid in the presence of a single economic unit, which should, however, be possible according to the case-law of the Court of Justice and in the light of the Commission’s policy in that area. The General Court thus incorrectly held that establishing the existence of a single economic unit allowed the aid beneficiary to be determined automatically and accordingly disregarded the fact that, in the present case, the measure at issue was specifically designed to benefit only one entity, namely KLM, to the express exclusion of the other entities of the Air France-KLM group.

35

The appellants state that, contrary to the interpretation adopted by the General Court, the key point for identifying the beneficiary of the aid is to determine which entities actually benefit or could benefit from the aid, as the Court of Justice held, inter alia, in the judgment of 3 July 2003, Belgium v Commission (C‑457/00, ‘the judgment in Verlipack’, EU:C:2003:387, paragraphs 55 to 60). By omitting from its analysis the principles arising from that case-law, the General Court established, in paragraphs 54 to 61 of the judgment under appeal, an incorrect or at least incomplete legal framework, without providing a valid explanation. Moreover, in paragraphs 135 to 138 of that judgment, the General Court incorrectly drew a distinction between the circumstances of the present case and those which gave rise to that case-law and therefore wrongly found it to be irrelevant.

36

According to the appellants, the General Court also incorrectly referred, in paragraphs 55 to 58 of the judgment under appeal, to paragraph 11 of the Notice on the notion of State aid and to an analogy with the judgment of 16 December 2010, AceaElectrabel Produzione v Commission (C‑480/09 P, EU:C:2010:787). While factors such as functional, economic and organic links are relevant for determining whether several entities form part of a single undertaking, their weight and importance vary depending on whether one seeks to identify an ‘economic unit’ or the beneficiary of aid as such, who must actually benefit from that aid.

37

In that context, the appellants submit that the application, by the General Court, of an incorrect criterion for determining the scope of the beneficiaries of the measure at issue caused the entirety of the analysis carried out in paragraphs 63 to 139 of the judgment under appeal to be vitiated by an error in law, in the light of the control rights and the economic, capital, organic and functional links within the Air France-KLM group, and so far as concerns, in the light of those factors, the impact of the precise conditions governing the grant of the measure at issue on its actual effect.

38

The French Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands support, in essence, the arguments put forward by the appellants in their first ground of appeal and consider that that ground should be upheld.

39

Ryanair submits that the first ground of appeal in each of the Joined Cases must be rejected, in part, as inadmissible and, in any event, as unfounded.

40

As a preliminary point, in order to examine whether the General Court, in paragraphs 54 to 159 of the judgment under appeal, applied an incorrect criterion to determine the beneficiary of the measure at issue within the Air France-KLM group, it is necessary, first, to reject Ryanair’s plea of inadmissibility with regard to all or, at the very least, a large part of the first ground of appeal, in so far as it seeks to call into question the General Court’s assessment of the facts.

41

It is true that it follows from the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union that the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to establish the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and, second, to assess those facts (judgment of 25 June 2020, SatCen v KF, C‑14/19 P, EU:C:2020:492, paragraph 103 and the case-law cited).

42

It follows that the appraisal of the facts by the General Court does not constitute, save where the clear sense of the evidence adduced before it is distorted, a question of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (judgment of 25 June 2020, SatCen v KF, C‑14/19 P, EU:C:2020:492, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited).

43

However, in so far as, by their first ground of appeal, the appellants seek, in essence, to demonstrate that the General Court applied an incorrect legal criterion for determining the beneficiary of the measure at issue, that ground of appeal does not seek to call into question the General Court’s determination and assessment of the facts, but raises a question of law which may be subject to review by the Court of Justice on appeal, in accordance with that case-law. Accordingly, that ground of appeal must be declared admissible.

44

Second, it is appropriate to recall the reasoning which led the General Court to find that, contrary to what the Commission had decided in the decision at issue, the beneficiaries of the measure at issue were not only KLM and its subsidiaries, to the exclusion of the Air France-KLM holding and Air France.

45

In that regard, in order to rule on the first plea in law in the action at first instance, alleging an error of law relating to the exclusion of the Air France-KLM holding and Air France from the scope of the beneficiaries of the measure at issue, the General Court recalled, in paragraph 54 of the judgment under appeal, that several separate legal entities could be regarded as forming a single economic unit for the purposes of the application of the rules on State aid and that the question whether there is such an economic unit arises, in particular, where the beneficiary of aid needs to be identified.

46

After having set out, in paragraphs 55 to 58 and 61 of the judgment under appeal, the criteria drawn from the case-law and the Notice on the notion of State aid for determining the existence of an economic unit in the field of State aid, the General Court concluded, in paragraph 62 of that judgment, that, in the light of those criteria and the arguments of the parties, it was appropriate to examine consecutively the capital, organic, functional and economic links between the Air France-KLM holding, Air France and KLM and their respective subsidiaries, the agreements on the basis of which the measure at issue had been granted, and the type of aid measure granted and the context in which it had been granted.

47

Thus, first of all, in paragraphs 63 to 107 of that judgment, the General Court examined the capital, organic, functional and economic links between the Air France-KLM holding, Air France and KLM and their respective subsidiaries, finding, in paragraphs 77, 97 and 107 of that judgment, that those links were factors indicating that the separate legal entities within the Air France-KLM group formed a single economic entity for the purposes of the application of the State aid rules.

48

Next, the General Court examined, in paragraphs 108 to 139 of the judgment under appeal, the agreements on the basis of which the measure at issue had been granted, concluding, inter alia in paragraphs 132 and 139 of that judgment, that the mechanisms provided for by those agreements did not support the conclusion that the sole beneficiaries of the measure at issue were KLM and its subsidiaries, to the exclusion of the Air France-KLM holding and Air France and of the subsidiaries controlled by them.

49

Last, in paragraphs 140 to 146 of that judgment, the General Court examined the type of aid measure which had been granted and the context in which it had been granted, finding that the Commission had failed, in that connection, to take into account the Air France-KLM and Air France decision. In paragraphs 147 to 158 of that judgment, the General Court also ruled on the difference between a direct or indirect advantage and mere secondary economic effects.

50

In order to determine whether, by that reasoning, the General Court erred in law so far as concerns the criterion to rely on to identify the beneficiary of the aid at issue, it should be recalled that, in order to be classified as ‘State aid’ within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, a State measure must, inter alia, confer a selective advantage on the undertaking which is the beneficiary of that measure (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 101, and of 20 November 2025, Stockholms Hamn, C‑401/24, EU:C:2025:902, paragraph 37).

51

In that regard, as the applicants have correctly noted, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that an undertaking which actually benefits from aid must be regarded as a ‘beneficiary’ of that aid (see, to that effect, the judgment in Verlipack, paragraph 55; judgments of 29 April 2004, Germany v Commission, C‑277/00, EU:C:2004:238, paragraph 75, and of 29 July 2024, Koiviston Auto Helsinki v Commission, C‑697/22 P, EU:C:2024:641, paragraph 79).

52

Whereas Ryanair argues that that criterion is applicable only in respect of decisions ordering the recovery of aid already paid, it must be pointed out that that criterion is also relevant where the Commission takes a decision on the compatibility of an aid measure in the context of a procedure laid down in Article 108 TFEU and therefore, as a general rule, prior to the actual payment of the aid concerned. In any event, an aid measure can be assessed, for the purposes of applying the rules on State aid, only in the light of the effects which it produces, including when it comes to identifying the beneficiary of that measure (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2016, Commission v Aer Lingus and Ryanair Designated Activity, C‑164/15 P and C‑165/15 P, EU:C:2016:990, paragraph 68).

53

As regards the concept of ‘undertaking’, as referred to in that context, it must be borne in mind that it is apparent from settled case-law in the field of competition law, including State aid, that that concept covers any entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal status and the way in which it is financed (judgment of 10 January 2006, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others, C‑222/04, EU:C:2006:8, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited).

54

The Court has specified that that concept, placed in that context, must be understood as designating an economic unit even if in law that economic unit consists of several persons, natural or legal (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 April 2017, Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission, C‑516/15 P, EU:C:2017:314, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited, and of 6 October 2021, Sumal, C‑882/19, EU:C:2021:800, paragraph 41).

55

Thus, as is apparent from the Court’s case-law, where several legally independent entities are involved, such as the members of a group of companies, those entities may, where appropriate, be regarded as forming an economic unit and, therefore, a single undertaking for the purposes of the application of competition law and, more specifically, State aid law (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 November 1984, Intermills v Commission, 323/82, EU:C:1984:345, paragraph 11; of 16 December 2010, AceaElectrabel Produzione v Commission, C‑480/09 P, EU:C:2010:787, paragraph 47; and of 6 October 2021, Sumal, C‑882/19, EU:C:2021:800, paragraphs 42 and 48).

56

Accordingly, the General Court was correct to state, in paragraph 54 of the judgment under appeal, that the question whether several legally separate entities form an economic unit arises, in particular, where the beneficiary of the aid needs to be identified.

57

Furthermore, contrary to what the appellants claim, there is nothing to indicate that the assessment carried out by the General Court in paragraphs 63 to 159 of the judgment under appeal was intended to identify as being the beneficiary, within the Air France-KLM group, an entity other than that actually benefiting from the measure at issue. On the contrary, the purpose of that assessment was precisely to ascertain whether, in addition to KLM and its subsidiaries – that is to say, the entity designated by the decision at issue as being the beneficiary of the measure at issue – other entities of that group could also benefit from that measure.

58

In that regard, it should be noted that the elements presented, in paragraph 62 of the judgment under appeal, as having to be examined in order to identify the beneficiary of the measure at issue include not only elements relating to the structure of, and internal links within, the Air France-KLM group, but also ‘the agreements on the basis of which the measure at issue was granted, as well as the type of aid measure granted and the context of that measure’.

59

First, it follows from the Court’s case-law that, as the General Court correctly pointed out in paragraph 55 of the judgment under appeal, the factors that must be taken into account in order to determine the scope of the beneficiaries of an aid measure within a group of companies include the links prevailing between the entities which form part of that group, such as those relating to the existence of a controlling interest by one of those entities in another, as well as other functional, economic and organic links between them (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 November 1984, Intermills v Commission, 323/82, EU:C:1984:345, paragraphs 11 and 12; of 10 January 2006, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others, C‑222/04, EU:C:2006:8, paragraphs 114 to 118; and of 16 December 2010, AceaElectrabel Produzione v Commission, C‑480/09 P, EU:C:2010:787, paragraphs 47 to 55).

60

Second, the General Court correctly pointed out in, inter alia, paragraph 55 of the judgment under appeal, that, for the purposes of determining the beneficiary of the measure at issue, it was also necessary to take into consideration the agreements on the basis of which that measure was granted (see, to that effect, the judgment in Verlipack, paragraphs 56 and 57), which the General Court did in paragraphs 108 to 139 of that judgment. Thus, contrary to what the appellants claim, the General Court fully recognised, in paragraph 134 of that judgment, that such contractual mechanisms can, depending on their actual content and the relevant circumstances specific to each case, enable the beneficiary of an aid measure to be identified.

61

In its assessment of the agreements on the basis of which the measure at issue was granted, given that contractual clauses may allow only one of the companies forming part of a group to be considered the actual beneficiary of an aid measure (see, to that effect, the judgment in Verlipack, paragraphs 55 to 60), the General Court was entitled to examine whether that was so in the present dispute, without erring in law as regards the concept of ‘beneficiary’ of an aid measure.

62

That finding cannot be called into question by the fact that the General Court, in paragraphs 136 to 138 of the judgment under appeal, held that the particular circumstances forming the basis of disputes which gave rise to judgments to which the Commission referred were not comparable, in the light, inter alia, of the contractual clauses and relevant links between the entities concerned, to those of the present case. On those grounds, the General Court did not deny the relevance of such clauses for the purposes of identifying the beneficiary of an aid measure, but made an assessment of the agreements on the basis of which the measure at issue was granted.

63

It follows from the foregoing that, in so far as the General Court relied, for the purposes of determining the beneficiary of the measure at issue, on the concept of ‘economic unit’, it did not apply an incorrect criterion or legal framework.

64

Furthermore, in so far as the appellants claim that the General Court attributed too much weight to some of the factors to which it referred in order to identify the beneficiary of the measure at issue, it is sufficient to note that the appellants do not explain specifically what form such an error might take in the judgment under appeal.

65

In that context, while the appellants claim that the application of an incorrect criterion for determining the beneficiary of the measure at issue caused the entirety of the analysis carried out in the light of those factors by the General Court, in paragraphs 63 to 139 of the judgment under appeal, to be vitiated by an error in law, and criticise, to that end, several aspects of that analysis, it must be held, first, that that argument cannot succeed since it is apparent from the preceding paragraphs of the present judgment that that analysis is not based on an incorrect legal criterion and, second, that it relates, in actual fact, not to the legal criterion relied on, but to the detailed assessment carried out by the General Court on the basis of that criterion, which assessment is the subject of the second ground of appeal.

66

It follows from the foregoing that the first ground of appeal in each of the Joined Cases must be rejected as unfounded.

67

By their second ground of appeal in each of the Joined Cases, the appellants complain that the General Court erred in law and failed to comply with the limits of its judicial review by holding, in paragraphs 59 to 159 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission had made a manifest error of assessment in finding that the beneficiaries of the measure at issue were KLM and its subsidiaries, to the exclusion of the Air France-KLM holding and its other subsidiaries, including Air France and its subsidiaries.

68

More specifically, the appellants complain that the General Court erred in law by substituting its own assessment concerning the determination of the beneficiary of the measure at issue for that carried out by the Commission, without having established to the requisite legal standard that the Commission had committed a manifest error of assessment in that regard. In so doing, the General Court exceeded the limits of its judicial review.

69

In that connection, the appellants submit that although the General Court, in particular in paragraph 59 of the judgment under appeal, correctly recalled the case-law of the Court of Justice according to which the Commission has a broad discretion in identifying the beneficiary of aid within a group, it had, when examining, in paragraphs 63 to 146 of the judgment under appeal, the capital and organic, functional and economic links between the Air France-KLM holding, Air France and KLM, the agreements on the basis of which the measure at issue had been granted, and the type of aid measure and the context in which it was granted, carried out its own assessment in that respect, essentially in the light of the same elements and factors on which the Commission relied in the decision at issue.

70

Rather than establishing, as required by that case-law, that that decision was based on a manifest error which renders implausible the assessment carried out by the Commission, due to substantially incorrect or unreliable facts or the failure to take into consideration all the relevant information necessary for the assessment of a complex situation, the General Court reached – often by attributing a somewhat different interpretation or weight to the elements taken into account by that institution and by relying, in part, on unfounded or speculative assertions – conclusions that were, largely, consistent with those of the Commission or, in any event, not such as to call them into question. Accordingly, following its analysis, the General Court did not find any manifest error committed by the Commission in relation to its examination of individual elements or the weighing or overall assessment thereof. Therefore, the General Court incorrectly, and without justification, found that the decision at issue was vitiated by such an error, in so far as it identified KLM as being the sole beneficiary of the measure at issue.

71

More specifically, as regards, in the first place, the General Court’s assessment of the capital and organic links between the Air France-KLM holding, Air France and KLM in paragraphs 63 to 77 of the judgment under appeal, the appellants submit that that assessment and the conclusion which the General Court drew from it, that is to say, that those links were an initial factor demonstrating that those entities formed a single economic unit, corresponds, in essence, to the content of recital 112 of the decision at issue, which refers, inter alia, to ‘certain … links’ in that regard. In that context, the General Court did not find any manifest error of assessment attributable to the Commission.

72

Similarly, as regards, in the second place, functional links, the appellants note that, like the Commission, the General Court pointed out, in paragraphs 78 to 97 of the judgment under appeal, that there was a certain degree of coordination and integration between the companies of the Air France-KLM group. As regards more specifically Transavia, the appellants state that the commercial relations noted by the General Court, in paragraph 82 of that judgment, also coincide with the factors relied on by the Commission. According to the appellants, at no point does the General Court explain why the veto and approval rights of the Air France-KLM holding, which, moreover, were taken into account by the Commission, are not limited in view of the conditions governing the grant of the aid. The power of control enjoyed by that holding company does not go beyond the traditional prerogatives enjoyed by any parent company that controls its subsidiary. More specifically, in paragraphs 95 and 96 of that judgment, the General Court incorrectly considered that the Commission’s conclusion that Air France and KLM enjoyed considerable autonomy had to be called into question. However, even though the Commission never concluded that each of those entities was fully autonomous, each of them enjoyed a relatively significant independence. In any event, the General Court’s findings in that context are not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a manifest error of assessment on the part of that institution.

73

In the third place, as regards the economic links between the Air France-KLM holding, KLM and Air France, examined in paragraphs 98 to 107 of the judgment under appeal, the appellants submit that the elements demonstrating a degree of coordination between those various entities had been taken into account by the Commission and that, contrary to what the General Court states in paragraph 104 of that judgment, the Commission never considered that the various entities concerned were fully autonomous, but only that they enjoyed considerable de facto economic autonomy, as is shown by the fact, among others, that the commercial transactions between those entities were carried out under normal market conditions. In particular, the General Court, inter alia in paragraph 102 of that judgment, drew excessive and incorrect conclusions from Transavia’s position within the Air France-KLM group, inter alia, because of a shared brand and website and the joint order of a large number of aircraft. In actual fact, the existence of a certain degree of integration and cooperation between the subsidiaries of a group is normal, since such activities merely follow that logic. Moreover, the assumptions set out by the General Court, in paragraphs 100, 105 and 106 of that judgment, according to which Air France and the Air France-KLM holding may benefit indirectly from the measure at issue, are in part unfounded and speculative and in actual fact relate to secondary economic effects.

74

In the fourth place, as regards the examination of the agreements on the basis of which the measure at issue was granted, which the General Court carried out in paragraphs 108 to 139 of the judgment under appeal, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in finding that the Commission had made a manifest error of assessment in concluding that those agreements included sufficient safeguards for KLM alone to benefit from that measure.

75

In that regard, in so far as the General Court relied, to that end, inter alia, on the fact that the Air France-KLM holding was a party to the agreement, that the financing was also subject to its approval and that the Air France-KLM holding had entered into a series of commitments concerning KLM, the appellants note that none of those factors made it possible to demonstrate that the Air France-KLM group formed in actual fact an economic unit and that the measure at issue also benefited Air France or that holding company. They maintain that, on the contrary, examined as a whole, the agreements underlying the measure at issue contained a comprehensive network of safeguards designed to ensure that KLM alone benefits from that measure and both KLM and the holding company were contractually obliged to respect those safeguards.

76

The fact that, in general, a holding company has approval rights typical of a controlling shareholder does not mean that it must, based on that fact alone, be considered to be a beneficiary of aid granted to an entity over which it exercises such control. In the present case, the Air France-KLM holding was a party to the agreements underlying the measure at issue only owing to its capacity as main shareholder of KLM, in order to ensure that KLM complied with its obligations.

77

In addition, according to the appellants, in assessing the contractual clauses at issue, in paragraphs 122 to 126 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court incorrectly and with no substantive basis considered that the effect of those clauses was that the Air France-KLM holding and Air France indirectly benefited from the measure at issue. In so doing, the General Court again incorrectly classified those effects as ‘indirect advantages’, whereas they were in fact secondary economic effects.

78

In the fifth place, as regards the assessment carried out, in paragraphs 140 to 146 of the judgment under appeal, relating to the type of aid measure and its context, the appellants submit that the General Court incorrectly criticises the Commission for failing to take account of the cumulative effects of the Air France decision, the Air France-KLM and Air France decision and the decision at issue. They observe, first, that the General Court did acknowledge, in paragraph 141 of that judgment, that the Commission had examined, in the decision at issue, whether that first decision was relevant for the purposes of its assessment, concluding that that was not the case, given that Air France was the sole beneficiary of the aid referred to in that decision and that it was not, by contrast, a beneficiary of the measure at issue. Second, the General Court erred, and exceeded the limits of its judicial review, by concluding that there was a chronological, structural and economic link between the decision at issue and the Air France-KLM and Air France decision. The decision at issue was initially adopted on 13 July 2020 and should therefore be regarded as predating the Air France-KLM and Air France decision.

79

Ryanair disputes the arguments put forward by the appellants and submits that the second ground of appeal in the Joined Cases must be rejected as inadmissible and, in any event, as unfounded. They contend, in essence, that the grounds of the judgment under appeal concerned by the present ground should be upheld since the General Court did not, inter alia, exceed the limits of the judicial review which it is required to carry out.

80

It should be noted, at the outset, that it is apparent from settled case-law, referred to by the General Court in paragraphs 59 and 60 of the judgment under appeal, that, for the purpose of assessing the compatibility of State aid measures with the internal market under Article 107(3) TFEU, including the determination of the identity of the beneficiary of such a measure, the Commission enjoys wide discretion, the exercise of which involves complex economic and social assessments (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 December 2010, AceaElectrabel Produzione v Commission, C‑480/09 P, EU:C:2010:787, paragraph 63, and of 23 April 2026, Deutsche Lufthansa v Ryanair and Condor Flugdienst, C‑457/23 P, EU:C:2026:331, paragraphs 56 and 57 and the case-law cited).

81

A manifest error in the exercise of that discretion may be demonstrated by evidence which renders implausible the Commission’s assessment of the facts in its decision. By contrast, the plea must be rejected if, despite the evidence put forward by the applicants, the contested assessment does not appear to be vitiated by such an error (judgment of 23 April 2026, Deutsche Lufthansa v Ryanair and Condor Flugdienst, C‑457/23 P, EU:C:2026:331, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

82

However, the EU judicature must, inter alia, establish not only whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that evidence contains all the relevant information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it (judgment of 23 April 2026, Deutsche Lufthansa v Ryanair and Condor Flugdienst, C‑457/23 P, EU:C:2026:331, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).

83

In addition, and more generally, the General Court cannot substitute its own reasoning for that of the author of the contested act (see judgment of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 117 and the case-law cited).

84

As regards the admissibility of the second ground of the appeals, it is necessary, as a preliminary point, to reject Ryanair’s plea of inadmissibility in respect of that ground of appeal in its entirety, in so far as it seeks to call into question the General Court’s assessment of the facts.

85

Indeed, by that ground of appeal, the appellants complain, in essence, that the General Court failed to establish to the requisite legal standard that the Commission committed a manifest error of assessment as regards the identification of the beneficiary of the measure at issue. However, that ground of appeal raises, as is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice referred to in paragraphs 80 to 82 of the present judgment, a question of law which may therefore be subject to review by the Court on appeal, in accordance with the case-law of the Court referred to in paragraphs 41 and 42 of the present judgment. Accordingly, the second ground of appeal must be declared admissible.

86

As to the substance, in the light of the Court’s case-law referred to in paragraphs 80 to 83 of the present judgment, it is necessary to determine whether – as it is claimed in the second ground of appeal – the General Court erred in law and exceeded the limits of the review which it is required to carry out in that regard by holding that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment because it considered that KLM and its subsidiaries were the sole beneficiaries of the measure at issue. In particular, it is necessary to examine whether the General Court did indeed rely, in paragraphs 59 to 159 of the judgment under appeal, on evidential elements which are sufficient, taken individually or as a whole, to render implausible that factual assessment, carried out by the Commission, inter alia, in recitals 112 to 118 of the decision at issue.

87

In that respect, it should be recalled that, in order to determine whether the Commission had made a manifest error of assessment in identifying KLM as the beneficiary of the measure at issue, the General Court examined in turn, first, the capital and organic links between the Air France-KLM holding and KLM, second, the functional links between them, third, the economic links between them, fourth, the agreements on the basis of which that measure was granted, fifth, the type of aid measure granted and its context and, sixth, the Commission’s argument that that measure produces only mere secondary economic effects for the Air France-KLM holding and Air France.

88

In the first place, it should be noted that, in each of the successive stages of its examination, the General Court stated that the Commission had made various errors of assessment without however formally finding that one of those errors was manifest in nature or indicating, even implicitly, that one of those errors may render the conclusion reached by the Commission implausible.

89

In the second place, it must be stated that, as the appellants claim, in its analysis of the beneficiary of the measure at issue within the Air France-KLM group, the General Court ultimately reached conclusions on decisive aspects of that analysis that were broadly consistent with those of the Commission.

90

Thus, in particular, when the General Court refers, in paragraphs 95, 100 and 103 of the judgment under appeal respectively, to the existence of ‘a certain degree of functional integration and cooperation’, ‘a degree of economic interdependence’ or ‘a degree of economic integration and cooperation’ within the Air France-KLM group, those are factual findings which correspond, in essence, to those of the Commission in that regard, as is apparent from recitals 112 and 114 of the decision at issue, in which, first, that institution acknowledged that there were ‘certain functional, economic and organic links’ between the entities forming part of that group, while concluding, second, that, despite those links, KLM and Air France enjoyed ‘de facto considerable functional, economic and organic autonomy’.

91

In the third place, it should be pointed out that the General Court essentially confined itself to re-examining the same factors and the same facts than those relied on in the decision at issue, by carrying out an assessment of those factors and facts which was presented as departing in part from that of the Commission, without, however, making any criticism capable of demonstrating that the Commission’s assessment of those factors and facts was manifestly incorrect.

92

In that connection, as regards, first, the General Court’s assessment of the capital and organic links between the Air France-KLM holding, Air France and KLM in paragraphs 63 to 77 of the judgment under appeal, it should be noted that the General Court confined itself, in paragraphs 66, 68 and 69 of that judgment, to recalling certain structural characteristics of the Air France-KLM group, such as, as was apparent from Section 2.5.1. of the decision at issue, the power of control which the Air France-KLM holding held over KLM as a result of its veto rights vis-à-vis its subsidiaries and the right of approval which that holding company enjoyed in respect of the financing transactions of its subsidiaries exceeding EUR 150 million.

93

Second, concerning the analysis carried out by the General Court in paragraphs 78 to 97 of the judgment under appeal covering the functional links between the Air France-KLM holding, Air France and KLM, it should be noted that, in paragraphs 78 to 80 of that judgment, the General Court relied on elements relating to those links which are apparent from the decision at issue, to find, in paragraph 81 of that judgment, the existence of ‘a degree of integration’ between those three entities and, in particular, in paragraph 82 of that judgment, the existence of ‘a degree of functional coordination’ within the Air France-KLM group. Similarly, in paragraphs 83 to 95 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court referred to various characteristics of the Air France-KLM group in the decision at issue to highlight certain aspects of the functional links within that group, relating, inter alia, to the role of the Air France-KLM holding in the financing of that group, in its operations relating to the fleet and in the commercial field, aspect which the Commission had taken into account in the decision at issue to establish the existence of certain functional links within that group.

94

As regards, third, the economic links between the Air France-KLM holding, Air France and KLM, examined in paragraphs 98 to 107 of that judgment, it should be noted that the General Court relied on facts put forward by the Commission in recitals 43 to 46 of the decision at issue, relating to the economic links between, on the one hand, that holding company and KLM and, on the other hand, KLM and Air France, in order to conclude, in paragraph 100 of that judgment, that there was ‘a degree of economic interdependence’ between that holding company and its subsidiaries. In addition, the General Court found, in paragraph 103 of the judgment under appeal, that, inter alia, the cost-sharing agreements between Air France and KLM, referred to in the decision at issue, confirmed that there was ‘a degree of economic integration and cooperation’ between those entities. Furthermore, the General Court found, in paragraph 104 of that judgment, in the light of the factors relating to the financial and commercial relations between the entities forming the Air France-KLM group, as set out in recitals 44 to 46 of the decision at issue, that those factors were not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of economic autonomy on the part of those entities.

95

As the appellants correctly submit, such findings and grounds are not such as to call into question, to the point of rendering them implausible, the Commission’s corresponding assessments, in particular in recitals 113 and 117 of that decision, according to which, despite such links within the Air France-KLM group, Air France and KLM each enjoyed, de facto, ‘considerable economic autonomy’.

96

Fourth, the General Court examined, in paragraphs 108 to 139 of the judgment under appeal, the agreements on the basis of which the measure at issue was granted. In that regard, it referred to the contractual commitments taken into account by the Commission in the decision at issue, without expressly calling into question the Commission’s assessment that those commitments could be regarded as being equivalent to an allocation clause, but by merely stating, in essence, that the Air France-KLM holding had approved some of those commitments and that it could not be ruled out that it may benefit indirectly from the measure at issue.

97

As the appellants submit, the effects of the contractual commitments intended to ensure that an aid measure is allocated to a company are not excluded or limited by the fact that those commitments were made by a holding company owning that company. Furthermore, the fact that such commitments do not completely eliminate the secondary effects of an aid measure which necessarily result from the ownership of that company by that holding company is not capable, as such, of precluding those commitments from being regarded as being a decisive allocation clause for the purpose of identifying the actual beneficiary of an aid measure.

98

In the fourth place, while the General Court also relied on certain facts arising not from the decision at issue but from items of evidence submitted during the proceedings at first instance, those facts are not sufficient to demonstrate that the Commission’s assessment of the identification of the beneficiary of the measure at issue was implausible.

99

Thus, while, in paragraphs 70 to 77 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court based its finding of the existence of certain mixed bodies entrusted with a coordinating function within the Air France-KLM group on an extract from the ‘2019 Universal Registration Document’ of that holding company, which had been produced by Ryanair, such findings do not, as such, demonstrate an error of assessment on the part of the Commission that is so manifest that that assessment is implausible.

100

Similarly, while the General Court set out, in paragraph 82 of the judgment under appeal, considerations relating to the links between a number of companies containing the name ‘Transavia’ within the Air France-KLM group, those considerations cannot be regarded as demonstrating to the requisite legal standard evidence which renders implausible the Commission’s assessment that Air France and KLM enjoyed functional autonomy. It must also be stated that the General Court merely inferred from those considerations the existence of ‘a degree of functional and commercial cooperation between two subsidiaries of Air France and KLM’, while, in the decision at issue, the Commission had itself referred to a certain degree of functional and commercial integration within the Air France-KLM group.

101

That analysis may be applied, mutatis mutandis, in the case of the bond issues referred to in paragraph 88 of the judgment under appeal and the joint order of aircraft for KLM, Transavia Airlines CV and Transavia France SAS referred to, in paragraph 102 of that judgment, to demonstrate the financial role of the Air France-KLM holding.

102

Furthermore, as regards the analysis which the General Court carried out, in paragraphs 140 to 146 of that judgment, concerning the type of aid measure at issue in the present case and the context of that measure, while the General Court criticised the Commission for not having taken into consideration the Air France-KLM and Air France decision, it is not apparent from the judgment under appeal that, according to the General Court, that omission on the part of the Commission was such as to alter that institution’s assessment to the point of rendering it implausible. The General Court did not in any way explain how that decision is, as such, relevant for the purpose of establishing whether KLM was an economic unit sufficiently distinct from Air France and the Air France-KLM holding so that the advantage resulting from the grant of the measure at issue does not benefit those companies.

103

In the fifth place, as regards paragraphs 147 to 158 of the judgment under appeal, since those paragraphs merely reject, for explanatory purposes, an argument put forward by the Commission before the General Court, without affecting the decision at issue, they cannot establish that that decision is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment.

104

In the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be held that, by holding, in paragraph 159 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission had made a manifest error of assessment in finding that KLM and its subsidiaries were the sole beneficiaries of the measure at issue, the General Court ultimately substituted its assessment for that of the Commission, by giving, overall, a different weighting to the relevance to be attributed to each of the elements enabling the beneficiary of the measure at issue to be determined and by adopting a different view of the degree of integration from which it may be concluded that a group of companies constitutes such a beneficiary, without demonstrating that the conclusion reached by the Commission was implausible.

105

It follows that the General Court erred in law and that the second ground of appeal raised by the appellants in support of their respective appeals in the Joined Cases must therefore be upheld.

106

In the light of all those considerations, the judgment under appeal must be set aside, without it being necessary to examine the third ground of appeal in Cases C‑269/24 P and C‑289/24 P.

107

In accordance with the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, if the Court quashes the decision of the General Court, it may itself give final judgment in the matter, where the state of the proceedings so permits.

108

That is true, in the present case, of the first plea in law in the action at first instance, alleging that the Commission erred in law and made a manifest error of assessment in finding that only KLM and its subsidiaries were the beneficiaries of the measure at issue, to the exclusion of the Air France-KLM holding and Air France.

109

It must be stated that the grounds relied on by the General Court, in paragraphs 63 to 159 of the judgment under appeal, in order to find that the Commission made such a manifest error of assessment cover all the arguments put forward by Ryanair at first instance, in the context of that plea, in order to demonstrate the existence of that error.

110

It follows from the considerations set out in paragraphs 80 to 105 of the present judgment that those grounds of the judgment under appeal are not sufficient to establish that the Commission committed that manifest error of assessment, with the result that that ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.

111

By contrast, as regards the second to fifth pleas in law in the action at first instance, alleging, in the case of the second plea, infringement of the provisions of the FEU Treaty and of the general principles of law relating to non-discrimination, freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment; in the case of the third, misapplication of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU; in the case of the fourth, infringement of Ryanair’s procedural rights; and, in the case of the fifth plea, infringement of the obligation to state reasons, the state of the proceedings does not permit final judgment to be given.

112

Those second to fifth pleas relating, for the most part, to the merits of the decision at issue, which the General Court did not examine, require factual assessments to be carried out, in relation to which the Court of Justice does not have before it all the necessary information.

113

Consequently, it is necessary to refer the case back to the General Court for judgment on the pleas referred to in paragraph 111 above and to reserve the costs.

On those grounds, the Court (Third Chamber) hereby: