<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><CONCLUSION NNC="YES" xmlns:fmx="http://opoce" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://formex.publications.europa.eu/schema/formex-05.58-20161101.xd"><BIB.CONCLUSION><REF.CASE FILE="n.a."><NO.CASE>C-78/18</NO.CASE></REF.CASE><NO.CELEX>62018CC0078</NO.CELEX><NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2020:1">EU:C:2020:1</NO.ECLI><NO.SEQ>0001</NO.SEQ><PAGE.FIRST.ECR>1</PAGE.FIRST.ECR><PAGE.SEQ>1</PAGE.SEQ><PAGE.LAST.ECR>26</PAGE.LAST.ECR><PAGE.TOTAL>26</PAGE.TOTAL></BIB.CONCLUSION><CURR.TITLE><PAGE.HEADER><P><HT TYPE="SC">Opinion of Mr Campos Sánchez-Bordona — Case C‑78/18</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="SC">Commission v Hungary (Transparency of associations)</HT></P></PAGE.HEADER></CURR.TITLE><TITLE><TI><P><HT TYPE="UC">Opinion of Advocate General</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="UC">Campos Sánchez-Bordona</HT></P><P>delivered on <DATE ISO="20200114">14 January 2020</DATE><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0001"><P>Original language: Spanish.</P></NOTE></P></TI><STI><P><HT TYPE="BOLD">Case C‑78/18</HT></P><P>European Commission</P><P>v</P><P>Hungary</P><P>(Transparency of associations)</P></STI></TITLE><INTERMEDIATE><INDEX IDX.CLOSE=")" SEPARATOR=" — " IDX.OPEN="("><KEYWORD>Action for failure to fulfil obligations</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Free movement of capital</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Articles 63 TFEU and 65 TFEU</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Respect for private life</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Protection of personal data</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Freedom of association</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Transparency</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Articles 7, 8 and 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Foreign donations to non-governmental organisations which carry on their activity in a Member State</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>National legislation imposing on non-governmental organisations in receipt of support from abroad legally binding obligations of registration, declaration and transparency which can be enforced</KEYWORD></INDEX></INTERMEDIATE><CONTENTS.CONCLUSION><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0001"><NO.P>1.</NO.P><TXT>In an action brought by the Commission, the Court is required to adjudicate on whether Hungary, in establishing by law<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0002"><P>A külföldről támogatott szervezetek átláthatóságáról szóló 2017. évi LXXVI. törvény ((Law No LXXVI of 2017 on the transparency of organisations which receive support from abroad; <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0001" REF.END="QE0001"/>Law No LXXVI of 2017<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0001" CODE="2019" ID="QE0001"/>).</P></NOTE> certain restrictions on donations received from abroad for the benefit of so-called <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0002" REF.END="QE0002"/>civil society organisations<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0002" CODE="2019" ID="QE0002"/>, has failed to fulfil the obligations incumbent on it under Article 63 TFEU and Articles 7, 8 and 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0003" REF.END="QE0003"/>the Charter<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0003" CODE="2019" ID="QE0003"/>).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0002"><NO.P>2.</NO.P><TXT>The Court must rule on the action for failure to fulfil obligations brought by the Commission, by again approaching the judicial review of a Member State’s actions in such a way that, in its analysis, the fundamental freedoms laid down in the Treaties dovetail harmoniously with the rights protected by the Charter.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">I.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Legislative framework</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">A.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">EU law</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">1.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">FEU Treaty</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0003"><NO.P>3.</NO.P><TXT>Article 63 TFEU reads:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><PARAG IDENTIFIER="063.001"><NO.PARAG><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0004" REF.END="QE0004"/>1.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.</ALINEA></PARAG><?PAGE NO="2"?><PARAG IDENTIFIER="063.002"><NO.PARAG>2.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions on payments between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0004" CODE="2019" ID="QE0004"/></ALINEA></PARAG></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0004"><NO.P>4.</NO.P><TXT>Article 65 TFEU provides:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><PARAG IDENTIFIER="065.001"><NO.PARAG><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0005" REF.END="QE0005"/>1.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA><P>The provisions of Article 63 shall be without prejudice to the right of Member States:</P><LIST TYPE="alpha"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>a)</NO.P><TXT>to apply the relevant provisions of their tax law which distinguish between taxpayers who are not in the same situation with regard to their place of residence or with regard to the place where their capital is invested;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>b)</NO.P><TXT>to take all requisite measures to prevent infringements of national law and regulations, in particular in the field of taxation and the prudential supervision of financial institutions, or to lay down procedures for the declaration of capital movements for purposes of administrative or statistical information, or to take measures which are justified on grounds of public policy or public security.</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="065.002"><NO.PARAG>2.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>The provisions of this Chapter shall be without prejudice to the applicability of restrictions on the right of establishment which are compatible with the Treaties.</ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="065.003"><NO.PARAG>3.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>The measures and procedures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on the free movement of capital and payments as defined in Article 63.</ALINEA><ALINEA>…<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0005" CODE="2019" ID="QE0005"/></ALINEA></PARAG></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">2.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The Charter</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0005"><NO.P>5.</NO.P><TXT>Article 7 states:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><ALINEA><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0006" REF.END="QE0006"/>Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0006" CODE="2019" ID="QE0006"/></ALINEA></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0006"><NO.P>6.</NO.P><TXT>Article 8 stipulates:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><PARAG IDENTIFIER="008.001"><NO.PARAG><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0007" REF.END="QE0007"/>1.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.</ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="008.002"><NO.PARAG>2.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.</ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="008.003"><NO.PARAG>3.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0007" CODE="2019" ID="QE0007"/></ALINEA></PARAG></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0007"><NO.P>7.</NO.P><TXT>In accordance with Article 12(1):</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><ALINEA><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0008" REF.END="QE0008"/>Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association at all levels, in particular in political, trade union and civic matters, which implies the right of everyone to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his or her interests.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0008" CODE="2019" ID="QE0008"/></ALINEA></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0008"><NO.P>8.</NO.P><TXT>Article 52 provides:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><PARAG IDENTIFIER="052.001"><NO.PARAG><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0009" REF.END="QE0009"/>1.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.</ALINEA><?PAGE NO="3"?><ALINEA>…</ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="052.003"><NO.PARAG>3.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.</ALINEA><ALINEA>…<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0009" CODE="2019" ID="QE0009"/></ALINEA></PARAG></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">B.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">National law. Law No LXXVI of 2017</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0009"><NO.P>9.</NO.P><TXT>The preamble states:</TXT><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0010" REF.END="QE0010"/>… organisations established in accordance with the freedom of association are an expression of the self-organisation of society and their activities contribute to democratic scrutiny of and public debate about public issues … such organisations perform a decisive role in the formation of public opinion,</P><P><LIST TYPE="NDASH"><ITEM><P>… the transparency of associations and foundations in society is overwhelmingly in the public interest,</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>… support from unknown foreign sources to organisations established in accordance with the freedom of association is liable to be used by foreign public interest groups to promote — through the social influence of those organisations — their own interests rather than community objectives in the social and political life of Hungary and … may jeopardise the political and economic interests of the country and the ability of legal institutions to operate free from interference.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0010" CODE="2019" ID="QE0010"/></P></ITEM></LIST></P></QUOT.S></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0010"><NO.P>10.</NO.P><TXT>In accordance with Article 1:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><PARAG IDENTIFIER="001.001"><NO.PARAG><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0011" REF.END="QE0011"/>1.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>For the purposes of the application of this law, <QUOT.START CODE="201C" ID="QS0012" REF.END="QE0012"/>organisation in receipt of support from abroad<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0012" CODE="201D" ID="QE0012"/> means every association or foundation which benefits from funding within the meaning of paragraph 2.</ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="001.002"><NO.PARAG>2.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>For the purposes of this law, any donation of money or other assets coming directly or indirectly from abroad, regardless of the legal instrument, shall be treated as support where, in a given financial year, that donation — alone or cumulatively — comes to double the amount stipulated in Paragraph 6(1)(b) of Law No LIII of 2017 on the prevention of and fight against money laundering and terrorist financing (<QUOT.START CODE="201C" ID="QS0013" REF.END="QE0013"/>the Pmt Law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0013" CODE="201D" ID="QE0013"/>).<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0003"><P>7.2 million Hungarian forint (HUF) (around EUR <FT TYPE="NUMBER">24000</FT>).</P></NOTE></ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="001.003"><NO.PARAG>3.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>That calculation of the amount of support for the purposes of paragraph 2 shall not include support received by the association or foundation under a special legal rule, such as funding from the European Union channelled through a [Hungarian] financial institution.</ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="001.004"><NO.PARAG>4.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA><P>This law shall not apply to:</P><LIST TYPE="alpha"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>a)</NO.P><TXT>associations and foundations which are not regarded as civil society organisations;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>b)</NO.P><TXT>associations covered by Law No I of 2004 on sport;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>c)</NO.P><TXT>organisations which carry on a religious activity;</TXT></NP></ITEM><?PAGE NO="4"?><ITEM><NP><NO.P>d)</NO.P><TXT>organisations and associations for national minorities covered by Law No CLXXIX of 2011 on the rights of national minorities, and foundations which, in accordance with their constitution, carry on an activity directly connected to the cultural autonomy of a national minority or which represent and protect the interests of a particular national minority.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0011" CODE="2019" ID="QE0011"/></TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></ALINEA></PARAG></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0011"><NO.P>11.</NO.P><TXT>Paragraph 2 provides:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><PARAG IDENTIFIER="002.001"><NO.PARAG><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0014" REF.END="QE0014"/>1.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>Every association and foundation within the meaning of Paragraph 1(1) must, within 15 days, give notice of the fact that it has become an organisation in receipt of support from abroad where the amount of support it has received in the year in question comes to double the amount stipulated in Paragraph 6(1)(b) of the [Pmt] Law.</ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="002.002"><NO.PARAG>2.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>An organisation in receipt of support from abroad must send the declaration referred to in paragraph 1 to the court with jurisdiction for the place of its registered office (<QUOT.START CODE="201C" ID="QS0015" REF.END="QE0015"/>the court for the place of registration<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0015" CODE="201D" ID="QE0015"/>) and provide the information specified in Annex I.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0004"><P>That information concerns the identity of the organisation in receipt of support and that of the donor, in addition to the amount of the support by reference to the thresholds laid down in subparagraph (3) of that provision and a statement of whether the donations are of cash or other assets.</P></NOTE> The court for the place of registration shall include the declaration in the records relating to the association or foundation in the register of civil organisations and other organisations considered to be non-commercial (<QUOT.START CODE="201C" ID="QS0016" REF.END="QE0016"/>the register<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0016" CODE="201D" ID="QE0016"/>) and shall record the association or foundation as an organisation in receipt of support from abroad.</ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="002.003"><NO.PARAG>3.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>Applying by analogy the rules laid down in paragraph 1, the organisation in receipt of support from abroad must forward to the court for the place of registration, at the same time as its calculation of the amount received, a declaration containing the information specified in Annex I relating to support received in the previous year. The declaration must set out, for the year in question,</ALINEA><ALINEA>a) where the support is less than HUF <FT TYPE="NUMBER">500000</FT><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0005"><P>Around EUR <FT TYPE="NUMBER">1500</FT>.</P></NOTE> per donor, the information set out in Annex I, point (A), part II,</ALINEA><ALINEA>b) where the support is equal to or more than HUF <FT TYPE="NUMBER">500000</FT> per donor, the information set out in Annex I, point (B), part II.</ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="002.004"><NO.PARAG>4.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>By the 15<HT TYPE="SUP">th</HT> day of each month, the court for the place of registration must send to the minister with responsibility for management of the civil information portal the name, registered office and tax identifier of the associations and foundations which it has entered in the register as organisations in receipt of support from abroad in the previous month. The minister shall disseminate without delay the information forwarded to it in order to ensure that the information is freely available to the public on the electronic platform set up for that purpose.</ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="002.005"><NO.PARAG>5.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>After making its declaration for the purposes of paragraph 1, the organisation in receipt of support from abroad must indicate without delay on its homepage and in its publications … that it has been classified as an organisation in receipt of support from abroad within the meaning of this law.</ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="002.006"><NO.PARAG>6.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>The organisation in receipt of support from abroad shall continue to be bound by the obligation laid down in paragraph 5 for as long as it is classified as [such] an organisation for the purposes of this law.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0014" CODE="2019" ID="QE0014"/></ALINEA></PARAG></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0012"><NO.P>12.</NO.P><TXT>In accordance with Paragraph 3:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><PARAG IDENTIFIER="003.001"><NO.PARAG><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0017" REF.END="QE0017"/>1.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>If the association or foundation fails to comply with the obligations imposed on it under this law, the public prosecutor must, upon becoming aware of this … require the association or foundation to comply with its obligations within the next 30 days.</ALINEA></PARAG><?PAGE NO="5"?><PARAG IDENTIFIER="003.002"><NO.PARAG>2.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>If the organisation in receipt of support from abroad fails to comply with the obligation indicated by the public prosecutor, the latter must again require it to comply with the obligations imposed on it by this law within 15 days. Within 15 days of the expiry of that time limit without any response, the public prosecutor shall apply to the competent court for the imposition of a fine under Paragraph 37(2) of Law No CLXXXI of 2011 on the registration of civil society organisations with the courts and on the applicable rules and procedures.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0006"><P>That provision reads: <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0018" REF.END="QE0018"/>If it is clear from the application for amendment that the organisation, or, in the case of a foundation, the founder(s), failed to submit the application for amendment within the period allowed, the court may impose a fine of between HUF <FT TYPE="NUMBER">10000</FT> and HUF <FT TYPE="NUMBER">900000</FT> on the organisation, the founder of the foundation or, where there is more than one founder, the founders jointly.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0018" CODE="2019" ID="QE0018"/></P></NOTE></ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="003.003"><NO.PARAG>3.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>After forwarding a fresh communication to the organisation under paragraph 2, the public prosecutor shall act in accordance with the principle of proportionality, applying by analogy the rules laid down in Law No CLXXV of 2011 on the right of association, the status of a not-for-profit association and the funding of civil society organisations,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0007"><P>Under Paragraph 3 of the Law on civil society organisations, the right of association must not infringe Paragraph (C), subparagraph 2, of the Fundamental Law, nor must it entail an infringement or an incitement to commit an infringement or involve the breach of the rights and freedoms of other persons. Pursuant to that provision, the right of association does not cover the creation of armed organisations or the creation of organisations whose purpose is to carry out a public function which, according to statute, falls within the exclusive remit of a State body.</P></NOTE> and in Law No CLXXXI of 2011 on the registration of civil society organisations with the courts and on the applicable rules and procedures.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0017" CODE="2019" ID="QE0017"/><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0008"><P>Within the framework of the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0019" REF.END="QE0019"/>common rules applicable to judicial review<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0019" CODE="2019" ID="QE0019"/> laid down by that law, Paragraph 71/G provides that the competent court may take the following measures, depending on the circumstances: (a) impose a fine of HUF <FT TYPE="NUMBER">10000</FT> to HUF <FT TYPE="NUMBER">900000</FT> on the organisation or representative; (b) annul the unlawful … decision of the organisation and, if necessary, order the adoption of a fresh decision within an appropriate time limit; (c) if it is likely that the proper operation of the organisation can be restored by summoning its principal body, summon the decision-making body of the organisation or entrust that task to an appropriate person or organisation, with the cost to be borne by the organisation; (d) appoint an administrator for a maximum period of 90 days if it is not possible to ensure by other means that the proper operation of the organisation is restored and if, in view of the outcome, that is particularly justified in the light of the operation of the organisation or other circumstances; (e) dissolve the organisation.</P></NOTE></ALINEA></PARAG></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0013"><NO.P>13.</NO.P><TXT>Paragraph 4 is worded as follows:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><PARAG IDENTIFIER="004.001"><NO.PARAG><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0020" REF.END="QE0020"/>1.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>Where, during the year following the tax year referred to in Paragraph 2(3), the contribution of cash or other assets from which the organisation in receipt of foreign assistance has benefitted does not come to double the amount indicated in Paragraph 6(1) of the Pmt Law, the association or foundation shall cease to be regarded as an organisation in receipt of support from abroad and it shall communicate that information — applying by analogy the rules relating to the declaration — within 30 days of the adoption of its annual report for the year in which that situation arises. Pursuant to Paragraph 2(4), the court for the place of registration shall notify this fact to the minister with responsibility for management of the civil information portal, who shall remove without delay the data of the organisation concerned from the electronic platform set up for that purpose.</ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="004.002"><NO.PARAG>2.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>Following the declaration referred to in paragraph 1, the court with jurisdiction for the place of registration shall delete from the register the information that the association or foundation is an organisation in receipt of support from abroad.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0020" CODE="2019" ID="QE0020"/></ALINEA></PARAG></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">II.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">The pre-litigation procedure</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0014"><NO.P>14.</NO.P><TXT>On <DATE ISO="20170714">14 July 2017</DATE>, the Commission sent the Hungarian Government a letter of formal notice in relation to Law No LXXVI of 2017, on the grounds that that law breached the obligations laid down in Article 63 TFEU and Articles 7, 8 and 12 of the Charter.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0015"><NO.P>15.</NO.P><TXT>The letter of formal notice granted the Hungarian Government a period of one month within which to submit its comments. The Hungarian Government requested an extension, which the Commission refused to grant.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="6"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0016"><NO.P>16.</NO.P><TXT>The Hungarian Government replied to the Commission by letters of <DATE ISO="20170814">14 August</DATE> and <DATE ISO="20170907">7 September 2017</DATE>, disputing the complaints set out in the letter of formal notice.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0017"><NO.P>17.</NO.P><TXT>Since it was not satisfied with the Hungarian Government’s response, the Commission issued a reasoned opinion on <DATE ISO="20171005">5 October 2017</DATE>, in which it:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="ARAB"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>1)</NO.P><TXT>stated that, by Law No LXXVI of 2017, and contrary to the provisions of EU law cited above, Hungary had introduced discriminatory, unnecessary and unjustified restrictions in respect of foreign donations to civil society organisations in Hungary; and</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>2)</NO.P><TXT>called on the Hungarian Government to adopt the necessary measures to comply with the opinion or to submit comments within one month.</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0018"><NO.P>18.</NO.P><TXT>The Hungarian Government was again refused an extension of the time limit granted and it replied to the Commission’s reasoned opinion on <DATE ISO="20171205">5 December 2017</DATE>, rejecting the claim that it was in breach of its obligations.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0019"><NO.P>19.</NO.P><TXT>On <DATE ISO="20171207">7 December 2017</DATE>, the Commission decided to bring this action.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">III.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Procedure before the Court of Justice and forms of order sought by the parties</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0020"><NO.P>20.</NO.P><TXT>The action for failure to fulfil obligations was lodged with the Court of Justice on <DATE ISO="20180206">6 February 2018</DATE>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0021"><NO.P>21.</NO.P><TXT>The Commission claims that the Court of Justice should declare that, as a result of the adoption of Law No LXXVI of 2017, Hungary has failed to fulfil its obligations imposed under Article 63 TFEU and Articles 7, 8 and 12 of the Charter by introducing discriminatory, unnecessary and unjustified restrictions on foreign donations to civil society organisations. The Commission also seeks an order for costs against that Member State.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0022"><NO.P>22.</NO.P><TXT>The Hungarian Government claims that the action should be ruled inadmissible or, in the alternative, dismissed on the grounds that it lacks any basis, and that the Commission should be ordered to pay the costs.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0023"><NO.P>23.</NO.P><TXT>By order of the President of the Court of Justice of <DATE ISO="20180926">26 September 2018</DATE>, the Kingdom of Sweden was granted leave to intervene in support of the Commission’s submissions.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0024"><NO.P>24.</NO.P><TXT>A hearing was held on <DATE ISO="20191022">22 October 2019</DATE>, which was attended by the Hungarian Government, the Swedish Government and the Commission.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">IV.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Analysis</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">A.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Inadmissibility of the action</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">1.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The parties’ positions</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0025"><NO.P>25.</NO.P><TXT>The Hungarian Government submits that the action is inadmissible on account of irregularities committed during the pre-litigation procedure. The Hungarian Government contends that the Commission set shorter than usual time limits for the presentation of comments and wrongly refused to grant it the extensions requested.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="7"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0026"><NO.P>26.</NO.P><TXT>In the Hungarian Government’s submission, those irregularities breach of the duty of sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU), the right to good administration (Article 41 of the Charter), more specifically, the right to be heard, and the general principle of the rights of defence.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0027"><NO.P>27.</NO.P><TXT>The Commission maintains that the time limits were not unfair or unreasonably short and that they did not prevent the Hungarian Government from lodging detailed comments on the alleged failure to fulfil obligations.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0028"><NO.P>28.</NO.P><TXT>As regards the time limit for submitting comments on the letter of formal notice, the Commission argues that an extension of that time limit was conditional on Hungary’s compliance with it and on the preparation by Hungary of a realistic timetable of measures for compliance with the letter of formal notice.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0009"><P>The Hungarian Government rejects that argument in its rejoinder, claiming that it amounts to ignoring the rationale for the pre-litigation procedure, the aim of which is to offer the Member State the opportunity to comply with the obligation at issue or to assert its rights of defence against that obligation.</P></NOTE> The Commission further submits that, when the time limits were set, account was taken of the fact that Hungary had decided not to continue the dialogue with the Commission, meaning that their brevity is attributable to that Member State’s conduct.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">2.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Assessment</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0029"><NO.P>29.</NO.P><TXT>The Court has held that <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0021" REF.END="QE0021"/>the purpose of the pre-litigation procedure is to give the Member State concerned an opportunity, on the one hand, to comply with its obligations under [EU] law and, on the other, to avail itself of its right to defend itself against the complaints made by the Commission.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0021" CODE="2019" ID="QE0021"/><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0010"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19880202">2 February 1988</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Belgium</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>293/85</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1988:40">EU:C:1988:40</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0022" REF.END="QE0022"/>judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Belgium</HT><QUOT.END REF.START="QS0022" CODE="2019" ID="QE0022"/>), paragraph 13.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0030"><NO.P>30.</NO.P><TXT>With the aim of fulfilling that dual purpose, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0023" REF.END="QE0023"/>the Commission must allow Member States a reasonable period to reply to the letter of formal notice and to comply with a reasoned opinion, or, where appropriate, to prepare their defence.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0023" CODE="2019" ID="QE0023"/><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0011"><P>Ibid., paragraph 14.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0031"><NO.P>31.</NO.P><TXT>The usual period set by the Commission in pre-litigation procedures is two months.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0012"><P>Paragraphs 9 and 18 of the Hungarian Government’s defence.</P></NOTE> However, that does not mean that the Commission must confine itself to that period in all cases: as indicated, what matters is that the period should be <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0024" REF.END="QE0024"/>reasonable<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0024" CODE="2019" ID="QE0024"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0032"><NO.P>32.</NO.P><TXT>However, the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">reasonableness</HT> of the period cannot be determined in the abstract but rather by reference to the dual purpose it serves.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0013"><P>Thus, in the judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19840131">31 January 1984</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Ireland</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>74/82</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1984:34">EU:C:1984:34</NO.ECLI>), paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0013">13</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0014">14</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>, the Court found that, although it was <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0025" REF.END="QE0025"/>unreasonable … to allow a Member State five days to amend legislation which has been applied for more than 40 years and which, moreover, has not given rise to any action on the part of the Commission over the period which has elapsed since the accession of [the] Member State<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0025" CODE="2019" ID="QE0025"/>, and although there was no evidence of any urgency, that was not sufficient <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0026" REF.END="QE0026"/>to render the action inadmissible<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0026" CODE="2019" ID="QE0026"/> (italics added).</P></NOTE> In particular, the Member State must be in a position to prepare the defence of its position against the allegations made by the Commission.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0033"><NO.P>33.</NO.P><TXT>In order to determine whether the period allowed by the Commission is reasonable in a particular case, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0027" REF.END="QE0027"/>account must be taken of all the circumstances of the case.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0027" CODE="2019" ID="QE0027"/><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0014"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20011213">13 December 2001</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">France</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑1/00</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2001:687">EU:C:2001:687</NO.ECLI>), paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0065">65</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> For example, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0028" REF.END="QE0028"/>very short periods may be justified in particular circumstances, especially where there is an urgent need to remedy a breach or where the Member Sate concerned is fully aware of the Commission’s views long before the procedure starts.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0028" CODE="2019" ID="QE0028"/><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0015"><P>Judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Belgium</HT>, paragraph 14.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="8"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0034"><NO.P>34.</NO.P><TXT>The Commission submits that, in this case, an extension of the time limit for responding to the reasoned opinion could have been granted only in order to enable the Member State to adopt the measures necessary for it to comply with the reasoned opinion.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0016"><P>Paragraph 16 of the Commission’s reply.</P></NOTE> The Commission further submits that the Hungarian Government did not state in its request for an extension that this was its intention.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0035"><NO.P>35.</NO.P><TXT>That contention does not take into account the second of the objectives served by the pre-litigation procedure, which is to enable the Member State to prepare its defence against the allegations made against it. Therefore, it is not compatible with the settled case-law of the Court.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0036"><NO.P>36.</NO.P><TXT>However, the decisive point for the present purposes is whether the Commission’s conduct made it difficult for the Member State to prepare its defence. It is for the Member State to adduce evidence of such difficulty.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0017"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20070718">18 July 2007</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Germany</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑490/04</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2007:430">EU:C:2007:430</NO.ECLI>), paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0026">26</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0037"><NO.P>37.</NO.P><TXT>The Hungarian Government has not succeeded in establishing that the time limits granted had a negative impact on the defence of its position. Even though it might be correct to complain that the Commission imposed on it a time limit (one month) that was shorter than the usual time limit that it was the Commission’s practice to impose (two months), the latter was, de facto, the period that the Hungarian Government had to respond to both the letter of formal notice and the reasoned opinion.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0018"><P>The letter of formal notice of <DATE ISO="20170714">14 July 2017</DATE> was answered by the Hungarian Government by letters of <DATE ISO="20170814">14 August</DATE> and <DATE ISO="20170907">7 September 2017</DATE>. The reply to the reasoned opinion of <DATE ISO="20171005">5 October 2017</DATE> was sent on <DATE ISO="20171205">5 December 2017</DATE>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0038"><NO.P>38.</NO.P><TXT>In those circumstances, I believe that the Hungarian Government was able to mount an adequate defence by ultimately benefitting from the time limit which it initially requested.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0039"><NO.P>39.</NO.P><TXT>The fact that the Commission decided to bring its action just two days after receiving the Hungarian Government’s reply to the reasoned opinion is irrelevant for the purpose of the inadmissibility of the action.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0040"><NO.P>40.</NO.P><TXT>It is for the Commission to choose when to commence proceedings against a Member State for failure to fulfil obligations, while <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0029" REF.END="QE0029"/>the considerations which determine that choice cannot affect the admissibility of the action<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0029" CODE="2019" ID="QE0029"/> for <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0030" REF.END="QE0030"/>the Commission is entitled to decide, in its discretion, on what date it may be appropriate to bring an action and it is thus not for the Court, in principle, to review the exercise of that discretion<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0030" CODE="2019" ID="QE0030"/>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0019"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20170919">19 September 2017</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Ireland</HT> (registration tax)</NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑552/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2017:698">EU:C:2017:698</NO.ECLI>), paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0034">34</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0041"><NO.P>41.</NO.P><TXT>The Hungarian Government submits that two days were insufficient for the Commission to form a view on its reply to the reasoned opinion.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0020"><P>Paragraph 25 of the Hungarian Government’s defence.</P></NOTE> The Commission responds that it decided to bring the action after conducting a completely professional examination of the Hungarian Government’s reply.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0021"><P>Paragraph 11 of the Commission’s reply.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0042"><NO.P>42.</NO.P><TXT>I have already drawn attention to the Commission’s competence to choose the time when it decides to commence this type of action. On that basis, I see no reason for the claim that the Commission adopted its decision in this case without giving the Hungarian Government’s comments due consideration.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="9"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0043"><NO.P>43.</NO.P><TXT>The reply to the reasoned opinion constitutes the final stage of a procedure in which the parties involved are fully aware of the respective positions. That being so, once the different stages of the pre-litigation procedure are finished, two days may be sufficient to decide on the next step, that is, to bring proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0044"><NO.P>44.</NO.P><TXT>A reply to the reasoned opinion which, as in this case, simply repeats the position that Hungary adopted from the outset was sufficient for the Commission to conclude that that Member State’s legal position, of which it was already aware, had not changed during the procedure. Accordingly, the decision to bring proceedings does not need to be examined in any greater detail than it was throughout the pre-litigation procedure.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0045"><NO.P>45.</NO.P><TXT>Although, as stated, the decision was taken on <DATE ISO="20171207">7 December 2017</DATE>, the application was lodged with the Court of Justice on <DATE ISO="20180206">6 February 2018</DATE>. The application includes many references to the Hungarian Government’s reply, which is evidence of a detailed examination of its position. It is untenable to argue, therefore, that the Commission neglected to scrutinise the reply to the reasoned opinion.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0046"><NO.P>46.</NO.P><TXT>Finally, the important point is that the pre-litigation procedure enabled the Hungarian Government to set out its arguments before the Commission and, ultimately, before the Court of Justice, free from any restriction of its right of defence.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0047"><NO.P>47.</NO.P><TXT>It seems barely necessary to state that, for the purpose of adjudicating on this action, the Court of Justice has at its disposal all the documents produced by the Hungarian Government in the pre-litigation stage and, of course, its arguments in defence and rejoinder in these judicial proceedings. In those circumstances, I believe that Hungary’s right of defence has been respected.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">B.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The parties’ submissions on the substance</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0048"><NO.P>48.</NO.P><TXT>The Commission alleges, first, that Hungary has infringed the free movement of capital (Article 63 TFEU) and, second, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0031" REF.END="QE0031"/>separately<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0031" CODE="2019" ID="QE0031"/>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0022"><P>Paragraph 90 of the application.</P></NOTE> that Hungary has infringed a number of rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0049"><NO.P>49.</NO.P><TXT>For the reasons I shall explain,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0023"><P>See points 93 to 113 below.</P></NOTE> I believe that those two complaints should not be examined <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0032" REF.END="QE0032"/>separately<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0032" CODE="2019" ID="QE0032"/> but rather in an integrated way.</TXT></NP.ECR><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">1.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Submissions of the Commission and the Swedish Government</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0050"><NO.P>50.</NO.P><TXT>The Commission and the Swedish Government both contend that the donations governed by Law No LXXVI of 2017 are a form of movement (transfer) of capital. That Law includes an indirect discriminatory restriction on the free movement of capital, based on nationality, which cannot be justified by an objective difference, as regards transparency and control, between the situation of donors resident in Hungary and donors resident abroad.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0051"><NO.P>51.</NO.P><TXT>Even if Law No LXXVI of 2017 were applicable in a non-discriminatory way, that would not prevent it from constituting a restriction on the free movement of capital, given the onerous nature of the obligations of declaration, registration and publication it imposes, in addition to their associated deterrent effects. Moreover, the fact that the obligations of declaration and publication are <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ex post</HT> does not affect their restrictiveness even though they are less onerous than an <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ex ante</HT> obligation.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="10"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0052"><NO.P>52.</NO.P><TXT>Furthermore, the grounds of public policy and transparency on which the Hungarian Government relies do not justify legislation which: (a) stigmatises organisations in receipt of support from abroad (not all such organisations because it excludes some, such as sporting and religious organisations, without any objective reason); and (b) proceeds on the basis that activities which benefit from such support are unlawful.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0053"><NO.P>53.</NO.P><TXT>In addition, those measures are not appropriate for achieving the objectives pursued by the national legislature.</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="NDASH"><ITEM><P>As regards the protection of public policy and public security, even allowing the Member States a certain amount of discretion (Article 4(2) TEU), the Hungarian Government has not established that the organisations concerned represent a sufficiently serious threat to sovereignty and the constitutional order.</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>Nor has the Hungarian Government established that the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing makes it necessary to disclose the funding by foreign capital of Hungarian not-for-profit organisations or explained how the disputed measures contribute to that fight.</P></ITEM></LIST></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0054"><NO.P>54.</NO.P><TXT>At all events, those measures, which are additional to others already applicable to civil society organisations, are disproportionate and it would be possible to create others which are less restrictive.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0055"><NO.P>55.</NO.P><TXT>As regards Article 12 of the Charter, the requirements, formalities and penalties laid down by Law No LXXVI of 2017 infringe the freedom of association of civil society organisations, which has an impact on their operation, organisation and funding. The penalties, in particular, constitute a legal risk to the existence of such organisations because they include the possibility that an organisation may be wound up.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0056"><NO.P>56.</NO.P><TXT>Furthermore, the restrictions on the freedom of association are unjustified because they do not meet the objectives at which they are purportedly aimed.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0057"><NO.P>57.</NO.P><TXT>The system of penalties laid down does not respect the principle of proportionality either: a measure such as winding-up can only be envisaged as a last resort in exceptionally serious situations and not as a penalty for minor infringements, particularly those of an administrative nature.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0058"><NO.P>58.</NO.P><TXT>As concerns Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, Law No LXXVI of 2017 constitutes an unjustified and disproportionate interference with the rights of those who make donations to respect for their privacy and to the protection of their personal data.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0059"><NO.P>59.</NO.P><TXT>Without denying that it is possible for the transparency of civil society organisations and the fight against anonymous donations to be general interest objectives, it seems excessive to categorise donors whose gifts exceed HUF <FT TYPE="NUMBER">500000</FT> as <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0033" REF.END="QE0033"/>public actors<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0033" CODE="2019" ID="QE0033"/> deserving of less protection of their personal data (which enables, inter alia, the publication of their names in a publicly accessible register). That automatically gives transparency precedence over respect for donors’ fundamental rights.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">2.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The Hungarian Government’s response</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0060"><NO.P>60.</NO.P><TXT>The Hungarian Government maintains that the background to Law No LXXVI of 2017 is the Union’s concern with ensuring the transparency and traceability of capital movements, in the interests of combating money laundering and terrorist financing.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="11"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0061"><NO.P>61.</NO.P><TXT>That Law does not constitute an indirect discriminatory restriction based on nationality and instead concerns the source of the support. Further, it also applies to support from abroad donated by Hungarian nationals, and the Commission has been unable to establish that the persons who donate those sums in practice are predominantly foreign nationals. In any event, the criterion relating to the source of the support is justified because support from a domestic source is easier to control than support from abroad.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0062"><NO.P>62.</NO.P><TXT>The disputed measures do not have a deterrent effect because they do not impose any new administrative obligations on those concerned. Moreover, the publication obligations are neutral and do not affect the average donor but rather donors who contribute more than HUF <FT TYPE="NUMBER">500000</FT>. The Court of Justice has allowed <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ex post</HT> obligations like these.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0063"><NO.P>63.</NO.P><TXT>As regards the justification for the measures, the aims of Law No LXXVI of 2017 are set out below.</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="NDASH"><ITEM><P>To enhance the transparency of civil society organisations as a result of their growing influence on the formation of public opinion and on public life. Far from criticising their role, the legislature was seeking to recognise and encourage them, provided that they operate within the law. In that regard, civil society organisations are treated more favourably than political parties, which cannot receive support from abroad.</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>To contribute to the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.</P></ITEM></LIST></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0064"><NO.P>64.</NO.P><TXT>Law No LXXVI of 2017 does not pursue those objectives inconsistently: it excludes some financial support because, if that support comes from Hungarian sources, it can be controlled under pre-existing legislation and, in the case of religious or sporting associations, their specific legal nature requires their exclusion.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0065"><NO.P>65.</NO.P><TXT>As regards the proportionality of the measures, the concept of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0034" REF.END="QE0034"/>support<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0034" CODE="2019" ID="QE0034"/> has been defined in such a way that it is no less indeterminate than other comparable definitions used by EU law.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0066"><NO.P>66.</NO.P><TXT>It is not true that the pre-existing legislation imposed on civil society organisations the obligation to notify donations received. Furthermore, measures like those suggested by the Commission would be far more intrusive.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0067"><NO.P>67.</NO.P><TXT>The obligations of registration and publication do not apply systematically but rather only within the limits laid down by the Law. Those limits address the need torestrict the information to significant funding from abroad and are well in excess of the average donations made in practice.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0068"><NO.P>68.</NO.P><TXT>As regards penalties, the Law creates an incremental set of measures, which are applicable in stages and subject to judicial scrutiny, with winding-up as the last resort for cases where a clear and persistent intention of breaching the law has been established.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0069"><NO.P>69.</NO.P><TXT>Law No LXXVI of 2017 has not limited the substance of the freedom of association and instead respects that freedom while governing its exercise. The obligations of registration and publication are confined to the disclosure of a neutral event (the receipt of a certain level of financial support from abroad) and they do not involve the stigmatising and deterrent effects alleged by the Commission.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0070"><NO.P>70.</NO.P><TXT>The objective of transparency justifies the adoption of (non-prohibitive) declaratory measures which are normally applicable to political parties and, therefore, also to civil society organisations, to which the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) attaches comparable importance.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="12"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0071"><NO.P>71.</NO.P><TXT>The data to which Law No LXXVI of 2017 refers — the donor’s name and city and country of residence — are not personal and, in any event, the obligations in that connection do not amount to an interference with rights protected by the Charter. Only part of the information requested, affecting only a negligible proportion of natural persons (3.6% of donors in 2015), is made public.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0072"><NO.P>72.</NO.P><TXT>Any interference with the rights guaranteed by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter is ultimately justified on general interest grounds recognised by the Union, such as greater transparency in the funding of civil society organisations and the fight against anonymous donations.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0073"><NO.P>73.</NO.P><TXT>Lastly, it was necessary to fill the pre-existing legislative gap in this area. The fact that the measures are the same as those laid down by EU legislation in relation to European political parties is proof of their proportionality.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">C.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Preliminary assessment of the need to use integrated review criteria</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">1.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The position of the Court of Justice</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0074"><NO.P>74.</NO.P><TXT>In his Opinion in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hungary</HT> (right of usufruct over agricultural land),<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0024"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR><NO.CASE>C‑235/17</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2018:971">EU:C:2018:971</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>; <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0035" REF.END="QE0035"/>Opinion in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hungary</HT> (rights of usufruct over agricultural land)<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0035" CODE="2019" ID="QE0035"/>.</P></NOTE> Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe noted that, for the first time, the Commission was seeking from the Court a declaration that a Member State — also Hungary — had failed to fulfil the obligations imposed by the Charter.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0025"><P>Opinion in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hungary</HT> (rights of usufruct over agricultural land), point 64.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0075"><NO.P>75.</NO.P><TXT>That new complaint did not raise any issues of admissibility, for, as Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe observed, the obligations in respect of which the Commission may make a complaint of non-fulfilment to the Court under Article 258 TFEU include respect for the rights guaranteed by the Charter.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0026"><P>Ibid., point 66.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0076"><NO.P>76.</NO.P><TXT>The thorny question then (as now) was the fact that, according to the Commission, the Court was required to rule on an alleged infringement of the Charter independently of, and separately from, an infringement of the freedom of movement, also alleged to have been committed by Hungary in those proceedings.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0077"><NO.P>77.</NO.P><TXT>In response to that argument, the Advocate General maintained that the Court could not examine the possible infringement of the Charter <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0036" REF.END="QE0036"/><HT TYPE="ITALIC">independently of the question of the infringement of freedoms of movement</HT>.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0036" CODE="2019" ID="QE0036"/><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0027"><P>Ibid., point 76. Italics in the original. Position previously adopted in his Opinion in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">SEGRO and Horváth</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑52/16 and C‑113/16</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2017:410">EU:C:2017:410</NO.ECLI>), point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0121">121</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>, following the case-law laid down in the judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19910618">18 June 1991</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">ERT</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑260/89</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1991:254">EU:C:1991:254</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> That was how the Court interpreted the issue in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">SEGRO and Horváth</HT>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0028"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20180306">6 March 2018</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑52/16 and C‑113/16</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2018:157">EU:C:2018:157</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>) (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0037" REF.END="QE0037"/>judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">SEGRO and Horváth</HT><QUOT.END REF.START="QS0037" CODE="2019" ID="QE0037"/>), paragraphs 127 and 128.</P></NOTE> when it ruled on a case in which there was <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0038" REF.END="QE0038"/>a <HT TYPE="ITALIC">complete overlap</HT> between the right to property and the free movement of capital.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0038" CODE="2019" ID="QE0038"/><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0029"><P>Opinion in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hungary</HT> (rights of usufruct over agricultural land), point 117. Italics in the original. In that case, Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe went on to state that <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0039" REF.END="QE0039"/>the analyses to be carried out in order to establish both an interference with the rights guaranteed by Article 63 TFEU and Article 17 of the Charter and the impossibility of justifying that interference <HT TYPE="ITALIC">are based on the same factors, leading to an outcome which is essentially identical</HT><QUOT.END REF.START="QS0039" CODE="2019" ID="QE0039"/> (loc. cit., point 120; italics in the original). Thus, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0040" REF.END="QE0040"/>a separate examination of the legislation at issue in the light of Article 17 of the Charter in addition to the examination that has already been carried out under Article 63 TFEU<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0040" CODE="2019" ID="QE0040"/> would constitute a clear <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0041" REF.END="QE0041"/>artificiality<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0041" CODE="2019" ID="QE0041"/> (ibid., point 121).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0078"><NO.P>78.</NO.P><TXT>However, in its judgment of <DATE ISO="20190521">21 May 2019</DATE>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0030"><P><REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hungary</HT> (rights of usufruct over agricultural land)</NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑235/17</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2019:432">EU:C:2019:432</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0042" REF.END="QE0042"/>judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hungary</HT> (rights of usufruct over agricultural land)<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0042" CODE="2019" ID="QE0042"/>).</P></NOTE> the Court preferred to examine in turn the infringement of Article 63 TFEU and the infringement of Article 17 of the Charter.</TXT><?PAGE NO="13"?><P><LIST TYPE="NDASH"><ITEM><P>With regard to Article 63 TFEU, the Court held that the national provision restricted the right of the persons concerned to the free movement of capital.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0031"><P>Judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hungary</HT> (rights of usufruct over agricultural land), paragraph 58. The restriction was derived from the fact that the persons concerned were deprived of both the possibility of continuing to enjoy their rights of usufruct over agricultural land and the possibility of alienating that right.</P></NOTE></P></ITEM><ITEM><P>Next, the Court looked at whether that restriction was justified, either by overriding reasons in the public interest or by the reasons referred to in Article 65 TFEU.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0032"><P>Ibid., paragraphs 59 and 60.</P></NOTE></P></ITEM><ITEM><P>From the latter perspective, the Court found that national legislation which relies on both types of reason must be compatible with the rights guaranteed by the Charter. Accordingly. the compatibility of that legislation with EU law must be examined <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0043" REF.END="QE0043"/>in the light both of the exceptions thus provided for by the Treaty and the … case-law, on the one hand, and of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter, on the other hand<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0043" CODE="2019" ID="QE0043"/>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0033"><P>Ibid., paragraph 66.</P></NOTE></P></ITEM><ITEM><P>It was therefore necessary to determine whether the national provision also breached the fundamental right relied on at that time (the right to property safeguarded by Article 17 of the Charter).<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0034"><P>Ibid., paragraph 86.</P></NOTE></P></ITEM></LIST></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0079"><NO.P>79.</NO.P><TXT>Having established both infringements — that of Article 63 TFEU and that of Article 17 of the Charter — the Court went on to determine whether each one was justified.</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="NDASH"><ITEM><P>In relation to the infringement of Article 63 TFEU, the Court rejected in turn the justification founded on certain objectives of general interest,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0035"><P>Ibid., paragraphs 90 to 101.</P></NOTE> the justification deriving from infringement of the national legislation concerning exchange controls<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0036"><P>Ibid., paragraphs 102 to 109.</P></NOTE> and the justification based on the protection of public policy.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0037"><P>Ibid., paragraphs 110 to 122.</P></NOTE></P></ITEM><ITEM><P>In relation to Article 17 of the Charter, the Court disagreed that there were public interest grounds which would justify deprivation of the right to property, while the national provision did not provide for the payment of fair compensation.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0038"><P>Ibid., paragraphs 123 to 129.</P></NOTE></P></ITEM></LIST></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0080"><NO.P>80.</NO.P><TXT>The Court was undoubtedly seeking to link the fundamental freedoms safeguarded by the Treaties and the fundamental rights laid down in the Charter, but there is a certain risk of overlap in their analysis as Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe pointed out.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0039"><P>I refer to the quotation at footnote 28 of this Opinion. In reality, the establishment of each infringement and its possible justification are based on a substantially equivalent legal analysis. In the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hungary</HT> (rights of usufruct over agricultural land), paragraph 124, the Court confirmed that there were no public interest grounds to justify the infringement of Article 17 of the Charter, referring to the reasons why it had previously ruled out the existence of such grounds in relation to the infringement of Article 63 TFEU.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0081"><NO.P>81.</NO.P><TXT>Although that overlap would probably not have excessive practical consequences, I believe that it is possible to link the freedoms laid down in the Treaties and the rights laid down in the Charter in a way which enables the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">integration</HT> of both in a single set of review criteria.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="14"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">2.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The search for integrated review criteria</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0082"><NO.P>82.</NO.P><TXT>In accordance with the Court’s traditional approach, when assessing whether there has been an infringement of the freedoms protected by the Treaties, the fundamental rights only come into play in so far as the Member States have obstructed or restricted those freedoms relying on reasons or grounds accepted by EU law.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0040"><P>Where a Member State relies on the Treaties <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0044" REF.END="QE0044"/>in order to justify rules which are likely to obstruct the exercise of [a fundamental freedom], such justification, provided for by [EU] law, must be interpreted in the light of the general principles of law and in particular of fundamental rights<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0044" CODE="2019" ID="QE0044"/>, in such a way that <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0045" REF.END="QE0045"/>the national rules in question can fall under the exceptions provided for by the [Treaties] only if they are compatible with the fundamental rights the observance of which is ensured by the Court<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0045" CODE="2019" ID="QE0045"/> (judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19910601">1 June 1991</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">ERT</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑260/89</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1991:254">EU:C:1991:254</NO.ECLI>) paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0043">43</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0083"><NO.P>83.</NO.P><TXT>Therefore, the rule is that the Court <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0046" REF.END="QE0046"/>has no power to examine the compatibility with the Charter of national legislation lying outside the scope of European Union law.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0046" CODE="2019" ID="QE0046"/><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0041"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20130226">26 February 2013</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Åkerberg Fransson</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑617/10</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2013:105">EU:C:2013:105</NO.ECLI>), paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0019">19</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> That is the criterion enabling the rights laid down in the Charter to be relied on against such legislation.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0084"><NO.P>84.</NO.P><TXT>It might be possible to superimpose another approach, which is more focused on the applicability of the Charter, on that traditional approach when the Court interprets the freedoms laid down in the Treaties, of which the fundamental rights safeguarded by the Charter form an essential part.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0085"><NO.P>85.</NO.P><TXT>As stated above, the Court <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0047" REF.END="QE0047"/>has no power to examine the compatibility with the Charter of national legislation lying outside the scope of European Union law.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0047" CODE="2019" ID="QE0047"/><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0042"><P>Judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Åkerberg Fransson</HT>, paragraph 19.</P></NOTE> When interpreting EU law (in so far as is relevant for the present purposes, Article 63 TFEU), it is undeniable that the effects of the Charter must be taken into account.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0086"><NO.P>86.</NO.P><TXT>EU law as a whole, including both primary and secondary law, has been imbued with the content of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter, whose legal value is the same as that of the Treaties (Article 6(1) TEU). Furthermore, that occurred in a radical manner as befits a Union based on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom and human rights (Article 2 TEU) which places the individual at the heart of its activities (preamble to the Charter).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0087"><NO.P>87.</NO.P><TXT>The entry into force of the Charter constituted the final transition from the previous legislative system to another which revolves around the figure of the citizen, that is to say an actor who holds rights which afford him a legal framework in which he can live autonomously and have the freedom to pursue the attainment of his own goals.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0088"><NO.P>88.</NO.P><TXT>Therefore, in particular, the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">traditional</HT> freedoms protected by the Treaties can no longer be interpreted independently of the Charter, and the rights laid down therein must be treated as an integral part of the substance of those freedoms. In that connection, the Union safeguards those freedoms in a legislative context defined by the fundamental freedoms laid down in the Charter.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0089"><NO.P>89.</NO.P><TXT>Accordingly, if the compatibility of national legislation with any of those <HT TYPE="ITALIC">traditional</HT> freedoms is called into question, the Charter will be applicable both where the Member States seek to rely on one of the exceptions which the Treaties lay down in that regard and in any other situation in which the fundamental rights are affected. In other words, those rights do not come into play by way of Article 65 TFEU but instead do so directly and primarily by way of Article 63 TFEU.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0090"><NO.P>90.</NO.P><TXT>That approach may not seem very far removed from that taken where the applicability of the Charter is linked to the application of a justification expressly allowed by the Treaties. However, I believe that the approaches differ in terms of their conceptual basis and their consequences.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="15"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0091"><NO.P>91.</NO.P><TXT>The integration of the fundamental rights into the content of the freedoms safeguarded by the Treaties (required, as stated, following the entry into force of the Charter) means that the rights laid down in the Charter must be respected not only by national legislation which seeks to rely on EU law to limit those freedoms but also by legislation which, while not seeking to rely on EU law, contravenes or restricts those freedoms. Otherwise, the paradox would arise whereby Member States would have to respect the fundamental rights only where they were seeking to justify a restriction of the protected freedoms but not where they restrict those freedoms without recourse to any justification.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0092"><NO.P>92.</NO.P><TXT>On that basis, the subject matter of any of the freedoms safeguarded by the Treaties must be considered to have been <HT TYPE="ITALIC">redefined</HT> by the integration of the rights laid down in the Charter into their definition.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0093"><NO.P>93.</NO.P><TXT>Where, as in this instance, the free movement of capital is in issue, the transactions benefitting from that freedom are not only those liable to restriction under Articles 64 TFEU and 65 TFEU but also those liable to any other restriction, the scrutiny of which requires an examination of whether, pursuant to the Treaties, the fundamental rights concerned have been respected. Naturally, those rights may include the right to acquire property, the right to work and the freedom of association.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0094"><NO.P>94.</NO.P><TXT>Restrictions of the fundamental freedoms permissible under the Treaties before the entry into force of the Charter had to comply with the requirements of necessity, appropriateness and proportionality, on which there is extensive case-law.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0095"><NO.P>95.</NO.P><TXT>Now that the Charter has entered into force, it is necessary to determine when the examination of a hypothetical infringement of the free movement of capital must be carried out in line with that traditional technique (assessment of necessity, appropriateness and proportionality) and when it must be carried out in the light of the fundamental freedoms, that is, using more stringent review criteria.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0096"><NO.P>96.</NO.P><TXT>In my view, if national legislation is called into question on the grounds of infringement of Article 63 TFEU without express reference to a possible breach of the Charter (in other words, if the complaint relates to the mere restriction of the free movement of capital as such, without associating that restriction with the breach of a particular fundamental right), the judicial test must be that always used by the Court for this task: the traditional test.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0097"><NO.P>97.</NO.P><TXT>On the other hand, if the restriction of that freedom is the primary or direct cause of the infringement of a fundamental right (in other words, if the national legislation which limits the free movement of capital itself seeks to restrict a right or inevitably leads to that outcome), the judicial test must be that applicable to every breach of fundamental rights.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0098"><NO.P>98.</NO.P><TXT>Therefore, there is a need to overcome the duplication of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0048" REF.END="QE0048"/>infringements of Article 63 TFEU<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0048" CODE="2019" ID="QE0048"/>, on the one hand, and <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0049" REF.END="QE0049"/>infringements of the fundamental rights based on a restriction of Article 63 TFEU authorised by the Treaties<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0049" CODE="2019" ID="QE0049"/>, on the other.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0099"><NO.P>99.</NO.P><TXT>Article 63 TFEU lays down a single freedom. That freedom likewise has a single purpose which is the free movement of capital, subject only to the limitations permitted by the Treaties; that includes respect for the fundamental rights, both where their exercise may be facilitated by the enjoyment of the freedom of capital and where their exercise may be undermined by curtailment of that freedom.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="16"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0100"><NO.P>100.</NO.P><TXT>Accordingly, it is necessary to determine, in each case, whether the infringement of Article 63 TFEU flows from a limitation of the free movement of capital which is confined solely to the restriction of that movement as such or whether that restriction actually gives rise to the infringement of a fundamental right.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0043"><P>A restriction of the free movement of capital can hardly be neutral from the perspective of the fundamental rights. For example, the right not to suffer discrimination would be fatally undermined by a measure selectively restricting that freedom, as, in general, would all the rights whose exercise may be facilitated by capital the movement of which is restricted. In contrast to those structural or basic effects are the characteristic effects of restrictions implemented specifically to the detriment of a right where that detriment is not merely collateral damage but the primary consequence of those restrictions.</P></NOTE> In both cases, the standard of review will include the traditional criteria (assessment of necessity, appropriateness and proportionality) but the stringency of those criteria will be qualified where the infringement of a fundamental right is at the heart of the matter.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0101"><NO.P>101.</NO.P><TXT>Based on those propositions, I shall now go on to examine the Commission’s action.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">D.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Restriction of the free movement of capital</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0102"><NO.P>102.</NO.P><TXT>At the heart of the Commission’s complaint is the treatment which Law No LXXVI of 2017 affords to civil society organisations in receipt of funding from abroad. That treatment, through its features and its consequences, breaches the freedom of association (Article 12 of the Charter) and, collaterally, breaches the rights to respect for private life and the protection of personal data (Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, respectively).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0103"><NO.P>103.</NO.P><TXT>In view of the nature of the action, the contested legislation is, at first sight, liable to infringe Article 63 TFEU. If its rules were to constitute an unjustified restriction of the free movement of capital, they would be incompatible with that provision and could, at the same time, breach the rights recognised in the Charter.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0104"><NO.P>104.</NO.P><TXT>It will therefore be necessary to establish:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="NDASH"><ITEM><P>whether that legislation is concerned with a movement of capital and, if so, the conditions to which it makes that movement of capital subject;</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>whether, if it is found that the legislation genuinely places conditions on capital movements, the conditions imposed amount to a breach of the fundamental rights relied on by the Commission, in which case they will constitute a restriction of the freedom safeguarded by Article 63 TFEU;</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>lastly, whether that restriction can be justified under EU law, which would preclude it from being classified as improper and would, therefore, rule out the infringement alleged by the Commission.</P></ITEM></LIST></P></NP.ECR><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">1.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Consideration of whether a capital movement exists and whether that capital movement is restricted by national law</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0105"><NO.P>105.</NO.P><TXT>Law No LXXVI of 2017 imposes on associations or foundations which receive support from abroad — with some exceptions — the obligation to notify the authorities of their status as an <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0050" REF.END="QE0050"/>organisation in receipt of support from abroad<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0050" CODE="2019" ID="QE0050"/> where the amount of support received reaches a specified threshold.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0106"><NO.P>106.</NO.P><TXT>Those organisations or foundations must also notify certain particulars relating to the amount and nature of the support received and the donor’s identity. The prescribed declaration is entered into a register which records the status of the organisation in receipt of support from abroad. All those details are published in that official register which can be accessed free of charge. The organisation in receipt of support from abroad must indicate that status on its homepage and in its publications.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="17"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0107"><NO.P>107.</NO.P><TXT>The Hungarian Government does not even deny that the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0051" REF.END="QE0051"/>support<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0051" CODE="2019" ID="QE0051"/> governed by Law No LXXVI of 2017 — Paragraph 1(2) of which defines that support as <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0052" REF.END="QE0052"/>any donation of money or other assets … regardless of the legal instrument<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0052" CODE="2019" ID="QE0052"/> — is a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0053" REF.END="QE0053"/>movement of capital<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0053" CODE="2019" ID="QE0053"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0108"><NO.P>108.</NO.P><TXT>Such operations fall readily within the category of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0054" REF.END="QE0054"/>capital movements<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0054" CODE="2019" ID="QE0054"/>, as is clear from the nomenclature in Annex I to Directive 88/361/EEC,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0044"><P>Council Directive of <DATE ISO="19880624">24 June 1988</DATE> for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty (that article was repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam) (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="178" PAGE.FIRST="5" DATE.PUB="1988">OJ 1988 L 178, p. 5</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> which, in accordance with the case-law, still has the same indicative value for the purposes of defining the notion of capital movements.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0045"><P>Since there is no definition of the term <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0055" REF.END="QE0055"/>capital movements<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0055" CODE="2019" ID="QE0055"/> in the Treaties, the Court conferred indicative value on the nomenclature annexed to Directive 88/361, finding that, in accordance with its introduction, the list it includes is not exhaustive. See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20090127">27 January 2009</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Persche</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑318/07</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2009:33">EU:C:2009:33</NO.ECLI>), paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0024">24</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>. Heading XI of that annex, entitled <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0056" REF.END="QE0056"/>Personal capital movements<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0056" CODE="2019" ID="QE0056"/>, includes under B <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0057" REF.END="QE0057"/>Gifts and endowments<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0057" CODE="2019" ID="QE0057"/>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0109"><NO.P>109.</NO.P><TXT>Under the legislation at issue in the action, capital movements in the form of support to a number of associations and foundations established in Hungary are not, therefore, completely free and are instead subject to certain conditions, in particular, the conditions set out above (recipients of support must declare it to the national authorities so that it can be registered and published).<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0046"><P>At the hearing, the Hungarian government referred to Article 65 TFEU, regardless of the fact that, under paragraph 1(b) of that article, it is permitted <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0058" REF.END="QE0058"/>to lay down procedures for the declaration of capital movements for purposes of administrative or statistical information<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0058" CODE="2019" ID="QE0058"/> but not of publication, as stipulated by the legislation at issue.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0110"><NO.P>110.</NO.P><TXT>Those conditions apply by reference to the donor’s registered office or address, since the decisive criterion is that the contribution must come <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0059" REF.END="QE0059"/>directly or indirectly from abroad<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0059" CODE="2019" ID="QE0059"/>, as stipulated by Paragraph 1(2) of Law No LXXVI of 2017.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0111"><NO.P>111.</NO.P><TXT>However, the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0060" REF.END="QE0060"/>foreign provenance<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0060" CODE="2019" ID="QE0060"/> requirement is much more likely to affect nationals of other Member States than Hungarian nationals, even though the latter may also reside outside Hungary and, accordingly, be affected by the measures at issue.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0112"><NO.P>112.</NO.P><TXT>I should point out, in that connection, that the Court has held that national legislation must be regarded as indirectly discriminatory if it is intrinsically liable to affect nationals of other Member States more than nationals of the State imposing that legislation.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0047"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20080911">11 September 2008</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Petersen</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑228/07</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2008:494">EU:C:2008:494</NO.ECLI>), paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0054">54</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0055">55</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0113"><NO.P>113.</NO.P><TXT>The Commission’s complaints in this case do not constitute mere <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0061" REF.END="QE0061"/>presumptions<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0061" CODE="2019" ID="QE0061"/> as the Hungarian Government alleges. In its application, the Commission does not dispute the compatibility with EU law of a mere administrative practice but rather of legislation the application of which is capable of producing the effects it explains in its application.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0048"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20121219">19 December 2012</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Belgium</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑577/10</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2012:814">EU:C:2012:814</NO.ECLI>), paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0035">35</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0114"><NO.P>114.</NO.P><TXT>In addition to being primarily incumbent on foreign nationals and, in particular, on nationals of other Member States, it is my view that the conditions set out in Law No LXXVI of 2017 in relation to donations to specified associations and foundations amount to a <HT TYPE="ITALIC">restriction</HT> of such capital movements.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0115"><NO.P>115.</NO.P><TXT>Those conditions are, I repeat, liable to restrict the free movement of capital in view of the reasons set out below.</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="NDASH"><ITEM><P>They may have a negative impact on the funding of associations and foundations established in Hungary which receive money from abroad. To that extent, they negatively affect the exercise of the freedom of association safeguarded by Article 12 of the Charter.</P></ITEM><?PAGE NO="18"?><ITEM><P>They are also capable of negatively affecting the rights to respect for private life and the protection of personal data (Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter) of those who make contributions from abroad to the civil society organisations concerned.</P></ITEM></LIST></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0116"><NO.P>116.</NO.P><TXT>The restriction of capital movements does not end there and instead, as I shall discuss below, it constitutes a medium for the infringement of certain fundamental rights. That is why, as I argued above,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0049"><P>Point 113 above.</P></NOTE> the standard of review must be the typical standard for such rights and not the typical standard for the traditional freedoms protected by the Treaties. That standard must therefore be qualified or enhanced in terms of its intensity and rigour.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">2.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Consideration of the interference with the fundamental rights safeguarded by Articles 7, 8 and 12 of the Charter</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(a)</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Freedom of association</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0117"><NO.P>117.</NO.P><TXT>Article 12 of the Charter confers on everyone <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0062" REF.END="QE0062"/>freedom of association at all levels, in particular in political, trade union and civic matters<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0062" CODE="2019" ID="QE0062"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0118"><NO.P>118.</NO.P><TXT>In addition to its strictly personal dimension, that freedom has an objective dimension which makes it one of the pillars of pluralist societies, for its exercise enables the creation of entities that are essential in a democratic system. Those entities naturally include political parties but also all entities which assist with the shaping and expression of the cultural, religious, social and economic pluralism of society.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0119"><NO.P>119.</NO.P><TXT>The entities affected by Law No LXXVI of 2017 (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0063" REF.END="QE0063"/>civil society organisations<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0063" CODE="2019" ID="QE0063"/>) correspond to the second of the two groups referred to above, which makes it necessary to leave aside political parties and trade unions, whose specific features preclude their comparison with such entities.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0050"><P>Political parties participate in the formation and expression of the will of the people as a means of shaping the will of the State. While they are not emanations of the State, political parties contribute to the selection of holders of public authority and, in that sense, they are particularly important for the stability of the State. That feature is the reason why some constitutional systems lay down conditions and safeguards which do not apply (and would not be justified) in relation to other associations. Although the latter participate in public life, they do not so much seek to <HT TYPE="ITALIC">hold</HT> power as to carry on their activities freely under the auspices of public authority, or, at most, to influence the exercise of that authority. That is why Article 12 of the Charter deals separately with associations <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0064" REF.END="QE0064"/>in political, trade union and civic matters<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0064" CODE="2019" ID="QE0064"/>. As the preamble to Law No LXXVI of 2017 states, civil society associations contribute to <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0065" REF.END="QE0065"/>democratic scrutiny and public debate in relation to public matters<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0065" CODE="2019" ID="QE0065"/> but their purpose is not to take power. The same is true of trades unions, whose activities in the sphere of employment relations means that they warrant a special set of provisions.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0120"><NO.P>120.</NO.P><TXT>Although that Law does not preclude the creation of such entities or restrict their powers of self-organisation, it negatively affects their financing options, which amounts to an adverse effect on their viability and their survival and consequently undermines the attainment of their social objectives.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0051"><P>The ECtHR has held that the impact of certain measures of the public authorities on the financial capacity of associations to pursue their activities can amount to interference with the exercise of freedom of association safeguarded by Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). See ECtHR, judgment of <DATE ISO="20070607">7 June 2007</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parti Nationaliste Basque — Organisation Régionale d’Iparralde v. France</HT> (CE:ECHR:2007:0607JUD007125101), §§ 37 and 38.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0121"><NO.P>121.</NO.P><TXT>The publication requirements imposed on gifts received from abroad may deter potential donors, with the consequent reduction in their gifts to associations. No matter how small it may be, that effect can still be significant as regards the finances of civil society organisations which tend to rely on donations from their members and supporters (some of these organisations also turn the refusal of all public funding into a point of principle, in order to retain their independence).</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="19"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0122"><NO.P>122.</NO.P><TXT>In particular, foreign donations, regardless of their economic significance, represent, for donors who are resident abroad, the most direct, if not the only, way of participating in the activities of the associations they support financially. Making it difficult for such persons to make financial contributions amounts to preventing them de facto from exercising freedom of association <HT TYPE="ITALIC">tout court</HT>: through financial support for an association, these persons come together with others to collectively pursue certain aims, which is ultimately what the freedom of association entails.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0123"><NO.P>123.</NO.P><TXT>The Commission refers to the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">stigmatising</HT> effect created by the obligation of associations in receipt of gifts from abroad to <HT TYPE="ITALIC">label themselves</HT> as <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0066" REF.END="QE0066"/>organisations in receipt of support from abroad<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0066" CODE="2019" ID="QE0066"/>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0052"><P>The Venice Commission also took that view in its opinion on the draft law (Opinion 889/2017 of <DATE ISO="20170620">20 June 2017</DATE> on the draft law on the transparency of organisations receiving support from abroad (CDL-AD(2017)015); <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0067" REF.END="QE0067"/>Venice Commission Opinion<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0067" CODE="2019" ID="QE0067"/>), paragraphs 54 to 56. Although such <HT TYPE="ITALIC">labelling</HT> appears to be relatively neutral, the Venice Commission warned that it could have a stigmatising effect in the context prevailing in Hungary, characterised by clear political positions adopted against associations which receive funding from abroad (loc. cit., paragraph 65).</P></NOTE> Furthermore, that effect is achieved through the clear emphasis in the preamble to Law No LXXVI of 2017 on the potential negative connotations of such gifts,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0053"><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0068" REF.END="QE0068"/>… The support provided by unknown foreign sources to organisations established in accordance with the freedom of association is liable to be used by foreign interest groups to promote — through the social influence of those organisations — their own interests rather than community objectives in the social and political life of Hungary and … may jeopardise the political and economic interests of the country in addition to the ability of legal institutions to operate free from interference<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0068" CODE="2019" ID="QE0068"/>.</P></NOTE> which could jeopardise the country’s political and economic interests. A widespread cloud of suspicion thus hangs over donors, which is sufficient to dissuade some, or many, from contributing to the funding of civil society organisations.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0124"><NO.P>124.</NO.P><TXT>It must be noted, furthermore, that, as the Hungarian Government accepted at the hearing, EU citizens have a qualified interest in participation in the economic, social and cultural life of the Member States as a whole and, therefore, in turning the ideal of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0069" REF.END="QE0069"/>an ever closer union<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0069" CODE="2019" ID="QE0069"/> into reality. The rights of EU citizens to vote and to stand as candidates in municipal elections (unconnected to their status of nationals in the State of residence) and in elections to the European Parliament in any of its national constituencies are the institutional corollary of a shared interest in the public life of all the Member States. The freedom of citizens to associate and participate in this way in public debate in their respective societies is often confined to the right to contribute to the funding of a citizen’s preferred associations in any of those States. All the more reason why it should not be possible for that means of collective involvement in civic affairs to be restricted or undermined.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0125"><NO.P>125.</NO.P><TXT>Law No LXXVI of 2017 provides additionally for the possible compulsory dissolution of associations and foundations which do not fulfil the duties to notify and make public any gifts received, which constitutes the highest level of interference in their lives.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0054"><P>ECtHR, judgment of <DATE ISO="20111011">11 October 2011</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Association Rhino</HT> <HT TYPE="ITALIC">and Others v</HT>. <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Switzerland</HT> (CE:ECHR:2011:1011JUD004884807), § 54.</P></NOTE> Even though that is applied as part of a scale of penalties, following a court decision, it is nonetheless an interference with the right guaranteed by Article 12 of the Charter.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(b)</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The rights to private life and the protection of personal data</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0126"><NO.P>126.</NO.P><TXT>Law No LXXVI of 2017 requires the entities concerned to notify the court for the place of registration of the amount of a donation from abroad together with the donor’s name, city and country, regardless of whether the donor is an individual or a legal person.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0055"><P>The Hungarian Government argues that the vast majority of donors are legal persons, which excludes the possibility of any interference with rights which can be held only by individuals. I agree with the Commission that, quite apart from the practical reality, the obligation at issue does not differentiate between legal persons and individuals: the latter are clearly subject to that obligation.</P></NOTE> The register in which those particulars are recorded is freely accessible.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0127"><NO.P>127.</NO.P><TXT>Respect for the right to private life, in so far as it applies to the processing of personal data, concerns any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0056"><P>Opinion 1/15 (EU-Canada PNR Agreement) of <DATE ISO="20170726">26 July 2017</DATE>, paragraph 122.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="20"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0128"><NO.P>128.</NO.P><TXT>Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0057"><P>Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20160427">27 April 2016</DATE> on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation; <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0070" REF.END="QE0070"/>GDPR<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0070" CODE="2019" ID="QE0070"/>) (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="119" PAGE.FIRST="1" DATE.PUB="2016">OJ 2016 L 119, p. 1</REF.DOC.OJ>). Italics added.</P></NOTE> provides that <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0071" REF.END="QE0071"/>an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as <HT TYPE="ITALIC">a name</HT>, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0071" CODE="2019" ID="QE0071"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0129"><NO.P>129.</NO.P><TXT>Therefore, a name alone is sufficient for the purpose of establishing identity, which makes it possible to reject the Hungarian Government’s submission that merely notifying a donor’s name, city and country of residence is insufficient to identify that donor.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0130"><NO.P>130.</NO.P><TXT>The Hungarian Government attempts to argue that those data are not personal (and are, therefore, outside the scope of Article 8 of the Charter) by relying on two judgments of the Court:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="NDASH"><ITEM><P>judgment of <DATE ISO="20031106">6 November 2003</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Lindqvist</HT>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0058"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR><NO.CASE>C‑101/01</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2003:596">EU:C:2003:596</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>; <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0072" REF.END="QE0072"/>judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Lindqvist</HT><QUOT.END REF.START="QS0072" CODE="2019" ID="QE0072"/>.</P></NOTE> from which it infers that it is not possible to identify a person from his/her name alone and that instead other, additional data are needed for that purpose, such as a telephone number or information relating to the person’s working conditions or hobbies.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0059"><P>Paragraph 155 of the Hungarian Government’s defence.</P></NOTE></P></ITEM><ITEM><P>judgment of <DATE ISO="20101109">9 November 2010</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert</HT>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0060"><P>Cases <REF.DOC.ECR><NO.CASE>C‑92/09 and C‑93/09</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2010:66">EU:C:2010:66</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>; <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0073" REF.END="QE0073"/>judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert</HT><QUOT.END REF.START="QS0073" CODE="2019" ID="QE0073"/>.</P></NOTE> from which it infers that if a donor’s address is not published, his/her name, city and country are not sufficient to identify that person.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0061"><P>Paragraph 154 of the Hungarian Government’s defence.</P></NOTE></P></ITEM></LIST></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0131"><NO.P>131.</NO.P><TXT>It is my view, rather, that those judgments of the Court undermine the Hungarian Government’s position. As regards <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Lindqvist</HT>, that judgment found that the term <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0074" REF.END="QE0074"/>any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person … undoubtedly covers the name of a person in conjunction with his telephone coordinates or information about his working conditions or hobbies.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0074" CODE="2019" ID="QE0074"/><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0062"><P>Judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Lindqvist</HT>, paragraph 24.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0132"><NO.P>132.</NO.P><TXT>The obligation imposed by Law No LXXVI of 2017 means that a donor’s name (which, I repeat, is sufficient by itself to identify that donor)<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0063"><P>By definition, a name <HT TYPE="ITALIC">identifies</HT> a person, even though, as the Hungarian Government contends at paragraph 156 of its defence, it is possible for many people to share the same name in the same city.</P></NOTE> is inextricably linked to the information regarding a donation for the benefit of a particular association. That link alone reveals an affinity with that association which may help to ideologically <HT TYPE="ITALIC">profile</HT> the donor in the broadest sense of the term.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0064"><P>Under Article 4(4) of the GDPR, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0075" REF.END="QE0075"/>profiling<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0075" CODE="2019" ID="QE0075"/> means <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0076" REF.END="QE0076"/>any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person's performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0076" CODE="2019" ID="QE0076"/>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0133"><NO.P>133.</NO.P><TXT>The judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert</HT> held that publication on a website of the names and municipalities of residence of the beneficiaries of certain government aid and the amount of that aid <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0077" REF.END="QE0077"/>constitutes an interference with their private life within the meaning of Article 7 of the Charter<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0077" CODE="2019" ID="QE0077"/> <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0078" REF.END="QE0078"/>because the information becomes available to third parties<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0078" CODE="2019" ID="QE0078"/>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0065"><P>Judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert</HT>, paragraph 58, citing the judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20030520">20 May 2003</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑465/00, C‑138/01 and C‑139/01</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2003:294">EU:C:2003:294</NO.ECLI>), paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0074">74</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> of which states that the communication <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0079" REF.END="QE0079"/>of data by name relating to the remuneration paid to … employees … infringes the right of the persons concerned to respect for private life … and constitutes an interference within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0079" CODE="2019" ID="QE0079"/></P></NOTE> In my opinion, what is applicable to aid received by a person must also apply to the aid through which that person contributes to supporting an association.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="21"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0134"><NO.P>134.</NO.P><TXT>Accordingly, the publication in a publicly accessible register of the names of natural persons who make donations from abroad to certain associations established in Hungary and the amounts of such donations is an interference in the private life of those persons as regards the processing of their personal data.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0135"><NO.P>135.</NO.P><TXT>Furthermore, as I explained above, in so far as the data published (name and donation) enable the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ideological</HT> profiling of donors, the latter may be deterred, or at least discouraged, from helping to support a civic organisation with which they wish to collaborate in the exercise of their freedom of association.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0136"><NO.P>136.</NO.P><TXT>The publication of those data interferes not only with the rights safeguarded by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter but also with the freedom of association, because its deterrent effect may have an impact on the financial position of civil society organisations and, therefore, on their ability to pursue their activities.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0066"><P>See points 140 and 141 above.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">3.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Consideration of the justification for the interference identified</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0137"><NO.P>137.</NO.P><TXT>Can the interference which I have just examined be justified under Article 52(1) of the Charter? It should be recalled that, pursuant to that provision, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0080" REF.END="QE0080"/>any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0080" CODE="2019" ID="QE0080"/></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0138"><NO.P>138.</NO.P><TXT>The measures at issue clearly fulfil the condition of having been provided for by law. I also believe that those measures do not infringe the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">essence</HT> of the rights concerned, although they do undermine those rights.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0139"><NO.P>139.</NO.P><TXT>Whether that interference is necessary to meet a legitimate objective of general interest and whether that can be done proportionately, having ruled out the existence of less restrictive measures or solutions, is a different question.</TXT></NP.ECR><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(i)</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The need for and the effectiveness of the measures at issue</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0140"><NO.P>140.</NO.P><TXT>The Hungarian Government relies on the financial transparency of associations which receive support from abroad as a public interest ground. The Hungarian Government adds that that interest is closely linked to that of the protection of public policy and the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0141"><NO.P>141.</NO.P><TXT>The Commission submits that those objectives reflect in principle the aims which justify interference with the rights concerned. For my part, I agree with that assessment, which is also consistent with the case-law of the ECtHR.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0067"><P>ECtHR, judgment of <DATE ISO="20040217">17 February 2004</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Gorzelik and Others v. Poland</HT> (CE:ECHR:2004:0217JUD004415898), §§ 94 and 95.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0142"><NO.P>142.</NO.P><TXT>I also agree that Member States have a certain discretion when it comes to defining the general interest objectives they wish to promote.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0068"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20110616">16 June 2011</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Austria</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑10/10</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:399">EU:C:2011:399</NO.ECLI>), paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0032">32</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="22"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0143"><NO.P>143.</NO.P><TXT>The Court’s case-law on reliance on public policy as a ground justifying the restriction of the freedoms laid down in the Treaties is applicable to limitations of the fundamental rights. Therefore, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0081" REF.END="QE0081"/>requirements of public security must … be interpreted strictly, so that their scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without any control by the institutions of the European Union<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0081" CODE="2019" ID="QE0081"/> and <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0082" REF.END="QE0082"/>public security may be relied on only if there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0082" CODE="2019" ID="QE0082"/>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0069"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20100708">8 July 2010</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Portugal</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑171/08</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2010:412">EU:C:2010:412</NO.ECLI>), paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0073">73</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0144"><NO.P>144.</NO.P><TXT>On that basis, the public policy clause could legitimise measures imposed on associations and foundations suspected of breaching public policy (in other words, which pose a real and serious threat to it) but not general legislation which imposes, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ex ante</HT>, on all associations and foundations, whatever their purpose and activities, the duty to publish donations from abroad.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0070"><P>The Hungarian Government has also pleaded the protection of public security in the strict sense and, in particular, the need to eradicate the influence of organised crime on certain humanitarian organisations whose aims may coincide with the interests of international people trafficking networks (paragraphs 84 and 85 of the Hungarian Government’s defence). Again, that interest could justify the adoption of specific measures against those particular entities but not the adoption of measures of general scope, like those at issue, against all civil society organisations.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0145"><NO.P>145.</NO.P><TXT>As regards the fight against money laundering and, in particular, terrorist financing, I agree with the Hungarian Government’s contention that this could justify measures for the transparency and scrutiny of funding received by any natural or legal person.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0071"><P>According to the Commission (paragraphs 62 to 64 of its application), Hungary did not establish the existence of a definite risk in that sense. Even if there were such a risk, it would be regarded as common to all the Member States. The recommendations of the Groupe d’Action Financière (GAFI) in relation to the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing identify not-for-profit organisations as possible instruments for the commission of those illegal activities (GAFI (2012-2017), <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Recommandations du GAFI — Normes internationales sur la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux et le financement du terrorisme et de la proliferation</HT>, mise à jour novembre 2017 (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0083" REF.END="QE0083"/>the GAFI Recommendations<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0083" CODE="2019" ID="QE0083"/>), point 8. Whether the fact that the assessment of the risks faced may be inadequate legitimises, from the perspective of need, appropriateness and effectiveness, any measure adopted by the national legislature is a different matter.</P></NOTE> Specifically, the requirement that legal persons established in a Member State must inform the authorities of their objectively <HT TYPE="ITALIC">suspicious</HT> funding sources appears in principle to be appropriate for preventing and prosecuting money laundering and the funding of terrorist activities.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0072"><P>It is not appropriate to categorise implicitly every donation from any Member State or third country as suspicious.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0146"><NO.P>146.</NO.P><TXT>I do not believe that any of the above can reasonably be called into question. The Hungarian Government was unable to explain satisfactorily at the hearing why the common legislative provisions on the fight against money laundering are inadequate.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0073"><P>The Commission refers, in that connection, to the possibility that Member States may include civil society organisations within the scope of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20150520">20 May 2015</DATE> on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="141" PAGE.FIRST="73" DATE.PUB="2015">OJ 2015 L 141, p. 73</REF.DOC.OJ>). That legislation is founded on a rigorous assessment of the existing risks.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0147"><NO.P>147.</NO.P><TXT>Even if the connection between the measures at issue and the fight against money laundering were established (<HT TYPE="ITALIC">quod non</HT>), it is my view that the general and indiscriminate obligation to publish that information, including before it has been scrutinised by the authorities responsible for examining whether there is any evidence of money laundering, goes beyond what is strictly necessary to legitimise that interference.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0148"><NO.P>148.</NO.P><TXT>Having set down those propositions, it is necessary to determine whether the measures adopted by the Hungarian legislature are <HT TYPE="ITALIC">commensurate</HT> with another of the objectives relied on, namely, transparency in the financing of civil society organisations. For the reasons I shall now explain, I believe that they are not.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0149"><NO.P>149.</NO.P><TXT>Three factors in those measures are striking.</TXT><?PAGE NO="23"?><P><LIST TYPE="NDASH"><ITEM><P>First, the measures do not concern all associations and foundations established in Hungary. They do not cover commercial companies, even though some of these (for example, those which own communications media) also <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0084" REF.END="QE0084"/>perform a decisive role in the formation of public opinion<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0084" CODE="2019" ID="QE0084"/>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0074"><P>The preamble to Law No LXXVI refers to that factor to characterise civil society organisations.</P></NOTE></P></ITEM><ITEM><P>Second, no evidence has been adduced concerning how the information gathered genuinely serves to achieve the aims which justify it.</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>Third, in addition to being insufficient from the perspective of the group of entities required to provide the information and from the perspective of their functionality, the measures are disproportionate in terms of their consequences.</P></ITEM></LIST></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0150"><NO.P>150.</NO.P><TXT>With regard to the organisations concerned, Law No LXXVI of 2017 excludes those financed from national sources and applies only to those which receive financial support from abroad. Further, as concerns the latter, the Law exempts organisations which <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0085" REF.END="QE0085"/>are not regarded as civil society organisations<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0085" CODE="2019" ID="QE0085"/>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0075"><P>Paragraph 1(4)(a) of Law No LXXVI of 2017 indicates as much. As the Hungarian Government stated at the hearing, in order to ascertain which organisations <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0086" REF.END="QE0086"/>are not regarded as civil society organisations<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0086" CODE="2019" ID="QE0086"/>, regard must be had to Law No CLXXV of 2011 on the right of association, the status of not-for-profit association and the financing of civil society organisations. It is clear from Paragraph 2(6) of that law that associations registered in Hungary, with the exception of parties, foundations and, for certain purposes, mutual societies and trades unions, are considered to be <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0087" REF.END="QE0087"/>non-governmental organisations<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0087" CODE="2019" ID="QE0087"/>. I do not find that definition particularly helpful for the purposes of delimiting precisely the entities affected by Law No LXXVI of 2017. That vagueness of its scope <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ratione personae</HT> does not reflect the objectivity required of legislation which has such a direct impact on the exercise of a number of fundamental rights.</P></NOTE> sporting organisations, organisations which perform a religious activity and organisations linked to national minorities.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0151"><NO.P>151.</NO.P><TXT>I agree with the Commission that it is not clear why the Law is centred on donations from abroad, other than being based on a general presumption (in reality, a suspicion) of fraud committed by persons established abroad or in other Member States, which is incompatible with EU law.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0076"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20091006">6 October 2009</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Spain</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑153/08</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2009:618">EU:C:2009:618</NO.ECLI>), paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0039">39</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0152"><NO.P>152.</NO.P><TXT>The argument put forward by Hungary to the effect that it is more difficult to control support from abroad is not consistent with the fact, also pointed out by the Commission, that the previous legislative framework already imposed on associations the obligation to provide detailed information concerning their funding sources, including those abroad.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0077"><P>Paragraphs 75 to 77 of the Commission’s application and paragraphs 74 to 76 of its reply.</P></NOTE> At all events, that difficulty could have been countered using less restrictive measures, as I shall explain.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0153"><NO.P>153.</NO.P><TXT>If the aim is genuinely to control funding from abroad, it is not particularly consistent with that aim to exempt sporting and religious associations and those connected to a national minority: any of these could also <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0088" REF.END="QE0088"/>be used [from abroad] to promote — through the social influence of those organisations — their own interests rather than community objectives in the social and political life of Hungary<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0088" CODE="2019" ID="QE0088"/>, as the preamble to Law No LXXVI states.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0154"><NO.P>154.</NO.P><TXT>None of the characteristics of those exempt associations relate to the specific features of their financing which would make them unsusceptible to the risks that, for any of the associations subject to the measures at issue, the receipt of funds from abroad might entail.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0078"><P>The Swedish Government also makes that point (paragraph 39 of its statement in intervention).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0155"><NO.P>155.</NO.P><TXT>Furthermore, the Commission has serious doubts about the usefulness of the information gathered: there is nothing to indicate whether it is made available to those in charge of the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0079"><P>Paragraph 66 of the Commission’s application.</P></NOTE> For my part, I can only share those doubts which the Hungarian Government did not succeed in dispelling at the hearing.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="24"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0156"><NO.P>156.</NO.P><TXT>In those circumstances, reliance on the transparency of associations is not consistent with the legal rules laid down. In particular, it does not legitimise the publication of the personal data of persons who contribute through their donations to the funding of the entities in question.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0157"><NO.P>157.</NO.P><TXT>In addition to being inappropriate and of questionable effectiveness, the measures at issue are disproportionate.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(ii)</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Consideration of whether the measures are proportionate</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0158"><NO.P>158.</NO.P><TXT>I believe that it is disproportionate, first, that the limit in respect of the obligation to declare support received from abroad has been set at HUF <FT TYPE="NUMBER">500000</FT>. That is an excessively low threshold for a duty which, for the reasons set out, seriously undermines the exercise of the freedom of association and the rights to private life and the protection of personal data, since the information provided has to be published.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0159"><NO.P>159.</NO.P><TXT>Second, the fact that <HT TYPE="ITALIC">all</HT> donations from abroad are treated the same, including those from the rest of the Member States, is also disproportionate, when, I repeat,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0080"><P>See point 144 above.</P></NOTE> EU citizens may have an interest in participating in the public life of any of those States.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0160"><NO.P>160.</NO.P><TXT>Third, the obligation to record the status of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0089" REF.END="QE0089"/>organisation in receipt of support from abroad<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0089" CODE="2019" ID="QE0089"/> on an association’s homepage and in its publications is, to my mind, also an excessive requirement. That is not solely because of the material burden which the recording of that fact may present but also because of the stigmatising effect associated with it, to which I have already referred.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0161"><NO.P>161.</NO.P><TXT>Fourth, I believe that it is disproportionate that non-fulfilment of the obligations at issue can lead, ultimately, to the winding-up of the infringing association. That is certainly an extreme solution which, according to the Hungarian Government, constitutes a <HT TYPE="ITALIC">staged</HT> response to infringement of the law.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0081"><P>Paragraph 122 of the Hungarian Government’s defence.</P></NOTE> Those <HT TYPE="ITALIC">stages</HT> correspond to a first infringement (which is followed by a formal request from the public prosecutor), failure to comply with that request (involving the possible imposition of a fine) and failure to comply with a new request, which opens the door to other penalties, including dissolution.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0162"><NO.P>162.</NO.P><TXT>The Hungarian Government contends that a conscious failure to respond to successive communications is not a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0090" REF.END="QE0090"/>minor administrative infringement<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0090" CODE="2019" ID="QE0090"/> and warrants dissolution.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0082"><P>Loc. ult. cit.</P></NOTE> In my opinion, however, such a severe penalty requires rather more than a refusal, including a repeated refusal, to provide information such as that required by Law No LXXVI of 2017.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0083"><P>It must be stressed that, according to the ECtHR, dissolution is a measure which may be adopted only in the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0091" REF.END="QE0091"/>most serious cases<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0091" CODE="2019" ID="QE0091"/>. ECtHR, judgment of <DATE ISO="20030213">13 February 2003</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey</HT> (CE:ECHR:2003:0213JUD004134098), § 100.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(iii)</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Consideration of whether more proportionate restrictive measures are possible</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0163"><NO.P>163.</NO.P><TXT>The nature and scope of the measures at issue offer little leeway for proposing other alternatives in the same vein, that is, for envisaging measures focusing on the information which it is sought to make public.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="25"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0164"><NO.P>164.</NO.P><TXT>Such alternatives would involve the adoption of a different approach to attainment of the objectives of Law No LXXVI of 2017. It would be necessary, instead, to have regard to a rigorous, detailed assessment of the risks of instrumentalisation of associations, which would make it possible to identify those in a position to jeopardise those objectives.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0084"><P>That view is supported by the GAFI Recommendations (point 8). In the absence of that assessment, the legislation at issue confuses as one all civil society organisations (with the sole exception of three types of entity which, for the reasons already stated, are treated differently without justification from the perspective of the purpose of the legislation).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0165"><NO.P>165.</NO.P><TXT>If the aim is to control irregular funding sources, the Commission draws attention to, for example, the implementation of obligations of notification and surveillance in relation to suspicious transactions from high-risk countries. I believe that this is the area where the best results of effective action by the public authorities can be expected.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0166"><NO.P>166.</NO.P><TXT>On the other hand, it seems to me that it would be impossible to replace the obligation to register and publish the names of individuals who make donations to associations of their choice with an alternative measure, given that it intrudes radically into the sphere of the privacy safeguarded by the Charter.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0167"><NO.P>167.</NO.P><TXT>As concerns the requirement that associations must indicate on their homepage and in their publications that they are recipients of foreign funding, I believe that this is also inappropriate because it may impede the exercise of freedom of association.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0085"><P>This is also stated in the Venice Commission Opinion, paragraph 67, fourth indent.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0168"><NO.P>168.</NO.P><TXT>Finally, excluding Member States from the requirement and restricting it solely to third countries would lessen the interference it represents with the right of EU citizens to participate, by association, in the public life of all the Member States. However, that geographical restriction does not entirely exclude the stigmatizing connotation which would continue to be detrimental to the associations concerned.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0169"><NO.P>169.</NO.P><TXT>In so far as the obligations of registration and publication are not intrinsically capable of substitution by other, equivalent obligations, the system of penalties laid down is incompatible with the Charter. Accordingly, removal of the penalty of dissolution would not be sufficient to make good a system which, as long as it permits the imposition of penalties for the non-fulfilment of conditions incompatible with the Charter, cannot itself be rectified.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0170"><NO.P>170.</NO.P><TXT>I consider, therefore, that Law No LXXVI of 2017 unduly restricts the free movement of capital guaranteed by Article 63 TFEU, in that it includes provisions which amount to unjustified interference with the fundamental rights protected by Articles 7, 8 and 12 of the Charter.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">V.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Costs</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0171"><NO.P>171.</NO.P><TXT>Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Both those criteria are satisfied in this action.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="26"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">VI.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Conclusions</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0172"><NO.P>172.</NO.P><TXT>For the reasons set out, I propose that the Court of Justice, allowing the Commission’s action, should:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="NDASH"><ITEM><P>Declare that Hungary has failed to fulfil the obligations incumbent on it under Article 63 TFEU by infringing Articles 7, 8 and 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in so far as the a külföldről támogatott szervezetek átláthatóságáról szóló 2017. évi LXXVI. törvény (Law No LXXVI of 2017 on the transparency of organisations which receive support from abroad) introduces unjustified restrictions in respect of donations from abroad received by certain associations and foundations established in Hungary.</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>Order Hungary to pay the costs.</P></ITEM></LIST></P></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></CONTENTS.CONCLUSION></CONCLUSION>