COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

EVALUATION

of

Directive 2013/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013

on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of pyrotechnic articles (recast)

Table of contents

1.Introduction

2.What was the expected outcome of the intervention?

2.1.    Description of the intervention and its objectives    

2.2.    Points of comparison    

3.How has the situation evolved over the evaluation period?

Current state of play    

3.1.    The market for pyrotechnic articles    

3.2.    Human health and safety    

3.3.    Public security    

3.4.    Environmental protection    

3.5.    Harmonisation of laws and implementation    

4.Evaluation findings (analytical part)

4.1.To what extent was the intervention successful and why?

4.1.1.    Effectiveness    

4.1.2.    Efficiency    

4.1.3.    Coherence    

4.2.How did the EU intervention make a difference and to whom?

4.3.Is the intervention still relevant?

4.3.1.    Relevance of the objectives    

4.3.2.    Relevance with regard to other priorities/challenges    

4.3.3.    Relevance of the scope    

5.What are the conclusions and lessons learned?

5.1.Conclusions

5.2.Lessons learned

Annex I: Procedural Information

Annex II. Methodology and Analytical models used

Annex III. Evaluation matrix

Annex IV. Overview of benefits and costs and Table on simplification and burden reduction

Annex V. Stakeholders consultation - Synopsis report

Annex VI. Functioning of the Pyrotechnics Directive

Annex VII. Complementary information on the current state of play

Annex VIII. Case studies

Glossary

Term or acronym

Meaning or definition

ADR

Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road

ADN

Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways

AdCo

Administrative Cooperation

ATM

Automated teller machine

CEN

European Committee on Standardization

CLP Regulation

Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006

DG

Directorate-General

EEA

European Economic Area

ESOs

European Standardisation Organisations

ESRs

Essential safety requirements

EU

European Union

EUR

Euro

ICSMS

Information and Communication System for Market Surveillance

NACE

Acronym used to designate the various statistical classifications of economic activities developed since 1970 in the European Union (EU) (Eurostat) 

NB

Notified Body

NGO

Non-governmental organisation

NLF

New Legislative Framework, as established by Decision No 768/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 on a common framework for the marketing of products, and repealing Council Decision 93/465/EEC and Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93

MSA

Market surveillance authority

PC

Public consultation

REACH Regulation

Regulation (EU) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC

RID

Regulations concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail

SBS

Eurostat Structural Business Statistics

SITC

Eurostat Standard International Trade Classification

Seveso-III Directive

Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC

SMEs

Small and medium-sized enterprises

The Directive

Directive 2013/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of pyrotechnic articles (recast)

UEFA

Union of European Football Associations

US

United States of America

1.Introduction

Directive 2013/29/EU on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of pyrotechnic articles 1 (hereinafter ‘the Pyrotechnics Directive’ or ‘the Directive’) aims to achieve the free movement of pyrotechnic articles in the internal market while ensuring a high level of protection of human health and safety of consumers and taking into account the relevant aspects related to environmental protection. Hence the internal market legal base was used (Article 114 TFEU, approximation of laws). The Pyrotechnics Directive was adopted as a recast of Directive 2007/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 May 2007 on the placing on the market of pyrotechnic articles 2 (hereinafter ‘the 2007 Directive’), aligning it to the New Legislative Framework (hereinafter ‘NLF’) 3 but leaving the sector-specific rules introduced in 2007 essentially untouched.

Commission Implementing Directive 2014/58/EU complements the Pyrotechnics Directive by setting up a system for the traceability of pyrotechnic articles 4 .

Purpose and scope of the evaluation

The Pyrotechnics Directive has been in force in its current form since 2013. Member States had to transpose the Directive into national law by 30 June 2015. Studies have been carried out on certain aspects of the Directive – notably on high-risk fireworks, illegal sales and criminal misuse 5 , and transposition by Member States 6 – but no comprehensive evaluation of the Directive and Implementing Directive 2014/58/EU has yet been carried out.

The environment in which EU pyrotechnics legislation operates has changed, not only since the introduction of the substantive provisions in 2007 but also since the recast in 2013. Member States, stakeholders and citizens have drawn the Commission’s attention to several shortcomings and problems with the Directive and its implementation.

Against this background it was necessary to assess the overall performance of the current Directive and whether it is still fit for purpose. In line with the Better Regulation Guideline and Toolbox 7 , the evaluation examined the relevance, effectiveness, coherence and efficiency of EU pyrotechnics legislation, and its EU added value. Based on the evaluation criteria and taking into account the Directive’s objectives and experience with implementing it, the following aspects were looked at in particular:

a)the appropriateness of requirements, including essential safety requirements;

b)the safety of articles imported from non-EU countries, including the effectiveness of enforcement of rules for those products;

c)the effectiveness of the current system for the traceability of pyrotechnic articles;

d)the diversion of articles for use to criminal ends;

e)the effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness of penalties;

f)the impact of national derogations and possible gold-plating;

g)internal coherence and potential gaps;

h)the potential for simplification or burden reduction for economic operators and authorities.

The evaluation focuses on the sector-specific aspects of the Directive, bearing in mind that some horizontal issues are addressed by the evaluation of the NLF 8 . However, where appropriate, NLF-related aspects are also included. The evaluation covers the period from 2015 (when the Directive became fully applicable) until the end of 2024 and covers the geographical scope of the EU pyrotechnics legislation, the European Economic Area. 9

Methodological approach

This Staff Working Document builds on desk research, including Commission studies, academic literature, legal texts and grey literature, and on various stakeholder consultations, involving economic operators, authorities, notified bodies and citizens. The Commission started the evaluation process with a call for evidence , launched in May 2023, which aimed to inform the public and stakeholders about the evaluation and to gather their feedback on the initiative.

The evaluation was supported by a study carried out for DG GROW by Technopolis Group , supported by Milieu , Wavestone and Intellera , between October 2023 and February 2025 10 . This Staff Working Document takes into account the study’s findings, but also other relevant information not covered by the study. Due to the limited amount of data available, it is not possible to substantiate all conclusions quantitatively. These shortcomings were mitigated to the extent possible by using qualitative information. As only limited information was available through desk research, the findings strongly rely on the stakeholder consultations that reflect participating stakeholders’ experiences and perspectives.

For the market analysis, it was not possible to tailor the data from Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics (SBS) to the scope of the evaluation. The statistics for the pyrotechnics and civil explosives sectors fall under the same NACE division: ‘Manufacture of explosives’. This also includes gunpowder and match production. In addition, data was not available for every year covered by the evaluation. The cost assessment presented under the efficiency criterion is based on very limited data from cost templates, interviews and the targeted survey. Although the assessment was validated during the stakeholder workshop, it may not fully represent stakeholders’ costs associated with the Directive. Moreover, stakeholders encountered difficulties in classifying costs into adjustment, administrative and enforcement costs 11 .

A detailed description of the methodology and main sources of information for this evaluation are provided in  Annex II .

2.What was the expected outcome of the intervention?

2.1.Description of the intervention and its objectives

The Directive sets out rules for the making available on the market of pyrotechnic articles, including essential safety requirements, rules for conformity assessment and related obligations for economic operators. It defines pyrotechnic articles as ‘any article containing explosive substances or an explosive mixture of substances designed to produce heat, light, sound, gas or smoke or a combination of such effects through self-sustained exothermic chemical reactions’. This includes consumer and professional fireworks and emergency flares, but also other pyrotechnic articles that are often components of other products, particularly in the automotive industry, such as airbags and seatbelt fasteners in vehicles. The Directive differentiates between eight categories of pyrotechnic articles, based on use and hazard:

·F1 to F4: fireworks for entertainment purposes;

·T1 and T2: theatrical fireworks for stage use; 

·P1 and P2: other pyrotechnic articles, including for vehicles.

Categories F4, T2 and P2 are only for users with specialist knowledge.

Several kinds of articles are excluded from the scope of the Directive:

·those for use by the armed forces, the police or fire departments;

·those for use in the aerospace industry and as marine equipment;

·civil explosives; 

·percussion caps intended for toys; 

·ammunition; and

·fireworks built and approved by a Member State for use exclusively on that Member State’s territory. 

The categorisation of pyrotechnic articles and related provisions are explained in more detail in Annex V I .

2.1.1.How did the intervention fit in the wider policy framework?

As part of a package of proposals (‘the Goods Package’) for several product directives, the current Directive brought the rules on pyrotechnic articles into alignment with the New Legislative Framework (NLF) 12 . The NLF was a response to large-scale product recalls and product safety problems. The product recalls, particularly in the toys sector, revealed shortcomings in the functioning of market surveillance and raised questions about the ability of EU legislation to protect the health and safety of consumers 13 . Other important policy considerations for the development of the NLF were the need to streamline the rights and obligations of economic operators in the single market and across sectors, in line with the Better Regulation agenda and the need to strengthen regulatory coherence across EU harmonisation legislation 14 . In the recast, the sector-specific rules established by the 2007 Directive were essentially brought over into the current Pyrotechnics Directive.

2.1.2.Problems and needs that the intervention aimed to address

Adopting the Directive was considered necessary to align the EU pyrotechnics rules to the NLF, which addressed the following horizontal weaknesses and inconsistencies in the implementation and enforcement of EU harmonisation legislation:

·the presence of non-compliant or dangerous products on the market and consequently a lack of trust in CE marking;

·competitive disadvantages for economic operators complying with the legislation as opposed to those circumventing the rules;

·unequal treatment in the case of non-compliant products and distortion of competition amongst economic operators due to different enforcement practices;

·differing practices in the designation of conformity assessment bodies by national authorities;

·problems with the quality of certain notified bodies for the mandatory third-party conformity assessment of pyrotechnic articles 15 .

Besides addressing these horizontal issues, the Directive was to continue to address the problems and needs that had motivated the adoption of its predecessor, the 2007 Directive:

·divergent legal frameworks for the placing on the market and the use of pyrotechnic articles in the Member States that created barriers to trade within the internal market;

·the dangers inherent to the use of pyrotechnic articles and different safety requirements across Member States 16 .

2.1.3.General and specific objectives of the intervention

The Directive maintained the general objectives of its predecessor, as stipulated in Article 1(1), according to which the Directive aims to achieve the free movement of pyrotechnic articles in the internal market while ensuring a high level of protection of human health and public security and the protection and safety of consumers and taking into account the relevant aspects related to environmental protection.

Linked to those general objectives, the Directive pursues the following specific objectives:

·the harmonisation of rules for the making available of pyrotechnic articles, and the strengthening of the single market 17 ;

·the improvement of the traceability of sales and transactions to prevent illicit possession, misuse and thefts 18 .

In addition, the Directive, by implementing the NLF, aimed to:

·ensure the quality and credibility of the work of notified bodies;

·increase the effectiveness of market surveillance activities 19 .

Commission Implementing Directive 2014/58/EU aims to ensure traceability of pyrotechnic articles by introducing the requirement that such articles be labelled with a registration number based on a uniform numbering system. This labelling system is to guarantee the identification of pyrotechnic articles and their manufacturers throughout all stages of the supply chain. 20

2.1.4.The intervention logic

The intervention logic of the evaluation is to examine the inter-relationships between 1) the problems that the Directive was designed to address; 2) the general and specific objectives that it seeks to achieve; 3) the inputs (such as human and financial resources) required to achieve these objectives; 4) the activities and implementation processes; and 5) the expected effects in terms of outputs (shorter-term outcomes), results (intermediate outcomes) and impacts (longer-term outcomes) through which the Directive’s general and specific objectives should be achieved.

Essential safety requirements (ESRs), in combination with rules for conformity assessments, obligations on economic operators (including in relation to labelling and traceability) and measures on market surveillance were established to achieve several outputs. It was expected that Member States would adapt their national laws, putting in place measures to ensure that only compliant articles are placed on the market. The Directive also envisaged systems and procedures for conformity assessments, oversight over notified bodies, and effective market surveillance mechanisms. A further desired output was the institutionalisation of information exchange and cooperation between market surveillance authorities, economic operators and the European Commission.

Overall, these outputs were expected to result in 1) the harmonisation of laws; 2) the reduction of technical barriers and costs in the single market; 3) improved traceability of sales and transactions; 4) higher compliance of pyrotechnic articles with safety requirements; and 5) increased quality and credibility of the work of notified bodies. The desired impacts of the Directive were: 1) increased intra-EU flows of pyrotechnics and enhanced competitiveness of EU companies; 2) improved safety of products and high levels of public security; and 3) the reduction of risks to the environment.

Figure 1: Intervention Logic

Source: own preparation

2.2.Points of comparison

A proper assessment of the existing pyrotechnics legislation against the evaluation criteria requires a comparison between the current situation and the situation before the Directive was adopted. For this purpose, the following points of comparison were identified as the baseline.

2.2.1.The internal market for pyrotechnic articles

In 2015, the production value of pyrotechnic articles was approximately EUR 260 million. The EU mostly produced signalling flares, rain rockets, fog signals and other pyrotechnic articles, with a value of EUR 134.5 million, followed by fireworks at around EUR 76 million. The production value of matches was approximately EUR 49.5 million 21 . The EU was a net-importer of pyrotechnic articles, with imports of approximately EUR 283 million, exceeding its exports of around EUR 110 million. The overall negative trade balance was due to the significant reliance on imports of fireworks. For matches, signalling flares, rain rockets, fog signals and other pyrotechnic articles, the EU was a net exporter 22 .

Figure 3: Extra-EU trade in pyrotechnic articles in 2015

Source: own preparation based on Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Data (Eurostat) (INDICATORS: VALUE_IN_EUROS, PRODUCT: Fireworks, Matches (excluding Bengal matches and other pyrotechnic products), Signalling flares, rain rockets, fog signals and other pyrotechnic articles (excluding fireworks))

Trade between Member States was most pronounced for fireworks, but matches, signalling flares, rain rockets, fogs signals and other pyrotechnic articles were also actively traded. Overall, intra-EU trade (using Eurostat intra-EU export figures) amounted to EUR 165 million 23 .

Figure 4: Intra-EU export of pyrotechnic articles in 2015

Source: own preparation based on SITC Data (Eurostat) (INDICATORS: VALUE_IN_EUROS, PRODUCT: Fireworks, Matches (excluding Bengal matches and other pyrotechnic products), Signalling flares, rain rockets, fog signals and other pyrotechnic articles (excluding fireworks))

As regards the size and structure of the market, no data is available for 2015. However, at the time of the impact assessment for the Goods Package in 2011, the market size of the EU’s pyrotechnic sector was estimated at EUR 4.2 billion per year. The impact assessment differentiated between the two biggest sub-sectors – fireworks and pyrotechnic articles in vehicles. Of the overall EU pyrotechnics market, EUR 1.4 billion per year was attributable to the fireworks sector, with equal shares for sales to consumers (categories 1, 2 and 3) and sales to professionals (category 4). The fireworks industry in the EU was composed mainly of SMEs, employing collectively between 15 000 and 20 000 people in the EU. This estimate was made with the caveat that most companies were operating in more than just the field of fireworks and employed seasonal workers in the end-of-year period. Businesses were mostly active in distribution, storage and professional display of fireworks. The small EU firework-manufacturing sector was predominantly engaged in the production of fireworks for professional use (F4) and was concentrated in Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Portugal and the UK 24 .

In contrast, the size of the market in automotive pyrotechnic articles in 2011 was EUR 2.8 billion, including airbag systems (EUR 1.8 billion) and seatbelts (EUR 1 billion). The market for automotive pyrotechnic articles was dominated by a few big international automotive supplier companies with a total of around 40 000 employees. They were responsible for approximately two thirds of pyrotechnic article sales in the EU 25 .

2.2.2.Human health and safety

The safety situation was not comprehensively assessed for the recast of the Directive in 2013. However, in the impact assessment, a projection by the EU injury database from 2010 was cited which revealed an annual average of 27 000 injuries due to fireworks in the EU, representing 0.07% of all injuries. Misuse was estimated to be the main cause of these accidents, but high product failure rates (up to 50%) were also reported 26 . A study carried out for the European Commission and published in 2019 estimated on the basis of data from the European Injury Database 27 that, between 2013 and 2015, around 16 000 fireworks accidents happened each year. This counted only those reported by hospitals 28 . Some fragmented accident data from Member States is also available from the period around the entry into application of the Directive. For instance 29 , the Romanian authorities reported to the Commission that 17 accidents with pyrotechnic articles were recorded in Romania in 2013, and 33 in 2014. These accidents predominantly led to hand injuries, followed by eye injuries. Portugal reported 10 and 11 accidents in 2013 and 2014 respectively, mostly involving F4 fireworks. Denmark recorded 233 accidents at New Year’s Eve 2013/2014 and 334 in 2014/2015, also mostly causing hands and eyes injuries.

This fragmented data on accidents makes it difficult to draw a reliable picture of the safety of pyrotechnic articles at that time. Nevertheless, the high level of non-compliance in the sector observed at the time was clearly one of the reasons for the NLF alignment. In the public consultation for the impact assessment of the Goods Package, 78% of the responding authorities and 50% of the responding notified bodies indicated that they considered the pyrotechnic sector to be affected by non-compliance 30 . For most sectors, the ineffective operation of market surveillance in the European Union, exacerbated by the limited traceability of articles, was identified as the main reason for the high non-compliance rates. Other factors included inadequate conformity assessments, in particular where subcontractors of notified bodies were located outside the EU 31 . This issue was particularly acute in the case of fireworks, which are predominantly produced in third countries and imported into the EU 32 . Insufficient coordination between notified bodies was also seen as contributing to the varying quality of conformity assessments 33 .

2.2.3.Public security

The recast in 2013 was meant to address issues in conformity assessments and enforcement and did not assess or touch upon security. However, a study in 2012 commissioned by the European Commission analysed the misuse of pyrotechnic articles for terrorist purposes, criminal activities and to disturb public order. As regards terrorist activities, the study pointed to the fact that pyrotechnic articles, more precisely flash bangers, were used as boosters to spread flammable liquids and gases in the New York Times Square bombing attempt in 2010. Moreover, high-energy pyrotechnic substances (like flash compositions) were identified as potential materials used for bombings, considering that terrorists could acquire large quantities of pyrotechnic shells, open them relatively easily and extract the flash composition in quantities of up to 300 grams. Lastly, according to the study, terrorists also sometimes used certain pyrotechnic articles, such as gas generators, as components of homemade improvised explosive devices 34 .

Other criminal uses identified by the study were the use of pyrotechnic articles to enter buildings, to frighten or warn people or to build pipe bombs. In addition, theft of pyrotechnic articles, e.g. from a storage location, transport containers or from vehicles (e.g. airbags) was a concern raised. In terms of disturbances of public order, the study highlighted vandalism and hooliganism, notably around New Year’s Eve, but also in football stadia (with distress signals such as hand-held flares). Consumer and professional fireworks, and illegal fireworks obtained online, were the articles most associated with criminal misuse by stakeholders. More generally, the study concluded that the broad availability of pyrotechnic articles facilitated their misuse 35 .

2.2.4.Harmonisation of laws and implementation

Member States were obliged to transpose the 2007 Directive by 2010, thereby harmonising their laws, which had previously differed significantly in terms of classification and authorisation systems for pyrotechnic articles, labelling and sales restrictions 36 . Since the pyrotechnics-specific provisions were retained in the NLF alignment, Member States did not need to adapt their laws to these provisions when the current Pyrotechnics Directive was adopted in 2013.

For the recast, no mapping of the pyrotechnics-specific rules in Member States was undertaken, as this was not the focus of the initiative. However, the absence of EU-wide obligations for importers and distributors, which led to differing rules in the Member States, was considered a problem. This contributed to different approaches to cases of non-compliance by market surveillance authorities. For instance, measures taken against the non-compliant product concerned varied in severity depending on the product and the authority involved. Different approaches were applied to importers and distributors to demonstrate compliance. Cases were reported in which non-compliant products had been withdrawn in one Member State but could still circulate in another Member State 37 .

3.How has the situation evolved over the evaluation period?

Current state of play

This section will outline the development of the legal and factual situation for pyrotechnic articles in the EU since the adoption of the current Directive, structured by the points of comparison described in the previous section.

3.1.The market for pyrotechnic articles

There does not seem to have been any significant change in EU production of signalling flares, rain rockets, fog signals and other pyrotechnic articles, matches and fireworks 38  since the adoption of the current Pyrotechnics Directive. Post-adoption production figures are generally in the same range as in the years before adoption (2009-2011), although there were small temporary peaks in production in 2012 and 2018, and a minor decline in 2020 39 . Low production volumes of fireworks during the COVID-19 pandemic seem to have been largely balanced by increased production of signalling flares, rain rockets, fog signals and other pyrotechnic articles. After the pandemic, the production of fireworks recovered quickly and exceeded pre-pandemic levels in 2022, with a value of EUR 90 million. There were also slight increases in post-COVID production of matches 40 . A slight decrease in production was recorded in 2023. At the time of the evaluation, data for 2024 was not yet available.

Figure 5: EU production of pyrotechnic articles 2009-2023

Source: own preparation based on Prodcom Data (INDICATORS: PRODVAL, PRCCODE: Fireworks, Matches (excluding Bengal matches and other pyrotechnic products), Signalling flares, rain rockets, fog signals and other pyrotechnic articles (excluding fireworks)), not inflation-adjusted

The EU continues to be an overall net importer of pyrotechnic articles, with imports increasing over recent years, reaching an all-time high of EUR 452 million in 2024. Fireworks still represent the largest share of imports and affect the overall trade balance: while the EU continues to be a net importer of fireworks, it is a net exporter of signalling flares, rain rockets, fog signals and other pyrotechnic articles, and of matches. In the years following the adoption of the Directive exports remained relatively stable at around EUR 110 million annually, but in recent years they have increased slightly, to approximately EUR 150 million. The biggest share of imports still comes from China, followed by the US 41 . The US is also the main destination for extra-EU exports 42 .

In 2024, the EU imported fireworks with a value of approximately EUR 407 million, and exported signalling flares, rain rockets, fog signals and other pyrotechnic articles with a value of about EUR 108 million 43 .

Figure 6: Extra-EU trade in pyrotechnic articles 2014-2024

Source: own preparation based on SITC Data (Eurostat) (INDICATORS: VALUE_IN_EURO, PRODUCT: Fireworks, Matches (excluding Bengal matches and other pyrotechnic products), Signalling flares, rain rockets, fog signals and other pyrotechnic articles (excluding fireworks)), not inflation-adjusted

When examining the developments in intra-EU trade, it is worth looking at the data since 1999.

Figure 8: Intra-EU exports in pyrotechnic articles 1999-2024

Source: Evaluation Study based on SITC Data (Eurostat)(INDICATORS: VALUE_IN_EUROS, PRODUCT: Fireworks, Matches (excluding Bengal matches and other pyrotechnic products), Signalling flares, rain rockets, fog signals and other pyrotechnic articles (excluding fireworks)), not inflation-adjusted

An upward trend in intra-EU trade was already observed after the adoption of the 2007 Directive and this continued after the adoption of the current Directive. In particular, exports from Member States to other Member States have increased at an accelerated pace since 2021, reaching a value of approximately EUR 376 million in 2023 44 . This might be due to increased imports of fireworks from outside the EU in 2022, which were then traded within the EU. In 2024, intra-EU exports decreased slightly.

Currently there are no public or private databases that can be used to conduct a market analysis of pyrotechnic devices for the automotive industry 45 .  Case study 2  aimed to shed light on the state of this sector and revealed that the market has remained stable since the implementation of the Pyrotechnics Directive, with the EU industry generating 40% of the global market’s turnover from these products. Pyrotechnic automotive parts seem to be an area of innovation, with the development of new products that aim to improve passengers’ safety 46 .

Information on the development of the market structure, including the number of businesses and employees and turnover, are presented in  Annex VI I .1 .

3.2.Human health and safety

Despite the obligation imposed on Member States to report accident statistics to the Commission, introduced by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/1096 47 , it is still difficult to identify clear trends in pyrotechnics-related accidents and to derive conclusions on the safety of pyrotechnic articles. This results on the one hand from different reporting practices of Member States and, on the other hand, from the difficulty of identifying the cause of accidents due to the many factors that can cause such accidents and the fact that the article concerned is destroyed in the accident. While accident statistics submitted by Sweden show an overall decrease in the number of accidents related to pyrotechnic articles between 2012/2013 and 2021/2022, but a strong increase from 2023, data from Ireland indicate more fluctuation during that period, with no identifiable trend 48 .

Data from the EU rapid alert system Safety Gate  is also useful to get an idea of the nature and scale of safety issues occurring in Member States. In 2024, 60 unsafe pyrotechnic articles were notified via Safety Gate, which is the highest number of incidents since 2015. The articles concerned were mainly fireworks imported from China that were withdrawn, recalled or destroyed because they were found to pose a risk of burns, damage to sight or hearing or other injuries, but also of fires. The number of notifications in Safety Gate concerning pyrotechnic articles has significantly increased since the entry into application of the Directive 49 . 

Data from the Information and Communication System for Market Surveillance (ICSMS) shows that in 2024, 58.3% (233 out of 400) of the pyrotechnic articles tested by market surveillance authorities were non-compliant, of which 68% were imported from China. Compared with 2015, when 86.5% (186 out of 215) of products tested were found non-compliant, this seems to be an improvement, but the 2024 numbers are still dissatisfactory. Since 2010 50 , non-compliances posing a risk have been detected in 77.1% (1 274 out of 1 653) of all completed inspections of pyrotechnic articles reported in ICSMS. In comparison, the non-compliance rate (with risk) over this period was 77.6% (7, 820 out of 10, 082) for personal protective equipment, 91.5% (4, 313 out of 4, 713) for vehicles, and 90.1% (3, 881 out of 4, 271) for radio equipment. This shows that non-compliances are an issue across different pieces of product legislation. It should be noted, however, that not all market surveillance authorities systematically report cases in ICSMS and some only report cases where non-compliances were found.

Stakeholders that responded in the targeted survey did not confirm the trend derived from Safety Gate and ICSMS and generally seem to be uncertain about the trends in accidents and health and safety issues, with about 40% (29 out of 73) choosing the ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’ option. However, 31.5% (23 out of 73) indicated that the number of accidents and health issues involving pyrotechnic articles has remained the same since the start of application of the current Directive in 2016, while 24.7% (18 out of 73) reported a decrease. The overall perception of stakeholders in the public consultation was that pyrotechnic articles in the single market are safe 51 .

Besides the risk of accidents, which comes mainly from illegal or improper handling by individuals 52 , the harmful effects of the chemical substances released during fireworks displays have become a point of concern in recent years. A study published in 2020 suggests that significant amounts of toxic metal are released from both private fireworks and larger commercial pyrotechnic displays, with potential adverse cardiopulmonary effects 53 . Also, the awareness of the risks of noise exposure during fireworks seems to have increased 54 .

The misuse of pyrotechnic articles in sports stadia has also become a safety and security concern over the last two decades, as described in a study carried out on behalf of the European Football Associations (UEFA) and as noted more recently in Council Conclusions 13370/2022 on the use of fireworks in football stadia 55 . The UEFA study identified several health and safety risks, including burns and other wounds, vision and hearing impairments, effects of smoke, and panic 56 .

3.3.Public security

The security situation related to pyrotechnic articles has become more severe in recent years. 35.3% (24 out of 68) of respondents to the targeted survey believe that illicit activities have increased or strongly increased, while 19.1% (13 out of 68) indicated that the number has remained constant 57 . The most prevalent types of illicit activity, according to stakeholders, include black market sales/illegal trade (including through online shopping), misuse for criminal activities and diversion of the product (e.g. use by non-professionals) 58 . Besides the recurrent misuse in football stadia and in riots (see Case Study 1 ), the use by criminals to break into automated teller machines (ATMs) has become a frequently observed phenomenon in the past years, especially in Germany 59 . A study carried out for the European Commission in 2019 found that, while the misuse of F4 fireworks by the public on New Year’s Eve is much more common than criminal activities to harm persons and damage property, there is a significant black market for the illegal sale of F4 category pyrotechnics online used by organised crime groups. An investigation in Poland in December 2018 resulted in the seizure of 80 tonnes of F4 pyrotechnics, and the assessment of the evidence revealed that organised crime groups ship an estimated 1 000 kg of F1-F3 fireworks and 500 kg of F4 pyrotechnics to different Member States every day 60 . Based on a sample, the study estimated that around 73% of online retailers sell F4 pyrotechnic articles without checking the buyers’ specialist knowledge 61 . Moreover, the Terrorism Situation and Trend Report of 2019 reported an increased use of pyrotechnics products in planned or plotted terrorist attacks in Europe 62 .

However, obtaining an EU-wide picture of the security problem is difficult as the channels used for such criminal activities are often hidden from the authorities, for instance by the use of non-compliant web-shops to sell pyrotechnics to non-authorised users and by shipping products in unlabelled parcels. Postal and courier companies are unable to prevent the misuse of their services for illegal trade and are exposed to serious risks from unmarked parcels containing pyrotechnic articles 63 . As most fireworks are imported from third countries, effective customs controls are essential to discover illegal trade flows but the number of parcels flooding the EU market as a consequence of e-commerce poses challenges for customs authorities 64 .

As this evaluation was being finalised, a feasibility study on the criminal misuse of pyrotechnic articles was being carried out for the Directorate-General of Migration and Home Affairs, aiming to provide a broader and more in-depth analysis of security issues involving pyrotechnic articles.

3.4.Environmental protection

Finally, the negative impact of fireworks on the environment, including on domestic and wild animals, has in recent years been the focus of many academic articles and calls from environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 65 . Concerns include disturbance of migratory or reproductive behaviour of wildlife and animal welfare more generally, as well as chemical pollution of soil, water and air 66 .

Fireworks release substances that contaminate water bodies or are taken up by plants and end up in insects, mammals, amphibians and fishes 67 . Heavy metals are also emitted by fireworks, some of them inhalable and/or bioaccumulative 68 . As regards animal welfare, a study from 2024 carried out by the Faculty of Veterinary Medicine at Utrecht University in the Netherlands found that almost 80% of cats and dogs experience stress and fear as a consequence of hearing fireworks; for more than a third of cats and dogs the fear lasts for more than half an hour after the firework noise 69 . There have even been reports of deaths of pets during or following fireworks, presumably due to stress 70 . The effect of fireworks on wildlife is more difficult to study, but strong flight responses have been observed in studies on the impact of fireworks on birds 71 .

3.5.Harmonisation of laws and implementation

A study carried out in 2022 concluded that the transposition of the Directive is generally satisfactory, although the transposition in most Member States showed several shortcomings 72 .

The Directive leaves Member States a certain degree of discretion in the transposition of the harmonised EU rules, and this has led to national laws that differ considerably in some aspects. Article 4(2) of the Directive allows Member States to prohibit or restrict the possession, use and/or the sale to the general public of categories F2 and F3 fireworks, theatrical pyrotechnic articles and other pyrotechnic articles on grounds of public order, security, health and safety, or environmental protection. In 2022, ten Member States had introduced prohibitions or restrictions under Article 4(2) of the Pyrotechnics Directive, including the prohibition of mail order/online sales, limits on net explosives mass and the prohibition of sales of F3 and certain F2 fireworks to the general public 73 .

Some Member States impose certain licensing obligations, while others do not. Those with licensing requirements generally exempt category F1, and some also exempt F2 74 . Moreover, the majority of Member States have made use of the option under Article 7 to increase the required minimum age, changing the age limits for sales of F1 fireworks from 12 to 14, 15, 16 or 18, and/or the age limits for F2 fireworks from 16 to 18. Two Member States have also increased the minimum age for F3 fireworks from 18 to 21 75 .

Significant differences between Member States’ laws also exist with regard to the definition of a ‘person with specialist knowledge’ and the requirements for acquiring this status 76 . The definitions in ten Member States only refer to certifications and/or authorisations delivered by their own national authorities. This raises questions about mutual recognition of specialist knowledge between Member States. Moreover, the Directive leaves it to the discretion of the Member States to lay down rules for the authentication and verification of persons with specialist knowledge. Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg have jointly decided to introduce a uniform control document in the Benelux area – the so-called Pyro-pass 77 .

Moreover, there are significant differences in the transposition of the obligation to establish effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties under Article 45. The amounts of the fines range from a minimum of EUR 600 in one Member State to a maximum (criminal) fine of EUR 10.8 million in another Member State. Imprisonment is a possibility in only half of the Member States, with prison terms ranging from 60 days to seven years. Other penalties introduced by Member States include forfeiture and confiscation, market restrictions and prohibitions, and the relocation and suspension of licences 78 .

In seven Member States, restrictions on the free movement (Article 4(1)) of pyrotechnic articles have been observed. These come in two categories: (1) the introduction of an obligation to register or notify pyrotechnic articles to national authorities before they are placed on the market, and (2) the introduction of restrictions on the sale and/or use of pyrotechnic articles beyond those in the Pyrotechnics Directive 79 .

Annex VII.2  provides a more detailed overview of transposition and implementation of the Directive in Member States.

4.Evaluation findings (analytical part)

4.1.To what extent was the intervention successful and why?

This chapter summarises the evaluation findings in terms of effectiveness (fulfilling expectations and meeting objectives), efficiency (proportionality of its costs and benefits) and coherence (internal and external). The evaluation matrix included in  Annex I II lists the specific evaluation questions as well as the judgement criteria, indicators and sources of information used to answer the questions. They include desk research and the various consultation activities carried out in the context of the evaluation.

Overall, satisfaction of stakeholders with the Directive is moderate to high, with 47.4% (27 out of 57) of respondents in the targeted survey rating it at 3 out of 5, and 28.1% (16 out of 57) at 4 out of 5. In the public consultation, 29.7% (11 out of 37) responded that they were satisfied to a large or moderate extent with the rules established by the Directive.

Where the findings below do not specify the category of article, it is assumed that they are valid for all categories. The evaluation questions mostly did not differentiate between pyrotechnic articles for vehicles and other pyrotechnic articles. The feedback received from stakeholders was largely related to pyrotechnic articles other than those for vehicles – in particular to fireworks. This suggests that the Directive is performing well in relation to those articles.

4.1.1.Effectiveness

a)Free movement of pyrotechnic articles in the internal market

Member States have largely aligned their legislation to the Directive’s requirements, leading to an approximation of laws on pyrotechnic articles (see section  3.5. ). According to 45.9% (17 out of 37) of the participants to the public consultation (17 of 37), the Directive contributed to the harmonisation of rules on the making available of pyrotechnic articles to a large extent. 16.2% (6 out of 37) believe it has contributed to a moderate extent. Although it is not possible to establish causality, this harmonisation of national rules might have facilitated the free movement of pyrotechnic articles in the internal market. As shown in section  3.1. , intra-EU trade in pyrotechnic articles has generally increased since the adoption of the current Directive. This suggests that it has enhanced the free movement of pyrotechnic articles within the EU and thereby strengthened the internal market. The findings of the public consultation reveal that almost 60% of respondents believe that the Directive’s objective of guaranteeing the functioning of the internal market has been achieved to a large (35.1%, 13 out of 37) or moderate (24.3%, 9 out of 37) extent.

However, as outlined in section  3.5. , the discretion of Member States in some areas to prohibit or restrict access to pyrotechnics 80  has resulted in differences between the Member States’ laws which might have impeded further integration. In that regard, the differences in the certification of specialist knowledge and the mutual recognition of such certificates were highlighted in the targeted survey. Moreover, different formats of licenses and language barriers pose practical challenges for distributors who want to verify the specialist knowledge of citizens from other Member States 81 .

b)Health and Safety

As shown in section 3.2 , information on trends in accidents and other health related issues is inconclusive. Although more than two thirds of stakeholders (64.9%, 24 out of 37) in the public consultation consider that pyrotechnic articles in the single market are safe, data from Safety Gate and ICSMS, the fragmented statistics reported from Member States to the Commission in accordance with Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/1096, and also stakeholders’ impressions in the public consultation 82 , show that the Directive has not succeeded in eliminating unsafe pyrotechnic articles from the internal market.

Essential safety requirements

Compliance with the essential safety requirements (ESRs) set out in the Directive is supposed to ensure the safety of pyrotechnic articles. In the targeted survey, the Directive’s contribution to a high level of protection of human health and safety and higher compliance of pyrotechnics was recognised by more than half of respondents 83 . Nevertheless, certain shortcomings which limit the ESRs’ effectiveness were identified.

The applicable ESRs depends on the category of pyrotechnic article. However, two market surveillance authorities and a notified body indicated in interviews that the current criteria for classification in the Directive seem to allow for unintentional and intentional misclassification of products into categories with less stringent safety requirements. This concerns, in particular, fireworks that are miscategorised as other pyrotechnic articles of category P1. A Commission guidance document on the categorisation of pyrotechnic articles intended for entertainment purposes 84  is considered of limited use due to its non-binding nature and the vague reference to ‘entertainment purposes’ to qualify category F fireworks. Therefore, there is a considerable risk that products are not assessed against the appropriate ESRs.

Moreover, for some categories of fireworks, the ESRs do not seem adequate to ensure safety. In the public consultation and the call for evidence, several stakeholders pointed out that the one-metre safety distance for F1 fireworks was not sufficient as it does not adequately account for external circumstances, such as wind or improper usage.

The Directive does not set out any specific safety requirements for F4 fireworks, apart from safeguards against inadvertent ignition, as this category of firework is supposed to be manufactured for use by professionals only. For the same reason, Member States are not allowed to impose any restrictions on the manufacturing and sale of this category of firework. This has led to a situation where fireworks with an exceedingly high net explosive content – higher than the needs of professional users 85  – are made available on the market.

According to the Directive, pyrotechnic articles which are in conformity with harmonised standards published in the Official Journal of the European Union must be presumed to be in conformity with the essential safety requirements. Harmonised standards are meant to translate the essential requirements into concrete technical specifications. Yet at present no harmonised standards are available for consumer fireworks or other pyrotechnic articles (category P). The standards proposed by the European Standardisation Organisations (ESOs) did not meet the essential requirements or the relevant standardisation request. While this is not a shortcoming of the Directive as such, it might hamper the effectiveness of the broadly formulated essential safety requirements 86 .

Compliance and quality of conformity assessments

For the assessment of conformity of pyrotechnic articles, the manufacturer must follow one of the procedures according to the modules further explained in  Annex V I . Third-party conformity assessment by a notified body is mandatory. Member States have notified 12 bodies, and ten of these are accredited 87 .

The alignment of the Directive to the NLF aimed to enhance the credibility and quality of the mandatory conformity assessment procedures and to increase compliance. Indeed, many respondents in the public consultation indicated that the Directive had contributed to a large extent (40.5%, 15 out of 37) or a moderate extent (16.2%, 6 out of 37) to higher compliance of pyrotechnic articles on the market with essential safety requirements. Nevertheless, non-compliance and unsafe products are still a concern 88 . Fireworks imported from third countries in particular – and especially those from China – often do not meet EU essential safety requirements 89 .

The high number of instances of non-compliance presented in section 3.2.    raises questions about the quality of conformity assessments. According to 54.1% (20 out of 37) of stakeholders in the public consultation, the Directive has contributed to an increased quality and credibility of conformity assessments 90 . Similarly, 30.4% (21 out of 69) of respondents to the targeted survey are very satisfied and 24.6% (17 out of 69) moderately satisfied with the current requirements for overseeing and assessing notified bodies 91 . However, the consultation activities also revealed doubts about the quality of the conformity assessment undertaken by laboratories subcontracted by notified bodies, especially where subcontractors are based in non-EU countries 92 . This echoes a Dutch non-paper from 2024 on ‘Improving the product conformity of pyrotechnic articles within the European Union’ 93 . In the targeted survey, a market surveillance authority and two SMEs pointed out that economic considerations by notified bodies might impact the quality of conformity assessments 94 . Considering the shortcomings observed in conformity assessments, several stakeholders in the targeted survey and interviews deplored a lack of oversight over notified bodies by notifying authorities and accreditation bodies.

Market surveillance and enforcement

Market surveillance should identify non-compliant products and then ensure their removal from the market. It is essential for the enforcement of the Directive. Besides the rules and procedures set out in the Pyrotechnics Directive, the overarching EU legal framework for market surveillance, including Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 95  and certain provisions of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 96  apply to the market surveillance for pyrotechnic articles, including the provisions on controls on imports.

For pyrotechnic articles, the effectiveness of market surveillance increased thanks to the Pyrotechnics Directive, according to most stakeholders participating in the public consultation 97 . However, most respondents in the targeted survey reported that the frequency of product controls both for EU manufactured and imported products has remained unchanged since the entry into application of the Directive. 98 The controls carried out were in most cases documentary and physical checks (product testing) and, in some case, only documentary checks. 99  Restrictions to the circulation of products for reasons of environmental, safety or security concerns have been rather rare in recent years. 100  Moreover, according to the targeted survey 101 and an interview with a market surveillance authority, stakeholders note significant differences in market surveillance practices between Member States, including in the use of ICSMS, which might be an obstacle to more effective market surveillance 102 .

Cooperation and information sharing

In general, cooperation and information sharing among market surveillance authorities and between authorities and economic operators seem to be effective thanks to market surveillance tools like ICSMS and Safety Gate 103 and regular Administrative Cooperation (AdCo) meetings. The same seems to be true for cooperation between notified bodies. However, when asked about the effectiveness of information sharing with competent authorities from other Member States, 32.3% (21 out of 64) of respondents to the targeted survey considered it rather ineffective, especially in comparison with information sharing between authorities of their own Member State. 104  Cooperation on concrete and specific cases, such as F4 fireworks, can be challenging 105 . In a non-paper, the Dutch authorities stressed that international cooperation and information sharing among European authorities was essential for effective market surveillance and suggested that a joint European testing centre be set up to improve cost efficiency, facilitate information sharing and ensure a uniform approach to testing and interpreting results. Better cooperation and coordination in daily practice and on concrete cases would prevent non-compliant products withdrawn from one Member State’s market from being sold in another Member State 106 .

Accessibility of high-risk pyrotechnics

Lastly, in addition to the issue of non-compliance, the accessibility of high-risk pyrotechnics to consumers, including those intended only for use by professionals, is seen as a weakness of the Directive when it comes to the protection of health and safety 107 . While some Member States have made use of the option to restrict fireworks under Article 4(2), others have not (see section 3.5 ), which allows consumers to circumvent national sales restrictions by buying restricted fireworks in other countries or online. As regards (professional) F4 fireworks, Member States are not allowed to adopt national restrictions going beyond the Directive. Internet sales are the main supply channel for this kind of firework 108 . As pointed out in section 3.3 , buyers’ specialist knowledge is not adequately checked 109 . In fact, some of the most serious accidents around New Year’s Eve involve F4 fireworks 110 . As mentioned above, some Member States, including Austria and Italy, have reacted to this problem by prohibiting mail order sales and/or using the Benelux Pyro-pass.

c)Security

Despite its declared objective, and given that it was conceived at a time when – contrary to today – the criminal misuse of pyrotechnic articles was not yet a serious concern, the Directive does not directly address public security issues 111 . As the 2019 study confirmed, the Directive was designed to enable the free movement of pyrotechnic articles in the internal market, not to prevent cross-border crime 112 . Participants in the public consultation were concerned about access to pyrotechnic articles by malicious actors, with 54.1% (20 out of 37) of them considering that there were currently no effective controls on sales.

Diversion and traceability

It appears that legally produced articles are increasingly used for criminal purposes. This notably concerns F4 fireworks which, because of their explosive content (especially flash powder), are particularly popular among criminals. In the same way that these articles easily end up in the hands of consumers, they are also readily accessible to criminals. The 2019 study found that the problem of the illegal sale of F4 pyrotechnics was hidden from the authorities, because the illegal transactions were mainly taking place online and the products were shipped in unmarked parcels. 113 The latter presents a risk also for postal companies 114 . In the public consultation, several public authorities 115  and a professional user shared their concern about the illegal online trade in pyrotechnic articles. This was echoed by market surveillance authorities in interviews, where they stressed the problem of increased accessibility of high-risk articles to unauthorised users.

Contrary to explosives for civil use, pyrotechnic articles cannot be traced on an item-specific level, as the current system for traceability set up by Commission Implementing Directive 2014/58/EU only requires manufacturers to label their articles with a registration number issued by the notified body. This registration number belongs to all articles covered by the same assessment. When asked about the effectiveness of traceability rules, stakeholder replies were divided in the public consultation and the targeted survey. In the public consultation, 27% (10 out of 37) responded that the Directive contributed mostly to improved traceability and control of sales and transactions, 18.9% (7 out of 37) replied to a limited extent, and 13.5% (5 out of 37) to a moderate extent 116 . In the targeted survey, 34% (18 out of 53) of respondents found that the Directive contributed to a moderate extent to the traceability of pyrotechnic articles, and 32.1% (17 out of 53) to a high or very high extent 117 . In interviews with three market surveillance authorities, the lack of an item-level traceability system was identified as a problem for tracing back the movement of pyrotechnic articles in the supply chain when used in criminal activities.

Penalties

Penalties aim to ensure compliance and deter illegal behaviour. In the context of diversion and criminal misuse of pyrotechnic articles, it is, however, necessary to bear in mind the nature of the Directive as a single market instrument based on Article 114 TFEU. While its safeguards against diversion may not be fully effective, the Directive’s remit does not govern the criminal misuse of pyrotechnic articles. Neither does it extend to harmonising criminal sanctions for their misuse.

As shown in section  3.5 , penalties for economic operators not respecting the provisions of the Directive differ between Member States. Among the stakeholders participating in the targeted survey, 30.5% (18 out of 59) of respondents indicated that current penalties were to a high extent effective in ensuring that pyrotechnic articles on the market fulfilled the existing requirement, while 25.4% (15 out of 59) replied that penalties were moderately effective. However, according to 56.8% (21 out of 37) of respondents to the public consultation, proportionate enforcement and penalties to prevent illicit possession, misuse, and thefts of pyrotechnic articles (i.e. penalties not mandated by the Directive, which only requires penalties for infringements of provisions of national law adopted pursuant to the Directive) should be further addressed in the future. Moreover, two market surveillance authorities explained during interviews that the current penalties imposed by Member States were not sufficient to deter serious infringements, such as organised crime, noting that illegal activities with pyrotechnics articles were generally subject to lighter penalties than those involving explosives or weapons.

Illegal manufacturing

It is important to note that not all security issues observed are linked to products manufactured in line with the Pyrotechnics Directive that are diverted for criminal purposes. Illegal and counterfeit articles that were likely manufactured entirely outside of the legal supply chain have been detected in some Member States 118 . During the traditional celebrations called ‘Las Fallas’ in Valencia in 2024, the Spanish police seized pyrotechnic articles with a total of approximately 80 kg net explosive content. Investigations revealed that a large share of the seized products were illegally manufactured counterfeits 119 . Black market sales, both online and on the streets, are a source of supply for criminals, such as organised crime groups 120 121 .

d)Environmental protection

As explained in section 3.4 , awareness about the negative environmental effects of pyrotechnic articles has increased since the Directive was adopted. The results from the stakeholder consultations suggest that the Directive does not fully ensure the protection of the environment from pyrotechnic articles. In the targeted survey, while 44.1% (26 out of 59) of respondents said the Directive had a positive impact on the protection of the environment, 33.1% (20 out of 59) considered the Directive’s effect was negative. In interviews, stakeholders pointed to the Directive’s weak focus on environmental protection as a factor limiting its environmental effectiveness. In the public consultation, environmental pollution and animal welfare were also concerns highlighted by stakeholders. The 2022 standardisation request for harmonised standards 122  aims to translate the environmental essential requirements into concrete technical requirements for pyrotechnic articles. However, the results are not expected until 2027. It is therefore not yet possible to draw any conclusions from this workstream. Existing standards have only focused marginally on the environmental effects of pyrotechnic articles.

4.1.2.Efficiency

To the extent that the Directive’s objectives have been attained, this seems to have been achieved in an overall efficient manner. While all stakeholder types, except notified bodies, reported cost increases due to compliance with the Directive’s requirements, there were also significant efficiency gains for most stakeholders.

The cost estimations presented in this section are based on findings from the study in support of the evaluation 123 . The study relied on cost templates filled in by six companies (five SMEs and one large company), two market surveillance authorities and three notified bodies, as well as interviews with these stakeholders. This data was complemented by findings from the targeted survey. The assessment of the benefits is based on the findings from the effectiveness analysis. It is mostly qualitative, given the difficulty to monetise these positive effects of the Directive. Efficiency gains were identified on the basis of the responses to the targeted survey. In view of the limited available data on costs and benefits, the analysis below can provide only an indication of how efficient the Directive is.

a)Costs

Industry

For the six companies 124 interviewed in the context of the study in support of this evaluation, costs arising from compliance with the Pyrotechnics Directive represent 0.9% of their annual turnover. For the large enterprise interviewed, the share is smaller (0.4%), while the SMEs spend an equivalent of 1.6% of their annual turnover on compliance with the Directive. This is comparable to the regulatory burden of other directives and regulations referred to in the evaluation of the New Legislative Framework 125 . The annual compliance costs have been calculated as the average (mean) over the period from 2015 to 2022.

Table 1: Average yearly (2015-2022) compliance costs attributed to compliance with the Pyrotechnics Directive as share of turnover

Components

All companies

Large enterprises

SMEs

Turnover

EUR 20 889.026

EUR 85 859.154

EUR 12 091.667

Compliance costs

EUR 196 048

EUR 347 085

EUR 194 044

Share of compliance costs in turnover

0.9%

0.4%

1.6%

N=6 (1 large company, 5 SMEs), Source: Technopolis Group, based on cost templates

For the SMEs, most costs are investments and expenses needed to adjust their activity to the Directive’s requirements (adjustment costs). These represent 87.6% of the total compliance costs. Administrative costs account for only 8.3%. The large company reported inverse proportions, with administrative costs making up 63.5% of total compliance costs, and adjustment costs 36.5%. Hassle costs (i.e. costs resulting from inconveniences such as unnecessary waiting time, delays, redundant legal provisions, corruption, etc.) and costs only indirectly caused by the Directive 126  seem to be negligible and are not further specified in this section.

Table 2: Average yearly costs for industry attributed only to the Pyrotechnics Directive

Costs typology

All companies

Large enterprises

SMEs

Total yearly costs of the Directive

EUR 196 048

EUR 347 085

EUR 194 044

Adjustment costs

71.1%

36.5%

87.6%

Administrative costs

25.5%

63.5%

8.3%

Hassle costs

0.9%

0.0%

1.0%

Indirect costs

2.6%

0.0%

3.1%

Other costs

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

N=6 (1 large company, 5 SMEs), Source: Technopolis Group, based on cost templates

Adjustment costs

The interviewed SMEs spend, on average, EUR 170 020 on adjusting to the Directive’s requirements, but it varies considerably from EUR 9 903 to EUR 485 078, depending on the company. The large company reported average annual adjustment costs of EUR 126 735. While manufacturing in line with the essential safety requirements is the biggest adjustment cost factor for the SMEs, accounting for 58% of total adjustment costs, it represents only 7% of the large company’s adjustment costs. For the large company, the design, testing and categorisation of products is the biggest adjustment cost, making up 46% of the total adjustment costs. This is followed by costs for affixing the CE marking (16%), operational costs for traceability and labelling actions (equipment acquisition and implementation of activities) (13%), and adaptation of the design for compliance (11%). For SMEs, the design, testing and categorisation of products is the second biggest adjustment cost, but at 17%, so relatively low compared to the large company. Sample testing, investigations and record-keeping (complaints and non-conforming articles) represent 10% of adjustment costs for SMEs.

In the targeted survey, the responding large manufacturer allocated the largest share (40%) of adjustment costs covered by the question 127 to equipment acquisition and implementation of activities linked to CE marking, labelling and traceability 128 , while 30% of the adjustment costs were attributed to the design and manufacturing of products according to the Directive’s requirements, which was also a significant cost factor for most SMEs responding to the targeted survey. According to five out of seven, it represents 30-40% of adjustment costs. For four of them, it is the largest adjustment cost. Costs for the acquisition of equipment for conformity assessments and the implementation of these assessments also represent a good share of SMEs’ adjustment costs – for five out of seven it accounts for 20-30%. Moreover, for four SMEs, the costs for equipment and activities linked to CE marking, labelling and traceability represent 20-40% of the adjustment costs covered by the question.

Figure 11: Share of adjustment costs for companies by key drivers attributed only to the Pyrotechnics Directive as per cost templates

N=6 (1 large company, 5 SMEs), Source: Technopolis Group, based on cost templates

Administrative costs

All administrative costs linked to compliance with the Pyrotechnics Directive together amount to an average of EUR 16 023 per year for the five SMEs that submitted cost templates, again with a big span from EUR 2 067 to EUR 49 140. The large company incurs on average EUR 220 350 for administrative activities linked to compliance with the Directive. 33% of the SME’s administrative costs result from labelling pyrotechnic articles in accordance with the Directive’s requirements, collecting documentation for conformity assessments accounts for 14% and collaboration with surveillance authorities for 8%. For the large company, producing the technical documentation represents the most significant share of administrative costs, representing 30% of all administrative costs, followed by ensuring correct labelling (16%) and providing safety information in the language of the user (13%).

Figure 12: Share of administrative costs for companies by key drivers attributed only to the Pyrotechnics Directive as per cost templates

N=6 (1 large company, 5 SMEs), Source: Technopolis Group, based on cost templates

In the targeted survey, ensuring correct labelling also emerged as an important driver of administrative costs for SMEs, with six out of eight indicating that it represents between 15-30% of the administrative costs covered by the question 129 130 . Similar shares were attributed to producing the technical documentation 131 and documentary verification of the product’s conformity 132 . The responding large enterprise allocated the largest share (30%) of the administrative costs covered by the question to documentary verification of the product’s conformity. Ensuring correct labelling was also found to be a significant administrative cost, with a 20% share of all administrative costs covered by the question. Only 10% of the large company’s administrative costs went on producing the technical documentation for conformity assessment procedures.

Market surveillance authorities

The two market surveillance authorities (MSAs) that provided cost data spend, on average, EUR 76 388 per year on compliance with the Directive. 73.9% of these costs are linked to enforcement, while adjustment costs represent 18.7% and administrative costs 4.6%. Hassle costs and indirect costs represent 1.3% of total compliance costs, respectively.

Table 3: Average yearly compliance cost for MSAs

Public body

Market surveillance authority

Total yearly costs of the Directive

EUR 76 388

Enforcement costs

73.9%

Adjustment costs

18.7%

Administrative costs

4.6%

Hassle costs

1.3%

Indirect costs

1.3%

N= 2 (market surveillance =2), Source: Technopolis Group, based on cost template

Enforcement costs

The two MSAs incur average enforcement costs of EUR 21 516 and EUR 93 680 per year respectively. Of these costs, 25% are linked to checks and risk assessments (excl. outsourced tests), while communicating non-conformance and market surveillance actions account for 23%. 17% of enforcement costs are attributed to the verification of reports and certificates.

Figure 13: Share of enforcement costs for MSAs by key driver attributed only to the Pyrotechnics Directive as per cost templates

N=2, Source : Technopolis Group, based on cost templates

In the targeted survey, one MSA indicated that laboratory testing represented 30% of all costs covered by the question 133 , while the other two MSAs allocated no costs to this task. Coordination activities, including with expert groups within the Member State, competent authorities and regional authorities and external expert groups (e.g. standardisation bodies, Commission Expert Groups), account for approximately 30% of all presented costs for two out of three MSAs, while one did not provide complete information. Other significant cost factors reported in the survey were costs linked to record-keeping and the maintenance of registers, product recalls, and the training of inspectors 134 .

Adjustment costs

The yearly adjustment costs reported in the cost templates differ significantly between the two MSAs, with one indicating EUR 650 and the other EUR 27 953. As most costs for MSAs can be categorised as enforcement costs, there are only two adjustment cost factors. The familiarisation and training of staff accounts for 75% of adjustment costs, while ensuring that personnel are informed of relevant harmonisation and standardisation activities accounts for 25%.

For the three MSAs participating in the targeted survey, inspectors’ training represents, respectively, 10%, 20% and 30% of the costs covered by the question.

Administrative costs

The annual administrative costs incurred by the two MSAs that filled in the cost templates are EUR 3 626 and EUR 4 977. These are split between record-keeping of surveillance activities (58%) and the collection of documents and evidence and reporting to authorities (42%).

For the three MSAs responding to the targeted survey, administrative costs from receiving, storing and retrieving records account for 10%, 15% and 20%, respectively, of the costs covered by the question, while the maintenance of registers represents 5%, 10% and 20%.

Notified bodies

When looking at the costs for notified bodies (NBs), it needs to be borne in mind that NBs owe their income to the conformity assessment requirement in the Directive. They can also – apart from considerations of competitiveness and proportionality as mandated by the Directive (Article 33(2)) – freely set the price for their assessments to cover their costs. Accordingly, costs directly linked to carrying out conformity assessments are not considered in this section 135 .

On average, the three NBs providing cost data incur EUR 34 895 to comply with the Directive. Adjustment costs account for 64% and administrative costs for 36%. NBs also reported some indirect costs stemming from the Directive. Those notably included the use of external experts for audits and the training and monitoring of those experts to ensure compliance with the Directive. No hassle costs were reported.

Table 4: Average yearly (2015-2022) compliance cost for notified bodies

Cost categories

Costs in EUR

Total yearly costs of the Directive

EUR 34 895

Adjustment costs

64%

Administrative costs

36%

N=3, Source : own preparation, based on cost templates

Adjustment costs

The NBs’ reported adjustment costs, on average, amount to EUR 22 192 per year. Most of these costs are linked to participation in coordination group meetings (49%). 41% relate to familiarising staff with the essential safety requirements and 10% to the liability insurance

Administrative costs

Administrative costs for the three consulted NBs are on average EUR 12 703 per year. Of these costs, 79% are attributed to (re)accreditation 136 .

Figure 17: Share of administrative costs for NBs by key driver attributed only to the Pyrotechnics Directive as per cost templates

N=3, Source: own preparation, based on cost templates

b)Burden

In light of the Commission’s constant objective to reduce regulatory burden for stakeholders 137 , the efficiency evaluation should also include an assessment of the proportionality of the burden of legal obligations 138 . When asked in the public consultation to what extent certain operative tasks constituted a proportionate burden, one third (4 out of 12) of stakeholders indicated that designing and manufacturing according to the essential safety requirements constituted a proportionate burden to a very large extent, while this was a proportionate burden to a moderate extent for another third (4 out of 12). The operational tasks linked to labelling, CE marking and affixation of the registration number were perceived as proportionate to a moderate extent by 23.1% (3 out of 13) of stakeholders and to a large extent by 15.4% (2 out of 13) and not at all proportionate by another 15.4%. The two ‘not at all’ replies were submitted by companies. Conducting investigations on non-conforming articles in response to requests from public authorities was considered proportionate to a moderate extent by 46.2% (6 out of 13) and to a limited extent by 7.7% (1 out of 13).

Figure 18: Proportionality of the burden of operative tasks

N= 5-20 (depending on the task), Source: own preparation based on the public consultation

Looking at the burden of the different administrative tasks, most stakeholders participating in the public consultation (58.3%, 7 out of 12) perceive the preparation of a technical dossier for conformity assessment applications to be proportionate to a moderate extent. 50% (3 out of 6) of companies shared this view, while 33.3% (2 out of 6) found this task to a large extent proportionate. When it comes to the burden of labelling, stakeholders were divided, with one third (4 out 12) considering it not at all proportionate, while 25% (3 out of 12) said it was to a large extent proportionate. 50% (3 out of 6) of companies selected ‘not at all’; the other half was divided between ‘to a very large extent’ and ‘to a moderate extent’ or preferred not to answer. One company suggested simplifying labelling requirements, such as allowing the use of QR codes to convey safety information digitally, to reduce costs. Supplying the technical information of the pyrotechnic articles to surveillance authorities and economic operators constitutes a proportionate burden to a large extent for 58.3% (7 out of 12) of stakeholders participating in the public consultation. Record-keeping – one of the most cost-intensive administrative tasks for market surveillance authorities – was considered moderately proportionate by 50% (5 out of 10) public authorities, whereas two rated it as proportionate only to a limited extent or not at all.

Figure 19: Proportionality of the burden of administrative and office tasks

N=12-37 (depending on the task), Source: own preparation based on the public consultation

A separate question in the public consultation asked about the burden of the submission of accident data, as required by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/1096 139 . Three out of five authorities replied in the public consultation that the regular reporting of pyrotechnic-related accidents represented a significant burden to a moderate (1) or large (2) extent 140 . Moreover, it has emerged from informal discussions with MSAs that the submission of accident data is tying up resources that might be better used for other purposes.

Accident monitoring is important for taking appropriate policy decisions at Member-State and EU level. Without information about the product types involved, the victims and the causes of accidents, it is difficult to draw conclusions and take targeted and proportionate measures. However, considering the difficulty of producing complete, comparable and meaningful accident statistics, due to the different recording practices between Member States and the often unclear causes of the accidents, the proportionality of the mandatory accident reporting in its current form is questionable. In the public consultation, when asked how accident reporting could be improved, multiple responses (4 companies and 2 interest groups / civil societies / business organisations) suggested distinguishing between the use of legal and illegal items and whether they were used properly or improperly. A company highlighted the need for more detailed research into the behavioural aspects of accidents and the importance of collecting comprehensive statistics. A citizen/consumer also suggested an online reporting system for pyrotechnicians.

c)Trends in costs and efficiency gains

Looking at how costs evolved during the evaluation period (i.e. from 2015) can provide an idea of the stakeholders’ financial burden linked to the Directive, but does not allow us to establish a causal relationship between changes in costs and the Directive’s implementation, as other factors, including macro-economic developments, such as increasing energy prices, might also have played a role.

In the targeted survey, economic operators mostly reported that they had experienced cost increases since the Directive was implemented 141 . MSAs and enforcement authorities mainly experienced cost increases or no change 142 . For the participating NBs the costs mainly remained unchanged 143 .

At the same time, a large proportion of stakeholders experienced efficiency gains in their administrative and/or operational activities from complying with the Directive. 27.5% (14 out of 51) of respondents in the targeted survey said that their administrative procedures became more or much more efficient, and 25.5% (13 out of 51) reported improved efficiency in their operative tasks 144 . Only a few stakeholders experienced a decline in their efficiency, including the two responding large manufacturers, one out of twelve SMEs and one out of fourteen MSAs.

d)Benefits

As explained in Section 4.1.1 , the Directive has in many respects achieved its objectives, in particular as regards contributing to increased health and safety and the free movement of pyrotechnic articles on the internal market. In doing so, it has generated a number of benefits for stakeholders and society.

The following direct benefits have been identified in the cost interviews on the cost templates:

·Sustained level of safety: The Directive seems to have contributed to a relatively stable safety level of the pyrotechnic articles on the market. This benefits not only users but also society at large 145 .

·Positive impact on public security: Although security issues remain, stakeholders mostly acknowledge the Directive’s positive impact on public security 146 .

·Improved market access: Companies and NBs report improved access to the single market thanks to the harmonised rules and the CE marking system. They have also experienced advantages on non-EU markets, as CE marking is widely accepted internationally as complying with other markets’ safety requirements 147 .

·Reduction of familiarisation cost: Although the Directive has not entirely harmonised rules across Member States, adapting national laws to the Directive has reduced stakeholders’ costs for familiarisation with legal requirements.

·Cost savings in conformity assessment activities: The harmonisation of conformity assessment procedures has created cost savings for stakeholders.

·Coordination and information exchange: The Directive has facilitated coordination and information exchange between MSAs, NBs and the Commission. Fora like the Forum of Notified Bodies and the AdCo Group are appreciated for providing an opportunity to exchange views on issues encountered during market surveillance and conformity assessments, find solutions and agree on common approaches.

·Traceability: Although it does not allow for item-level tracking, the traceability system for pyrotechnic articles, which requires pyrotechnic articles to be labelled with registration numbers issued by the notified body that carried out the conformity assessment, has made it easier to track pyrotechnic articles throughout the supply chain 148 .

4.1.3.Coherence

The Directive is meant to integrate well into the overall legal and policy framework at EU level, but also at international and national level. Contradictions, overlaps or other tensions with other measures should be avoided and, ideally, synergies created. This is what is understood by ‘external coherence’. At the same time, the various components of the Directive should build upon or complement each other in a logical and meaningful way – the Directive should be ‘internally coherent’. External and internal coherence of the pyrotechnics legislation were assessed for this evaluation and no major points of incoherence were identified.

a)External coherence

The Pyrotechnics Directive operates alongside other EU legislation regulating explosive products or substances, chemicals, or other aspects of consumer or environmental protection.

·Explosives Precursors Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2019/1148) 149

The Explosives Precursors Regulation sets harmonised rules for substances or mixtures that could be misused for the illicit manufacture of explosives. It explicitly excludes from its scope pyrotechnic articles covered by the Pyrotechnics Directive. Before the Explosives Precursors Regulation was adopted in 2019, an impact assessment examined the coherence of the initiative with the existing legal framework, including the Pyrotechnics Directive. It was concluded that, given that they had a different focus in terms of products, the two pieces of legislation were complementary. No major inconsistencies or overlaps were identified 150 . Since then, no coherence issues have been brought to the attention of the Commission and of the 15 stakeholders sharing their opinion on this point in the public consultation, 12 perceived the Pyrotechnics Directive to be highly or moderately coherent with the Explosives Precursors Regulation 151 .

·Marine Equipment Directive (Directive 2014/90/EU) 152

The Marine Equipment Directive applies to equipment placed or to be placed on board an EU ship and for which the approval of the flag State administration is required by international instruments. Pyrotechnic articles, such as signal flares, that meet these criteria are excluded from the scope of the Pyrotechnics Directive and are exclusively subject to the Marine Equipment Directive. A stakeholder participating in the targeted survey pointed to difficulties encountered with the exclusion of marine equipment where national laws required pyrotechnic articles on ships that did not fall under the Marine Equipment Directive, such as small pleasure vessels or fishing boats. In such cases the same products would be considered marine equipment when placed on a ship subject to the Marine Equipment Directive, but P1 or P2 pyrotechnic articles when placed on any other ship. In the case of P2 articles, the Pyrotechnics Directive would require specialist knowledge for people to buy them for their pleasure vessel or fishing boat, but this would not be required for articles intended for use on a ship under the Marine Equipment Directive.

·Civil Explosives Directive (Directive 2014/28/EU) 153

The Civil Explosives Directive regulates materials and articles considered to be explosives in the United Nations recommendations on the transport of dangerous goods and falling within Class 1 of those recommendations. Pyrotechnic articles falling within the scope of Directive 2013/29/EU are explicitly excluded from the Civil Explosives Directive’s scope. At the same time, the Pyrotechnics Directive does not apply to civil explosives under the scope of the Civil Explosives Directive. Legally, there are therefore no overlaps between the two directives. However, in practice, stakeholders report difficulties in distinguishing between the two kinds of products and, therefore, the applicable rules. For instance, high-hazard pyrotechnic articles (e.g. category P2) are extensively used like civil explosives and could be considered as explosives due to their potential risks 154 . Primer caps are another example of products which, according to NBs, do not fit clearly into either category 155 .

·CLP Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008) 156  REACH Regulation (Regulation (EU) 1907/2006) 157

The Classification, Labelling and Packaging (CLP) Regulation sets harmonised rules for the classification of substances and mixtures and for the labelling and packaging of hazardous substances and mixtures. Pyrotechnic articles, if classified as explosives under the CLP Regulation, must be labelled and packaged as such in accordance with CLP. Accordingly, pyrotechnic articles under the scope of the Pyrotechnics Directive must comply with the labelling requirements both in the CLP Regulation and in the Directive. While the definition of ‘pyrotechnic article’ in the Directive is almost identical to that in the CLP Regulation, the non-detonative character of the chemical reactions referred to in the CLP definition is not explicitly required by the definition in the Directive 158 . This, however, seems to be a negligible misalignment.

The REACH (registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals) Regulation regulates the manufacture, placing on the market and use of chemical substances, on their own, in mixtures or in articles to ensure a high level of protection of human health and the environment. REACH applies to substances and mixtures used for pyrotechnic articles.

In the public consultation, out of the 17 stakeholders that shared their opinion, 9 perceived a high coherence between the EU chemicals legislation (CLP and REACH) (see below) and the Directive and 7 a moderate coherence. No concrete coherence issues between the two pieces of legislation and the Pyrotechnics Directive were identified.

·Waste Framework Directive (Directive 2008/98/EC) 159

The Waste Framework Directive (WFD) lays down measures to protect the environment and human health from waste, including rules for hazardous waste. It applies to pyrotechnic waste, which falls under the category of ‘explosive’, and therefore hazardous, waste 160 . The Pyrotechnics Directive itself is largely silent on the disposal of pyrotechnic articles. The essential safety requirements only very broadly stipulate that ‘each pyrotechnic article must be designed and manufactured in such a way that it can be disposed of safely by a suitable process with minimum effect on the environment’ 161 . The WFD, therefore, complements the Pyrotechnics Directive, and there do not seem to be contradictions or overlaps between the two directives. It must be noted, however, that it is unclear from the wording in the WFD whether ‘pyrotechnic waste’ only refers to the residues of used pyrotechnic articles or also to expired articles. Expired articles could also be excluded from the scope of the WFD if they were considered ‘decommissioned explosives’ in accordance with Article 2(1)(e) of the WFD.

·Seveso-III Directive (Directive 2012/18/EU) 162

The Seveso-III Directive lays down rules for the prevention of major accidents involving dangerous substances in establishments where such substances are present. It also applies to economic operators in the pyrotechnics sector, if dangerous substances within the scope of the Seveso-III Directive are present in their establishments. The participants in the public consultation mainly (62.2%, 23 out of 37) did not know or preferred not to say whether the Seveso-III Directive and the Pyrotechnics Directive were coherent. However, of the 14 stakeholders that replied, 7 perceived a high coherence, 4 a moderate coherence and 3 a low coherence. No conflicting rules were identified.

·Product Liability Directive (Directive (EU) 2024/2853) 163

The Product Liability Directive sets rules on the liability of economic operators for damage suffered by natural persons and caused by defective products and on compensation for such damage. While it applies to pyrotechnic articles accessible to consumers under the scope of the Pyrotechnics Directive, the two directives regulate distinct aspects – safe products vs liability for defective products – and complement each other. The respondents to the public consultation mainly found the two pieces of legislation highly coherent (52.9%, 9 out of 17, of those who expressed their opinion) 164 .

·Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU 165

The EU Counter-Terrorism Agenda seeks to support Member States in better anticipating, preventing, protecting and responding to the terrorist threat. Two of the pillars of the agenda are (i) identifying vulnerabilities and building capacity to anticipate threats and (ii) promoting security by design and reducing vulnerabilities to protect cities and people 166 . The Directive’s stated objective of ensuring a high level of public security is in line with the EU Counter-Terrorism agenda. However, as explained in section  4.1.1.c) , the Directive is currently not sufficiently effective in preventing the criminal misuse of pyrotechnic articles. Most importantly, the fact that Member States cannot ban or restrict F4 fireworks seems to contradict the agenda’s objective of supporting Member States in anticipating, preventing, protecting and responding to the terrorist threat. The study on the criminal misuse of pyrotechnic articles commissioned by the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs is looking more closely into EU pyrotechnics policy from a security angle.

·Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR) 167 , Regulations concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail (RID), Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways (ADN) and UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods 168

The ADR, RID, ADN and the UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods set out conditions or recommendations that should be met when dangerous goods are transported. The EU has transposed the ADR, RID and ADN into Directive 2008/68/EC on the inland transport of dangerous goods, which makes them applicable to all transport in the EU, both within and across national borders 169 . Directive 2008/68/EC is complementary to the Pyrotechnics Directive, which does not regulate the transport of pyrotechnic articles.

·National laws and policies

As explained previously, the Directive allows Member State to impose bans or restrictions on certain categories of fireworks and many Member States have made use of this option. The resulting variations between national laws seem to create barriers to the free movement of pyrotechnic articles, undermining the Directive’s objective of creating a single market for these articles. According to 36.8% (25 out of 68) of respondents in the targeted survey, current variations in national rules affect intra-EU flows of pyrotechnic articles negatively or very negatively 170 ,while 32.4% (22 out of 68) observe a negative or very negative effect on the competitiveness of EU companies 171 . Moreover, although 25% (17 out 68) of respondents consider that national rules have positive effects on health and safety and 27.9% (19 out of 68) on public security 172 , the possibility of circumventing national rules via cross-border sales from less-restrictive Member States seems to undermine the Directive’s objective of ensuring high levels of safety and security across the EU 173 .

b)Internal coherence

Half of the 58 respondents to the targeted survey rated internal coherence as moderate and 36.2% (21 out of 58) as high. In fact, only one minor issue was identified in the course of the evaluation, which was also brought up by several stakeholders in the validation workshop in the context of the Technopolis Group study. Articles 8(6) and 12(3) of the Directive stipulate that manufacturers and importers must indicate their name, registered trade name or registered trade mark and their postal address on the pyrotechnic article itself ‘or, where that is not possible, on its packaging or in a document accompanying the pyrotechnic article’. Articles 10 and 11, on the other hand, which set out labelling requirements and reiterate the obligation to provide the information on the manufacturer and importer, do not refer to the possibility of providing this information in a document accompanying the article, but only to it being put on the article itself or its packaging. This creates confusion for manufacturers and importers that are unable to provide the information on the article itself as to the options they have to provide that information in an alternative way.

4.2.How did the EU intervention make a difference and to whom?

In line with the principle of subsidiarity, it is important to evaluate whether the EU pyrotechnics legislation has had a positive impact beyond what could have been achieved by the Member States acting alone.

Overall, stakeholders acknowledge the added value of EU-wide rules on pyrotechnic articles. When asked about the expected consequences if the Directive were withdrawn, 51.3% (19 out of 37) of respondents in the public consultation replied that the pyrotechnics sector would be affected negatively, or even very negatively 174 , although most business associations (3 out of 4) considered that it would remain unchanged. The stakeholders supplemented their reply saying that the withdrawal of the Directive would likely lead to more accidents (national and EU enforcement agency), chaos and a lack of control (a professional user), and jeopardise safety and security (MSAs, company, citizen/consumer). At a meeting with the Commission on 19 February 2025, an animal welfare organisation stressed that the fragmentation of national laws would be problematic in terms of protection. On the other hand, a stakeholder responding to the public consultation and identifying as an interest group / civil society / business organisation sees also a positive side to leaving the pyrotechnics rules to the Member States, suggesting that allowing Member States to introduce general bans on fireworks might benefit animal welfare.

Looking at the EU added value of the Directive in relation to its various objectives, respondents to the targeted survey predominantly believe that these objectives could not have been achieved at all (20.7%, 12 out of 58) or only to a low extent (36.2%, 21 out of 58) if Member States had acted alone. However, the public consultation reveals that the EU added value as perceived by stakeholders differs depending on the objective. While the Directive seems to be essential for cross-border trade in the internal market, other objectives, notably the protection of safety and security were not sufficiently supported by the Directive. In fact, Member States acting individually might have achieved better levels of protection at national level, if allowed to take action on safety and security issues with regard to f4 fireworks, which may not be restricted by Member States under the current Directive, thereby limiting their ability to react to related safety and security threats 175 . In an interview, an industry stakeholder mentioned that, without the Directive, Member States could have made faster decisions at national level. 

About 45.9% (17 out of 37) of stakeholders in the public consultation believed that cross-border facilitation related to the supply, trade, and use of pyrotechnics could only have been achieved to a limited extent or could not have been achieved at all in the absence of the Directive. Companies especially expressed this view 176 . In the same vein, 48.6% (18 out of 37) indicated that the reduction in trade barriers could have been achieved only to a limited extent or not at all 177 . The EU added value of the traceability system was also recognised, with 27% (10 out of 37) responding that, in the absence of the Directive, it could have been achieved to a moderate extent, and 32.4% (12 out of 37) considering that it could only have been achieved to a limited extent or not at all 178 .

In turn, as regards the protection of human health and safety, stakeholders said that it could have been achieved to a large (32.4%, 12 out of 37) or moderate (21.6%, 8 out of 37) extent. Notably, 75% (3 out of 4) of business associations responded ‘to a large extent’ and 25% (1 out of 4) ‘to a very large extent’. Similarly, when asked about public security, 24.3% (9 out of 37) answered that it could have been achieved to a large extent and another 24.3% said to a moderate extent 179 .

Overall, these findings suggest that the Directive’s role in harmonising rules is beneficial to the free movement of pyrotechnic articles in the internal market, but, in its current form, impedes Member States from taking action on safety and security issues with regard to F4 fireworks at national level. In light of the frequent circumvention of national rules via cross-border (online) sales, a harmonised approach seems however preferable to individual national measures.

4.3.Is the intervention still relevant?

Under the criterion of relevance, this evaluation looked at the relationship between the scope and objectives of the Pyrotechnics Directive, on the one side, and the current and future needs and problems in relation to pyrotechnic articles in the EU, on the other. As explained in the Better Regulation Toolbox, if an intervention does not help address the current and likely future needs or problems, then it does not matter how effective, efficient or coherent it is, because it may no longer be appropriate 180 .

4.3.1.Relevance of the objectives

In this section, the relevance of the Directive’s objectives in light of current problems and needs is assessed. Stakeholders in the targeted survey mostly believe that the Directive addresses current needs and challenges to some extent, with 39.3% (22 out of 56) responding ‘to a high extent’ and 37.5% (21 out of 56) ‘to a moderate extent’.

a)Free movement of pyrotechnic articles in the internal market (incl. harmonisation of laws and implementation)

As illustrated in section 4.1.1 , Member States’ laws have significantly aligned following the adoption of the Directive, but there are still notable differences, which are not only considered to result in trade barriers, but also to hamper cooperation between MSAs.

In the public consultation, when asked about the extent to which the guaranteeing of the functioning of the internal market is still relevant, 35.1% (13 out of 37) responded ‘to a large extent’, including all four responding business associations, and 24.3% (9 out of 37) said ‘to a moderate extent’. Similarly, in the targeted survey, 38.9% (21 out of 54) of stakeholders replied that the issue of differences between national laws, causing barriers to trade within the Union, was still to a high or very high extent relevant and continued to require action at EU level, while 22.2% (12 out of 54) chose ‘to a moderate extent.’ Here again, industry representatives generally attributed high relevance to this problem 181 .

The objective of ensuring the free movement of pyrotechnic articles in the internal market by means of the harmonisation of laws and practices can therefore be considered to be still relevant.

b)Health and Safety

As mentioned in section  3.2 , the numbers of accidents with pyrotechnic articles do not seem to have decreased and the negative impact of substances and noise emitted during explosions are an increasing concern. Moreover, as was explained in section 4.1.1.b ) , non-compliant articles on the market, especially those imported from China, as well as the easy accessibility of high-risk fireworks by non-authorised persons, seem to compromise health and safety. In line with these observations, the respondents to the public consultation predominantly considered the Directive’s objective of ensuring the protection of human health and safety of consumers still relevant, with 32.4% (12 out of 37) responding ‘to a very large extent’ and 27% (10 out of 37) ‘to a large extent’. In the targeted survey, 27.8% (15 out of 54) of respondents said that they consider the presence of non-compliant or dangerous products on the market to be relevant to a low extent, including both responding large manufacturers, all three responding importers and three out of six industry organisations 182 . However, 22.2% (12 out of 54) of all stakeholders considered the problem relevant to a high extent, 20.4% (11 out of 54) to a moderate extent and 18.5% (10 out of 54) to a very high extent.

Overall, health and safety risks linked to pyrotechnic articles are still a common concern for most stakeholders, and thus a relevant objective of the Directive. 54.1% (20 out of 37) of respondents in the public consultation believe that minimising the number of unsafe pyrotechnic articles on the market, and the safety and accessibility of bigger and more powerful pyrotechnics to the public should be further addressed by the Directive in the future.

c)Security

Security concerns linked to pyrotechnic articles such as illegal trade and criminal misuse, which were not of major relevance when the 2007 Directive was adopted, nor during the recast in 2013, have become more and more pressing in recent years, as shown in section  3.3 .  Accordingly, the majority of respondents in the public consultation considered the objective of ensuring public security still relevant to a large extent (37.8% (14 out of 37)) or very large extent (21.6% (8 out of 37)). In the open responses, an enforcement agency and a national government authority shared their concern that, despite progress in restricting pyrotechnics access to non-authorised individuals, these items were still misused in criminal activities due to inefficiencies in the current authorisation systems. A company and a market surveillance authority stated that they considered public security not adequately addressed by the Directive.

In conclusion, it becomes apparent that the objective of public security has become even more relevant than it was when the Directive was adopted. Accordingly, controls to prevent access to pyrotechnic articles by malicious actors is a concern that, according to 54.1% (20 out of 37) of stakeholders in the public consultation, should be further addressed in the future 183 . Moreover, 56.8% (21 out of 37) of respondents believe that proportionate enforcement and penalties to prevent illicit possession, misuse, and thefts of pyrotechnic articles should be further addressed by the Directive in the future.

d)Environmental protection

As explained in section 3.4 , the detrimental effects of pyrotechnic articles on wildlife and pets and the contamination of soil, air and water with chemical substances and plastics are concerns that have been expressed more and more vocally in recent years. In the public consultation, 35.1% (13 out of 37) of stakeholders deem the consideration of aspects related to environmental protection to a large or very large extent still relevant, while 29.7% (11 out of 27) find it relevant to a moderate extent. Moreover, animal protection and environmental impacts were raised by two non-governmental organisations and a citizen, respectively, in their responses to the open question, as topics that are currently not sufficiently addressed.

Against this background, the objective of environmental protection seems to be even more relevant than at the time when the Directive was adopted. In fact, only about a third of participants to the public consultation considered that greener and more sustainable chemical compositions for pyrotechnic articles (including compostability and plastic pollution) and animal welfare were currently addressed by the Directive, while almost half expressed their wish that these issues be further addressed in the future 184 . The relevance of environmental protection from the impacts of fireworks should also be considered in the light of new developments in the area of entertainment, such as light and drone shows, which have been gaining popularity and seem to have less environmental impact.

4.3.2.Relevance with regard to other priorities/challenges

In the public consultation, stakeholders were also asked to what extent the technical developments were currently addressed by the Directive. In that regard, online trade emerged as a topic that is considered relevant to be further addressed for pyrotechnics in the future, with 51.4% (19 out of 37) stakeholders sharing this view, including seven out of ten public authorities. In relation to pyrotechnics containing digital components that are exposed to new risks (e.g. software malfunctioning, cyberattacks), 27% (10 out of 37) of stakeholders considered that this concern should be further addressed in the future, 2.7% (1 out of 37) said that it is currently addressed, while 70.3% (26 out of 37) responded ‘Do now know/prefer not to say’.

Among other concerns, the need to increase the competitiveness of EU companies was considered to be currently addressed by 35.1% (13 out of 37) of respondents to the public consultation, while 27% (10 out of 37) responded that this should be further addressed in the future. As regards, the Member States’ flexibility to authorise the use of pyrotechnics for traditional celebrations, processions, etc., 32.4% (12 out of 37) responded that this concern should be further addressed in the future, and 27% (10 out of 37) considered that it was currently addressed.

4.3.3.Relevance of the scope

After having assessed the Directive’s relevance in terms of objectives, this sub-section will look more closely at the Directive’s current scope and whether it is still relevant. According to 64.8% (48 out of 74) of the respondents to the targeted survey, it is still relevant 185 .

Relevance of product coverage

Some issues were raised with regard to the delineation of scope set out in Article 2 of the Directive. According to paragraph 2(a) of that Article, pyrotechnic articles intended for non-commercial use by the armed forces, the police or fire departments do not fall under the scope of the Directive. However, outside the context of the evaluation, Member States and industry have approached the Commission via email, in AdCo group meetings and meetings of the Forum of Notified Bodies to clarify from which point in the supply chain does the Directive not apply to a product that will eventually be used by the public security forces. The question was also raised in the targeted survey. It is especially relevant when one or several intermediate companies are involved that manufacture final pyrotechnic articles not only for use by public security forces, but also for commercial use. The Commission services outlined their understanding of the matter in a document presented at the Commission Expert Group meeting on 18 March 2025, explaining that, while the exemption is not limited to direct sales to public security forces, it does not necessarily apply to the whole supply chain and a case-by-case assessment of the situation is needed.

Some stakeholders in the targeted survey, the public consultation and the interviews noted that some pyrotechnic articles, such as heavy flash bangers, posed similar risks to civil explosives and should therefore fall under the Civil Explosives Directive or be subject to similar rules. Moreover, the exclusion of pyrotechnic articles intended for use in the aerospace industry was mentioned as problematic by two stakeholders in the targeted survey, as those articles were not excluded from the Civil Explosives Directive and, therefore, also low-risk explosive aviation components had to follow the strict traceability and transfer systems for civil explosives. When asked about products that were currently covered by the Directive but should rather be excluded from its scope, a professional user participating in the public consultation suggested excluding smoke devices. In turn, participants in the targeted survey proposed including equipment mimicking a pyrotechnic effect, ammunition-like articles, sparkle machines, maritime equipment and pyrotechnic substances.

Relevance of provisions

The provisions of the Directive are still to a very high or high extent relevant across almost all areas of intervention, according to most stakeholders sharing their views in the public consultation 186 . Nevertheless, some stakeholders criticised certain provisions or made suggestions.

As mentioned in section  4.1.1.b ) , the 1 m safety distance for F1 articles is not considered appropriate. Moreover, a small number of stakeholders interviewed in the Study on the illegal sales of F4 fireworks called for EU-wide limits to the net explosive content in F4 fireworks 187 . In a non-paper addressed to the Commission in late 2024, France and the Netherlands went even further to consider an EU-wide limit on the amount of gunpowder and flash powder necessary also for F3, T1, T2, P1 and P2 articles, for which there was no maximum content defined in the Directive 188 .

Stakeholders suggested that a number of aspects not currently covered by the provisions of the Directive should, in their view, be included. An enforcement agency, a professional user and two interest groups / civil society / business organisations proposed including common rules for storage. Animal welfare considerations should be covered according to two interest groups / civil society / business organisations. According to some respondents, the Directive should also regulate the transfer of articles (other, interest group / civil society / business organisation, and MSA), and harmonise requirements for online sales and professional certifications (other). Stricter rules on emissions (company) and better consumer awareness campaigns (interest group / civil society / business organisation and professional user) are also considered necessary. Finally, a mandatory authorisation system for the free movement of pyrotechnic articles within the EU was called for by a notifying authority 189 .

5.What are the conclusions and lessons learned?

5.1.Conclusions

Based on the above assessment and by drawing on different data sources and expertise, certain conclusions can be made on the overall performance of the Pyrotechnics Directive in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, relevance and EU added value. It should be remembered, however, that data available for the assessment of efficiency was limited and rather difficult to correctly classify into the appropriate cost category and, as regards the benefits, impossible to quantify.

Where the conclusions do not differentiate between different categories of pyrotechnic articles, they are valid for all, including for pyrotechnic articles for use in vehicles. With regard to pyrotechnic articles for use in vehicles, no specific concerns or shortcomings were identified in the course of the evaluation.

5.1.1.Effectiveness

The Directive has to a large extent achieved its objectives. In particular, it contributed to the free movement of pyrotechnic articles in the internal market and the protection of health and safety. However, its positive effects on security and environmental protection have been more limited.

Free movement of pyrotechnic articles in the internal market: Despite persistent differences between Member States’ laws, intra-EU trade in pyrotechnic articles has increased since the Directive was adopted and a large share of stakeholders participating in the public consultation believe that the objective of guaranteeing the functioning of the internal market has been achieved.

Health and safety: Although the lack of comprehensive and comparable data prevents us from drawing very clear conclusions on the Directive’s contribution to health and safety, it has become clear that there are persistent health and safety issues. The essential safety requirements, especially for categories F1, F4 and P1, do not seem sufficient to ensure the safety of users, bystanders and, in the event of criminal misuse, society at large. Moreover, non-compliance rates are still very high, despite a general perception among stakeholders that the quality of conformity assessments and market surveillance have improved thanks to the Directive. Concerns remain, in particular, with regard to imported fireworks and the accessibility of high-risk pyrotechnics to consumers. Moreover, differences in market surveillance practices and difficulties in cross-border cooperation between market surveillance authorities seem to hamper the enforcement of safety requirements.

Security: The Directive has not effectively prevented security threats related to pyrotechnic articles. Pyrotechnic articles are increasingly used for criminal purposes, e.g. to attack first-responders and law enforcement personnel and to break open ATMs, but also for organised crime. This is possible because the Directive does not effectively prevent the diversion of legally manufactured pyrotechnic articles. Moreover, the traceability system set up by the Directive does not allow item-level tracking, making it difficult to trace back to which point in the supply chain an article was diverted. At the same time, illegally manufactured pyrotechnic articles are traded on the black market. Enforcement and penalties seem insufficient to effectively deter illegal behaviour, especially considering that illegal behaviour involving pyrotechnic articles is often subject to lighter penalties than that committed with explosives or weapons.

Environmental protection: The Pyrotechnics Directive does not fully ensure the protection of the environment from the negative effects of pyrotechnic articles. Environmental pollution and animal welfare were mentioned by stakeholders as not being adequately addressed by the Directive.

5.1.2.Efficiency

Bearing in mind the limited available cost data, it can cautiously be concluded that the Directive is, overall, operating efficiently.

Costs have increased for most stakeholders but, overall, still seem to be proportionate – they are equivalent to a proportionate share of companies’ turnover, although the burden for SMEs seems to be bigger than for large companies. Most stakeholders have also experienced improved efficiency of processes and tasks thanks to the Directive. Harmonised rules have reduced costs for familiarisation with legal requirements and for conformity assessments and facilitated market access. Stakeholders also benefit from improved coordination and information exchange and enhanced traceability of pyrotechnic articles. Costs due to conformity with the essential safety requirements, including design, manufacturing and assessment, seem proportionate, in particular in light of the safety benefit they bring.

The Directive has led to a certain burden reduction, as tasks and procedures can be carried out more efficiently. Most obligations are perceived by stakeholders to be proportionate and seem essential for achieving the Directive’s objectives. Some potential for further burden reduction could be identified in relation to the labelling of pyrotechnic articles and record-keeping obligations, which create significant costs for stakeholders and are by some considered disproportionate. In the same vein, the mandatory accident reporting by authorities, in its current form, is tying up authorities’ resources, while not bringing the expected benefits.

5.1.3.Coherence

The Directive is coherent with other relevant EU legislation, but, with its limited focus on security and environmental protection, the Directive does not seem to fully support broader EU policies, in particular the EU Counter-Terrorism Agenda. Internationally, the Directive is complemented by international agreements and recommendations on the transport of dangerous goods. As regards coherence with national laws and policies, it must be noted that the Directive does not allow Member States to further restrict F4 fireworks, which is not in line with some Member States’ security priorities.

In terms of internal coherence, only a minor inconsistency between labelling provisions has been identified, potentially leading to confusion or misunderstandings as to whether certain information can be provided in a document accompanying the article.

5.1.4.EU added value

The Directive has had an added value compared to what could have been achieved by the Member States acting alone. The results from the targeted survey suggest that, while the Directive seems to be essential for cross-border trade in the internal market, the objectives of protecting safety and security were not sufficiently supported by the Directive, meaning that Member States acting individually might have achieved better higher levels of protection at national level. In light of circumvention of national rules via cross-border sales, a harmonised approach seems, however, preferable to individual national measures.

5.1.5.Relevance

The Directive’s objectives of ensuring the free movement of pyrotechnic articles on the internal market via the harmonisation of laws and the protection of health and safety, security and the environment are still relevant in light of current needs and problems. However, some of the objectives have become more relevant in recent years. Given the rise in illegal activities committed with pyrotechnic articles, the security objective seems even more important than ever. Similarly, environmental protection seems to have become more relevant since the Directive was adopted, also in light of emerging and possibly more environmentally-friendly alternatives, such as light and drone shows. The technological advancements made since the Directive was adopted are also not sufficiently addressed at present, notably online trade and pyrotechnics containing digital components.

A few concerns about clarity and scope have emerged. These relate to the exemption of articles intended for use by public security forces, and the exclusion of articles for use in the aerospace industry. Moreover, in some cases, the delineation between civil explosives and pyrotechnic articles has proven to be challenging or inappropriate. Stakeholders are missing provisions on storage, animal welfare, transfer, online sales, professional certifications, emissions and consumer awareness.

5.2. Lessons learned

The evaluation shed light on those aspects of the Directive that are working well but also revealed problems and gaps.

The main achievements of the Directive are:

·The free movement of pyrotechnic articles on the internal market through harmonised conformity assessment procedures and the alignment of national laws;

·Essential safety requirements for pyrotechnic articles across the EU;

·Increased cooperation and information sharing between and among market surveillance authorities, notified bodies and the Commission.

However, there are significant shortcomings which compromise the Directive’s contribution to safety, security and environmental protection, as detailed below.

·Accessibility of dangerous fireworks: The Directive allows for the production of pyrotechnic articles with a net explosive content that exceeds even professional users’ needs. At the same time, it does not sufficiently prevent such articles from being used by unauthorised users, and even by criminals. Although this is also a question of enforcing existing rules properly, a harmonised system for the verification of the required specialist knowledge would facilitate more effective checks and help prevent abuse, notably online. Another way of intentionally or unintentionally circumventing the strict rules for F4 fireworks is miscategorisation into the less stringent P1 or P2 categories. In addition to the risk from F4 fireworks, the broad availability of other dangerous consumer fireworks results in severe accidents and poses a security threat.

·National restrictions: Most Member States have made use of the possibility to introduce bans or restrictions on F2 and F3 fireworks, theatrical pyrotechnic articles and other pyrotechnic articles. While it is important to tackle risks that are not considered to be sufficiently addressed by the Directive, this national discretion prevents laws from being fully harmonised and can cause trade barriers. At the same time, national restrictions can be easily circumvented by buying pyrotechnic articles across the border or online. On the other hand, because Member States cannot restrict F4 fireworks, the safety and security risks from such fireworks cannot be adequately addressed.

·Mail order sales: The existing framework is not designed to address the risks related to common online sales practices, mostly taking the form of mail order sales. The lack of physical contact between the distributor and the buyer means that the rules can be circumvented, particularly the age verification or specialist knowledge requirements, but also national restrictions. Moreover, the illegal postal shipment of pyrotechnic articles in regular parcels poses risks to postal services staff and other persons.

·Traceability: The lack of unique identification numbers, as required for civil explosives, makes it impossible to trace individual pyrotechnic articles throughout the supply chain, which could, however, be helpful for law enforcement and market surveillance. Moreover, even high-risk pyrotechnic articles, with risks similar to civil explosives, can be transferred across the EU without any procedural requirements, such as approval from the destination and transit states.

·Pollution and animal welfare: The essential safety requirements do not sufficiently account for environmental protection. Although they will be supported by harmonised standards, a stronger focus especially on pollution and animal welfare seems warranted in light of contemporary concerns and the EU’s environmental ambitions.

Annex I: Procedural Information

Lead DG, Decide reference and, if relevant, Work Programme reference

DG for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs

Agenda planning/ Work programme reference: PLAN/2022/1203

Organisation and timing

After it had been politically validated, the work on the evaluation started with the drafting of the terms of reference for the external study in support of the evaluation and the creation of the Interservice Steering Group (ISSG) in the last quarter of 2022. The first ISSG took place on 6 December 2022. The contract with the Economisti Associati SRL consortium for the external study was signed in October 2023 for an initially planned duration of ten months which, in May 2024, was extended by an additional three months. The ISSG was involved in all steps of the evaluation starting from the terms of reference, the consultation strategy and the call for evidence, and continuing throughout the duration of the public and targeted surveys, and the supporting study until the finalisation of the Staff Working Document. In total, the ISSG met seven times (06/12/22, 14/03/23, 12/12/23, 31/05/24, 01/10/24, 18/11/24 and 05/05/25).

Evidence used together with sources and any issues regarding its quality (i.e. has the information been quality assured?)

The evaluation mainly used information gathered through various stakeholder consultation activities but also studies, reports, academic and grey literature (e.g. non-papers) and statistical data from different databases, where available. Availability of cost data was very limited, and the market analysis was compromised by a lack of disaggregated data and data missing for some years within the evaluation period. Quality was assured through triangulation of information from different sources and validation of findings in the stakeholder validation workshop. A more detailed outline of the methodology can be found in Annex II .

Use of external expertise

Technopolis Group, supported by Milieu, Wavestone and Intellera, produced a supporting study. The study consulted external experts on Task 1 (Design of the methodology), Task 2 (Collection of Information and data), and Task 4 (Answer to evaluation questions and conclusions). The external experts involved in the study were Ineris and the law firm Kanzlei Wübbe. The legal expert from Kanzlei Wübbe primarily contributed to the analysis of transposition and implementation, as well as the coherence aspect of the evaluation. Ineris provided technical guidance and feedback to the evaluation team on multiple evaluation criteria across the study.

Annex II. Methodology and Analytical models used

The evaluation was supported by an external study carried out by Technopolis Group, supported by Milieu, Wavestone and Intellera. The contractor carried out most of the data collection activities and data analysis and organised a stakeholder workshop. DG GROW and the ISSG closely monitored the contractor’s work from the inception phase until the final report. Consultation questionnaires were discussed and refined before their dissemination. The deliverables, notably the final report, underwent several rounds of commenting and revisions, to improve their quality.

1.Data collection activities

The evaluation relied on information from a variety of sources:

Desk research: Academic literature, grey literature (e.g. study reports, position papers, meeting minutes, contributions and documents shared by stakeholders) and official documents (e.g. legislation, Commission Communications, Council decision) were consulted to gather information, mainly on three areas of the evaluation:

·The transposition of the Directives by Member States and their implementation;

·The market structure analysis in the EU as well as trends in intra-EU and extra-EU trade;

·The key contextual developments and trends.

All sources are listed in a bibliography at the end of this Annex.

In addition, data for the market structure 190  analysis was retrieved from the Eurostat Structural Business Statistics (SBS). The market structure analysis encompasses the entire European ‘Manufacture of explosives’ sector, which includes both civil explosives and pyrotechnics, because they fall under the same NACE division. Data was available for the period from 2008 to 2022. Moreover, data is missing on some indicators for some years, which affects the continuity and completeness of the analysis. Data for the market size 191  analysis was taken from Prodcom, covering the period from 2003 to 2022, as records on pyrotechnic products for most Member States and the EU aggregate are missing from 1995 to 2002 in the Prodcom dataset. Pyrotechnic articles in vehicles were not covered, because they are not categorised separately in the Prodcom data base. The trade analysis 192 is based on data from the Eurostat Standard International Trade Classification (STIT) from 1999 to 2024. However, some data from reporting countries was unavailable which may affect the completeness of analysis.

Call for evidence: With a  call for evidence , published in all EU languages on the Commission ‘Have your say’ from 4 May to 1 June 2023, the Commission gathered preliminary reactions from stakeholders on the main elements of the initiative. In total, feedback from 20 stakeholders was received: nine public authorities, four EU citizens, three companies/businesses, two non-governmental organisations, one business organisation and one person.

Targeted survey: A targeted survey, launched on 15 March 2024 gathered specialists’ views across different categories of stakeholders on all evaluation questions. The survey consisted of 110 questions structured in five sections: 1) national transposition of the Directive; 2) socio-economic context; 3) implementation of the Directive’s provisions; 4) overall assessment of the Directive; 5) suggestions for improvement. To take account of the different areas of competence of the potential respondents, the survey included different question paths adapted to the different respondent types (economic operators, notified bodies, accreditation bodies, notifying authorities, etc.).

The survey was deployed in English, using the tool Medalia 193 and took approximately 45 min to complete. The survey was distributed to all stakeholders identified through the mapping process (approx. 200 stakeholders). Multipliers were employed to further disseminate the survey, including the chair of the Pyrotechnics AdCO and industry organisations such as EuFias and SFEPA. The contractor aimed at balanced representation across Member States and stakeholder types. Tailored reminders were sent to specific stakeholder groups as corrective measures. Responses were closely monitored on a bi-weekly basis to ensure diversity. Weekly reminders were also sent to selected stakeholders to boost response rates and encourage completion of the survey.

Initially, the survey was set to be open for four weeks (i.e. mid April 2024). However, to accommodate stakeholders’ needs for sufficient time to collect relevant data, often involving coordination across various departments within organisations due to the extensive nature of the survey and the large number of questions, the deadline was extended until the end of May 2024. In total, 80 answers were received, most of which from market surveillance authorities (24%). For many questions, a high percentage of respondents (sometimes exceeding 40% for specific questions) selected the ‘Do not know/prefer not to answer’. This trend was particularly evident in questions related to environmental protection, the situation before the implementation of the previous directive, and questions requiring factual information, such as accident frequency and health and safety issue. Stakeholders cited the lack of available data or aggregated tracking systems in their Member States as reasons why they could not answer. Other factors might have been the historic focus of some questions and stakeholder fatigue due to the various consultation activities stakeholders were invited to.

Public consultation: A public consultation  was held from 8 April to 1 July 2024 on ‘Have your Say’. It included a questionnaire with closed and open questions, which the wide public was invited to fill in, in order to reach a broad range and large number of stakeholders. The consultation aimed to validate the topics and issues covered by the evaluation, gather information, data and experience on the implementation of the Pyrotechnics Directive, solicit views and opinions of stakeholders on the extent to which this Directive has met its objectives, and gather views on the Directive’s relevance, taking into account social developments. In total, 37 answers were collected, most of them from EU citizens and public authorities (approx. 30 % each).

Interviews: The contractor, in total, conducted 48 interviews. A smaller number of ‘scoping interviews’ took place in the inception phase of the study in the form of exploratory interviews. This allowed the study team to obtain necessary and relevant information at an early stage, so as to further develop the intervention logic, that ultimately also fed into the questionnaires and interview guides for the remaining stakeholders to be consulted. In addition, some key sources of information to be considered in the desk research were identified and suggestions for potential topics to address via the case studies were collected.

The majority of interviews were conducted in the main phase of the study, in the form of ‘study interviews’, which covered some key trends and findings that emerged from the desk research and the survey in more depth and/or filled some information gaps. These also comprised interviews on the eleven completed cost templates that were received.

The interviewees were identified through a comprehensive mapping of actors in each category, using existing contact information from the European Commission (e.g., notified bodies, competent authorities, market surveillance authorities) and other information available online. This process also included members of the Expert Group and contacts provided following pilot interviews. Additionally, some interviewees were identified through the survey, which included a question allowing respondents to indicate their contact details for follow-up interviews. Lastly, some interviewees reached out directly to the contractor by email after learning about the study through the Expert Group.

The interviews used semi-structured questionnaires covering the core analytical themes selected and issues of interest for deeper analysis, with flexibility to probe responses and to explore issues that emerge during discussion. The interviews included strategic questions and operational questions and were tailored to the different types of interviewees. The interviews were conducted via MS-Teams. The interviews were undertaken in English, and, where possible, in the national language (some interviews were conducted in French or Spanish upon request).

Cost templates: Templates were circulated to administrations and economic operators for the quantification/monetisation of costs. Different cost templates were used for economic operators (manufacturers), notified bodies and market surveillance authorities. Stakeholders were asked for estimations of costs and shares of costs across different cost categories (adjustment costs, administrative costs, indirect costs…) and whether those are one-off or recurrent as well as for information about the number of full-time equivalents dedicated to compliance with the Directive. Despite the contractor’s efforts, only eleven cost templates were completed by stakeholders.

Case studies: Two case studies were carried out in the context of the study with the aim to examine relevant aspects of the evaluation more in-depth.

·Case Study 1: Challenges and measures to tackle the illicit use of pyrotechnic articles in the Netherlands and in France – hooliganism and riots

·Case study 2: The use of pyrotechnics in the automotive industry

Summaries of these case studies can be found in Annex V II I .

2.Data analysis

All collected data was analysed by the contractor using the indicators and judgment criteria from the evaluation matrix (see Annex I II ) and information from different sources combined and compared (‘triangulation’). 

Responses from the public consultation and the targeted survey were statistically analysed to identify trends and patterns. Qualitative insights from interviews complemented these findings with context and details. More information on the methodology used to process consultation data can be found in the synopsis report in Annex V .

For market structure analysis, the contractor used the following indicators:

Table 5: Indicators for the market structure analysis

Indicator

Description

Turnover

Total revenue generated from operational activities within a specified accounting period, including all amounts invoiced for goods and services sold during the reference period. Measures company size and market performance.

Number of companies

Number of businesses whose primary activity is in the sector.

Number of employees

Total human resources employed within the sector.

Source : Structural Business Statistics glossary and metadata

The market size of the European pyrotechnics industry is evaluated using the value of sold production of pyrotechnic products manufactured in the EU and placed on both EU and global markets. The analysis does not include pyrotechnic articles in vehicles, which are not categorised separately in the Prodcom dataset.

For the trade analysis, the contractor used the following indicators:

Table 6: Indicators for the trade analysis

Indicator

Description

Extra-EU imports

Value of goods entering the EU from non-EU countries under various customs procedures.

Intra-EU imports

Value of goods entering a Member State from another EU country.

Extra-EU exports

Value of goods leaving the EU for non-EU countries under various customs procedures.

Intra-EU exports

Value of goods destined for another Member State from a given Member State, including those in free circulation or under inward processing.

Information and findings from the study were checked and complemented for the purpose of this Staff Working Document.

3.Bibliography

Documents from public authorities

Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions concerning the need to prevent and counter the use of pyrotechnics in spectator areas of football stadia and other sports venues , 13 October 2022, 13370/22

European Commission, Evaluation study of Pyrotechnics and Civil Explosives Legislation (Directive 2013/29/EU, Commission Implementing Directive 2014/58/EU, and Directive 2014/28/EU, Commission Implementing Directive 2008/43/EC and Commission Decision 2004/388/EC), Final Report, Technopolis Group in collaboration with Milieu, Wavestone, and Intellera, 2025

European Commission, A simpler and faster Europe: Communication on implementation and simplification , European Commission 2024-2029, 2024 

European Commission, Better regulation toolbox 2023

European Commission, Commission Notice. The ‘ Blue Guide ’ on the implementation of EU product rules 2022, (2022/C 247/01)

European Commission, Evaluation of the New Legislative Framework , SWD(222) 365 final, 2022

European Commission, Study of conformity in all EU countries on EU pyrotechnics and explosives legislation. Final Report, EY Law, 2022

European Commission, , 2021

European Commission, Group of Experts on Pyrotechnic Articles, Categorisation of pyrotechnic articles intended for entertainment purposes, 2021

European Commission, Communication from the Commission, , COM(2020) 795 final, 2020

European Commission, Study on illegal sales of pyrotechnic articles destined for professional users (category F4) to the general public. , Oxford Research A/S (Denmark), 2019

European Commission, accompanying the document proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the marketing and use of explosives precursors, amending Annex XVII to Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors, SWD(2018) 104 final, 2018

European Commission, F4 Flash Bangers in EU Member States, Study on production, import and use in the EU of high risk pyrotechnic articles categorised F4 according to Directive 2007/23/EC and Directive 2013/29/EU. Final Report, DJS Research Ltd, 2016

European Commission, Reducing security risks of pyrotechnic articles in the EU A study on the security risks related to the handling of large amounts of pyrotechnic articles and on ways to mitigate these risks. Final Report, DHV B.V., 2012

European Commission, accompanying the 10 proposals to align product harmonisation directives to Decision No 768/2008/EC, New Legislative Framework (NLF) Alignment Package (Implementation of Goods Package), SEC(2011) 1375 final, 2011

European Commission, for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of pyrotechnic articles (Recast), Explanatory Memorandum, COM(2011) 764 final, 2011

European Commission, for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the placing on the market of pyrotechnic articles, COM(2005) 457 final, Explanatory Memorandum, 2005

Europol, . The large and highly explosive fireworks were stored in barns and bunkers that did not conform to mandatory safety standards, 9 November 2022

Europol, , 2019

French Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development, Transport and Housing, Fireworks Accident Analysis , 2012, pp. 2-4.

Government of the Netherlands/République Francaise, Modify the Pyro Directive to Protect Public Order and Safety, A collaborative non-paper between the Netherlands and France, 2024

Rijksoverheid, Improving the product conformity of pyrotechnic articles within the European Union , 14/03/2024

Scottish Government, Director-General Education and Justice, , 2020

Spanish Guardia Civil, Weapons and Explosives Central Inspectorate Report on the Seizure in Public Areas of Counterfeit and Illegally Manufactured Pyrotechnics, 2025

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, , 2022

United Nations, , Model Regulations, Volume I, Twenty-first revised edition, 2019

Ursula von der Leyen, Europe’s choice, Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029 , 2024

Ursula von der Leyen, Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2019-2024 , 2019

UK Government, Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, , 2014

Secondary literature

American Speech-Language-Hearing Association, Fireworks Can Cause Permanent Hearing Loss, But Simple Steps Can Prevent Harm This July 4th , 24 June 2024

Aufauvre, L. (2006), New Trends for Pyrotechnic Automotive Safety in the European Union , 33. International Pyrotechnics Seminar (IPS 2006), 2006, 509-512

Bateman et al., Not just a flash in the pan: short and long term impacts of fireworks on the environment , Pacific Conservation Biology 29:5, 2023, 396-401

Buffet, F.-N., Rapport d’information fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de législation, du suffrage universel, du Règlement et d’administration générale, investie des pouvoirs d’une commission d’enquête, sur les émeutes survenues à compter du 27 juin 2023, 2024

Camilleri, R., Vella J., Emission Factors for Aerial Pyrotechnics and Use in Assessing Environmental Impact of Firework Displays : Case Study from Malta, Propellants, Explosives, Pyrotechnics, 41:2, 2015, 273-280

CLEPA, Fleet vehicles capture larger share of the EU aftermarket, 2023

CLEPA, New technologies for green and digital mobility take first prize at the CLEPA Innovation Awards 2022 , 14 October 2022

CLEPA, Innovation in the Automotive Supply Industry , 2019

Collins, M., The Environmental Impact of Fireworks: Celebrations and Consequences , E+E Leader, 2 July 2024

Deutschmann, C.W., Pyromechanic actuators increase safety for passengers and pedestrians , ATZ Worldwide 109, 7-8

Espina, Z., PH records 8 new fireworks-related injuries; 1st noise-induced hearing loss case reported , Manila Bulletin, 29 December 2023

Garaliu-Bușoi et al., Evaluation of the effects produced by triggering pyrotechnic articles for automotive use by exposure to various hazardous external stimuli , MATEC Web of Conferences 389:00021, 2024

Górniak et al., The Numerical Simulation of the Pyrotechnic Actuator for the Active Bumper , Journal of KONES Powertrain and Transport 19, 2012, 141-147

Hartmann, I., Silvester war Nacht der Panik für Hunde in Bad Kreuznach , SWR, 1 January 2025

Herwijnen et al., Firework aversion in cats and dogs as reported by Dutch animal owners , Veterinary and Animal Science 26:100402, 2024

Hickey, C., Gordon, C., Galdanes, K. et al., Toxicity of particles emitted by fireworks . Part Fibre Toxicology 17:28, 2020, 7-11

Hoekstra et al., Fireworks disturbance across bird communities , Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 22:1, 2024, e2694

Koninklijke Nederlandse Voetbalbond, Richtlijn Termijn Stadionverbod Seizoen 2023/’24

Kukulsky, B., Wszolek, T., Mleczko, D., The Impact of Fireworks Noise on the Acoustic Climate in Urban areas , Archives of Acoustics, 43:4, 2018, 697-705

Macneal et al., High numbers of firework related injury referrals to the London Burns Service during the recent ‘Bonfire night’ period, is it time for new regulations? , Burns 44, 2018, 1011–1023

Magliocco, S., ‘Distraught’ family makes heartfelt Halloween plea after death of cat due to firework fright , RSVP Live, 29 October 2024Matussek, K., Germany Is Europe’s Prime Target for Audacious ATM Bombings , Bloomberg, 12 August 2024

MDR SACHSEN, Zwei Todesfälle in Sachsen: Deshalb sind Kugelbomben so gefährlich , 5 January 2025

Prasuła, P. et al., Safety Risks Posed by Pyrotechnic Materials , Issues of Armament Technology 165:3, 2023

Purdue University , Fireworks are fun for the eyes, dangerous for the ears, says Purdue audiology expert , 26 June 2018

Radeanu et al., Evaluation of the safety quality of automotive pyrotechnic articles following their exposure to triaxial vibrations with predetermined thermal conditioning cycles , MATEC Web of Conferences 389:0054, 2024

Shamoun-Baranes et al., Birds flee en mass from New Year’s Eve fireworks , Behavioural Ecology 22:6, 2011, 1173-1177

Sijimol, M.R./Mohan, M., Environmental impacts of perchlorate with special reference to fireworks—a review , Environmental Monitoring and Assessment 186, 2014, 7203-7210

UEFA, Pyrotechnics in Stadia: Health and Safety issues relating to the use of pyrotechnics in football stadia , 2016

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Annex III. Evaluation matrix

The table below presents the evaluation matrix. For each key evaluation question, it presents sub-questions, judgement criteria, and indicators, as well as relevant data and information sources and assessment methods.

#

Question

Judgement criteria

Indicators and descriptors

Sources of information

ECT-01.1

Do the existing requirements, including essential requirements as well as categories of pyrotechnics, continue to provide for an adequate level of protection of public interests and security, health and safety of users?

0.Existing requirements adequately cover the needs, risks and recent developments in terms of health and safety;

1.Existing requirements adequately cover the needs, risks, and recent developments in terms of security;

2.Existing requirements adequately cover the needs, risks and recent developments in terms of environment

3.Trend and type of accidents and health and safety issues involving products covered by the Directive

4.Public consultation

5.Targeted survey

6.Interviews

7.Desk research

8.Safety Gate and ICSMS

9.

10.Trend and type of cases of illicit activities linked to the products covered by the Directive

11.Public consultation

12.Targeted survey

13.Interviews

14.Desk research

15.

16.Number and type of cases where Member States found that a product in compliance with the Directive presented a health & safety, security and/or environmental risk

17.Targeted survey

18.

19.New products falling under the scope of the Directive for which requirements are not fully fit for purpose

20.Desk research

21.Interviews

22.

23.Stakeholders’ opinion on the level of protection in terms of health & safety, security and environment ensured by the current requirements and potential uncovered risks

24.Public consultation

25.Targeted survey

26.Trend in the number of incidents adversely affecting the environment related to pyrotechnic articles

27.Targeted survey

28.Desk research

29.Number and type of restrictions going beyond the minimum requirements adopted by Member States for health and safety reasons

30.Targeted survey

31.Desk research

ECT-01.2

32.The enforcement of the existing requirements ensures an adequate level of protection of public interests and security, health and safety of their users practices

33.Types and frequency of controls performed by MS to verify the compliance of products on the EU market

34.Targeted survey

35.Main differences in the controls performed nationally to ensure compliance of the products on the EU market

36.Targeted survey

37.Frequency, number and types of infringements of national rules on the compliance with essential safety requirements

38.Targeted survey

39.Most common difficulties faced in national and cross-border enforcement of rules

40.Targeted survey

41.Stakeholders’ opinion on the level of protection in terms of health & safety, security and environment ensured by the current enforcement practices

42.Targeted survey

43.Public consultation

ECT-02.1

To what extent does the Directive ensure that the articles imported from third countries (non-EEA) are equally safe as those manufactured in the EU?

44.Obligations on the economic operators involved in the import are clear and cover all possible areas of health & safety risks

45.Conformity assessment carried out in third countries is subject to the same level of controls and supervision and conformity assessment carried out in the EU

46.Type of obligations adopted at the national level on economic operators involved in the import of products covered by the Directive

47.Targeted survey

48.Desk research

49.Number and type of infringements of obligations on economic operators involved in the import of products covered by the Directives

50.Targeted survey

51.ICSMS

52.Number and types of requests for clarification sent by MSs to the Commission on the obligations of economic operators involved in the import

53.Desk research

54.Interviews

55.Share of products found not compliant out of the total number of products imported from third countries subject to controls

56.Targeted survey

57.Desk research

58.ICSMS

59.Share of subcontracting to third country bodies by notified bodies

60.Targeted survey

61.List of possible health & safety issues identified during the controls of EU manufactured products and imported products

62.Interviews

63.Safety Gate

ECT-02.2

64.Consistency in the application of conformity assessment: comparing conformity assessment levels between products manufactured within the EU and those imported from third countries

65.Consistency in Market Surveillance: comparing levels of control by market surveillance actors on articles entering the EU market through physical and online channels

66.Types and frequency of conformity assessment performed by MS on products manufactured in the EU and products imported into the EU to verify the compliance

67.Desk research

68.Interviews

69.Types of controls performed to ensure the compliance of products coming from third countries and actors involved

70.Desk research

71.Targeted survey

72.Interviews

73.Types and frequency of controls performed nationally on physical and online incoming flows of goods

74.Desk research

75.Interviews

76.Targeted survey

77.Types and frequency of controls performed on notified bodies

78.Targeted survey

79.Frequency, number and types of infringements of national rules requiring compliance with essential safety requirements for both products manufactured in the EU and products imported into the EU

80.Targeted survey

81.Public consultation

82.ICSMS

83.Most common difficulties to the implementation of controls on products manufactured in the EU and products imported into the EU

84.Targeted survey

85.Most common difficulties to the implementation of controls on physical and online incoming flows of goods

86.Interviews

Stakeholders’ opinion on the level of protection in terms of health & safety ensured by the current enforcement practices

87.Public consultation

88.Targeted survey

ECT-03.1

Are the current penalties effective, proportionate and dissuasive?

The level of penalties for infringements of the requirements set by the Directive is comparable across MS

89.Severity of penalties per type of infringement per MS

90.Targeted survey

91.Desk research

92.Main differences in the penalty systems implemented nationally

93.Targeted survey

94.Desk research

95.Level of consistency/distortion across sanction regimes.

96.Desk research

97.Interviews

ECT-03.2

98.Penalties defined at the national level allow for cross border cooperation

99.The introduction of penalties at the national level is accompanied by a reduction in cases of non-compliance

100.Number and type of cases requiring cross- border cooperation

101.Targeted survey

102.Enablers and challenges of cross-border cooperation

103.Interviews

104.Trend in the number of non-compliant products circulating in the EU market

105.Targeted survey

106.Public consultation

107.Trend in illicit activities involving the products covered by the Directive

108.Targeted survey

109.Public consultation

110.Frequency and trend in the number of infringements or cases of non-compliance by stakeholders concerned by the obligations of the Directive

111.Targeted survey

112.Public consultation

113.Factors affecting the effectiveness of the penalties (eg. levels of awareness of health & safety, security and environmental risks of the public opinion, cultural traditions)

114.Interviews

115.Stakeholders’ opinion on the effectiveness of the system of penalties

116.Targeted survey

117.Public consultation

ECT-04.1

Is the current system enabling traceability of articles effective?

The current system ensures the traceability of the articles through all steps of the value chain

118.Types of measures adopted at the national level to implement the traceability requirements set by the Directive ( eg. marking/labelling processes, digital vs ; online record keeping practices, type of information stored, exchange of information)

119.Targeted survey

120.Roles and responsibilities of the actors involved in the traceability of the products throughout the value chain

121.Desk research

122.Main differences in national measures implementing the traceability system

123.Targeted survey

124.Desk research

125.Type and frequency of controls on the respect of the traceability requirements

126.Targeted survey

127.Enablers and challenges in the implementation of controls on the traceability requirements

128.Targeted survey

129.Interviews

130.Trend in the frequency of infringements related to traceability requirements

131.Interviews

132.Number of lost, stolen or diverted products covered by the Directive

133.Targeted survey

134.Interview

135.Number and key features of cases of trafficking of illegal pyrotechnics

136.Targeted survey

137.Interview

138.Types of mechanisms for sharing information among stakeholders and MS in case of security concerns in relation to the products covered by the Directive

139.Targeted survey

140.Interview

141.Stakeholders’ opinion on the effectiveness of the traceability system

142.Targeted survey

143.Public consultation

ECT-04.2

Does the current system provide enough safeguards to combat trafficking of illegal pyrotechnic articles?

The current system ensures the traceability of the pyrotechnic articles

144.Ibid

145.Information included in the licences and authorisations granted to economic operators to engage in the manufacture, storage, use, import, export, transfer or trade of pyrotechnics and challenges in checking the validity of licences granted by another MS

146.Desk research

ECT-05.1

Is the current framework for storage and or transfer or transit of articles effective?

The framework for storage prevent pyrotechnics from being stolen

147.Types of obligations and requirements concerning the storage and transit set by the Directive and other relevant EU legislation

148.Desk research

149.Types of measures adopted nationally for the storage and transit of products covered by the Directive

150.Desk research

151.Types of security risks linked to the storage and transit

152.Targeted survey

153.Types and frequency of controls at the national level on the storage and transit of the products covered by the Directive (e.g. substantial vs procedural)

154.Targeted survey

155.Trend in the n. of stolen/diverted products covered by the Directive (in the EU and outside)

156.Targeted survey

157.Stakeholders’ opinion on the effectiveness of the current framework for storage and transit

158.Targeted survey

ECT-05.2

To what extent are pyrotechnics diverted for terrorist and criminal purposes?

The current rules prevent pyrotechnic articles from being diverted

159.ibid

160.Targeted survey

ECT-06

Are the monitoring provisions, or the lack thereof, effective in providing data that allows well-informed conclusions about the functioning of the Directive?

The existing monitoring system covers all the key aspects of the Directive, Information collected through the monitoring system allows well-informed EU decision-making processes

161.List of key provisions of the Directive

162.Desk research

163.Level of compliance of MS with the monitoring requirements

164.Desk research

165.Interviews

166.Level of involvement of MS in the expert groups on pyrotechnic articles

167.Desk research

168.Types of monitoring arrangements at the national level (besides those set by the Directive)

169.Targeted survey

170.Interviews

171.Stakeholders’ opinion on the relevance of the existing monitoring provisions of the Directive, the usefulness of the information obtained and the potential areas for improvement

172.Targeted survey

173.Interviews

ECT-07.1

What have been the qualitative and quantitative effects of the measures on their objectives? How have they evolved since the implementation of the measures

174.Measures had economic effects on intra-EU flows and increased competitiveness of EU companies

175.The effects evolved over time since the implementation of the measures

176.Level of harmonisation of national rules on the making available of products covered by the Directive on the EU market (provisions linked to the Single Market)

177.Targeted survey

178.Public consultation

179.Desk research

180.Main differences in the current national implementation practices and requirements perceived by stakeholders to have adverse impacts on the Single Market

181.Desk research

182.Interviews

183.Trend in the production value and turnover of the EU industry for the products covered by the Directive

184.Desk research

185.Interviews

186.Trend in the number and size of companies active in the sectors covered by the Directive, per sector

187.Desk research

188.Interviews

189.Trend in volume and value of intra-EU flows of products covered by the Directive

190.Desk research

191.Interviews

192.Trend in volume and value of extra-EU flows of products covered by the Directive

193.Desk research

194.Interviews

195.Trend in the proportion of sales that EU businesses derive from national, intra-EU or extra-EU trade

196.Desk research

197.Interviews

198.Trend in the proportion of sales taking place online vs. offline

199.Desk research

200.Trend in the share of the EU industry in the total value of the market for the products covered by the Directive

201.Desk research

202.Interviews

203.Trend in the trade competitiveness index

204.Desk research

205.Trend in the trade barriers affecting the Single market

206.Targeted survey

207.Desk research

208.Level of trust of MSs and economic operators and mutual recognition of authorisations, compliance assessments and marking/labelling

209.Interviews

210.Stakeholders’ opinion on the positive and negative effects of the Directive on the strengthening of the Single Market and potential areas for improvement

211.Targeted survey

212.Public consultation

ECT-07.2

Measures had effects in terms of safety, the effects evolved over time since the implementation of the measures

213.Level of coverage of health and safety risks in the Directive

214.Public consultation

215.Targeted survey

216.Desk research

217.Level of harmonisation of national rules on the making available of products covered by the Directive on the EU market (provisions linked to the health and safety)

218.Targeted survey

219.Public consultation

220.Desk research

221.Main differences in the current national implementation practices and requirements perceived by stakeholders to have adverse impacts on health and safety

222.Interviews

223.Trend in the number of accidents and health & safety issues concerning the products covered by the Directive

224.Targeted survey

225.Safety Gate

and ICSMS

226.Data from accident reporting

227.Key changes in the testing procedures adopted at the national level to verify the safety of the products

228.Desk research

229.Trend in the compliance to essential requirements of products available on the EU market

230.Targeted survey

231.Public consultation

232.ICSMS

233.Trends in the power/capacity of individual pyrotechnic products

234.Desk research

235.Stakeholders’ opinion on the positive and negative effects of the Directive on the health and safety of the products made available on the EU market

236.Targeted survey

237.Public consultation

ECT-07.3

Measures had effects in terms of public security. The effects evolved over time since the implementation of the measures

238.Level of coverage of security risks in the Directive

239.Targeted survey

240.Public consultation

241.Desk research

242.Level of harmonisation of national rules on the making available of products covered by the Directive on the EU market (provisions linked to security)

243.Targeted survey

244.Public consultation

245.Desk research

246.Main differences in the current national implementation practices and requirements perceived by stakeholders to have adverse impacts negative effects in terms of security (eg, transfer procedures, requirements for authorisation, identification and traceability requirements)

247.Interviews

248.Trend in the number of security-related incidents and illicit activities concerning the products covered by the Directive

249.Targeted survey

250.Key changes in the national measures for the identification and traceability of the products covered by the Directive

251.Desk research

252.Stakeholders’ opinion on the positive and negative effects brought by the Directive in terms of overall public security

253.Targeted survey

254.Public consultation

ECT-07.4

Measures had environmental effects. The effects evolved over time since the implementation of the measures

255.Level of coverage of environmental risks in the Directive

256.Public consultation

257.Targeted survey

258.Desk research

259.Level of harmonisation of national rules on the making available of products covered by the Directive on the EU market (provisions linked to the protection of the environment)

260.Targeted survey

261.Public consultation

262.Desk research

263.Main differences in the current national implementation practices and requirements that might have negative effects on the environment

264.Desk research

265.Interviews

266.Trend in the number of incidents that negatively affected the environment concerning the products covered by the pyrotechnic Directive

267.Targeted survey

268.Key changes in the measures adopted nationally to assess the conformity of the products covered by the pyrotechnic Directive and extent to which environmental risks have been considered

269.Desk research

270.Interviews

271.Stakeholders’ opinion on the positive and negative effects brought by the pyrotechnic Directive in terms of environmental risk protection

272.Targeted survey

273.Public consultation

274.Level of coverage of the Directive of environmental aspects (environmental protection, biodiversity, animal well being, etc.)

275.Public consultation

276.Desk research

ECT-08

Are there any unintended effects of the measures?

The measures had unintended effects

277.Stakeholders’ opinion on the unintended effect of the Directive

278.Interviews

ECT-09.1

To what extent has the different implementation in MSs impacted the effectiveness of the measures on the objectives?

There are differences in the implementation of the measures, differences in the implementation have reduced the effectiveness of the measures, Member States have derogated to common rules and/or have adopted more restrictive rules, derogations and/or restrictions resulted in good practices, derogations and/or restrictions resulted in gold-plating

279.Level of harmonisation of rules and practices adopted at the national level per area of intervention of the Directive

280.Targeted survey

281.Main differences in the national implementation practices and requirements that might have negative effects/create risks on the Single Market, on the health and safety of the users, on the public security and on the protection of the environment

282.Desk research

283.Interviews

284.Number and rationale of cases where MSs adopted stricter rules for pyrotechnics intended to the general public

285.Targeted survey

286.Desk research

287.Number and rationale of cases of gold plating

288.Targeted survey

289.Stakeholders’ opinion on the extent to which differences in national rules and practices affected the overall effectiveness of the Directive’s measures and on the effects generated

290.Targeted survey

291.Type of effects brought by differences in the national measures

292.Targeted survey

293.Number and type of national measures, derogations and/or additional restrictions that proved to be good practices

294.Targeted survey

295.Interviews

ECT-09.2

Is there national gold-plating that hampers the internal market?

Ibid

296.Number and rationale of cases of gold plating

297.Targeted survey

ECT-09.3

What is the impact of national derogations and possible gold-plating on the free movement of articles in the internal market?

Ibid

298.Stakeholders’ opinion on the extent to which national derogations and possible gold-plating on the free movement of articles affected the free movement of articles in the internal market

299.Interviews

300.Type of effects brought by derogations and possible gold-plating

301.Targeted survey

302.Number and type of national measures, derogations and/or additional restrictions that proved to be good practices for the internal market

303.Interviews

ECT-10

The traditional use of fireworks differs greatly between Member States, e.g. for traditional festivities. Does the Directive effectively reflect cultural differences for fireworks?

National rules for F2 and F3 fireworks are different among MSs, differences in national rules for F2 and F3 fireworks reflect different national traditions

304.Level of harmonisation of national rules applicable to F2 and F3 fireworks

305.Targeted survey

306.Desk research

307.Type and scale of the differences in the rules applicable to F2 and F3

308.Desk research

309.List of MSs with historical traditions linked to the use of fireworks

310.Desk research

311.Level of correlation between MSs that adopt stricter rules for F2 and F3 and those that have strong traditions linked to the use of fireworks

312.Targeted survey

313.Stakeholders’ opinion on the extent to which the room left by the Pyrotechnic Directive to MSs allows them to safeguard and maintain their national traditions

314.Targeted survey

315.Public consultation

ECT-11

Are there any aspects/means/actors that render certain aspects of the measures more or less effective than others, and – if there are – what lessons can be drawn from this?

The allocation of roles and responsibilities in the implementation of the measures to specific actors affected the effectiveness of the measures, the use of digital and electronic tools affected the effectiveness of the measures, the means of of transposition (legal acts, administrative documents) affected the effectiveness of the measures

316.Types of digital and electronic tools used at the national level for the implementation of obligations and requirements stemming from the various measures of the Directive

317.Targeted survey

318.Forms of transposition of the Directive adopted by MSs

319.Desk research

320.Key challenges preventing the Directive from effectively achieving its intended objectives

321.Public consultation

322.Targeted survey

323.Interviews

324.Trend in the number of accidents and health & safety issues related to the products covered by the Directive per MS

325.Targeted survey

326.ICSMS

and Safety Gate

327.Data from accident reporting

328.Trend in the number of security incidents related to the products covered by the Directive per MS

329.Targeted survey

330.Trend in the number of non-compliant products per MS

331.Targeted survey

332.Public consultation

333.ICSMS

334.Types of product-related controls and frequency per MS

335.Targeted survey

336.Stakeholders’ opinion on the effectiveness of the Directive at the national level and on key strengths and weaknesses per MS

337.Targeted survey

338.Public consultation

339.Stakeholders’ opinion on aspects/means/actors that affect the effectiveness of the measures of the Directive

340.Targeted survey

ECT-12.1

To what extent have the specific and general objectives been achieved?

The directive contributed to harmonising rules: for making available pyrotechnics.

341.Level of harmonisation of national rules and practices per area of intervention

342.Targeted survey

343.Public consultation

344.Desk Research

345.Main differences in national rules and practices per area of intervention

346.Desk research

347.Targeted survey

348.Number and rationale of cases where MSs adopted stricter rules for pyrotechnics intended to the general public

349.Targeted survey

350.Number and rationale of cases of gold plating

351.Targeted survey

352.Areas of improvement

353.Targeted survey

354.Interviews

355.Public consultation

ECT-12.2

The directive improved the traceability of sales and transactions to prevent illicit possession, misuse and thefts.

356.Main differences in the national measures implementing the traceability requirements set by the Directive

357.Desk research

358.Targeted survey

359.Trend in the controls on the respect of the traceability requirements

360.Interviews

361.Trend in the n. of lost, stolen or diverted products covered by the Directive

362.Targeted survey

363.Trend in the n. of security incidents linked to the products covered by the Directive

364.Targeted survey

365.Trend in the ability of Law Enforcement Authorities and Market surveillance authorities to trace a product throughout all stages of the supply chain

366.Targeted survey

367.Stakeholders’ opinion on the contribution of the Directive’s measures to the traceability of pyrotechnics

368.Targeted survey

369.Public consultation

370.Areas of improvement

371.Targeted survey

372.Interviews

373.Public consultation

ECT-12.3

The directive contributed to ensuring the quality and credibility of notified bodies’ work

374.Trend in the type and number of controls over the notified bodies per MS

375.Targeted survey

376.Trend in the number of cases where the competence of notified bodies has been challenged

377.Desk research

378.Trend in the number of appeal procedures against decisions of a notified body

379.Desk research

380.Trend in the number of non-compliant products covered by the Directive (as resulting from incidents, market surveillance evaluations or controls performed by EOs and notified bodies)

381.Targeted survey

382.Public consultation

383.ICSMS

384.Rules and topics of discussion of the working group of Notified Bodies organised by the EC

385.Desk research

386.Level of involvement of national authorities responsible for notification policy in the platform mentioned above

387.Desk research

388.Rules and topics of discussion in the sectoral group of notified bodies

389.Desk research

390.Level of involvement of the national notified bodies in the sectoral group mentioned above

391.Desk research

392.Stakeholders’ opinion on the contribution of the Directive’s measures to increasing the quality and credibility of the work of the notified bodies

393.Public consultation

394.Targeted survey

395.Stakeholders’ opinion on the extent to which the lack of validity of the conformity certificates granted by notified bodies represents an obstacle to supervision

396.Targeted survey

397.Areas of improvement

398.Targeted survey

399.Interviews

400.Public consultation

ECT-12.4

The directive increased the effectiveness of market surveillance activities

401.Channels and frequency of exchange of information between national market surveillance authorities (especially when the product’s non-compliance or risk affect other MSs)

402.Targeted survey

403.Trend in the number of incidents and health & safety issues related to the products covered by the Directive

·Targeted survey

·Public consultation

·ICSMS

and Safety Gate

·Data from accident reporting

404.Trend in the number of prohibitions, withdrawals, recalls of products covered by the Directive and underlying rationale (non-compliance and/or risks)

·Targeted survey

405.Trend in the n. of market surveillance evaluations launched in the MS

·Targeted survey

406.Stakeholders’ opinion on the contribution of the Directive’s measures to the improvement of the effectiveness of market surveillance authorities

·Targeted survey

·Public consultation

407.Areas of improvement

·Targeted survey

·Interviews

·Public consultation

ECT-12.5

The directive contributed to ensuring that pyrotechnic articles on the EU market fulfil the requirements providing a high level of protection of health and safety, and other public interests (security and environment), while guaranteeing the functioning of the internal market

408.In addition to all indicators used to assess the achievement of the specific objectives (listed above) and those used to assess the overall qualitative and quantitative effects of the measures the analysis included:

409.Comparison of the Directive’s impact on market, health & safety and security aspects

410.Targeted survey

411.Public consultation

412.Stakeholders’ opinion on the contribution of the Directive to ensuring that pyrotechnic articles on the EU market fulfil the requirements providing a high level of protection of health and safety, and other public interests, while guaranteeing the functioning of the internal market

413.Targeted survey

414.Public consultation 

415.Areas for improvement

416.Targeted survey

417.Public consultation

418.Interviews

ECT-13.1

To what extent has the directive contributed to the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals?

The directive positively contributed to Goal 9 (Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation)

419.Trend in the production value and turnover of the EU industry for the products covered by the Directive

420.Desk research

421.Interview

422.Trend in the number and size of companies active in the sectors covered by the Directive (with specific focus on SMEs)

423.Desk research

424.Interview

425.Trend in volume and value of intra-EU flows of products covered by the Directive

426.Desk research

427.Interview

428.Trend in volume and value of extra-EU flows of products covered by the Directive

429.Desk research

430.Interview

431.Trend in the proportion of sales that EU businesses derive from national, intra-EU or extra-EU trade

432.Desk research

433.Interview

434.Trend in the share of the EU industry in the total value of the market for the products covered by the Directive

435.Desk research

436.Interview

437.Trend in the trade competitiveness index

438.Desk research

439.Trend in the trade barriers affecting the Single Market (with a specific focus on SMEs)

440.Targeted survey

441.Desk research

442.Evolution in the measures adopted by MS to reduce environmental risks when evaluating the conformity of pyrotechnic products to EU requirements

443.Desk research

444.Interviews

445.Stakeholders’ opinion on the contribution of the Directive to:

·Increasing the competitiveness of the EU sectors and raising the industry’s share of employment and GDP

·Integrating SMEs in the value chain

·Increasing the overall sustainability of the industrial sector

446.Targeted survey

447.Public consultation

ECT-13.2

The directive positively contributed to Goal 16 (Peace, justice and strong institutions)

448.Trend in the number of security-related incidents and illicit activities concerning the products covered by the Directive

449.Targeted survey

450.Key changes in the national measures for the identification and traceability of the products covered by the Directive

451.Desk research

452.Interviews

453.Key changes in the national measures and requirements on exchange of information of products covered by the Directive

454.Desk research

455.Interviews

456.Stakeholders’ opinion on the contribution of the Directive to:

·reducing violence

·creating peace, security and stability

·ensuring stable enabling conditions for the global social and economic development of the EU SDG 16

457.Targeted survey

ECT-14

To what extent has the directive contributed to the new European Growth Model?

The directive enhanced Europe’s resilience by strengthening the Single Market

458.Trend in the production value and turnover of the EU industry for the products covered by the Directive

459.Desk research

460.Interviews

461.Trend in the number and size of companies active in the sectors covered by the Directive

462.Desk research

463.Interviews

464.Trend in volume and value of intra-EU flows of products covered by the Directive

465.Desk research

466.Interviews

467.Trend in volume and value of extra-EU flows of products covered by the Directive

468.Desk research

469.Interviews

470.Trend in the proportion of sales that EU businesses derive from national, intra-EU or extra-EU trade

471.Desk research

472.Interviews

473.Trend in the share of the EU industry in the total value of the market for the products covered by the Directive

474.Desk research

475.Interviews

476.Trend in the trade competitiveness index

477.Desk research

478.Trend in the trade barriers affecting the Single Market

479.Targeted survey

480.Desk research

EFF- 01

What are administrative burdens, adjustment costs and enforcement costs imposed by the directive to all stakeholders along the value chain?

Quantitative assessment of the cost and the administrative burden placed on competent authorities, notifying bodies, market surveillance and economic operators. Qualitative assessment of the costs on importers, distributors, consignees, consumers, environment and cultural organisations, NGOs).

481.Quantitative assessment for difference in current costs to the baseline per Directive

482.Public consultation

483.Targeted survey

484.Cost templates and interviews

485.Total administrative, adjustment and enforcement costs (min, max, average) by sub-category of costs and stakeholder

486.Targeted survey

487.Cost templates and interviews

488.Administrative, adjustment and enforcement costs broken down by sub-category of costs and stakeholder type

489.Targeted survey

490.Cost templates and interviews

491.Qualitative assessment for economic operators and administrations

492.Public consultation

493.Targeted survey

494.Cost interviews

495.What are the likely causes of change (Drivers) of administrative, adjustment and enforcement costs by stakeholder type and country

496.Public consultation

497.Targeted survey

498.Cost interviews

EFF-02

How affordable are the regulatory/ administrative costs borne by all stakeholders?

Procedures and obligations introduced by the Directive are achieved at a reasonable cost

Economic operators

499.Cost per unit (economic operators) (difference in current share of costs to the Baseline)

500.Targeted survey

501.Public consultation

502.Share of regulatory cost in total production (current share comparison with the Baseline).

503.Targeted survey

504.Cost templates and interviews

505.Share of regulatory cost in average yearly turnover (current share comparison with the Baseline)

506.Targeted survey

507.Cost templates and interviews

508.Share of survey respondents who express a strong increase to strong decrease of costs since the Baseline.

509.Public consultation

510.Targeted survey

511.Cost templates and interviews

Administrators

512.Number of staff (FTEs)

513.Targeted survey

514.Cost templates and interviews

515.Number of personnel engaged in control and inspection.

516.Targeted survey

517.Cost templates and interviews

518.Number of personnel engaged in reporting obligations.

519.Targeted survey

520.Cost templates and interviews

521.Average labour cost

522.Targeted survey

523.Cost templates and interviews

524.Frequency of inspections per year

525.Targeted survey

526.Cost templates and interviews

527.Total cost per year

528.Targeted survey

529.Cost templates and interviews

530.Total cost per FTE

531.Targeted survey

532.Cost templates and interviews

EFF-03

What aspects of the measures are the most inefficient in terms of resources that are mobilised by stakeholders during the different phases of the process?

Quantitative assessment based on the break-down of administrative costs, adjustment costs namely related to Product conformity assessment procedure and Product traceability and labelling and costs of enforcementQualitative assessment of the above categories

Economic operators

533.Average share of (particular sub-categories of) administrative costs in total regulatory costs (three year average) compared to the baseline

534.Targeted survey

535.Public consultation

536.Cost templates and interviews 

537.Average share of (particular sub-categories of) adjustment costs in total regulatory costs (three year average) compared to the baseline

538.Share of regulatory cost in total production cost compared to the baseline

539.Share of regulatory cost in average yearly turnover compared to the baseline

Administrative costs

540.Total cost per FTE compared to the baseline

541.Total cost of reporting obligations compared to the baseline

All

542.Share of survey respondents who characterise the aspects of measures as highly inefficient to highly efficient compared to the baseline

EFF-04.1

What are the main benefits for stakeholders and civil society that derive from the directive?

Measures had economic effects on intra-EU flows and Increased competitiveness of EU companiesThe effects evolved over time since the implementation of the measures

543.Trend in the production value and turnover of the EU industry for the products covered by the Directive

544.Desk research

545.Interviews

546.Trend in the number and size of companies active in the sectors covered by the Directive

547.Desk research

548.Interviews

549.Trend in volume and value of intra-EU flows of products covered by the Directive

550.Desk research

551.Interviews

552.Trend in volume and value of extra-EU flows of products covered by the Directive

553.Desk research

Interviews

554.Trend in the proportion of sales that EU businesses derive from national, intra-EU or extra-EU trade

555.Desk research

556.Interviews

557.Trend in the share of the EU industry in the total value of the market for the products covered by the Directive

558.Desk research

559.Interviews

560.Share of stakeholders with positive opinion on the effects of the Directive on the strengthening of the Single Market and potential areas for improvement

561.Public consultation

562.Targeted stakeholder consultation

EFF-04.1 bis

What are the main benefits for stakeholders and civil society that derive from the directive?

Measures had benefits in terms of safety in the industry and for consumers. Measures had benefits in terms of public security. Measures had benefits in terms of environment

563.Trend in number of accidents (injuries and safety issues)

564.Public consultation

565.Targeted survey

566.Desk research, data from accident reporting

567.Number and types of infringements of national rules requiring compliance with essential safety requirements

568.Public consultation

569.Targeted survey

570.ICSMS

571.Share of stakeholders with positive opinion on the level of protection in terms of health & safety, security and environment ensured by the current enforcement practices

572.Public consultation

573.Targeted survey

574.Trend in the number of security-related incidents and illicit activities concerning the products covered by the Directive

575.Share of stakeholders with positive opinion on the effects brought by the Directive in terms of overall public security

576.Desk research

577.Public consultation

578.Targeted survey

579.Share of stakeholders with positive opinion on the effects brought by the pyrotechnic Directive in terms of environmental risk protection

580.Public consultation

581.Targeted survey

REL-01

To what extent do the objectives of the Directive correspond to the needs?

Degree of alignment between stakeholders’ perception of the needs and the objectives of the Directive. The objectives are; i) achieving free movement of articles in the Internal Market, ii) protecting human health and safety; iii) ensuring high level of public security and iv) considering environmental aspects. The alignment considers past, present and future needs.

582.List of potential health & safety, security and environmental risks linked to pyrotechnics

583.Desk research

584.Interviews

585.Level of coverage of potential risks by the measures included in the Directive

586.Interviews

587.Targeted survey

588.Public consultation

589.Desk research

590.Type of industrial accidents (and other accidents?) and health and safety issues involving products covered by the Directive (in the EU and outside)

591.Desk research

592.Interviews

593.ICSMS

594.Safety Gate

595.Type of cases of illicit activities linked to the products covered by the Directive (in the EU and outside)

596.Desk research

597.Interviews

598.Type of environmental accidents linked to the products covered by the Directive

599.Desk research

600.Interviews

601.Examples of products covered by the Directive that do not meet the essential safety requirements

602.Desk research

603.Interviews

604.ICSMS

605.Main differences in the measures adopted by MS to implement common EU requirements

606.Desk research

607.Interviews

608.Type of restrictions going beyond the minimum requirements adopted by MSs for health and safety reasons

609.Desk research

610.Interviews

611.Stakeholders’ opinion on the continuous need for protection in terms of health & safety, security and environment and the existence of potential uncovered risks

612.Interviews

613.Public consultation

614.Targeted survey

REL-02

To what extent are there adaptation mechanisms in place to follow technological, and scientific and social developments?


The essential safety requirement set by the Directive adequately protect the health and safety of persons, property and the environment in relation to all types of pyrotechnics. The harmonised standards used to demonstrate the conformity to the essential safety requirements ensure an adequate protection of the health and safety of persons, property and the environment.The Directive addresses new emerging trends.

615.List of main technological, scientific, and social developments relevant to pyrotechnics

616.Desk research

617.Interviews

618.Level of coverage of the main developments by adaptations mechanisms foreseen by the Directive

619.Desk research

620.Interviews

621.Examples of cases where Member States found that a product in compliance with the Directive presented a health & safety, security and/or environmental risk

622.Desk research

623.Interviews

624.Examples of cases where MSs identified shortcomings in the harmonised standards used to prove the conformity to essential safety requirement

625.Desk research

626.Interviews

627.Type of restrictions going beyond the minimum requirements adopted by MSs for health and safety reasons

628.Desk research

629.Interviews

630.Examples of good practices adopted nationally (besides EU requirements) to adequately follow technological, and scientific and social developments 

631.Desk research

632.Interviews

633.Stakeholders’ opinion on the extent to which existing adaptation mechanisms allow to keep up with and adequately address technological, social and scientific developments

634.Desk research

635.Interviews

REL-03

To what extent is the current scope of application of the Directive adequate and clear for the attainment of the objectives?

Degree of alignment between stakeholders’ perception on the clarity of the scope of the Directive; coverage in terms of products covered and exempted; stakeholders role within their value chain.

636.List of pyrotechnics covered by the Directive

637.Desk research

638.Health & safety, security and environmental risks per type of product

639.Desk research

640.Interviews

641.Type of requests for clarifications sent by MSs to the Commission in relation to the scope of the Directive

642.Desk research

643.Examples of cases where products were wrongly categorised

644.Desk research

645.Interviews

646.Targeted survey

647.New products whose categorisation (within or without the scope of the Directive) appears not clear

648.Desk research

649.Interviews

650.Public consultation

651.Targeted survey

652.Stakeholders’ opinion on the clarity of the scope of application and definitions of the Directive

653.Interviews

654.Public consultation

655.Targeted survey

REL-04

Which gaps exist (e.g. health & safety, security, and/or environmental concerns)?

The relevance of the Directive to address uncovered health & safety, security, and/or environmental concerns in terms of measures, definitions, scope

656.Indicators listed in the previous questions

657.Desk research

658.Interviews

659.Stakeholders’ opinion on the main gaps (if any) in terms of measures, definitions and scope of the Directive

660.Interviews

661.Public consultation

662.Targeted survey

COH-01

Is there any issue of internal coherence of the measures (i.e., between the various components of the measures)?

Clarity and comprehensibility, consistency of terminology, logical structure and organization, legal certainty, objectives and policy goals reflected in provisions.

0.Clear and unambiguous language in provisions

1.Interviews

2.Public consultation

3.Targeted survey

4.Desk research

5.Avoidance of overly technical language

6.Interviews

7.Targeted survey

8.Desk research

9.Consistent use of terms and definitions throughout the document

10.Interviews

11.Public consultation

12.Targeted survey

13.Desk research

14.Specification of roles and responsibilities of involved parties

15.Interviews

16.Public consultation

17.Targeted survey

18.Desk research

19.Clear articulation of the objectives and policy goals

20.Interviews

21.Targeted survey

22.Desk research

23.Provisions directly linked to the achievement of objectives and policy goals.

24.Interviews

25.Targeted survey

26.Desk research

27.Adequate coverage of all relevant aspects of the objectives and policy goals 

28.Interviews

29.Public consultation

30.Targeted survey

31.Desk research

32.Complaints from stakeholders related to internal coherence (e.g. complexity/ lack of clarity/lack of consistency) to the EC Commission or via the survey and Open Public consultation

33.Interviews

34.Public consultation

35.Targeted survey

36.Desk research

37.No internal contradiction or overlaps

38.Interviews

39.Public consultation

40.Targeted survey

41.Desk research

COH-02

Are there overlaps or complementarities between the measures and any other Community action having similar objectives

Overlaps between the measures, In-built mechanism in place, non- alignment and contradictory provisions/objectives, synergies

42.Degree of alignment with other measures (high, medium, low)

43.Interviews

44.Public consultation

45.Targeted survey

46.Desk research.

47.Synergies leading to positive impacts or with limited effects.

48.Interviews

49.Targeted survey

50.Desk research

51.Impacts of overlaps (e.g., administrative burden, cost on companies, legal uncertainties due to double regulation)

52.Interviews

53.Targeted survey

54.Desk research

55.Impact of in-built mechanisms (derogations, exemptions, legal references) to avoid overlaps

56.Interviews

57.Targeted survey

58.Desk research

59.Impact of non-alignment and contradictory provisions/objectives (e.g. administrative burden, legal clarity, barrier to achieve broader EU objectives)

60.Interviews

61.Targeted survey

62.Desk research

COH-03

Are there any issues of coherence, alignment with international laws?

Non- alignment and contradictory provisions/objectives

63.Degree of alignment with international measures (high, medium, low)

64.Interviews

65.Targeted survey

66.Desk research

67.Impact of non-alignment and contradictory provisions/objectives with international measures (e.g., non-compliance)

68.Interviews

69.Targeted survey

70.Desk research

EUAD-01

What is the additional value resulting from the EU intervention compared to the situation in which Member State would act at national level?

Comparison (in relation to several indicators and descriptors) between the situation at national level in relevant sectors before the introduction of the Directive and after the implementation, assessing the added value of the EU intervention.

71.Trend in the production value and turnover of the EU industry for the products covered by the Directive

72.Desk research

73.Interviews

74.Trend in the number and size of companies active in the sectors covered by the Directive

75.Desk research

76.Interviews

77.Trend in volume and value of intra-EU flows of products covered by the Directive

78.Desk research

79.Interviews

80.Trend in volume and value of extra-EU flows of products covered by the Directive

81.Desk research

82.Interviews

83.Trend in the number of incidents and infringements concerning the products falling under the scope of the two Directive.

84.Desk research

85.Interviews

86.Types of measures in place before the entry into force of the Directive

87.Desk research

88.Interviews

89.Stakeholders’ opinion on the added value brough by the Directive in relation to the current levels of health & safety, security, market and environment protection

90.Interviews

91.Public consultation

92.Targeted survey

EUAD-02

To what extent the issues addressed by the measures require a continuation of the EU action?

The scale of the issues initially addressed by the Directive (or of their potential impacts on other MSs) requires a continuation of the EU action.

93.Level of harmonization of national measures implementing the Directive

94.Desk research

95.Interviews

96.Public consultation

97.Targeted survey

98.Main differences in the rules and measures adopted nationally to implement the Directive

99.Desk research

100.Examples and geographical scope of cases of non-compliance

101.Desk research

102.Interviews

103.ICSMS

104.Examples and geographical scope of cases of illicit use of products covered by the Directive

105.Desk research

106.Interviews

107.Stakeholders’ opinion on the need for EU action to address current issues

108.Interviews

109.Public consultation

110.Targeted survey

EUAD-03

What would be the consequence of stopping or withdrawing the measures on pyrotechnics?

Without the Directive pyrotechnics may be subject to different rules and restrictions in different MSs thus raising health & safety, security and environmental risks and competition distortions among Economic operators. EU-wide rules and coordination at the EU level is necessary to ensure synergies in terms of information-exchanges, controls, investigations.

Measure adopted to implement the directive have brought substantial changes in the national context that will likely remain unchanged.

111.Types of measures in force before the introduction of the Directive

112.Desk research

113.Requirements and rules stemming from relevant EU and international law and policies (besides the Directive under investigation)

114.Desk research

115.Main technological, scientific and social developments relevant to pyrotechnics

116.Desk research

117.Interviews

118.Type and scale of the changes occurred at the national level to Implement the Directive (eg. new institutions, changes in roles and responsibilities, new operational systems and procedures)

119.Desk research

120.Interviews

121.Stakeholders’ opinion on the consequences of withdrawing the Directive

122.Interviews

123.Public consultation

124.Targeted survey

Annex IV. Overview of benefits and costs and Table on simplification and burden reduction

Table 1. Overview of costs and benefits identified in the evaluation 194

Citizens/Consumers

Businesses

Administrations

Other…

Quantitative

Comment

Quantitative

Comment

Quantitative

Comment

Quantitative

Comment

Administrative costs

Draw up EU declaration of conformity

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 10 979 per year, per company

Manufacturers

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Draw up the technical documentation referred to in Annex II

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 23 153 per year, per company

Manufacturers

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Lodge application for Conformity Assessment (e.g. Module B, Module C2, Module D, Module E, Module F, Module G).

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 3 274 per year, per company

Manufacturers

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Collect documentation related to carrying out conformity assessment procedure

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 6 756 per year, per company

Manufacturers

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Keep the technical documentation and the EU declaration of conformity for 10 years after the pyrotechnic article has been placed on the market

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 537 per year, per company

Manufacturers

Importers

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Inform national authorities of pyrotechnic articles that may represent a risk

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 992 per year, per company

Manufacturers

Importers

Distributors

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Ensure pyrotechnic articles are labelled according to articles 10 (Fireworks and Theatrical pyrotechnics) or article 11 (pyrotechnics for vehicles labelling and supply of safety data sheets to professional users)

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 11 755 per year, per company

Manufacturers

Importers

Distributors

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Ensure pyrotechnic articles are accompanied by instructions and safety information in the language of the consumer/user

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 5 983 per year, per company

Manufacturers

Importers

Distributors

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Administrative actions to ensure traceability, labelling pyrotechnic articles with the registration number assigned by the notified body

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 3 785 per year, per company

Manufacturers

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Keep records of the registration numbers of the pyrotechnic articles

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 2 563 per year, per company

Manufactures

Importers

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Collaborate with market surveillance authorities to identify suppliers and distributors of their pyrotechnic articles.

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 1 869 per year, per company

Manufacturers

Importers

Distributors

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Investigate, and, if necessary, keep a register of non-conforming pyrotechnic articles and pyrotechnic article recalls, upon duly justified requests of competent authorities

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 623 per year, per company

Manufacturers

Importers

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Administrative actions to withdraw or recall not conformant articles

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 660 per year, per company

Manufacturers

Importers

Distributors

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Resources used to recordkeeping of the Market Surveillance Activities

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

EUR 1 813 per year, per MSA

Market surveillance authorities

N/A

N/A

Resources used to documentary and evidence collection, and of information exchange with the EC on an annual basis of the Market Surveillance Activities

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

EUR 2 489 per year, per MSA

Market surveillance authorities

N/A

N/A

Resources used to lodge application for (re)notification to the notifying authority of the Member State in which it is established. Includes costs of collecting document evidence of conformity assessment activities, the conformity assessment module or modules and the pyrotechnic article or articles for which that body claims to be competent and accreditation certificates.

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 587 per year, per NB

Notified bodies

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Resources used to (re)accreditation procedure, (when applicable) issued by national accreditation body the competence and capacity of the conformity assessment body

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 10 062 per year, per NB

Notified bodies

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Resources used to ensure independence from notifying authorities, notified bodies, and so on (e.g ethics committee)

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 880 per year, per NB

Notified bodies

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Resources used to communicate the non-conformance of pyrotechnic articles to competent authorities (incl. third country authorities)

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 587 per year, per NB

Notified bodies

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Inform other notified bodies of negative or positive results (upon request)

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 587 per year, per NB

Notified bodies

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Adjustment costs

Designing, test, and categorise products according to their intended use (fireworks, theatrical, other), level of hazard (including their noise level)

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 44 644 per year, per company

Manufacturers

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Manufacturing pyrotechnic articles according to the essential safety requirements set out in annex I

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 56 960 per year, per company

Manufacturers

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Carry out a conformity assessment procedure

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 3 471 per year, per company

Manufacturers

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Affix CE marking

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 18 677 per year, per company

Manufacturers

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Account for changes in pyrotechnic article design, characteristic, harmonised standards, or technical specifications to remain conformant to the Directive

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 8 816 per year, per company

Manufacturers

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Operational actions to ensure traceability, labelling pyrotechnic articles with the registration number assigned by the notified body, and according to the uniform system determined by the Commission

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 12 551 per year, per company

Manufacturers

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Upon a duly justified request of the competent authorities:

• Carry out sample testing of pyrotechnic articles already made available on the market

• Investigate, and, if necessary, keep a register of:

−Complaints

−Non-conforming articles

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 9 874 per year, per company

Manufacturers

Importers

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Corrective operational actions to withdraw or recall non-conformant articles

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 1 133 per year, per company

Manufacturers

Importers

Distributors

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Resources used to personnel familiarisation/training on pyrotechnics essential safety requirements set out in Annex I

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 9 150 per year, per NB

Notified bodies

EUR 10 736 per year, per MSA

Market surveillance authorities

N/A

N/A

Resources used to ensure that personnel responsible for carrying out the conformity assessment and risk assessment tasks are informed of the relevant standardisation and harmonisation activities

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

EUR 3 656 per year, per MSA

Market surveillance authorities

N/A

N/A

Coordination and expert group meetings

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 10 942 per year, per NB

Notified bodies

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Liability insurance (if private)

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

EUR 2 100 per year, per NB

Notified bodies

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Enforcement costs

Participation of coordination groups meetings

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

EUR  5 866 per year, per MSA

Market surveillance authorities

N/A

N/A

Resources used to communicate the non-conformance of pyrotechnic articles to economic operators, notified bodies, the EC, and competent authorities (incl. third country authorities)

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

EUR 12 939 per year, per MSA

Market surveillance authorities

N/A

N/A

Resources used to performance of appropriate checks and risk assessments on the characteristics of the pyrotechnic article by means of documentary checks and, where appropriate, physical and laboratory checks (excludes outsourced laboratory tests) based on adequate samples (includes visit to premises of economic operators for sampling purposes)

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

EUR 13 977 per year, per MSA

Market surveillance authorities

N/A

N/A

Resources used to monitor accidents and harms in the Member State caused by pyrotechnic articles

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

EUR 1 849 per year, per MSA

Market surveillance authorities

N/A

N/A

Resources used to take corrective actions when the Economic Operator does not (incl. Resources used to destruction/decommissioning/disposal)

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

EUR 3 780 per year, per MSA

Market surveillance authorities

N/A

N/A

Resources used to map non-conformant pyrotechnic articles’ supply chain

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

EUR 762 per year, per MSA

Market surveillance authorities

N/A

N/A

Resources used to verification of reports and certificates presented by economic operators, notified bodies, etc. regarding the conformity assessment activities

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

EUR 9 527 per year, per MSA

Market surveillance authorities

N/A

N/A

Resources used to alert users of pyrotechnic articles that may pose a risk of injury or damage

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

EUR 3 626 per year, per MSA

Market surveillance authorities

N/A

N/A

Resources used to outsourced laboratory tests for conformity assessment and risk assessments

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

EUR  762 per year, per MSA

Market surveillance authorities

N/A

N/A

‘Other’ enforcement costs

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

EUR 762 per year, per MSA

Market surveillance authorities

N/A

N/A

Direct benefits

Sustained level of safety 195

Recurrent

Not quantifiable

The Directive seems to have contributed to a relatively stable safety level of the pyrotechnic articles on the market. This benefits not only users but also society at large.

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Positive impact on public security 196

Recurrent

Not quantifiable

Despite the persistent problems, stakeholders mostly acknowledge the Directive’s positive impact on public security.

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Improved market access 197

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

Not quantifiable

Companies and notified bodies report improved access to the single market thanks to the harmonisation of rules and the CE marking system. They have also experienced advantages on non-EU markets, as CE marking is widely accepted internationally as complying with other markets’ safety requirements

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Reduction of familiarisation costs 198

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

Not quantifiable

The Directive has resulted in an approximation of Member States’ legislation. Largely identical definitions and similar requirements have reduced businesses’ costs for familiarisation with legislation.

Not quantifiable

The Directive has resulted in an approximation of Member States’ legislation. Largely identical definitions and similar requirements have reduced businesses’ costs for familiarisation with legislation.

N/A

N/A

Cost savings in conformity assessment activities 199

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

Not quantifiable

The introduction of the horizontal NLF provisions for conformity assessments has brought cost savings for companies thanks to harmonised procedures.

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Coordination and information exchange 200

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

Not quantifiable

The Directive has facilitated coordination and information exchange between market surveillance authorities, notified bodies and the Commission. Fora like the Forum of Notified Bodies and the Administrative Cooperation Group (AdCo) provide an opportunity to exchange on issues encountered during market surveillance and conformity assessments, to find solutions and to agree on common approaches.

Not quantifiable

The Directive has facilitated coordination and information exchange between market surveillance authorities, notified bodies and the Commission. Fora like the Forum of  Notified Bodies and the Administrative Cooperation Group (AdCo) provide an opportunity to exchange on issues encountered during market surveillance and conformity assessments, to find solutions and to agree on common approaches.

N/A

N/A

Enhanced traceability of pyrotechnic articles 201

Recurrent

Not quantifiable

The traceability system for pyrotechnic articles, which requires the labelling of pyrotechnic articles with registration numbers issued by the notified body that carried out the conformity assessment, although not allowing item-level tracking, has enhanced the possibility to track pyrotechnic articles throughout the supply chain.

Not quantifiable

The traceability system for pyrotechnic articles, which requires the labelling of pyrotechnic articles with registration numbers issued by the notified body that carried out the conformity assessment, although not allowing item-level tracking, has enhanced the possibility to track pyrotechnic articles throughout the supply chain.

N/A

N/A

TABLE 2: Simplification and burden reduction (savings already achieved) 

Report any simplification, burden reduction and cost savings achieved already by the intervention evaluated, including the points of comparison/ where available (e.g. REFIT savings predicted in the IA or other sources). 

Citizens/Consumers/Workers

Businesses

Administrations

[Other…] _ specify

Quantitative

Comment

Quantitative

Comment

Quantitative

Comment

Quantitative

Comment

Indirect compliance cost savings 

Reduction of familiarisation cost

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

Not quantifiable

The Directive has resulted in an approximation of Member States’ legislation. Largely identical definitions and similar requirements have reduced businesses’ costs for familiarisation with legislation.

Not quantifiable

The Directive has resulted in an approximation of Member States’ legislation. Largely identical definitions and similar requirements have reduced businesses’ costs for familiarisation with legislation.

N/A

N/A

Cost savings in conformity assessment activities

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

Not quantifiable

The introduction of the horizontal NLF provisions for conformity assessments has brought cost savings for companies thanks to harmonised procedures.

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Coordination and information exchange

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

Coordination and information exchange

The Directive has facilitated coordination and information exchange between market surveillance authorities, notified bodies and the Commission. Fora like the Forum of Notified Bodies and the Administrative Cooperation Group (AdCo) provide an opportunity to exchange on issues encountered during market surveillance and conformity assessments, to find solutions and to agree on common approaches.

Coordination an information exchange

The Directive has facilitated coordination and information exchange between market surveillance authorities, notified bodies and the Commission. Fora like the Forum of  Notified Bodies and the Administrative Cooperation Group (AdCo) provide an opportunity to exchange on issues encountered during market surveillance and conformity assessments, to find solutions and to agree on common approaches.

N/A

N/A

PART II: II Potential simplification and burden reduction (savings)

Identify further potential simplification and savings that could be achieved with a view to make the initiative more effective and efficient without prejudice to its policy objectives 202 .

Citizens/Consumers/Workers

Businesses

Administrations

[Other…] _ specify

Quantitative

Comment

Quantitative

Comment

Quantitative

Comment

Quantitative

Comment

Simplification of labelling and record-keeping requirements

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

Not quantifiable

Labelling and CE marking as well as record-keeping create significant costs for businesses. Further digitalisation could be explored.

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Remove accident reporting obligation

Recurrent

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Not quantifiable

The obligation for competent authorities to report accident data introduced via Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/1096 203 has not produced the expected reliable and comparable data on accidents with pyrotechnic articles. Removing this obligation would reduce burden for national authorities and the Commission.

N/A

N/A

Annex V. Stakeholders consultation - Synopsis report

1.Introduction 

This synopsis report provides a concise summary of the key findings and insights gathered during the evaluation of the Pyrotechnics Directive (2013/29/EU and Implementing Directive 2014/58/EU). The report supports the European Commission by presenting evidence, analysis, and conclusions relevant for assessing the Directive’s relevance, effectiveness, coherence, efficiency, and EU added value. Engaging a diverse range of stakeholders, this report incorporates perspectives from national authorities, conformity assessment bodies, industry representatives, NGOs, logistics operators, and environmental and cultural organisations across all 27 EU Member States.

2.Consultation strategy

2.1. Outline of the strategy 

The consultations conducted as part of the evaluation of the Pyrotechnics legislation (Directive 2013/29/EU and Implementing Directive 2014/58/EU) were designed to assess whether the current EU rules remain effective, relevant, and fit for purpose in achieving their objective and addressing the needs and problems, including emerging challenges, in the sector. Their overall aim was to evaluate the success of the legislation in achieving its objectives, identify gaps or areas for improvement, and assess whether it remains aligned with evolving societal, technological, and environmental priorities. To achieve this, four types of consultations were carried out – a public consultation 204 , a call for evidence, an online survey and interviews. A summary of insights gathered during discussions at the validation workshop was also incorporated into this synopsis report.

Each consultation tool played a complementary role in ensuring a comprehensive evaluation of the Pyrotechnics Directive. The public consultation provided a broad platform to gather diverse views from the general public and stakeholders, offering a wide range of perspectives on the legislation. The targeted online survey focused on collecting detailed, structured input, enabling a more technical and nuanced assessment of the Directive’s impact and challenges. Meanwhile, the interviews allowed for in-depth discussions with key stakeholders, providing qualitative insights and context that enriched the understanding of sector-specific issues. Together, these tools ensured a balanced mix of broad, focused, and detailed inputs to support a robust evaluation.

2.2. Overview of the consultation activities carried out

Public consultation

The public consultation (PC) was conducted from 8th of April to 1st of July 2024 on the European Commission’s dedicated Better Regulation online platform ‘Have Your Say’ 205 .

The consultation received 37 responses in total, with the stakeholder breakdown provided in  Table 8 . From the respondents, 11 (29.7%) stakeholders were from Germany, 11 (29.7%) from Austria, 5 (13.5%) from the Netherlands, 3 (8.1%) from Belgium, 2 (5.4%) from Czechia, 1 (2.7%) from Slovenia, 1 (2.7%) from Liechtenstein, 1 (2.7%) from Sweden, 1 (2.7%) from Italy and 1 (2.7%) from France.

Targeted survey

The survey, launched on the 15th of March 2024, and closing on the 31st of May, consisted of 110 questions and was distributed online to key stakeholders in the field of European pyrotechnics. Multipliers were employed to further disseminate the survey and weekly reminders were sent to survey respondents who had not yet answered.

The survey received 80 complete responses, representing various stakeholder groups. The largest number of responses has been provided by the national market surveillance authorities (23.8%) and industry importers and national enforcement authorities (15% each). The distribution of all responses is detailed in Table 8 . Respondents came from 25 Member States. Notably, Spain (14%) and the Netherlands (11%) accounted for the majority of stakeholder responses.

Interviews

The interview process engaged a diverse range of stakeholders, yielding 48 interviews from key groups involved in the regulation, oversight, and use of pyrotechnics articles. National enforcement authorities and market surveillance authorities accounted for the largest share, contributing for 23 interviews (47.9%). 10 interviews (20.8%) were carried out with individual industry stakeholders and an additional 3 interviews (6.3%) with industry organisations. Notified bodies provided 7 responses (14.6), while notifying authorities and the European Commission each contributed 2 responses (4.2%). Finally, one interview was conducted with an accreditation body (2.1%). This broad representation ensured a comprehensive collection of insights, capturing the views of both public authorities and private entities affected by the Directive.

It is important to note that in many instances, the same stakeholder was engaged multiple times throughout the evaluation process, including during the scoping phase, survey piloting, study phase, and for contributing to the cost templates.

Table 8: Consulted stakeholders by consultation activity

Public consultation

Consulted stakeholders

Responses

EU Citizens

11 (29.7%)

Public authorities

10 (27%)

Companies/businesses

6 (16.2%)

Business associations

4 (10.8%)

NGOs

3 (8.1%)

Other

2 (5.4%)

Non-EU citizen

1 (2.7%)

Targeted survey

Consulted Stakeholders

Responses

National market surveillance

19 (23.8%)

Industry - importer

12 (15 %)

National enforcement Authority

12 (15 %)

Industry: manufacturer (SME)

9 (11.3%)

Industry organisation

8 (10%)

Notified body

7 (8.8%)

Industry manufacturer (large enterprise)

7 (8.8%)

Notifying authority

3 (3.8%)

Accreditation body

1 (1.3%)

NGO - Animal welfare

1 (1.3%)

Regional authority

1 (1.3%)

Interviews

Consulted stakeholders

Responses

Industry organisations

3 (6.3%)

Accreditation body

1 (2.1%)

National enforcement Authority & market surveillance authority

23 (47.9%)

European Commission

2 (4.2%)

Industry

10 (20.8%)

Notified body

7 (14.6%)

Notifying authority

2 (4.2%)

Source: Technopolis Group

2.3. Methodology used to process data 

The data and information collected across the consultations were analysed using a combination of methods to ensure a balanced and robust evaluation. Responses from the public consultation and the targeted online survey were subjected to statistical analysis to identify trends and patterns, while qualitative insights from interviews provided context and depth to the findings. Triangulation was used to cross-validate information across the different consultation tools, as well as sources such as desk research, ensuring consistency and reliability.

Due to limited information from desk research, the evaluation depended heavily on stakeholder consultations. While valuable, stakeholder responses often reflected specific national contexts or organisational perspectives, introducing subjective biases. Additionally, respondents frequently provided fragmented or partial views, with occasional inconsistencies influenced by differences in stakeholder type, geographic location, and organisational role. These factors complicated the synthesis of a unified perspective. To mitigate these limitations, the evaluation employed data triangulation, integrating insights from desk research (where available), public consultations, interviews, and survey data to enhance the robustness and reliability of findings.

Low response rates, particularly for the online survey and public consultation, further constrained the evaluation. This was largely attributed to respondent fatigue, as stakeholders faced multiple concurrent data collection exercises, including surveys and interviews. Stakeholders reported difficulties allocating sufficient time to participate fully, particularly in the public consultation. A significant proportion of responses (sometimes exceeding 40% for specific questions) indicated ‘Does not know/prefer not to answer’. This trend was particularly evident in questions addressing: environmental protection, the situation prior to the implementation of the Directive and Factual information, such as accident frequency and health and safety issues. Stakeholders cited reasons such as the absence of aggregated data or tracking systems in their Member States. Questions requiring a long-term perspective, such as trends since the adoption of the first Directive in 2007 (2007/23/EEC), were particularly challenging for respondents without relevant historical insights. The prevalence of ‘Do not know’ responses was observed in the survey for pyrotechnics. This outcome was partly influenced by the evaluation team's inclusive approach, which encouraged a broad range of stakeholder types to respond. While this enhanced response rates, it also led to instances where respondents lacked the requisite knowledge or experience to address certain questions.

Interviews provided qualitative insights but were subject to inherent limitations. Stakeholders often shared fragmented or incomplete perspectives, with some feedback proving contradictory. These inconsistencies were influenced by variations in stakeholder type, geographic location, and organisational role. Additionally, much of the information gathered was anecdotal and sometimes conflicting, making it challenging to derive definitive conclusions. As a result, the findings were constrained by the subjective nature of the evidence.

To account for these limitations, the evaluation team implemented mitigation strategies, such as data triangulation, to strengthen the robustness of the findings. However, the reliance on subjective stakeholder input, low response rates especially for the public consultation, and challenges in qualitative data interpretation must be taken into account when assessing the conclusions of this evaluation.

3. Results of the consultation activities

2.1. Call for evidence

The call for evidence for the Pyrotechnics Directive (Directive 2013/29/EU) received input from 23 stakeholders, including public authorities, companies, NGOs, business associations, and EU citizens. Feedback came from several Member States, with notable contributions from Germany, France, Portugal, Croatia, Norway, and the Netherlands, highlighting a diverse range of perspectives. The key themes emerging from the feedback were safety and risk management, security and misuse prevention, environmental consideration, market surveillance and regulatory consistency, and animal welfare.

Safety and risk management

Concerns about safety dominated the feedback, particularly in relation to the current minimum safety distances specified in the Directive. Business stakeholders questioned the adequacy of the one-meter safety distance for F1 category fireworks, highlighting that it does not sufficiently account for practical risks such as wind or improper usage. Several contributors recommended increasing these distances, suggesting a minimum of two meters for the spread of effects and three meters for user safety. Additionally, there were concerns about the lack of harmonisation in product labelling and design norms. Business associations noted that inconsistent or unclear labelling can mislead users, potentially increasing safety risks during use. Public authorities also highlighted the importance of clear labelling and accurate safety instructions to ensure compliance and minimise risks during both professional and recreational use.

Security and misuse prevention

Security concerns focused on the misuse of pyrotechnic articles, particularly high-risk items like F4 fireworks. Public authorities emphasised the recurring issue of illegal trafficking, with fireworks often being used for criminal purposes such as vandalism or attacks on law enforcement. The accessibility of such products through online sales platforms was a prominent concern, with stakeholders urging a harmonised EU-level approach to monitor and regulate digital markets. Suggestions included stricter online sales restrictions, traceability mechanisms for high-risk categories, and stronger penalties for illegal transactions. Moreover, feedback stressed the need to ensure that P1 and P2 technical pyrotechnics are only used for their intended purposes and not misclassified or mis-advertised as recreational fireworks.

Environmental considerations

The environmental impact of fireworks was raised by multiple stakeholders. NGOs and citizens highlighted the use of harmful materials such as heavy metals and plastics in fireworks, which contribute to pollution and pose long-term risks to ecosystems. Stakeholders called for updated standards that promote environmentally sustainable alternatives, including the use of biodegradable materials. Noise pollution was another significant concern, with many contributors noting its detrimental effects on communities, particularly vulnerable groups such as children, the elderly, and individuals with sensitivities to loud noises. Recommendations included promoting quieter fireworks or alternatives that reduce noise without compromising visual effects.

Market surveillance and regulatory consistency

Market surveillance and regulatory alignment emerged as critical areas for improvement. Public authorities pointed out deficiencies in the CE marking system, with several instances of certified pyrotechnic articles failing to meet the required safety and quality standards. Such inconsistencies undermine consumer trust and create potential safety hazards. Stakeholders emphasised the need for harmonised safety audits and compliance checks across Member States to ensure consistent enforcement. Business stakeholders also highlighted inefficiencies in market surveillance mechanisms, including disparities in technical capacity and resource allocation among national authorities. Suggestions included establishing an EU-level oversight body to coordinate enforcement efforts and ensure uniform application of the directive.

Animal welfare

Animal welfare concerns featured prominently in the feedback, particularly from NGOs and public authorities. Fireworks were reported to cause severe stress and behavioural changes in animals, including fear, anxiety, and long-term health issues. Scientific studies cited by stakeholders indicated that a significant proportion of domestic animals, such as dogs and cats, exhibit adverse reactions to fireworks, with some requiring weeks or months to recover from exposure. Stakeholders called for the inclusion of animal welfare as a legitimate reason for restricting or prohibiting fireworks under the directive, alongside existing considerations such as public safety and environmental protection. Specific proposals included amending the Directive to allow Member States to implement restrictions based on animal welfare concerns.

2.2.Targeted survey 

Relevance

Relevance of objectives

A majority of respondents, particularly national enforcement authorities, consider the Directive's objectives as highly (39%) or moderately (37.5%) relevant 206 . In particular, it is perceived as relevant to a high or very high extent for removing trade barriers within the EU market and addressing safety concerns by 39% of respondents 207 . However, a large share of industry representatives considered the Directive only to a moderate (55%) or low (10%) extent relevant, thereby diverging from the general perception of respondents 208 . The harmonisation of rules on the sales of goods across Member States 209 and the free movement of goods 210  are aspects for which the Directive is considered relevant by a large share (73% and 61%, respectively) of stakeholders. Moreover, a significant share of stakeholders (40%), excluding however most industry actors 211 rated the persistent issue of non-compliant or dangerous products on the market as highly or very highly relevant 212 . There is no consensus on whether the still to a certain extent heterogeneous safety requirements in the Member States are a relevant issue 213 .

Figure 22: Stakeholders' views on relevance of problems

 N=54, Source: Technopolis Group, based on targeted survey results

Adoption of more stringent national rules

Despite its relevance, many Member States have implemented stricter national rules than those outlined in the Directive 214 . Survey results reveal that these stricter rules commonly involve sales restrictions, additional requirements for licensing, or increased oversight of certain categories of products 215 .

Scope of the Directive

The scope of the Directive, including its categorisation framework under Article 6(1) 216 , is perceived as generally fit-for-purpose 217 . 55% of stakeholders, express satisfaction with its ability to accommodate newly emerging products 218 . However, concerns persist regarding potential misclassification of products, whether accidental or deliberate. For instance, the wide nature of the P1 and P2 categories of pyrotechnic articles outlined in Article 6 of the Pyrotechnics Directive might lead to a misclassification of articles by the manufacturer 219 .

Emerging product coverage

Stakeholders highlighted gaps in the Directive's scope concerning specific products, such as sparkle machines and pyrotechnic effect-mimicking equipment, which are currently not covered by the Directive but are considered to pose risks comparable to regulated pyrotechnic articles. Conversely, heavy flash bangers, currently in scope, were suggested for exclusion or explicit prohibition, given their similarities to explosives and their associated risks 220 .

Need for further harmonisation

Misclassification and overlapping or grey areas regulations between the Pyrotechnics Directive and other legislation, such as the Marine Equipment Directive, were cited as areas needing further harmonisation 221 . Stakeholders advocate for measures to ensure that dangerous goods do not fall into the hands of unqualified users 222 .

Coherence

External coherence

Of the 57 respondents, 30% believe there is coherence between the Pyrotechnics Directive and other EU legislation to a moderate extent, while 23% rate it to a high extent. However, 20% of participants chose ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’, reflecting some uncertainty or lack of opinion. Polarised views emerge as 13% rate coherence to a very high extent and another 13% to a low extent.

Certain stakeholders expressed concerns that the Directive’s strong focus on facilitating the free movement of pyrotechnic articles contrasts with stricter controls under other directives, such as the Civil Explosives Directive and the Firearms Directive. They called for more alignment with the Civil Explosives Directive security measures for at least the most dangerous pyrotechnic articles (e.g. alignment with traceability provisions), to mitigate risks associated with the misuse of pyrotechnic articles. They flagged that they face classification issues with certain products that could also fall under other EU legal regimes such as they Civil Explosive Directive or the Marine Equipment Directive.

Internal coherence

The internal coherence of the Pyrotechnics Directive is widely viewed as unproblematic. Among 58 respondents, the vast majority found no significant issues, with only one respondent identifying low coherence. The single concern raised related to unclear text or inconsistent terminology, but no specific examples were provided.

Figure 23: Stakeholders' views on internal coherence

 

N = 58, Source: Technopolis Group, based on targeted survey results

Effectiveness

National transposition

Thirteen Member States introduced additional measures such as age restrictions, prohibitions on certain fireworks categories, and custom authorisation procedures. Conversely, nine Member States imposed restrictions on the free movement of goods, leveraging the directive’s optional provisions 223 . The need for enhanced safety and public protection is considered by respondents as the main factor behind the implementation of more stringent or additional rules than those indicated in the Directive 224 . This was followed by the fact of preventing illicit trade and misuse, selected by around one-fourth of the respondents.

Figure 24: Stakeholders' views on reasons for more stringent or additional national requirements

 

N = 19, Source: Technopolis Group, based on targeted survey results

Differences in national rules appear to have mixed impacts. Stakeholders were divided on whether and how (negatively or positively) variations affected public security, competitiveness, and intra-EU flows, with no clear consensus on their overall impact.

Figure 25: Stakeholders' views on effect of variations in national rules

 

N = 68, Source: Technopolis Group, based on targeted survey results

Socio-economic context

While the majority of stakeholders did not know or preferred not to give an answer as regards the number of accidents and health issues involving pyrotechnics, 22% indicated that it has largely remained unchanged, 16% reported a decrease and 7% an increase in accidents 225 . However, stakeholders emphasised challenges such as illicit transportation, storage issues, and the rise of online sales that evade regulatory oversight. Stakeholders highlighted the need for stricter controls over high-risk categories like F4 items, enhanced traceability measures, and improved collaboration on cross-border challenges like smuggling and terrorism.

When asked about the prevalence of illicit activities related to pyrotechnic articles, approximately a quarter of respondents (out of the 68 that responded to this survey question) believe that instance of illicit activities had increased since the implementation of both the initial Directive 2007/23/EC and the Directive 2013/29/EU. Conversely, approximately a fifth of respondents felt the number of illicit activities remained constant.

Figure 26: Stakeholders' views on trends in illicit activities

 

N = 68, Source: Technopolis Group, based on targeted survey results

Furthermore, according to all stakeholder types, the most prevalent types of illicit activities include black market sales/illegal trade (including through online shopping), misuse for criminal activities and diversion of the product (e.g., use by non-professionals).

Figure 27: Stakeholders' views on most prevalent types of illicit activities since 2015

 N = 68, Source: Technopolis Group, based on targeted survey results

Implementation of provisions

Most Member States combine physical inspections and documentary checks for compliance. Challenges include managing cross-border sales, e-commerce growth, and complex supply chains. While traceability systems have improved since the directive's implementation, respondents highlighted difficulties in accessing data on product origins and testing certifications. Satisfaction with digital tools like ICSMS and Safety Gate was moderate to high, but cross-border information sharing remains an area for improvement 226 .

Efficiency

The efficiency analysis examines the compliance costs and obligations stemming from Directive 2013/29/EU across various stakeholder groups, focusing on cost drivers and efficiency indicators.

Yearly compliance costs 227

Yearly compliance costs vary significantly between stakeholders. 228

·SMEs incur average costs of EUR 31 250, ranging from less than EUR 25 000 to EUR 100 000, while the single large company faces EUR 375 000.

·Notified bodies have the highest costs, averaging EUR 687 500, reflecting their specialised roles in conformity assessments which is the core of their economic activity 229 .

·Market surveillance authorities average EUR 314 286, and enforcement authorities EUR 370 833, with labour costs constituting 65% and 54% of their total costs, respectively.

Relative size of compliance costs 230

Compliance costs for industry represent, on average, 17% of production costs and 13% of turnover per pyrotechnic article. Large companies experience higher compliance costs relative to production costs (30%) than SMEs (18%), indicating differing compliance strategies 231 . However, turnover-based costs are comparable for SMEs (16%) and large companies (15%).

Adjustment costs 232

·Large manufacturers: Focused 30% of costs on designing and manufacturing products to meet the Directive's requirements, with additional significant expenses allocated to equipment acquisition (40%) and smaller portions to product testing (15%), conformity assessments (5%), and corrective actions (10%).

·SMEs: Allocated the largest portion of costs (36%) to designing and manufacturing products, followed by product testing (23%), equipment acquisition (27%), conformity assessments (15%), and corrective actions (15%).

Administrative costs 233

·Manufacturers (large): Key costs are divided between handling paperwork for lodging applications (20%), recordkeeping and technical documentation (22%), and ensuring correct labelling and markings (29%). Smaller shares are attributed to information sharing (10%) and product testing (10%).

·SMEs: The largest share of costs (33%) goes to ensuring correct labelling and markings, followed by handling paperwork (28%) and recordkeeping (20%). Information sharing (10%) and product testing (10%) are less significant.

·Importers: Predominantly invest in ensuring correct labelling and markings (40%) and handling paperwork (25%), with lower costs allocated to recordkeeping (18%), information sharing (10%), and product testing (7%).

·Notified bodies: Almost entirely focused (97%) on conducting conformity assessments, with marginal contributions (1-2%) to recordkeeping, information sharing, and other administrative tasks.

Regulatory charges

Licensing and authorisation fees are key one-off costs for SMEs, while notified bodies primarily incur administrative fees.

Conformity assessment costs

Costs for conformity assessments vary widely:

·Module B (EU-type examination) ranges from EUR 950 to EUR 60 000.

·Combined module conformity assessments, i.e. Module B plus Module C2, D or E, range from EUR 2 150 to EUR 190 000, with typical costs around EUR 5 000. Module G costs approx. EUR 2 700 and Module H costs approx. EUR 5 500

Performance Indicators

Market surveillance authorities conduct the highest number of inspections (47 per year), followed by enforcement authorities (38). Labour costs per intervention average EUR 5 267 for enforcement authorities and EUR 4 858 for market surveillance authorities. Total intervention costs are EUR 9 759 and EUR 7 447, respectively.

EU added value

The Pyrotechnics Directive has been attributed significant EU-added value by stakeholders participating in the survey. Stakeholders believe to a very high extent that those main benefits of harmonising different national rules, has ensured reduction of the trade barriers and costs in the single Market (15%), higher compliance of pyrotechnics available on the EU market with the requirements (13%), and harmonising rules on the making available and supervision of pyrotechnics (10%) 234 .

Figure 28: Stakeholders' views on achievement of benefits from harmonising national rules

 

N = 68, Source: Technopolis Group, based on targeted survey results

However, when asked to what extent they believe that there should be further harmonisation of national laws, 67% of respondents across all stakeholder groups selected ‘to a very high extent’, ‘to a high extent’ and ‘to a moderate extent’. Stakeholders noted areas where further harmonisation is needed, particularly in the classification and labelling of products, rules governing public use, and the prohibition of certain articles 235 . Clearer regulations ensuring that testing and CE mark evaluations are conducted within the EU were also suggested.

Figure 29: Stakeholders’ views on need of further harmonisation of rules

 

N = 73, Source: Technopolis Group, based on targeted survey results

Significant shares of stakeholders considered the following issues relevant for continued EU action: the presence of non-compliant and dangerous products, barriers to trade arising from differing national rules, and inconsistencies in the designation of conformity assessment bodies 236 .

Concerns were expressed over the potential withdrawal of the Directive, which, according to many stakeholders would impact the economic conditions within the sector strongly negatively (44%) or moderately negatively (28%) 237 . Stakeholders believe the withdrawal would lead to market fragmentation, increased illegal trade, and heightened security risks. Disparities in national regulations would hinder trade and result in the proliferation of dangerous goods in the market. 

2.3. Interviews 

Relevance

Stakeholders across all groups generally viewed the Pyrotechnics Directive as relevant, noting that its core objectives and scope continue to address current needs and challenges. However, interviewees highlighted that the Directive, designed to meet the market conditions and safety concerns of its time, faces challenges in adapting to new risks and products. For instance, one notified body pointed out a lag in the adoption of updated harmonised standards, leading to regulatory gaps. This was echoed by a market surveillance authority, which noted inconsistencies in how notified bodies assess the conformity of new pyrotechnic articles.

Nevertheless, not all stakeholders reported significant issues. A national market surveillance authority indicated that they had not yet encountered challenges linked to emerging trends, and a notified body experienced no difficulties in categorising new products under the current framework.

Security concerns emerged as an area considered not sufficiently addressed under the Directive, particularly regarding online sales and unauthorised access to pyrotechnic products. Interviewees, especially national market surveillance authorities, raised concerns about the increasing volume of online sales, which has made pyrotechnics more accessible to the public and increased the prevalence of dangerous goods in the market. Differing practices across Member States (such as insufficient age verification for online purchases or check regarding ‘specialist knowledge’) exacerbate these risks. Estonia was cited as an example of good practice, implementing ID verification for online purchases, while Spain allows online sales with additional safeguards, such as requiring collection from authorised stores, i.e. excluding mail orders, and recording purchaser details.

The misuse of P1 articles, especially at football events, was flagged as a widespread issue. National market surveillance authorities identified such events as the most common context for misuse, echoing findings from the survey and public consultation.

Concerns were also raised about F3 and F4 pyrotechnics, particularly regarding traceability. A national market surveillance authority suggested that the framework used for civil explosives, which includes strict controls and detailed tracking, could serve as a model. Stakeholders emphasised the importance of digital tracking tools to improve safety and oversight. Three national market surveillance authorities recommended leveraging existing initiatives, such as the Pyro-pass used in the Benelux region, and expanding these tools across the EU to enhance traceability and reduce illegal trade.

Coherence

Stakeholders’ views on the coherence of the Pyrotechnics Directive with other EU legislation were mixed. Among the 57 interview participants, 30% indicated coherence to a moderate extent, while 23% believed coherence exists to a high extent. Responses suggesting either a high or low level of coherence were evenly split at 13%. Regional authorities and accreditation bodies were more likely to report moderate or very high levels of coherence, whereas other stakeholder groups provided no clear conclusions.

Ambiguities in the classification of pyrotechnic articles were a recurring theme. Stakeholders noted inconsistent classification practices across Member States, with some categorising certain articles as pyrotechnics and others as ammunition. Additionally, stakeholders flagged the absence of transition frameworks for products that evolve from heavy firecrackers to explosives, which has contributed to misuse, particularly in the Netherlands.

Gaps in traceability and market transparency were also highlighted, particularly for F4, P1, and P2 articles. The absence of robust track-and-trace systems was seen as a significant shortcoming. To address this, stakeholders recommended aligning the Pyrotechnics Directive with the Civil Explosives Directive to enhance traceability, security, and public safety.

Effectiveness

The interviews highlighted several areas where the Pyrotechnics Directive is perceived as falling short in effectively addressing key issues, particularly those related to the misuse, safety, and enforcement of pyrotechnic articles.

Misuse and safety risks

Interviewees, particularly market surveillance authorities (MSAs) and enforcement authorities, indicated that the Directive inadequately addresses the misuse of pyrotechnic articles. While products are assessed for the intended use, their misuse—such as use outside their intended purpose or by individuals lacking the necessary knowledge—poses significant safety risks. These concerns are compounded by the perceived ease of acquiring and distributing pyrotechnics across the EU, enabled by free circulation and informal networks. To mitigate these risks, stakeholders emphasised the need for enhanced traceability mechanisms to monitor the origins and movement of pyrotechnic products more effectively.

Deliberate misclassification

Market surveillance authorities, enforcement authorities, and notified bodies raised concerns about the deliberate misclassification of pyrotechnic products (e.g., F4 being labelled as P1). This practice enables manufacturers to circumvent stricter regulatory standards, undermining the safety framework. Interviewees suggested stricter penalties for deliberate misclassification, alongside clearer definitions of regulatory categories, to enhance compliance and ensure the integrity of the Directive.

Public security and high-risk categories

The Directive’s failure to address public security risks related to high-risk pyrotechnics, particularly category F4, was another area of concern. Some stakeholders recommended stricter controls on the movement of these items, while others suggested banning specific high-risk pyrotechnics to mitigate emerging threats. The lack of unique identifiers for individual products within the traceability system was flagged as a critical gap, making it difficult for enforcement agencies to track non-compliant articles or articles used for criminal purposes. Additionally, monitoring online trade remains a significant challenge, as customs and enforcement authorities face barriers in regulating these goods effectively.

Regulatory disparities and fragmentation

Stakeholders noted that regulatory variability across EU Member States complicates cross-border trade and enforcement. For instance, differences in how Member States regulate online sales of pyrotechnics allow products to bypass national restrictions, further fragmenting the market. Interviewees recommended addressing these inconsistencies to create a more harmonised and unified regulatory framework across the EU.

Conformity assessments and testing

Concerns were also raised about the reliability of conformity assessments conducted in non-EU countries. Stakeholders identified insufficient oversight of subcontractors performing these assessments as a critical issue. Subcontracting to third countries is linked to the limited availability of suitable testing sites within the EU. One MSA suggested establishing European testing centres to ensure more reliable assessments and reduce dependence on third-country facilities.

Environmental considerations

The Directive’s lack of explicit focus on environmental concerns was noted by stakeholders, including two MSAs and one notified body. They recommended that the Directive include clear objectives addressing environmental impact, supported by stricter product requirements to minimise harm. Explicitly incorporating environmental considerations could align the Directive with broader EU sustainability goals and enhance its effectiveness in this area.

Efficiency

It is important to note that the cost estimates derived from this analysis are findings from the cost templates, with the interviews being largely based on the cost templates.

The companies that participated in the cost interviews, indicated average annual compliance costs of EUR 196 048 due to the Directive. For the industry, the cost interview data shows that the administrative and adjustment costs during the period (2015 – 2022) were on average 71.1% and 25.5% of the total compliance costs, respectively. The single large enterprise reported annual average administrative costs of EUR 220 350. The five SMEs have average annual administrative costs of EUR 16 023 and a range from EUR 2 067 to EUR 49 140. As regards adjustment costs, the single large enterprise has annual average costs of EUR 126 735. The five SMEs have average annual adjustment costs of EUR 170 020 and a wide range from EUR 9 903 to EUR 485 078. 238

For notified bodies that participated in costs interviews, data shows 239 that regulatory compliance costs on average per year were EUR 34 893, with the administrative and adjustment costs during the period (2015 – 2022) were on average 36% and 64% of the total compliance costs, respectively. The average administrative cost was EUR 12 703per year. The average adjustment cost for notified bodies was EUR 22 192 240 .

The market surveillance authorities that participated in the cost interviews indicated compliance costs of EUR 76 388 due to the Directive. For these authorities, enforcement costs (73.9%) naturally constitute the largest portion of their average yearly cost associated to the Directive, adjustment costs (18.7%) account for the second most, followed by administrative (4.6%). Hassle costs and enforcement costs are both at 1.3% 241 .

According to the majority of interviewed stakeholders, the Directive delivered substantial benefits, including enhanced safety and compliance through harmonised rules and improved supply chain transparency. For both notified bodies and MSAs, recurring benefits included cost savings in conformity assessments and streamlined traceability. Businesses reported improved single-market access and a 7.5% increase in turnover from extra-EU markets due to compliance with EU regulations.

EU added value

Interviewees generally agreed that the Pyrotechnics Directive provides clear EU added value by fostering harmonisation across Member States and reducing barriers to trade. Two national market surveillance authorities expressed concerns that withdrawing the Directive could lead to negative outcomes, including diverging national rules, increased costs, and an influx of cheaper, potentially unsafe products from non-EU markets.

However, one industry stakeholder suggested that the overall impact of withdrawal might be relatively neutral, as it would entail both advantages and disadvantages. Advantages could include faster decision-making at the national level, while disadvantages might involve increased trade barriers and a loss of harmonised safety standards within the EU.

2.4. Public consultation 

Relevance

The public consultation results demonstrate that the Pyrotechnics Directive remains relevant across its key objectives. Ensuring the protection of human health and consumer safety was relevant either ‘to a very large extent’ or ‘to a large extent’ by 59.4% of stakeholders 242 . A 100% (4 out of 4) of Business Associations responded that it is still relevant ‘to a large extent’. Additionally, 50% of Companies/businesses said that the objective is relevant ‘to a very large extent’ and 50% (3 out of 6) that it is still relevant ‘to a large extent’.

Regarding security concerns, 37.8% 243  agreed that the Directive remains relevant ‘to a large extent’, while 21.6% 244 believed it is still relevant ‘to a very large extent’. Concerns were also raised about varying national rules affecting the retail market and illegal cross-border trade. Notably, a 100% (4 out of 4) of business associations responded that it is still relevant ‘to a large extent’. 

For the issue of ‘Online trade’, 51.4% of the consulted stakeholders responded that this concern should be further addressed in the future by the Directive, while 32.4% chose the ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’ option 245 . Notably, 70% 246  of public authorities responded that this concern should be further addressed in the future by the Directive.

On environmental protection, 64.8% of stakeholders found the Directive relevant to some extent, with 29.7% 247 rating it ‘to a moderate extent’ and a combined 35.1% viewing it as relevant ‘to a large’ or ‘very large extent’ 248 .

For the classification of pyrotechnic articles (e.g., F1-4, T1-2, P1-2), 51.4% viewed this aspect of the Directive as relevant ‘to a very large extent’, while 18.9% rated it relevant ‘to a large extent’ 249 . Notably, 83.3% of companies/businesses responded that the Directive is relevant ‘to a very large extent’, and 16.7% that it is relevant ‘to a large extent’.

Coherence

When asked about the coherence of the Pyrotechnics Directive with other EU interventions, many respondents selected the ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’ option. For those who did respond, the strongest coherence was observed with the EU chemicals legislation (REACH and CLP Regulations) and the Product Liability Directive, with 24.3% (9 out of 37) 250 indicating high coherence.

Effectiveness

The public consultation revealed mixed views on the effectiveness of the Pyrotechnics Directive in meeting its objectives. According to the public consultation, 64.9% of respondents indicated that pyrotechnic articles in the single market are safe, while 27% disagreed 251 . At the same time, 54.1% 252 of stakeholders stated that the ‘Minimisation of unsafe pyrotechnic articles on the market’ remains a concern that should be further addressed by the Directive. Similarly, ‘controlled access to pyrotechnics not intended for the general public or specific age groups’ was identified as a concern by 51.4% 253 of stakeholders who believe this issue warrants further attention.

In terms of environmental issues, 48.7% 254 of stakeholders agreed that the Directive should address ‘greener and more sustainable chemical compositions of pyrotechnic articles (including compostability and plastic pollution)’ in the future. Meanwhile, 35.1% 255 felt this issue is currently addressed by the Directive.

Addressing public security, 54.1% 256 of respondents supported the need for stronger ‘controls to prevent access to pyrotechnic articles by malicious actors’ in future revisions of the Directive. Notably, 83.3% of Companies/businesses responded that this concern is currently addressed by the Directive 257 .

In the area of ‘health and safety’, regarding the minimisation of presence of unsafe pyrotechnics articles on the market’, 54.1% of the stakeholders answered that this concern should be further addressed in the future by the Directive. 258 However, 75% of Business associations and 83.3% of Companies responded that this concern is currently addressed by the Directive 259 .  

Regarding the controlled access to pyrotechnics not intended for general public or to specific age groups 51.4% of the stakeholders answered that this concern should be further addressed in the future by the Directive and 37.8% responded that this concern is currently addressed by the Directive. 260 Notably, 100% (6 out of 6) of companies/businesses responded that this concern is currently addressed by the Directive.  

On the topic of harmonising rules for making pyrotechnic articles available on the market, 46% 261  of stakeholders stated that the Directive has contributed ‘to a large extent’, while 16.2% 262 said it has contributed ‘to a moderate extent’. Notably, 83.4% of companies and businesses indicated that the Directive has contributed positively 263 .

The effectiveness of traceability systems yielded limited responses, with 27% stating that the Directive has contributed ‘to a large extent’ and an equal proportion was not in a position to respond 264 . Regarding compliance with safety requirements, 40.5% 265 of stakeholders agreed that the Directive has contributed ‘to a large extent’ to ensuring ‘higher compliance with safety requirements of pyrotechnic articles available on the EU market’. Notably, 75% of business associations responded that the Directive has ‘to a large extent’ contributed to the objective, and 25% responded that it contributed ‘to a very large extent’.

In the area of market surveillance activities, 29.7% 266  of respondents said the Directive has contributed ‘to a large extent’ to ‘increased effectiveness of market surveillance’, while 18.9% rated its contribution as ‘moderate’ 267 . Business associations were unanimously positive indicating contributions to a large or very large extent 268 .

Efficiency

Efficiency analysis based on data collected through public consultation revealed mixed opinions. For the ‘submission of reports, data, and statistics to competent authorities’, almost a third of the stakeholders could not answer, showing stakeholders’ difficulty in estimating the associated burden. 269 Among those who provided feedback, ca. 45% stated that it constitutes a proportional burden to a moderate or large extent. 270  For ‘Recordkeeping information’, ca. one-third of the stakeholders indicated that it constitutes a proportional burden to a moderate extent. 271 A notable number of stakeholders frequently opted for the ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’ response.

EU added value

A significant proportion of stakeholders underlined the role of the Directive and EU intervention in achieving the harmonisation of rules for the availability and supervision of pyrotechnics. Specifically, more than half of the respondents (ca. 62.1%) stated that the result could not have been achieved at all or only to a limited extent without the Directive 272 .

When stakeholders were asked how the pyrotechnics sector would be affected if the Directive was withdrawn, the largest share of the respondents answered either ‘very negatively’ or ‘negatively’ 273 . Notably, 75% of business associations responded that the pyrotechnics sector would ‘remain unchanged’ 274 . On the other hand, 40% of public authorities responded that it would be affected ‘very negatively’ and 40% responded that it would be affected ‘negatively’ 275 .

2.5. Validation workshop 

Stakeholders at the validation workshop highlighted several key points and perspectives. Subcontracting conformity assessments to third countries, particularly China, was noted as an issue in specific cases but not universally. Stakeholders identified diverging definitions of ‘person with specialist knowledge’ and differing enforcement mechanisms across Member States as problems requiring EU-level consistency. High-risk pyrotechnics, such as certain powerful firecrackers of category F4, were proposed for individual tracking, while concerns about online sales and product misclassification were emphasised. Participants stressed the importance of better enforcement and coordination at the Member State level, rather than increasing categories or general requirements. Security and environmental issues, including animal welfare, were raised, though some stakeholders viewed these as outside the Directive's core scope.

The workshop validated regulatory costs, representing around 7.2% of MSAs’ annual budgets and 11.2% of NBs’ turnover. MSAs confirmed that adjustment costs constituted the largest share of total costs, followed by administrative costs, with their main administrative expenses stemming from changes to documentary verification of certificates of conformity and adjustments focusing on procedure modifications for checks and risk assessments. For NBs, administrative costs were primarily driven by updates to their Quality Management System, while adjustment costs were associated with establishing or modifying conformity assessment procedures and training personnel to comply with the Directive. Despite these costs, participants acknowledged benefits such as improved safety standards, reduced accidents, and enhanced market access. Compliance costs, varying by company size and country, were generally seen as proportionate. Several participants emphasized that the Directive has greatly improved the quality of safety standards, resulting in improved safety and health outcomes. Furthermore, mandatory CE certification was recognised as a key factor in preventing accidents. One participant also highlighted that the potential savings from avoiding accident investigations illustrate the Directive's cost-effectiveness.

Annex VI. Functioning of the Pyrotechnics Directive

The Pyrotechnics Directive sets out rules for the making available on the market of pyrotechnic articles, including essential safety requirements and rules for conformity assessment and related obligations for economic operators. It defines pyrotechnic articles as ‘any article containing explosive substances or an explosive mixture of substances designed to produce heat, light, sound, gas or smoke or a combination of such effects through self-sustained exothermic chemical reactions’. This includes consumer and professional fireworks, emergency flares but also other pyrotechnic articles that are often components of other products such as airbags or seatbelt fasteners in vehicles. Pyrotechnic articles intended for use by the armed forces, the police or fire departments and for use in the aerospace industry as well as marine equipment, civil explosives, percussion caps intended for toys, ammunition and fireworks built and approved for the use exclusively on the manufacturer’s territory are excluded from the scope.

1.Categories of pyrotechnic articles and essential safety requirements

The Pyrotechnics Directive differentiates between three categories of pyrotechnic articles: fireworks (F), theatrical pyrotechnic articles (T) and other pyrotechnic articles (P). Each of these categories is divided into sub-categories, depending on the hazard and noise level. The categorisation of a pyrotechnic articles determines which essential safety requirements, age and knowledge requirements apply and whether Member States can introduce national bans or restrictions. The table below provides an overview of the different categories and the way they are regulated by the Directive.

Figure 21: Categories of pyrotechnic articles

Category 

Use 

Hazard 

Professional/

consumer 

Age 

Examples 

Possibility for national restrictions 

F1 

 

For entertainment 

Very low, negligible noise level, including for indoor use, 1m safety distance 

Consumer  

12 

Sparklers, christmas crackers, crackling granules, party poppers, serpents, etc. 

No possibility for national restrictions, apart from increasing age levels for public order, security or health and safety 

F2 

For entertainment 

Low hazard and low noise, outdoor use in confined areas, 8m safety distance 

Consumer / professional 

16 

Bangers, flash bangers, battery,  bengal flames, fountains, mini rockets, jumping ground spinners, rockets, wheels 

·Possibility to increase age levels  

·Possibility to restrict sale to general public for public order, security, health and safety, or environmental protection  

·Age levels may be lowered for persons vocationally trained or undergoing such training 

F3 

For entertainment 

Medium hazard, for outdoor use in large open areas, noise level not harmful to human health, 25 m safety distance 

Consumer / professional 

18 

Banger, flash banger, aerial wheel, battery, compound firework, mines, report rocket, rocket, shot tubes 

As for F2

F4 

For entertainment 

High hazard, noise level not harmful to human health, safety distance to be determined by professional 

Professional 

N/A 

Flash bangers (little known legal use), rockets, brocade crowns chrysanthemum 

No national restrictions are foreseen as these are professional articles. 

T1 

Stage use 

Low hazard 

Consumer 

18 

 

·Possibility to change age  

restrictions

·Possibility to restrict sale to general public  

T2 

Stage use 

 

Professional 

N/A 

 

Possibility to restrict sale to general public  

P1 

Other uses 

Low hazard 

Consumer 

18 

Signalling: some flares to put on recreational crafts (if not marine equipment), fire extinguishers, machine tools 

·Possibility to increase age levels  

·Possibility to restrict sale to general public  

P1  

automotive use 

Low hazard 

Not general public unless incorporated into vehicle or part. 

N/A 

Components of other products such as airbags, seat-belt tensioners 

N/A 

P2 

Other uses 

 

Professional  

N/A 

Same as P1 but for professional use 

Possibility to restrict sale to general public  

The essential safety requirements in Annex I concern, in particular, the following aspects:

·Correct functioning when used for intended purpose

·Use instructions

·Materials/(chemical) composition

·Physical and chemical stability

·Sensitivity to handling and transportation

·Resistance to moisture, low and high temperatures and other conditions

·Movement during use

·Safety distances

·Noise levels

2.Conformity assessment of pyrotechnic articles 

The Pyrotechnics Directive is part of the New Legislative Framework (NLF) which introduced harmonised rules on conformity assessments across 29 pieces of EU product legislation. The purpose of conformity assessments is that products are assessed against all legislative requirements before they are placed on the market. The NLF introduced several model conformity assessment procedures (‘Modules’) which are included in sectoral legislation, as appropriate for the product concerned. 276

For the purpose of assessing the conformity of pyrotechnic articles in accordance with the Pyrotechnics Directive, manufacturers have the choice between different (combinations of) Modules:

·EU-type examination (Module B), and, at the choice of the manufacturer, one of the following procedures:

(i)conformity to type based on internal production control plus supervised product checks at random intervals (Module C2);

(II)conformity to type based on quality assurance of the production process (Module D);

(III)conformity to type based on product quality assurance (Module E); or

·conformity based on unit verification (Module G);or

·conformity based on full quality assurance (Module H), insofar as it concerns fireworks of category F4.

Table 7: Overview of conformity assessment Modules

Module

Description

B: EU-type examination

Covers design. It is always followed by other modules by which the conformity of the products to the approved EU-type is demonstrated. A notified body examines the technical design and or the specimen of a type and verifies and attests that it meets the requirements of the legislative instrument that apply to it by issuing an EU-type examination certificate. There are 3 ways to carry out EU-type examination: 1) production type, 2) combination of production type and design type and 3) design type. The Pyrotechnics Directive applies the combination of production type and design type.

C2: Conformity to EU-type based on internal production control plus supervised product checks at random intervals

Covers production and follows module B. Manufacturer must internally control its production in order to ensure product conformity against the EU-type approved under module B. C + product checks at random intervals tests on specific aspects of the product carried out by a notified body or in-house accredited body.

D: Conformity to EU-type based on quality assurance of the production process

Covers production and follows module B. The manufacturer operates a production (manufacturing part and inspection of final product) quality assurance system in order to ensure conformity to EU-type. The notified body assesses the quality system.

G: Conformity based on unit verification

Covers both design and production. The manufacturer ensures compliance of the manufactured products to the legislative requirements. The notified body verifies every individual product in order to ensure conformity to legislative requirements (no EU-type).

H: Conformity based on full quality assurance

Covers both design and production. The manufacturer operates a full quality assurance system in order to ensure conformity to legislative requirements (no EU-type). The notified body assesses the quality system.

Source : Based on the Blue Guide 277

3.Labelling and traceability system for pyrotechnic articles

Pyrotechnic articles need to be labelled in accordance with the Directive which sets different rules for pyrotechnic articles for vehicles and other pyrotechnic articles (Article 10 and 11).

All labelling of pyrotechnic articles needs to include information about the manufacturer, the name and type of the article and a registration number. Where necessary, pyrotechnic articles for vehicles shall also be labelled with safety instructions and they have to be accompanied by a safety data sheet compiled in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006. Other pyrotechnic articles, depending on the category, need to be labelled with the relevant category and instructions for use, the year of production, age limits, safety distances, the net explosive content and, where appropriate, ‘for outdoor use only’ or ‘for use only by persons with specialist knowledge’.

The registration number shall have the following format 278 :

XXXX — YY — ZZZZ

Processing number used by the notified body for the pyrotechnic article

4-digit identification number of the notified body

Category of the pyrotechnic article, e.g. F1, T2, P1

Manufacturers, importers and notified bodies need to keep record of the registration numbers. The registration number is not item-specific but is the same for all pyrotechnic articles covered by the same conformity assessment (i.e. type or batch).

Annex VII. Complementary information on the current state of play

1.Market structure

As regards the market structure, data could not be differentiated between pyrotechnic articles and explosives, as they fall under the same NACE code 279  ‘Manufacture of explosives’. The trends in turnover, number of companies and number of employees in the entire ‘manufacture of explosives’ sector does not seem to correspond to the rather stable, and recently increasing, production of pyrotechnics values shown above. As some data for the years around the adoption and entry into application is missing, the overall trend since 2008 is illustrated below. 280  

Figure 9: Turnover, number of companies and number of employees of the EU 'Manufacture of explosives' sector

Source: own preparation of SBS data (Economical indicator for structural business statistics: V12110 Turnover or gross premiums written - million euros, V11110 Enterprises number, V16130 Employees – number, Statistical classification of economic activity: C2051 Manufacture of explosives)

2.Harmonisation of laws

The Directive leaves Member States a certain degree of discretion in the transposition of the harmonised EU rules. A study carried out in 2022 concluded that the transposition of the Directive is generally satisfactory, although the transposition in most Member States showed several shortcomings. 281  

Definitions

Definitions (Article 2) have mainly been taken over with only some minor variation in a few Member States for ‘pyrotechnic article’ and ‘ammunition’- Due to the ambiguity of the definition of ‘pyrotechnic article’ in the English version of the Directive, where ‘designed to produce heat, light, sound, gas or smoke or a combination of such effects through self-sustained exothermic chemical reactions’ could refer both to the pyrotechnic article itself or to the explosive substances or explosive mixture of substances contained in the pyrotechnic article, in several language versions of the Directive, the definition was translated with the latter meaning. These language versions were subsequently corrected by the Commission. 282 However, 16 Member States still use the latter definition in their laws. 283  

The definitions of ‘ammunition’ in eight Member States are not a direct transposition of the Directive’s definition, mainly because they either require the presence of a projectile or do not cover blank ammunition, with the consequence that some articles that do not fall under the Pyrotechnics Directive are considered ‘pyrotechnic articles’ under those Member States’ legislation to which the rules spelled out in the Directive apply.  284

According to the Directive, F4, T2 and P2 pyrotechnic articles may only be sold to ‘persons with specialist knowledge’. While the definitions of a ‘person with specialist knowledge’ (Article 3(6)) in most Member States laws are in line with the definition in the Directive, the concrete wordings vary between Member States. Moreover, the definitions in ten Member States only refer to certifications and/or authorisations delivered by their own national authorities, posing questions about mutual recognition of specialist knowledge between Member States. 285  

National prohibitions, restrictions and age limits

Article 4(2) of the Directive allows Member States to prohibit or restrict the possession, use and/or the sale to the public of categories F2 and F3 fireworks, theatrical pyrotechnic articles and other pyrotechnic articles on grounds of public order, security, health and safety, or environmental protection. In 2022, ten Member States had introduced prohibitions or restrictions pursuant to Article 4(2) of the Pyrotechnics Directive. Among the restrictions adopted are:

-Prohibition of mail order/online sales

-Prohibition of the sale of fireworks of which the pyrotechnic composition exceeds 1 kg to consumers that do not hold the necessary permit

-Prohibition of F3 and certain F2 fireworks for the general public

-License requirements or requirements of specialist knowledge for certain fireworks and other pyrotechnic articles other than F4, T2 and P2

-Requirements for sales rooms

-Sales and use restrictions to the end of year period

-Maximum weight limits for the availability, possession, transport and storage

-Maximum net explosive mass for articles sold to the general public

In addition, five Member States allow competent authorities to adopt restrictive measures by administrative decisions. 286

Besides the possibility to prohibit and restrict certain categories of pyrotechnic articles, Member States also have the discretion to increase the age limits set out in Article 7, where justified on grounds of public order, security or health and safety. They may also set lower age limits for persons vocationally trained or undergoing such training. The majority of Member States have made use of this option, increasing the age limits for F1 fireworks from 12 to 14, 15, 16 or 18 and/or the age limits for F2 fireworks from 16 to 18. Two Member States have also increased the minimum age for F3 fireworks from 18 to 21. 287

In seven Member States, restrictions on the free movement (Article 4(1)) of pyrotechnic articles related to notification obligations were observed, which can be subsumed under two categories: (1) the introduction of an obligation to register or notify pyrotechnic articles to national authorities before they are placed on the market and (2) the introduction of restrictions to the sale and/or use of pyrotechnic articles beyond the Pyrotechnics Directive. 288 Restrictions of the latter kind include the prohibition of mail order sales, maximum limits for the availability, possession, transport and storage of pyrotechnic articles and limiting the sale of consumer fireworks to the end of year period, applying to all fireworks, including F1 articles, although Article 4(2) only provides for national restrictions for categories F2 and F3, theatrical pyrotechnic articles and other pyrotechnic articles. 289

Licensing requirements for economic operators

The Pyrotechnics Directive applies without prejudice to national legislation on the licensing of manufacturers, distributors and importers by the Member States. 290 Accordingly, the Directive does not mandate any specific licensing requirements, nor a licensing system in general. In 2022, 15 Member States imposed certain licensing obligations, while 12 did not. Those with licensing requirements generally exempt category F1, some also F2. 291  

Requirements for persons with specialist knowledge

Besides the differences in the definitions of a ‘person with specialist knowledge’ mentioned above, Member States also set out different requirements to be met in order to acquire this status. For instance, one Member State requires certification in accordance with the norm EN ISO/IEC 17024, while another Member State presupposes (i) the successful participation in a state or state-recognised course of instruction for the intended activity, (ii) practical experience of at least three years, or (iii) the completion of a course of study at a university/university of applied sciences/technical school and practical experience of at least one year. 292 Moreover, the Directive leaves it to the discretion of the Member States to lay down rules for the authentication and verification of persons with specialist knowledge. Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg have jointly decided to introduce a uniform control document in the Benelux area – the so-called Pyro-pass. 293

Traceability

In terms of traceability, some Member States went beyond the requirements of the Pyrotechnics Directive and Commission Implementing Directive 2014/58/EU. One Member State, for instance, requires importers and dealers to report all movements of fireworks to competent authorities. Moreover, in some Member States, economic operators must inform the authorities when they import or export pyrotechnic articles or before placing a pyrotechnic article on the market, with some Member States entering such information into a register. In another Member State distributors are obliged to record transactions and the identity of purchasers when selling certain category F2 and F3 pyrotechnic articles. 294  

Environmental protection and animal welfare

The Directive’s objective to ensure, among others, environmental protection has been included in provisions of 18 Member States. While most Member Sates only mention environmental protection as ground for restriction and prohibitions, thus implementing Article 4(2), some also link other consequences to environmental concerns. For instance, in one Member State, damage to the environment caused by a violation of pyrotechnics legislation may lead to an increased imprisonment time of up to 2 years. Other Member States require pyrotechnic articles to be designed and manufactured in such a way as to have the least possible impact on the environment, transposing one of the essential safety requirements of the Directive explicitly in national law. Collection, disposal and destruction of explosive products and waste are regulated with the purpose of protecting the environment in at least one Member State. Finally, one Member State takes into account the risk for the environment for the classification of pyrotechnic articles, where F1 fireworks are characterised by a low risk and F4 fireworks with a high risk. By 2022, no Member State had introduced the objective of ensuring animal welfare in their laws transposing the Pyrotechnics Directive. 295

Penalties

In transposition of the obligation to establish effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties (Article 45), most Member States have opted for fines. The amounts of the fines vary between a maximum fine of EUR 600 in one Member State to a maximum (criminal) fine of EUR 10.8 million in another Member State. Imprisonment is only provided for by half of the Member States, with imprisonment terms ranging from 60 days to 7 years. Other penalties introduced by Member States include forfeiture and confiscation, market restrictions and prohibitions, and the relocation and suspension of licenses. 296

Annex VIII. Case studies

The below case studies were carried out by the Technopolis Group in the context of the study in support of the evaluation.

1.Case Study 1: Challenges and measures to tackle the illicit use of pyrotechnic articles in the Netherlands and in France- hooliganism and riots

Objective and rationale of the case study

Both France and the Netherlands are facing significant challenges related to the illicit use of pyrotechnic articles, primarily during riots in France and football events involving hooligans in the Netherlands. This case study details how and to what extent these groups employ illicit pyrotechnic articles as well as the responses of public authorities, including police forces and market surveillance authorities, to such threats. Furthermore, it aims to highlight the challenges these authorities face in enforcing the measures transposed from Directive 2013/29/EU in such contexts.

This case study is linked to the following evaluation questions:

·Is the current system enabling traceability of pyrotechnic articles effective?

·Does the current system provide enough safeguards to combat trafficking of illegal pyrotechnic articles?

·Does national law impose sanctions on individuals selling F4 pyrotechnic articles to persons that do not demonstrate the required specialist knowledge?

·Are the current penalties effective, proportionate, and dissuasive?

The case study can contribute to several types of lessons learned and in particular to assess if there are shortcomings in the monitoring, control, and traceability of pyrotechnics articles to tackle their illicit use at EU level.

Methodology

This case study was built based on the following sources:

-Interviews with market surveillance authorities in FR and the NL

-Interviews with national enforcement authorities FR and the NL

-Desk research on French and Dutch data bases and related grey literature

The research and interviews were carried out by respectively French and Dutch native legal experts.

Types of pyrotechnic articles commonly used illicitly by hooligans and by protesters

In France, pyrotechnic articles have been continuously used against security forces since the early 2000s. However, between 27 June and 7 July 2023, France experienced significant riots where pyrotechnic articles were illicitly deployed on an unprecedented scale against security forces and public buildings. This marked the first instance of such a massive, coordinated, and prolonged use of pyrotechnics in this manner. The articles used ranged from F2 to F4 category fireworks, with a particularly heavy use of firework rockets, Roman candles and high-capacity flash bangers. They were occasionally deployed in rapid, concentrated actions as rioters charged at security forces and also used to create barriers that impeded the progress of law enforcement forces.

In the Netherlands, the types of pyrotechnics most often used illegally by hooligans are mainly certain brands of powerful firecrackers and shells. 297  Certain brands of firecrackers are known for their enormous explosive power and considered one of the most dangerous types of fireworks. Shells, a type of F4 fireworks, are small bombs often used in fireworks shows, for example during Kings Day and New Year's Eve, because of their large effects.

Shells are not allowed to be stored in the Netherlands. These items are usually obtained illegally through other countries, such as Italy, or through storage in Germany, and then transported to the Netherlands. Under the Dutch Fireworks Decree, anyone bringing fireworks or theatrical pyrotechnic articles into or out of the Netherlands for commercial purposes must notify the Minister electronically at least 48 hours in advance. An exception applies if it can be demonstrated to the Minister that the articles will leave the Netherlands within 48 hours. If pyrotechnic articles are stored for a short period with an environmental permit, pending transport to a specific recipient, at seaports in Amsterdam, Eemshaven, Rotterdam, or Vlissingen, the 48-hour limit extends to two weeks.

Additional fireworks used by hooligans are avalanche rockets (P2), that are originally F3/F4 bangers (extremely loud and powerful fireworks) refitted for controlled avalanche setting off in mountainous areas. Also, bengal flames (F1-F3), brightly burning fireworks, are often used to create atmosphere in stadiums, as well as to intimidate opponents and the police.

Methods of acquisition and distribution among these groups

In France, stocks of pyrotechnic articles were gathered in advance. At least two supply networks were identified: one through the internet and the other through well-organised networks bringing stocks from Belgium and Poland. Social media platforms were also widely used to exchange information about potential supply sources that offered products for delivery, most often via express freight or postal services 298 .

In the Netherlands, hooligans use various methods and channels to obtain and distribute these fireworks:

-Online marketplaces and dark web: Illegal fireworks are often sold through anonymous online platforms and marketplaces on the dark web, where payments are often made in cryptocurrency to ensure anonymity.

-Smuggling: Many illegal fireworks are illegally brought into the country from countries with less stringent regulations, such as Belgium, Poland and Eastern European countries.

-Networks and middlemen: Hooligans often have a well organised network of contacts and intermediaries specialising in the trade and distribution of illegal fireworks. This network uses hidden warehouses and changing locations to avoid detection by the authorities.

-Anonymous orders and deliveries: Tactics such as placing anonymous orders and using pick-up points or fictitious addresses to deliver fireworks are common to avoid detection.

Between 2020 and 2023, 6% of football hooligan-related incidents involved the use of fireworks. 299  

Measures to tackle this illicit use of pyrotechnic articles

France has adopted several measures to tackle the illicit use of pyrotechnic articles in France.

The Environmental Code was amended by a 2021 law 300 to enhance the control on the sale of pyrotechnic articles. It requires distributors and sellers to record transactions and the identity of purchasers when selling pyrotechnic articles for entertainment, as defined by the Interior Ministry in a 2021 Order 301 (i.e. bangers (F3), batteries (F3), batteries requiring external support (F3), combinations (F3), combinations requiring external support (F3), double bangers (F2 and F3), flash bangers (F3), rockets (F2 and F3), roman candles (F2 and F3), and shot tubes (F2 and F3)). Sellers have the right to refuse transactions deemed suspicious and must report such attempts to designated authorities. They face penalties for providing pyrotechnic articles to ineligible individuals, including imprisonment and fines. Individuals face similar penalties for acquiring or using pyrotechnic articles without the required technical knowledge or not meeting age requirements. Carrying out such illicit conduct online is considered an aggravating circumstance leading to more stringent penalties.

Furthermore, as a reaction to the riots, that occurred close to the national day, the Government adopted a Decree 302  temporarily prohibiting the sale, carrying, transport, and use of all pyrotechnic articles sold to the general public throughout the country until July 15, to avoid serious public order disturbances. Pyrotechnic article producers challenged this Decree before the Council of State, arguing that it was overly broad as it also covered very low-risk pyrotechnic articles. The Council of State in its decision No. 475817 dated July 13, 2023 303 , determined that, while certain categories of pyrotechnic articles (i.e., F3 bangers, rockets, and other items specifically listed in the 2021 Order) posed a higher risk of misuse and could be justifiably restricted, the prohibition was excessive concerning F1, T1 and P1 as well as F2 and F3 pyrotechnic articles not listed in the 2021 Order. Consequently, the Council of State partially suspended the Decree regarding these latter categories, concluding that a blanket prohibition exceeded what was strictly necessary to preserve public order.

More generally, local orders issued by French territorial administrative authorities (the departmental prefects) are enacted each summer and for the end-of-year holidays to ban the use of certain categories of fireworks for the public to ensure public order as a legal basis. These orders are becoming increasingly robust from a legal standpoint and are less and less contested.

Note that with regard to the misuse of pyrotechnic articles in sport events, the French Ministry of Sports launched a pilot program to regulate the use of pyrotechnic articles in designated areas within sports venues. This concerns pyrotechnic articles of moderate power, with a limited list of authorised items.

In the Netherlands, the Fireworks Decree 304 requires importers and dealers to report all movements of fireworks to the competent authorities. This system has been developed to monitor the transport of fireworks by car, ship or train, keeping a record of all fireworks movements within the Netherlands. The competent authorities randomly check the quality of fireworks. On average, 20% of tested fireworks are destroyed because they are non-compliant 305 .

The Fireworks Decree also regulates fireworks inspections providing comprehensive power to inspectors (e.g. access to locations where fireworks are stored, sold or used without the owner's permission including business premises, means of transport and event venues where fireworks may be present, samples of fireworks products, and request documents relevant to regulatory compliance.) and setting a stringent sanctioning regime.

Furthermore, some due diligence requirements on postal package companies were adopted to prevent fireworks from entering their systems, enhancing preventive controls.

In the football sector, additional measures are in place to combat hooligans. Mayors have extensive powers to better prevent abuses around football matches, set out in the Measures to Combat Football Hooliganism and Serious Nuisance Act 306 .

Mayors can impose long-term area bans or group bans on hooligans (maximum 2 years). An area ban, reporting obligation or group ban around a home match can be extended to non-home matches. Additionally, a football club can ban rioters from their own stadium 307 . The Royal Dutch Football Association (KNVB) can ban rioters from entering all stadiums in the Netherlands. This can be based on camera images from the club or on information obtained from the club, the municipality, the police or the public prosecutor. A civil stadium ban lasts a minimum of three months. There is a guideline with the terms of a stadium ban 308 .

The police register records hooligans and disturbances involving football violence in a central database. This database is called the Football and Safety Chain System 309 . Municipalities, police, football clubs and the Public Prosecution Service use the data from this system and can put information into it themselves. In this way, parties exchange data. They estimate safety risks for each match. But they also determine the deployment of police, stewards and private security guards with the help of this data.

Strict enforcement measures have recently been applied during football matches, using a zero-tolerance policy. This means that if someone is caught setting off fireworks, they are immediately detained 310 .

Recommendations for improvement and lessons learned

In France, as outlined by representatives of French authorities 311 , there is an ongoing debate about how to enhance security measures and control access to fireworks to prevent their increasing illegal misuse. These representatives pointed out that the limited traceability requirements for fireworks across the EU deriving from the Pyrotechnic Directive hinder the ability to track the movement and storage of pyrotechnic articles within the Union despite national enforcement efforts. They suggested that the EU civil explosives traceability regime could serve as a model for the most dangerous categories of pyrotechnic articles, advocating for the adoption of similar requirements for pyrotechnic articles, allowing detailed tracking and documentation measures for the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive. They also stressed that it is becoming increasingly necessary to hold transport and freight operators accountable for their duty of vigilance regarding explosive materials that may pass through their services, particularly in relation to the safety of their own employees, who may sometimes handle dangerous packages unknowingly.

A 2023 Senate Report also suggested banning the online and postal sales of mortar fireworks requiring individuals to physically purchase these items from authorized dealers, who are better equipped to identify suspicious transactions as it is already the case in Spain  312  .

It is proposed to lower the powder weights for professional fireworks, especially for dangerous popping fireworks, to reduce illegal use and enhance safety. The extension of the pyro-pass system 313 used in BENELUX to all EU Member States was suggested to enhance traceability and control over the purchase and use of professional fireworks, ensuring they are only accessible to authorised and trained individuals 314 .

Both Member States also suggest further enforcement cooperation between Member States based on lessons learned from cooperation between the two countries. Illegal fireworks were entering the Netherlands through postal shipments from France. The Netherlands established a mechanism in 2015 to address this issue and included France in the Dutch surveillance process. As part of this effort, both countries trained personnel and deployed specially trained fireworks detection dogs to intercept illegal shipments. This collaboration has resulted in a noticeable decrease in the number of fireworks smuggled through postal packages. However, smugglers have since shifted to alternative routes, such as through Belgium, to continue their activities.

Conclusion

France and the Netherlands have taken important steps to address the illegal use of pyrotechnic articles. Their efforts demonstrate that robust legal frameworks, strong enforcement mechanisms, and cooperation amongst Member States are key to tackling the illegal misuse of pyrotechnic articles. Both countries, however, advocate for further action at the EU level to improve traceability and security of the most dangerous pyrotechnic articles under the Pyrotechnic Directive, ensuring that all Member States, working together, have the relevant tools to address this growing concern.

2.Case study 2: The use of pyrotechnics in the automotive industry 

INTRODUCTION

Purpose & scope of the Case Study 

The integration of pyrotechnics in automotive safety systems, such as airbags and seat belt pretensioners, has become a crucial aspect of vehicle safety technology. As a consequence, the automotive industry represents a large market for pyrotechnic devices. This case study aims to delve deeper into their use within this sector.

Methodology

This case study provides additional evidence to feed the following research questions:

·ECT-01.1: Do the existing requirements, including essential requirements as well as categories (especially of pyrotechnics), continue to provide for an adequate level of protection of public interests and security, health, and safety of their users?

·ECT-07.1: What have been the qualitative and quantitative effects of the measures on their objectives? How have they evolved since the implementation of the measures?

This analysis is based on secondary data sources, including data on accidents, industry reports, regulatory documents, and academic studies. The review of evidence revealed a scarcity of data on this issue; consequently, although a substantial number of sources were analysed, many were ultimately deemed irrelevant to the study. In addition, it integrates findings from an interview with one manufacturer of automotive devices 315 .

Context and Background

Use of pyrotechnic devices in the automotive industry

Pyrotechnic devices are integral components in modern automotive safety systems. They are primarily used in:

·Airbag systems: these include actuators, inflators, and gas generators that rapidly inflate airbags during a collision to protect passengers 316 .

·Seat belt pretensioners: pyrotechnic mechanisms that tighten the seatbelt in the event of a crash to restrain the passenger more securely 317 .

·Pyrotechnic actuators: these are used in applications such as active bumpers, pop-up hoods for pedestrian protection, and systems that automatically open car doors after a crash to facilitate occupant rescue 318 .

The EU market of pyrotechnic devices for the automotive industry

The analysis of the market has been carried out using a single interview with a manufacturer of pyrotechnic devices for the automotive industry. It must be noted that six manufacturers were contacted as part of this case study. However, only one agreed to be interviewed. Findings from the interview have been integrated with data from market reports. Due to the absence of quantitative data and the single interview conducted, caution must be applied when interpreting the market analysis.

Currently, there are no public or private databases that can be used to conduct a market analysis of pyrotechnic devices for the automotive industry. In addition, primary data is limited because manufacturers do not make the price of their products publicly available. Moreover, there are no online marketplaces for pyrotechnic devices for the automotive industry. Therefore, an ad-hoc study employing both bottom-up and top-down market analysis would be needed to estimate the size and structure of this market.

According to the manufacturer consulted, the market for pyrotechnic products in the automotive sector has remained stable since the implementation of the EU directive in 2013. The industry stakeholder provided estimates on market data indicating that the annual sales of inflators in Europe amount to approximately 50 million units, generating a turnover of about EUR 400 million, which represents around 40% of the global market. This stability reflects the continued demand for pyrotechnic safety systems, such as airbags and seat belts, despite the overall declining trend in the wider pyrotechnics industry.

The manufacturer indicated that Europe and North America are currently leading the global market of pyrotechnic products in the automotive sector. The interview suggested that 40% of the global production occurs in Europe, 40% in North America, 17% in Asia (with China and India as emerging markets), and the remaining 3% in other countries. Notably, the number of pyrotechnic components in vehicles has increased, with pyrotechnic systems now present in rear seats and airbags, which were less common a decade ago.

In 2023, the European Association of Automotive Suppliers (CLEPA) has forecasted that the pyrotechnic automotive market is expected to grow significantly, driven by advancements in safety technologies and new applications such as pyrotechnic battery cut-off systems 319 and pedestrian protection systems 320 . These developments are supported by innovations in pyro-mechanic actuators that offer compact designs and quick activation times, enhancing overall vehicle safety 321 .

According to the interviewee, the number of companies operating in the pyrotechnic sector within the automotive industry has remained relatively stable. The consulted industry stakeholder reveals that their company alone employs approximately 35 000 people, with a turnover of  4.7 billion, underscoring the scale and economic importance of pyrotechnics in automotive safety systems. Despite the relevant role of pyrotechnic components in the automotive industry, the interviewee highlighted that the majority of companies specialised in pyrotechnic manufacturers, such as those involved in fireworks, are characterised by small-medium size compared to automotive suppliers.

Finally, the interview with the manufacturer indicates that there is a slow pace of product development, which typically lasts from 15 to 20 years.

Safety and security issues linked to the use of pyrotechnic devices in the automotive industry

Evidence from the literature indicates that the use of pyrotechnics in the automotive industry, particularly in seatbelt pretensioners and airbags, presents several risks to health and safety. These risks include the potential for accidental explosions, toxic emanations during normal operation, and hazards across the value chain, such as those encountered during manufacturing, transportation, and assembly. 322 Additionally, the end-of-life disposal and recycling of vehicles equipped with pyrotechnic devices pose further concerns 323 .

For example, airbag gas generators can explode, leading to the breakage of components and the generation of high-velocity projectiles or missile-like behaviour as gas is rapidly expelled. 324 Toxic substances, such as sodium azide, may be emitted in confined environments, presenting further health risks. 325 Furthermore, the compaction of vehicles during disposal can trigger explosions, resulting in the release and dissemination of toxic propellants 326 .

The harmonised standard EN ISO 14451:2013 provides presumption of conformity with the legal requirements under the Directive. To date two studies have been conducted on testing the quality of pyrotechnic articles according to the specifications of the harmonised standards 327 . Both studies show that under various testing methods products conforming to EN ISO 14451:2013 meet the security requirements for ensuring their quality.

Finally, the interview with the manufacture indicates that the essential safety requirements are easily adaptable to new products, such as those designed for autonomous vehicles or larger airbags.

Conclusion

The interview conducted for the case study suggests that the European market for pyrotechnic products is stable both in terms of number and size of companies and in its pace of product development. In terms of safety, the case study did not reveal any safety gaps in the Directive. Furthermore, the market’s stability and gradual pace of innovation mean there are no abrupt technological advancements necessitating revisions to existing safety requirements.

(1)  Directive 2013/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of pyrotechnic articles (recast) (OJ L 178, 28.6.2013, p. 27, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/29/oj ).
(2) Directive 2007/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 May 2007 on the placing on the market of pyrotechnic articles (OJ L 154, 14.6.2007, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2007/23/oj ).
(3) The New Legislative Approach consists of Decision No 768/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 on a common framework for the marketing of products, and repealing Council Decision 93/465/EEC (OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 82, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2008/768(1)/oj ) and Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93 (OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/765/oj ).
(4)  Commission Implementing Directive 2014/58/EU of 16 April 2014 setting up, pursuant to Directive 2007/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, a system for the traceability of pyrotechnic articles (OJ L 115, 17.4.2014, p. 28, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir_impl/2014/58/oj ).
(5)  European Commission, Study on illegal sales of pyrotechnic articles destined for professional users (category F4) to the general public. Final Report , Oxford Research A/S (Denmark), 2019; European Commission, F4 Flash Bangers in EU Member States, Study on production, import and use in the EU of high risk pyrotechnic articles categorised F4 according to Directive 2007/23/EC and Directive 2013/29/EU. Final Report, DJS Research Ltd, 2016; European Commission, Reducing security risks of pyrotechnic articles in the EU A study on the security risks related to the handling of large amounts of pyrotechnic articles and on ways to mitigate these risks. Final Report, DHV B.V., 2012.
(6) European Commission, Study of conformity in all EU countries on EU pyrotechnics and explosives legislation. Final Report, EY Law, 2022.
(7)  European Commission, Better regulation guidelines , 2021; European Commission, Better Regulation Toolbox 2023.
(8)  European Commission, Evaluation of the New Legislative Framework , SWD(222) 365 final, 2022.
(9) Agreement on the European Economic Area, Annex II Technical Regulations, Standards, Testing and Certification, OJ No L 1, 3.1.1994, p. 3, pp. 352 et seq.
(10)  European Commission, Evaluation study of Pyrotechnics and Civil Explosives Legislation (Directive 2013/29/EU, Commission Implementing Directive 2014/58/EU, and Directive 2014/28/EU, Commission Implementing Directive 2008/43/EC and Commission Decision 2004/388/EC), Final Report, Technopolis Group in collaboration with Milieu, Wavestone, and Intellera, 2025.
(11)  These cost categories are used in the Better Regulation (BR) approach and are defined in the BR Toolbox.
(12) Decision No 768/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 on a common framework for the marketing of products, and repealing Council Decision 93/465/EEC (OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 82, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2008/768(1)/oj) and Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93 (OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/765/oj ).
(13)   Impact Assessment accompanying the 10 proposals to align product harmonisation directives to Decision No 768/2008/EC, New Legislative Framework (NLF) Alignment Package (Implementation of Goods Package), SEC(2011) 1375 final, 2011, p. 7.
(14)  European Commission, Evaluation of the New Legislative Framework , SWD(222) 365 final, 2022, p. 10.
(15)  The Directive does not contain the possibility of a self-declaration of conformity. European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of pyrotechnic articles (Recast), Explanatory Memorandum, COM(2011) 764 final, 2011, p. 5.
(16)  European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the placing on the market of pyrotechnic articles (COM(2005) 457 final), Explanatory Memorandum, 2005, pp. 2 ff; recital 9 Directive 2007/23/EC; recital 15 of Directive 2013/29/EU.
(17)  As already indicated in the title of the Directive.
(18) See Article 9 of the Directive.
(19)  European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of pyrotechnic articles (Recast), Explanatory Memorandum, COM(2011) 764 final, 2011, p. 5.
(20)  See recital 2 of Commission Implementing Directive 2014/58/EU.
(21)  As covered by the available Prodcom Data (INDICATORS: PRODVAL, PRCCODE: Fireworks, Matches (excluding Bengal matches and other pyrotechnic products), Signalling flares, rain rockets, fog signals and other pyrotechnic articles (excluding fireworks)). It should be noted that these statistics do not take into account the scope exemptions in the Pyrotechnics Directive, such as that for maritime equipment. Consequently, some articles covered by the figures presented in this section, e.g. signalling flares in the scope of Directive 2014/90/EU on maritime equipment, might not be subject to the Pyrotechnics Directive.
(22) SITC Data (Eurostat) (INDICATORS: VALUE_IN_EUROS, PRODUCT: Fireworks, Matches (excluding Bengal matches and other pyrotechnic products), Signalling flares, rain rockets, fog signals and other pyrotechnic articles (excluding fireworks).
(23) Ibid.
(24) European Commission, Impact Assessment accompanying the 10 proposals to align product harmonisation directives to Decision No 768/2008/EC, New Legislative Framework (NLF) Alignment Package (Implementation of Goods Package), SEC(2011) 1375 final, 2011, p. 62.
(25)  Ibid.
(26)  Ibid., p. 63.
(27) The European Injury Database is an injury surveillance system based on accident and emergency department data from selected hospitals in various EU member states.
(28)  European Commission, Study on illegal sales of pyrotechnic articles destined for professional users (category F4) to the general public. Final Report , Oxford Research A/S (Denmark), 2019, p. 64.
(29)  Some other Member States also submitted accident data to the Commission for these years, but given the lack of data from other Member States and the difficulty in comparing the data available, only some accident figures are presented here, for illustrative purposes.
(30)  European Commission, Impact Assessment accompanying the 10 proposals to align product harmonisation directives to Decision No 768/2008/EC, New Legislative Framework (NLF) Alignment Package (Implementation of Goods Package), SEC(2011) 1375 final, 2011, p. 19.
(31)  Ibid., pp. 19-25.
(32)  Ibid., p. 61.
(33)  Ibid., p. 26.
(34)  European Commission, Reducing security risks of pyrotechnic articles in the EU: a study on the security risks related to the handling of large amounts of pyrotechnic articles and on ways to mitigate these risks. Final Report, DHV B.V., 2012, p. 57.
(35) Ibid., pp. 57-59.
(36)  European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the placing on the market of pyrotechnic articles (COM(2005) 457 final), Explanatory Memorandum, 2005, p. 2 et seq.
(37)  European Commission, Impact Assessment accompanying the 10 proposals to align product harmonisation directives to Decision No 768/2008/EC, New Legislative Framework (NLF) Alignment Package (Implementation of Goods Package), SEC(2011) 1375 final, 2011, p. 21.
(38) It must be noted that these statistics do not take into account the scope exemptions in the Pyrotechnics Directive, such as those for maritime equipment. Consequently, some articles covered by the figures presented in this section, e.g. signalling flares in the scope of Directive 2014/90/EU on maritime equipment, might not be subject to the Pyrotechnics Directive.
(39) Production value refers to the value of sold production of pyrotechnic products manufactured in the EU. Prodcom Data (INDICATORS: PRODVAL, PRCCODE: Fireworks, Matches (excluding Bengal matches and other pyrotechnic products), Signalling flares, rain rockets, fog signals and other pyrotechnic articles (excluding fireworks)), not inflation-adjusted.
(40)  Ibid.
(41) SITC Data (Eurostat) (INDICATORS: VALUE_IN_EUROS, PRODUCT: Fireworks, Matches (excluding Bengal matches and other pyrotechnic products), Signalling flares, rain rockets, fog signals and other pyrotechnic articles (excluding fireworks)).
(42)  Ibid.
(43)      Ibid.
(44)  Ibid.
(45)  European Commission, Evaluation study of Pyrotechnics and Civil Explosives Legislation (Directive 2013/29/EU, Commission Implementing Directive 2014/58/EU, and Directive 2014/28/EU, Commission Implementing Directive 2008/43/EC and Commission Decision 2004/388/EC), Final Report, Technopolis Group in collaboration with Milieu, Wavestone, and Intellera, 2025, Annexes, 2025, p. 250.
(46) CLEPA, New technologies for green and digital mobility take first prize at the CLEPA Innovation Awards 2022 , 14 October 2022.
(47) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/1096 of 2 June 2023 laying down rules for the application of Directive 2013/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the regular collection and updating of data on accidents related to the use of pyrotechnic articles (OJ L 146, 6.6.2023, p. 24, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2023/1096/oj ).
(48) These two countries are taken as example because both submitted an overview of accident numbers over this period of time.
(49) One notification in 2015, nine in 2016 and 22 in 2017.
(50)  This year was chosen because there is comparative data available for several sectors for the period from 2010 to 2025.
(51)  64.9% (24 out of 37) of respondents answered ‘Yes’ to the question whether pyrotechnic articles are safe, while 27% (10 out of 37) answered ‘No’. 8.1% (3 out of 37) responded ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’.
(52) Ulbricht, J., Doberentz, E. & Madea, B., Death on New Year’s Eve caused by illegal fireworks—a firework shell , Forensic Sci Med Pathol 20, 2024, 205-211, p. 205.
(53)  Hickey, C., Gordon, C., Galdanes, K. et al.,  Toxicity of particles emitted by fireworks . Part Fibre Toxicology 17:28, 2020, 7-11, p. 8.
(54)  Kukulsky, B., Wszolek, T., Mleczko, D., The Impact of Fireworks Noise on the Acoustic Climate in Urban areas , Archives of Acoustics 43:4, 2018, 697-705, Purdue University , Fireworks are fun for the eyes, dangerous for the ears, says Purdue audiology expert , 26 June 2018; American Speech-Language-Hearing Association, Fireworks Can Cause Permanent Hearing Loss, But Simple Steps Can Prevent Harm This July 4th , 24 June 2024.
(55) Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions concerning the need to prevent and counter the use of pyrotechnics in spectator areas of football stadia and other sports venues , 13 October 2022, 13370/22.
(56)  UEFA, Pyrotechnics in Stadia: Health and Safety issues relating to the use of pyrotechnics in football stadia , 2016.
(57)  When asked how the number of cases of illicit activities linked to products covered by the Directive had changed since the entry into application of the Directive in 2015, 20.06% (15 out of 68) selected ‘increased’, 13.24 (9 out of 68) ‘strongly increased’ and 19.12% (12 out of 68) ‘remained unchanged’.
(58) Targeted survey: replies to open question.
(59)  See Europol, 350 tonnes of dangerous fireworks seized in Germany and the Netherlands , 9 November 2022; Matussek, K ., Germany Is Europe’s Prime Target for Audacious ATM Bombings , Bloomberg, 12 August 2024.
(60)  European Commission, Study on illegal sales of pyrotechnic articles destined for professional users (category F4) to the general public. Final Report , Oxford Research A/S (Denmark), 2019, pp. 82 et seq.
(61)  Ibid. p. 47.
(62) Europol, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2019 , 2019, p. 18.
(63)  European Commission, Study on illegal sales of pyrotechnic articles destined for professional users (category F4) to the general public. Final Report , Oxford Research A/S (Denmark), 2019, pp. 82 et seq.
(64) In the targeted survey, 58,3%, (14 out of 24) of respondents attributed high importance (4 or 5 out of 5) to the challenge of e-commerce and the related difficulty to control transport and parcel deliveries and 54.1% (13 out of 24) recognised the high importance (4 or 5 out of 5) of the challenge of global supply chains.
(65) See e.g. Bateman et al., Not just a flash in the pan: short and long term impacts of fireworks on the environment , Pacific Conservation Biology 29:5, 2023; 396-401; Camilleri, R., Vella J., Emission Factors for Aerial Pyrotechnics and Use in Assessing Environmental Impact of Firework Displays : Case Study from Malta, Propellants, Explosives, Pyrotechnics, 41:2, 2015, 273-280; Collins, M., The Environmental Impact of Fireworks: Celebrations and Consequences , E+E Leader, 2 July 2024; Han, J., Crowd-Pleasing Fireworks Are Not So Pleasing to the Planet , Earth.org, 19 April 2023.
(66) Bateman et al., Not just a flash in the pan: short and long term impacts of fireworks on the environment , Pacific Conservation Biology 29:5, 2023, 396-401, p. 396; Collins, M., The Environmental Impact of Fireworks: Celebrations and Consequences , E+E Leader, 2 July 2024.
(67)  Such as sulphur dioxide, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, suspended particles, aluminium, manganese, potassium nitrate, charcoal and sulphur. Inorganic anion perchlorates (such as potassium perchlorate and ammonium perchlorate) are particularly concerning since perchlorates are water-soluble and stable. Reviewed in Sijimol, M.R./Mohan, M., Environmental impacts of perchlorate with special reference to fireworks—a review , Environmental Monitoring and Assessment 186, 2014, 7203-7210, pp. 7203-7204.
(68) Reviewed in Bateman et al., Not just a flash in the pan: short and long term impacts of fireworks on the environment , Pacific Conservation Biology 29:5, 2023, 396-401, p. 398.
(69)  Herwijnen et al., Firework aversion in cats and dogs as reported by Dutch animal owners , Veterinary and Animal Science 26:100402, 2024, pp. 1, 4.
(70) See for instance Magliocco, S., ‘Distraught’ family makes heartfelt Halloween plea after death of cat due to firework fright , RSVP Live, 29 October 2024; Hartmann, I., Silvester war Nacht der Panik für Hunde in Bad Kreuznach , SWR, 1 January 2025.
(71)  Hoekstra et al., Fireworks disturbance across bird communities , Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 22:1, 2024, e2694; Shamoun-Baranes et al., Birds flee en mass from New Year’s Eve fireworks , Behavioural Ecology 22:6, 2011, 1173-1177.
(72)  European Commission, Study of conformity in all EU countries on EU pyrotechnics and explosives legislation. Final Report, EY Law, 2022, p. 34.
(73)  Ibid., pp. 51-55.
(74)  Ibid., pp. 70-73.
(75)  Ibid., pp. 65-68.
(76) For instance, one Member State requires certification in accordance with EN ISO/IEC 17024, while another Member State presupposes (i) the successful participation in a state or state-recognised course of instruction for the intended activity, (ii) practical experience of at least three years, or (iii) the completion of a course of study at a university/university of applied sciences/technical school and practical experience of at least one year. European Commission, Study of conformity in all EU countries on EU pyrotechnics and explosives legislation. Final Report, EY Law, 2022, pp. 56-62, p. 64.
(77)   Decision du Comité de Ministres Benelux relative à l’introduction d’un pyro-pass du 7 décembre 2020, M (2020) 14.
(78)  European Commission, Evaluation study of Pyrotechnics and Civil Explosives Legislation (Directive 2013/29/EU, Commission Implementing Directive 2014/58/EU, and Directive 2014/28/EU, Commission Implementing Directive 2008/43/EC and Commission Decision 2004/388/EC), Final Report, Technopolis Group in collaboration with Milieu, Wavestone, and Intellera, 2025, p. 47.
(79) Restrictions of the latter kind include the prohibition of mail order sales, maximum limits for the availability, possession, transport and storage of pyrotechnic articles and limiting the sale of consumer fireworks to the end-of-year period, applying to all fireworks, including F1 articles. Article 4(2) only provides for national restrictions for categories F2 and F3, theatrical pyrotechnic articles and other pyrotechnic articles. European Commission, Study of conformity in all EU countries on EU pyrotechnics and explosives legislation. Final Report, EY Law, 2022, pp. 48-51.
(80) Articles 4(2) and 7 and the lack of harmonised licensing requirements.
(81)  Reported by a market surveillance authority at the Administrative Cooperation Group meeting in November 2024.
(82) The majority (54.1%, 20 out of 37) consider that unsafe pyrotechnics articles on the market are a persistent concern that should be further addressed by the Directive in the future.
(83) Stakeholders were asked ‘To what extent were the following main benefits of harmonising different national rules on pyrotechnic articles achieved in your member state since the entry into application in 2015 of the current Directive 2013/29/EU?’. For ‘high level of protection of human health and safety, 34.78% (24 out of 65) selected ‘to a high extent’ and 11.59% (8 out of 65) ‘to a very high extent’. 20.29% (14 out of 65) replied ‘to a moderate extent’. Note, however, that 14.49% (10 out of 65) responded ‘to no extent’. For ‘higher compliance of pyrotechnics available on the EU market with the requirements’, 28.99% (20 out of 65) selected ‘to a high extent’ and 13.04% (9 out of 65) ‘to a very high extent’. 21.74% (15 out of 65) responded ‘to a moderate extent’.
(84)  European Commission, Group of Experts on Pyrotechnic Articles, Categorisation of pyrotechnic articles intended for entertainment purposes, 2021.
(85) Government of the Netherlands/République Francaise, Modify the Pyro Directive to Protect Public Order and Safety, A collaborative non-paper between the Netherlands and France, 2024.
(86)  In 2017, the Commission rejected the publication of standards EN 16263 and 16265. No new version has been submitted to the Commission. In February 2025 the Commission withdrew the harmonised standards on consumer fireworks (the EN 15947 series) from the Official Journal as those standards had been replaced by the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) with new standards series, published by CEN in October 2022. The Commission did not cite the new standards in the Official Journal as they did not satisfy the requirements set out in the standardisation request and the relevant essential safety requirements laid down in the Directive. And while CEN was asked by the Commission to provide revised standards for pyrotechnic articles, including for fireworks, it will take several years for these to be finalised and cited in the Official Journal. See also: Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/337 of 20 February 2025 on the harmonised standards for pyrotechnic articles drafted in support of Directive 2013/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L, 2025/337, 24.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2025/337/oj ) and Commission Implementing Decision of 12.5.2022 on a standardisation request to the European Committee for Standardization as regards pyrotechnic articles in support of Directive 2013/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, C(2022) 3011 final.
(87) See  Single Market Compliance Space .
(88) 54.1% (20 out of 37) of respondents to the public consultation believe that the minimisation of unsafe pyrotechnic articles on the market should be further addressed by the Directive in the future. Non-compliant products imported from third countries were mentioned as safety risks by national authorities in the targeted survey.
(89)  Five national authorities explained in interviews that many consumer fireworks in the categories F2 and F3 imported from China do not meet the EU’s safety requirements. One national government authority noted in the public consultation that many fireworks, particularly those imported from Asia, fail safety tests. This could be due to insufficient oversight of testing laboratories. See also Rijksoverheid, Improving the product conformity of pyrotechnic articles within the European Union , 14/03/2024, p. 1.
(90) 35.1% (13 out of 37) selected ‘to a large extent’, 18.9% (7 out of 37) ‘to a very large extent’. Notably, 100% (4 out of 4) of business associations responded ‘to a large extent’.
(91)  17.4% (12 out of 69) rated their satisfaction with 5 out of 5, 13% (9 out of 69) rated it with 4 out of 5 and 24.6% (17 out of 69) with 3 out of 5.
(92) Inadequate oversight over conformity assessments carried out in third countries was also a concern mentioned in the targeted survey (by market surveillance authorities and industry manufacturers) and in interviews with five national authorities.
(93) Rijksoverheid, Improving the product conformity of pyrotechnic articles within the European Union , 14/03/2024, p. 1.
(94) Responses to an open question.
(95)  Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on market surveillance and compliance of products and amending Directive 2004/42/EC and Regulations (EC) No 765/2008 and (EU) No 305/2011 (OJ L 169, 25.6.2019, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1020/oj ).
(96)  Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93 (OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 30, ELI:  http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/765/oj ).
(97)  Among the respondents, 29.7% (11 out of 37) stated it was effective ‘to a large extent,’ 18.9% (7 out of 37) said ‘to a moderate extent,’ and 13.5% (5 out of 37) replied ‘to a very large extent.’ Meanwhile, 21.6% (8 out of 37) selected ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’.
(98)  44% (11 out of 25) said the frequency of checks on imported products remained unchanged, 28% (7 out of 25) said it increased or strongly increased. As regards EU manufactured products, 52% (13 out of 25) said the frequency remained unchanged and 20% (5 out of 25) said it increased or strongly increased.
(99) In the targeted survey, ‘both’ (documentary and physical checks) was the most frequently given answer for most product categories, followed by documentary checks. For some product categories, ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’ was the most frequent answer.
(100)  The most frequently given responses were no instances or 1-5 instances for all three concerns.
(101) 52.8% (28 out of 53) respondents in the targeted survey chose ‘market surveillance’ as one of the areas where they observe the most pronounced differences across Member States.
(102) In fact, only approximately ten Member States report relatively regularly in ICSMS.
(103)  In the targeted survey, when asked about their satisfaction with digital and electronic tools for exchanging information about products governed by the Directive, ICSMS got mostly positive feedback, with 50% (12 out of 24) of the respondents rating it highly (4 or 5 out of 5). Dissatisfaction was minimal, with only 12.5% (3 out of 24) rating it at 2 out of 5 and no one rating it at 1 out 5. Similarly, Safety Gate, the EU rapid alert system for dangerous non-food products, was rated with moderate or high satisfaction levels, as 37.5% (9 out of 24) of respondents rated it moderately at 3 or 4 out of 4, and 8.3% (2 out of 24) at 5 out of 5. Among the 14 Member State authorities that completed this survey question, only 3 expressed dissatisfaction with Safety Gate, while dissatisfaction with ICSMS was reported by 2 Member State authorities.
(104) The effectiveness of information sharing with competent authorities from another Member State was rated 2 out of 5 by 23.1% (15 out of 65), 4 out of 5 by 20% (13 out of 65), 3 out of 5 by 19.9% (11 out of 65), 1 out of 5 by 9.2% (6 out of 65) and 5 out of 5 by 1.5% (1 out of 65) respondents. In comparison, information sharing with competent authorities of the same Member State was rated 4 out of 5 by 26.1% (17 out of 65), 3 out of 5 by 24.6% (16 out of 65) and 5 out of 5 by 21.5% (14 out of 65).
(105)  Pointed out by two market surveillance authorities in interviews.
(106)  Rijksoverheid, Improving the product conformity of pyrotechnic articles within the European Union , 14/03/2024, p. 2.
(107) 54.1% (20 out of 37) of respondents to the public consultation believe that the issues of controlled access to pyrotechnics not intended for the general public or to specific age groups, and safety and accessibility of the public to bigger and or powerful pyrotechnics, should be further addressed by the Directive in the future. Accidents with F4 fireworks were mentioned as a safety risk by national authorities in the targeted survey.
(108)  Ibid., p. 3.
(109)  Ibid., p. 2.
(110) See for instance MDR SACHSEN, Zwei Todesfälle in Sachsen: Deshalb sind Kugelbomben so gefährlich , 3 January 2025.
(111)  Described in section  2.1.2.
(112)  Ibid., p. 4.
(113)  Ibid., pp. 32, 46.
(114)  European Commission, Evaluation study of Pyrotechnics and Civil Explosives Legislation (Directive 2013/29/EU, Commission Implementing Directive 2014/58/EU, and Directive 2014/28/EU, Commission Implementing Directive 2008/43/EC and Commission Decision 2004/388/EC), Final Report, Technopolis Group in collaboration with Milieu, Wavestone, and Intellera, 2025, p. 140.
(115) One market surveillance authority, a central administrative office and a national and EU enforcement agency.
(116)      Out of 37 respondents.
(117)      28.3% (15 out of 53) selected ‘to a high extent’ and 3.8% (2 out of 53) ‘to a very high extent’.
(118)      European Commission, Study on illegal sales of pyrotechnic articles destined for professional users (category F4) to the general public. Final Report , Oxford Research A/S (Denmark), 2019, p. 3.
(119)  Spanish Guardia Civil, Weapons and Explosives Central Inspectorate Report on the seizure in public areas of counterfeit and illegally manufactured pyrotechnics, 2025.
(120)  European Commission, Study on illegal sales of pyrotechnic articles destined for professional users (category F4) to the general public. Final Report , Oxford Research A/S (Denmark), 2019, p. 3; Minutes – Meeting of the Pyrotechnics Working Group 2016_10_06.
(121)  The study on the criminal misuse of pyrotechnic articles commissioned by the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs is looking more closely into the criminal misuse of pyrotechnic articles, including from the angle illicit manufacturing.
(122)   Commission Implementing Decision of 12.5.2022 on a standardisation request to the European Committee for Standardization as regards pyrotechnic articles in support of Directive 2013/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, C(2022) 3011 final.
(123)  European Commission, Evaluation study of Pyrotechnics and Civil Explosives Legislation (Directive 2013/29/EU, Commission Implementing Directive 2014/58/EU, and Directive 2014/28/EU, Commission Implementing Directive 2008/43/EC and Commission Decision 2004/388/EC), Final Report, Technopolis Group in collaboration with Milieu, Wavestone, and Intellera, 2025.
(124) One large enterprise and five SMEs.
(125) The NLF evaluation for industrial products assessed the efficiency of the Toy Safety Directive, the Restriction of Hazardous Substances Directive, the Electromagnetic Compatibility Directive, the Low Voltage Directive, and the Construction Products Regulation. European Commission, Supporting Study for the evaluation of certain aspects of the New Legislative Framework (Decision No 768/2008/EC and Regulation (EC) No 765/2008), 2022,  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12654-Industrial-products-evaluation-of-the-new-legislative-framework_en . In that evaluation study, the regulatory burden of some of the horizontal NLF provisions and the one-off costs ranged between 0.6% and 3% of the industry turnover.
(126)  In the cost templates stakeholders were asked to indicate any indirect costs, with the explanation that such costs include: a) indirect compliance costs – costs related to the fact that other stakeholders have to comply with legislation; b) offsetting/substitution costs – for example costs related to reliance on alternative experts; c) transaction costs – costs of renegotiating contracts; d) opportunity costs – the costs of foregone alternative investments/opportunities; e) negative impacts on market functioning such as reduced competition or market access, reduced innovation or investment.
(127)  Economic operators were asked to indicate the respective shares of the following adjustment costs: liability insurance; designing and manufacturing products according to the Directive’s requirements [manufacturers only]; product testing before and for conformity assessment; equipment acquisition for and implementation of the conformity assessment process; equipment acquisition for and implementation of activities for affixing CE marking, labels, registration numbers, traceability systems or devices to the product; taking corrective actions on identified non-conforming products (e.g. recalls/withdrawals); other adjustment costs.
(128)  Costs for labelling and traceability could also have been categorised entirely as administrative costs. The supporting study had, however, collected the data with a distinction between operational tasks for labelling and traceability and administrative tasks in that regard. Therefore, the distinction was kept for this SWD.
(129)  Economic operators were asked to indicate the respective shares of the following administrative costs: producing the technical documentation for conformity assessment procedures (referred to in Annex II to the Directive); keeping records of technical documentation, EU declarations of conformity and registration numbers of products for 10 years; ensuring the correct labelling, CE marking, identification and registration numbers, and traceability data of products; documentary verification of the product’s conformity (i.e. the validity of the certificate of conformity, verification of laboratory testing provided by manufacturers, verification of product versus safety requirements, correct labelling, CE marking, registration number, etc.); handling paperwork for lodging applications for registrations, certifications, accreditations, authorisations, etc.; information sharing and cooperation with organisations and authorities related to non-compliant products, their suppliers and buyers (supply chain).
(130)  One out of eight responding SMEs allocated 30% to administrative costs linked to ensuring correct labelling, CE marking and traceability of products, one 25%, two 20%, two 15% and two 10%. For four out of seven, it was one of the administrative tasks attributed the highest or second-highest shares of costs.
(131) For one out of eight SMEs, this represents 30% of all administrative costs, for four it represents 25%, and for one, 20%, another 15% and another 10%.
(132)  For one out of eight SMEs, this represents 30% of all administrative costs, for six it represents 20% and for one 10%.
(133)  MSAs were asked to indicate the respective shares of the following costs: administrative costs from receiving, storing and retrieving the records; coordination of expert groups within the Member State; coordination between and with competent authorities and regional authorities (for surveillance and enforcement purposes); coordination with external expert groups (standardisation bodies, EC expert groups, for knowledge management purposes); the recall process; training of inspectors; maintenance of registers; laboratory testing (incl. safe transportation and storage); legal costs of transposition. These costs were not categorised in adjustment, administrative and enforcement costs.
(134)  The three MSAs allocated 15%, 10% and 20% respectively to administrative costs from receiving, storing and retrieving the records, and 5%, 10% and 20% to the maintenance of registers. 5%, 10% and 20% were attributed to recall processes and 20%, 30% and 10% to inspector training.
(135)  It should be noted that the supporting study included them in the efficiency assessment. This cost calculation has been adjusted for this SWD.
(136)  It should be noted that accreditation is not mandatory under the Pyrotechnics Directive, but, if available, it facilitates the notification procedure.
(137)    See, for instance, European Commission, A simpler and faster Europe: Communication on implementation and simplification , European Commission 2024-2029, 2024; Ursula von der Leyen, Europe’s choice, Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029 , 2024; Ursula von der Leyen, Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2019-2024 , 2019.
(138)    See European Commission,  Better regulation toolbox , 2023 p. 407.
(139) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/1096 of 2 June 2023 laying down rules for the application of Directive 2013/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the regular collection and updating of data on accidents related to the use of pyrotechnic articles.
(140) For the remaining two authorities, it represents a significant burden to a limited or to no extent.
(141)      Between 50%-100% of SME manufacturers, large manufacturers, importers and industry organisations reported that their administrative, operative and hassle costs increased or strongly increased.
(142)  33% (3 out of 9) of enforcement authorities reported that their administrative and operative costs increased, 11% (1 out of 9) said they remained the same. The reverse ratio applies to hassle costs. Among MSAs, 21.4% (3 out of 14) reported unchanged operative costs, but increased administrative costs, while 14.3% (2 out of 14) experienced increased operative costs and unchanged administrative costs. 55.6% (5 out of 9) of enforcement authorities and 64.3% (9 out of 14) of MSAs did not know or preferred not to answer.
(143)  50% (2 out of 4) of NBs reported that their adjustment and administrative costs remained unchanged, while 75% (3 out of 4) said this about their hassle costs. The remaining NBs did not know or preferred not to say.
(144) 23.5% (12 out of 51) and 27.5% (14 out of 51) did not perceive any difference in their efficiency, while 37.3% (19 out of 51) did not know or preferred not to say.
(145)      Interviews with MSAs. See also Section 4.1.1.b) .
(146)      In the targeted survey, 34.8% (24 out of 69) of respondents indicated that this benefit was achieved to a high extent, 14.5% (10 out of 69) selected ‘to a moderate extent‘, and 11.6% (8 out of 69) ‘to a very high extent‘.
(147)      Cost assessment interviews with industry stakeholders and NBs.
(148) In the targeted survey, 36.8% (25 out of 68) of respondents indicated that this benefit was achieved to a moderate extent, 19.1% (13 out of 68) selected ‘to a high extent’ and 4.4% (3 out of 68) selected ‘to a very high extent’. However, 14.7% (10 out of 68) considered that this benefit had not been achieved at all or to a low extent.
(149)  Regulation (EU) 2019/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors, amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 (OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1148/oj ).
(150)  European Commission, Impact Assessment accompanying the document proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the marketing and use of explosives precursors, amending Annex XVII to Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors, SWD(2018) 104 final, 2018, p. 106.
(151)  18.9% (7 out of 37) responded that the Directive had ‘high coherence’, 13.5% (5 out of 37) responded ‘moderate coherence’ and 8.1% (3 out of 37) ‘low coherence’. 59.5% (22 out of 37) chose the ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’ option.
(152) Directive 2014/90/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on marine equipment and repealing Council Directive 96/98/EC (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 146, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/90/oj ).
(153)  Directive 2014/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market and supervision of explosives for civil uses (recast) (OJ L 96, 29.3.2014, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/28/oj ).
(154)  Information from interviews with NBs and national enforcement authorities in the context of the study in support of the evaluation.
(155) Discussion at meeting of the Forum of Notified Bodies for pyrotechnic articles, 6 March 2025. Minutes not yet available.
(156) Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (OJ L 353, 31.12.2008, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/1272/oj ).
(157) Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC (OJ L 396, 30.12.2006, p. 1, ELI:  http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2006/1907/oj ).
(158) Article 3(1) of the Pyrotechnics Directive lays down that: ‘‘pyrotechnic article” means any article containing explosive substances or an explosive mixture of substances designed to produce heat, light, sound, gas or smoke or a combination of such effects through self-sustained exothermic chemical reactions.’
(159)  Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives (OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/98/oj ).
(160)  See Annex III WFD.
(161)      See Annex I, point 2, WFD.
(162)  Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC (OJ L 197, 24.7.2012, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2012/18/oj ).
(163)  Directive (EU) 2024/2853 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on liability for defective products and repealing Council Directive 85/374/EEC (OJ L, 2024/2853, 18.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/2853/oj ). The same applies to Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products (OJ L 210, 7.8.1985, p. 29, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1985/374/oj ). The latter will be repealed 9 December 2026.
(164) 24.3% (9 out of 37) responded ‘high coherence’, 10.8% (4 out of 37) ‘moderate coherence’ and 10.8% ‘low coherence’. 54.1% (20 out of 37) responded ‘Do not know/prefer not to say.
(165)  European Commission, Communication from the Commission, A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond , COM(2020) 795 final, 2020.
(166)   https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2326
(167) United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road , 2022.
(168)  United Nations, Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods , Model Regulations, Volume I, Twenty-first revised edition, 2019.
(169)  Directive 2008/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on the inland transport of dangerous goods (OJ L 260, 30.9.2008, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/68/oj ); Directive (EU) 2022/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on uniform procedures for checks on the transport of dangerous goods by road (OJ L 274, 24/10/2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/1999/oj ); Directive 2010/35/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 June 2010 on transportable pressure equipment and repealing Council Directives 76/767/EEC, 84/525/EEC, 84/526/EEC, 84/527/EEC and 1999/36/EC (OJ L 165, 30.6.2010, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/35/oj ).
(170)  In the targeted survey, 30.9% (21 out of 68) of respondents selected ‘unchanged/neutral’, 22.1% (15 out of 68) ‘negatively’, 14.7% (10 out of 68) ‘very negatively, 5.9% (4 out of 68) ‘positively’ and 4.4% (3 out of 68) ‘very positively’. The remaining 22.1% (15 out of 68) did not know or preferred not to say.
(171) In the targeted survey, 32.4% (22 out of 68) of respondents selected ‘unchanged/neutral’, 25% (17 out of 68) ‘negatively’, 7.4% (5 out of 68) ‘very negatively’ and ‘positively’, respectively, and 2.9% (2 out of 68) ‘very positively’. The remaining 25% (17 out of 68) did not know or preferred not to say.
(172) In the targeted survey, for health and safety 29.4% (20 out of 68) selected ‘unchanged/neutral’, 19.1% (13 out of 68) ‘positively’, 11.8% (8 out of 68) ‘negatively’, 5.9% (4 out of 68) ‘very positively’ and 2.9% (2 out of 68) ‘very negatively‘. 30.9% (21 out of 68) did not know or preferred not to say. In terms of security, 17.7% (12 out of 68) selected ‘negatively’ 14.7% (10 out of 68) ‘positively’, 13.2% (9 out of 68) ‘very positively’ and ‘very negatively’, respectively, and 20.6% (14 out of 68) did not know or preferred not to say.
(173) The circumvention of national rules was pointed out by two Member States’ authorities in a joint letter to the Commission.
(174)  If the Directive were withdrawn, the largest share of the respondents would see the pyrotechnics sector affected very negatively (18.9%, 7 out of 37) or negatively (32.4%, 12 out of 37). 16.2% (6 out of 37) responded ‘remain unchanged’ and 24.3% (9 out of 37) chose ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’.
(175)  See also European Commission, Study on illegal sales of pyrotechnic articles destined for professional users (category F4) to the general public. Final Report , Oxford Research A/S (Denmark), 2019, p. 69.
(176)  For ‘Cross-border facilitation related to the supply, trade and use of pyrotechnics’, 27% (10 out of 37) responded that it could have been achieved only ‘to a limited extent’, 18.9% (7 out of 37) responded ‘not at all’ and 13.5% (5 out of 37) ‘to a moderate extent’. 27% (10 out of 37) responded ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’. Notably, 66.7% (4 out of 6) of companies/businesses chose ‘to a limited extent’ and 16.7% (1 out of 6) ‘to a moderate extent’.
(177)  For ‘Reduction of the trade barriers and costs in the Single Market’, 27% (10 out of 37) responded that it could have been achieved only ‘to a limited extent’, 21.6% (8 out of 37) responded ‘not at all’ and 13.5% (5 out of 37) ‘to a moderate extent’. 27% (10 out of 37) chose the ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’ option.
(178) For ‘Improved traceability of sales and transactions’, 27% (10 out of 37) responded that it could have been achieved ‘to a moderate extent’, 21.6% (8 out of 37) chose ‘to a limited extent’ and 10.8% (4 out of 37) ‘not at all’. 24.3% (9 out of 37) answered ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’.
(179) For ‘High level of protection of public security’, 24.3% (9 out of 37) answered that it could have been ‘to a large extent’ achieved and 24.3% answered ‘to a moderate extent’ achieved. 18.9% (7 out of 37) responded ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’.
(180)  European Commission, Better regulation toolbox 2023, p. 409.
(181)  83.3% (5 out of 6) of industry associations and both large manufacturers rated it as to a high extent relevant. Among the twelve responding SMEs, five found it relevant to a moderate extent, three to a high extent and four to a very high extent.
(182)  The remaining industry organisations indicated ‘to a moderate extent’ (2 out of 6) and ‘to a high extent’ (1 out of 6).
(183)  However, 83.3% (5 out of 6) of companies/businesses responded that this concern was currently addressed.
(184)  For ‘Addressing greener and more suitable chemical compositions of pyrotechnic articles (including compostability, plastic pollution)’, 48.7% (18 out of 37) responded that this concern should be further addressed in the future, while 35.1% (13 out of 37) responded that this concern was currently addressed.
(185)  43.2% (32 out of 74) rated the relevance of the scope at 4 out of 5 and 21.6% (16 out of 74) at 5 out of 5.
(186)  ‘To a very large extent‘ and ‘to a large extent‘ were the most frequently given answers for the following areas: ‘obligations of manufacturers’, ‘obligations of importers’, ‘obligations of distributors’, ‘obligations of notified bodies’, ‘marking and labelling’, ‘classification of pyrotechnic articles’, ‘traceability and record keeping’, ‘licences and authorisations’, ‘notification of conformity assessment bodies’, ‘seizures’, ‘sharing of information with authorities and operators’ and ‘conformity assessment procedures’.
(187)  European Commission, Study on illegal sales of pyrotechnic articles destined for professional users (category F4) to the general public. Final Report , Oxford Research A/S (Denmark), 2019, p. 77.
(188) Government of the Netherlands/République Francaise, Modify the Pyro Directive to Protect Public Order and Safety, A collaborative non-paper between the Netherlands and France, 2024, not published.
(189) Other aspects were mentioned by stakeholders under the relevant open questions, but are not presented here as they do not relate to the relevance of the Directive’s provisions.
(190)  Market structure is defined by the size, number, and distribution of businesses within a sector.
(191)  The market size of the European pyrotechnics industry is defined as the value of sold production of pyrotechnic products manufactured in the EU and placed on both EU and global markets.
(192) The Trade Analysis analyses the trade value of the civil explosives industry, focusing on import and export values of civil explosives products. We differentiate between intra-EU trade (transactions between EU member states) and extra-EU trade (transactions with countries outside the EU).
(193)  For more information, please refer to the following website: https://www.medallia.com/products/agile-research/?utm_campaign=checkmarketmerger  
(194)      Cost data in this table is based on cost templates and related interviews, as reported in European Commission, Evaluation study of Pyrotechnics and Civil Explosives Legislation (Directive 2013/29/EU, Commission Implementing Directive 2014/58/EU, and Directive 2014/28/EU, Commission Implementing Directive 2008/43/EC and Commission Decision 2004/388/EC), Final Report, Technopolis Group in collaboration with Milieu, Wavestone, and Intellera, 2025.
(195) Interviews with market surveillance authorities. See also section 4.1.1.b).
(196) In the Targeted survey, 34.78% (24 out of 69) of respondents indicated that this benefit was achieved to a high extent, 14.49% (10 out of 69) selected ‘to a moderate extent’, and 11.59% (8 out of 69) ‘to a very high extent’.
(197) Cost assessment interviews with industry stakeholders and notified bodies.
(198) Cost assessment interviews.
(199) Cost assessment interviews.
(200) Cost assessment interviews.
(201) Cost assessment interviews.
(202) This assessment is without prejudice to a possible future Impact Assessment.
(203) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/1096 of 2 June 2023 laying down rules for the application of Directive 2013/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the regular collection and updating of data on accidents related to the use of pyrotechnic articles (OJ L 146, 6.6.2023, p. 24, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2023/1096/oj ).
(204) Using European Commission’s dedicated Better Regulation online platform ‘Have Your Say’, Link
(205)  European Commission, Have Your Say ‘EU rules on pyrotechnic articles – evaluation’, Link . The summary report can be found here .
(206)  ‘To a moderate extent was answered in question 107 by 67% (n=4) of 6 respondents for industry organisations; 67% (n=2) of 3 respondents for importers; 50% (n=6) of 12 respondents for SMEs; and 50% (n=1) of 2 respondents for large manufacturers.
(207)    39% (n=21) of 54 respondents answered, ‘To a high extent’ or ‘To a very high extent’, and 22% (n=12) ‘To a moderate extent’ in relation to the relevance of this problem in question 102.
(208) 35% (n=19) of 54 respondents answered, ‘Not at all’ or ‘To a low extent’ in relation to the relevance of this problem in question 102, with 40% (n=22) replying ‘To a moderate extent’ or ‘To a high extent’.
(209) 39% (n=21) of 54 respondents answered, ‘To a high extent’ or ‘To a very high extent’, and 22% (n=12) ‘To a moderate extent” in relation to the relevance of this problem in question 102
(210) 35% (n=19) of 54 respondents answered, ‘Not at all’ or ‘To a low extent’ in relation to the relevance of this problem in question 102, with 40% (n=22) replying ‘To a moderate extent’ or ‘To a high extent’.
(211) 100% of large manufacturing entities (n=2) and importers (n=3) responding to question 102 consider that the problem has a low relevance. The same view is shared by 50% (n=3) of the 6 respondents for industry organisations and, to a lesser extent, 25% (n=3) of the 12 respondents for SMEs manufacturers.
(212)    40% (n=22) of 54 respondents answered ‘To a high extent’ or ‘To a very high extent’ in relation to the relevance of this problem.
(213) 35% (n=19) of 54 respondents answered, ‘Not at all’ or ‘To a low extent’ in relation to the relevance of this problem in question 102, with 40% (n=22) replying ‘To a moderate extent” or ‘To a high extent’.
(214)  55% (n=21) of 30 respondents answered ‘Yes’ to ‘Adoption of measures or requirements in addition to those already included in the Directive’ in question 10.
(215)  Based on responses to open question 11.
(216) 55% (n=39) of 71 respondents answered ‘To a high extent’ or ‘To a very high extent’ in question 37.
(217)      72% (n=53) of 74 respondents provided a score equal or higher to 4 in a relevance 5-point scale in question 35. 17% (n=13) of the respondents provided a score of 3, while scores of 2 and 1 were selected by11% (n=8) of the participants respectively.
(218)  ‘To a very high extent’ or ‘To a high extent’ was answered in question 37 by 62% (n=5) of 8 respondents for industry organisations; 50% (n=3) of 6 respondents for importers; 64% (n=9) of 14 respondents for SMEs; and 100% (n=3) of large manufacturers.
(219) More information available at: https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/45126  
(220) This paragraph reports views shared by the 10 respondents to question 36.
(221) 2 responders out of 10 mentioned maritime equipment in question 36.
(222) This reports views shared by the 10 respondents to question 36.
(223)  In total, stakeholders from 21 Member States (n=30) have answered the survey question on whether their Member State has adopted more stringent rules than those indicated in the Directive or added additional requirements.
(224) Stakeholders were asked to provide a rating on a scale of 1-5 for the relative importance of each factor. Out of the stakeholders who answered (n=19), ‘Enhanced Safety and Public Protection’ received a rating of 5 from 68.42% of respondents, with only 5.26% rating it as 1.
(225)  From the remaining stakeholders, 6.85% (5 out of 73) responded ‘Increased’, 16.44% (12 out of 37) responded ‘Decreased’, and 54.79% (40 out of 70) responded ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’.
(226)  The effectiveness of information sharing with competent authorities from another Member State was rated at 2 out of 5 by 23.1% (15 out of 65), at 4 out of 5 by 20% (13 out of 65), 3 out of 5 by 19.9% (11 out of 65), at 1 out of 5 by 9.2% (6 out of 65) and at 5 out of 5 by 1.5% (1 out of 65) respondents. In comparison, information sharing with competent authorities of the same Member State was rated at 4 out of 5 by 26.1% (17 out of 65), at 3 out of 5 by 24.6% (16 out of 65) and at 5 out of 5 by 21.5% (14 out of 65).
(227) N = 21 (MSA = 3; SME = 10; notifying authority = 1; national enforcement authority = 3; NB = 2; LE = 1; importer = 1).
(228) Respondents were asked to estimate the yearly average cost attributable to the directive (including administrative costs, Operational and investment costs). The estimate is made with a simple average for each type of stakeholder. For the case of the lower bound (Less than EUR 25 000), the value per stakeholder is EUR 12 500. For the upper bound, the value per stakeholder was EUR 1 m. The middle value was given to each stakeholder for the rest of the ranges.
(229) The large variability in reported costs by notified bodies, to the extent of reporting up to EUR 1 m, may be explained by three factors: 1) the scale of the notified body’s operations, which is substantially larger in some countries; 2) the number of obligations the notified body has (compliance with multiple Directives, national legislations, additional activities related to the sector such as training, certification, education, etc.; and 3) the ownership/governance structure of the notified body (see figure 15 above), for instance, being a university, national institute, or military institution, may have an impact in the cost structure of the notified body. The analysis of the costs exclusively allocated to compliance with the Directive is part of another analysis, i.e., cost efficiency analysis, which will be included in the final report.
(230) N= 12 respondents (2 importers, 1 large company, 9 SMEs).
(231) SMEs, for instance, do not prioritise testing before conformity assessment processes but rely on notified bodies for knowledge at the design and manufacturing stages.
(232) N=8 (1 large company, 7 SMEs).
(233) N=12 (importers=2, SMEs = 8, large companies=1, notified bodies=1).
(234)  In question 17 (total respondents=68), ‘To a high extent’ and ‘To a very high extent’ in relation to the achievement of benefits was answered by: 47% (n=32) for High level of protection of human health and safety; 47% (n=32) for higher compliance of pyrotechnics available on the EU market with the requirements; 40% (n=27) for high level of protection of public security, and 35% (n=24) for harmonising rules on the making available and supervision of pyrotechnics.
(235) 67% (n=49) of 73 respondents answered, ‘to a very high extent’, ‘to a high extent’ or ‘to a moderate extent’ to question 41.
(236) 48% (n=26) of 54 respondents answered, ‘to a moderate extent’, ‘to a high extent’ or ‘to a very high extent’ in relation to the relevance of this problem in question 102.
(237) 44% (n=14) of 32 respondents answered, ‘strongly negative’ and 28% (n=9) of them answered ‘moderately negative’ in question 39.
(238)    N = 6 (SMEs = 5; LEs = 1).
(239)  To note that the cost classification for notified bodies has been adjusted compared to the supporting study to reflect that conformity assessments are notified bodies‘ usual business.
(240) N = 3.
(241) N = 3.
(242)  32.4% (n=12) out of 37 respondents rated it as relevant ‘to a very large extent’ and 27% (n=10) out of 37 respondents rated it relevant ‘to a large extent’. From the remaining stakeholders, 10.8% (4 out of 37) responded ‘not at all’, 10.8% (4 out of 37) responded ‘to a moderate extent’, 10.8% (4 out of 37) responded ‘to a limited extent’, and 8.1% (3 out of 37) responded ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’.
(243) 37.8% (n=14) out of 37 respondents. From the remaining stakeholders, 13.5% (5 out of 37) responded ‘not at all’, 10.8% (4 out of 37) responded ‘to a limited extent’, 8.1% (3 out of 37) responded ‘to a moderate extent’ and 8.1% (3 out of 37) responded ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’.
(244)  21.6% (n=8) out of 37 respondents.
(245) From the remaining stakeholders, 16.2% (6 out of 37) responded that ‘this concern is currently addressed by the Directive’.
(246) From the remaining responses, 30% (3 out of 10) responded ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’.
(247) 29.7% (n=11) out of 37 respondents.
(248) 18.9% (n=7) out of 37 respondents considered it relevant ‘to a large extent,’ and 16.2% (n=6) out of 37 rated it relevant ‘to a very large extent’.
(249)      51.4% (n=19) out of 37 respondents rated it relevant to ‘to a very large extent’ and 18.9% (n=7) out of 37 respondents rated relevant to a ‘large extent’. From the remaining stakeholders, 10.8% (4 out of 37) responded ‘to a moderate extent’, 5.4% (2 out of 37) responded ‘to a limited extent’, 5.4% (2 out of 37) responded ‘not at all’, and 10.8% (4 out of 37) responded ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’.
(250) 24.3% (n=9) out of 37 respondents.
(251)  64.9% (n=24) out of 37 respondents agreed and 27% (n=10) out of 37 respondents disagreed. From the remaining stakeholders, 8.1% (3 out of 37) responded ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’.
(252)  54.1% (20 out of 37 respondents. From the remaining stakeholders, 43.2% (16 out of 37) responded ‘this concern is currently addressed by the Directive’, and 2.7% (1 out of 37) responded ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’.
(253)  51.4% (n=19) out of 37 respondents. 37.8% (14 out of 37) responded that this concern is currently addressed by the Directive. From the remaining stakeholders, 10.8% (4 out of 37) responded ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’.
(254)      48.7% (n=18) out of 37 respondents.
(255) 35.1% (n=13) out of 37 respondents. From the remaining stakeholders, 16.2% (6 out of 37) responded ‘Do now know/prefer not to say’.
(256) 54.1% (n=20) out of 37 respondents.
(257)  83.3% (n=5) out of 6 respondents.
(258)  54.1% (n=20) out of 37 respondents.
(259)  75% (n=3) out of 4 respondents and 83.3% (n=5) out of 5 respondents.
(260)  51..4% (n=19) and 37.8% (n=20) out of 37 respondents.
(261) 46% (n=17) out of 37 respondents.
(262) 16.2% (n=6) out of 37 respondents. From the remaining stakeholders, 13.5% (5 out of 37) responded ‘to a very large extent’, 8.11% (3 out of 37) responded ‘to a limited extent’, 2.7% (1 out of 37) responded ‘not at all’ and 13.5 (5 out of 37) responded ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’.
(263) 66.7% (4 out of 6) of companies and businesses indicated that the Directive has contributed ‘to a large extent’, and 16.7% (1 out of 6) felt it contributed ‘to a very large extent’.
(264) 27% (n=10) out of 37 respondents. From the remaining responses, 18.9% (7 out of 37) responded ‘to a limited extent’, 13.5% (5 out of 37) responded ‘to a moderate extent’, 10.8% (4 out of 37) responded ‘to a very large extent’, and 2.7% (1 out of 37) responded ‘not at all’.
(265) 40.5% (n=15) out of 37 respondents. 18.9% (7 out of 37) responded with ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’. From the remaining responses, 16.2% (6 out of 37) responded ‘to a moderate extent’, 13.5% (5 out of 37) responded ‘to a very large extent’,
(266) 29.7% (n=11) out of 37 respondents.
(267) 18.9% (n=7) out of 37 selected ‘to a moderate extent’ and 21.6% (n=8) out of 37 respondents selected ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’. From the remaining responses, 13.5% (5 out of 37) responded ‘to a very large extent’, 10.8% (4 out of 37) responded ‘to a limited extent’, and 5.4% (2 out of 37) responded ‘not at all’.
(268) 75% (n=3) out of 4 respondents indicated the Directive contributed ‘to a large extent’, and 25% (n=1) out of 4) respondents said it contributed ‘to a very large extent’.
(269) 29.7% (n=11) out of 37 respondents selected the ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’ option.
(270) 24.3% (n=9) out of 37 respondents stated that it constitutes a proportional burden to a moderate extent, while 21.6% (n=8) out of 37 respondents said it constitutes a burden to a large extent.
(271) 32.4% (n=12) out of 37 respondents.
(272) 35.1% (n=13) out of 37 respondents of consulted stakeholders stated that the result could not have been achieved at all without the Directive, while 27% (n=10) out of 37 respondents indicated that it could have only been achieved ‘to a limited extent’.
(273)  ‘very negatively’ (18.9%, 7 out of 37) or ‘negatively’ (32.4%, 12 out of 37). From the remaining stakeholders, 24.3% (9 out of 37) responded with ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’. From the remaining stakeholders, 16.2% (6 out of 37) responded ‘remain unchanged’, 5.4% (2 out of 37) responded ‘very positively’, and 2.7% (1 out of 37) responded ‘positive’.
(274) From the remaining responses, 25% (1 out of 4) responded ‘negatively’.
(275) From the remaining responses, 20% (2 out of 10) responded ‘Do not know/prefer not to say’.
(276) See Decision No 768/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 on a common framework for the marketing of products, and repealing Council Decision 93/465/EEC (OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 82, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2008/768(1)/oj ).
(277)      European Commission, Commission Notice. The ‘ Blue Guide ’ on the implementation of EU product rules 2022, (2022/C 247/01).
(278) Commission Implementing Directive 2014/58/EU.
(279)  ‘NACE is the acronym used to designate the various statistical classifications of economic activities developed since 1970 in the European Union (EU). NACE provides the framework for collecting and presenting a large range of statistical data according to economic activity in the fields of economic statistics (e.g. business statistics, labour market, national accounts) and in other statistical domains.” Eurostat .
(280) Data is missing for the number of companies for the years 2011, 2014, 2015, for the number of employees for the years 2011, 2012, 2015, 2016 and 2019, and for the turnover for the years 2009, 2011-2015 and 2019. No data was yet available for 2023 and 2024.
(281) European Commission, Study of conformity in all EU countries on EU pyrotechnics and explosives legislation. Final Report, EY Law, 2022, p. 34.
(282) Corrigendum to Directive 2013/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of pyrotechnic articles (OJ L 94 of 18 March 2021, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/29/corrigendum/2021-03-18/oj ).
(283) European Commission, Study of conformity in all EU countries on EU pyrotechnics and explosives legislation. Final Report, EY Law, 2022, p. 36.
(284)  Ibid., pp. 36 et seq.
(285)  Ibid., pp. 56-62.
(286)  Ibid., pp. 51-55.
(287)  Ibid., pp. 65-68.
(288)  Ibid., p. 48.
(289)    Ibid., pp. 48-51.
(290)    See recital 12.
(291) European Commission, Study of conformity in all EU countries on EU pyrotechnics and explosives legislation. Final Report, EY Law, 2022, pp. 70-73.
(292)  Ibid., p. 64.
(293)   Decision du Comité de Ministres Benelux relative à l’introduction d’un pyro-pass du 7 décembre 2020, M (2020) 14.
(294)      European Commission, Evaluation study of Pyrotechnics and Civil Explosives Legislation (Directive 2013/29/EU, Commission Implementing Directive 2014/58/EU, and Directive 2014/28/EU, Commission Implementing Directive 2008/43/EC and Commission Decision 2004/388/EC), Final Report, Technopolis Group in collaboration with Milieu, Wavestone, and Intellera, 2025, p. 46.
(295)      European Commission, Study of conformity in all EU countries on EU pyrotechnics and explosives legislation. Final Report, EY Law, 2022, pp. 79-82.
(296)      European Commission, Evaluation study of Pyrotechnics and Civil Explosives Legislation (Directive 2013/29/EU, Commission Implementing Directive 2014/58/EU, and Directive 2014/28/EU, Commission Implementing Directive 2008/43/EC and Commission Decision 2004/388/EC), Final Report, Technopolis Group in collaboration with Milieu, Wavestone, and Intellera, 2025, p. 47.
(297) Reinier Auwema (Inspectie Leefomgeving en Transport), ‘Interview on illegal use of fireworks by Dutch hooligans’ taken on 7 August 2024.
(298) Information collected from representatives of the French Ministry of the Interior via e-mail exchanges.
(299)  Wolsink, J. et al., Van voetbalrellen leren: Een onderzoek naar modern voetbalgeweld en de tekortkomingen van en kansen voor de aanpak , Bureau Beke, 2023.
(300) Article 70 and Article 71 of Law No. 2021-646 of May 25 , 2021, for comprehensive security preserving freedoms.
(301)   Order of December 17, 2021 , Implementing Articles L. 557-10-1 and R. 557-6-14-1 of the Environmental Code concerning pyrotechnic articles intended for entertainment.
(302)   Décret n° 2023-576 du 8 juillet 2023 portant interdiction de la vente, du port et du transport d'engins pyrotechniques et d'artifices de divertissement.
(303) See Council State Decision N° 475817 of 13 July 2023.
(304)   Vuurwerkbesluit , BWBR0013360.
(305)  See: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/vuurwerk/regels-vuurwerk#:~:text=Sinds%202022%20geldt%20tijdens%20oud,hebben%20en%20ook%20niet%20afsteken .
(306) Wijzigingswet Gemeentewet, Wetboek van Strafvordering en Wetboek van Strafrecht (maatregelen bestrijding voetbalvandalisme en ernstige overlast), BWBR0028120.
(307) For more information, see https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/voetbalvandalisme/aanpak-hooligans . https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/voetbalvandalisme/aanpak-hooligans .
(308)  Koninklijke Nederlandse Voetbalbond, Richtlijn Termijn Stadionverbod Seizoen 2023/’24 .
(309)       https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/contact/contactgids/auditteam-voetbal-en-veiligheid .
(310) Politie (Police) Rotterdam representative, ‘Interview on illegal use of fireworks by Dutch hooligans’ carried out on 9 September 2024.
(311) Interview held in July 2024 with representatives of the Ministry of Ecological Transition of the Ministry of the Interior, of police forces and customs.
(312)  Buffet, F.-N., Rapport d’information fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de législation, du suffrage universel, du Règlement et d’administration générale, investie des pouvoirs d’une commission d’enquête, sur les émeutes survenues à compter du 27 juin 2023, 2024.
(313) The Pyro-pass initiative, formalised through Benelux Decision 2020(14) and amended by Decision 2022(9), is a standardised, trilingual permit recognised across Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, allowing qualified individuals to purchase and handle professional-grade fireworks. It includes a harmonised documentation process and digital verification portals for real-time authorisation checks, enhancing cross-border compliance, preventing unauthorised access, and promoting public safety by reducing illegal trade and misuse of high-risk pyrotechnic articles.
(314) Reinier Auwema (Inspectie Leefomgeving en Transport), ‘Interview on illegal use of fireworks by Dutch hooligans’ taken on 7 August 2024.
(315) Despite efforts to engage a broader range of stakeholders for interviews, there was a lack of response from several key parties, which limited the scope of stakeholder perspectives included in this study.
(316) Aufauvre, L. (2006), New Trends for Pyrotechnic Automotive Safety in the European Union , 33. International Pyrotechnics Seminar (IPS 2006), 2006, 509-512.
(317)  Górniak et al., The Numerical Simulation of the Pyrotechnic Actuator for the Active Bumper , Journal of KONES Powertrain and Transport 19, 2012, 141-147.
(318)  Deutschmann, C.W., Pyromechanic actuators increase safety for passengers and pedestrians , ATZ Worldwide 109, 7-8.
(319) These mechanisms are able to detect and to interrupt excess or high electrical voltage safeguarding the vehicle battery. They prevent potential issues or dangers for passengers in case of a crash or a malfunction of the car electrical system
(320) CLEPA, Fleet vehicles capture larger share of the EU aftermarket, 2023.
(321)  CLEPA, Innovation in the Automotive Supply Industry , 2019.
(322)  Aufauvre, L. (2006), New Trends for Pyrotechnic Automotive Safety in the European Union, 33. International Pyrotechnics Seminar (IPS 2006), 2006, 509-512.
(323) Ibid.
(324) Ibid.
(325) Ibid.
(326) Ibid.
(327)  Garaliu-Bușoi et al., Evaluation of the effects produced by triggering pyrotechnic articles for automotive use by exposure to various hazardous external stimuli , MATEC Web of Conferences 389:00021, 2024; Radeanu et al., Evaluation of the safety quality of automotive pyrotechnic articles following their exposure to triaxial vibrations with predetermined thermal conditioning cycles , MATEC Web of Conferences 389:0054, 2024.