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**COMMISSION OPINION**

**of 2 June 2026**

**on the necessity and proportionality of the reintroduction of border control by Sweden at its internal borders in accordance with Article 27a(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Schengen Borders Code)**

**(only the Swedish text is authentic)**

(C/2026/4086)

(1) In accordance with Article 3(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers in which the free movement of persons is ensured, in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.

(2) Pursuant to Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (codification) ([1]), a Member States may, when confronted with a serious threat to public policy or internal security, exceptionally and temporarily reintroduce border control at all or specific sections of its internal borders. This should only be done as a measure of last resort and the scope and duration of the temporary reintroduction of border control should not exceed what is strictly necessary to respond to the serious threat identified.

(3) Article 25a(4) of the Schengen Borders Code specifies that where a Member State plans to reintroduce border control at internal borders to address a foreseeable serious threat, it should notify the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the other Member States of the planned reintroduction of such control, at the latest four weeks before the planned reintroduction of border control, or as soon as possible where the circumstances giving rise to the need to reintroduce border control at internal borders become known to the Member State less than four weeks before the planned reintroduction.

(4) Article 27a(3) of the Schengen Borders Code requires the Commission, following receipt of notifications submitted in relation to a prolongation of border control at the internal border under Article 25a(4) which leads to the continuation of control at internal borders for more than 12 months in total, based on the same grounds, to issue an opinion on the necessity and proportionality of such border control.

(5) The framework for the reintroduction and prolongation of internal border control was substantially revised by Regulation (EU) 2024/1717 of the European Parliament and of the Council ([2]), which entered into force on 10 July 2024. Consequently, the start of all the periods referred to in Title III, Chapter II of the Schengen Borders Code have been calculated from that date.

(6) By letter dated 7 October 2024, the Swedish authorities notified the reintroduction of border control on the basis of Article 25a of the Schengen Borders Code, at all internal borders (land, sea and air), for a period of six months, from 12 November 2024 until 11 May 2025.

([1]) OJ L 77, 23.3.2016, p. 1.

([2]) Regulation (EU) 2024/1717 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (OJ L, 2024/1717, 20.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1717/oj).

(7) By letter dated 8 April 2025, the Swedish authorities notified the prolongation of the reintroduction for an additional period of six months, from 12 May 2025 until 11 November 2025. By letter dated 7 October 2025, the Swedish authorities notified a second prolongation of the reintroduction of internal border control for a further period of six months, from 12 November 2025 until 11 May 2026. By letter dated 30 April 2026, the Swedish authorities notified a third prolongation of the reintroduction of internal border control for a further period of six months, from 12 May 2026 until 11 November 2026.

(8) Sweden was included in the Commission's structured dialogue on the reintroduction of internal border control. Following the receipt of Sweden's notification for a prolongation, this structured dialogue has continued as part of a consultation process provided for by Article 27a(4) of the Schengen Borders Code.

(9) The current state of play at internal borders was described in the State of Schengen Report of 23 April 2025 ([3]) and is regularly discussed at the Schengen Council.

(10) As internal border control was reintroduced and prolonged, on the same grounds, for a continued period of more than 12 months in total, the Commission is to issue an opinion on the necessity and proportionality of such border control.

(11) Following an assessment of the notifications, supplemented with the information provided in the framework of the consultation process and other official documents, publicly available, the Commission adopts the present Opinion.

ASSESMENT OF THE NOTIFICATIONS

I. FORMAL REQUIREMENTS

(12) In the framework of notifications, the Schengen Borders Code imposes several formal obligations on the Member States.

(13) The Commission observes that the notifications of the reintroduction of internal border control as well as the prolongations thereof were notified in accordance with the time limits set out in Article 25a(4) of the Schengen Borders Code, that is at the latest four weeks prior to the entry into effect of the reintroduction or prolongation of internal border control.

(14) Those notifications were made in accordance with the template established for that purpose by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/315 ([4]).

(15) They specifically refer to the reintroduction of control at the internal land border with Denmark at the exit for train and motorised traffic from the Öresund bridge. However, the notifications state that checks may also occur at the ports and airports of the cities of Stockholm, Gothenburg, Malmö and Västerås, as well as at any of the other internal borders, whenever this proves to be necessary based on risk analysis, intelligence or other relevant information. However, given that Article 25 of the Schengen Borders Code allows a Member State to immediately reintroduce internal border control for unforeseeable events, the Commission does not consider that a notification under Article 27(1) allows for such conditional reintroduction of internal border control.

([3]) COM(2025) 185 final.

([4]) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/315 of 14 February 2025 establishing a template for the notification of the temporary reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders (OJ L, 2025/315, 17.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2025/315/oj).

(16) Article 27(2) of the Schengen Borders Code requires the MS in situations where the border control has been in place for six months to provide a risk assessment in any subsequent notification presenting the scale and anticipated evolution of the serious threat. Whilst a precise assessment of the scale and anticipated duration of the serious threat may be difficult to provide by the national authorities due to its complex nature, the Commission notes that the information provided by the Swedish authorities in the notifications does not make a detailed risk assessment pursuant to Article 27(2) of the Schengen Borders Code, taking into account trends in the development of the serious threat in the preceding period of reintroduction of internal border control, and using risk analyses prepared at national level and by the relevant Union agencies.

(17) The Commission takes note of the fact that detailed and operational information has been withheld from the notification due to its relation to matters of national interest and internal security, as well as for reasons of ongoing criminal investigations. Article 27(5) of the Schengen Borders Code indeed allows Member States to exclude information relation to the serious threat to public policy or national security based on public security grounds, taking into account the confidentiality of ongoing investigations.

(18) The Commission notes that Sweden did not submit a report in accordance with Article 33(2) of the Schengen Borders Code, which requires a Member State to submit a report on the reintroduction and prolongation of internal border control at the expiry of 12 months, which would have been 12 November 2025.

II. NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY

**Position of the Swedish Authorities**

(19) The Swedish authorities invoke a serious threat to public policy and internal security related to terrorist incidents and threats posed by serious organised crime.

(20) The Swedish authorities point at:

— continued activities of and conflicts between criminal networks with international connections, operating across borders;

— indications that foreign actors are using and recruiting members of criminal networks for their own interest;

— Sweden as a potential target of violent-Islamist groups and individuals.

(21) Moreover, a succession of serious incidents occurred involving military grade weaponry and explosives having targeted foreign state institutions and the general public.

(22) The reintroduction of internal border control is therefore the only suitable tool for checking large passenger flows, such as at the land border crossing point at the Øresund bridge between Denmark and Sweden. The reintroduction enables the Swedish Police Authority to perform spot checks and gather intelligence while maintaining an active police presence.

(23) Valuable results have been obtained through the reintroduction of internal border control which would have not been obtained otherwise.

(24) The internal border control takes place on the basis of intelligence and risk analysis, in the form of non-systematic spot checks. The Swedish Police Authority is responsible for strategic analysis and the operational decision-making concerning the scope, frequency and location of checks.

**Commission Observations**

(25) The Swedish authorities have provided information on the various aspects of the identified serious threats to the internal security and public policy as well as arguments to substantiate the necessity and proportionality of the reintroduced border control.

(26) The Commission observes that Sweden is facing a complex security situation.

(27) The reintroduction of internal border control may in general contribute to addressing a serious threat to internal security, in particular with regard to cross-border activities of criminal organisations.

(28) The Commission acknowledges the right to withhold information on public security grounds. However, the Commission finds that insufficient information has been provided, such as general statistics on cross-border crime, a general terrorist threat assessment, as well as additional information on how internal border control has been able to address the serious threat identified during the first 12 months of its reintroduction.

(29) The notifications do not state specific reasons for the choice of the geographical and temporal scope of the reintroduction of internal border control. There is no explanation as to why a six-month duration, rather than a shorter period, seems most appropriate, or how it is specifically the Swedish land border with Denmark that is most affected by the serious threat underlying the reintroduction of internal border control, justifying that in practice control is only reintroduced at that specific border.

(30) There is no explanation as to why alternative measures, such as police checks in border areas and cross-border police cooperation, are insufficient to address the identified serious threats.

(31) Denmark has already, based on its successful police cooperation with Sweden, lifted internal border control at the Swedish-Danish internal border.

III. ALTERNATIVE MEASURES

**Position of the Swedish Authorities**

(32) According to the Swedish authorities, alternative measures, such as police checks in border areas and cross-border cooperation with neighbouring Member States, complement the reintroduction of internal border control, as part of a comprehensive 'total approach'.

(33) New Swedish legislation enabling police checks in border areas entered into force on 1 August 2023. The Swedish Police Authority has been working on the implementation of this legislation, developing methods and strategies.

(34) The Swedish authorities maintain intensive police cooperation with all neighbouring countries in border areas, within the framework of updated cooperation agreements and within joint police stations. All Nordic countries participate in the Nordic Police Cooperation, under which the Nordic Situational Picture subgroup facilitates regular intelligence-sharing and exchanges of operational information. Cooperation is particularly close in border regions.

(35) An agreement on police cooperation in the border area between Finland and Sweden has entered into force on 1 February 2025.

(36) A new joint police station on the Norwegian-Swedish border in Magnormoen was inaugurated in September 2025.

(37) However, the Swedish authorities submit that, after careful consideration and dialogue with the Police Authority, they consider that police checks in border areas are insufficient as an alternative to reintroducing internal border control, due to practical and legal limitations.

**Commission Observations**

(38) The Commission takes note of Sweden's active application of alternative measures accompanying the reintroduction of internal border control.

(39) The Commission notes the existence of cooperation agreements and joint police stations with neighbouring countries.

(40) However, the Swedish authorities have provided insufficient information as to why the police checks in border areas cannot serve as alternative to the reintroduction of internal border control, in particular in light of the new legislation in force since 1 August 2023, allowing for police checks in border areas.

(41) The Commission recalls that if Sweden would replace internal border control with police checks, Article 25 of the Schengen Borders Code will always allow the Swedish authorities to immediately reintroduce internal border control if necessary to address a serious threat to public policy and national security that arises unexpectedly due to unforeseeable events.

IV. MITIGATING MEASURES

**Position of the Swedish Authorities**

(42) The Swedish authorities submit that utmost attention is paid to ensuring that the impact of reintroduced control remains minimal and that mitigating the effects of the reintroduced border control at internal borders remains a priority.

(43) Internal border control takes place in the form of non-systematic spot checks, which are carried out based on intelligence and risk analysis. The performed spot checks are conducted as swiftly and non-disruptively as possible.

(44) According to the Swedish authorities the effect of the reintroduced control on cross-border movement of persons remains minimal. The impact of controls has been limited by adjustments to train timetables and by checking passengers at the first scheduled stop on Swedish territory. Given that delays of train traffic remain limited, a Swedish-Danish agreement allowing for checks to be performed on moving trains over the Öresund bridge has not been put in effect.

(45) The Swedish authorities note that dialogue with stakeholders in the transport sector and the Police Authority has been reinforced in order to come to practical solutions for commuters and other members of the public in affected regions.

**Commission Observations**

(46) The notifications submitted by the Swedish authorities demonstrate their commitment to ensure that the impact of internal border control remains limited as required by Article 26(3) of the Schengen Borders Code.

(47) The Commission notes that border control takes place in a targeted and risk-based manner, in order to limit the impact on cross-border travel.

(48) The Commission takes note of the reinforced dialogue with stakeholders in the transport sector as well as the Police Authority. However, no mention is made of the form in which this dialogue takes place, or which specific problems commuters and other members of the public face and which measures have been taken to address these concerns.

(49) Sweden has notified its cross-border regions under Article 42b of the Schengen Borders Code.

(50) Finally, specific information on the effect of the reintroduction of internal border control, even if limited, on the cross-border region that is most concerned by the reintroduction of internal border control, namely the Malmo-municipality, is lacking.

## V. RECOMMENDATIONS

(51) The Commission emphasises that making full use of the available alternative measures laid out in Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/268 ([5]) and the possibilities under the revised Schengen Borders Code, reinforcing and complementing existing measures, may constitute a more efficient and effective means to ensure a high level of security, without the need to reintroduce internal border control.

(52) Security concerns are the main reason put forward by Sweden justifying the reintroduction of internal border control. EU law already provides a wide range of tools to help address these concerns. Member States should make full use of existing mechanisms to enhance security and cooperation. These include the Prüm II Regulation, the new Schengen Information System and the new Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record legislation ([6]). The entry into operation of the EES and ETIAS will further secure the external borders ([7]).

(53) The Commission submits that, that the way in which border checks take place, namely in the form of risk-based spot checks, remains possible under Article 23 of the Schengen Borders Code, without having to resort to an official reintroduction of internal border control or having to compromise on security, provided that these checks do not have an equivalent effect to border checks, requiring that their frequency, intensity and duration remain limited ([8]).

(54) The Commission recommends that Sweden make full use of the Swedish legislation which entered into force on 1 August 2023, allowing for police checks in border areas.

([5]) Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/268 of 23 November 2023 on cooperation between the Member States with regard to serious threats to internal security and public policy in the area without internal border controls (OJ L, 2024/268, 17.1.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2024/268/oj).

([6]) Regulation (EU) 2024/982 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the automated search and exchange of data for police cooperation, and amending Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA and 2008/616/JHA and Regulations (EU) 2018/1726, (EU) No 2019/817 and (EU) 2019/818 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Prüm II Regulation) (OJ L, 2024/982, 5.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/982/oj); Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November 2018 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, amending and repealing Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Decision 2010/261/EU (OJ L 312, 7.12.2018, p. 56, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1862/oj); Regulation (EU) 2025/13 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 on the collection and transfer of advance passenger information for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/818 (OJ L, 2025/13, 8.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/13/oj); Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 132; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/681/oj).

([7]) Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No 767/2008 and (EU) No 1077/2011 (OJ L 327, 9.12.2017, p. 20, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/2226/oj); Regulation (EU) 2018/1240 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 September 2018 establishing a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) and amending Regulations (EU) No 1077/2011, (EU) No 515/2014, (EU) 2016/399, (EU) 2016/1624 and (EU) 2017/2226 (OJ L 236, 19.9.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1240/oj).

([8]) Judgment of the Court of 21 June 2017, criminal proceedings against A, Case C-9/16 (OJ C 277, 21.8.2017, p. 10).

(55) Based on the scale and nature of alternative measures that have been put in place by the Swedish authorities, Sweden should work towards phasing out control at the Swedish internal borders. The Commission will remain in close contact with all Member States concerned to achieve this goal.

Done at Brussels, 2 June 2026.

*For the Commission*
Magnus BRUNNER
*Member of the Commission*