<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><CONCLUSION NNC="YES" xmlns:fmx="http://opoce" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://formex.publications.europa.eu/schema/formex-05.55-20141201.xd"><BIB.CONCLUSION><REF.CASE FILE="n.a."><NO.CASE>C‑528/15</NO.CASE></REF.CASE><NO.CELEX>62015CC0528</NO.CELEX><NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:865">EU:C:2016:865</NO.ECLI><NO.SEQ>0001</NO.SEQ><PAGE.FIRST.ECR>1</PAGE.FIRST.ECR><PAGE.SEQ>1</PAGE.SEQ><PAGE.LAST.ECR>16</PAGE.LAST.ECR><PAGE.TOTAL>16</PAGE.TOTAL></BIB.CONCLUSION><CURR.TITLE><PAGE.HEADER><P>OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL SAUGMANDSGAARD ØE — CASE C‑528/15</P><P>AL CHODOR</P></PAGE.HEADER></CURR.TITLE><TITLE><TI><P><HT TYPE="UC">Opinion of Advocate General</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="UC">Saugmandsgaard Øe</HT></P><P>delivered on <DATE ISO="20161110">10 November 2016</DATE><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0001"><P>Original language: French.</P></NOTE></P></TI><STI><P><HT TYPE="BOLD">Case C‑528/15</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="BOLD">Policie ČR, Krajské ředitelství policie Ústeckého kraje, odbor cizinecké policie</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="BOLD">v</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="BOLD">Salah Al Chodor,</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="BOLD">Ajlin Al Chodor,</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="BOLD">Ajvar Al Chodor</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="NORMAL">(Request for a preliminary ruling</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="NORMAL">from the Nejvyšší správní soud (Supreme Administrative Court, Czech Republic))</HT></P></STI></TITLE><INDEX><KEYWORD>Reference for a preliminary ruling</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 (Dublin III)</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Article 28(2)</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Detention for the purpose of transfer</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Article 2(n)</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Significant risk of absconding</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Objective criteria defined by law</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>No national legislation defining such criteria)</KEYWORD></INDEX><CONTENTS.CONCLUSION><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>I –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Introduction</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0001"><NO.P>1.</NO.P><TXT>By its request for a preliminary ruling, the Nejvyšší správní soud (Supreme Administrative Court, Czech Republic) is questioning the Court of Justice as to the interpretation of the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0002"><P>Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20130626">26 June 2013</DATE> establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="180" PAGE.FIRST="31" DATE.PUB="2013">OJ 2013 L 180, p. 31</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0001" REF.END="QE0001"/>the Dublin III Regulation<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0001" CODE="2019" ID="QE0001"/>) which circumscribe the Member States’ freedom to detain applicants for international protection<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0003"><P>As is apparent from Article 2(b) of the Dublin III Regulation, read in conjunction with Article 2(h) of Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20111213">13 December 2011</DATE> on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="337" PAGE.FIRST="9" DATE.PUB="2001">OJ 2001 L 337, p. 9</REF.DOC.OJ>), an <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0002" REF.END="QE0002"/>applicant for international protection<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0002" CODE="2019" ID="QE0002"/> is, in essence, any third-country national or stateless person who has made an application for refugee status or subsidiary protection status.</P></NOTE> (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0003" REF.END="QE0003"/>applicants<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0003" CODE="2019" ID="QE0003"/>) pending their transfer to the Member State responsible for processing their application.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0002"><NO.P>2.</NO.P><TXT>In accordance with Article 28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, the freedom of Member States to detain applicants pending their transfer is conditional, in particular, on there being a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0004" REF.END="QE0004"/>significant risk of [their] absconding<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0004" CODE="2019" ID="QE0004"/>. Article 2(n) of that regulation, which defines the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0005" REF.END="QE0005"/>risk of absconding<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0005" CODE="2019" ID="QE0005"/>, provides that that risk must be assessed, in each individual case, on the basis of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0006" REF.END="QE0006"/>objective criteria defined by law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0006" CODE="2019" ID="QE0006"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0003"><NO.P>3.</NO.P><TXT>At the time of the events giving rise to the dispute in the main proceedings, those criteria had not yet been laid down in Czech legislation, although a legislative amendment intended to introduce such criteria had been proposed. According to the Czech Government, that legislative amendment has since been adopted.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="2"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0004"><NO.P>4.</NO.P><TXT>It is in those circumstances that the referring court is asking, in essence, whether the requirement, mentioned in Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation, that the objective criteria for assessing whether there is a risk of absconding must be defined <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0007" REF.END="QE0007"/>by law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0007" CODE="2019" ID="QE0007"/> means that legislation must be adopted, or whether that requirement may also be satisfied if such criteria are apparent from the case-law of the higher courts and/or from the administrative practice of a Member State.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>II –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Legal framework</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>A –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The ECHR</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0005"><NO.P>5.</NO.P><TXT>Article 5(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on <DATE ISO="19501104">4 November 1950</DATE> (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0008" REF.END="QE0008"/>the ECHR<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0008" CODE="2019" ID="QE0008"/>), provides:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><ALINEA><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0009" REF.END="QE0009"/>Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:</P><P>…</P><LIST TYPE="alpha"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(f)</NO.P><TXT>the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0009" CODE="2019" ID="QE0009"/></TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></ALINEA></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0006"><NO.P>6.</NO.P><TXT>Article 53 of the ECHR states that <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0010" REF.END="QE0010"/>nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a party<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0010" CODE="2019" ID="QE0010"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>B –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">EU law</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>1.</NO.P><TXT>The Charter</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0007"><NO.P>7.</NO.P><TXT>Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0011" REF.END="QE0011"/>the Charter<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0011" CODE="2019" ID="QE0011"/>) states that <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0012" REF.END="QE0012"/>everyone has the right to liberty and security of person<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0012" CODE="2019" ID="QE0012"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0008"><NO.P>8.</NO.P><TXT>Article 52 of the Charter provides:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><PARAG IDENTIFIER="052.001"><NO.PARAG><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0013" REF.END="QE0013"/>1.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.</ALINEA></PARAG><P>…</P><PARAG IDENTIFIER="052.003"><NO.PARAG>3.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.</ALINEA></PARAG><P>…<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0013" CODE="2019" ID="QE0013"/></P></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="3"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>2.</NO.P><TXT>The Dublin III Regulation</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0009"><NO.P>9.</NO.P><TXT>According to recital 20 of the Dublin III Regulation:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><CONSID><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0014" REF.END="QE0014"/>The detention of applicants should be applied in accordance with the underlying principle that a person should not be held in detention for the sole reason that he or she is seeking international protection. Detention should be for as short a period as possible and subject to the principles of necessity and proportionality. In particular, the detention of applicants must be in accordance with Article 31 of the Geneva Convention. The procedures provided for under this Regulation in respect of a detained person should be applied as a matter of priority, within the shortest possible deadlines. As regards the general guarantees governing detention, as well as detention conditions, where appropriate, Member States should apply the provisions of Directive 2013/33/EU also to persons detained on the basis of this Regulation.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0014" CODE="2019" ID="QE0014"/></P></CONSID></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0010"><NO.P>10.</NO.P><TXT>Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation defines the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0015" REF.END="QE0015"/>risk of absconding<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0015" CODE="2019" ID="QE0015"/> as <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0016" REF.END="QE0016"/>the existence of reasons in an individual case, which are based on objective criteria defined by law, to believe that an applicant or a third-country national or a stateless person who is subject to a transfer procedure may abscond<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0016" CODE="2019" ID="QE0016"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0011"><NO.P>11.</NO.P><TXT>Article 28 of that regulation, entitled <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0017" REF.END="QE0017"/>Detention<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0017" CODE="2019" ID="QE0017"/>, provides:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><PARAG IDENTIFIER="028.001"><NO.PARAG><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0018" REF.END="QE0018"/>1.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>Member States shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he or she is subject to the procedure established by this Regulation.</ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="028.002"><NO.PARAG>2.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>When there is a significant risk of absconding, Member States may detain the person concerned in order to secure transfer procedures in accordance with this Regulation, on the basis of an individual assessment and only in so far as detention is proportional and other less coercive alternative measures cannot be applied effectively.</ALINEA></PARAG><P>…<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0018" CODE="2019" ID="QE0018"/></P></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>3.</NO.P><TXT>Directive 2013/33</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0012"><NO.P>12.</NO.P><TXT>Recital 15 of Directive 2013/33/EU<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0004"><P>Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20130626">26 June 2013</DATE> laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="180" PAGE.FIRST="96" DATE.PUB="2013">OJ 2013 L 180, p. 96</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0019" REF.END="QE0019"/>the Reception Directive<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0019" CODE="2019" ID="QE0019"/>) states:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><CONSID><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0020" REF.END="QE0020"/>The detention of applicants should be applied in accordance with the underlying principle that a person should not be held in detention for the sole reason that he or she is seeking international protection, particularly in accordance with the international legal obligations of the Member States and with Article 31 of the Geneva Convention. Applicants may be detained only under very clearly defined exceptional circumstances laid down in this Directive and subject to the principle of necessity and proportionality with regard to both … the manner and the purpose of such detention. Where an applicant is held in detention he or she should have effective access to the necessary procedural guarantees, such as [a] judicial remedy before a national judicial authority.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0020" CODE="2019" ID="QE0020"/></P></CONSID></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0013"><NO.P>13.</NO.P><TXT>Under Article 8 of that directive:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><PARAG IDENTIFIER="008.001"><NO.PARAG><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0021" REF.END="QE0021"/>1.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>Member States shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he or she is an applicant in accordance with Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20130626">26 June 2013</DATE> on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection ....</ALINEA></PARAG><?PAGE NO="4"?><PARAG IDENTIFIER="008.002"><NO.PARAG>2.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>When it proves necessary and on the basis of an individual assessment of each case, Member States may detain an applicant, if other less coercive alternative measures cannot be applied effectively.</ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="008.003"><NO.PARAG>3.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA><P>An applicant may be detained only:</P><P>…</P><LIST TYPE="alpha"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(f)</NO.P><TXT>in accordance with Article 28 of [the Dublin III Regulation].</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></ALINEA><ALINEA>The grounds for detention shall be laid down in national law.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0021" CODE="2019" ID="QE0021"/></ALINEA></PARAG></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>C –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Czech law</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0014"><NO.P>14.</NO.P><TXT>Paragraph 129(1) of Law No 326/1999 on the residence of foreign nationals in the Czech Republic and amending other laws on the residence of foreign nationals (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0022" REF.END="QE0022"/>the Law on the residence of foreign nationals<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0022" CODE="2019" ID="QE0022"/>) provides that <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0023" REF.END="QE0023"/>the police shall detain a foreign national who has entered or stayed in the Czech Republic illegally for the period of time necessarily required in order to secure transfer procedures in accordance with an international treaty concluded with another Member State of the European Union before <DATE ISO="20090113">13 January 2009</DATE> or with directly applicable legislation of the European Union<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0023" CODE="2019" ID="QE0023"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0015"><NO.P>15.</NO.P><TXT>At the time the order for reference was adopted, a legislative procedure was underway to amend Paragraph 129 of the Law on the residence of foreign nationals by inserting a fourth subparagraph, worded as follows:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><ALINEA><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0024" REF.END="QE0024"/>The police shall decide to detain a foreign national for the purpose of his transfer to a State bound by directly applicable legislation of the European Union only if there is a significant risk of absconding. There is considered to be a significant risk of absconding in particular where the foreign national has stayed in the Czech Republic illegally, has already avoided transfer to a State bound by directly applicable EU legislation, or has attempted to abscond or has expressed an intention not to comply with a final decision to transfer him to a State bound by directly applicable EU legislation, or if such an intention is apparent from his behaviour. There is also considered to be a significant risk of absconding where a foreign national who is to be transferred to a State bound by directly applicable EU legislation which is [not] immediately adjacent to the Czech Republic cannot lawfully travel to that State independently and cannot provide the address of a place of residence in the Czech Republic.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0024" CODE="2019" ID="QE0024"/></ALINEA></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0016"><NO.P>16.</NO.P><TXT>According to the Commission’s written observations, the Czech legislature adopted that amendment on <DATE ISO="20151111">11 November 2015</DATE>. At the hearing, the Czech Government confirmed that the amendment had been adopted.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>III –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">The dispute in the main proceedings, the question referred for a preliminary ruling, and the procedure before the Court</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0017"><NO.P>17.</NO.P><TXT>Salah Al Chodor and his two sons Ajlin and Ajvar Al Chodor (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0025" REF.END="QE0025"/>the Al Chodors<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0025" CODE="2019" ID="QE0025"/>), all of whom are Iraqi nationals, were subject to a police check carried out in the Czech Republic on <DATE ISO="20150507">7 May 2015</DATE>. Since the Al Chodors were unable to produce any documents proving their identities, the Policie České republiky, Krajské ředitelství [policie] Ústeckého kraje, odbor cizinecké policie (Foreigners Police Section, Regional Directorate of the Ústí nad Labem Region, Police Force of the Czech Republic) (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0026" REF.END="QE0026"/>the Foreigners Police Section<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0026" CODE="2019" ID="QE0026"/>) initiated an administrative procedure concerning them.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="5"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0018"><NO.P>18.</NO.P><TXT>During their interview with the Foreigners Police Section, the Al Chodors stated that they were of Kurdish origin and that their village had been invaded by fighters from the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0027" REF.END="QE0027"/>Islamic State<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0027" CODE="2019" ID="QE0027"/> terrorist organisation. The Al Chodors had crossed Turkey into Greece, from where they had continued their journey by lorry. In Hungary, the police detained them and made digital records of their fingerprints. Salah Al Chodor stated that he signed some documents at that point. The next day, the Al Chodors were taken to a railway station and directed to a refugee camp. They apparently left that camp two days later, with the intention of joining members of their family in Germany.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0019"><NO.P>19.</NO.P><TXT>After arresting the Al Chodors in the Czech Republic, the Foreigners Police Section consulted the Eurodac database and found that they had filed an application for asylum in Hungary. In addition, they did not have any residence permits or travel documents. They did not have either the financial means to pay for accommodation in the Czech Republic or any contact person capable of assisting them in that regard.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0020"><NO.P>20.</NO.P><TXT>The Foreigners Police Section considered that, since the Al Chodors had left the refugee camp in Hungary without awaiting a decision on their application for asylum, were aware that they were staying illegally, and had expressed an intention to continue their journey on to Germany, there was a significant risk that they would abscond. On the basis of that finding, and the belief that there were no other less coercive measures that could be applied in their case, the Foreigners Police Section, by decision of <DATE ISO="20150508">8 May 2015</DATE>, placed the Al Chodors in detention for a period of 30 days, pursuant to Paragraph 129(1) of the Law on the residence of foreign nationals, read in conjunction with Article 28 of the Dublin III Regulation. At the end of that period of detention, the Al Chodors were to be transferred to Hungary, that being the Member State responsible for examining their application for asylum under the Dublin III Regulation.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0021"><NO.P>21.</NO.P><TXT>The Krajský soud d’Ústí nad Labem (Regional Court, Ústí nad Labem, Czech Republic), hearing an action brought by the Al Chodors challenging that decision, annulled the decision. It held that, since the objective criteria for assessing the risk of absconding are not defined by Czech legislation as required by Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation, applicants cannot be detained in the Czech Republic on the basis of Article 28(2) of that regulation. The Regional Court thus followed the approach taken by the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, Germany)<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0005"><P>Bundesgerichtshof, <DATE ISO="20140626">26 June 2014</DATE>, V ZB 31/14.</P></NOTE> and the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Administrative Court, Austria).<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0006"><P>Verwaltungsgerichtshof, <DATE ISO="20150219">19 February 2015</DATE>, RO 2014/21/0075-5.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0022"><NO.P>22.</NO.P><TXT>The Al Chodors were released as soon as the decision of the Foreigners Police Section was annulled. They have since left the Czech Republic for an unknown destination.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0023"><NO.P>23.</NO.P><TXT>The Foreigners Police Section brought an appeal on a point of law before the Nejvyšší správní soud (Supreme Administrative Court) against the judgment of the Krajský soud d’Ústí nad Labem (Regional Court, Ústí nad Labem). According to the Foreigners Police Section, the mere fact that there are no provisions of national law defining the objective criteria for assessing the risk of absconding does not mean that Article 28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation is not applicable.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0024"><NO.P>24.</NO.P><TXT>The referring court therefore seeks to ascertain whether Article 28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, read in conjunction with Article 2(n) of that regulation and/or Paragraph 129(1) of the Law on the residence of foreign nationals, provides a sufficient legal basis in view of the fact that the national legislation lays down no objective criteria for assessing whether there is a risk of absconding. The referring court questions whether the recognition of such criteria in the established case-law of the higher courts, or indeed in administrative practice, satisfies the requirement in Article 2(n) of that regulation that those criteria be defined <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0028" REF.END="QE0028"/>by law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0028" CODE="2019" ID="QE0028"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="6"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0025"><NO.P>25.</NO.P><TXT>In that regard, that court refers to its own case-law concerning the interpretation of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0029" REF.END="QE0029"/>a significant risk of absconding<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0029" CODE="2019" ID="QE0029"/>, as reflected in several of its judgments. According to one such judgment, one objective criterion for assessing whether such a risk exists is a previous infringement of a Member State’s laws together with an infringement of EU law.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0007"><P>Judgment of <DATE ISO="20150610">10 June 2015</DATE>, čj. 2 Azs 49/2015-50.</P></NOTE> In another judgment, that court accepted other criteria, including the entry of the person concerned into the Schengen area without leave to remain, together with contradictory statements about that person’s entry into the Czech Republic and a general lack of credibility.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0008"><P>Judgment of <DATE ISO="20141204">4 December 2014</DATE>, čj. 9 Azs 199/2014-49.</P></NOTE> In two other judgments, the court recognised a person’s illegal entry into the Czech Republic or a person’s illegally staying there as objective criteria.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0009"><P>Judgments of <DATE ISO="20111123">23 November 2011</DATE>, čj. 7 As 79/2010-153, and of <DATE ISO="20150617">17 June 2015</DATE>, čj. 1 Azs 39/2015-56.</P></NOTE> In another judgment, the lack of documents proving identity was held to be an objective criterion.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0010"><P>Judgment of <DATE ISO="20141009">9 October 2014</DATE>, čj. 2 Azs 57/2014-30.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0026"><NO.P>26.</NO.P><TXT>In addition, the referring court observes that the practice followed by the Foreigners Police Section as regards detaining applicants under Article 28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation is foreseeable, not arbitrary and consistent with national legislation as interpreted by its established case-law. Moreover, each case is assessed individually.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0027"><NO.P>27.</NO.P><TXT>The referring court adds that the Czech legislature was planning to codify that case-law by amending the Law on the residence of foreign nationals so as to include a list of objective criteria for assessing the risk of absconding.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0028"><NO.P>28.</NO.P><TXT>In those circumstances, the Nejvyšší správní soud (Supreme Administrative Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0030" REF.END="QE0030"/>Does the [mere] fact that no objective criteria for assessment of a significant risk that a foreign national may abscond [within the meaning of Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation] have been defined in [national legislation] render detention under Article 28(2) of that regulation inapplicable?<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0030" CODE="2019" ID="QE0030"/></P></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0029"><NO.P>29.</NO.P><TXT>The Foreigners Police Section, the Czech, Greek and United Kingdom Governments and the European Commission have filed written observations. The Czech and United Kingdom Governments and the Commission were represented at the hearing on <DATE ISO="20160714">14 July 2016</DATE>.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>IV –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Analysis</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>A –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Preliminary observations</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0030"><NO.P>30.</NO.P><TXT>The factual context of the present case is emblematic of the phenomenon, widely observed in recent years, of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0031" REF.END="QE0031"/>secondary movements<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0031" CODE="2019" ID="QE0031"/> whereby numerous applicants for international protection move from the Member State responsible for processing their application in accordance with the criteria laid down in the Dublin III Regulation<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0011"><P>The criteria are, in hierarchical order: the existence of family links (Articles 8 to 11); possession of a visa or valid residence document issued by a Member State (Article 12); and entry (legal or illegal) into the territory of a Member State (Articles 13 to 15).</P></NOTE> (often the Member State of first entry)<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0012"><P>See European Commission, DG Migration and Home Affairs, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0032" REF.END="QE0032"/>Evaluation of the Dublin III Regulation — Final Report<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0032" CODE="2019" ID="QE0032"/>, <DATE ISO="20151204">4 December 2015</DATE>, p. 4.</P></NOTE> to another Member State where they wish to settle and apply for international protection.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0013"><P>See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of <DATE ISO="20160406">6 April 2016</DATE> (COM(2016) 197 final, p. 4).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="7"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0031"><NO.P>31.</NO.P><TXT>Faced with such migration, the Member State in which an applicant is present may request the Member State which it considers responsible under the Dublin III Regulation to take charge of that applicant, or to take him back.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0014"><P>Taking charge applies where the person concerned has not yet lodged an application for international protection in the requested Member State (Articles 20 to 23 of the Dublin III Regulation), while taking back applies where, as in the present case, the person concerned has lodged such an application before moving to the requesting Member State (Articles 24 to 27 of that regulation).</P></NOTE> If the requested Member State agrees to the request, the requesting Member State will transfer the applicant there in accordance with the procedure laid down in that regulation (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0033" REF.END="QE0033"/>the transfer procedure<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0033" CODE="2019" ID="QE0033"/>).<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0015"><P>Articles 29 to 33 of the Dublin III Regulation.</P></NOTE> In order to ensure that that procedure is implemented, the Dublin III Regulation permits, subject to strict guarantees, recourse to coercive measures such as detention<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0016"><P>Article 28 of the Dublin III Regulation.</P></NOTE> and supervised departure or departure under escort.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0017"><P>Second subparagraph of Article 29(1) of the Dublin III Regulation.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0032"><NO.P>32.</NO.P><TXT>Thus, Article 28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation — to which Article 8(3)(f) of the Reception Directive refers — authorises Member States to detain applicants, provided that three conditions are met.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0033"><NO.P>33.</NO.P><TXT>The first condition concerns the purpose of such a measure, and requires the measure to be implemented <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0034" REF.END="QE0034"/>when there is a significant risk of absconding … in order to secure transfer procedures on the basis of an individual assessment<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0034" CODE="2019" ID="QE0034"/>. Article 2(n) of that regulation defines the risk of absconding as <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0035" REF.END="QE0035"/>the existence of reasons in an individual case, which are based on objective criteria defined by law, to believe that an applicant … may abscond<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0035" CODE="2019" ID="QE0035"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0034"><NO.P>34.</NO.P><TXT>The second and third conditions concern, respectively, the proportionality of the detention and the need for it — that is, the absence of other less coercive measures that might effectively be taken instead.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0035"><NO.P>35.</NO.P><TXT>The question referred for a preliminary ruling concerns only the scope of the first of those conditions, more specifically the requirement that the objective criteria for establishing a risk of absconding must, in accordance with Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation, be <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0036" REF.END="QE0036"/>defined by law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0036" CODE="2019" ID="QE0036"/>. It does not concern the substantive validity of those criteria, whether or not they are objective and consistent with the requirements of proportionality, or whether the detention is necessary.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0036"><NO.P>36.</NO.P><TXT>For the reasons set out below, I believe that the objective criteria for assessing whether there is a risk of absconding must be defined in legislation, that is to say, in written rules of law that have been adopted by the legislature.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>B –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Minimum level of protection of the right to liberty of applicants arising from Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0037"><NO.P>37.</NO.P><TXT>Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation does not itself lay down the objective criteria for assessing the risk of absconding, referring instead in that regard to the national legal systems of the Member States.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0038"><NO.P>38.</NO.P><TXT>Certain language versions of that regulation, such as the Bulgarian, Spanish and German versions, use expressions in Article 2(n) which correspond to the French term <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0037" REF.END="QE0037"/>loi<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0037" CODE="2019" ID="QE0037"/> and, in principle, designate only legislation. Others, including the English, Polish and Slovak versions, use broader expressions corresponding to the French term <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0038" REF.END="QE0038"/>droit<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0038" CODE="2019" ID="QE0038"/>, which covers, according to its usual meaning, not only legislation but also other rules of law.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="8"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0039"><NO.P>39.</NO.P><TXT>In addition to this disparity between the various language versions of the same regulation, the referring court has emphasised, making reference to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, that even the word <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0039" REF.END="QE0039"/>law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0039" CODE="2019" ID="QE0039"/> does not lend itself to one unequivocal interpretation. Accordingly, the written observations and oral submissions made in the present case have, to a large extent, addressed the question whether observance of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR and interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights — which, in accordance with Article 6(3) TEU, form part of EU law as general principles<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0018"><P>See, inter alia, Opinion 2/13 of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20141218">18 December 2014</DATE> (<NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454">EU:C:2014:2454</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0179">179</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>). I would also point out that, under Article 52(3) of the Charter, the rights affirmed by the Charter, where they correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, have the same meaning and scope as those laid down by that convention. Accordingly, inasmuch as the rights provided for in Article 6 of the Charter are the rights guaranteed by Article 5 of the ECHR (see Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="C" NO.OJ="303" PAGE.FIRST="17" DATE.PUB="2007">OJ 2007 C 303, p. [17</REF.DOC.OJ>])), the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning Article 5 of the ECHR is to be taken into consideration for the purpose of interpreting Article 6 of the Charter (judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20160215">15 February 2016</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">N</HT></NAME.CASE>. (<NO.CASE>C‑601/15 PPU</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:84">EU:C:2016:84</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0044">44</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>)). However, Article 52(3) of the Charter is not to prevent EU law providing more extensive protection of those rights.</P></NOTE> — demands that the objective criteria for assessing the risk of absconding be defined in legislation.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0040"><NO.P>40.</NO.P><TXT>The Czech and United Kingdom Governments have argued that, according to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the concept of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0040" REF.END="QE0040"/>law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0040" CODE="2019" ID="QE0040"/>, as referred to in the ECHR,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0019"><P>The word <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0041" REF.END="QE0041"/>law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0041" CODE="2019" ID="QE0041"/> is used in Articles 8(2), 9(2), 10(2) and 11(2) of the ECHR, which require that any interference with the rights affirmed by those provisions must be <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0042" REF.END="QE0042"/>in accordance with the law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0042" CODE="2019" ID="QE0042"/> or <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0043" REF.END="QE0043"/>prescribed by law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0043" CODE="2019" ID="QE0043"/>. According to the European Court of Human Rights, that condition has the same effect as the condition that any interference with the right to liberty protected by Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR must be <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0044" REF.END="QE0044"/>in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0044" CODE="2019" ID="QE0044"/> and <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0045" REF.END="QE0045"/>lawful<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0045" CODE="2019" ID="QE0045"/> (ECtHR, <DATE ISO="19960625">25 June 1996</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Amuur</HT> <HT TYPE="ITALIC">v</HT>. <HT TYPE="ITALIC">France</HT> (CE:ECHR:1996:0625JUD001977692, § 50), and <DATE ISO="20090709">9 July 2009</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Mooren</HT> <HT TYPE="ITALIC">v</HT>. <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Germany</HT> (CE:ECHR:2009:0709JUD001136403, § 76)).</P></NOTE> is not limited to legislation, but also includes other sources of law, provided that they possess the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0046" REF.END="QE0046"/>substantive<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0046" CODE="2019" ID="QE0046"/> qualities of precision, foreseeability and accessibility.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0020"><P>See, inter alia, ECtHR, <DATE ISO="20010306">6 March 2001</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Dougoz</HT> <HT TYPE="ITALIC">v</HT>. <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Greece</HT> (CE:ECHR:2001:0306JUD004090798, § 55); <DATE ISO="20131021">21 October 2013</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Del Río Prada</HT> <HT TYPE="ITALIC">v</HT>. <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Spain</HT> (CE:ECHR:2013:1021JUD004275009, § 125); and <DATE ISO="20150901">1 September 2015</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Khlaifia and Others</HT> <HT TYPE="ITALIC">v</HT>. <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Italy</HT> (CE:ECHR:2015:0901JUD001648312, § 64).</P></NOTE> They have asserted that established case-law and consistent administrative practice possess those qualities in the present case.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0021"><P>I would observe that, in its judgment of <DATE ISO="20130411">11 April 2013</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Firoz Muneer</HT> <HT TYPE="ITALIC">v</HT>. <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Belgium</HT> (CE:ECHR:2013:0411JUD005600510, § 59 and 60), the European Court of Human Rights held that established case-law constituted a sufficient legal basis for prolonging the detention of a person under Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR. However, I am unaware of any case-law in which the European Court of Human Rights has regarded consistent administrative practice as a sufficient legal basis for interference with a fundamental right.</P></NOTE> The Greek Government and the Commission dispute those arguments.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0041"><NO.P>41.</NO.P><TXT>In addition, the Czech Government maintained at the hearing that the condition of lawfulness arising from Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR concerns, in any event, the sole <HT TYPE="ITALIC">legal basis</HT> for interference with the right to liberty of applicants, which is already present in Article 28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation. That condition does not, by contrast, apply to the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">restrictions</HT> imposed on that interference, which require the assessment of the risk of absconding to be supported by objective criteria.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0042"><NO.P>42.</NO.P><TXT>Without it being necessary to verify the accuracy of that last argument, I consider that the concept of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0047" REF.END="QE0047"/>law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0047" CODE="2019" ID="QE0047"/> as referred to in Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation, read in context and in the light of its specific purpose,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0022"><P>I would observe, in this connection, that where there is divergence between the language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of that text. See, in particular, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20110609">9 June 2011</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Eleftheri tileorasi and Giannikos</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑52/10</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:374">EU:C:2011:374</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0024">24</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited).</P></NOTE> has an independent meaning distinct from that of the concept of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0048" REF.END="QE0048"/>law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0048" CODE="2019" ID="QE0048"/> as referred to in the ECHR.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0043"><NO.P>43.</NO.P><TXT>I would emphasise, in that regard, that the provisions of the ECHR merely establish a minimum level of protection of fundamental rights and do not affect the possibility that EU law may provide more extensive protection of those rights.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0023"><P>See Article 53 of the ECHR and Article 52(3) of the Charter.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="9"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0044"><NO.P>44.</NO.P><TXT>I shall now endeavour to show that, by adopting the provisions of the Dublin III Regulation and the Reception Directive which restrict the Member States’ freedom to detain applicants, the EU legislature chose to provide more extensive protection of the right to liberty of those applicants than that arising from Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0045"><NO.P>45.</NO.P><TXT>I shall then go on to set out the reasons why the requirement that the criteria for assessing the risk of absconding be defined <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0049" REF.END="QE0049"/>by law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0049" CODE="2019" ID="QE0049"/> under Article 2(n) of that regulation forms part of that objective of more extensive protection and thus means that those criteria must be laid down in legislation.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>C –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Intention of the EU legislature to extend the protection of the right to liberty of applicants</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0046"><NO.P>46.</NO.P><TXT>One of the major advances brought about by the Dublin III Regulation and the Reception Directive is the extension of the guarantees which circumscribe the Member States’ freedom to detain applicants. As is stated in recital 15 of that directive, the EU legislature intended that the detention of those persons — which constitutes a particularly serious interference with their fundamental right to liberty guaranteed by Article 6 of the Charter<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0024"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20160215">15 February 2016</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">N</HT></NAME.CASE>. (<NO.CASE>C‑601/15 PPU</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:84">EU:C:2016:84</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0056">56</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), and, by analogy, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20110428">28 April 2011</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">El Dridi</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑61/11 PPU</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:268">EU:C:2011:268</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0042">42</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> — should be limited to <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0050" REF.END="QE0050"/>exceptional circumstances<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0050" CODE="2019" ID="QE0050"/>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0025"><P>The idea that detention should be exceptional is also apparent from the Guidelines of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum Seekers and Alternatives to Detention, in the version adopted during 2012, referred to by the Commission in its Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers (COM(2008) 815 final, p. 6, [second subparagraph of Section 3.4]).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0047"><NO.P>47.</NO.P><TXT>Accordingly, those legal instruments have significantly restricted the Member States’ discretion to deprive applicants who are subject to a transfer procedure of their liberty.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0048"><NO.P>48.</NO.P><TXT>Before those instruments entered into force, there was, under secondary EU law, only minimal regulation of the detention of such applicants. The regulation which preceded the Dublin III Regulation, namely Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0051" REF.END="QE0051"/>the Dublin II Regulation<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0051" CODE="2019" ID="QE0051"/>),<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0026"><P>Council Regulation of <DATE ISO="20030218">18 February 2003</DATE> establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="050" PAGE.FIRST="1" DATE.PUB="2003">OJ 2003 L 50, p. 1</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> contained no provisions on that subject. Consequently, the general guarantees laid down in Article 7(3) of the instrument which preceded the Reception Directive, namely Directive 2003/9/EC,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0027"><P>Council Directive of <DATE ISO="20030127">27 January 2003</DATE> laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="031" PAGE.FIRST="18" DATE.PUB="2003">OJ 2003 L 31, p. 18</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> applied. That provision stipulated that, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0052" REF.END="QE0052"/>when it proves necessary, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">for example</HT> for legal reasons or reasons of public order, Member States may confine an applicant to a particular place in accordance with their national law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0052" CODE="2019" ID="QE0052"/> (italics mine). The grounds on which an applicant could be deprived of his or her liberty were not, therefore, harmonised. In addition, Article 18(1) of the directive which preceded Directive 2013/32/EU (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0053" REF.END="QE0053"/>the Procedure Directive<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0053" CODE="2019" ID="QE0053"/>)<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0028"><P>Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20130626">26 June 2013</DATE> on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="180" PAGE.FIRST="60" DATE.PUB="2013">OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE>, namely Directive 2005/85/EC,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0029"><P>Council Directive of <DATE ISO="20051201">1 December 2005</DATE> on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="326" PAGE.FIRST="13" DATE.PUB="2005">OJ 2005 L 326, p. 13</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> specified that a person could not be held in detention for the sole reason that he or she was an applicant for asylum.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0049"><NO.P>49.</NO.P><TXT>The freedom of the Member States to detain applicants pending their transfer was also restricted by their obligations under Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0030"><P>I would reiterate that fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR and the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, form part of EU law as general principles (see point 39 of this Opinion).</P></NOTE> That provision authorises the Contracting Parties, in the exercise of their competence in the management of migratory flows, to restrict an individual’s liberty either to prevent him from entering the country unlawfully (the first limb) or where action is being taken with a view to that individual’s deportation or extradition (the second limb).</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="10"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0050"><NO.P>50.</NO.P><TXT>In some of its judgments,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0031"><P>ECtHR, <DATE ISO="20130411">11 April 2013</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Firoz Muneer v. Belgium</HT> (CE:ECHR:2013:0411JUD005600510, § 53), and <DATE ISO="20160712">12 July 2016</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">A. M. and Others v. France</HT> (CE:ECHR:2016:0712JUD002458712, § 64 and 65).</P></NOTE> the European Court of Human Rights has likened the detention of an applicant in the context of a procedure for his transfer to the Member State responsible for examining his application to the detention of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to his deportation or extradition, as provided for in the second limb of Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0032"><P>For arguments in support of the opposing view that the detention of applicants in the context of a transfer procedure does not fall within the scope of either of the limbs of Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR, see European Council on Refugees and Exiles, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0054" REF.END="QE0054"/>The Legality of Detention of Asylum Seekers under the Dublin III Regulation<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0054" CODE="2019" ID="QE0054"/>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">AIDA Legal Briefing</HT> No 1, June 2015, p. 7, and Costello, C., <HT TYPE="ITALIC">The Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in European Law</HT>, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, pp. 296 and 297.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0051"><NO.P>51.</NO.P><TXT>According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the detention of a person in the context of a deportation or extradition procedure is not subject to the condition that that measure is <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0055" REF.END="QE0055"/>necessary, for example to prevent the individual from … absconding<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0055" CODE="2019" ID="QE0055"/>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0033"><P>See, inter alia, ECtHR, <DATE ISO="19961115">15 November 1996</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Chahal v. United Kingdom</HT> (CE:ECHR:1996:1115JUD002241493, § 112 and 113); <DATE ISO="20140710">10 July 2014</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Rakhimov v. Russia</HT> (CE:ECHR:2014:0710JUD005055213, § 119 and 120); and <DATE ISO="20141127">27 November 2014</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Khomullo v. Ukraine</HT> (CE:ECHR:2014:1127JUD004759310, § 52).</P></NOTE> The compliance of a detention measure with Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR is therefore not conditional on the existence of a risk of absconding or on the absence of other less restrictive measures enabling the removal of the person concerned. All that is required in that regard is that action is being taken diligently with a view to removal.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0034"><P>The European Court of Human Rights recently refined that case-law, adding that <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0056" REF.END="QE0056"/>exceptionally, when a child is present, … the deprivation of liberty must be necessary to achieve the objective pursued, namely the family’s deportation<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0056" CODE="2019" ID="QE0056"/> (ECtHR, <DATE ISO="20160712">12 July 2016</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">A. B. [and Others] v. France</HT> (CE:ECHR:2016:0712JUD001159312, § 120)).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0052"><NO.P>52.</NO.P><TXT>By adopting the Dublin III Regulation and the Reception Directive, the EU legislature has decided in favour of providing more extensive protection of the right to liberty of applicants who are subject to a transfer procedure than that arising from Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0035"><P>I would nevertheless point out that, where the domestic law of a Contracting Party or EU law requires the observance of guarantees which go beyond the Contracting Party’s obligations under the ECHR, as is permitted by Article 53 thereof, the European Court of Human Rights <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0057" REF.END="QE0057"/>incorporates<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0057" CODE="2019" ID="QE0057"/> the observance of those guarantees into the condition that interference with that right must be lawful and itself endeavours to verify that they have been observed (see, inter alia, ECtHR, <DATE ISO="20081002">2 October 2008</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Rusu v. Austria</HT> (CE:ECHR:2008:1002JUD003408202, § 54 to 58); <DATE ISO="20150922">22 September 2015</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Nabil v. Hungary</HT> (CE:ECHR:2015:0922JUD006211612, § 31 and § 39 to 42); and <DATE ISO="20160705">5 July 2016</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">O. M. v. Hungary</HT> (CE:ECHR:2016:0705JUD000991215, § 47 to 52)).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0053"><NO.P>53.</NO.P><TXT>This is because, in the first place, Article 28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation permits the detention of such applicants only where there is a significant risk of their absconding. The detention of an applicant on the sole ground that a transfer procedure is underway is therefore prohibited, as is also apparent from Article 28(1) of that regulation.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0036"><P>Article 28(1) of the Dublin III Regulation thus differs from Article 27(1) of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (COM(2008) 820 final). The provision as proposed went no further than reiterating the principle, set out in Article 18(1) of Directive 2005/85, that no one may be held in detention <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0058" REF.END="QE0058"/>for the sole reason that he/she is an applicant for international protection<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0058" CODE="2019" ID="QE0058"/>. The provision as adopted appears to be stricter, inasmuch as neither the status of applicant (see recital 20 of the Dublin III Regulation) nor even the fact that a transfer procedure is underway justifies such a measure.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0054"><NO.P>54.</NO.P><TXT>In addition, the Reception Directive now sets out, in Article 8(3) thereof, an exhaustive list of the reasons why applicants may be held in detention. Those reasons include, in Article 8(3)(f), detention for the purposes of transfer in accordance with Article 28 of the Dublin III Regulation.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0055"><NO.P>55.</NO.P><TXT>In the second place, Article 28(2) of that regulation and Article 8(2) of the Reception Directive provide that detention is a measure of last resort that may be taken only in the absence of less coercive alterative measures.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="11"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0056"><NO.P>56.</NO.P><TXT>All the aforementioned provisions thus reflect the desire of the EU legislature to limit the detention of applicants to exceptional circumstances, as is apparent from recital 15 of the Reception Directive and as was emphasised by the Court in the judgment <HT TYPE="ITALIC">N</HT>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0037"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20160215">15 February 2016</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑601/15 PPU</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:84">EU:C:2016:84</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0052">52</REF.NP.ECR>, <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0056">56</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0063">63</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), concerning the detention of an applicant for reasons of public order or public security pursuant to Article 8(3)(e) of the Reception Directive.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0057"><NO.P>57.</NO.P><TXT>In my view, those considerations justify a restrictive interpretation of the provisions authorising the Member States to detain applicants. From that perspective, if there is any uncertainty as regards the interpretation of the term <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0059" REF.END="QE0059"/>law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0059" CODE="2019" ID="QE0059"/> used in Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation, preference should be given to the interpretation which results in greater protection of the right to liberty of applicants.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0058"><NO.P>58.</NO.P><TXT>As I shall explain below, listing the criteria for assessing the risk of absconding in a legislative text seems to me to be likely to increase the protection of applicants against arbitrary interference with their right to liberty. It also seems to me that this is necessary in order to achieve the dual objectives which, to my mind, are served by the requirement that those criteria be defined <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0060" REF.END="QE0060"/>by law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0060" CODE="2019" ID="QE0060"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>D –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Need for legislation which defines the criteria for assessing the risk of absconding in the light of the objectives pursued by Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>1.</NO.P><TXT>The dual objectives of the requirement that the criteria for assessing the risk of absconding be defined <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0061" REF.END="QE0061"/>by law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0061" CODE="2019" ID="QE0061"/></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0059"><NO.P>59.</NO.P><TXT>As defined in Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation, the risk of absconding comprises a subjective, fact-based aspect (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0062" REF.END="QE0062"/>in an individual case<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0062" CODE="2019" ID="QE0062"/>)<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0038"><P>The expression <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0063" REF.END="QE0063"/>on the basis of an individual assessment<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0063" CODE="2019" ID="QE0063"/> used in Article 28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation also reflects this requirement.</P></NOTE> and an objective, general aspect (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0064" REF.END="QE0064"/>[on the basis of] objective criteria defined by law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0064" CODE="2019" ID="QE0064"/>).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0060"><NO.P>60.</NO.P><TXT>That definition thus expresses two cumulative requirements: the competent authorities — namely the administrative or judicial authorities<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0039"><P>In accordance with Article 9(2) of the Reception Directive, detention measures are to be ordered in writing by administrative or judicial authorities.</P></NOTE> — are required to examine on a case-by-case basis all the individual, specific circumstances which characterise each applicant’s situation,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0040"><P>Accordingly, even where one or more of the criteria laid down in domestic law for assessing a risk of absconding have been fulfilled, that is not sufficient to establish a risk of the person in question absconding if his or her situation has not been assessed individually on a case-by-case basis (see, by analogy, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20140605">5 June 2014</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Mahdi</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑146/14 PPU</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:1320">EU:C:2014:1320</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0070">70</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0074">74</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>)).</P></NOTE> while ensuring that that examination is based on objective criteria defined generally and in the abstract.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0061"><NO.P>61.</NO.P><TXT>In that context, the requirement that the criteria for assessing the risk of absconding be defined <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0065" REF.END="QE0065"/>by law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0065" CODE="2019" ID="QE0065"/> indicates, in my view, a dual objective.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0062"><NO.P>62.</NO.P><TXT>First, it is intended to ensure that those criteria offer sufficient guarantees in terms of legal certainty. On this point, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court that measures taken by a Member State pursuant to a regulation, even where they relate to the exercise of the discretion conferred on the Member State by that regulation, must be consistent with the principle of legal certainty, as a general principle of EU law.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0041"><P>See, inter alia, judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20020620">20 June 2002</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Mulligan and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑313/99</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2002:386">EU:C:2002:386</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0046">46</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20110505">5 May 2011</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Kurt und Thomas Etling and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑230/09 and C‑231/09</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:271">EU:C:2011:271</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0074">74</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20141105">5 November 2014</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Cypra</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑402/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2333">EU:C:2014:2333</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0026">26</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> In my view, that principle applies in the present case because, when defining those criteria, the Member States are implementing Article 28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, read in conjunction with Article 2(n) thereof, in order to exercise the freedom to detain applicants conferred on them by the former provision.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="12"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0063"><NO.P>63.</NO.P><TXT>Second, that requirement is intended to ensure that the discretion enjoyed by the individual authorities responsible for applying the criteria for assessing a risk of absconding is exercised within a framework of certain pre-determined markers.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0064"><NO.P>64.</NO.P><TXT>Those objectives are also apparent from the preparatory work for Directive 2008/115/EC (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0066" REF.END="QE0066"/>the Return Directive<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0066" CODE="2019" ID="QE0066"/>),<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0042"><P>Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20081216">16 December 2008</DATE> on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="348" PAGE.FIRST="98" DATE.PUB="2008">OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> Article 3(7) of which contains a definition of the risk of absconding that is almost identical to the definition given in Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation (except that those provisions concern, respectively, persons subject to a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0067" REF.END="QE0067"/>return procedure<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0067" CODE="2019" ID="QE0067"/> and persons subject to a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0068" REF.END="QE0068"/>transfer procedure<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0068" CODE="2019" ID="QE0068"/>).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0065"><NO.P>65.</NO.P><TXT>Although the Return Directive does not apply to applicants for international protection<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0043"><P>This is true, more specifically, from the making of an application for international protection until the adoption of a decision at first instance on that application or, as the case may be, until the outcome of any action brought against that decision is known (judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20130530">30 May 2013</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Arslan</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑534/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2013:343">EU:C:2013:343</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0049">49</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>)) (see point 67 of this Opinion).</P></NOTE> and although detention for the purposes of removal under that directive and the detention of applicants for international protection thus fall under different legal rules,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0044"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20091130">30 November 2009</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Kadzoev</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑357/09 PPU</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2009:741">EU:C:2009:741</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0045">45</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> I believe that the preparatory work relating to that directive may help to shed some light on how to interpret Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation. That provision was clearly inspired by Article 3(7) of the Return Directive, which it reproduces almost verbatim. Indeed, there is no evidence in the preparatory work for the Dublin III Regulation of any debate having taken place concerning the definition of the risk of absconding set out in Article 2(n) of that regulation.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0045"><P>However, the [European] Economic and Social Committee has made certain observations concerning that definition (Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee, SOC/333, <DATE ISO="20090716">16 July 2009</DATE>, p. 7).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0066"><NO.P>66.</NO.P><TXT>I would add that the level of risk that must be reached in order to justify a detention measure varies depending on which instrument applies. Article 15(1)(a) of the Return Directive makes detention for the purposes of removal conditional on the existence of a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0069" REF.END="QE0069"/>risk of absconding<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0069" CODE="2019" ID="QE0069"/>. Article 28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, by contrast, requires there to be a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0070" REF.END="QE0070"/>significant risk of absconding<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0070" CODE="2019" ID="QE0070"/> if an applicant is to be deprived of his or her liberty pending a transfer.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0067"><NO.P>67.</NO.P><TXT>In addition, unlike the return procedure, the transfer procedure applies to applicants whose presence in the territory of the requesting Member State is lawful. Under Article 9(1) of the Procedure Directive, as recalled in recital 9 of the Return Directive, an applicant has the right to remain in the territory of the Member State in which he or she has made an application until the adoption of a decision at first instance on that application or, as the case may be, until the outcome of any action brought against that decision is known.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0046"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20130530">30 May 2013</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Arslan</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑534/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2013:343">EU:C:2013:343</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0048">48</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0049">49</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>). Applicants are not, therefore, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0071" REF.END="QE0071"/>staying illegally<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0071" CODE="2019" ID="QE0071"/> within the meaning of the Return Directive and consequently cannot be deported from the Union unless and until their application has been rejected. That is also a consequence of the principle of non-refoulement affirmed by Article 33 of the Geneva Convention of <DATE ISO="19510728">28 July 1951</DATE> relating to the status of refugees, to which Article 18 of the Charter refers.</P></NOTE> That is the case even if the Member State in question considers that it is not responsible for processing the application and, pursuant to the Dublin III Regulation, requests another Member State to take charge of the applicant.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0047"><P>Applicants have the right to remain not only in the Member State in which their application is being examined, but also in the Member State in which the application was lodged (judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20120927">27 September 2012</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Cimade and GISTI</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑179/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2012:594">EU:C:2012:594</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0048">48</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>)).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0068"><NO.P>68.</NO.P><TXT>In those circumstances, the guarantees provided for in the Return Directive which circumscribe the detention of persons who are to be removed should, to my mind, apply <HT TYPE="ITALIC">a fortiori</HT> to the detention of applicants who are subject to a transfer procedure.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="13"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0069"><NO.P>69.</NO.P><TXT>However, I would observe that, during the procedure for adopting that directive, the Commission’s initial proposal contained no definition of the risk of absconding.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0048"><P>Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (COM (2005) 391 final) (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0072" REF.END="QE0072"/>the proposal for the Return Directive<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0072" CODE="2019" ID="QE0072"/>).</P></NOTE> The definition was introduced in the report of the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0073" REF.END="QE0073"/>the LIBE Committee<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0073" CODE="2019" ID="QE0073"/>), which nevertheless confined itself to requiring that the risk should be assessed on the basis of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0074" REF.END="QE0074"/>individual and objective criteria<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0074" CODE="2019" ID="QE0074"/>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0049"><P>Report of <DATE ISO="20070920">20 September 2007</DATE> on the proposal for the Return Directive, A6-0339/2007, 2005/0167(COD), PE 374.321, [Amendment 19]. Various amendments had been suggested, referring to <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0075" REF.END="QE0075"/>serious grounds, to be defined on an individual and objective basis and assessed by the courts<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0075" CODE="2019" ID="QE0075"/> (Opinion of <DATE ISO="20070622">22 June 2007</DATE> of the Committee on Development for the LIBE Committee on the proposal for the Return Directive, 2005/0167(COD), PE 386.728, [Amendment 19]), <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0076" REF.END="QE0076"/>criteria defined by national law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0076" CODE="2019" ID="QE0076"/> (draft report of <DATE ISO="20060613">13 June 2006</DATE> of the LIBE Committee on the proposal for the Return Directive, 2005/0167(COD), PE 374.321v02-00, p. 9) and <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0077" REF.END="QE0077"/>objective criteria laid down by law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0077" CODE="2019" ID="QE0077"/> (amendment of <DATE ISO="20060927">27 September 2006</DATE> to the draft report of the LIBE Committee, 2005/0167(COD), PE 378.672v01-00, p. 23).</P></NOTE> The Parliament’s position at first reading, as approved by the Council, replaced this with the expression <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0078" REF.END="QE0078"/>objective criteria defined by law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0078" CODE="2019" ID="QE0078"/>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0050"><P>Position of the European Parliament of <DATE ISO="20080618">18 June 2008</DATE> adopted at first reading, EP-PE_TC1-COD(2005)00167, PE 400.777, p. 13.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0070"><NO.P>70.</NO.P><TXT>That choice of words, when the Commission’s proposal placed no restrictions on the assessment of the risk of absconding and the LIBE Committee’s report referred only to <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0079" REF.END="QE0079"/>individual and objective criteria<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0079" CODE="2019" ID="QE0079"/> without specifying the source of those criteria, cannot be regarded as insignificant.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0051"><P>I would point out in this connection that, in clause 2 of the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded on <DATE ISO="19990318">18 March 1999</DATE> and set out in the annex to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of <DATE ISO="19990628">28 June 1999</DATE> concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="175" PAGE.FIRST="43" DATE.PUB="1999">OJ 1999 L 175, p. 43</REF.DOC.OJ>), to which the United Kingdom Government has made reference, the EU legislature chose to refer, for the purposes of defining a certain concept, to both legislation and other sources of domestic law, without making any distinction. On that occasion, the legislature referred not merely to <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0080" REF.END="QE0080"/>law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0080" CODE="2019" ID="QE0080"/> but to the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0081" REF.END="QE0081"/>law, collective agreements or practice<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0081" CODE="2019" ID="QE0081"/> in each Member State.</P></NOTE> In my view, it constitutes evidence of a desire to ensure that the criteria used in any individual assessment of the risk of absconding are foreseeable and to counterbalance the powers of the authorities responsible for making that assessment by requiring their assessment to be based on objective criteria of a general and abstract nature.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>2.</NO.P><TXT>Need for legislation which defines the criteria for assessing the risk of absconding in order to achieve those objectives</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0071"><NO.P>71.</NO.P><TXT>The achievement of either of the objectives I have mentioned is dependent, in my view, on the objective criteria for assessing the risk of absconding being defined in a legislative text.</TXT></NP.ECR><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>a)</NO.P><TXT>Objective of ensuring legal certainty</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0072"><NO.P>72.</NO.P><TXT>The principle of legal certainty means, in essence, that measures adopted by the Member States in order to implement EU law must enable the individuals concerned to ascertain the scope of their rights and obligations and to foresee the consequences of their actions.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0052"><P>See, to that effect, judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20020620">20 June 2002</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Mulligan and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑313/99</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2002:386">EU:C:2002:386</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0047">47</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20040325">25 March 2004</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Azienda Agricola Ettore Ribaldi and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑480/00, C‑482/00, C‑484/00, C‑489/00 to C‑491/00 and C‑497/00 to C‑499/00</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2004:179">EU:C:2004:179</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0085">85</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> As the Court has previously held,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0053"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20020620">20 June 2002</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Mulligan and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑313/99</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2002:386">EU:C:2002:386</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0048">48</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> the observance of that principle depends not only on the content of the measures adopted, but also, where appropriate, on the nature of the instrument chosen for that purpose.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0073"><NO.P>73.</NO.P><TXT>Since it seems to me neither appropriate nor even possible to assess in the abstract the relative merits, in terms of legal certainty, of legislation, case-law and administrative practice, I shall focus my analysis on the specific circumstances which characterise the case in the main proceedings.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="14"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0074"><NO.P>74.</NO.P><TXT>As I have explained in point 25 of this Opinion, the established case-law to which the national court refers consists in a series of judgments delivered by that court, each of which lays down one or more criteria for assessing whether there is a risk of absconding. The presentation of those criteria is therefore fragmentary.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0075"><NO.P>75.</NO.P><TXT>That also suggests that the criteria in question have been acknowledged by that court on a case-by-case basis, depending on the individual circumstances of each of the cases brought before it. In that regard, the Czech Government admitted at the hearing that administrative practice and case-law could develop as experience brings to light other criteria relevant to the assessment of a risk of absconding. Thus, criteria initially identified in the course of administrative practice might subsequently be endorsed in case-law.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0076"><NO.P>76.</NO.P><TXT>That being so, I doubt whether the administrative practice and the case-law in question, even if well established, offer sufficient guarantees in terms of foreseeability. That is all the more debateable having regard to the particularly serious nature of the interference with the fundamental rights of applicants which a detention measure represents — interference which, moreover, the EU legislature intended should be limited to exceptional cases.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0054"><P>See point 46 of this Opinion.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0077"><NO.P>77.</NO.P><TXT>Indeed, if the criteria for assessing the risk of absconding could be derived from an administrative practice or, as the case may be, from case-law endorsing that practice, then those criteria might fluctuate as that administrative practice develops. They might even, in such a situation, lack the stability necessary to be regarded as being <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0082" REF.END="QE0082"/>defined<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0082" CODE="2019" ID="QE0082"/>, as is required by Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0078"><NO.P>78.</NO.P><TXT>In addition, the Czech Government expressed doubts at the hearing as to whether the administrative practice giving rise to those criteria had been publicised. In the absence of publicity measures, it cannot be guaranteed that the individuals concerned would have access to that administrative practice. Indeed, the Court has held in that regard that mere administrative practices, which by their nature are alterable at will by the authorities and are not given appropriate publicity, do not have the clarity and precision necessary to satisfy the requirement of legal certainty.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0055"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20020620">20 June 2002</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Mulligan and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑313/99</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2002:386">EU:C:2002:386</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0047">47</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited). In another context, the Court held that a restriction of the right to an effective remedy, affirmed in Article 47 of the Charter, infringed that provision because it was set out in an administrative committee’s manual (judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20140917">17 September 2014</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Liivimaa Lihaveis</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑562/12</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2229">EU:C:2014:2229</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0074">74</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>)).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0079"><NO.P>79.</NO.P><TXT>Admittedly, as has been observed by the United Kingdom Government, defining the criteria for assessing the risk of absconding in a written law does not provide an absolute guarantee of legal certainty either, given that an individual, specific assessment of the risk is required. Nevertheless, laying down criteria in legislation to guide that assessment does, in my view, offer better guarantees in terms of stability and therefore legal certainty. Moreover, I believe it was precisely in order to limit the risk of individual administrative and judicial authorities exercising their discretion arbitrarily that the EU legislature called for that discretion to be circumscribed by statutory criteria.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0056"><P>See points 81 to 84 of this Opinion.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0080"><NO.P>80.</NO.P><TXT>Furthermore, some might object that the rights of applicants would be better protected by established case-law or an established administrative practice which has identified criteria that are precise and rigid than by a piece of legislation laying down criteria that are vague and lax. In order to avoid any confusion in that regard, I would reiterate that the question referred for a preliminary ruling concerns only the requirements relating to the normative source of the criteria for assessing the risk of absconding. It does not therefore concern the separate issue of the content of those criteria.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0057"><P>See point 35 of this Opinion.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="15"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>b)</NO.P><TXT>Objective of circumscribing the administrative and judicial authorities’ discretion</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0081"><NO.P>81.</NO.P><TXT>The adoption of legislation, in addition to providing advantages in terms of legal certainty, offers additional assurances in terms of external control of the discretion of the administrative and judicial authorities responsible for assessing the risk of absconding and, where appropriate, ordering the detention of applicants.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0082"><NO.P>82.</NO.P><TXT>Given the particularly serious nature of the interference with the fundamental right to liberty represented by a detention order and the EU legislature’s desire to limit that interference to exceptional circumstances,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0058"><P>See point 46 of this Opinion.</P></NOTE> the discretion of those authorities should be circumscribed in such a way as will best guard applicants against arbitrary deprivations of liberty. From that perspective, I believe it is important that the content of the criteria in the abstract and their actual application in a specific case be determined by institutionally separate authorities.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0083"><NO.P>83.</NO.P><TXT>That is, in my view, the true significance of the two-fold requirement (for an individual assessment and for that assessment to be based on pre-defined, objective criteria) arising from Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation. First, that provision requires the administrative and judicial authorities to take the circumstances of each specific case into consideration. Second, it ensures that the discretion of the individual authority concerned is channelled by means of general, abstract criteria that have been determined in advance by a third authority.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0084"><NO.P>84.</NO.P><TXT>In my view, those considerations permit a finding that the requirement that the objective criteria for assessing the risk of absconding be defined <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0083" REF.END="QE0083"/>by law<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0083" CODE="2019" ID="QE0083"/> remains unsatisfied where those criteria are established not in legislation but under an administrative practice or in case-law.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0059"><P>Whereas my assessment of the first of the objectives pursued by this requirement (legal certainty) is closely linked to the specific context of the present case, my conclusion concerning the second objective (circumscribing the discretion of individual administrative and judicial authorities) applies regardless of the characteristics of the administrative practice or case-law in question.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0085"><NO.P>85.</NO.P><TXT>In corroboration of that view, I would add, first of all, that the approach I am recommending is consistent with that followed by the Commission in its <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0084" REF.END="QE0084"/>Return Handbook<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0084" CODE="2019" ID="QE0084"/> regarding the interpretation of Article 3(7) of the Return Directive.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0060"><P>Annex to the Commission Recommendation of <DATE ISO="20151001">1 October 2015</DATE> establishing a common <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0085" REF.END="QE0085"/>Return Handbook<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0085" CODE="2019" ID="QE0085"/> to be used by Member States’ competent authorities when carrying out return related tasks (C(2015) 6250 final, p. 11). Regarding the relationship between the Return Directive and the Dublin III Regulation so far as detention measures are concerned, see points 65 and 66 of this Opinion.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0086"><NO.P>86.</NO.P><TXT>Next, most of the Member States seem to acknowledge that Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation requires them to define the criteria for assessing the risk of absconding in their legislation if they wish to have recourse to detention measures, as can be seen from the answers to two questionnaires sent to the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0086" REF.END="QE0086"/>NCPs<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0086" CODE="2019" ID="QE0086"/> (national contact points) of the Member States in surveys carried out by the European Migration Network.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0061"><P>Ad-Hoc Query on detention in Dublin III cases, available at the following address: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/ad-hoc-queries/protection/590_emn_ahq_on_detention_in_dublin_cases_en.pdf, and Ad-Hoc Query on objective criteria to identify risk of absconding in the context of reception directive art 8 (recast) and Dublin regulation no 604/2014 art 28 (2), available at the following address: http://emn.ypes.gr/images/docs/EMN_QUERIES/EMN_QUERIES_2014/2014_619_emn_ahq_on_objective_criteria_to_identify_risk_of_absconding_%28wider_diss%29.pdf. The European Migration Network was set up by Council Decision 2008/381/EC of <DATE ISO="20080514">14 May 2008</DATE> establishing a European Migration Network (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="131" PAGE.FIRST="7" DATE.PUB="2008">OJ 2008 L 131, p. 7</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> The majority of respondents stated that, in 2014, their national legislation either already defined the objective criteria for assessing the risk of absconding for the purposes of Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation, or was in the process of being amended to that effect. That was the case for the Czech Republic, whose legislation was amended in this way after the present request for a preliminary ruling was submitted.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0062"><P>See point 16 of this Opinion.</P></NOTE> Only the United Kingdom’s NCP disputed the requirement for those criteria to be defined in legislation.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="16"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0087"><NO.P>87.</NO.P><TXT>Lastly, several national courts subscribe to that interpretation. In particular, the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) has held that that provision requires the grounds on which it may be concluded that there is a risk of absconding to be determined by legislation in a manner which is foreseeable and subject to scrutiny (case-law being insufficient in that regard).<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0063"><P>Bundesgerichtshof, <DATE ISO="20140626">26 June 2014</DATE>, V ZB 31/14.</P></NOTE> The Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Administrative Court) also delivered a judgment to that effect, expressly stating in addition that there was no need to refer a question for a preliminary ruling because no other interpretation was possible.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0064"><P>Verwaltungsgerichtshof, <DATE ISO="20150219">19 February 2015</DATE>, RO 2014/21/0075-5.</P></NOTE> Similarly, the Cour administrative (Higher Administrative Court, Luxembourg) has emphasised that Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation refers to provisions of a legislative nature.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0065"><P>Cour administrative du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, <DATE ISO="20161006">6 October 2016</DATE>, roll no 35301C. See also the judgments of the Tribunal administratif (Administrative Court, Luxembourg), Second Chamber, <DATE ISO="20150305">5 March 2015</DATE>, roll no 35902, and Third Chamber, <DATE ISO="20151224">24 December 2015</DATE>, roll no 37301.</P></NOTE> The Raad van State (Council of State, Netherlands), for its part, held that the risk of absconding within the meaning of Article 3(7) of the Return Directive<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0066"><P>Regarding the relationship between Article 3(7) of the Return Directive and Article 2(n) of the Dublin III Regulation, see points 65 and 66 of this Opinion.</P></NOTE> had to be based on objective criteria defined by legislation, an administrative practice being insufficient in that regard.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0067"><P>Raad van State, <DATE ISO="20110321">21 March 2011</DATE>, BP9284, 201100555/1/V3.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>V –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Conclusion</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0088"><NO.P>88.</NO.P><TXT>Having regard to all of the foregoing, I propose that the answer to the question referred for a preliminary ruling by the Nejvyšší správní soud (Supreme Administrative Court, Czech Republic) should be as follows:</TXT><P>Article 2(n) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20130626">26 June 2013</DATE> establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, read in conjunction with Article 28(2) of that regulation, is to be interpreted as meaning that a Member State may not detain an applicant for international protection for the purpose of securing a procedure for his or her transfer to another Member State if the former Member State has not defined in its legislation the objective criteria for assessing the risk of absconding, even if those criteria are apparent from the case-law or the administrative practice of that Member State.</P></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></CONTENTS.CONCLUSION></CONCLUSION>