<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><CONCLUSION NNC="YES" xmlns:fmx="http://opoce" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://formex.publications.europa.eu/schema/formex-05.55-20141201.xd"><BIB.CONCLUSION><REF.CASE FILE="n.a."><NO.CASE>C‑263/14</NO.CASE></REF.CASE><NO.CELEX>62014CC0263</NO.CELEX><NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:729">EU:C:2015:729</NO.ECLI><NO.SEQ>0001</NO.SEQ><PAGE.FIRST.ECR>1</PAGE.FIRST.ECR><PAGE.SEQ>1</PAGE.SEQ><PAGE.LAST.ECR>18</PAGE.LAST.ECR><PAGE.TOTAL>18</PAGE.TOTAL></BIB.CONCLUSION><CURR.TITLE><PAGE.HEADER><P>OPINION OF MRS KOKOTT — CASE C‑263/14</P><P>PARLIAMENT v COUNCIL</P></PAGE.HEADER></CURR.TITLE><TITLE><TI><P><HT TYPE="UC">Opinion of Advocate General</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="UC">Kokott</HT></P><P>delivered on <DATE ISO="20151028">28 October 2015</DATE><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0001"><P>Original language: German.</P></NOTE></P></TI><STI><P>Case C‑263/14</P><P>European Parliament</P><P>v</P><P><HT TYPE="BOLD">Council of the European Union</HT></P></STI></TITLE><INDEX><KEYWORD>Action for annulment</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Council Decision 2014/198/CFSP</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Operation Atalanta</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Agreement between the European Union and the United Republic of Tanzania</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Transfer of suspected pirates and seized property from the European Union-led naval force to Tanzania</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Choice of correct legal basis</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Common foreign and security policy (CFSP, Article 37 TEU)</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation (Articles 82 TFEU and 87 TFEU)</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Rights of the European Parliament to have a say where <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0001" ID="QS0001"/>international agreements relate exclusively to the CFSP<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0001" CODE="2019" ID="QE0001"/> (Article 218(6) TFEU)</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Provision of immediate and full information to the Parliament (Article 218(10) TFEU)</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Maintenance of the effects of the decision</KEYWORD></INDEX><CONTENTS.CONCLUSION><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>I –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Introduction</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0001"><NO.P>1.</NO.P><TXT>Is the transfer of a pirate by the European Union to the State authorities of the United Republic of Tanzania primarily an act of foreign and security policy? Or does such a measure also include significant elements of international cooperation between police and law enforcement authorities? These are essentially the legal questions which the Court is asked to clarify in the present case. In doing so, it will be able to build on the foundations which it laid in Case C‑658/11.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0002"><P>Judgment in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑658/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025">EU:C:2014:2025</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0002"><NO.P>2.</NO.P><TXT>Like Case C‑658/11, this case also concerns the military operation through which the European Union has for some time now been participating in the fight against piracy off the Somali coast in the form of an EU-led naval force. In many cases the persons arrested and property seized by the EU Member States’ warships are transferred to third States in that region with a view to a prosecution. In order to establish the detailed arrangements for such transfers, the Union has concluded international agreements with those third States — in Case C‑685/11 with Mauritius and in this case with Tanzania.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="2"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0003"><NO.P>3.</NO.P><TXT>In the present case the European Parliament is again at odds with the Council of the European Union over the choice of the substantive legal basis for the conclusion of such agreements. Whilst the Council based its Decision 2014/198/CFSP<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0003"><P>Council Decision 2014/198/CFSP of <DATE ISO="20140310">10 March 2014</DATE> on the signing and conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the United Republic of Tanzania on the conditions of transfer of suspected pirates and associated seized property from the European Union-led naval force to the United Republic of Tanzania (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="108" PAGE.FIRST="1" DATE.PUB="2014">OJ 2014 L 108, p. 1</REF.DOC.OJ>), also <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0002" ID="QS0002"/>the contested decision<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0002" CODE="2019" ID="QE0002"/>.</P></NOTE> approving the agreement with Tanzania<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0004"><P><REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="108" PAGE.FIRST="3" DATE.PUB="2014">OJ 2014 L 108, p. 3</REF.DOC.OJ>; also <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0003" ID="QS0003"/>the disputed agreement<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0003" CODE="2019" ID="QE0003"/>.</P></NOTE> <HT TYPE="ITALIC">solely</HT> on the rules on the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), namely on Article 37 TEU, the Parliament takes the view that recourse should have been had <HT TYPE="ITALIC">additionally</HT> to the provisions on judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation, more specifically, Articles 82 TFEU and 87 TFEU.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0004"><NO.P>4.</NO.P><TXT>At first sight this might all seem a question of technical detail which certainly does not hold the same excitement as many literary treatments of the subject of piracy.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0005"><P>I am thinking in particular of the stories about the character of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Long John Silver</HT> in <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0004" ID="QS0004"/>Treasure Island<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0004" CODE="2019" ID="QE0004"/> (Robert Louis Stevenson) and of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0005" ID="QS0005"/>El Trato de Argel<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0005" CODE="2019" ID="QE0005"/> (Miguel de Cervantes), but also of children’s stories like <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0006" ID="QS0006"/>Pippi Langstrumpf in Taka-Tuka-Land<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0006" CODE="2019" ID="QE0006"/> (Astrid Lindgren) and <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0007" ID="QS0007"/>Jim Button and the Wild 13<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0007" CODE="2019" ID="QE0007"/> (Michael Ende).</P></NOTE> Nevertheless, the problem at issue here has considerable political and even constitutional implications because it is necessary to define more sharply the limits of the common foreign and security policy and to delimit it from other European Union policies.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0006"><P>See also Opinion of Advocate General Bot in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑658/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:41">EU:C:2014:41</NO.ECLI>, points <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0004">4</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0005">5</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> The choice of the substantive legal basis predetermines, to a significant degree, the powers of the European Parliament. If it transpires that the disputed agreement is to be attributed exclusively to the CFSP, as it was here, and could therefore be concluded solely on the basis of Article 37 TEU, the Parliament had no rights at all to have a say under the first part of the second subparagraph of Article 218(6) TFEU, not even a right of consultation. If, however, recourse should rightly have been had to a combination of Article 37 TEU and Articles 82(1) and (2) and 87(2) TFEU as the legal bases, the disputed agreement would have required the consent of the Parliament under point (a)(v) of the second subparagraph of Article 218(6) TFEU. The scope of the European Commission’s powers in the procedure for the conclusion of such an international agreement is also dependent to a considerable extent on the choice of legal basis.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0005"><NO.P>5.</NO.P><TXT>The debate over the choice of the correct legal basis forms the main subject-matter of this action for annulment which the Parliament has brought against the Council. However, the parties are also in dispute over the extent of the Council’s duty under Article 218(10) TFEU to inform the Parliament fully and immediately at all stages of the procedure for the conclusion of an international agreement.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>II –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Legislative framework</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0006"><NO.P>6.</NO.P><TXT>The legislative framework of this case is formed by Articles 216 and 218 TFEU, both contained in Title V of the FEU Treaty, which is dedicated to <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0008" ID="QS0008"/>International agreements<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0008" CODE="2019" ID="QE0008"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0007"><NO.P>7.</NO.P><TXT>Article 216(1) TFEU summarises the substantive legal bases on which the Union has been able to conclude international agreements since the Treaty of Lisbon:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><ALINEA><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0009" ID="QS0009"/>The Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or international organisations where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union’s policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0009" CODE="2019" ID="QE0009"/></ALINEA></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="3"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0008"><NO.P>8.</NO.P><TXT>Article 218 TFEU governs the procedure for negotiating and concluding international agreements and includes the following provisions:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0010" ID="QS0010"/>…</P><PARAG IDENTIFIER="218.004"><NO.PARAG>4.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>The Council may address directives to the negotiator and designate a special committee in consultation with which the negotiations must be conducted.</ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="218.005"><NO.PARAG>5.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>The Council, on a proposal by the negotiator, shall adopt a decision authorising the signing of the agreement and, if necessary, its provisional application before entry into force.</ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="218.006"><NO.PARAG>6.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA><P>The Council, on a proposal by the negotiator, shall adopt a decision concluding the agreement.</P><P>Except where agreements relate exclusively to the common foreign and security policy, the Council shall adopt the decision concluding the agreement:</P><LIST TYPE="alpha"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(a)</NO.P><TXT>after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament in the following cases:</TXT><P>…</P><P><LIST TYPE="alpha"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(v)</NO.P><TXT>agreements covering fields to which either the ordinary legislative procedure applies, or the special legislative procedure where consent by the European Parliament is required.</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></P><P>The European Parliament and the Council may, in an urgent situation, agree upon a time-limit for consent.</P></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(b)</NO.P><TXT>after consulting the European Parliament in other cases. ...</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></ALINEA></PARAG><P>…</P><PARAG IDENTIFIER="218.010"><NO.PARAG>10.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>The European Parliament shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure.</ALINEA></PARAG><P>…<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0010" CODE="2019" ID="QE0010"/></P></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0009"><NO.P>9.</NO.P><TXT>From the point of view of substantive law, Article 37 TEU, which appears in Chapter 2 of Title V of the EU Treaty (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0011" ID="QS0011"/>Common foreign and security policy<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0011" CODE="2019" ID="QE0011"/>) and is contained in Section 1 (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0012" ID="QS0012"/>Common provisions<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0012" CODE="2019" ID="QE0012"/>), is also relevant. That provision states:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><ALINEA><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0013" ID="QS0013"/>The Union may conclude agreements with one or more States or international organisations in areas covered by this Chapter.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0013" CODE="2019" ID="QE0013"/></ALINEA></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0010"><NO.P>10.</NO.P><TXT>Reference should also be made to Articles 82 TFEU and 87 TFEU, which are part of Title V of the FEU Treaty on the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0014" ID="QS0014"/>Area of freedom, security and justice<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0014" CODE="2019" ID="QE0014"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0011"><NO.P>11.</NO.P><TXT>Article 82 TFEU concerns judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Under the second subparagraph of Article 82(1), the European Parliament and the Council may adopt <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0015" ID="QS0015"/>measures<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0015" CODE="2019" ID="QE0015"/> in the ordinary legislative procedure, inter alia, to</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><ALINEA><P><LIST TYPE="DASH"><ITEM><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0016" ID="QS0016"/>support the training of the judiciary and judicial staff<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0016" CODE="2019" ID="QE0016"/> (point (c)) and to</P></ITEM><ITEM><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0017" ID="QS0017"/>facilitate cooperation between judicial or equivalent authorities of the Member States in relation to proceedings in criminal matters and the enforcement of decisions<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0017" CODE="2019" ID="QE0017"/> (point (d)).</P></ITEM></LIST></P></ALINEA></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="4"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0012"><NO.P>12.</NO.P><TXT>Furthermore, the second subparagraph of Article 82(2) TFEU permits the European Parliament and the Council in the ordinary legislative procedure to adopt directives to establish certain minimum rules for criminal procedure concerning inter alia</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><ALINEA><P><LIST TYPE="DASH"><ITEM><P>mutual admissibility of evidence between Member States (point (a)) and</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>the rights of individuals in criminal procedure (point (b)).</P></ITEM></LIST></P></ALINEA></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0013"><NO.P>13.</NO.P><TXT>Article 87 TFEU concerns police cooperation. Under Article 87(2)(a), the European Parliament and the Council may, for the purposes of developing such cooperation, establish measures in the ordinary legislative procedure concerning the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant information.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>III –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Background to the dispute</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0014"><NO.P>14.</NO.P><TXT>In view of the rising incidence of piracy off the Somali coast, at the end of 2008 the Council adopted, within the framework of the EU common foreign and security policy, a Joint Action<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0007"><P>Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of <DATE ISO="20081110">10 November 2008</DATE> on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="301" PAGE.FIRST="33" DATE.PUB="2008">OJ 2008 L 301, p. 33</REF.DOC.OJ>), as amended by Joint Action 2010/766/CFSP (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="327" PAGE.FIRST="49" DATE.PUB="2010">OJ 2010 L 327, p. 49</REF.DOC.OJ>) and Joint Action 2012/174/CFSP (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="089" PAGE.FIRST="69" DATE.PUB="2012">OJ 2012 L 89, p. 69</REF.DOC.OJ>); <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0018" ID="QS0018"/>the Joint Action<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0018" CODE="2019" ID="QE0018"/>.</P></NOTE> establishing a joint military operation called Operation Atalanta. The operation consisted in the deployment of an EU-led naval force (EU NAVFOR) for the protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast and the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0015"><NO.P>15.</NO.P><TXT>It is apparent from Article 1(1) of the Joint Action, that, through that military operation, which was decided on the basis of Articles 14, 25(3) and 28(3) EU,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0008"><P>Treaty on European Union as amended by the Treaty of Nice.</P></NOTE> the Union is supporting the objectives set by the United Nations Security Council in its Resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838, 1846 and 1851 (2008) and also refers to Article 100 et seq. of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0009"><P>The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was signed in Montego Bay on <DATE ISO="19821210">10 December 1982</DATE>. The European Union and all its Member States are Contracting Parties to the Convention. Under Article 100 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, all States are to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State. Article 105 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea permits the seizure of pirate ships or aircraft and the arrest of persons and seizure of property on board; that provision also allows penalties to be imposed by the courts of the State which seized a pirate ship or aircraft. Lastly, Article 107 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea regulates which State ships and aircraft are entitled to seize ships and aircraft on account of piracy.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0016"><NO.P>16.</NO.P><TXT>The mandate of EU NAVFOR under Article 2(e) of the Joint Action includes <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0019" ID="QS0019"/>in view of prosecutions potentially being brought by the relevant States … [to] arrest, detain and transfer persons suspected of intending, as referred to in Articles 101 and 103 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to commit, committing or having committed acts of piracy or armed robbery<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0019" CODE="2019" ID="QE0019"/> and to <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0020" ID="QS0020"/>seize the vessels of the pirates or armed robbers or the vessels caught following an act of piracy or an armed robbery and which are in the hands of the pirates or armed robbers, as well as the property on board<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0020" CODE="2019" ID="QE0020"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0017"><NO.P>17.</NO.P><TXT>According to the first sentence of Article 10(3) of the Joint Action, the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0021" ID="QS0021"/>detailed modalities for the participation by third States<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0021" CODE="2019" ID="QE0021"/> in the activity of EU NAVFOR are <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0022" ID="QS0022"/>the subject of agreements concluded in accordance with … Article 37 [TEU]<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0022" CODE="2019" ID="QE0022"/>. In addition, Article 10(6) of the Joint Action states:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><ALINEA><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0023" ID="QS0023"/>The conditions for the transfer to a State participating in the operation of persons arrested and detained, with a view to the exercise of jurisdiction of that State, shall be established when the participation agreements referred to in paragraph 3 are concluded or implemented.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0023" CODE="2019" ID="QE0023"/></ALINEA></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="5"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0018"><NO.P>18.</NO.P><TXT>Article 12 of the Joint Action then sets out general conditions under which EU NAVFOR transfers the arrested persons to European Union Member States or to third States if the Member State or the third State of which the EU NAVFOR vessel concerned flies the flag cannot, or does not wish to, exercise its jurisdiction. The aim is prosecution with due regard to certain minimum standards. Under Article 12(3) of the Joint Action, the transfer of persons to a third State requires that <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0024" ID="QS0024"/>the conditions for the transfer have been agreed with that third State in a manner consistent with relevant international law, notably international law on human rights, in order to guarantee in particular that no one shall be subjected to the death penalty, to torture or to any cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0024" CODE="2019" ID="QE0024"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0019"><NO.P>19.</NO.P><TXT>Against this background, following authorisation by the Council on <DATE ISO="20100322">22 March 2010</DATE>, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy negotiated the agreement with Tanzania on the conditions of transfer of suspected pirates and associated seized property from the European Union-led naval force to Tanzania, which is the subject of the present dispute.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0010"><P>Alongside the negotiations with Tanzania negotiations were also opened with Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa and Uganda.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0020"><NO.P>20.</NO.P><TXT>By the contested decision, which has Article 37 TEU as its sole substantive legal basis and Article 218(5) and (6) TFEU as its formal legal basis,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0011"><P>See the first citation in the preamble to the contested decision.</P></NOTE> the Council approved the agreement on behalf of the Union without the consent or consultation of the Parliament and authorised its signature. The agreement was then signed on <DATE ISO="20140401">1 April 2014</DATE>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0021"><NO.P>21.</NO.P><TXT>The Parliament takes the view that, in respect of the contested decision, recourse should also have been had, alongside Article 37 TEU, to Articles 82 TFEU and 87 TFEU as additional substantive legal bases and the decision therefore required its consent in accordance with point (a)(v) of the second subparagraph of Article 218(6) TFEU.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0022"><NO.P>22.</NO.P><TXT>As regards provision of information to the Parliament, the Council notified that institution by letter of <DATE ISO="20100322">22 March 2010</DATE> of its decision to authorise negotiations with a view to an agreement under Article 37 TEU. The Council did not provide the Parliament with any information on the further progress of the negotiations. It was not until the procedure had been concluded that the Council informed the Parliament, by letter of <DATE ISO="20140319">19 March 2014</DATE>, that it had approved the disputed agreement and authorised its signature, although it did not apprise the Parliament of the wording of the contested decision or the text of the disputed agreement. The Parliament was able to ascertain their content only following the publication of the decision and the agreement in the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Official Journal of the European Union</HT> on <DATE ISO="20140411">11 April 2014</DATE>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0023"><NO.P>23.</NO.P><TXT>In the Parliament’s view, the Council did not therefore properly fulfil its duty under Article 218(10) TFEU to inform the representative body of the people immediately and fully.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>IV –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Procedure before the Court and forms of order sought</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0024"><NO.P>24.</NO.P><TXT>By written pleading of <DATE ISO="20140528">28 May 2014</DATE>, the Parliament brought the present action for annulment under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0025"><NO.P>25.</NO.P><TXT>Pursuant to Article 131(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the President of the Court of Justice granted the European Commission leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the Parliament and granted the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the Council.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="6"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0026"><NO.P>26.</NO.P><TXT>The Parliament, supported by the Commission, claims that the Court should:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="DASH"><ITEM><P>annul Council Decision 2014/198/CFSP of <DATE ISO="20140310">10 March 2014</DATE>;</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>order that the effects of that decision be maintained until it is replaced, and</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>order the Council to pay the costs.</P></ITEM></LIST></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0027"><NO.P>27.</NO.P><TXT>The Council, likewise supported by its interveners, contends that the Court should dismiss the application as unfounded. Furthermore, the Council and the Czech Republic claim that the Parliament should be ordered to pay the costs.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0028"><NO.P>28.</NO.P><TXT>Should the contested decision be annulled, the Council further requests the Court to maintain effects of that decision</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="DASH"><ITEM><P>either until such time as it is replaced, if the annulment is based on a finding that the choice of legal basis is incorrect in accordance with the first plea in law,</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>or indefinitely, if the annulment is based solely on a finding that the Parliament was not informed adequately in accordance with the second plea in law.</P></ITEM></LIST></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0029"><NO.P>29.</NO.P><TXT>The Czech Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland also expressly ask that in the event of the annulment of the contested decision,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0012"><P>The Kingdom of Sweden does not expressly request that the effects of the contested decision be maintained but it can be inferred from its statements that it supports the Council’s claim to that effect.</P></NOTE> its effects should be maintained; in that connection the Czech Republic simply requests that the Court use its power under the second paragraph of Article 264 TFEU, whilst the United Kingdom requests it to take the same course of action as in its judgment in Case C‑658/11.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0030"><NO.P>30.</NO.P><TXT>The Court received written submissions on the Parliament’s action,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0013"><P>Whilst most of the parties make observations in their written pleadings on both pleas in law, the Czech Republic confines its observations to the second plea, whereas the Kingdom of Sweden and the Commission concentrate on the first plea.</P></NOTE> followed by oral argument on <DATE ISO="20150922">22 September 2015</DATE>.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>V –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">The relevant provisions of the disputed agreement</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0031"><NO.P>31.</NO.P><TXT>According to Article 1, the disputed agreement defines the conditions and modalities for the transfer of suspected pirates detained by EU NAVFOR, and associated property seized by EU NAVFOR, to Tanzania, and the conditions for their treatment after such transfer.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0032"><NO.P>32.</NO.P><TXT>The second sentence of Article 3(1) of the agreement provides that agreement on acceptance of a handover proposed by EU NAVFOR will be made on a case-by-case basis by Tanzania, taking into account all relevant circumstances including the location of the incident.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0033"><NO.P>33.</NO.P><TXT>Under Article 3(3) and Article 4(1) of the agreement, the parties must treat the persons concerned, both prior to and following transfer, humanely and in accordance with international human rights obligations, including the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, the prohibition of unlawful detention, and in accordance with the requirement to have a fair trial. The second part of Article 4(1) of the agreement further states that transferred persons must receive reasonable accommodation and nourishment and access to medical treatment and must be able to carry out religious observance.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="7"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0034"><NO.P>34.</NO.P><TXT>Further rights of transferred persons are laid down in Article 4(2) to (7) of the agreement, in particular the right to an impartial tribunal and to trial within a reasonable time or to release.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0035"><NO.P>35.</NO.P><TXT>Under Article 5 of the agreement, no transferred person may be tried for an offence which has a maximum punishment that is more severe than imprisonment for life.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0036"><NO.P>36.</NO.P><TXT>Article 6 of the agreement regulates EU NAVFOR’s duties to keep records in connection with the persons and property concerned and the way in which records are to be provided to the Tanzanian authorities.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0037"><NO.P>37.</NO.P><TXT>Article 7 of the agreement deals with the Union and EU NAVFOR obligation to facilitate investigation and prosecution by the Tanzanian judicial authorities.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0038"><NO.P>38.</NO.P><TXT>Lastly, regard should be had to the preamble to the agreement, which expressly mentions the Joint Action. Reference is also made to various instruments of international law, in particular the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>VI –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Legal assessment</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0039"><NO.P>39.</NO.P><TXT>The Parliament’s action for annulment is based on two pleas in law, the first of which relates to the choice of the correct legal basis for the contested decision (see below, section B), whilst the second concerns the Council’s duty to inform the Parliament fully and immediately at all stages of the procedure for the conclusion of an international agreement (see below, section C).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0040"><NO.P>40.</NO.P><TXT>Before I turn to the substantive assessment of these two pleas in law, I will briefly consider the Court’s jurisdiction to hear the present case (see immediately below, section A).</TXT></NP.ECR><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>A –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The Court’s jurisdiction</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0041"><NO.P>41.</NO.P><TXT>In principle, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union has, since the Treaty of Lisbon, extended to all areas of EU law, the EU Courts being authorised to interpret all rules of EU law and to review the legality of all acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union (first subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, first paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and first paragraph of Article 267 TFEU).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0042"><NO.P>42.</NO.P><TXT>In derogation from that principle, the Court of Justice of the European Union does not have jurisdiction either with respect to the provisions of primary law relating to the CFSP or with respect to acts adopted on the basis of those provisions (see the sixth sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU in conjunction with the first paragraph of Article 275 TFEU). However, the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU makes an exception in so far as it establishes the jurisdiction of the EU Courts inter alia to monitor compliance with Article 40 TEU.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0043"><NO.P>43.</NO.P><TXT>It is precisely the latter <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0025" ID="QS0025"/>exception to the exception<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0025" CODE="2019" ID="QE0025"/> that is the subject of the Parliament’s first plea in law, which focuses on the choice of the correct legal basis. Even though, regrettably, the Parliament does not at any point refer expressly to Article 40 TEU, it clearly has in mind, from a substantive point of view, the problem addressed therein of the demarcation between the CFSP on the one hand and the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0026" ID="QS0026"/>communitarised<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0026" CODE="2019" ID="QE0026"/> policies on the other. If, as the Parliament claims, the Council wrongly based the contested decision solely on the CFSP, rather than additionally relying on the rules on judicial<?PAGE NO="8"?> cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation, it would have encroached on the powers of the other institutions in the area of freedom, security and justice, which is prohibited under the first paragraph of Article 40 TEU and may be reviewed by the Court under the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0044"><NO.P>44.</NO.P><TXT>The second plea in law raised by the Parliament is based on the general duty to provide information under Article 218(10) TFEU, a rule which — as the Court has already held in Case C‑658/11<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0014"><P>Judgment in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑658/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025">EU:C:2014:2025</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0072">72</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0073">73</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); see also the <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE>Opinion of Advocate General Bot in that case</NAME.CASE> (<NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:41">EU:C:2014:41</NO.ECLI>, points <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0137">137</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0138">138</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> — is <HT TYPE="ITALIC">not</HT> as such among the provisions of primary law relating to the CFSP in Chapter 2 of Title V of the EU Treaty, but applies across the board to all Union procedures for the conclusion of international agreements. Consequently, that rule is <HT TYPE="ITALIC">not</HT> affected by the limitation on the Court’s jurisdiction which applies to the CFSP under the sixth sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU in conjunction with the first paragraph of Article 275 TFEU.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0045"><NO.P>45.</NO.P><TXT>The Czech Republic requests the Court, in the present case, to reconsider, and if necessary nuance, its conclusions with regard to Article 218(10) TFEU as set out in the judgment in Case C‑658/11.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0046"><NO.P>46.</NO.P><TXT>However, contrary to the view taken by the Czech Republic, it certainly cannot be inferred from the sixth sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU in conjunction with the first paragraph of Article 275 TFEU that the Court has only limited jurisdiction to hear an action based on Article 218(10) TFEU, such that it would have to confine itself simply to <HT TYPE="ITALIC">declaring</HT> a breach of the duty to inform the Parliament without <HT TYPE="ITALIC">annulling</HT> the contested decision.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0047"><NO.P>47.</NO.P><TXT>The Court either has jurisdiction or it does not. Exceptions to its jurisdiction require an express provision and must be given a strict interpretation. Neither in the sixth sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU nor in the first paragraph of Article 275 TFEU are there any gradations in respect of the EU Courts’ powers to deal with actions for annulment concerning Article 40 TEU or Article 218(10) TFEU.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0015"><P>Only in respect of reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures is the Court’s jurisdiction expressly limited under the second alternative in the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU to proceedings brought in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0048"><NO.P>48.</NO.P><TXT>Aside from this, it would be incompatible with the nature of the action for annulment to deliver a declaratory judgment, as the Czech Republic appears to have in mind. It would be contrary to Article 264 TFEU, which governs the legal consequences of a successful action and reflects the cassatory nature of the action for annulment. There are no grounds to waive Article 264 TFEU on the basis of either the sixth sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU or the first paragraph of Article 275 TFEU.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0049"><NO.P>49.</NO.P><TXT>All in all, the Court therefore has full jurisdiction to determine the present action, including the possible annulment of the contested decision.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0016"><P>See also the judgment in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑658/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025">EU:C:2014:2025</NO.ECLI>, in particular paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0087">87</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>B –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The choice of the correct legal basis (first plea in law)</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0050"><NO.P>50.</NO.P><TXT>By its first plea in law, which is the main focus of this case, the Parliament challenges the legal basis chosen by the Council for the contested decision.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0051"><NO.P>51.</NO.P><TXT>The Parliament submits that it was an error in law to base the decision solely on the CFSP, and on Article 37 TEU to be precise. In the Parliament’s view, recourse should also have been had to Articles 82 TFEU and 87 TFEU, two provisions in the fields of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation, as additional legal bases. The Parliament thus ultimately advocates a<?PAGE NO="9"?> dual substantive legal basis, combining powers from the CFSP with powers from the area of freedom, security and justice. If a combination of legal bases from these two policy areas is impossible, because the respective procedures are mutually incompatible, the Parliament considers only Articles 82 TFEU and 87 TFEU to be relevant, as it stated at the hearing.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0017"><P>Further still, the Commission takes the view that the contested decision falls exclusively in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, with the result that Article 82 TFEU alone is a possible enabling provision.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><P>Preliminary remark</P></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0052"><NO.P>52.</NO.P><TXT>It has already been made clear in case-law that a European Union measure — including a decision approving an international agreement<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0018"><P>See in particular the judgments in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑94/03</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2006:2">EU:C:2006:2</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0055">55</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0056">56</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>) and <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">United Kingdom</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑81/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2449">EU:C:2014:2449</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0035">35</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> — may have a dual substantive legal basis. This is necessary wherever it is established that the measure concerned simultaneously pursues a number of objectives, or has several components, which are inseparably linked without one being incidental to the other, so that various provisions of the Treaty are equally applicable.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0019"><P>Judgments in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑130/10</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2012:472">EU:C:2012:472</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0043">43</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0044">44</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑377/12</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:1903">EU:C:2014:1903</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0034">34</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), and <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑658/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025">EU:C:2014:2025</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0043">43</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0053"><NO.P>53.</NO.P><TXT>Contrary to the view taken by the Council and its interveners, the Court has certainly not thus far rejected the possibility of such a dual legal basis in a case like the present one. In particular, the judgment in Case C‑658/11 does not set a precedent in this regard.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0054"><NO.P>54.</NO.P><TXT>That judgment does concern an international agreement — the agreement with Mauritius — whose content was essentially similar to the disputed agreement in this case. However, in that judgment the Court did not take a definitive view on the correct substantive legal basis, because on that occasion, unlike in the present case, the applicant, the Parliament, had not challenged the exclusive applicability of Article 37 TEU and even acknowledged that the approval of the EU/Mauritius agreement <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0027" ID="QS0027"/>could legitimately be founded solely on Article 37 TEU, to the exclusion of any other substantive legal basis<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0027" CODE="2019" ID="QE0027"/>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0020"><P>See the Court’s statements on the submissions of the parties in the judgment in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑658/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025">EU:C:2014:2025</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0044">44</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0045">45</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> Accordingly, in Case C‑658/11 the Court concentrated on the interpretation of the special procedural rule in the first part of the second subparagraph of Article 218(6) TFEU, based on the complaints raised by Parliament at the time.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0055"><NO.P>55.</NO.P><TXT>Even if it were to be assumed, like the Council and its interveners, that the Court has helped to determine the question of the correct substantive legal basis at least implicitly in Case C‑658/11,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0021"><P>The Council and its interveners rely in this regard in particular on paragraphs 58, 59 and 62 of the judgment in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑658/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025">EU:C:2014:2025</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> that would not permit a definitive assessment of the complaint raised by the Parliament in the present case. It is settled law that, in a review of the legal basis of the decision that is contested here, the legal basis used for the adoption of other European Union measures which might display similar characteristics is irrelevant.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0022"><P>Judgments in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑94/03</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2006:2">EU:C:2006:2</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0050">50</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑658/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025">EU:C:2014:2025</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0048">48</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); and <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">United Kingdom</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑81/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2449">EU:C:2014:2449</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0036">36</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); see also the judgment in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">United Kingdom</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑431/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2013:589">EU:C:2013:589</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0066">66</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0056"><NO.P>56.</NO.P><TXT>Consequently, in the present case an autonomous examination must be conducted of the choice of the substantive legal basis for the contested decision, including the possibility of a dual legal basis for that decision.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="10"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0057"><NO.P>57.</NO.P><TXT>It is by no means impossible to rely on legal bases other than the CFSP for the Union’s external action as the Parliament and the Commission argue. For example, it is expressly recognised in Article 21(3) TEU that, in addition to the CFSP, the Union’s other policies can include <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0028" ID="QS0028"/>external aspects<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0028" CODE="2019" ID="QE0028"/>. It is therefore perfectly conceivable, in principle, to have recourse, for the approval of an international agreement for the European Union, to competences in the area of freedom, security and justice or to have a dual substantive legal basis by exercising additional competences.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0058"><NO.P>58.</NO.P><TXT>That conclusion is not affected by the fact that the provisions of primary law concerning the area of freedom, security and justice — in particular the two relevant chapters of the FEU Treaty on judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation — do not include express enabling provisions for external action.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0023"><P>One exception, which is not relevant here, is Article 79(3) TFEU, which contains an express legal basis for the conclusion of agreements for the readmission of illegally resident third-country nationals to their countries of origin or provenance.</P></NOTE> As we know, the Union institutions may, under certain circumstances, also have implicit external competences. Such powers were originally derived from the existing competences for internal action in accordance with the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0029" ID="QS0029"/>ERTA principle<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0029" CODE="2019" ID="QE0029"/>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0024"><P>The ERTA principle stems from the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT> (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0030" ID="QS0030"/><HT TYPE="ITALIC">ERTA</HT><QUOT.END REF.START="QS0030" CODE="2019" ID="QE0030"/>, <REF.DOC.ECR><NO.CASE>22/70</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1971:32">EU:C:1971:32</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0015">15</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0019">19</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); a recent overview can be found, for example, in Opinion <REF.DOC.ECR><NO.CASE>1/03</NO.CASE> (<NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2006:81">EU:C:2006:81</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0114">114</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0133">133</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> Such external competences are now even expressly enshrined in the Treaties by Article 216(1) TFEU. If recourse is now had to the ERTA principle, Article 216(1) TFEU must also therefore be expressly cited in the Union measure concerned.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0025"><P>See my Opinion in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">United Kingdom</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑81/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2114">EU:C:2014:2114</NO.ECLI>, point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0104">104</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); earlier, to the same effect, my Opinion in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">United Kingdom</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑431/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2013:187">EU:C:2013:187</NO.ECLI>, points <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0064">64</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0070">70</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0059"><NO.P>59.</NO.P><TXT>The assessment whether additional legal bases from the fields of judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Article 82 TFEU) and police cooperation (Article 87 TFEU) were necessary in the case in point must, according to settled case-law, have regard to objective factors amenable to judicial review, which include in particular the aim and content of the contested decision,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0026"><P>Judgments in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑300/89</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1991:244">EU:C:1991:244</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0010">10</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑130/10</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2012:472">EU:C:2012:472</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0042">42</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); and <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">United Kingdom</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑81/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2449">EU:C:2014:2449</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0035">35</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> but also the context of that decision.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0027"><P>Judgments in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">United Kingdom</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑431/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2013:589">EU:C:2013:589</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0048">48</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">United Kingdom</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑656/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:97">EU:C:2014:97</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0050">50</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); and <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">United Kingdom</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑81/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2449">EU:C:2014:2449</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0038">38</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><P>Insufficient connection with the area of freedom, security and justice</P></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0060"><NO.P>60.</NO.P><TXT>If regard is had only to the content of the disputed agreement, the Parliament and the Commission are right in stating that it contains a number of provisions that are typical of cross-border judicial cooperation in criminal matters and cross-border police cooperation. It deals with the transfer of persons and property for the purpose of prosecution<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0028"><P>Article 3(1) and (2) of the disputed agreement.</P></NOTE> and the rights of the persons concerned with a view to humane treatment in accordance with the rule of law.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0029"><P>Articles 3(3), 4 and 5 of the disputed agreement.</P></NOTE> The agreement also governs the duties of the Union and EU NAVFOR in relation to records and notifications<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0030"><P>Article 6 of the disputed agreement.</P></NOTE> and the form in which they provide assistance to the competent Tanzanian authorities with a view to investigating and prosecuting transferred persons.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0031"><P>Article 7 of the disputed agreement.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0061"><NO.P>61.</NO.P><TXT>Against this background, the content of the disputed agreement undoubtedly has a certain affinity with the subject-matter regulated in the area of freedom, security and justice, in particular with regard to cooperation between authorities in relation to proceedings in criminal matters (point (d) of the second subparagraph of Article 82(1) TFEU), the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange<?PAGE NO="11"?> of relevant information (Article 87(2)(a) TFEU), the mutual recognition of evidence (point (a) of the second subparagraph of Article 82(2) TFEU), the rights of individuals in criminal procedure (point (b) of the second subparagraph of Article 82(2) TFEU), and the training of personnel of the competent authorities (point (c) of the second subparagraph of Article 82(1) TFEU).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0062"><NO.P>62.</NO.P><TXT>It would be insufficient, however, to conclude solely from this similar content that recourse should have been had to Articles 82 TFEU and 87 TFEU as additional legal bases for the contested decision. The rules concerning the area of freedom, security and justice are not necessarily the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">sedes materiae</HT> in every case where measures having some connection with the subjects of judicial cooperation in criminal matters or police cooperation are to be adopted.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0032"><P>See the judgment in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament and Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑43/12</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:298">EU:C:2014:298</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0045">45</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0050">50</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); to the same effect — in relation to the definition of the rights of third-country nationals within the Union — judgments in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">United Kingdom</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑431/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2013:589">EU:C:2013:589</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0062">62</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0067">67</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>) and <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">United Kingdom</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑81/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2449">EU:C:2014:2449</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0040">40</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0046">46</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0063"><NO.P>63.</NO.P><TXT>As the Council and the Kingdom of Sweden very rightly state, the crucial factor is that the relevant rules in Articles 82 TFEU and 87 TFEU deal only with cooperation <HT TYPE="ITALIC">within the Union</HT>. This can be seen, on the one hand, from a glance at the wording of the two provisions,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0033"><P>They refer to <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0031" ID="QS0031"/>judicial cooperation in criminal matters <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in the Union</HT><QUOT.END REF.START="QS0031" CODE="2019" ID="QE0031"/> (Article 82(1) TFEU) and <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0032" ID="QS0032"/>police cooperation involving all the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Member States’ competent authorities</HT><QUOT.END REF.START="QS0032" CODE="2019" ID="QE0032"/> (Article 87(1) TFEU); my emphasis.</P></NOTE> but, on the other, it also follows from the concept of the area of freedom, security and justice, to the creation of which they contribute. It is the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Union</HT> that provides <HT TYPE="ITALIC">its citizens</HT> with such an area and it is the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Union</HT> that <HT TYPE="ITALIC">constitutes</HT> that area (Article 67(1) TFEU), with the emphasis on an area <HT TYPE="ITALIC">without internal frontiers</HT> (Article 3(2) TEU and 67(2) TFEU).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0064"><NO.P>64.</NO.P><TXT>By contrast, the contested decision — or the disputed agreement which it approves — does not regulate judicial or police cooperation within the Union. Nor does it affect or alter such cooperation in accordance with the last variant of Article 216(1) TFEU. Rather, contrary to the claim made by the Parliament and the Commission, the Member States’ power to prosecute international crimes like piracy is completely unaffected by the agreement. The sole subject of the agreement is cooperation with the authorities of Tanzania, a third State, and then only if the authorities of the Member States do not take on the prosecution themselves.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0034"><P>See the second indent of Article 12(1) of the Joint Action.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0065"><NO.P>65.</NO.P><TXT>There may certainly be cases where cooperation with a third State is also capable of helping to achieve the objectives of the area of freedom, security and justice within the Union (see the second variant of Article 216(1) TFEU) and thus of giving that area a genuine <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0033" ID="QS0033"/>external dimension<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0033" CODE="2019" ID="QE0033"/>. Examples are the inclusion of Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland in the Schengen area or the Lugano Convention, which includes some of those States in certain aspects of judicial cooperation in civil matters. However, external action has no evident repercussions on the area within the Union in the case of cooperation like that with Tanzania, for which the contested decision and the disputed agreement lay the legal foundations.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0066"><NO.P>66.</NO.P><TXT>That cooperation between the Union and Tanzania is intended solely to promote <HT TYPE="ITALIC">international security</HT> outside the territory of the Union. It makes an important contribution to combating piracy on the high seas in an effective and sustainable manner and thus to improving the general security situation worldwide if suspected pirates are effectively brought to a just prosecution in accordance with the rule of law.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0067"><NO.P>67.</NO.P><TXT>On the other hand, a specific connection with <HT TYPE="ITALIC">security within the European Union</HT> or with the national security of its Member States is not evident. It would be only very indirect if it did exist, as the cooperation with Tanzania does not seek to combat and prosecute piracy off European coasts, but in the much more distant Horn of Africa, off the Somali coast.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="12"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0068"><NO.P>68.</NO.P><TXT>Nor can an internal Union dimension be inferred from the mere fact that suspected pirates who are to be transferred to the Tanzanian authorities by EU NAVFOR are temporarily on board EU Member States’ warships and are detained there. Although the persons concerned are thus temporarily subject to the sovereignty of the Member States and are therefore also able to benefit from guarantees laid down by EU law, in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0035"><P>See to this effect the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, in particular the judgments of <DATE ISO="20141204">4 December 2014</DATE>, Samatar and Others v France (Applications No 17110/10 and 17301/10, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2014:1204JUD001711010, paragraphs 41 to 59) and Hassan and Others v France (Applications No 46695/10 and 54588/10, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2014:1204JUD004669510, paragraphs 60 to 72 and 86 to 104), which each concern Article 5 ECHR.</P></NOTE> this does not mean that they come within the territory of the Union and thus within the geographical scope of the area of freedom, security and justice.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0069"><NO.P>69.</NO.P><TXT>For the same reason, the present case is also not comparable with the situation of a readmission agreement in accordance with Article 79(3) TFEU. The latter case — unlike this instance — concerns the transfer to third States of persons who have resided illegally <HT TYPE="ITALIC">within</HT> the territory of the Union.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><P>Foundation of the disputed agreement in the CFSP</P></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0070"><NO.P>70.</NO.P><TXT>Ultimately, the cooperation with Tanzania has a genuine foreign and security policy context. It is a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0034" ID="QS0034"/>mission outside the Union<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0034" CODE="2019" ID="QE0034"/> <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0035" ID="QS0035"/>strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0035" CODE="2019" ID="QE0035"/>, the conduct of which the Union has set as an objective within the framework of the CFSP or, to be precise, within the framework of its common security and defence policy (second sentence of Article 42(1) TEU and 43(1) TEU).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0071"><NO.P>71.</NO.P><TXT>According to its preamble and the preamble to the contested decision, the disputed agreement serves to implement several United Nations Security Council resolutions and clarifies the legal conditions for EU NAVFOR’s activity as part of Operation Atalanta,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0036"><P>See in particular Articles 10(6) and 12(3) of the Joint Action.</P></NOTE> a joint military action falling within the scope <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ratione materiae</HT> of the CFSP.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0072"><NO.P>72.</NO.P><TXT>The fact that the disputed agreement stipulates humane treatment of detained persons and certain principles connected with the rule of law as basic conditions for the cooperation with Tanzania does not in any way militate against its attribution to the CFSP. The rule of law and protection of human rights are, in general, among the principles governing the Union’s external action which are to be observed and implemented not only, but also within the framework of the CFSP (first subparagraph of Article 21(1), Article 21(2)(b) and (3) TEU).<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0037"><P>To this effect, Opinion of Advocate General Bot in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑130/10</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2012:50">EU:C:2012:50</NO.ECLI>, point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0064">64</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), in relation to the objectives of preserving international peace and security.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0073"><NO.P>73.</NO.P><TXT>All in all, the Council was therefore right to rely on the CFSP, and more precisely Article 37 TEU, as the sole legal basis for the contested decision.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0038"><P>See also the detailed analysis of the EU/Mauritius Agreement by Advocate General Bot in his Opinion in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑658/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:41">EU:C:2014:41</NO.ECLI>, points <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0068">68</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0121">121</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), in which he reaches the same conclusion based on essentially similar arguments (see in particular points 83 and 109 to 115).</P></NOTE> Consequently, the first plea in law raised by the Parliament is unfounded.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>C –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The provision of information to the Parliament (second plea in law)</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0074"><NO.P>74.</NO.P><TXT>By the second plea in law, it is claimed that the Parliament was not informed immediately and fully at all stages of the procedure for the conclusion of the disputed agreement, in contravention of Article 218(10) TFEU.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="13"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0075"><NO.P>75.</NO.P><TXT>As the Court has held, Article 218(10) TFEU is applicable to all international agreements of the European Union, including those, like the disputed agreement, which relate exclusively to the CFSP.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0039"><P>Judgment in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑658/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025">EU:C:2014:2025</NO.ECLI>, in particular paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0085">85</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> However, the extent of the Council’s duties vis-à-vis the Parliament under that provision is still hotly disputed.</TXT></NP.ECR><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><P>General remarks</P></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0076"><NO.P>76.</NO.P><TXT>The wording used in Article 218(10) TFEU points to a very extensive duty for the Council to provide information. The Parliament must be informed <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0036" ID="QS0036"/>immediately<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0036" CODE="2019" ID="QE0036"/>, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0037" ID="QS0037"/>fully<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0037" CODE="2019" ID="QE0037"/> and <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0038" ID="QS0038"/>at all stages of the procedure<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0038" CODE="2019" ID="QE0038"/>. This is a reflection of the fundamental democratic principle applying to any decision-making process at EU level<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0040"><P>Judgments in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Roquette Frères</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>138/79</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1980:249">EU:C:1980:249</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0033">33</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑130/10</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2012:472">EU:C:2012:472</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0081">81</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); and <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑658/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025">EU:C:2014:2025</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0081">81</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> (see Article 2 TEU), including in the field of foreign and security policy.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0077"><NO.P>77.</NO.P><TXT>Unlike Advocate General Bot<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0041"><P>Opinion of Advocate General Bot in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑658/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:41">EU:C:2014:41</NO.ECLI>, in particular points <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0142">142</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0144">144</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> and some of the parties in this case, I am decidedly not of the view that informing the Parliament under Article 218(10) TFEU is subject to more or less strict requirements depending on whether the Parliament must consent to an international agreement under Article 218(6) TFEU, is consulted on it or — as in the present case — has no formal rights to have a say with regard to the agreement.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0078"><NO.P>78.</NO.P><TXT>Democratic control is not limited to the exercise of formal rights to have a say, and the purpose of informing the Parliament is not only to prepare for the exercise of such rights. Rather, the transparency created by informing the Parliament immediately and fully at all stages of the procedure is in itself an element of democratic control which is not to be underestimated and therefore has inherent value.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0079"><NO.P>79.</NO.P><TXT>This transparency is a corollary of the fundamental principle that decisions in the European Union are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen (second paragraph of Article 1 TEU). It helps to encourage all those involved in the Union’s external action to act responsibly. It also ensures that the elected representatives of the citizens of the Union have an opportunity, in full knowledge of the facts, to have a public debate on foreign policy matters of general European interest and to scrutinise the entire procedure for the conclusion of an international agreement critically through spontaneous expressions of opinion.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0042"><P>For example, the Parliament could, in a case like the present one, be interested in whether sufficient consideration has been given to the prohibition of the death penalty which applies in the Union (Article 2(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights). What if the Council had failed to take appropriate steps in the disputed agreement? Is it sufficient to lay down in the disputed agreement, not an express prohibition of the death penalty, but merely a hedged one? I would point out that, in Article 12(3), the Joint Action expressly makes the risk of being subjected to the death penalty an obstacle to the transfer of suspected pirates to third States, whereas Article 5 of the disputed agreement addresses this point only indirectly and with less symbolic force, stating that no transferred person is to be <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0039" ID="QS0039"/>tried for an offence which has a maximum punishment that is more severe than imprisonment for life<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0039" CODE="2019" ID="QE0039"/>.</P></NOTE> In this way they can also endeavour, entirely legitimately, to influence the content of the planned agreement, even if from a formal perspective the agreement can be concluded without their consent or consultation. Numerous controversial examples from the recent past show very clearly how important democratic control is in the field of the Union’s external action and how much it depends on the Parliament being properly informed.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0043"><P>I am thinking in particular of the planned <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0040" ID="QS0040"/>TTIP<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0040" CODE="2019" ID="QE0040"/> free-trade agreement with the United States of America, the SWIFT agreement and the Passenger Name Records agreement, but also the Union’s accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, provided for in Article 6(2) TEU and in Article 218(6) and (8) TFEU.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="14"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0080"><NO.P>80.</NO.P><TXT>An <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0041" ID="QS0041"/>increase in the role of the European Parliament<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0041" CODE="2019" ID="QE0041"/> which would be incompatible with the Declaration concerning the common foreign and security policy<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0044"><P>Declaration No 14 annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on <DATE ISO="20071213">13 December 2007</DATE> (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="C" NO.OJ="115" PAGE.FIRST="343" DATE.PUB="2008">OJ 2008 C 115, p. 343</REF.DOC.OJ>), states in its second paragraph that the provisions covering the common foreign and security policy in the Treaty of Lisbon do not <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0042" ID="QS0042"/>increase the role of the European Parliament<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0042" CODE="2019" ID="QE0042"/>.</P></NOTE> does not follow from this interpretation of Article 218(10) TFEU. The same principles of democratic control and transparency that now find expression in Article 218(10) TFEU were enshrined in the system of the European Treaties even before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon for all policies, including the common foreign and security policy.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0045"><P>See in particular the second paragraph of Article 1 EU and Article 21 EU.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0081"><NO.P>81.</NO.P><TXT>Aside from this, it is only the provision of full and immediate information at all stages of the procedure, in accordance with Article 218(10) TFEU, that ensures that the Parliament is able to examine critically the Council’s choice of the — formal and substantive — legal basis and, if appropriate, make known its views on the matter.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0046"><P>Judgment in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑658/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025">EU:C:2014:2025</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0086">86</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> Only if the Parliament has sufficient information on the subject and on the progress of negotiations on a planned international agreement can it form its own views in a timely manner of the choice of the correct legal basis and effectively assert any rights to have a say that might exist. The less the Council informs the Parliament, the more it is able to decide on a legal basis which is convenient for it without major political opposition.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0082"><NO.P>82.</NO.P><TXT>Accordingly, I will now examine whether the Parliament was informed in the present case as required by Article 218(10) TFEU, namely <HT TYPE="ITALIC">at all stages of the procedure</HT>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">fully</HT> and <HT TYPE="ITALIC">immediately</HT>.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><P>The duty to inform the Parliament at all stages of the procedure</P></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0083"><NO.P>83.</NO.P><TXT>With regard, first, to the duty to inform the Parliament <HT TYPE="ITALIC">at all stages of the procedure</HT>, that duty undoubtedly covers information about the initiation and the conclusion of the procedure. In this respect, the Council fulfilled its duty under Article 218(10) TFEU, as it first informed the Parliament of the imminent commencement of negotiations with Tanzania by letter of <DATE ISO="20100322">22 March 2010</DATE> and then of the approval of the final negotiated agreement by letter of <DATE ISO="20140319">19 March 2014</DATE>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0084"><NO.P>84.</NO.P><TXT>However, the Council’s duties vis-à-vis the Parliament certainly do not end there. As is very clear from the wording <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0043" ID="QS0043"/>at all stages of the procedure<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0043" CODE="2019" ID="QE0043"/> in Article 218(10) TFEU, the Parliament must be informed not only at the beginning and the end of the procedure for the conclusion of an international agreement but also — and with some regularity — <HT TYPE="ITALIC">during</HT> the ongoing procedure as to its progress. This was even acknowledged in principle by the Council at the hearing before the Court.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0085"><NO.P>85.</NO.P><TXT>Of course, informing the Parliament under Article 218(10) TFEU cannot have the same quality and intensity as, for example, informing a special committee under Article 218(4) TFEU, with which the Union negotiator must be <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0044" ID="QS0044"/>in consultation<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0044" CODE="2019" ID="QE0044"/> throughout negotiations with a third State. Nor does the Parliament have to be notified of purely preparatory internal processes within the other Union institutions, such as discussions in Council working groups or in the Committee of the Permanent Representatives of the Member States.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0086"><NO.P>86.</NO.P><TXT>Contrary to the view taken by the Council, however, informing the Parliament cannot be confined solely to the stages of the procedure in which the Council takes formal decisions, in particular issuing a negotiating mandate and adopting directives for the negotiator. Rather, the Parliament must also be informed about intermediate results achieved, significant progress in the negotiations and any major difficulties arising during the negotiations. Information must always be provided — having regard to all the circumstances of the individual case and, if necessary, with appropriate steps being taken for the confidential treatment of sensitive information — in such a way as to allow the Parliament sufficient room effectively to exercise its powers of control.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="15"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0087"><NO.P>87.</NO.P><TXT>Only through such ongoing provision of information can the Parliament fulfil its function of democratic control and, furthermore, ensure that the legal basis initially chosen by the Council is still correct. This function fulfilled by the Parliament is particularly important in the CFSP because, as has already been mentioned, judicial review is very limited in that area (sixth sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU in conjunction with Article 275 TFEU). If the Parliament could not perform its role until the end of the procedure, on the basis of a final negotiated or even already approved international agreement, its democratic control would be much less effective.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0088"><NO.P>88.</NO.P><TXT>As the Parliament did not receive any information about the current status during the ongoing procedure in this case, there is therefore a clear infringement of Article 218(10) TFEU.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0089"><NO.P>89.</NO.P><TXT>In this connection, it cannot be claimed that it is not the Council but the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who holds the reins during the ongoing procedure. On the one hand, as the decision-making body, the Council is responsible for the proper conduct of the entire procedure. On the other, the Council must assume responsibility for any failures on the part of the High Representative, as the High Representative not only presides over the Foreign Affairs Council (Article 18(3) TEU) but is also responsible for carrying out the common foreign and security policy as mandated by the Council (second sentence of Article 18(2) TEU); in this particular case the High Representative was specifically authorised by the Council to open negotiations with Tanzania<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0047"><P>As is expressly stated in the letter of <DATE ISO="20100322">22 March 2010</DATE>.</P></NOTE> (Article 218(3) TFEU).</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><P>The duty to inform the Parliament fully</P></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0090"><NO.P>90.</NO.P><TXT>With regard, second, to the duty to inform the Parliament <HT TYPE="ITALIC">fully</HT>, both letters from the Council to the Parliament in this case leave something to be desired.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0091"><NO.P>91.</NO.P><TXT>First, the letter of <DATE ISO="20100322">22 March 2010</DATE>, by which the Parliament was informed of the imminent commencement of negotiations with Tanzania, does not state anything about possible negotiating directives in accordance with Article 218(4) TFEU.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0092"><NO.P>92.</NO.P><TXT>This is contrary to Article 218(10) TFEU. Informing the Parliament fully logically requires that, in addition to simple notification of the commencement of negotiations, details of the Union’s desired content for the planned international agreement are also communicated. Only then is effective democratic control possible.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0093"><NO.P>93.</NO.P><TXT>As the Council itself has conceded with reference to earlier cases, there are no insurmountable obstacles to the communication of negotiating directives to the Parliament. In particular, appropriate steps can be taken, if necessary, to guarantee the confidential treatment of sensitive information, such as details of the Union’s negotiating strategy or information affecting the foreign policy interests or the security of the European Union and its Member States.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0094"><NO.P>94.</NO.P><TXT>Second, the texts of neither the contested decision nor the disputed agreement were enclosed with the letter of <DATE ISO="20140319">19 March 2014</DATE> by which the Parliament was informed of the conclusion of the procedure. The Council failed to communicate those two texts officially to the Parliament even subsequently.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0095"><NO.P>95.</NO.P><TXT>This likewise does not satisfy the requirements of Article 218(10) TFEU.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0048"><P>See also Opinion of Advocate General Bot in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑658/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:41">EU:C:2014:41</NO.ECLI>, point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0155">155</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="16"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0096"><NO.P>96.</NO.P><TXT>In this connection, it cannot be claimed that the Parliament was aware of the context of the planned agreement with Tanzania, in particular because two similar agreements had already been concluded with other third States. As the Parliament rightly states, it is not acceptable that the elected representatives of the Union’s citizens have to exercise their democratic control on the basis of speculation about the likely content of a proposed international agreement.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0097"><NO.P>97.</NO.P><TXT>Contrary to the claim made by the Council, it is also not for the Parliament to request further information of its own motion. In contrast with other rules such as Article 319(2) TFEU, Article 218(10) TFEU does not impose on the Parliament any obligation to take the initiative itself. Such an obligation would place the Parliament at a serious disadvantage on account of its lack of knowledge of the details and the progress of the negotiations and make it significantly more difficult for it to exercise democratic control. Under Article 218(10) TFEU, the Council must inform the Parliament without being requested to do so. This is ultimately required by institutional balance and the principle of sincere cooperation among the institutions (Article 13(2) TEU).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0098"><NO.P>98.</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">A fortiori</HT> the Parliament cannot be required to rely, as it was in this case, on finding out the content of a Council decision and of the agreement approved by it from the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Official Journal of the European Union</HT>. As the Court has held, publication in the Official Journal under Article 297 TFEU does not serve the same purpose as informing the Parliament under Article 218(10) TFEU.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0049"><P>Judgment in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑658/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025">EU:C:2014:2025</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0079">79</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0099"><NO.P>99.</NO.P><TXT>It is true that even publication in the Official Journal would still allow the Parliament sufficient time to have the legality of the decision, and thus also indirectly the disputed agreement, reviewed by way of an action for annulment (second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU). However, that is a <HT TYPE="ITALIC">judicial review</HT> by another EU institution, which is, moreover, limited to points of law. This must be distinguished sharply from the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">democratic control</HT> performed by the Parliament itself, which focuses on political assessments and questions of expediency. If that democratic control can only take place <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ex post</HT>, it is inevitably much less effective than during the ongoing procedure for the conclusion of an international agreement. If, on the other hand, it is allowed at an early stage, this may possibly even help to prevent subsequent legal disputes between the institutions.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><P>The duty to provide information immediately</P></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0100"><NO.P>100.</NO.P><TXT>Finally, under Article 218(10) TFEU the Parliament must also be informed <HT TYPE="ITALIC">immediately</HT>. As is apparent in particular from other language versions (French: <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0045" ID="QS0045"/>immédiatement<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0045" CODE="2019" ID="QE0045"/>, [German: <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0046" ID="QS0046"/>unverzüglich<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0046" CODE="2019" ID="QE0046"/>]), this wording is directed at the Parliament being informed straight away, or at least as quickly as possible.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0050"><P>In German law it is assumed that the word <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0047" ID="QS0047"/>unverzüglich<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0047" CODE="2019" ID="QE0047"/> requires action <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0048" ID="QS0048"/>without culpable delay<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0048" CODE="2019" ID="QE0048"/> (see the first sentence of Paragraph 121(1) of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code)).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0101"><NO.P>101.</NO.P><TXT>Through the information sent by it regarding the imminent commencement of negotiations, the Council undoubtedly fulfilled that duty, as it sent its letter on <DATE ISO="20100322">22 March 2010</DATE>, the very date on which it had given the authorisation to open negotiations with Tanzania.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0102"><NO.P>102.</NO.P><TXT>That is not the case, however, with the information about the conclusion of the procedure. The fact that the Council had approved the disputed agreement by the contested decision was notified to the Parliament only over a week later, by letter of <DATE ISO="20140319">19 March 2014</DATE>. Admittedly, this is a relatively short delay in comparison with Case C‑658/11, in which the Council allowed three months to pass.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0051"><P>See the judgment in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑658/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025">EU:C:2014:2025</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0077">77</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and paragraphs 15 to 17).</P></NOTE> It is none the less an appreciable delay, especially in the age of modern communication. The Council has not put forward the slightest justification for this delay either in the extrajudicial procedure or in the<?PAGE NO="17"?> proceedings before the Court.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0052"><P>In particular, the Council has not claimed translation problems. If an international agreement or the Council decision approving it are not immediately available in all the EU official languages, the Council must first communicate the available language versions to the Parliament and subsequently send outstanding translations without delay.</P></NOTE> Under these circumstances, a delay of even one week, as in the present case, shows a lack of respect for the representative body of the people which is not consistent with the wording and spirit of Article 218(10) TFEU or the principle of sincere cooperation among the institutions (second sentence of Article 13(2) TEU).</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><P>Interim conclusion</P></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0103"><NO.P>103.</NO.P><TXT>All in all, in the present case the Council failed in several respects to fulfil its duty under Article 218(10) TFEU to inform the Parliament fully and immediately at all stages of the procedure. The Parliament’s second plea in law is therefore well founded.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>D –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Summary</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0104"><NO.P>104.</NO.P><TXT>In conclusion, it can be stated that only the Parliament’s second plea in law has prospect of success. However, because the Council infringed an essential procedural requirement under Article 218(10) TFEU, the second plea in law alone justifies the annulment of the contested decision<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0053"><P>See the judgment in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑658/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025">EU:C:2014:2025</NO.ECLI>, in particular paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0080">80</REF.NP.ECR>, <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0086">86</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0087">87</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> (Article 263(1) and (2) TFEU in conjunction with Article 264(1) TFEU).</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>E –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Maintenance of the effects of the contested decision</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0105"><NO.P>105.</NO.P><TXT>If the Court annuls the contested decision, as I suggest, solely on the basis of the second plea in law, it should maintain its effects in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 264 TFEU, as all the parties unanimously agree.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0106"><NO.P>106.</NO.P><TXT>The effects of the contested decision must be maintained for reasons of legal certainty so as not to impair the full effectiveness of the prosecution and trial of suspected pirates. In this way, with reference to Article 10(6) and Article 12(3) of the Joint Action,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0054"><P>As we know, under those two provisions the transfer of persons to a third State requires the prior conclusion of an agreement with that third State in which the conditions for the transfer are established.</P></NOTE> the basis for any attempt to question EU NAVFOR’s mandate in relation to the transfer to Tanzania of persons arrested off the Somali coast and suspected of piracy is removed from the outset. Similarly, the legal effects of actions already undertaken pursuant to the disputed agreement cannot be called into question. Furthermore, in general terms, maintaining the effects of the contested decision at international level will avoid any uncertainty over the continued application of the obligations in international law entered into by the Union when it approved and signed the disputed agreement.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0107"><NO.P>107.</NO.P><TXT>Because the contested decision is annulled in connection with the second plea in law not by reason of an incorrect substantive or formal legal basis, but only for a failure to fulfil the duty to inform the Parliament, the effects of that decision should be maintained not just temporarily, but indefinitely,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0055"><P>See the judgment in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑658/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025">EU:C:2014:2025</NO.ECLI>, in particular paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0091">91</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> as, in accordance with the first part of the second subparagraph of Article 218(6) TFEU, the Council’s failure to provide information, even if it were properly remedied, would not be linked with any rights for the Parliament to have a say, not even a right of consultation. Under those circumstances, it would seem excessively formalistic still to require the Council to repeat its decision-making process within a reasonable time.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="18"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0108"><NO.P>108.</NO.P><TXT>It would be a different matter only if the Court (also) upheld the Parliament’s first plea in law and found an error in law in the choice of the legal basis for the contested decision. Such action would have implications for the Parliament’s rights to have a say. In that case, according to the Court’s recent case-law,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0056"><P>Judgments in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑355/10</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2012:516">EU:C:2012:516</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0090">90</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑137/12</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2013:675">EU:C:2013:675</NO.ECLI>, in particular paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0081">81</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); and <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament and Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑43/12</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:298">EU:C:2014:298</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0056">56</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> the maintenance of the effects of the contested decision would not be granted indefinitely, but only for the period within which the Council can reasonably expect to remedy the unlawfulness established in respect of the choice of the legal basis, and properly involve the Parliament in so doing. A time-limit of 10 months would seem reasonable in this case to allow the Council to obtain the consent of the Parliament pursuant to point (a)(v) of the second subparagraph of Article 218(6) TFEU and to adopt a new decision on the correct legal bases.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>VII –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Costs</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0109"><NO.P>109.</NO.P><TXT>Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since, according to my proposed solution, the Council has been unsuccessful and the Parliament has applied for costs, the Council must be ordered to pay the costs. On the other hand, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the European Commission, as interveners, must each bear their own costs in accordance with Article 140(1) of the Rules of Procedure.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>VIII –</NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Conclusion</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0110"><NO.P>110.</NO.P><TXT>In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court should:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="ARAB"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(1)</NO.P><TXT>annul Council Decision 2014/198/CFSP of <DATE ISO="20140310">10 March 2014</DATE>;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(2)</NO.P><TXT>order that the effects of the annulled decision be maintained;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(3)</NO.P><TXT>order the Council of the European Union to bear its own costs and to pay the costs incurred by the European Parliament;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(4)</NO.P><TXT>order the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the European Commission each to bear their own costs.</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></P></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></CONTENTS.CONCLUSION></CONCLUSION>