<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><CONCLUSION NNC="YES" xmlns:fmx="http://opoce" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://formex.publications.europa.eu/schema/formex-05.58-20161101.xd"><BIB.CONCLUSION><REF.CASE FILE="n.a."><NO.CASE>C-39/18 P</NO.CASE></REF.CASE><NO.CELEX>62018CC0039</NO.CELEX><NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2019:359">EU:C:2019:359</NO.ECLI><NO.SEQ>0001</NO.SEQ><PAGE.FIRST.ECR>1</PAGE.FIRST.ECR><PAGE.SEQ>1</PAGE.SEQ><PAGE.LAST.ECR>13</PAGE.LAST.ECR><PAGE.TOTAL>13</PAGE.TOTAL></BIB.CONCLUSION><CURR.TITLE><PAGE.HEADER><P><HT TYPE="SC">Opinion of Mr Tanchev – Case C‑39/18 P</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="SC">Commission v NEX International Limited</HT></P></PAGE.HEADER></CURR.TITLE><TITLE><TI><P><HT TYPE="UC">Opinion of advocate general</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="UC">Tanchev</HT></P><P>delivered on <DATE ISO="20190502">2 May 2019</DATE><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0001"><P>Original language: English.</P></NOTE></P></TI><STI><P><HT TYPE="BOLD">Case C‑39/18 P</HT></P><P>European Commission</P><P>v</P><P>NEX International Limited (formerly Icap plc,</P><P>Icap Management Services Ltd and</P><P>Icap New Zealand Ltd)</P></STI></TITLE><INTERMEDIATE><INDEX IDX.CLOSE=")" SEPARATOR=" — " IDX.OPEN="("><KEYWORD>Appeal</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Competition</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Agreements, decisions and concerted practices</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Yen Interest Rate Derivatives sector</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Fines</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Obligation to state reasons</KEYWORD></INDEX></INTERMEDIATE><CONTENTS.CONCLUSION><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0001"><NO.P>1.</NO.P><TXT>By the present appeal, the European Commission seeks to have the judgment of the General Court in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Icap plc and Others</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0002"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20171110">10 November 2017</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Icap and Others</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT></NAME.CASE>, <NO.CASE>T‑180/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:T:2017:795">EU:T:2017:795</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> set aside, in so far as it annulled the fines laid down in Article 2 of the decision in the Yen Interest Rate Derivatives (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0001" ID="QS0001"/>YIRD<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0001" CODE="2019" ID="QE0001"/>) cartel case (where the Commission imposed on Icap plc, Icap Management Services Ltd and Icap New Zealand Ltd unprecedented fines of nearly EUR 15 million for cartel facilitation).<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0003"><P>Commission Decision C(2015) 432 final of <DATE ISO="20150204">4 February 2015</DATE> relating to proceedings under Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39861 — Yen Interest Rate Derivatives) (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0002" ID="QS0002"/>the contested decision<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0002" CODE="2019" ID="QE0002"/>).</P></NOTE> The General Court found that the Commission had not provided sufficient reasoning in its decision as to the methodology applied in order to determine the amounts of the fines, and so it annulled the part of the decision setting those fines. I note that the Commission’s methodology was not a simple setting of a lump sum amount, but a complex five-stage test designed to calculate the basic amount of the fines.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0002"><NO.P>2.</NO.P><TXT>In the present appeal, the Commission submits that the General Court incorrectly applied the Court’s case-law on the statement of reasons required when imposing fines.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0004"><P>In particular, the judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20151022">22 October 2015</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">AC-Treuhand</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT></NAME.CASE>, <NO.CASE>C‑194/14 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:717">EU:C:2015:717</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0066">66</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0068">68</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0003"><NO.P>3.</NO.P><TXT>As I will explain below, it is my view that the present appeal has been largely resolved by the Court’s recent judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20190116">16 January 2019</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">United Parcel Service</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑265/17 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2019:23">EU:C:2019:23</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>) (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0003" ID="QS0003"/>the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">UPS</HT><QUOT.END REF.START="QS0003" CODE="2019" ID="QE0003"/>), in so far as, in that judgment, the Court upholds the General Court’s approach in the judgment under appeal.</TXT></NP.ECR><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">I.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Background to the dispute and the contested decision</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0004"><NO.P>4.</NO.P><TXT>It is apparent from paragraphs 1 to 21 of the judgment under appeal that NEX International Limited (formerly Icap plc, Icap Management Services Ltd and Icap New Zealand Ltd) (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0004" ID="QS0004"/>NEX<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0004" CODE="2019" ID="QE0004"/>), is part of a voice and electronic interdealer broker which is also a provider of post-trade services.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="2"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0005"><NO.P>5.</NO.P><TXT>By the contested decision, the Commission held that NEX had participated in six infringements of Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement in connection with the manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate (TIBOR) interbank reference rates on the Japanese YIRD market. Those infringements had been previously established by Commission Decision C(2013) 8602 final of <DATE ISO="20131204">4 December 2013</DATE> relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39861 — Yen Interest Rate Derivatives), imposing fines of nearly EUR 670 million (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0005" ID="QS0005"/>the 2013 decision<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0005" CODE="2019" ID="QE0005"/>).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0006"><NO.P>6.</NO.P><TXT>On <DATE ISO="20131029">29 October 2013</DATE> the Commission initiated infringement proceedings against NEX.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0007"><NO.P>7.</NO.P><TXT>On <DATE ISO="20131112">12 November 2013</DATE> NEX informed the Commission of its intention not to opt for a settlement procedure.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0008"><NO.P>8.</NO.P><TXT>On <DATE ISO="20150204">4 February 2015</DATE> the Commission adopted the contested decision, imposing on NEX six fines amounting to EUR <FT TYPE="NUMBER">14960000</FT> in total for having <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0006" ID="QS0006"/>facilitated<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0006" CODE="2019" ID="QE0006"/> six infringements, namely:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="NDASH"><ITEM><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0007" ID="QS0007"/>the UBS/RBS 2007 infringement<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0007" CODE="2019" ID="QE0007"/>, from 14 August until <DATE ISO="20071101">1 November 2007</DATE>;</P></ITEM><ITEM><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0008" ID="QS0008"/>the UBS/RBS 2008 infringement<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0008" CODE="2019" ID="QE0008"/>, from 28 August until <DATE ISO="20081103">3 November 2008</DATE>;</P></ITEM><ITEM><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0009" ID="QS0009"/>the UBS/DB infringement<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0009" CODE="2019" ID="QE0009"/>, from 22 May until <DATE ISO="20090810">10 August 2009</DATE>;</P></ITEM><ITEM><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0010" ID="QS0010"/>the Citi/RBS infringement<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0010" CODE="2019" ID="QE0010"/>, from 3 March until <DATE ISO="20100622">22 June 2010</DATE>;</P></ITEM><ITEM><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0011" ID="QS0011"/>the Citi/DB infringement<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0011" CODE="2019" ID="QE0011"/>, from 7 April until <DATE ISO="20100607">7 June 2010</DATE>;</P></ITEM><ITEM><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0012" ID="QS0012"/>the Citi/UBS infringement<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0012" CODE="2019" ID="QE0012"/>, from 28 April until <DATE ISO="20100602">2 June 2010</DATE>.</P></ITEM></LIST></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0009"><NO.P>9.</NO.P><TXT>Paragraphs 18 to 21 of the judgment under appeal are worded as follows:</TXT><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0013" ID="QS0013"/>18. The Commission made the preliminary observation that, under the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="C" NO.OJ="210" PAGE.FIRST="2" DATE.PUB="2006">OJ 2006 C 210, p. 2</REF.DOC.OJ>, <QUOT.START CODE="201C" REF.END="QE0014" ID="QS0014"/>the 2006 Guidelines<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0014" CODE="201D" ID="QE0014"/>), the basic amount of the fine must be determined having regard to the context in which the infringement was committed and in particular the gravity and duration of the infringement and that the role played by each participant must be assessed on an individual basis, reflecting any aggravating and attenuating circumstances (recital 284 of the contested decision).</P><P>19. The Commission observed that the 2006 Guidelines provided only limited guidance on the calculation of the fine for facilitators. Since [NEX] was an operator active on the brokerage services markets, and not on the interest rate derivatives market, the Commission held that it could not substitute brokerage fees for those for the prices of Japanese Yen interest rate derivatives in determining the value of sales and setting the fine, as such substitution does not reflect the gravity and nature of the infringement. It inferred, in essence, that it was necessary to apply point 37 of the 2006 Guidelines, which makes it possible to depart from those Guidelines for the determination of the basic amount of the fine (recital 287 of the contested decision).</P><P>20. In view of the gravity of the conduct at issue and the duration of [NEX’s] participation in each of the six infringements at issue, the Commission set, for each infringement, a basic amount of the fine, namely EUR <FT TYPE="NUMBER">1040000</FT> for the UBS/RBS 2007 infringement, EUR <FT TYPE="NUMBER">1950000</FT> for the UBS/RBS 2008 infringement, EUR <FT TYPE="NUMBER">8170000</FT> for the UBS/DB infringement, EUR <FT TYPE="NUMBER">1930000</FT> for the Citi/RBS infringement, EUR <FT TYPE="NUMBER">1150000</FT> for the Citi/DB infringement and EUR <FT TYPE="NUMBER">720000</FT> for the Citi/UBS infringement (recital 296 of the contested decision).</P><?PAGE NO="3"?><P>21. In determining the final amount of the fine, the Commission found that there were no aggravating or mitigating circumstances and noted that the ceiling of 10% of annual turnover had not been exceeded (recital 299 of the contested decision). Article 2 of the operative part of the contested decision therefore imposes on the applicants fines whose final amount is equivalent to their basic amount<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0013" CODE="2019" ID="QE0013"/>.</P></QUOT.S></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">II.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Procedure before the General Court and the judgment under appeal</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0010"><NO.P>10.</NO.P><TXT>By application lodged at the General Court Registry on <DATE ISO="20150414">14 April 2015</DATE>, NEX brought an action against the contested decision, seeking annulment of that decision and, in the alternative, a reduction in the amount of the fines imposed.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0011"><NO.P>11.</NO.P><TXT>In support of its action for annulment of the contested decision, NEX put forward six pleas in law. The first four pleas in law concerned the legality of Article 1 of the contested decision in relation to the existence of the infringements. The fifth and sixth pleas in law concerned the legality of Article 2 of that decision, relating to the fines imposed by the Commission for each of those infringements.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0012"><NO.P>12.</NO.P><TXT>The judgment under appeal partially annulled Article 1 of the contested decision and annulled Article 2 thereof in its entirety.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0013"><NO.P>13.</NO.P><TXT>In paragraph 91 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court rejected the first plea in law alleging errors in the interpretation of the concept of restriction or distortion of competition <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0015" ID="QS0015"/>by object<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0015" CODE="2019" ID="QE0015"/> within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0014"><NO.P>14.</NO.P><TXT>In paragraphs 133 to 144 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court ruled that the evidence of NEX’s participation in the UBS/RBS infringement of 2008 was insufficient. In paragraph 145 of that judgment, the General Court partially upheld the second plea in law alleging errors in the application of the concept of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0016" ID="QS0016"/>facilitation<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0016" CODE="2019" ID="QE0016"/>, and annulled Article 1(b) of the contested decision.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0015"><NO.P>15.</NO.P><TXT>In relation to the third plea in law alleging that the duration of the infringements at issue was incorrect, in paragraph 252 of the judgment under appeal the General Court ruled that the evidence relied on by the Commission to establish the duration of NEX’s participation in four of the five remaining infringements was insufficient, and declared that plea in law to be partially well-founded. Therefore, it annulled Article 1(a), (d), (e) and (f) of the contested decision.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0016"><NO.P>16.</NO.P><TXT>As far as the fourth plea in law is concerned, in paragraph 269 of the judgment under appeal the General Court held that <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0017" ID="QS0017"/>the Commission infringed the presumption of [NEX’s] innocence when adopting the 2013 decision. Admittedly, that breach of the presumption of its innocence at the time of the adoption of the 2013 decision cannot have a direct impact on the legality of the contested decision, in view of the separate and independent nature of the proceedings which gave rise to those two decisions<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0017" CODE="2019" ID="QE0017"/>. However, in paragraph 280 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court came to the conclusion that the fourth plea in law had to be rejected.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0017"><NO.P>17.</NO.P><TXT>In paragraphs 286 to 299 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court declared that the fifth plea in law (relating to the determination of the amount of the fines) was well founded. Paragraphs 292 to 299 of that judgment are worded as follows:</TXT><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0018" ID="QS0018"/>292. In the present case, in the first place, it should be pointed out that the reasons why the Commission decided to depart from the methodology set out in the 2006 Guidelines, by applying point 37 thereof, can be inferred from a reading of recital 287 of the contested decision. Those reasons stem from the fact that [NEX] was not active on the Japanese Yen interest rate derivatives market and that, therefore, taking into account the value of sales, namely the brokerage fees received, would not make it possible to reflect the gravity and nature of the infringements at issue.</P><?PAGE NO="4"?><P>293. In the second place, it must however be stated that recital 287 of the contested decision does not provide details on the alternative method favoured by the Commission, but is limited to a general assurance that the basic amounts reflect the gravity, duration and nature of [NEX’s] involvement in the infringements at issue, as well as the need to ensure that fines have a sufficiently deterrent effect.</P><P>294. Drafted in that manner, recital 287 of the contested decision does not enable the applicants to understand the justification for the methodology favoured by the Commission, or the Court to verify that justification. That insufficient reasoning is also to be found in recitals 290 to 296 of that decision, which do not provide the minimum information which might have made it possible to understand and ascertain the relevance and weighting of the factors taken into consideration by the Commission in the determination of the basic amount of the fines, in breach of the case-law cited in paragraph 291 above.</P><P>295. It is apparent from the parties’ pleadings that the question of the methodology that the Commission envisaged using for the purposes of calculating the amount of the fines was broached during a discussion with the applicants’ representatives, during the administrative procedure. Although, under the case-law cited in paragraph 288 above, the reasoning of a contested act must be examined taking into account its context, the view cannot be taken that holding such exploratory and informal discussions can relieve the Commission of its obligation to explain, in the contested decision, the methodology that it applied for the purposes of determining the amounts of the fines imposed.</P><P>296. In paragraph 176 of the defence, the Commission highlights the existence of a five-stage test designed to calculate the basic amount of the fines. However, pursuant to the case-law cited in paragraph 290 above, such an explanation provided at the stage of the proceedings before the Court cannot be taken into account for the purposes of assessing whether the Commission has complied with its obligation to state reasons.</P><P>297. In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that, so far as concerns the determination of the fines imposed on [NEX] for the infringements at issue, the contested decision is vitiated by insufficient reasoning.</P><P>298. The fifth plea must, therefore, be upheld and Article 2 of the contested decision must be annulled in its entirety, there being no need to examine the other complaints of that plea or those of the sixth plea, which relates exclusively to the legality of that article.</P><P>299. Moreover, in so far as Article 2 of the contested decision is annulled in its entirety, it is not necessary to examine the applicants’ claim for variation of the contested decision, which the applicants submitted in the alternative<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0018" CODE="2019" ID="QE0018"/>.</P></QUOT.S></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">III.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">The appeal</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">A.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Summary of the arguments of the parties</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0018"><NO.P>18.</NO.P><TXT>The Commission claims that the General Court’s reasoning in relation to the fifth plea in law is vitiated by serious errors of law which, if accepted, would be detrimental to the Commission’s ability to determine adequate fines so as to achieve sufficient deterrence.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0019"><NO.P>19.</NO.P><TXT>First, the Commission complains that the General Court failed to mention the applicable principles of the relevant case-law. It omitted to mention the judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20151022">22 October 2015</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">AC-Treuhand</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑194/14 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:717">EU:C:2015:717</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0066">66</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0068">68</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), even though it is the leading judgment on the statement of reasons required when imposing a fine on a facilitator.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="5"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0020"><NO.P>20.</NO.P><TXT>The General Court also failed to refer to the judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20160128">28 January 2016</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Quimitécnica.com and de Mello</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑415/14 P</NO.CASE>, not published, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:58">EU:C:2016:58</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0053">53</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>). It follows from that judgment that the statement of reasons for a Commission act must be assessed in view of the context of that act, including the exchanges which took place before and after the adoption of the act in question. In the present case, the Commission divulged certain information to NEX relating to the calculation of the fines during and after the administrative procedure.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0021"><NO.P>21.</NO.P><TXT>Secondly, the Commission argues that, while the judgment under appeal (paragraphs 287 to 291) recalls part of the case-law on reasoning in relation to fines, it does not correctly interpret that case-law or apply it in practice.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0022"><NO.P>22.</NO.P><TXT>In recital 287 of the contested decision, the Commission explicitly states that the basic amounts of the fines imposed on NEX reflect the gravity, duration and nature of NEX’s involvement in the infringements at issue, as well as the need to ensure that fines have a sufficiently deterrent effect. These elements are sufficient for the purposes of the reasoning of the Commission’s decisions,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0005"><P>The Commission is relying on the judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20001116">16 November 2000</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Sarrió</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑291/98 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2000:631">EU:C:2000:631</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0078">78</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20031002">2 October 2003</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Aristrain</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑196/99 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2003:529">EU:C:2003:529</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0056">56</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20151022">22 October 2015</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">AC-Treuhand</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑194/14 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:717">EU:C:2015:717</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0068">68</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> and so the communication of the arithmetical formulas was not required.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0023"><NO.P>23.</NO.P><TXT>While recalling the case-law to the effect that the Commission is not obliged to provide a more detailed explanation or an indication of the figures relating to the method of calculating fines, in paragraph 291 of the judgment under appeal the General Court ruled that, in the case at hand, the Commission had not provided details of the method used. The Commission submits that that reasoning is contradictory.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0024"><NO.P>24.</NO.P><TXT>The <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Chalkor</HT> case-law recalled in paragraph 291 of the judgment under appeal to the effect that the Commission must explain the weighting and assessment of the factors taken into account for the purpose of calculating the basic amount cannot be construed as requiring the Commission to indicate the figures relating to the method of calculating the fines and to set out its internal calculations in detail. However, this is precisely what the General Court did require and, in so doing, it committed an error of law.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0025"><NO.P>25.</NO.P><TXT>According to the Commission, the similarity of the contested decision to the Heat Stabilisers decision (recitals 747 to 750) is particularly striking.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0006"><P>Commission Decision C(2009) 8682 final of <DATE ISO="20091111">11 November 2009</DATE> relating to a proceeding under Article 81 [EC] and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/38589 — Heat Stabilisers).</P></NOTE> That decision gave rise to the judgment in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">AC-Treuhand</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C-194/14 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:717">EU:C:2015:717</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>) where the Court held the reasoning to be sufficient.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0026"><NO.P>26.</NO.P><TXT>As for paragraphs 295 and 296 of the judgment under appeal, the elements invoked by the General Court are inadequate to support the finding of an insufficient statement of reasons in relation to fines. The General Court recalls in those paragraphs that the question of the methodology of calculating fines was broached with NEX during the administrative procedure and during the procedure before the General Court itself (notably, in its defence, the Commission highlighted the existence of the five-stage test designed to calculate the basic amount of the fines). The Commission argues that the General Court was wrong to conclude that those elements were not able to remedy the insufficient reasoning at issue. Such an assessment is contrary to the case-law.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0007"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20160128">28 January 2016</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Quimitécnica.com and de Mello</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑415/14 P</NO.CASE>, not published, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:58">EU:C:2016:58</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0053">53</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="6"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0027"><NO.P>27.</NO.P><TXT>The reason why the Commission went beyond its duty to provide a statement of reasons and disclosed certain elements of its fine calculation to NEX (in paragraph 176 of its defence) is that NEX claimed to have been treated unequally compared to the undertaking R.P. Martin, which was an addressee of the 2013 decision in the same YIRD case, and which the Commission also considered to have acted as a facilitator of certain cartels covered by that case.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0028"><NO.P>28.</NO.P><TXT>In its reply, the Commission explains the methodology used for the calculation of fines. As a starting point, the same factors for assessing the gravity of the infringements were taken into account for all the relevant undertakings. However, there were objective differences between R.P. Martin and NEX that needed to be reflected in the fines levied on those facilitators. R.P. Martin got a 25% leniency reduction, whereas NEX did not apply for leniency; R.P. Martin got a 10% settlement discount; R.P. Martin’s 2012 worldwide turnover was EUR 82 million compared with EUR <FT TYPE="NUMBER">1656</FT> million (NEX’s 2013 worldwide turnover); R.P. Martin’s participation in the infringement lasted approximately 1 month while NEX’s lasted over 2 months.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0029"><NO.P>29.</NO.P><TXT>If the Court decides to rule on the fines, the Commission submits that a simple method to reflect the partial annulments in the judgment under appeal would be to apply a pro rata reduction to the original fines imposed on NEX. For example, this could be done by expressing the new duration of each infringement in days and dividing this by the original duration in days.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0030"><NO.P>30.</NO.P><TXT>NEX, for its part, defends the judgment under appeal and contends, in essence, that the appeal raises a fundamental question: can the Commission rely on specific and complex methodologies and factors, while at the same time pretending that such methodologies or factors do not exist and that a simple lump sum amount was used? The very <HT TYPE="ITALIC">raison d’être</HT> of the obligation to state reasons is to encourage the Commission to explain its decisions and to enable judicial review of its approach.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0031"><NO.P>31.</NO.P><TXT>First, NEX argues that, contrary to the Commission’s assertions, it is clear that the explanations provided in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">AC-Treuhand</HT> were more comprehensive and case-specific than the generic and broad-brush explanations provided in the contested decision. Put simply, the explanations in the contested decision could be used <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0019" ID="QS0019"/>as is<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0019" CODE="2019" ID="QE0019"/> in virtually any fining decision involving a facilitator, while those in the Heat Stabilisers decision would need to be adjusted to account for the specificities of the various cases. Second and more importantly, the underlying facts in NEX’s situation are different from those in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">AC-Treuhand</HT>. Indeed, in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">AC-Treuhand</HT>, there is nothing to suggest that the Commission used a specific and detailed methodology to arrive at the lump sum fine of EUR <FT TYPE="NUMBER">348000</FT> and, by extension, that it did something other than what was set out in its statement of reasons. Consequently, there is no demonstrated discrepancy between what the Commission did and what it claimed to have done.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0032"><NO.P>32.</NO.P><TXT>By contrast, in the NEX case the Commission explicitly acknowledged during the proceedings before the General Court that it had determined the level of the fines by using a detailed methodology and taking specific factors into account, but failed to provide NEX with any further detail when the latter was in a position to exercise its rights of defence. The Commission allegedly relied on a number of factors which it then failed to set out. Had it followed a lump-sum approach taking into account the basic factors that were stated, it could not have reached a level for NEX’s fine that was 22 times higher than the fine imposed on R.P. Martin, which it claimed to have treated similarly to NEX.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0033"><NO.P>33.</NO.P><TXT>The factors differentiating the situation of R.P. Martin from that of NEX, as relied on by the Commission, cannot rule out the existence of unequal treatment. With respect to duration, R.P. Martin was found to have facilitated the infringement from <DATE ISO="20090629">29 June 2009</DATE> to <DATE ISO="20090810">10 August 2009</DATE>, that is, for 43 days. NEX was found to have facilitated the infringement from <DATE ISO="20090522">22 May 2009</DATE> to <DATE ISO="20090810">10 August 2009</DATE>, that is, for 81 days. Consequently, allowing for the difference in duration, it can be assumed that R.P. Martin’s fine would have been EUR <FT TYPE="NUMBER">716000</FT> if the duration had been similar to NEX’s. This allows for the fourth difference suggested by the Commission.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="7"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">B.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Assessment</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">1.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Preliminary remarks</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0034"><NO.P>34.</NO.P><TXT>The General Court considered that the mere mention of the gravity, duration and nature of the participation in an infringement is insufficient in a situation where the Commission departs from its own fining guidelines.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0035"><NO.P>35.</NO.P><TXT>In the course of the proceedings before the General Court, the Commission revealed that it had, in fact, used a complex method to calculate the fines to be imposed on NEX. Given that the Commission had not divulged this method during the administrative proceedings, NEX was unable to contest it and the General Court could not carry out adequate judicial review.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0036"><NO.P>36.</NO.P><TXT>The Commission’s appeal is based on a single ground of appeal, by which it contests the General Court’s approach and submits that it would be detrimental to its ability to determine adequate fines (in particular in the case of facilitators) so as to achieve sufficient deterrence. The Commission insists, in particular, on the alleged divergence of approaches between the General Court’s judgment under appeal and the Court’s judgment in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">AC-Treuhand</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑194/14 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:717">EU:C:2015:717</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0037"><NO.P>37.</NO.P><TXT>NEX defends the approach in the judgment under appeal and seeks to justify it by pointing to its practical consequences. Given that it was not aware of the methodology/criteria employed by the Commission, NEX argues that it was subjected to unequal treatment in comparison with another facilitator in the same cartel (R.P. Martin). NEX also explains how, by keeping its methodology and the criteria which it relied on secret, the Commission deprived NEX of the possibility to contest those criteria.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0038"><NO.P>38.</NO.P><TXT>First of all, there are important differences between this case and that which resulted in the judgment in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">AC-Treuhand</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑194/14 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:717">EU:C:2015:717</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>), which is relied upon by the Commission.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0039"><NO.P>39.</NO.P><TXT>In the latter case, there was only one single facilitator. The Commission, which did not have to consider any risk of unequal treatment (between facilitators), imposed a lump sum fine.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0040"><NO.P>40.</NO.P><TXT>In the present case, however, there were two facilitators. The Commission claims (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0020" ID="QS0020"/>assures the Court<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0020" CODE="2019" ID="QE0020"/>) that it applied a single method in order to calculate the amount of the facilitators’ respective fines, but refuses to divulge any further details, simply invoking the judgment in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">AC-Treuhand</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑194/14 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:717">EU:C:2015:717</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0041"><NO.P>41.</NO.P><TXT>Moreover, the Commission’s reliance on the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">AC-Treuhand</HT> is unpersuasive. Whilst that judgment states that there is no requirement for any more detailed explanation or indication of the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">figures</HT> relating to the method of calculating the fine, the fact remains that the Court’s case-law importantly also makes it clear that the Commission must nevertheless explain the weighting and assessment of the factors taken into account in determining the amount of fines (and it is the court’s duty to verify of its own motion whether such reasons have been given) – notably in the leading judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20111208">8 December 2011</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Chalkor</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT></NAME.CASE>, <NO.CASE>C‑386/10 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:815">EU:C:2011:815</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0061">61</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0042"><NO.P>42.</NO.P><TXT>How else would the courts be able to carry out adequate judicial review and to verify, on the basis of the reasoning provided in the Commission’s decision (rather than on the basis of the Commission’s mere <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0021" ID="QS0021"/>assurances<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0021" CODE="2019" ID="QE0021"/>), whether a given undertaking was, for the purposes of the fine calculation and the criteria employed by the Commission, in a comparable or distinct situation vis-à-vis the other undertakings concerned, and to verify whether the Commission had observed the principle of equal treatment – as the Court is called to do in the present case?</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="8"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0043"><NO.P>43.</NO.P><TXT>In this respect, the General Court has applied the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Chalkor</HT> case-law correctly not only in the judgment under appeal (Second Chamber, extended composition), but also for instance in its judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20161213">13 December 2016</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Printeos and Others</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT></NAME.CASE>, <NO.CASE>T‑95/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:T:2016:722">EU:T:2016:722</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR> (Fourth Chamber, extended composition), and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20190328">28 March 2019</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Pometon</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT></NAME.CASE>, <NO.CASE>T‑433/16</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:T:2019:201">EU:T:2019:201</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR> (Third Chamber, extended composition). As regards these last two judgments, the Commission did not lodge any appeal against the former judgment and has not yet done so in relation to the latter.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0044"><NO.P>44.</NO.P><TXT>I would recall that, as early as 1995, the General Court emphasised that <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0022" ID="QS0022"/>it is desirable for undertakings – in order to be able to define their position in full knowledge of the facts – to be able to determine in detail, in accordance with any system which the Commission might consider appropriate, the method of calculation of the fine imposed upon them, without being obliged, in order to do so, to bring court proceedings against the Commission decision – which would be contrary to the principle of good administration<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0022" CODE="2019" ID="QE0022"/>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0008"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19950406">6 April 1995</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Trefilunion</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>T‑148/89</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:T:1995:68">EU:T:1995:68</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0142">142</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0045"><NO.P>45.</NO.P><TXT>Next, in the famous <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0023" ID="QS0023"/>Cement cartel<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0023" CODE="2019" ID="QE0023"/> case,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0009"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20000315">15 March 2000</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Cimenteries CBR and Others</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>T‑25/95, T‑26/95, T‑30/95 to T‑32/95, T‑34/95 to T‑39/95, T‑42/95 to T‑46/95, T‑48/95, T‑50/95 to T‑65/95, T‑68/95 to T‑71/95, T‑87/95, T‑88/95, T‑103/95 and T‑104/95</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:T:2000:77">EU:T:2000:77</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP4735">4735</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> the General Court added in a prescient manner that this applies <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0024" ID="QS0024"/>a fortiori where, as here, the Commission has used detailed arithmetical formulas to calculate the fines. In such a case it is desirable that the undertakings concerned and, if need be, the Court should be in a position to check that the method employed and the steps followed by the Commission are free of error and compatible with the provisions and the principles applicable in regard to fines, and in particular with the principle of non-discrimination<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0024" CODE="2019" ID="QE0024"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0046"><NO.P>46.</NO.P><TXT>Whilst, at the time, the General Court accepted the reasoning provided by the Commission a posteriori in the course of judicial proceedings as satisfactory, is it still possible to agree with the Commission here and accept such a solution in the present-day procedural context that is more receptive to the rights of defence?</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0047"><NO.P>47.</NO.P><TXT>I do not think so.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0010"><P>See point 79 of the present Opinion.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0048"><NO.P>48.</NO.P><TXT>As I will explain below, I consider that the present appeal has largely been resolved by the recent judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">UPS</HT>, handed down on <DATE ISO="20190116">16 January 2019</DATE>.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">2.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">UPS</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0049"><NO.P>49.</NO.P><TXT>It is important to draw, at the outset, a parallel with the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">UPS</HT>. At the hearing, the Commission sought to argue that that judgment is not relevant, because it is a merger case and does not deal with the setting of fines and the rights of defence. However, those arguments are unpersuasive.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0050"><NO.P>50.</NO.P><TXT>Indeed, in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">UPS</HT>, the Commission – not unlike the situation arising here – failed to divulge, in the context of the administrative procedure, a certain methodology which played an important role in its decision (in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">UPS</HT> it was the methodology used to evaluate a merger).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0051"><NO.P>51.</NO.P><TXT>In that judgment, the Court points out that, where the Commission intends to base its decision on econometric models, the notifying parties must be able to submit their observations in that regard.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="9"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0052"><NO.P>52.</NO.P><TXT>The methodological basis underpinning those models must be as objective as possible in order not to prejudge the outcome of that analysis one way or another. Accordingly, those factors contribute to the impartiality and quality of the Commission’s decisions, which, ultimately, is the basis of the trust that the public and businesses place in the legitimacy of the EU’s merger control procedure.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0053"><NO.P>53.</NO.P><TXT>The disclosure of such models and the methodological choices underlying their development is all the more necessary, as it contributes to ensuring that the procedure is fair, in accordance with the principle of good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0054"><NO.P>54.</NO.P><TXT>According to the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">UPS</HT>, the Commission is required to reconcile the need for speed that characterises the general scheme of the Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings with observance of the rights of the defence. Such observance does not allow the Commission, after the statement of objections has been disclosed, to modify the substance of an econometric model on which it intends to base its objections, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">without that modification being brought to the attention of the undertakings concerned and allowing them to submit their comments in that regard</HT>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0055"><NO.P>55.</NO.P><TXT>Consequently, the Court held in the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">UPS</HT> that the General Court had not erred in law when it concluded that the Commission could not claim that it was not required to disclose the final econometric analysis model to the applicant before adopting the decision at issue.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0056"><NO.P>56.</NO.P><TXT>It is particularly relevant here to refer to paragraph 31 of the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">UPS</HT>, where the Court ruled that <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0025" ID="QS0025"/>observance of the rights of the defence before the adoption of a decision relating to merger control … requires the notifying parties to be put in a position in which they can make known <HT TYPE="ITALIC">effectively</HT> their views on the accuracy and relevance of all the factors that the Commission intends to base its decision on<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0025" CODE="2019" ID="QE0025"/> (emphasis added).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0057"><NO.P>57.</NO.P><TXT>As we shall see below, that is precisely what the Commission failed to do, both in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">UPS</HT> and in the present case.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">3.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The case before the Court as a variation on UPS</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0058"><NO.P>58.</NO.P><TXT>The <HT TYPE="ITALIC">UPS</HT> case concerned a merger and the Court pointed out that the econometric model which was not divulged by the Commission in its final form was an <HT TYPE="ITALIC">important element</HT> in the context of the Commission’s decision.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0011"><P>A certain parallel may also be drawn with the Grand Chamber judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20170906">6 September 2017</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Intel</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT></NAME.CASE>, <NO.CASE>C‑413/14 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2017:632">EU:C:2017:632</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>. In that case, the General Court confirmed the Commission’s line of argument that loyalty rebates granted by an undertaking in a dominant position were, by their very nature, capable of restricting competition such that an analysis of all the circumstances of the case, in particular, an as efficient competitor test (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0026" ID="QS0026"/>AEC test<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0026" CODE="2019" ID="QE0026"/>) <HT TYPE="ITALIC">was not necessary</HT>. However, the Court observed that, while the Commission had emphasised that the rebates at issue were by their very nature capable of restricting competition, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">it nevertheless carried out an in-depth examination of the circumstances of the case</HT> in its decision, which led it to conclude that an as efficient competitor would have had to offer prices which would not have been viable and that, accordingly, the rebate scheme at issue was capable of having foreclosure effects on such a competitor. <HT TYPE="ITALIC">The AEC test therefore played an important role in the Commission’s assessment</HT> of whether the rebate scheme at issue was capable of having foreclosure effects on as efficient competitors. The Court therefore held that the General Court was required to examine all of Intel’s arguments concerning that test, which the General Court had failed to do. The Court therefore set aside the judgment of the General Court as a result of that failure in its analysis of whether the rebates at issue were capable of restricting competition.</P></NOTE> Similarly, the five-stage test used by the Commission in order to set the fines in the present case was important, and should have been disclosed (that is, at least to the extent that the Commission can properly explain the weighting and assessment of the factors taken into account).<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0012"><P>See point 74 of the present Opinion.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0059"><NO.P>59.</NO.P><TXT>As the Court recalled in paragraph 28 of the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">UPS</HT>, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0027" ID="QS0027"/>observance of the rights of the defence is a general principle of EU law which applies where the authorities are minded to adopt a measure which will adversely affect an individual<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0027" CODE="2019" ID="QE0027"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="10"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0060"><NO.P>60.</NO.P><TXT>The same general principle led the General Court to annul the contested decision (in the present case) in this respect.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0061"><NO.P>61.</NO.P><TXT>It is interesting to point out that in the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">UPS</HT> case, the Commission sought to argue that the amendments to econometric models were equivalent to internal documents, which could not be accessed pursuant to the right to have access to the file (paragraph 35 of the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">UPS</HT>).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0062"><NO.P>62.</NO.P><TXT>The Court rejected that argument.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0063"><NO.P>63.</NO.P><TXT>In the present case, the Commission again seeks to argue that the methodology used to calculate the fines is nothing more than an internal calculation which should not be disclosed to addressees of its decisions.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0064"><NO.P>64.</NO.P><TXT>I consider that this argument must be rejected, just as it was rejected in the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">UPS</HT>. Moreover, as NEX argues, the information revealed in paragraph 176 of the defence at first instance does not contain figures or calculations. The Commission merely reveals the existence of a complex five-stage test designed to calculate the basic amount of the fines as opposed to the use of a lump sum.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0065"><NO.P>65.</NO.P><TXT>The appeal essentially claims that the Commission sufficiently stated reasons by setting out the (rather vague) factors which were taken into account to determine the gravity, duration and nature of NEX’s involvement. The Commission claims that this is in line with the judgment in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">AC-Treuhand</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑194/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:717">EU:C:2015:717</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>). The Commission further claims that its explanations regarding the methodology referred to in paragraph 295 of the judgment under appeal were not required but provided further clarifications which should still be taken into account at the stage of the judicial proceedings.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0066"><NO.P>66.</NO.P><TXT>First, I have already explained that there are important differences between <HT TYPE="ITALIC">AC-Treuhand</HT> and the present case and why that case-law in and of itself should not change the analysis here (see point 38 et seq. of the present Opinion).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0067"><NO.P>67.</NO.P><TXT>Secondly, the Commission’s arguments must in any case be rejected.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0068"><NO.P>68.</NO.P><TXT>Indeed, in the present case, contrary to the situation in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">AC-Treuhand</HT>, it is common ground that the Commission did not merely carry out a simple examination of the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0028" ID="QS0028"/>gravity<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0028" CODE="2019" ID="QE0028"/>, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0029" ID="QS0029"/>nature<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0029" CODE="2019" ID="QE0029"/>, and <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0030" ID="QS0030"/>duration<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0030" CODE="2019" ID="QE0030"/> of NEX’s conduct so as to arrive at a certain lump sum amount, but rather employed a complex methodology in order to determine the fines, which was in fact hidden behind the vague and general references in the statement of objections and the contested decision.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0069"><NO.P>69.</NO.P><TXT>As the General Court notes in paragraph 296 of the judgment under appeal, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0031" ID="QS0031"/>the Commission highlights the existence of a five-stage test designed to calculate the basic amount of the fines<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0031" CODE="2019" ID="QE0031"/> in its defence at first instance, which it claims to have applied in the case at hand. As was, moreover, acknowledged by the Commission, this five-stage test had been mentioned to NEX during a settlement meeting in October 2013. However, when NEX received the statement of objections in June 2014 and was given the opportunity to exercise its rights of defence, the methodology which the Commission had set out back in October 2013 was not explained. Furthermore, the Commission refused on numerous occasions to confirm or deny if it was indeed using that methodology and instead kept insisting that it would set an unspecified <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0032" ID="QS0032"/>lump sum<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0032" CODE="2019" ID="QE0032"/> based on the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0033" ID="QS0033"/>gravity, duration and nature of the infringement<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0033" CODE="2019" ID="QE0033"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="11"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0070"><NO.P>70.</NO.P><TXT>As we have seen, it was only in the context of the judicial proceedings (that is, in paragraph 176 of the Commission’s defence at first instance) that the Commission, at last, admitted to having in fact employed a complex methodology when setting NEX’s fines. While the Commission was careful to classify this admission as <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0034" ID="QS0034"/>not being required<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0034" CODE="2019" ID="QE0034"/>, the case-law says otherwise.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0013"><P>See point 77 and footnote 16 of the present Opinion.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0071"><NO.P>71.</NO.P><TXT>While NEX correctly acknowledges that the Commission <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0035" ID="QS0035"/>is not required to indicate the figures relating to the method of calculating the fines<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0035" CODE="2019" ID="QE0035"/>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0014"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20151022">22 October 2015</DATE> in <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">AC-Treuhand</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT></NAME.CASE>, <NO.CASE>C-194/14 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:717">EU:C:2015:717</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0068">68</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> the fact remains that the Commission is still required to explain the factors it used to determine the fine.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0072"><NO.P>72.</NO.P><TXT>Indeed, as the General Court correctly ruled in paragraph 293 of the judgment under appeal, the Commission cannot simply provide <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0036" ID="QS0036"/>a general assurance that the basic amounts reflect the gravity, duration and nature of [NEX’s] involvement in the infringements<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0036" CODE="2019" ID="QE0036"/>. If such an approach were upheld, undertakings would not be in a position to challenge the Commission’s methodology and the Court would not be able to review it.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0073"><NO.P>73.</NO.P><TXT>In that regard, in paragraph 289 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court recalled the applicable case-law as follows: <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0037" ID="QS0037"/>when the Commission decides to depart from the general methodology set out in the 2006 Guidelines, by which it limited the discretion it may itself exercise in setting the amount of fines, and relies, as in the present case, on point 37 of those guidelines, the requirements relating to the duty to state reasons must be complied with all the more rigorously …. In that regard, … the Guidelines lay down a rule of conduct indicating the approach to be adopted from which the Commission cannot depart, in an individual case, without giving reasons which are compatible with, inter alia, the principle of equal treatment … Those reasons must be all the more specific because point 37 of the Guidelines simply makes a vague reference to <QUOT.START CODE="201C" REF.END="QE0038" ID="QS0038"/>the particularities of a given case<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0038" CODE="201D" ID="QE0038"/> and thus leaves the Commission a broad discretion where it decides to make an exceptional adjustment of basic amount of the fines to be imposed on the undertakings concerned. In such a case, the Commission’s respect for the rights guaranteed by the EU legal order in administrative procedures, including the obligation to state reasons, is of even more fundamental importance<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0037" CODE="2019" ID="QE0037"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0074"><NO.P>74.</NO.P><TXT>Next, in paragraph 291 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court correctly recalled the case-law to the effect that <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0039" ID="QS0039"/>with respect to a decision imposing a fine, the Commission is required to provide a statement of reasons, inter alia, for the amount of the fine imposed and for the method chosen in that regard … The Commission must indicate in its decision the factors which enabled it to determine the gravity of the infringement and its duration, there being no requirement for any more detailed explanation or indication of the figures relating to the method of calculating the fine … <HT TYPE="ITALIC">It must nevertheless explain the weighting and assessment of the factors taken into account</HT><QUOT.END REF.START="QS0039" CODE="2019" ID="QE0039"/> (emphasis added).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0075"><NO.P>75.</NO.P><TXT>Paragraph 292 of that judgment explains why, in the case at hand, the Commission decided to depart from the methodology set out in the 2006 Guidelines, by applying point 37 thereof.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0076"><NO.P>76.</NO.P><TXT>Paragraph 293 of the judgment under appeal rightly points out that <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0040" ID="QS0040"/>it must however be stated that recital 287 of the contested decision does not provide details on the alternative method favoured by the Commission, but is limited to a general assurance that the basic amounts reflect the gravity, duration and nature of [NEX’s] involvement in the infringements at issue, as well as the need to ensure that fines have a sufficiently deterrent effect<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0040" CODE="2019" ID="QE0040"/>. In fact, the Commission sought to justify its erroneous approach by repeating the same general assurance at the hearing before the Court.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0015"><P>The Commission’s desired outcome would be for the fine calculation to be a sort of Coca-Cola formula, which the parties and the EU Courts can enjoy and <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0041" ID="QS0041"/>taste<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0041" CODE="2019" ID="QE0041"/>, but are expected to accept as being secret, simply believing the Commission’s <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0042" ID="QS0042"/>assurances<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0042" CODE="2019" ID="QE0042"/> that it has been applied correctly and without any discrimination in a case such as this one where there is a risk of unequal treatment between two facilitators in a cartel.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="12"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0077"><NO.P>77.</NO.P><TXT>Therefore, I must agree with the General Court’s finding in paragraph 294 of the judgment under appeal that, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0043" ID="QS0043"/>drafted in that manner, recital 287 of the contested decision does not enable [NEX] to understand the justification for the methodology favoured by the Commission, or the Court to verify that justification. That insufficient reasoning is also to be found in recitals 290 to 296 of that decision, which do not provide the minimum information which might have made it possible to understand and ascertain the relevance and weighting of the factors taken into consideration by the Commission in the determination of the basic amount of the fines, in breach of the case-law cited in paragraph 291 [of the judgment under appeal]<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0043" CODE="2019" ID="QE0043"/>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0016"><P>Judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20060927">27 September 2006</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Jungbunzlauer</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT></NAME.CASE>, <NO.CASE>T‑43/02</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:T:2006:270">EU:T:2006:270</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0091">91</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>; of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20110713">13 July 2011</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Schindler Holding and Others</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT></NAME.CASE>, <NO.CASE>T‑138/07</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:T:2011:362">EU:T:2011:362</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0243">243</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>; and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20111208">8 December 2011</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Chalkor</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT></NAME.CASE>, <NO.CASE>C‑386/10 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:815">EU:C:2011:815</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0061">61</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0078"><NO.P>78.</NO.P><TXT>Moreover, the General Court did not err in law when it held that although <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0044" ID="QS0044"/>the reasoning of a contested act must be examined taking into account its context, the view cannot be taken that holding … exploratory and informal discussions [with NEX] can relieve the Commission of its obligation to explain, in the contested decision, the methodology that it applied for the purposes of determining the amounts of the fines imposed<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0044" CODE="2019" ID="QE0044"/> (paragraph 295 of the judgment under appeal).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0079"><NO.P>79.</NO.P><TXT>The General Court was also right to rule in paragraph 296 of the judgment under appeal that, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0045" ID="QS0045"/>in paragraph 176 of the defence [at first instance], the Commission highlights the existence of a five-stage test designed to calculate the basic amount of the fines. However, pursuant to the case-law … such an explanation provided at the stage of the proceedings before the Court cannot be taken into account for the purposes of assessing whether the Commission has complied with its obligation to state reasons<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0045" CODE="2019" ID="QE0045"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0080"><NO.P>80.</NO.P><TXT>In that regard, it is necessary to point out that the Commission’s argument that the General Court’s approach would be detrimental to the Commission’s ability to determine adequate fines so as to achieve sufficient deterrence is unpersuasive.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0081"><NO.P>81.</NO.P><TXT>As noted above, what the Commission must explain are, notably, the weighting and assessment of the factors taken into account, and I fail to see how that would deprive the Commission of the ability to determine adequate fines and/or achieve sufficient deterrence.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0082"><NO.P>82.</NO.P><TXT>This is indispensable in particular in a case such as this one where – contrary to the situation in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">AC-Treuhand</HT> – there were two facilitators and there is a risk that the Commission may have breached the principle of equal treatment in imposing fines on R.P. Martin and NEX.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0083"><NO.P>83.</NO.P><TXT>At the hearing, the Commission insisted that there was no discrimination in this case as to the level of fines <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0046" ID="QS0046"/>because it had applied the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">same</HT> fining methodology to both facilitators<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0046" CODE="2019" ID="QE0046"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0084"><NO.P>84.</NO.P><TXT>Aside from the fact that the courts are incapable of reviewing that methodology if it is kept secret, it should be pointed out that applying the same methodology to two different situations does not exclude a discriminatory outcome, in particular where the methodology relies on a discriminatory criterion. It should be borne in mind that discrimination is often the result of applying the same criterion to situations which are not comparable. Indeed, the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0047" ID="QS0047"/>principle of equal treatment<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0047" CODE="2019" ID="QE0047"/> or the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0048" ID="QS0048"/>principle of non-discrimination<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0048" CODE="2019" ID="QE0048"/> are simply two labels for a single general principle of EU law, which prohibits treating similar situations differently and treating different situations in the same way unless there are objective reasons for such treatment.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0017"><P>See, inter alia, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20021212">12 December 2002</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Rodríguez Caballero</HT></NAME.CASE>, <NO.CASE>C‑442/00</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2002:752">EU:C:2002:752</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0032">32</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0085"><NO.P>85.</NO.P><TXT>It is clear that on the basis of the general and vague information and assurances provided in the present case, neither NEX nor the General Court (and, in turn, the Court of Justice) are able to assess either that methodology or the question whether the principle of equal treatment was breached by the Commission.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="13"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0086"><NO.P>86.</NO.P><TXT>This is in marked contrast with what is laid down in the case-law, namely that the observance of the rights of defence requires that addressees of decisions which significantly affect their interests be placed in a position in which they can <HT TYPE="ITALIC">effectively</HT> make known their views as regards <HT TYPE="ITALIC">all</HT> <HT TYPE="ITALIC">elements</HT> on which the authorities intend to base their decision.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0018"><P>Judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19961024">24 October 1996</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Lisrestal and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑32/95 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1996:402">EU:C:1996:402</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0021">21</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20131022">22 October 2013</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Sabou</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑276/12</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2013:678">EU:C:2013:678</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0038">38</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20160614">14 June 2016</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Marchiani</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parliament</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑566/14 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:437">EU:C:2016:437</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0051">51</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); see also Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">UPS</HT></NAME.CASE>, <NO.CASE>C-265/17 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2018:628">EU:C:2018:628</NO.ECLI>, point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0038">38</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0087"><NO.P>87.</NO.P><TXT>Like the econometric model at issue in the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">UPS</HT>, the methodology of calculating a fine for a facilitator such as that at issue here undoubtedly constitutes such an important <HT TYPE="ITALIC">element</HT> on which the Commission based its decision.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0088"><NO.P>88.</NO.P><TXT>Moreover, as the Court ruled in the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">UPS</HT>, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0049" ID="QS0049"/>the disclosure of such models and methodological choices underlying their development is all the more necessary as it contributes … to ensuring that the procedure is fair, in accordance with the principle of good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the [Charter]<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0049" CODE="2019" ID="QE0049"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0089"><NO.P>89.</NO.P><TXT>It is clear that the same considerations should apply in the present case in relation to fine calculations, a fortiori in a case where the Commission departs from its fining guidelines.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0090"><NO.P>90.</NO.P><TXT>This is particularly important in such situations, as otherwise a facilitator would ultimately be worse off than an actual cartel member when it comes to being able to assess the appropriateness of the Commission’s decision and the possibility to have that decision examined by the Court. Indeed, this would run contrary to well-established case-law,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0019"><P>Such as the judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20130711">11 July 2013</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Ziegler</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT></NAME.CASE>, <NO.CASE>C‑439/11 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2013:513">EU:C:2013:513</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0060">60</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> in which the Court has held that guidelines <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0050" ID="QS0050"/>lay down rules of conduct indicating the approach to be adopted from which the administration cannot depart, in an individual case, without giving reasons which are compatible with the principle of equal treatment<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0050" CODE="2019" ID="QE0050"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0091"><NO.P>91.</NO.P><TXT>It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the General Court did not err in law when it concluded, in paragraph 297 of the judgment under appeal, that so far as concerns the determination of the fines imposed on NEX for the infringements at issue, the contested decision is vitiated by insufficient reasoning.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0092"><NO.P>92.</NO.P><TXT>Accordingly, the single ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded and the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">IV.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Conclusion</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0093"><NO.P>93.</NO.P><TXT>For these reasons, I propose that the Court should:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="ARAB"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(1)</NO.P><TXT>dismiss the appeal;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(2)</NO.P><TXT>order the European Commission to pay the costs.</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></P></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></CONTENTS.CONCLUSION></CONCLUSION>