<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><CONCLUSION NNC="YES" xmlns:fmx="http://opoce" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://formex.publications.europa.eu/schema/formex-05.58-20161101.xd"><BIB.CONCLUSION><REF.CASE FILE="n.a."><NO.CASE>C-546/18</NO.CASE></REF.CASE><NO.CELEX>62018CC0546</NO.CELEX><NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2021:219">EU:C:2021:219</NO.ECLI><NO.SEQ>0001</NO.SEQ><PAGE.FIRST.ECR>1</PAGE.FIRST.ECR><PAGE.SEQ>1</PAGE.SEQ><PAGE.LAST.ECR>17</PAGE.LAST.ECR><PAGE.TOTAL>17</PAGE.TOTAL></BIB.CONCLUSION><CURR.TITLE><PAGE.HEADER><P><HT TYPE="SC">Opinion of Mr Bobek – Case C‑546/18</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="SC">Adler Real Estate and Others</HT></P></PAGE.HEADER></CURR.TITLE><TITLE><TI><P><HT TYPE="UC">Opinion of Advocate General</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="UC">Bobek</HT></P><P>delivered on <DATE ISO="20210318">18 March 2021</DATE><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0001"><P>Original language: English.</P></NOTE></P></TI><STI><P><HT TYPE="BOLD">Case C‑546/18</HT></P><P>FN,</P><P>GM,</P><P>Adler Real Estate AG,</P><P>HL,</P><P>Petrus Advisers LLP</P><P>joined parties:</P><P>Übernahmekommission</P><P><HT TYPE="NORMAL">(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court, Austria))</HT></P></STI></TITLE><INTERMEDIATE><INDEX IDX.CLOSE=")" SEPARATOR=" – " IDX.OPEN="("><KEYWORD>Reference for a preliminary ruling</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Finality of decisions taken at the close of administrative procedures</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Directive 2004/25/EC</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Interpretation in conformity with EU law</KEYWORD></INDEX></INTERMEDIATE><CONTENTS.CONCLUSION><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">I.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Introduction</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0001"><NO.P>1.</NO.P><TXT>The context of the present case is shaped by two separate proceedings initiated by the Übernahmekommission (Takeover Commission, Austria). The first (preliminary) proceeding established the (objective) facts of an infringement of the rules on mandatory takeover bids. Under the Austrian procedural rules, once the findings from the preliminary proceedings become definitive, the second (administrative penalty) proceeding is bound by those objective determinations when assessing whether the (subjective) criteria for the alleged infringement are also satisfied and when imposing sanctions on the individuals concerned.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0002"><NO.P>2.</NO.P><TXT>It is in this context that the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court, Austria), invoking Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0001" REF.END="QE0001"/>the Charter<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0001" CODE="2019" ID="QE0001"/>) and Directive 2004/25/EC<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0002"><P>Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20040421">21 April 2004</DATE> on takeover bids (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="142" PAGE.FIRST="12" DATE.PUB="2004">OJ 2004 L 142, p. 12</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0002" REF.END="QE0002"/>the Takeover Bids Directive<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0002" CODE="2019" ID="QE0002"/>), essentially enquires about the procedural rights that EU law provides for persons who were not parties to the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0003" REF.END="QE0003"/>first round<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0003" CODE="2019" ID="QE0003"/> of preliminary proceedings, but who may face, due to their respective positions within the corporate structures of the companies that were the parties in the first proceedings, sanctions imposed on them in the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0004" REF.END="QE0004"/>second round<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0004" CODE="2019" ID="QE0004"/> of administrative proceedings.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="2"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">II.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Legal framework</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">A.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">EU law</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0003"><NO.P>3.</NO.P><TXT>Under Article 4(1) of the Takeover Bids Directive, the Member States shall designate one or more authorities to supervise bids for the purposes of the rules which they make or introduce pursuant to that directive. Pursuant to its Article 4(5):</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><ALINEA><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0005" REF.END="QE0005"/>The supervisory authorities shall be vested with all the powers necessary for the purpose of carrying out their duties, including that of ensuring that the parties to a bid comply with the rules made or introduced pursuant to this Directive.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0005" CODE="2019" ID="QE0005"/></ALINEA></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0004"><NO.P>4.</NO.P><TXT>Article 5(1) of that directive contains the obligation to make a takeover bid. That obligation arises whenever <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0006" REF.END="QE0006"/>a natural or legal person, as a result of his/her own acquisition or the acquisition by persons acting in concert with him/her, holds securities of a company as referred to in Article 1(1) which, added to any existing holdings of those securities of his/hers and the holdings of those securities of persons acting in concert with him/her, directly or indirectly give him/her a specified percentage of voting rights in that company, giving him/her control of that company …<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0006" CODE="2019" ID="QE0006"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0005"><NO.P>5.</NO.P><TXT>By virtue of Article 17 of the Takeover Bids Directive, entitled <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0007" REF.END="QE0007"/>sanctions<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0007" CODE="2019" ID="QE0007"/>:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><ALINEA><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0008" REF.END="QE0008"/>Member States shall determine the sanctions to be imposed for infringement of the national measures adopted pursuant to this Directive and shall take all necessary steps to ensure that they are put into effect. The sanctions thus provided for shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Member States shall notify the Commission of those measures no later than the date laid down in Article 21(1) and of any subsequent change thereto at the earliest opportunity.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0008" CODE="2019" ID="QE0008"/></ALINEA></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">B.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Austrian law</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0006"><NO.P>6.</NO.P><TXT>The Allgemeines Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz 1991 (1991 General Law on administrative proceedings) (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0009" REF.END="QE0009"/>the AVG<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0009" CODE="2019" ID="QE0009"/>) regulates the proceedings of administrative authorities in Austria. Paragraph 24 of the Verwaltungsstrafgesetz 1991 (1991 Law on administrative penalties) states that, unless otherwise provided, the AVG shall also apply in administrative penalty proceedings.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0007"><NO.P>7.</NO.P><TXT>The Bundesgesetz betreffend Übernahmeangebote (Federal Law on takeover bids), BGBl. [Federal Law Gazette] I No 127/1998 (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0010" REF.END="QE0010"/>the ÜbG<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0010" CODE="2019" ID="QE0010"/>) regulates substantive and procedural aspects for public takeovers of shares and other securities of listed companies.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0008"><NO.P>8.</NO.P><TXT>Paragraph 1(6) of the ÜbG defines the term <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0011" REF.END="QE0011"/>acting in concert<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0011" CODE="2019" ID="QE0011"/>. Pursuant to Paragraph 23(1), where parties are found to <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0012" REF.END="QE0012"/>act in concert<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0012" CODE="2019" ID="QE0012"/>, the mutually held shares or securities in an offeree company are aggregated when applying Paragraphs 22 to 22b of the ÜbG.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0009"><NO.P>9.</NO.P><TXT>Paragraph 22 of the ÜbG concerns the obligation to make a takeover bid. That obligation is incumbent on <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0013" REF.END="QE0013"/>anyone who directly or indirectly obtains a controlling interest in an offeree company<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0013" CODE="2019" ID="QE0013"/> within 20 stock-market working days’. Paragraph 22a thereof extends that takeover bid obligation also to parties acting in concert when acquiring a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0014" REF.END="QE0014"/>controlling interest<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0014" CODE="2019" ID="QE0014"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0010"><NO.P>10.</NO.P><TXT>Paragraph 30(2) of the ÜbG states that the AVG applies to proceedings initiated by the Takeover Commission.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="3"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">III.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Facts, national proceedings and the questions referred</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0011"><NO.P>11.</NO.P><TXT>On <DATE ISO="20161122">22 November 2016</DATE>, the Takeover Commission issued a decision (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0015" REF.END="QE0015"/>the Preliminary Decision<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0015" CODE="2019" ID="QE0015"/>) against Adler Real Estate AG (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0016" REF.END="QE0016"/>Adler<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0016" CODE="2019" ID="QE0016"/>), Mountain Peak Trading LLP (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0017" REF.END="QE0017"/>Mountain Peak<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0017" CODE="2019" ID="QE0017"/>), Westgrund AG (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0018" REF.END="QE0018"/>Westgrund<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0018" CODE="2019" ID="QE0018"/>), Petrus Advisers LLP (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0019" REF.END="QE0019"/>Petrus<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0019" CODE="2019" ID="QE0019"/>) and GM (a natural person). That decision was handed down in the context of proceeding concerning the acquisition of a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0020" REF.END="QE0020"/>major holding<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0020" CODE="2019" ID="QE0020"/> of shares with voting rights of 31.36% in Conwert Immobilien SE (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0021" REF.END="QE0021"/>Conwert<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0021" CODE="2019" ID="QE0021"/>), and the related failure to satisfy the obligation to submit a mandatory public takeover bid.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0012"><NO.P>12.</NO.P><TXT>In the preliminary proceedings, the Takeover Commission found that, upon the reciprocal attribution of voting rights pursuant to Paragraph 23(1) of the ÜbG, a controlling interest within the meaning of Paragraph 22 of the ÜbG was acquired. The Takeover Commission had reached that threshold finding on the basis of the aggregation criteria for <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0022" REF.END="QE0022"/>legal entities acting in concert<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0022" CODE="2019" ID="QE0022"/> laid down in Paragraph 1(6) of the ÜbG. Pursuant to Paragraph 23(1) of the ÜbG, those voting rights in Conwert should therefore have been reciprocally attributable to Adler, Mountain Peak, Westgrund, Petrus, and GM for the first time on <DATE ISO="20150929">29 September 2015</DATE>. In principle, pursuant to Point 1 of Paragraph 22a of the ÜbG, that acquisition of a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0023" REF.END="QE0023"/>major holding<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0023" CODE="2019" ID="QE0023"/> by <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0024" REF.END="QE0024"/>persons acting in concert<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0024" CODE="2019" ID="QE0024"/> should have led to a mandatory takeover bid for Conwert within a period of 20 stock-market working days.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0013"><NO.P>13.</NO.P><TXT>By decision of <DATE ISO="20170301">1 March 2017</DATE>, the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria) dismissed a challenge against the Preliminary Decision. The Preliminary Decision became definitive.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0014"><NO.P>14.</NO.P><TXT>Subsequently, the Takeover Commission initiated administrative penalty proceedings against, inter alia, GM, HL and FN (all natural persons). The liability of HL and FN arose from their functions as board member of Adler and director of Petrus, respectively, at the time of the alleged offense.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0015"><NO.P>15.</NO.P><TXT>On <DATE ISO="20180129">29 January 2018</DATE>, the Takeover Commission issued its decision against GM (as a natural person), HL (in the capacity of board member of Adler) and FN (in the capacity of director of Petrus) (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0025" REF.END="QE0025"/>Administrative Penalty Decision<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0025" CODE="2019" ID="QE0025"/>). The Takeover Commission imposed administrative penalties on GM, HL and FN and held that the respective companies represented by HL and FN were accessorily liable.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0016"><NO.P>16.</NO.P><TXT>In reaching that decision, the Takeover Commission based its factual findings on the Preliminary Decision, in particular with regard to the key finding that, on the basis of an agreement made on <DATE ISO="20150929">29 September 2015</DATE>, the parties concerned <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0026" REF.END="QE0026"/>acted in concert<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0026" CODE="2019" ID="QE0026"/> within the meaning of Paragraph 22a of the ÜbG. By failing to provide the Takeover Commission with a mandatory takeover bid within the statutory period of 20 stock-market working days, GM, HL and FN would be guilty of having breached Paragraph 22a(1) of the ÜbG, in conjunction with Paragraph 22(1) thereof. On that basis, the Takeover Commission imposed fines on GM, HL and FN and made Adler and Petrus accessorily liable for the fines imposed on HL and FN.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0017"><NO.P>17.</NO.P><TXT>Appeals were brought against the Administrative Penalty Decision before the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court, Austria), the referring court. That court observes that, under Austrian law relating to administrative proceedings, a final preliminary decision of an administrative authority binds (the same, as well as other) administrative authorities and courts that must decide on the same factual and legal situation as<?PAGE NO="4"?> that which was decided on by the previous preliminary decision. The prerequisite for such binding effects is the existence of party identity. The same binding effects must also be observed by the administrative courts, subject again to party identity in the two proceedings.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0018"><NO.P>18.</NO.P><TXT>As regards GM, the referring court considers that there is identity of parties for the purposes of the proceedings underlying the Preliminary and the Administrative Penalty Decisions. In respect of GM, it also considers all the other requirements for the binding effects of the Preliminary Decision to be satisfied under national law.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0019"><NO.P>19.</NO.P><TXT>In so far as HL and FN are concerned, the referring court doubts whether identity of parties between the preliminary and administrative penalty proceedings was present. It observes that HL and FN were not present as <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0027" REF.END="QE0027"/>parties<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0027" CODE="2019" ID="QE0027"/> during the preliminary proceedings but merely acted as representatives of the companies Adler (for which HL acted as board member) and Petrus (for which FN acted as director). Such <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0028" REF.END="QE0028"/>party<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0028" CODE="2019" ID="QE0028"/> status for HL and FN (as natural persons) was only present during the administrative penalty proceeding. Nevertheless, during the administrative penalty proceeding, the Takeover Commission found the existence of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0029" REF.END="QE0029"/>extended binding effects<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0029" CODE="2019" ID="QE0029"/> (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0030" REF.END="QE0030"/><HT TYPE="ITALIC">erweiterte Bindungswirkung</HT><QUOT.END REF.START="QS0030" CODE="2019" ID="QE0030"/>) arising from the Preliminary Decision also for HL and FN (as natural persons).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0020"><NO.P>20.</NO.P><TXT>It is within this factual and legal context that the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court) decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:</TXT><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><LIST TYPE="OTHER"><ITEM><NP><NO.P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0031" REF.END="QE0031"/>(1)</NO.P><TXT>Do Articles 4 and 17 of Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20040421">21 April 2004</DATE> on takeover bids – read in the light of the principle of effectiveness under EU law – preclude an interpretation according to which a decision having the force of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">res judicata</HT> taken by the supervisory authority pursuant to Article 4 of Directive 2004/25/EC by means of which a natural person’s breach of national provisions adopted in implementation of Directive 2004/25/EC was established is not given binding effect in the context of administrative-penalty proceedings subsequently conducted by that supervisory authority against that same person, as a consequence of which that person once again has all the factual and legal pleas and evidence available to him to challenge the breach of law established in the decision that already has the force <HT TYPE="ITALIC">of res judicata</HT>?</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(2)</NO.P><TXT>Do Articles 4 and 17 of Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20040421">21 April 2004</DATE> on takeover bids – read in the light of the principle of effectiveness under EU law – preclude an interpretation according to which a decision having the force <HT TYPE="ITALIC">of res judicata</HT> taken by the supervisory authority pursuant to Article 4 of Directive 2004/25/EC by means of which a legal person’s breach of national provisions adopted in implementation of Directive 2004/25/EC was established is not given binding effect in the context of administrative-penalty proceedings subsequently conducted by that supervisory authority against the body authorised to represent that legal person, as a consequence of which that legal person (the body) once again has all the factual and legal pleas and evidence available to it to challenge the breach of law established in the decision that already has the force of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">res judicata</HT>?</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(3)</NO.P><TXT>(If Question [1] is answered in the negative) Does Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union preclude a national practice according to which a decision having the force of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">res judicata</HT> taken by the supervisory authority pursuant to Article 4 of Directive 2004/25/EC by means of which a natural person’s breach of national provisions<?PAGE NO="5"?> adopted in implementation of Directive 2004/25/EC was established is given binding effect in the context of administrative-penalty proceedings subsequently conducted by that supervisory authority against that same person, with the result that that person is prevented from challenging, in law and fact, the breach of law already established with the force of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">res judicata</HT>?</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(4)</NO.P><TXT>(If Question [2] is answered in the negative) Does Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union preclude a national practice according to which a decision having the force of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">res judicata</HT> taken by the supervisory authority pursuant to Article 4 of Directive 2004/25/EC by means of which a legal person’s breach of national provisions adopted in implementation of Directive 2004/25/EC was established is given binding effect in the context of administrative-penalty proceedings subsequently conducted by that supervisory authority against the body authorised to represent that legal person, with the result that that person (the body) is prevented from challenging, in law and fact, the breach of law already established with the force of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">res judicata</HT>?<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0031" CODE="2019" ID="QE0031"/></TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></QUOT.S></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0021"><NO.P>21.</NO.P><TXT>Written observations were submitted by Alder, HL, GM, the Takeover Commission, as well as the European Commission. With the exception of the Commission, those parties also replied to the questions put to them by the Court.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">IV.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Analysis</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0022"><NO.P>22.</NO.P><TXT>This Opinion is structured as follows. I shall start by setting out my understanding of the national law and, on that basis, suggest a simplification of the questions raised by the referring court (A). I will then set out the applicable yardstick under EU law (B), before turning to the present case (C).</TXT></NP.ECR><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">A.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">The (national legislative) background and the questions raised</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0023"><NO.P>23.</NO.P><TXT>At first sight, the four questions formulated by the referring court, viewed in the context of the complex web of national rules and procedures, appear rather complicated indeed. Moreover, those questions seem to be quite far-reaching, touching in general on: the effectiveness of EU law; the status or binding effect of final administrative decisions, potentially coupled with the duty to revisit those final decisions; and fundamental rights in proceedings imposing criminal penalties.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0024"><NO.P>24.</NO.P><TXT>In my view, this case can be approached in a much more circumscribed manner. Useful guidance can perhaps be provided to the referring court without engaging in all the intricacies of the national law, set out in quite some detail by the referring court, as well as the elements of conflicting national case-law. Intriguing as such discussions might be, I am not sure that they are in fact necessary in the context of the present case. Instead, I prefer to focus on the practical problem emerging, in particular from the point of view of the rights of the defence and access to a court, for the individuals being subject to such proceedings.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0025"><NO.P>25.</NO.P><TXT>In order to be able to do so, there are three elements that must be discussed at the outset. First, what exactly is the issue under national law? Second, how does the Charter and its Article 47 interact with the Takeover Bids Directive and fit into the picture of the present case? Third, both of these points compel me to reformulate and simplify the questions raised by the referring court, hopefully without losing sight of the problem.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="6"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0026"><NO.P>26.</NO.P><TXT>First, for the purposes of the present case, it is crucial to understand two elements of national administrative law: on the one hand, the procedural rules on how the Takeover Commission conducts its administrative proceedings for alleged infringements of the rules on mandatory takeover bids; and, on the other hand, the national procedural rules which bestow binding effect on administrative decisions that have become definitive.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0027"><NO.P>27.</NO.P><TXT>The Takeover Commission has the power to initiate an investigation <HT TYPE="ITALIC">inter alia</HT> into whether a holder of securities failed to make a mandatory takeover bid, within the meaning of Paragraph 22(1) of the ÜbG, upon the acquisition of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0032" REF.END="QE0032"/>major holdings<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0032" CODE="2019" ID="QE0032"/> in an offeree company. It can also do so where a group of parties is <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0033" REF.END="QE0033"/>acting in concert<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0033" CODE="2019" ID="QE0033"/> to acquire such holdings.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0003"><P>Point 1 of Paragraph 22a of the ÜbG.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0028"><NO.P>28.</NO.P><TXT>However, the procedure is split into determinations of the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">objective</HT> and <HT TYPE="ITALIC">subjective</HT> elements of the failure to make a mandatory takeover bid.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0004"><P>Pursuant to Paragraphs 33 and 35 of the ÜbG.</P></NOTE> As the parties explain, those two determinations are made separately, with the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">objective</HT> determination of whether a party failed to submit a mandatory takeover bid being considered in a preliminary proceeding and decided by way of a preliminary decision. Nevertheless, the preliminary proceeding does not settle the question of criminal liability. That liability is dealt with by a subsequent determination to establish the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">subjective</HT> elements for the existence of administrative liability, which appears to amount to a sanction of a criminal nature.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0029"><NO.P>29.</NO.P><TXT>The potential <HT TYPE="ITALIC">judicial review</HT> of each of those determinations follows a different path. The Takeover Commission explains that the preliminary and administrative penalty proceedings are subject to different instances of appeal. The <HT TYPE="ITALIC">preliminary</HT> proceeding can be appealed to the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria). However, it has been stated that the Supreme Court’s review in such cases is limited to matters of law only. Matters of fact cannot be reviewed by it. By contrast, the administrative penalty proceeding can be challenged before the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court, Austria), and in certain cases can also be challenged before the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Higher Administrative Court, Austria). The Federal Administrative Court a holds <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0034" REF.END="QE0034"/>full jurisdiction<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0034" CODE="2019" ID="QE0034"/> to review the decision resulting from the administrative penalty proceeding in law and in fact. However, that jurisdiction appears to be subject to the binding nature of a prior decision taken by the Takeover Commission or another authority or court, which has become definitive.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0030"><NO.P>30.</NO.P><TXT>The Takeover Commission maintains that, as regards both instances of appeal, it acts as a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0035" REF.END="QE0035"/>court of first instance<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0035" CODE="2019" ID="QE0035"/>. Accordingly, for both the preliminary and administrative penalty proceedings, there are at least two instances of appeal.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0031"><NO.P>31.</NO.P><TXT>The referring court explains that once an administrative decision taken by the Takeover Commission becomes final, the Takeover Commission itself, as well as other administrative authorities, are bound by that previous decision. Moreover, the same effects are then created for the Federal Administrative Court as well, if that court were called upon to decide on the same factual and legal situation as that which was before the Takeover Commission. Thus, the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0036" REF.END="QE0036"/>two-rounds<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0036" CODE="2019" ID="QE0036"/> structure of proceedings before the Takeover Commission means that, in practice, the subsequent administrative penalty proceeding on the (subjective) elements of the failure to submit a mandatory takeover bid is bound by the binding force of the prior (objective) determinations of the preliminary proceeding, once a decision on that proceeding has become definitive.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="7"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0032"><NO.P>32.</NO.P><TXT>In short, this is where I understand the practical problem to lie. That which has been decided in the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0037" REF.END="QE0037"/>first<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0037" CODE="2019" ID="QE0037"/> preliminary procedure binds all the subsequent procedures, both administrative and judicial. Moreover, or rather above all, that <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0038" REF.END="QE0038"/>binding effect<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0038" CODE="2019" ID="QE0038"/> is not only produced across procedures with regard to the same parties (identity of the parties across proceedings).<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0005"><P>As the referring court noted would normally be the condition under national law – see above, point 17 of this Opinion.</P></NOTE> It is also, rather crucially, produced with regard to situations where such <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0039" REF.END="QE0039"/>identity<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0039" CODE="2019" ID="QE0039"/> appears debatable, to say the least (for instance, when individuals are being sanctioned in the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0040" REF.END="QE0040"/>second<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0040" CODE="2019" ID="QE0040"/> round in their personal capacity whereas, in the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0041" REF.END="QE0041"/>first<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0041" CODE="2019" ID="QE0041"/> round, it was only their company that formally participated in the preliminary procedure).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0033"><NO.P>33.</NO.P><TXT>Second, against the background of such a system, the referring court raises four questions. The <HT TYPE="ITALIC">first</HT> and <HT TYPE="ITALIC">second</HT> questions approach the compatibility of the Austrian national procedural rules on the finality of administrative decisions from the perspective of preserving the substantive effects of Articles 4 and 17 of the Takeover Bids Directive. The two questions differ on the issue of the identity of the parties, or the lack thereof, across the proceedings.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0034"><NO.P>34.</NO.P><TXT>Articles 4 and 17 of the Takeover Bids Directive deal with the appointment and powers of a supervisory authority and the issuing of sanctions for infringement of the national measures adopted pursuant to that directive. However, it is not obvious, and the referring court does not explain, how those provisions are able to provide any guidance on the specific issues raised in the present proceedings.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0035"><NO.P>35.</NO.P><TXT>The <HT TYPE="ITALIC">third</HT> and <HT TYPE="ITALIC">fourth</HT> questions approach the same issue from the perspective of the Charter. In essence, they ask whether Article 47 of the Charter would preclude national procedural rules which consider a decision of an administrative authority concerning breaches of the national rules on takeover bids, which has become final, to bind the same administrative authority in a later (administrative) criminal proceeding. The third question seeks guidance on that compatibility from the perspective that party identity between the two proceedings conducted by said administrative authority exists. The fourth question poses the same question from the perspective that there is a lack of party identity.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0036"><NO.P>36.</NO.P><TXT>Read together, the four questions raised by the referring court thus appear to juxtapose giving <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0042" REF.END="QE0042"/>full effectiveness<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0042" CODE="2019" ID="QE0042"/> to the Takeover Bids Directive with the adherence of the procedural rights protected by, inter alia, the Charter. The referring court seems to suggest that a certain tension exists between those two aims. Indeed, the silent assumption appears to be that there can either be effectiveness of the sanctions, or protection of fundamental rights, but not both. There may even be a further silent assumption, namely that if a sanction is to be <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0043" REF.END="QE0043"/>effective<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0043" CODE="2019" ID="QE0043"/>, it ought not to be disturbed too much by the rights of the parties.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0037"><NO.P>37.</NO.P><TXT>I do not think that this is a good starting assumption.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0038"><NO.P>38.</NO.P><TXT>Instead, it is uncontested that Austria’s rules on the supervision of takeover bids, as inter alia contained in the ÜbG, constitute implementation of the Takeover Bids Directive, and thus EU law, for the purposes of Article 51(1) of the Charter. Any national proceeding conducted pursuant to the framework of the Takeover Bids Directive must thus be compatible with Article 47 of the Charter and any rights guaranteed by EU law.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="8"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0039"><NO.P>39.</NO.P><TXT>Thus, the real issue, in my view, is not that one must choose between <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0044" REF.END="QE0044"/>full effectiveness<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0044" CODE="2019" ID="QE0044"/> and <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0045" REF.END="QE0045"/>fundamental rights<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0045" CODE="2019" ID="QE0045"/>. Rather, the genuine issue is whether the Austrian procedural rules, as applied and evidenced by the present case, are compatible with Articles 4 and 17 of the Takeover Bids Directive, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter and the rights guaranteed by EU law.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0040"><NO.P>40.</NO.P><TXT>Third, seen in this light, the four questions raised by the referring court become two, or rather one, with two sub-questions. Therefore, the questions referred can essentially be rephrased to enquire whether the application of the national procedural rules, as evidenced by the present case, is compatible with Articles 4 and 17 of the Takeover Bids Directive, if read in the light of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence and/or Article 47 of the Charter. That overarching question has two further sub-questions: a scenario where party identity across the procedures is present (Questions 1 and 3) and where such identity is missing (Questions 2 and 4).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0041"><NO.P>41.</NO.P><TXT>Those questions are posed with a particular focus on the administrative penalty proceeding. However, as becomes clear, that proceeding is not the origin of the problem. That problem begins <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0046" REF.END="QE0046"/>upstream<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0046" CODE="2019" ID="QE0046"/> with the protection of such rights during the preliminary proceeding by the Takeover Commission and the limited review of the resulting findings before the Supreme Court, with those issues then being carried <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0047" REF.END="QE0047"/>downstream<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0047" CODE="2019" ID="QE0047"/> into the subsequent (administrative) criminal (and potentially further) proceedings.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0042"><NO.P>42.</NO.P><TXT>Given the importance of the preliminary proceeding, I shall thus begin with Questions 2 and 4 and the protection of fundamental rights of those parties that did not participate in the preliminary proceeding and (therefore) were unable to challenge the findings made in the Preliminary Decision (C.1). Only thereafter shall I turn to Questions 1 and 3 and the situation of party identity between proceedings, albeit only briefly (C.2). Before doing so, however, I shall outline the fundamental rights standard applicable to both sets of questions (B).</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">B.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">The EU law requirements</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">1.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Administrative proceedings and the rights of the defence</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0043"><NO.P>43.</NO.P><TXT>Respect for the rights of the defence is a general principle of EU law, which applies where an authority is minded to adopt a measure which will adversely affect an individual.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0006"><P>See judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20131022">22 October 2013</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Sabou</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑276/12</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2013:678">EU:C:2013:678</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0038">38</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited); of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20151217">17 December 2015</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">WebMindLicenses</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑419/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:832">EU:C:2015:832</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0084">84</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20191016">16 October 2019</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Glencore Agriculture Hungary</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑189/18</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2019:861">EU:C:2019:861</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0039">39</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited).</P></NOTE> In those circumstances, the addressee of that decision must be put in a position to be heard and to submit his or her observations <HT TYPE="ITALIC">before</HT> that decision is taken.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0007"><P>Judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20090219">19 February 2009</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Kamino International Logistics</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑376/07</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2009:105">EU:C:2009:105</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0042">42</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0043">43</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20141105">5 November 2014</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Mukarubega</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑166/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2336">EU:C:2014:2336</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0047">47</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20191016">16 October 2019</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Glencore Agriculture Hungary</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑189/18</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2019:861">EU:C:2019:861</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0041">41</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> Those rights are indispensable in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">all</HT> proceedings leading to an adverse decision for the party concerned, be they of a civil, criminal, administrative, or other nature.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0008"><P>Judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20100914">14 September 2010</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑550/07 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2010:512">EU:C:2010:512</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0092">92</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited); of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20150305">5 March 2015</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission and Others</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Versalis and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑93/13 and C‑123/13 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:150">EU:C:2015:150</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0094">94</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited); and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20201006">6 October 2020</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Bank Refah Kargaran</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑134/19 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2020:793">EU:C:2020:793</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0056">56</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="9"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0044"><NO.P>44.</NO.P><TXT>Crucially, the respect for a party’s subjective rights of the defence must be safeguarded <HT TYPE="ITALIC">by administrative authorities</HT> when carrying out their proceedings.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0009"><P>See judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20130926">26 September 2013</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Texdata Software</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑418/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2013:588">EU:C:2013:588</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0083">83</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited), and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20160317">17 March 2016</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Bensada Benallal</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑161/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:175">EU:C:2016:175</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0033">33</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited).</P></NOTE> Those rights must be available at the point in time in which they become implicated.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0010"><P>See, to that effect, judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20121122">22 November 2012</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">M</HT></NAME.CASE>. (<NO.CASE>C‑277/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2012:744">EU:C:2012:744</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0090">90</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20191016">16 October 2019</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Glencore Agriculture Hungary</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑189/18</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2019:861">EU:C:2019:861</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0047">47</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0049">49</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20210202">2 February 2021</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Consob</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑481/19</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2021:84">EU:C:2021:84</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0042">42</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0044">44</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited).</P></NOTE> Only in this manner can it be ensured that the authority concerned takes all the relevant information into account, and that the person affected is permitted to correct any errors and argue in favour of the non-adoption of an adverse decision.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0011"><P>Judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20111221">21 December 2011</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">France</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑27/09 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:853">EU:C:2011:853</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0065">65</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited); of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20141105">5 November 2014</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Mukarubega</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑166/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2336">EU:C:2014:2336</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0047">47</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20191016">16 October 2019</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Glencore Agriculture Hungary</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑189/18</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2019:861">EU:C:2019:861</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0041">41</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">2.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Judicial proceedings and Article 47 of the Charter</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0045"><NO.P>45.</NO.P><TXT>The first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter provides for the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal. Key components of that right are the principle of equality of arms, including the principle of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">audi alteram partem</HT>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0012"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20100921">21 September 2010</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Sweden and Others</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">API and Commission</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑514/07 P, C‑528/07 P and C‑532/07 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2010:541">EU:C:2010:541</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0088">88</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited).</P></NOTE> and the principle of procedural equality.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0013"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20160630">30 June 2016</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Toma and Biroul Executorului Judecătoresc Horațiu-Vasile Cruduleci</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑205/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:499">EU:C:2016:499</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0036">36</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited).</P></NOTE> By imposing the obligation to provide each party with a reasonable opportunity to present their case in conditions that do not place one of the parties in a clearly less advantageous position than the other,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0014"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20140717">17 July 2014</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑169/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2099">EU:C:2014:2099</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0049">49</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> Article 47 of the Charter also concerns itself with the protection of the rights of the defence.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0015"><P>Judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20180725">25 July 2018</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice)</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑216/18 PPU</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2018:586">EU:C:2018:586</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0067">67</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20190624">24 June 2019</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court)</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑619/18</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2019:531">EU:C:2019:531</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0077">77</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0046"><NO.P>46.</NO.P><TXT>It is true that the full range of guarantees flowing from Article 6(2) and (3) of the European Convention on Human Rights (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0048" REF.END="QE0048"/>ECHR<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0048" CODE="2019" ID="QE0048"/>), to which Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter correspond, only arises in proceedings liable to lead to a penalty that is <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0049" REF.END="QE0049"/>criminal<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0049" CODE="2019" ID="QE0049"/> in nature.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0016"><P>See, to that effect, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20210202">2 February 2021</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Consob</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑481/19</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2021:84">EU:C:2021:84</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0042">42</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0043">43</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>). See also ECtHR <DATE ISO="20201210">10 December 2020</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Edizioni del Roma Societa Cooperativa A.R.L. et Edizioni del Roma S.R.L. v. Italy</HT> (ECLI:CE:ECHR:2020:1210JUD006895413, § 40 and the case-law cited).</P></NOTE> However, it is also clear from the wording of Article 47 of the Charter that that provision is not limited to proceedings which lead to the imposition of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0050" REF.END="QE0050"/>criminal<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0050" CODE="2019" ID="QE0050"/> penalties alone. Indeed, that provision establishes a nucleus of rights which must be protected in all judicial proceedings.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0017"><P>See, to that effect, judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20201217">17 December 2020</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie van België and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑336/19</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2020:1031">EU:C:2020:1031</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0056">56</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited), and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20210202">2 February 2021</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Consob</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑481/19</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2021:84">EU:C:2021:84</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0037">37</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="10"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0047"><NO.P>47.</NO.P><TXT>A review into whether said nucleus of rights has been observed must be available, both in law and in fact, by a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0051" REF.END="QE0051"/>tribunal<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0051" CODE="2019" ID="QE0051"/> within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0018"><P>See, to that effect, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20140911">11 September 2014</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">CB</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑67/13 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2204">EU:C:2014:2204</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0043">43</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0046">46</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>). See also ECtHR <DATE ISO="20201210">10 December 2020</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Edizioni del Roma Societa Cooperativa A.R.L. et Edizioni del Roma S.R.L. v. Italy</HT> (ECLI:CE:ECHR:2020:1210JUD006895413, § 90 and the case-law cited).</P></NOTE> For the purposes of the case-law, such a body must be established by law; be permanent; have compulsory jurisdiction; feature a proceeding that is <HT TYPE="ITALIC">inter partes</HT>; apply rules of law; and be independent (internally and externally).<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0019"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20180227">27 February 2018</DATE>, <NAME.CASE>Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses</NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑64/16</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2018:117">EU:C:2018:117</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0038">38</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited). See also, as regards the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0052" REF.END="QE0052"/>internal<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0052" CODE="2019" ID="QE0052"/> aspect of independence, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20191119">19 November 2019</DATE>, <NAME.CASE>A. K. and Others <HT TYPE="ITALIC">(Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court)</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑585/18, C‑624/18 and C‑625/18</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2019:982">EU:C:2019:982</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0122">122</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0048"><NO.P>48.</NO.P><TXT>By default, in order for judicial review under the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter to be effective, that review requires <HT TYPE="ITALIC">full jurisdiction</HT> at least in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">one instance</HT>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0020"><P>Judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20121106">6 November 2012</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Otis and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑199/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2012:684">EU:C:2012:684</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0049">49</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20170516">16 May 2017</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Berlioz Investment Fund</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑682/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2017:373">EU:C:2017:373</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0054">54</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0056">56</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited).</P></NOTE> The scope of the review by such a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0053" REF.END="QE0053"/>tribunal<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0053" CODE="2019" ID="QE0053"/> may be limited, for example, to questions of law only.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0021"><P>See, to that effect, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20060919">19 September 2006</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Wilson</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑506/04</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2006:587">EU:C:2006:587</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0061">61</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>). See also ECtHR <DATE ISO="20000118">18 January 2000</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Pesti et Frodl v. Autriche</HT> (ECLI:CE:ECHR:2000:0118DEC002761895, § 4 and the case-law cited), and of <DATE ISO="19851122">22 November 1985</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Bryan v. the United Kingdom</HT> (ECLI:CE:ECHR:1995:1122JUD001917891, § 47).</P></NOTE> However, in that case, the administrative authority competent to render the decision at issue must <HT TYPE="ITALIC">itself</HT> satisfy all the criteria of a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0054" REF.END="QE0054"/>tribunal<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0054" CODE="2019" ID="QE0054"/> for the purposes of Article 47 of the Charter.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0022"><P>See, to that effect, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20060919">19 September 2006</DATE>, <NAME.CASE>Wilson</NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑506/04</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2006:587">EU:C:2006:587</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0061">61</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0062">62</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>). See also, ECtHR <DATE ISO="20091027">27 October 2009</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Crompton v. the United Kingdom</HT> (ECLI:CE:ECHR:2009:1027JUD004250905, §§ 70 to 73).</P></NOTE> Thus, in one way or another, there must be at least one fully independent instance, which will qualify as <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0055" REF.END="QE0055"/>tribunal<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0055" CODE="2019" ID="QE0055"/> for the purposes of the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, and which is entitled to assess the case in full jurisdiction, that is to say involving elements of law as well as those elements of fact.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">C.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">The present case</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">1.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Different parties in subsequent administrative proceedings</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0049"><NO.P>49.</NO.P><TXT>The referring court explains that, during the preliminary proceeding, the Takeover Commission carried out an examination into whether the conduct of the parties to the proceedings could (objectively) be regarded as <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0056" REF.END="QE0056"/>acting in concert<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0056" CODE="2019" ID="QE0056"/> to acquire <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0057" REF.END="QE0057"/>major holdings<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0057" CODE="2019" ID="QE0057"/> in Conwert and whether that should have triggered the obligation to make a mandatory takeover bid. In the subsequent (administrative criminal) proceeding, the Takeover Commission then deemed itself bound by those (objective) findings for determining the subjective elements of the failure to make a mandatory takeover bid. It considered those binding effects to arise despite the fact that the preliminary and administrative criminal proceedings did not concern the same participants.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0050"><NO.P>50.</NO.P><TXT>In my view, this clearly raises issues under EU law, in both of the dimensions just outlined: from the perspective of the exercise of the rights of the defence of the parties concerned (a) and the lack of a possibility for review by a court with <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0058" REF.END="QE0058"/>full jurisdiction<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0058" CODE="2019" ID="QE0058"/> (b).</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="11"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(a)</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The exercise of the rights of the defence</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0051"><NO.P>51.</NO.P><TXT>HL explains that, during the preliminary proceeding, he was unable to exercise his rights of the defence because he was not designated as a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0059" REF.END="QE0059"/>party<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0059" CODE="2019" ID="QE0059"/> to the proceeding (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0060" REF.END="QE0060"/><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Parteistellung</HT><QUOT.END REF.START="QS0060" CODE="2019" ID="QE0060"/>). Instead, HL was merely deemed a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0061" REF.END="QE0061"/>participant<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0061" CODE="2019" ID="QE0061"/> (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0062" REF.END="QE0062"/><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Beteiligter</HT><QUOT.END REF.START="QS0062" CODE="2019" ID="QE0062"/>) for the purposes of the preliminary proceeding. Under Austrian law, those statuses apparently carry different procedural rights and guarantees. For instance, HL explains that he was not informed of the preliminary proceeding; he was not able to inspect the file; or exercise his right to remain silent; or appeal the Preliminary Decision. Only once the administrative penalty proceedings were initiated was HL allegedly able to exercise those rights, but only within that second set of proceedings. At that point in time, however, the Preliminary Decision, which by then had become definitive, already bound the Takeover Commission as regards the objective determination of the parties having <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0063" REF.END="QE0063"/>acted in concert<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0063" CODE="2019" ID="QE0063"/>. Therefore, HL was, from the beginning, objectively attributed the actions of Adler due to his position as board member of that company, without him being able to exercise his (own and personal) rights of the defence.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0052"><NO.P>52.</NO.P><TXT>In its reply to a question posed by the Court, the Takeover Commission argues that HL was able to participate in the preliminary proceeding; had the right to remain silent under Paragraph 51 of the AVG; and had the right to defend himself during those proceedings. The Takeover Commission also notes that HL was, indeed, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0064" REF.END="QE0064"/>personally<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0064" CODE="2019" ID="QE0064"/> invited to the oral hearing of the preliminary proceeding, was present, and participated therein. That would imply that HL was able to exercise some of his subjective procedural rights.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0053"><NO.P>53.</NO.P><TXT>It remains for the referring court to determine the factual circumstances of the present case, as well as the existing interpretation of national law, which appears somewhat disputed.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0054"><NO.P>54.</NO.P><TXT>From the case file, I understand that, during the preliminary proceeding, HL participated in his capacity as <HT TYPE="ITALIC">board member</HT> for Adler, acting for and on behalf of that company, but not in his personal capacity. In fact, there appears to be no indication that his personal liability was objectively investigated by the Takeover Commission in the preliminary proceeding. It was the company’s involvement that had been investigated. HL’s <HT TYPE="ITALIC">personal</HT> involvement appears only to arise during the administrative penalty proceeding.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0055"><NO.P>55.</NO.P><TXT>The Takeover Commission, however, appears to argue that, despite the party mismatch between the two proceedings, HL could have exercised his <HT TYPE="ITALIC">personal</HT> rights of the defence during the preliminary proceeding vicariously through Adler, when representing the latter legal entity in his capacity as board member since both parties shared the same interests (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0065" REF.END="QE0065"/><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Interessengleichlauf</HT><QUOT.END REF.START="QS0065" CODE="2019" ID="QE0065"/>).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0056"><NO.P>56.</NO.P><TXT>I disagree with that logic for (at least) two reasons.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0057"><NO.P>57.</NO.P><TXT>First, one cannot overlook the rather striking potential that a <HT TYPE="ITALIC">conflict of interests</HT> and/or a breach of fiduciary duties may arise for directors of companies who are placed in the position described by the Takeover Commission. Certainly, it is largely correct to assume that, as far as the bigger picture is concerned, both the company and its director(s) or other members of its governing bodies are likely to share the same interest in their company not being found guilty of infringing the rules on takeover bids. However, with regard to other issues potentially arising along the way, can it really be excluded that a company director or a board member will not find themselves in a position where he or she must choose between the best interests of the company<?PAGE NO="12"?> and his or her own best interest, particularly in the context of what appears to be a subsequent administrative personal liability for company directors with sanctions of a criminal nature being imposed?</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0058"><NO.P>58.</NO.P><TXT>Second, the rights of the defence are of a <HT TYPE="ITALIC">subjective</HT> nature. Pursuant to settled case-law, those rights may not be transferred to another person, natural or legal, and they may certainly not be exercised on behalf of another person.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0023"><P>See, for instance, judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20110609">9 June 2011</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Evropaïki Dynamiki</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ECB</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑401/09 P</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:370">EU:C:2011:370</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0049">49</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20150910">10 September 2015</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Fliesen-Zentrum Deutschland</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑687/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:573">EU:C:2015:573</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0073">73</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>). See also, more recently, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20190919">19 September 2019</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Zhejiang Jndia Pipeline Industry</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>T‑228/17</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:T:2019:619">EU:T:2019:619</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0036">36</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> It is the concerned parties themselves that must be able to effectively exercise their rights conferred on them by EU law, irrespective of the nature of the proceedings to which they are subject.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0059"><NO.P>59.</NO.P><TXT>Thus, without wishing to sound too formalistic, I cannot embrace the premiss that a physical person acting for and on behalf of a company (and thus normally understood as acting <HT TYPE="ITALIC">as the company</HT>, a statutory representative of a legal person), is effectively the same as that person acting in his or her personal interest and for his or her own account. This is a fortiori true in circumstances where, in the course of those procedures, the interests of both persons may diverge, if not outright conflict.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0060"><NO.P>60.</NO.P><TXT>In the present case, it appears that HL, in his personal capacity, was only able to exercise <HT TYPE="ITALIC">his</HT> rights of the defence during the administrative penalty proceeding. However, at that point in time, the Preliminary Decision had already become definitive. It therefore bound the administrative penalty proceeding as to the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0066" REF.END="QE0066"/>objective<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0066" CODE="2019" ID="QE0066"/> elements of the Takeover Commission’s investigation into a possible breach of the obligation to make a mandatory takeover bid. That had the effect of prejudging HL’s conduct, without him being able to make known his views <HT TYPE="ITALIC">before</HT> the adoption of that decision.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0024"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20141105">5 November 2014</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Mukarubega</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑166/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2336">EU:C:2014:2336</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0046">46</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0047">47</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(b)</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Lack of access to a court with <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0067" REF.END="QE0067"/>full jurisdiction<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0067" CODE="2019" ID="QE0067"/></HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0061"><NO.P>61.</NO.P><TXT>GM, HL and Adler take the view that, in the present circumstances, Article 47 of the Charter precludes the recognition of the binding effect of the Preliminary Decision for the purposes of the administrative penalty proceeding. As regards the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, those parties submit that, in the light of the limited judicial review available to the Supreme Court, recognising the binding effect of the Preliminary Decision, once it became definitive, in the context of the subsequent administrative penalty proceeding and for court proceedings before the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court, Austria), undermines their right to effective judicial protection arising from the Charter.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0062"><NO.P>62.</NO.P><TXT>The Takeover Commission opposes those views. It argues that the procedural guarantees underlying both the preliminary and administrative penalty proceedings are such that the resulting decisions are taken by an independent and impartial <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0068" REF.END="QE0068"/>tribunal<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0068" CODE="2019" ID="QE0068"/> within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter. Given that the Takeover Commission thus, in both cases, acts as the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0069" REF.END="QE0069"/>court of first instance<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0069" CODE="2019" ID="QE0069"/>, limiting the standard of review of the Supreme Court to questions of law only, is compatible with Article 47 of the Charter.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="13"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0063"><NO.P>63.</NO.P><TXT>The logic of the requirements of the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter requires a two-part assessment.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0025"><P>Set out above in point 48 of this Opinion.</P></NOTE> First, whether the Takeover Commission does in fact, like it claims, qualify as a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0070" REF.END="QE0070"/>tribunal<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0070" CODE="2019" ID="QE0070"/> within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter (1). Second, where that is not the case, whether its decisions are subject to review by a court with <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0071" REF.END="QE0071"/>full jurisdiction<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0071" CODE="2019" ID="QE0071"/> (2).</TXT></NP.ECR><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(1)</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Is the Takeover Commission a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0072" REF.END="QE0072"/>tribunal<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0072" CODE="2019" ID="QE0072"/> within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter?</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0064"><NO.P>64.</NO.P><TXT>One of the cumulative conditions required for there to be a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0073" REF.END="QE0073"/>tribunal<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0073" CODE="2019" ID="QE0073"/>, within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter, is whether the authority concerned is <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0074" REF.END="QE0074"/>independent<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0074" CODE="2019" ID="QE0074"/>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0026"><P>See above, point 47 of this Opinion.</P></NOTE> It ensures a level playing field for the parties to the proceedings and their respective interests in relation to the subject matter of those proceedings.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0027"><P>See, for instance, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20101222">22 December 2010</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">RTL Belgium</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑517/09</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2010:821">EU:C:2010:821</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0038">38</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0040">40</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited).</P></NOTE> In other words, the body concerned may not act as a party in its own cause in breach of the principle of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0075" REF.END="QE0075"/><HT TYPE="ITALIC">nemo judex in sua causa</HT><QUOT.END REF.START="QS0075" CODE="2019" ID="QE0075"/>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0028"><P>See, to that effect, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20200121">21 January 2020</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Banco de Santander</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑274/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2020:17">EU:C:2020:17</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0062">62</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited). See also ECtHR <DATE ISO="20201210">10 December 2020</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Edizioni del Roma Societa Cooperativa A.R.L. et Edizioni del Roma S.R.L. v. Italy</HT> (ECLI:CE:ECHR:2020:1210JUD006895413, § 64).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0065"><NO.P>65.</NO.P><TXT>Without it being necessary to run through all that is required in order to satisfy the criteria of a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0076" REF.END="QE0076"/>tribunal<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0076" CODE="2019" ID="QE0076"/>, as required for Article 47 of the Charter, it appears that the Takeover Commission does not satisfy the criterion linked to <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0077" REF.END="QE0077"/>independence<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0077" CODE="2019" ID="QE0077"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0066"><NO.P>66.</NO.P><TXT>In reply to a question posed by the Court, GM notes that, pursuant to Paragraph 29(1) of the ÜbG, the Takeover Commission is responsible for the implementation of the ÜbG, and has therefore been conferred extensive <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ex officio</HT> powers, including the power to initiate preliminary and administrative penalty proceedings. In such proceedings, the Takeover Commission itself decides on the scope and subject matter of the proceeding, and itself carries out the investigation for that proceeding. Subject to confirmation by the referring court, it appears from Paragraph 33(4) of the ÜbG that, in proceedings commenced pursuant to a reasoned request, the Takeover Commission holds the sole competence to decide on whether to continue a proceeding, even where said request is later withdrawn.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0067"><NO.P>67.</NO.P><TXT>Thus, in a nutshell, the Takeover Commission appears to have a number of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0078" REF.END="QE0078"/>hats<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0078" CODE="2019" ID="QE0078"/> under national law: the investigator, the prosecutor, as well as the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0079" REF.END="QE0079"/>judge<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0079" CODE="2019" ID="QE0079"/>. There is no indication that the Takeover Commission internally operates on the basis of a firm functional separation between, on the one hand, the departments of that authority responsible for investigation and decision-making in the context of the implementation of the Takeover Bids Directive, and, on the other hand, a body ruling on complaints lodged against decisions taken by those departments.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0029"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20200121">21 January 2020</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Banco de Santander</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑274/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2020:17">EU:C:2020:17</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0072">72</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0077">77</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0068"><NO.P>68.</NO.P><TXT>Indeed, it appears that, in subsequent judicial proceedings relating to challenges to the Takeover Commission’s preliminary or administrative penalty proceedings, the Takeover Commission acts as the defendant in its own cause to defend its decisions before the competent Austrian court.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0030"><P>Ibid., paragraph 42.</P></NOTE> It thus does not act as an impartial third party between the alleged offender, on the one hand, and the administrative authority responsible for monitoring the compliance with takeover bids, on the other hand.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="14"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0069"><NO.P>69.</NO.P><TXT>Naturally, all those elements are for the referring court to decide on. However, in view of the answers provided to this Court, and for the reasons laid down in the preceding points of this Opinion, I am not convinced that the Takeover Commission satisfies the criteria of a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0080" REF.END="QE0080"/>tribunal<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0080" CODE="2019" ID="QE0080"/> within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter. I wish to stress that such a tentative conclusion, again solely for the referring court to verify, in no way questions the fact that certain national administrative authorities will be endowed with an advanced level of independence, and possess the highest level of expertise in their respective fields of activity.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0070"><NO.P>70.</NO.P><TXT>However, that is not what defines an <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0081" REF.END="QE0081"/>independent<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0081" CODE="2019" ID="QE0081"/> tribunal. An independent tribunal under the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter is characterised by its complete independence, both <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0082" REF.END="QE0082"/>internal<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0082" CODE="2019" ID="QE0082"/> as well as <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0083" REF.END="QE0083"/>external<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0083" CODE="2019" ID="QE0083"/>. It is an independent <HT TYPE="ITALIC">third</HT> with regard to both parties concerned. Within that logic, decision-making chambers that are part of an administrative authority, or even functionally very independent appellate chambers that are part of an administrative authority, still tend to fall on the side of public administration and not be part of the judiciary.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0031"><P>See, by analogy, from the case-law concerning admissibility of requests for preliminary rulings issued by various (review or quasi-judicial) chambers of bodies within the public administration, for instance judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20050531">31 May 2005</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Syfait and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑53/03</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2005:333">EU:C:2005:333</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0031">31</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0037">37</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), or of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20020530">30 May 2002</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Schmid</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑516/99</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2002:313">EU:C:2002:313</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0034">34</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0038">38</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0071"><NO.P>71.</NO.P><TXT>Since it would appear that the Takeover Commission is not a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0084" REF.END="QE0084"/>tribunal<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0084" CODE="2019" ID="QE0084"/> within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, the question thus becomes whether, in the present case, the competent national courts maintain <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0085" REF.END="QE0085"/>full jurisdiction<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0085" CODE="2019" ID="QE0085"/> to review the decisions of the Takeover Commission.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(2)</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Does a review by a court with <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0086" REF.END="QE0086"/>full jurisdiction<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0086" CODE="2019" ID="QE0086"/> take place?</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0072"><NO.P>72.</NO.P><TXT>The judicial review of decisions of the Takeover Commission appears to differ depending on the proceeding at issue. On the one hand, the findings resulting from the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">preliminary</HT> proceeding may be appealed to the Supreme Court. That court’s review is limited to questions of law only.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0032"><P>See, in more detail, point 29 of this Opinion.</P></NOTE> It thus does not appear to have <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0087" REF.END="QE0087"/>full jurisdiction<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0087" CODE="2019" ID="QE0087"/> to review questions of fact.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0033"><P>See, in this regard, Paragraph 30a(1) and (2) of the ÜbG. By contrast, see for example the review proceeding available under German law against a decision of the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, Germany), which allows for a review of law and fact. See Paragraph 48 of the Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz (German Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act).</P></NOTE> On the other hand, the findings resulting from the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">administrative penalty</HT> proceeding may be appealed for review to the Federal Administrative Court (which, in the present case, is the referring court itself).<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0034"><P>Paragraph 35(3) of the ÜbG.</P></NOTE> That court appears to hold <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0088" REF.END="QE0088"/>full jurisdiction<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0088" CODE="2019" ID="QE0088"/> to review findings of the Takeover Commission in law and in fact.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0073"><NO.P>73.</NO.P><TXT>However, the referring court explains that it is, in practice, not exercising <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0089" REF.END="QE0089"/>full jurisdiction<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0089" CODE="2019" ID="QE0089"/> because it cannot review the Preliminary Decision of the Takeover Commission. It notes that – by reason of the broad binding effects which the Austrian procedural rules attach to final administrative decisions – the referring court is bound by the (now definitive) findings of the Takeover Commission in the Preliminary Decision, and cannot review those findings.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0074"><NO.P>74.</NO.P><TXT>In summary, national law puts in place a system, whereby the Takeover Commission, which (i) does not satisfy the qualities of a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0090" REF.END="QE0090"/>tribunal<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0090" CODE="2019" ID="QE0090"/>, renders a decision, which (ii) cannot be reviewed in full by the Supreme Court, and that, (iii) upon becoming definitive, (iv) binds not only the<?PAGE NO="15"?> Takeover Commission itself in future proceedings featuring identity of parties (interpreted rather broadly by that body), cause and object, but also (v) any court ordinarily tasked with reviewing those related proceedings.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0075"><NO.P>75.</NO.P><TXT>If that is indeed the case, such a situation is, in my view, at odds with Article 47 of the Charter and the requirement for effective judicial protection.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0076"><NO.P>76.</NO.P><TXT>I would emphasise that that incompatibility arises <HT TYPE="ITALIC">for every participant</HT> in the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0091" REF.END="QE0091"/>first<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0091" CODE="2019" ID="QE0091"/>, preliminary procedure, because there appears to be no <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0092" REF.END="QE0092"/>tribunal<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0092" CODE="2019" ID="QE0092"/> with full jurisdiction, as required under the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter. To that initial problem, an <HT TYPE="ITALIC">additional</HT> one arises with regard to the specific situation of the parties that were not even participating in the first preliminary proceedings.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">2.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The same parties in the subsequent proceedings</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0077"><NO.P>77.</NO.P><TXT>GM argues that, while he did participate as a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0093" REF.END="QE0093"/>party<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0093" CODE="2019" ID="QE0093"/> in the preliminary proceeding, he was not informed of the fact that that proceeding could lead to the imposition of a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0094" REF.END="QE0094"/>criminal<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0094" CODE="2019" ID="QE0094"/> penalty by virtue of the administrative penalty proceeding. He also notes that, during the preliminary proceeding, he was not given the right to remain silent.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0078"><NO.P>78.</NO.P><TXT>The Takeover Commission takes the position that all of GM’s fundamental rights were respected during the preliminary and administrative penalty proceedings.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0079"><NO.P>79.</NO.P><TXT>While it falls to the referring court to verify those circumstances, the bottom line for the purposes of protecting the fundamental rights of GM is the same as that evoked for the specific circumstances of HL and Adler. In a way, the problem arising in the first round is <HT TYPE="ITALIC">the same for all the parties</HT>. It is only that, in the specific context of where the parties are the same across the proceedings, the additional issue of the absence of the rights of the defence may not arise (that is, of course, subject to the proviso that those rights, which arose during the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0095" REF.END="QE0095"/>first round<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0095" CODE="2019" ID="QE0095"/>, could have been exercised when they became implicated).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0080"><NO.P>80.</NO.P><TXT>Beyond that, I see no reason why, in principle, objective determinations of a previous administrative proceeding could not be relied upon in a parallel, or later, administrative proceeding arising from the same facts.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0035"><P>See my Opinion in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Glencore Agriculture Hungary</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑189/18</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2019:462">EU:C:2019:462</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0039">39</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> It is common practice that later administrative decisions take as their basis the findings, information, or even elements of evidence established in their previous decisions or even decisions of other administrative authorities.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0081"><NO.P>81.</NO.P><TXT>However, the bottom line for all such <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0096" REF.END="QE0096"/>across-the-files-transfers<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0096" CODE="2019" ID="QE0096"/> is that the party concerned must remain able to fully exercise his or her rights of the defence when such rights became or would have become implicated.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0036"><P>See above, point 44 of this Opinion.</P></NOTE> It cannot be that such a party is suddenly faced with a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0097" REF.END="QE0097"/>fait accompli<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0097" CODE="2019" ID="QE0097"/>, in essence prejudging significantly his or her position without that party ever having the opportunity to state their case.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="16"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0082"><NO.P>82.</NO.P><TXT>In so far as it appears that GM was the party in both proceedings, acting in both his own and personal capacity, the structural issues arising from the lack of identity of parties across the various proceedings do not arise.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0037"><P>See above, points 54 to 60 of this Opinion.</P></NOTE> Whether or not his rights of the defence were respected in the specific case in either of the two sets of proceedings is an issue for the referring court.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">3.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">A Closing Remark</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0083"><NO.P>83.</NO.P><TXT>I find it necessary to point out that this Opinion does not question in any way the possibility for national law to extend the binding effect of administrative decisions, which have become final, across proceedings. It is, again, rather common that one decision may form the basis for another decision, or is taken into account in a different proceeding.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0038"><P>In relation to VAT, see, for instance, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20151217">17 December 2015</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">WebMindLicenses</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑419/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:832">EU:C:2015:832</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0068">68</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0090">90</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>). See also my Opinion in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Glencore Agriculture Hungary</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑189/18</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2019:462">EU:C:2019:462</NO.ECLI>, point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0039">39</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited).</P></NOTE> More often than not, administrative efficiency, together with equality and foreseeability of administrative action, indeed speaks to extending certain findings across proceedings.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0039"><P>Although reasons of administrative efficiency cannot act as a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0098" REF.END="QE0098"/>silver bullet<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0098" CODE="2019" ID="QE0098"/> to restrict the protection of fundamental rights. See, to that effect, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20110630">30 June 2011</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Zeturf</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑212/08</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:437">EU:C:2011:437</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0048">48</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0084"><NO.P>84.</NO.P><TXT>Whether, and how, the national legal order wishes to create binding effects of final decisions by administrative authorities is left to the procedural autonomy of the Member States. The fundamental rights protection of EU law limits that autonomy only to the extent that it is necessary to establish effective protection of those rights.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0040"><P>See, to that effect, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20151111">11 November 2015</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Klausner Holz Niedersachsen</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑505/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:742">EU:C:2015:742</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0040">40</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0085"><NO.P>85.</NO.P><TXT>It is also clear that the Member States are not required to establish a system of administrative decisions, in which the administrative authority itself satisfies the criteria of a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0099" REF.END="QE0099"/>tribunal<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0099" CODE="2019" ID="QE0099"/> within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter. However, as a matter of EU law, when rights derived from EU law are concerned, the (judicial) control of that administration’s decisions then shifts one step <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0100" REF.END="QE0100"/>upstream<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0100" CODE="2019" ID="QE0100"/> to the competent national courts.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0086"><NO.P>86.</NO.P><TXT>Viewed in that context, all that has been suggested in this Opinion is that the specific combination of institutional and procedural choices made by the national legislature is problematic for two reasons. First, within the preliminary proceedings, there must be, at some stage, the possibility to challenge the preliminary decision before a court with <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0101" REF.END="QE0101"/>full jurisdiction<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0101" CODE="2019" ID="QE0101"/>, should the parties wish to do so. Second, the protection of (by their nature) subjective rights does not allow for an <QUOT.START CODE="2018" ID="QS0102" REF.END="QE0102"/>imputation by proxy<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0102" CODE="2019" ID="QE0102"/> across administrative proceedings, in which individuals find themselves in a position where their case is being partially pre-judged by findings concerning their behaviour, established in a previous proceedings to which they were not a party.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">V.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Conclusion</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0087"><NO.P>87.</NO.P><TXT>I propose that the Court answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court, Austria) as follows:</TXT><P>Articles 4 and 17 of Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20040421">21 April 2004</DATE> on takeover bids, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the rights of the defence, must be interpreted as<?PAGE NO="17"?> precluding the application of national procedural rules that have as their effect the prevention of the parties concerned from fully exercising their rights of the defence in the course of a subsequent administrative penalty proceeding establishing the subjective responsibility for an infringement arising from Directive 2004/25 or which fail to provide the parties access to an effective remedy before a tribunal under the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter.</P></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></CONTENTS.CONCLUSION></CONCLUSION>