<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><CONCLUSION NNC="YES" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://formex.publications.europa.eu/schema/formex-05.00-20081231.xd"><BIB.CONCLUSION><REF.CASE FILE="ECRCJ2000ENB.0800783501.case.xml"><NO.CASE>C-290/98</NO.CASE></REF.CASE><NO.CELEX>61998C0290</NO.CELEX><NO.SEQ>0020.0001</NO.SEQ><PAGE.FIRST.ECR>7836</PAGE.FIRST.ECR><PAGE.SEQ>1</PAGE.SEQ><PAGE.LAST.ECR>7874</PAGE.LAST.ECR><PAGE.TOTAL>39</PAGE.TOTAL></BIB.CONCLUSION><CURR.TITLE><LEFT>OPINION OF MR SAGGIO — CASE C-290/98</LEFT><RIGHT>COMMISSION V AUSTRIA</RIGHT></CURR.TITLE><CONTENTS.CONCLUSION><TITLE><TI><P><HT TYPE="UC">Opinion of Advocate General</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="UC">Saggio</HT></P><P>delivered on <DATE ISO="20000518">18 May 2000</DATE><NOTE NOTE.ID="E0001" NUMBERING="STAR"><P>Original language: Italian.</P></NOTE></P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>1.</NO.P><TXT>By an application lodged at the Court Registry on <DATE ISO="19980728">28 July 1998</DATE>, the Commission is claiming that the Republic of Austria has failed properly to fulfil a number of obligations arising out of Council Directive 91/308/EEC of <DATE ISO="19910610">10 June 1991</DATE> on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0002" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P><REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="166" DATE.PUB="1991" PAGE.FIRST="77">OJ 1991 L 166, p. 77</REF.DOC.OJ>.</P></NOTE> (hereinafter: <QUOT.START ID="QS0001" REF.END="QE0001" CODE="2018"/>the Directive<QUOT.END ID="QE0001" REF.START="QS0001" CODE="2019"/>). The obligations in question concern the need to ensure that money laundering is prohibited and to guarantee that credit or financial institutions undertake customer identification.</TXT></NP><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><P>The relevant Community law</P></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>Scope and substance of the money laundering directive</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>2.</NO.P><TXT>The directive in question was adopted on the basis of Article 57(2), second and third sentences, and Article 100a of the EEC Treaty (subsequently, following the amendments introduced by the Treaty on European Union, Article 57(2), second and third sentences, and Article 100a of the EC Treaty and, now, following the amendments introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 47(2) EC, first and second sentences, and Article 95 EC). Those provisions basically lay down that the Council, acting by a qualified majority, on a Commission proposal and in cooperation with the European Parliament, shall issue <QUOT.START ID="QS0002" REF.END="QE0002" CODE="2018"/>directives for the coordination of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in the Member States concerning the taking-up and pursuit of activities as self-employed persons<QUOT.END ID="QE0002" REF.START="QS0002" CODE="2019"/> as well as <QUOT.START ID="QS0003" REF.END="QE0003" CODE="2018"/>measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their objective the establishment and functioning of the internal market.<QUOT.END ID="QE0003" REF.START="QS0003" CODE="2019"/></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>3.</NO.P><TXT>The scope of the directive is twofold: on the one hand, it is designed to regulate the conditions governing access to credit and financial activities, on the premiss that <QUOT.START ID="QS0004" REF.END="QE0004" CODE="2018"/>when credit and financial institutions are used to launder proceeds from criminal activities... soundness and stability of the institution concerned and confidence in the financial system as a whole could be seriously jeopardised thereby losing the<?PAGE NO="I-7837"?> trust of the public<QUOT.END ID="QE0004" REF.START="QS0004" CODE="2019"/>;<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0003" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See the first recital.</P></NOTE> on the other, it seeks to guarantee the proper functioning of the internal market, on the ground that <QUOT.START ID="QS0005" REF.END="QE0005" CODE="2018"/>lack of Community action against money laundering could lead the Member States, for the purpose of protecting their financial systems, to take measures which could be inconsistent with the completion of the single market<QUOT.END ID="QE0005" REF.START="QS0005" CODE="2019"/>.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0004" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See the first part of the second recital.</P></NOTE> That is the reason why the directive was adopted using two separate legal bases. More generally, the directive is designed to prevent circumstances in which <QUOT.START ID="QS0006" REF.END="QE0006" CODE="2018"/>in order to facilitate their criminal activities, launderers could try to take advantage of the freedom of capital movement and freedom to supply financial services which the integrated financial area involves, if certain coordinating measures are not adopted at Community level.<QUOT.END ID="QE0006" REF.START="QS0006" CODE="2019"/><NOTE NOTE.ID="E0005" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See the second part of the second recital.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>4.</NO.P><TXT>In that context, the directive's definition of money laundering — perceived as a <QUOT.START ID="QS0007" REF.END="QE0007" CODE="2018"/>criminal activity, which constitutes a particular threat to Member States' societies<QUOT.END ID="QE0007" REF.START="QS0007" CODE="2019"/><NOTE NOTE.ID="E0006" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See the second part of the third recital.</P></NOTE> — is taken word for word from the <QUOT.START ID="QS0008" REF.END="QE0008" CODE="2018"/>United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, adopted on <DATE ISO="19981219">19 December 1998</DATE> in Vienna... and [extended] more generally [in relation] to all criminal activities, by the Council of Europe Convention on laundering, tracing, seizure and confiscation of proceeds of crime, opened for signature on <DATE ISO="19901108">8 November 1990</DATE> in Strasbourg<QUOT.END ID="QE0008" REF.START="QS0008" CODE="2019"/>.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0007" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See the fourth and ninth recitals.</P></NOTE> The definition, contained in Article 1, third indent, of the directive, includes four types of <QUOT.START ID="QS0009" REF.END="QE0009" CODE="2018"/>conduct when committed intentionally<QUOT.END ID="QE0009" REF.START="QS0009" CODE="2019"/>: (a) <QUOT.START ID="QS0010" REF.END="QE0010" CODE="2018"/>the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such activity, to evade the legal consequences of his action<QUOT.END ID="QE0010" REF.START="QS0010" CODE="2019"/>; (b) <QUOT.START ID="QS0011" REF.END="QE0011" CODE="2018"/>the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity<QUOT.END ID="QE0011" REF.START="QS0011" CODE="2019"/>; (c) <QUOT.START ID="QS0012" REF.END="QE0012" CODE="2018"/>the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property was derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity<QUOT.END ID="QE0012" REF.START="QS0012" CODE="2019"/>; (d) <QUOT.START ID="QS0013" REF.END="QE0013" CODE="2018"/>participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the actions mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs.<QUOT.END ID="QE0013" REF.START="QS0013" CODE="2019"/> In regard to such criminal activity, knowledge, intent or purpose may be inferred from objective factual circumstances. Furthermore, according to the directive, money laundering also includes cases in which <QUOT.START ID="QS0014" REF.END="QE0014" CODE="2018"/>the activities which generated the property to be laundered were perpetrated in the territory of another Member State or in that of a third country<QUOT.END ID="QE0014" REF.START="QS0014" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>5.</NO.P><TXT>Having made those preliminary points of a general nature, I shall consider briefly the<?PAGE NO="I-7838"?> provisions of the directive which have a direct bearing on this case.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>6.</NO.P><TXT>Article 2 of the Directive prohibits any form of money laundering, a prohibition which, if backed by <QUOT.START ID="QS0015" REF.END="QE0015" CODE="2018"/>appropriate measures and penalties is a necessary condition for combating this phenomenon<QUOT.END ID="QE0015" REF.START="QS0015" CODE="2019"/>.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0008" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See the 10th recital.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>7.</NO.P><TXT>Article 3 of the Directive meantime requires credit and financial institutions to require identification of their customers <QUOT.START ID="QS0016" REF.END="QE0016" CODE="2018"/>to avoid launderers' taking advantage of anonymity to carry out their criminal activities<QUOT.END ID="QE0016" REF.START="QS0016" CODE="2019"/>.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0009" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See the 11th recital.</P></NOTE> More especially, Article 3 lays down different requirements for <HT TYPE="ITALIC">regular</HT> and <HT TYPE="ITALIC">occasional</HT> customers of the credit and financial institutions. In the case of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">regular</HT> customers, Article 3(1) requires the Member States to ensure that the credit and financial institutions establish identification of such customers <QUOT.START ID="QS0017" REF.END="QE0017" CODE="2018"/>by means of supporting evidence when entering into business relations, particularly when opening an account or savings account, or when offering safe custody facilities<QUOT.END ID="QE0017" REF.START="QS0017" CODE="2019"/>. In the case of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">occasional</HT> customers, Article 3(2) requires identification <QUOT.START ID="QS0018" REF.END="QE0018" CODE="2018"/>for any transaction... involving a sum amounting to ECU <FT TYPE="NUMBER">15000</FT> or more, whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations which seem to be linked<QUOT.END ID="QE0018" REF.START="QS0018" CODE="2019"/>; it further requires that, where the sum is not known at the time when the transaction is undertaken, the credit or financial institution <QUOT.START ID="QS0019" REF.END="QE0019" CODE="2018"/>shall proceed with identification as soon as it is apprised of the sum and establishes that the threshold has been reached<QUOT.END ID="QE0019" REF.START="QS0019" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>8.</NO.P><TXT>Article 3(5) and (6) contain two provisions designed to boost the effectiveness of the Directive. Article 3(5) provides that, in the event of doubt as to whether customers are acting on their own behalf, or where it is certain that they are not acting on their own behalf, <QUOT.START ID="QS0020" REF.END="QE0020" CODE="2018"/>the credit or financial institutions shall take reasonable measures to obtain information as to the real identity of the persons on whose behalf those customers are acting<QUOT.END ID="QE0020" REF.START="QS0020" CODE="2019"/>. Article 3(6) requires the credit and financial institutions to identify the client, even where the amount of the transaction is lower than the threshold laid down, <QUOT.START ID="QS0021" REF.END="QE0021" CODE="2018"/>wherever there is suspicion of money laundering<QUOT.END ID="QE0021" REF.START="QS0021" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>9.</NO.P><TXT>In connection with the latter provision, it should also be pointed out that Articles 5 and 6 of the Directive lay down a general requirement for the Member States to ensure that <QUOT.START ID="QS0022" REF.END="QE0022" CODE="2018"/>credit and financial institutions examine with special attention any transaction<?PAGE NO="I-7839"?> which they regard as particularly likely, by its nature, to be related to money-laundering<QUOT.END ID="QE0022" REF.START="QS0022" CODE="2019"/>,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0010" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>The 13th recital specifies that the credit or financial institutions <QUOT.START ID="QS0023" REF.END="QE0023" CODE="2018"/>should pay special attention to transactions with third countries which do not apply comparable standards against money laundering to those established by the Community or to other equivalent standards set out by international fora and endorsed by the Community<QUOT.END ID="QE0023" REF.START="QS0023" CODE="2019"/>.</P></NOTE> and <QUOT.START ID="QS0024" REF.END="QE0024" CODE="2018"/>cooperate fully with the authorities responsible for combating money laundering<QUOT.END ID="QE0024" REF.START="QS0024" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>10.</NO.P><TXT>Article 14 of the Directive then provides that the Member States are to take <QUOT.START ID="QS0025" REF.END="QE0025" CODE="2018"/>the appropriate measures to ensure the full application of all the provisions of this Directive<QUOT.END ID="QE0025" REF.START="QS0025" CODE="2019"/> and determine <QUOT.START ID="QS0026" REF.END="QE0026" CODE="2018"/>the penalties to be applied for infringement of the measures adopted pursuant to this Directive<QUOT.END ID="QE0026" REF.START="QS0026" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>11.</NO.P><TXT>Under Article 16(1) of the Directive, the deadline for adjusting the national legal systems to meet the requirements of the directive was <DATE ISO="19930101">1 January 1993</DATE>.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>Other relevant provisions</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>12.</NO.P><TXT>As we know, the first paragraph of Article 5 of the EC Treaty (now the first paragraph of Article 10 EC) provides that: <QUOT.START ID="QS0027" REF.END="QE0027" CODE="2018"/>Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations... resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community<QUOT.END ID="QE0027" REF.START="QS0027" CODE="2019"/>; whilst the third paragraph of Article 189 of the EC Treaty (now the third paragraph of Article 249 EC) lays down that a directive <QUOT.START ID="QS0028" REF.END="QE0028" CODE="2018"/>shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to national authorities the choice of form and methods<QUOT.END ID="QE0028" REF.START="QS0028" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>13.</NO.P><TXT>By Decision 94/1/ECSC, EC of the Council and the Commission of <DATE ISO="19931213">13 December 1993</DATE> on the conclusion of the Agreement on the European Economic Area between the European Communities, their Member States and the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland, the Republic of Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein, the Kingdom of Norway, the Kingdom of Sweden and the Swiss Confederation,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0011" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P><REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="001" DATE.PUB="1994" PAGE.FIRST="1">OJ 1994 L 1, p. 1</REF.DOC.OJ>.</P></NOTE> and Decision 94/2/ECSC, EC of the Council and the Commission of <DATE ISO="19931213">13 December 1993</DATE> on the conclusion of the Protocol adjusting the Agreement on the European Economic Area between the European Communities, their Member States and the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland, the Republic of Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein, the Kingdom of Norway and the Kingdom of Sweden,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0012" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Ibidem, p. 571.</P></NOTE> the Agreement on the European Economic Area (hereinafter: <QUOT.START ID="QS0029" REF.END="QE0029" CODE="2018"/>the EEA Agreement<QUOT.END ID="QE0029" REF.START="QS0029" CODE="2019"/>) and the adjusting Protocol were approved. The EEA Agreement entered into force on <DATE ISO="19940101">1 January 1994</DATE>.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0013" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See the information on the date of the entry into force of the European Economic Area and the adjusting Protocol (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="001" DATE.PUB="1994" PAGE.FIRST="606">OJ 1994 L 1, p. 606</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="I-7840"?><NP><NO.P>14.</NO.P><TXT>Article 7 of the EEA Agreement provides that: <QUOT.START ID="QS0030" REF.END="QE0030" CODE="2018"/>Acts referred to or contained in the Annexes to this Agreement... shall be binding upon the Contracting Parties and... be made part of their internal legal order<QUOT.END ID="QE0030" REF.START="QS0030" CODE="2019"/>; according to Article 36(2) meantime, Annexes IX to XI contain specific provisions on the freedom to provide services. Section II(iii)(23) of Annex IX to the EEA Agreement, on financial services, refers to the money laundering directive.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>15.</NO.P><TXT>Article 108 of the EEA Agreement provides that the EFTA States, which have signed it, are to establish an independent surveillance authority, called the <QUOT.START ID="QS0031" REF.END="QE0031" CODE="2018"/>EFTA Surveillance Authority<QUOT.END ID="QE0031" REF.START="QS0031" CODE="2019"/>, as well as procedures similar to those existing in the Community, including procedures for ensuring the fulfilment of obligations under the EEA Agreement. In that connection, the Agreement between the EFTA States of <DATE ISO="19920502">2 May 1992</DATE> on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0014" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P><REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="344" DATE.PUB="1994" PAGE.FIRST="1">OJ 1994 L 344, p. 1</REF.DOC.OJ>.</P></NOTE> creates, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">inter alia,</HT> an infringement procedure broadly similar to that laid down in Article 169 of the EC Treaty (now Article 226 EC). For the purposes of this case, it should be pointed out that Article 31 of that Agreement authorises the Surveillance Authority to invite an EFTA State to submit its observations on any failure to fulfil obligations under the EEA Agreement by means of a letter of formal notice.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>16.</NO.P><TXT>The Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Member States of the European Union) and the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden, concerning the Accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden to the European Union<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0015" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P><REF.DOC.OJ COLL="C" NO.OJ="241" DATE.PUB="1994" PAGE.FIRST="21">OJ 1994 C 241, p. 21</REF.DOC.OJ>.</P></NOTE> entered into force on <DATE ISO="19950101">1 January 1995</DATE>, as provided for in Article 2(2) of that Treaty. Article 2 of the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0016" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P><REF.DOC.OJ COLL="C" NO.OJ="241" DATE.PUB="1994" PAGE.FIRST="21">OJ 1994 C 241, p. 21, and OJ 1995, p. 1</REF.DOC.OJ>.</P></NOTE> (hereinafter: <QUOT.START ID="QS0032" REF.END="QE0032" CODE="2018"/>the Act of Accession<QUOT.END ID="QE0032" REF.START="QS0032" CODE="2019"/>), annexed to the aforementioned Treaty and forming an integral part of it, provides that from the date of accession <QUOT.START ID="QS0033" REF.END="QE0033" CODE="2018"/>the provisions of the original treaties and the acts adopted by the institutions before accession shall be binding on the new Member States and shall apply in those States under the conditions laid down... in this Act.<QUOT.END ID="QE0033" REF.START="QS0033" CODE="2019"/> According to Article 166 of the Act of Accession: <QUOT.START ID="QS0034" REF.END="QE0034" CODE="2018"/>Upon accession, the new Member States shall be considered as being addressees of directives... within the meaning of Article 189 of the EC Treaty... provided that those directives... have been addressed to all the present Member States<QUOT.END ID="QE0034" REF.START="QS0034" CODE="2019"/>, adding that: <QUOT.START ID="QS0035" REF.END="QE0035" CODE="2018"/>the new Member States shall be considered as having received notification of such directives... upon accession<QUOT.END ID="QE0035" REF.START="QS0035" CODE="2019"/>. Finally, in accordance<?PAGE NO="I-7841"?> with Article 168 of the Act of Accession: <QUOT.START ID="QS0036" REF.END="QE0036" CODE="2018"/>The new Member States shall put into effect the measures necessary for them to comply, from the date of accession, with the provisions of directives... within the meaning of Article 189 of the EC Treaty... unless a time-limit is laid down in the list of Annex XIX or in any other provisions of this Act<QUOT.END ID="QE0036" REF.START="QS0036" CODE="2019"/>. The money laundering directive is not mentioned in Annex XIX nor does it form the subject-matter of specific provisions of the Act of Accession.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>17.</NO.P><TXT>I would finally draw attention to a number of transitional provisions concerning infringement proceedings instigated by the EFTA Surveillance Authority before the new Member States acceded to the European Union. According to Article 172(6) and (7) of the Act of Accession, from the date of accession, <QUOT.START ID="QS0037" REF.END="QE0037" CODE="2018"/>the new Member States shall ensure that all other cases, where the EFTA Surveillance Authority has been seised in the framework of the surveillance procedure under the EEA Agreement before accession, are transmitted without delay to the Commission which shall continue to deal with them under the relevant Community provisions while ensuring that the right of defence continues to be observed<QUOT.END ID="QE0037" REF.START="QS0037" CODE="2019"/>, on the understanding that <QUOT.START ID="QS0038" REF.END="QE0038" CODE="2018"/>the decisions taken by the EFTA Surveillance Authority remain valid after accession unless the Commission takes a duly motivated decision to the contrary in accordance with the basic principles of Community law.<QUOT.END ID="QE0038" REF.START="QS0038" CODE="2019"/></TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><P>The relevant national legislation</P></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>Preliminary remarks</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>18.</NO.P><TXT>I shall confine myself here to furnishing the relevant information on the national legislation applicable to this case. That legislation basically includes certain provisions of the Austrian Penal Code<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0017" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Strafgesetzbuch (BGBl. No 60/1974, as subsequently amended). Material to this case are the amendments of 1993 (BGBl. No 527/1993), of 1996 (BGBl. No 762/1996) and 1998 (BGBl. No 153/1998).</P></NOTE> (hereinafter: the <QUOT.START ID="QS0039" REF.END="QE0039" CODE="2018"/>StGB<QUOT.END ID="QE0039" REF.START="QS0039" CODE="2019"/>), of the Austrian Bank Law<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0018" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Bankwesengesetz (BGBl. No 63/1979, as subsequently amended). Material to this case are the amendments of 1993 (BGBl. No 532/1993), of 1996 (BGBl. No 446/1996) and of 1998 (BGBl. No 11/1998).</P></NOTE> (hereinafter: the <QUOT.START ID="QS0040" REF.END="QE0040" CODE="2018"/>BWG<QUOT.END ID="QE0040" REF.START="QS0040" CODE="2019"/>) and of the Austrian Deposit Law<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0019" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Depotgesetz (BGBl. No 424/1969, as subsequently amended).</P></NOTE> (hereinafter: the <QUOT.START ID="QS0041" REF.END="QE0041" CODE="2018"/>DG<QUOT.END ID="QE0041" REF.START="QS0041" CODE="2019"/>), as well as a number of official communications of the Austrian National Bank.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0020" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Kundmachungen der Österreichischen Nationalbank DL 1/91, DL 2/91 and DL 1/99, transmitted by the Austrian Government on <DATE ISO="20000203">3 February 2000</DATE>, at the Court's request.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>Criminal law</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>19.</NO.P><TXT>In the area of criminal law, Paragraph 165 of the StGB expressly provides for the offence of <QUOT.START ID="QS0042" REF.END="QE0042" CODE="2018"/>money laundering<QUOT.END ID="QE0042" REF.START="QS0042" CODE="2019"/> (<QUOT.START ID="QS0043" REF.END="QE0043" CODE="2018"/>Geldwäscherei<QUOT.END ID="QE0043" REF.START="QS0043" CODE="2019"/>), largely defined as the act of concealing property derived from criminal<?PAGE NO="I-7842"?> activity perpetrated by others or disguising its provenance by providing false information as to the origin, nature or ownership of, power of disposal over, transfer or location of the property.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0021" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Moreover, Austrian criminal law also penalises the offence of handling stolen goods, provided for in Paragraph 164 of the StGB; the constituent elements of that offence differ from those of money laundering in the sense that the handling of stolen goods requires the offender to have assisted the perpetrator of a crime against property for the purpose of concealing or using the proceeds of the crime.</P></NOTE> Until 1998, that provision made money laundering a punishable offence provided that the property that had been concealed or had its origin changed, was <QUOT.START ID="QS0044" REF.END="QE0044" CODE="2018"/>of a value in excess of ATS <FT TYPE="NUMBER">100000</FT><QUOT.END ID="QE0044" REF.START="QS0044" CODE="2019"/>. After <DATE ISO="19981001">1 October 1998</DATE>, that condition was removed when the definition of the offence was amended to make it easier to prosecute money laundering. The aggravating circumstance provided for in cases where the money that has been laundered is <QUOT.START ID="QS0045" REF.END="QE0045" CODE="2018"/>in excess of ATS <FT TYPE="NUMBER">500000</FT><QUOT.END ID="QE0045" REF.START="QS0045" CODE="2019"/>, or the perpetrator of the offence is the member of a criminal organisation,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0022" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>As provided for in Paragraph 278a of the StGB.</P></NOTE> continue to apply, as well as the extenuating circumstance introduced<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0023" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>By Paragraph 165a of the StGB.</P></NOTE> where the perpetrator of the offence acts voluntarily to hinder its completion.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>Banking law</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>20.</NO.P><TXT>Austrian banking law contains provisions designed to combat money laundering. In particular, Paragraph 40 of the BWG requires the credit and financial institutions to identify customers where: (a) permanent business relations are established; (b) transactions are carried out which, although they do not form part of permanent business relations, are of a value of at least ATS <FT TYPE="NUMBER">200000</FT>, regardless of whether a single transaction or a series of transactions is involved, provided that, if the value of the transaction is unknown, identification of the customer is undertaken when the value of the transaction is established or it is ascertained that the aforementioned threshold has been reached; (c) there is good reason to suspect that the customer is involved in money laundering. The credit and financial institutions have also to ask their customers whether they intend maintaining business relations on their own behalf or on behalf of a third party and, if so, the identity of their principal.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>21.</NO.P><TXT>Until <DATE ISO="19960731">31 July 1996</DATE>, the abovementioned rules on customer identification permitted derogations concerning, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">inter alia,</HT> the opening of <QUOT.START ID="QS0046" REF.END="QE0046" CODE="2018"/>savings accounts<QUOT.END ID="QE0046" REF.START="QS0046" CODE="2019"/> (<QUOT.START ID="QS0047" REF.END="QE0047" CODE="2018"/>Sparbücher<QUOT.END ID="QE0047" REF.START="QS0047" CODE="2019"/>) and <QUOT.START ID="QS0048" REF.END="QE0048" CODE="2018"/>securities accounts<QUOT.END ID="QE0048" REF.START="QS0048" CODE="2019"/> (<QUOT.START ID="QS0049" REF.END="QE0049" CODE="2018"/>Wertpapierkonten<QUOT.END ID="QE0049" REF.START="QS0049" CODE="2019"/>) as well as transactions relating to them, save for the provisions laid down by the Austrian National Bank in regard to residents and <QUOT.START ID="QS0050" REF.END="QE0050" CODE="2018"/>foreigners<QUOT.END ID="QE0050" REF.START="QS0050" CODE="2019"/> (<QUOT.START ID="QS0051" REF.END="QE0051" CODE="2018"/>Ausländer<QUOT.END ID="QE0051" REF.START="QS0051" CODE="2019"/>).<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0024" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See, in that connection, paragraphs 8.2.2 and 8.2.3 of the official communication (<QUOT.START ID="QS0052" REF.END="QE0052" CODE="2018"/>Kundmachung<QUOT.END ID="QE0052" REF.START="QS0052" CODE="2019"/>) DL 2/91 of the Austrian National Bank, as amended by official communication DL 1/99. According to paragraphs 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 of official communication DL 1/91, <QUOT.START ID="QS0053" REF.END="QE0053" CODE="2018"/>foreigners<QUOT.END ID="QE0053" REF.START="QS0053" CODE="2019"/> (<QUOT.START ID="QS0054" REF.END="QE0054" CODE="2018"/>Ausländer<QUOT.END ID="QE0054" REF.START="QS0054" CODE="2019"/>) basically means persons not resident in Austrian territory.</P></NOTE> As of <DATE ISO="19960801">1 August 1996</DATE>, the identification requirement was extended — with effect from that date — to the opening of securities accounts,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0025" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>They fall within the scope of Article 11 of the DG which places a number of specific obligations on credit institutions with which they are opened.</P></NOTE> although in regard to transactions made from or to such accounts that requirement applies solely<?PAGE NO="I-7843"?> to the acceptance and acquisition of securities.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0026" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See Paragraph 40(5) of the BWG.</P></NOTE> However, the derogation concerning the opening of savings accounts has continued to apply, and also applies to the transactions relating to them.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>22.</NO.P><TXT>Savings accounts are regulated by Paragraphs 31 and 32 of the BWG. These are basically monetary deposits — opened with credit institutions authorised for that purpose — used not for payments transactions but simply for investment purposes, and from which it is therefore possible to withdraw sums subject only to certain conditions and on presentation of special documents (passbooks), in a registered name or payable to bearer. In the case of passbooks payable to bearer, access to the funds deposited may be subject to presentation of a particular <QUOT.START ID="QS0055" REF.END="QE0055" CODE="2018"/>password<QUOT.END ID="QE0055" REF.START="QS0055" CODE="2019"/> by the customer. For the purposes of this case, it should be noted that the only transactions allowed in relation to savings accounts are the payments and withdrawals that are entered in the passbook; it is not, in principle, possible to issue cheques or make credit transfers, although it is possible for third parties to make credit transfers to a savings account. The accounts in question yield interest at the agreed rate, and that interest is generally calculated and paid at the end of the calendar year, which is normally when the deposit matures.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0027" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Paragraph 32(5) of the BWG. Moreover, savings accounts may nave to be opened for a specific period.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><P>The stages in the infringement proceedings</P></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>The procedure before the EFTA Surveillance Authority</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>23.</NO.P><TXT>On <DATE ISO="19940101">1 January 1994</DATE>, the EEA Agreement entered into force. Consequently, by letter of <DATE ISO="19940617">17 June 1994</DATE>, the EFTA Surveillance Authority asked the Austrian Government for detailed information on the national legislation transposing the money laundering directive. The Austrian authorities provided that information by letter of <DATE ISO="19940725">25 July 1994</DATE>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>24.</NO.P><TXT>Once in receipt of that information, the EFTA Surveillance Authority sent to the Austrian Government, on <DATE ISO="19941209">9 December 1994</DATE>, a reasoned opinion in accordance with the abovementioned Article 31 of the Agreement between the EFTA States of <DATE ISO="19920502">2 May 1992</DATE> on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice, requesting the Austrian Government to comply as soon as possible with all provisions of the directive that had yet to be implemented. The Austrian Government replied to that letter on <DATE ISO="19950109">9 January 1995</DATE>, largely referring back to the statements already contained in its letter of <DATE ISO="19940725">25 July 1994</DATE>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>25.</NO.P><TXT>Austria acceded to the European Union on <DATE ISO="19950101">1 January 1995</DATE>. In accordance with Article 172(6) of the Act of Accession, the<?PAGE NO="I-7844"?> EFTA Surveillance Authority transmitted to the Commission, responsible for such issues, the whole of its correspondence with the Austrian Government.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>The procedure before the Commission</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>26.</NO.P><TXT>On <DATE ISO="19951220">20 December 1995</DATE>, the Commission decided to resume the infringement proceedings and invited the Austrian Government to submit its own observations on a number of complaints concerning failure to fulfil the obligations laid down in the Directive. The Commission therefore sent to the Austrian Government on <DATE ISO="19960214">14 February 1996</DATE> a letter of formal notice within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 169 of the EC Treaty. The Austrian Government submitted its own observations by letter of its permanent representative of <DATE ISO="19970412">12 April 1997</DATE>, but the Commission did not regard those observations as adequate.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>27.</NO.P><TXT>Taking the view that there had been a breach of Community law, the Commission decided to send the Austrian Government a reasoned opinion in accordance with and for the purposes of the abovementioned first paragraph of Article 169 of the EC Treaty. That reasoned opinion was served by letter of <DATE ISO="19970221">21 February 1997</DATE>. The Austrian authorities responded to the reasoned opinion, first by letter of <DATE ISO="19970404">4 April 1997</DATE> from the Federal Minister for Finance and, subsequently, by letter of <DATE ISO="19970417">17 April 1997</DATE> from the permanent representative. The Commission deemed both those replies to be inadequate.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>28.</NO.P><TXT>Considering therefore that Austria was still failing to fulfil its obligations under the directive, the Commission decided to bring the present action, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 169 of the EC Treaty, lodged at the Court Registry on <DATE ISO="19980728">28 July 1998</DATE>.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><P>Submissions of the parties</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>29.</NO.P><TXT>In its application in this case, the Commission is essentially claiming that the Court should:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="DASH"><ITEM><P>declare that the Republic of Austria has failed to fulfil its obligations under the EC Treaty and Articles 2 and 3(1), (5) and (6) of the Directive by:</P><P><LIST TYPE="DASH"><ITEM><P>limiting the prohibition on money laundering contained in Paragraph 165 of the StGB to assets having a value in excess of ATS <FT TYPE="NUMBER">100000</FT>;</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>requiring customer identification when a securities account is opened<?PAGE NO="I-7845"?> not as of <DATE ISO="19940101">1 January 1994</DATE> (the date on which the EEA Agreement entered into force) but only as of <DATE ISO="19960801">1 August 1996</DATE>;</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>not requiring customer identification for all transactions into or out of an existing securities account, but only, as provided under Paragraph 40(5) of the BWG, in the case of deposits and purchases of securities for such accounts;</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>not requiring customer identification whenever a savings account is opened on or after <DATE ISO="19940101">1 January 1994</DATE>;</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>not requiring customer identification for all transactions relating to a savings account opened before or after <DATE ISO="19940101">1 January 1994</DATE>;</P></ITEM></LIST></P></ITEM><ITEM><P>order the Republic of Austria to pay the costs.</P></ITEM></LIST></P></NP><NP><NO.P>30.</NO.P><TXT>In its reply,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0028" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Reply, paragraph 1.4. Clearly as a result of the failure to make the consequent changes, that amendment is not reflected in the conclusions set out at the end of the reply (paragraph 4.1.1).</P></NOTE> the Commission amended the first of the complaints addressed to the Austrian Government, and asked the Court to declare that <QUOT.START ID="QS0056" REF.END="QE0056" CODE="2018"/>the Republic of Austria has failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty and Article 2 of the Directive... in so far as it extended the prohibition on money laundering laid down by Paragraph 165 of the StGB to assets with a value of less than ATS <FT TYPE="NUMBER">100000</FT> only as of <DATE ISO="19981001">1 October 1998</DATE><QUOT.END ID="QE0056" REF.START="QS0056" CODE="2019"/>. The Commission is also asking the Court to <QUOT.START ID="QS0057" REF.END="QE0057" CODE="2018"/>declare inadmissible the objection set out in Section IV of the rejoinder<QUOT.END ID="QE0057" REF.START="QS0057" CODE="2019"/>,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0029" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Reply, at paragraph 4.2.</P></NOTE> that is to say the plea of illegality entered by the Austrian Government in relation to Article 3 of the Directive.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>31.</NO.P><TXT>For its part, the Austrian Government is essentially claiming that the Court should:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="DASH"><ITEM><P>reject the application in full;</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>order the Commission to pay the costs.</P></ITEM></LIST></P></NP></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="I-7846"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><P>The date from which the Austrian Government was required to comply with the provisions of the Directive</P></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>Positions of the parties</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>32.</NO.P><TXT>In its application, the Commission argues that <DATE ISO="19940101">1 January 1994</DATE>, the date on which the EEA Agreement entered into force, must be assumed to be the date from which the Austrian Government was required to comply with the provisions of the Directive<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0030" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See paragraph 17 of the application which refers to statements contained in the letter of formal notice of <DATE ISO="19960214">14 February 1996</DATE> and the reasoned opinion of <DATE ISO="19970221">21 February 1997</DATE>.</P></NOTE> and, therefore, that the unlawful conduct for which it criticises that Government began on that same date. However, the Commission fails — even in its reply<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0031" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>The Commission restates this argument in paragraph 31 of the reply without expanding on it.</P></NOTE> — to explain the reasons on which its argument is based, except for a vague reference to the provisions of the abovementioned Articles 7 and 36 of the EEA Agreement concerning the binding nature of the Community acts cited in Annex IX to the actual Agreement — including the money laundering directive — and the obligation on the contracting parties to transpose it into their national legal systems.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>33.</NO.P><TXT>Although, during the written procedure, the Austrian Government did not specifically challenge the Commission's argument concerning the date from which it was required to comply with the provisions of the Directive,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0032" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See section B.4 of the statement of defence which deals with the problem of retroactive transposition of the directive, but does not raise the issue of the date of transposition.</P></NOTE> at the hearing of <DATE ISO="20000315">15 March 2000</DATE> it contended that that obligation could apply only from the date of Austria's accession to the European Union, that is to say <DATE ISO="19950101">1 January 1995</DATE>, and that it was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to determine the validity of the alleged failure to fulfil an obligation for the period between <DATE ISO="19940101">1 January 1994</DATE> — the date on which the EEA Agreement entered into force — and <DATE ISO="19941231">31 December 1994</DATE>.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>Opinion of the Advocate General</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>34.</NO.P><TXT>Although belated, the criticisms of the Commission's argument raised by the Austrian Government at the hearing seem to me to be persuasive, also in relation to the case-law developed by the Court concerning the relationship between the Community legal system and the different legal system arising out of the EEA Agreement.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>35.</NO.P><TXT>I would point out in that connection that, according to the abovementioned Article 166 of the Act of Accession, the new Member States — including Austria — are deemed to be addressees of preexisting Community directives <HT TYPE="ITALIC">upon<?PAGE NO="I-7847"?> their accession,</HT> and to have been notified of the directives <HT TYPE="ITALIC">after accession.</HT> Furthermore, in accordance with the abovementioned Article 168 of the Act of Accession, the new Member States are to put into effect the measures necessary to comply with the provisions of preexisting directives only <HT TYPE="ITALIC">from the date of their accession,</HT> unless other time-limits have been set for the transposition of such directives. According to those provisions, the Austrian Government was not required to comply with the provisions of the money laundering directive until <DATE ISO="19950101">1 January 1995</DATE>, the date on which Austria acceded to the European Union, since no other specific time-limit was set in the annexes to the Act of Accession. In the only specific precedent in this area,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0033" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-328/96" YEAR="1999" PAGE.ECR="I-7479">C-328/96 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Austria</HT> [1999] ECR I-7479</REF.DOC.ECR>. This judgment concerns Community law on public contracts, with reference to the procedure for the award of contracts for the new Sankt Pölten administrative and cultural centre.</P></NOTE> moreover, the Court appears implicitly to accept the premiss that the Republic of Austria was required to comply with Community law only from the date of its accession to the European Union, on <DATE ISO="19950101">1 January 1995</DATE>.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0034" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>In the abovementioned Case C-328/96, the Court ruled as follows, at paragraph 63: <QUOT.START ID="QS0058" REF.END="QE0058" CODE="2018"/>The Commission observes first of all that, as from the time of its accession to the European Union on <DATE ISO="19950101">1 January 1995</DATE>, the Republic of Austria was bound to observe Community legislation, which includes the directives relating to the award of public contracts<QUOT.END ID="QE0058" REF.START="QS0058" CODE="2019"/>. (My emphasis.) Subsequently, when setting out the grounds for its judgment in that case (paragraphs 74-79), the Court makes no further mention of the date from which the obligation to comply with the relevant directives arose, but this is only — in my view — because this seems irrelevant to the judgment in the case, which specifically concerns <QUOT.START ID="QS0059" REF.END="QE0059" CODE="2018"/>contracts which were concluded before <DATE ISO="19960206">6 February 1996</DATE> but which on <DATE ISO="19960307">7 March 1996</DATE> had still not been performed or could reasonably have been cancelled<QUOT.END ID="QE0059" REF.START="QS0059" CODE="2019"/> (paragraph 79), that is to say activities which wholly take effect only after Austria has acceded to the European Union. For nis part, Advocate General Alber decided, in his Opinion, to leave aside the question of the date from which the Austrian Government was required to comply with Community law since it in any case became binding on Austria from the time of its accession to the European Union.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>36.</NO.P><TXT>Of course, according to Article 7 of the EEA Agreement, the contracting parties — including Austria — were required to transpose the directives mentioned in the annexes to the Agreement — including the money laundering directive — as soon as the Agreement itself entered into force. But that requirement has to be seen in the context of the special legal arrangements set in place between the Community and the EFTA States in the wake of the EEA Agreement, on the basis of which only the EFTA Court was and is competent to hear disputes concerning the EFTA States. However, since its accession, the Republic of Austria has been an integral part of the Community and, since <DATE ISO="19950101">1 January 1995</DATE>, it has been subject to Community law, in the light of which its conduct is assessed. From that point of view, to accept that it is possible to ascribe to Austria failures to fulfil obligations which relate in part to periods, albeit of limited duration, during which Austria, although a contracting party to the EEA Agreement, had yet to accede to the European Union, would be to accord the Court of Justice authority to rule on disputes over which it has no jurisdiction <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ratione materiae.</HT> That finding is confirmed by the Court's recent decisions in two cases for a preliminary ruling concerning Sweden<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0035" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="CST" NO.CASE="C-321/97" YEAR="1999" PAGE.ECR="I-3551">C-321/97 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Andersson and Wåkerås-Andersson</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Sweden</HT> [1999] ECR I-3551</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> and Austria<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0036" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-140/97" YEAR="1999" PAGE.ECR="I-3499">C-140/97 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Rechberger and Others</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Austria</HT> [1999] ECR I-3499</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> respectively, and relating to the Member State's liability for harm caused by the failure properly to transpose certain directives. In the first of those cases, the Court established, among other things, that it did not have the authority to rule on the interpretation of the EEA Agreement in relation to its application within the EFTA States, either on the basis of the EC Treaty or on the basis of the EEA Agreement itself, and that: <QUOT.START ID="QS0060" REF.END="QE0060" CODE="2018"/>The fact that the EFTA State in<?PAGE NO="I-7848"?> question subsequently became a Member State of the European Union... cannot have the effect of attributing to the Court of Justice jurisdiction to interpret the EEA Agreement as regards its application to situations which do not come within the Community legal order<QUOT.END ID="QE0060" REF.START="QS0060" CODE="2019"/>,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0037" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case C-321/97, paragraph 30.</P></NOTE> and went on to explain that: <QUOT.START ID="QS0061" REF.END="QE0061" CODE="2018"/>The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice covers the interpretation of Community law, of which the EEA Agreement forms an integral part, as regards its application in the new Member States <HT TYPE="ITALIC">with effect from the date of their accession</HT><QUOT.END ID="QE0061" REF.START="QS0061" CODE="2019"/>.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0038" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Ibidem, paragraph 31 (my emphasis).</P></NOTE> In the second of the abovementioned decisions, the Court specified that it <QUOT.START ID="QS0062" REF.END="QE0062" CODE="2018"/>does not have jurisdiction, either under Article [234] of the Treaty or under the EEA Agreement, to rule on the interpretation of the EEA Agreement as regards its application by the Republic of Austria during the period prior to the accession of that Member State to the European Union<QUOT.END ID="QE0062" REF.START="QS0062" CODE="2019"/>,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0039" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case C-140/97, cited in footnote 35 above, paragraph 38.</P></NOTE> since it <QUOT.START ID="QS0063" REF.END="QE0063" CODE="2018"/>only has jurisdiction to rule on the question whether a Member State which acceded to the European Union on <DATE ISO="19950101">1 January 1995</DATE><QUOT.END ID="QE0063" REF.START="QS0063" CODE="2019"/><NOTE NOTE.ID="E0040" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Ibidem, paragraph 40. But see also paragraph 44 in which the Court explicitly refers to <QUOT.START ID="QS0064" REF.END="QE0064" CODE="2018"/>the Republic of Austria's obligation under Community law to implement the Directive after its accession to the European Union on <DATE ISO="19950101">1 January 1995</DATE>.<QUOT.END ID="QE0064" REF.START="QS0064" CODE="2019"/></P></NOTE> has properly transposed the provisions of a directive after that date. It follows from those judgments that, from the point of view of Community law, only actions of the Member States which relate to periods subsequent to their accession to the European Union may be subject to investigation by the Commission or a ruling of the Court of Justice. While it is true that the Court acknowledged, in a number of judgments<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0041" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-43/95" YEAR="1996" PAGE.ECR="I-4661">C-43/95 Data Delecta and Forsberg [1996] ECR I-4661</REF.DOC.ECR> and Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-122/96" YEAR="1997" PAGE.ECR="I-5325">C-122/96 Saldanha and MTS [1997] ECR I-5325</REF.DOC.ECR>. Both judgments relate to the compatibility with Article 6 of the EC. Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 12 EC) of Swedish and Austrian legislation on security for costs and compliance with the judgment.</P></NOTE> delivered before the abovementioned decisions, that the scope of some provisions of the EC Treaty may extend to <QUOT.START ID="QS0065" REF.END="QE0065" CODE="2018"/>the future effects of situations arising prior to that new Member State's accession to the Communities<QUOT.END ID="QE0065" REF.START="QS0065" CODE="2019"/>,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0042" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case C-122/96, cited above, paragraph 14.</P></NOTE> that finding was always based on the principle that the legislation in question was binding on the State only at the date of its accession to the European Union.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0043" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>In both the abovementioned cases, Advocate General La Pergola stresses in his Opinion that issues relating to events prior to the accession of another Member State fall outside the temporal scope of the EC Treaty. See in particular, points 11 and 12 of the Opinion in Saldanha and MTS (I-5327).</P></NOTE> Moreover, derogations of that nature are justified only because of the principle that is being upheld — in the cases in issue, this was the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality — and the gravity of the breach of that principle, criteria which require the Court to assess particularly assiduously the individual circumstances of operators affected by national measures incompatible with Community law.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0044" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>The Court in fact pointed out that <QUOT.START ID="QS0066" REF.END="QE0066" CODE="2018"/>the main proceedings relate to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Community law<QUOT.END ID="QE0066" REF.START="QS0066" CODE="2019"/> (Saldanha and MTS, paragraph 17).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>37.</NO.P><TXT>It is not, in my view, possible to identify effective arguments to contradict the line of reasoning set out above from a reading of the transitional provisions, including Article 172(6) and (7) of the Act of Accession, concerning procedures instituted by the<?PAGE NO="I-7849"?> EFTA Surveillance Authority. The first of those provisions lays down that cases in which the EFTA Surveillance Authority has been seised in the framework of the surveillance procedure are to be transmitted to the Commission following the accession of a Member State which was previously a contracting party to the EEA Agreement; and the second that the decisions taken by the EFTA Surveillance Authority continue to remain valid after accession. However, those provisions make no stipulation as to the point from which the government of a new Member State is required to comply with Community law, nor as to the point from which infringements of Community law may be prosecuted by the Commission. In that connection, the only reference criteria are the abovementioned Articles 166 and 167 of the Act of Accession, from which it is clear that the relevant date is the date on which the new Member State acceded to the European Union.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0045" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>That solution is unsatisfactory because it neither allows the Commission to verify nor the Court to judge actions of a new Member State that are incompatible with Community law — of which the EEA Agreement is an integral part — which took place when the latter Agreement was in force but before the State in question acceded to the European Union. This is a limited period during which a Member State is, so to speak, guaranteed a kind of immunity in respect of the past. It is true that, in theory, illegal actions by a Member State which take place during that period could be verified by the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA Court, but once the new Member States have acceded, that possibility is more or less ruled out by the extremely restrictive provisions of Article 5 of the Agreement on the transitional provisions for the period subsequent to the accession of some EFTA Member States to the European Union.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>38.</NO.P><TXT>On the basis of the foregoing, I therefore consider that the Court should declare<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0046" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>On the basis of the principle arising out of Article 92(1) of the Rules of Procedure.</P></NOTE> that it has no jurisdiction to rule on the complaints the Commission addresses to the Austrian Government with reference to the period between <DATE ISO="19940101">1 January 1994</DATE>, the date on which the EEA Agreement entered into force, and <DATE ISO="19950101">1 January 1995</DATE>, the date on which Austria acceded to the European Union.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><P>The alleged infringement of the obligation to lay down a prohibition on money laundering</P></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>The Commission's original accusation and its amendment after the bringing of the action</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>39.</NO.P><TXT>In its application in this case, the Commission first of all asks the Court to declare that the Austrian Government has failed to observe the obligation arising out of Article 2 of the Directive, which requires that the Member States are to ensure that money laundering is prohibited, in that it limited the scope of the offence of money laundering — provided for and made punishable under Paragraph 165 of the StGB — solely to assets having a value in excess of ATS <FT TYPE="NUMBER">100000</FT>. In other words, the Commission criticises Austria for having set a <HT TYPE="ITALIC">quantitative threshold</HT> above which money laundering is a punishable offence, in contrast to the Directive, under which the Member States are required to prohibit money laundering <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in all cases and without restriction.</HT></TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="I-7850"?><NP><NO.P>40.</NO.P><TXT>By letter of the Federal Minister for Justice of <DATE ISO="19980828">28 August 1998</DATE> addressed to the Commission and, subsequently, in its statement of defence<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0047" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Defence, at paragraph II. 1.</P></NOTE> submitted on <DATE ISO="19981009">9 October 1998</DATE>, the Austrian Government informed the Commission that Paragraph 165 of the StGB had been appropriately amended by a federal law passed by the Nationalrat in July 1998 and published in August 1998.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0048" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>BGBl. No 153/1998.</P></NOTE> That amendment abolished the quantitative threshold of ATS <FT TYPE="NUMBER">100000</FT> with effect from <DATE ISO="19981001">1 October 1998</DATE>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>41.</NO.P><TXT>Once it had taken formal note of the amendment to the national legislation in issue, the Commission, in its reply,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0049" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Reply, at paragraph 1.4.</P></NOTE> changed the original wording of its complaint against the Austrian Government and asked the Court: <QUOT.START ID="QS0067" REF.END="QE0067" CODE="2018"/>to declare that the Republic of Austria had failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty and Article 2 of the directive... by failing to extend the prohibition on money laundering, provided for under Paragraph 165 of the StGB, to assets of less than ATS <FT TYPE="NUMBER">100000</FT> in value, until <DATE ISO="19981001">1 October 1998</DATE>.<QUOT.END ID="QE0067" REF.START="QS0067" CODE="2019"/> However, the conclusion to the reply makes no mention of that amendment, clearly as a result of a lack of coordination.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>42.</NO.P><TXT>In its rejoinder, the Austrian Government took note of the amendment to the Commission's complaint but did not express a view on its admissibility.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>Opinion of the Advocate General on the admissibility of amending the complaint after the application had been made</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>43.</NO.P><TXT>As I mentioned above, in its reply, the Austrian Government did not raise any objection to the Commission's amendment to the original complaint. However, in accordance with Article 92(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court may at any time of its own motion consider whether there exists any absolute bar to proceeding with a case. In this case, the Commission's amendment affects the delimitation of the subject-matter of the dispute and calls into question the procedural guarantees provided for under the Treaty, with the result that the admissibility of that amendment may be analysed on the basis of the abovementioned rule.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0050" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Settled case-law. See, among many, Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-225/91" YEAR="1993" PAGE.ECR="I-3203">C-225/91 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Matram</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> [1993] ECR I-3203, paragraph 13</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>44.</NO.P><TXT>I would make the preliminary point that, in accordance with settled case-law: <QUOT.START ID="QS0068" REF.END="QE0068" CODE="2018"/>The letter of formal notice from the Commission to the Member State, and then the reasoned opinion issued by the Commission, delimit the subject-matter of the dispute, so that it cannot thereafter be extended<QUOT.END ID="QE0068" REF.START="QS0068" CODE="2019"/>,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0051" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-365/97" YEAR="1999" PAGE.ECR="I-7773">C-365/97 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Italy</HT> [1999] ECR I-7773, paragraph 23</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> since the opportunity for a Member State to defend itself constitutes an essential guarantee of the legality of the procedure for establishing that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0052" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See, among many, Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-289/94" YEAR="1996" PAGE.ECR="I-4405">C-289/94 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Italy</HT> [1996] ECR I-4405, paragraph 15</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> In this case, it is common ground that the<?PAGE NO="I-7851"?> complaint originally set out in the application is the same as the complaint addressed to Austria by the Commission in both the letter of formal notice of <DATE ISO="19960214">14 February 1996</DATE> and the reasoned opinion of <DATE ISO="19970221">21 February 1997</DATE>. In that regard, the Commission has fully complied with the rules of the infringement procedure. The problem that arises relates solely to the stage after the application was lodged: at issue is whether the relevant amendment to the complaint, made by the Commission, can be deemed to be admissible.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>45.</NO.P><TXT>I have serious doubts about this. It is settled case-law that, in the context of a procedure designed to establish whether a Member State has failed to fulfil obligations incumbent upon it under Community law, the subject-matter of the dispute may be altered after the application has been lodged as a result of actions attributable to the defendant State, but only in the sense of restricting the complaints, that is to say <HT TYPE="ITALIC">limiting</HT> the subject-matter of the dispute.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0053" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See, simply by way of illustration, Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-257/94" YEAR="1995" PAGE.ECR="I-3041">C-257/94 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Italy</HT> [1995] ECR I-3041, paragraph 4</REF.DOC.ECR> and Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-17/95" YEAR="1995" PAGE.ECR="I-4895">C-17/95 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">France</HT> [1995] ECR I-4895, paragraph 4</REF.DOC.ECR>. In the latter case, Advocate General La Pergola referred to <QUOT.START ID="QS0069" REF.END="QE0069" CODE="2018"/>discontinuance of part of the action<QUOT.END ID="QE0069" REF.START="QS0069" CODE="2019"/> to define instances in which the complaints are restricted after the application has been made (see footnote 4 of the Opinion in Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-17/95" YEAR="1995" PAGE.ECR="I-4896">C-17/95, [1995] ECR I-4896</REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> Not permitted, however — since they would infringe the right of defence of the Member State in question — are amendments to the form of order sought which introduce a substantial change or extend the subject-matter of the dispute, introducing new complaints or aggravating the existing complaints.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0054" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-243/89" YEAR="1993" PAGE.ECR="I-3353">C-243/89 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Denmark</HT> [1993] ECR I-3353, paragraphs 15 and 19</REF.DOC.ECR>, as well as the Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro (I-3373, at point 7). The Court held to be inadmissible the way in which, in its reply, the Commission added to the complaint, with reference to the information supplied by the Danish Government in its statement of defence. In Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-274/93" YEAR="1996" PAGE.ECR="I-2019">C-274/93 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Luxembourg</HT> [1996] ECR I-2019, paragraphs 11 to 13</REF.DOC.ECR>), the Court — taking, in my view, an excessively formalistic approach — held to be inadmissible an application seeking a declaration of the failure, on the part of the Luxembourg Government, to fulfil its obligation to transpose the provisions of a directive because, having referred in the application to <QUOT.START ID="QS0070" REF.END="QE0070" CODE="2018"/>certain provisions not implemented by the Luxembourg Law<QUOT.END ID="QE0070" REF.START="QS0070" CODE="2019"/>, the Commission subsequently asked the Court <QUOT.START ID="QS0071" REF.END="QE0071" CODE="2018"/>to declare that Luxembourg has not adopted all the measures necessary to comply with the Directive<QUOT.END ID="QE0071" REF.START="QS0071" CODE="2019"/>, thereby making it impossible for the defendant Member State — which has not, moreover, submitted pleadings — <QUOT.START ID="QS0072" REF.END="QE0072" CODE="2018"/>to address the... claims relating to the defective transposition of specific provisions of the Directive<QUOT.END ID="QE0072" REF.START="QS0072" CODE="2019"/>.</P></NOTE> In this case, however, once it had taken formal note of the fact that the national legislation in issue had been amended in accordance with its wishes, the Commission could either have upheld its application unamended and sought a declaration of failure to fulfil an obligation at the time when the reasoned opinion was issued or withdrawn its action in part in relation to that head of claim. However, the Commission chose a third way, one fraught with negative consequences which it had clearly failed to appreciate: it amended the ground of application and asked the Court to declare that Austria had failed to fulfil its obligations under the Directive in so far as it abolished the quantitative threshold under Paragraph 165 of the StGB only as of <DATE ISO="19981001">1 October 1998</DATE>, leaving the period prior to that date uncovered. In that way, the Commission amended the substance of its own complaint, changing it from criticism that the prohibition was <HT TYPE="ITALIC">inadequate in terms of its quantitative scope</HT> to criticism that the amendment introduced in 1998 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">did not have retroactive effect.</HT> In those circumstances, I consider that the amendment introduced in the reply — leaving aside any consideration as to whether it is well<?PAGE NO="I-7852"?> founded<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0055" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>In point of fact, the Commission is basically asking Austria — perhaps without realising this — to accord retroactive effect to the extension of criminal liability in respect of the money laundering of assets less than ATS <FT TYPE="NUMBER">100000</FT> in value. But that request is incompatible with the principle that <QUOT.START ID="QS0073" REF.END="QE0073" CODE="2018"/>a provision of the criminal law may not be applied extensively to the detriment of the defendant, which is the corollary of the principle of legality in relation to crime and punishment and more generally of the principle of legal certainty<QUOT.END ID="QE0073" REF.START="QS0073" CODE="2019"/> (see Joined Cases <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-74/95+C-129/95" YEAR="1996" PAGE.ECR="I-6699">C-74/95 and C-129/95 Criminal proceedings against X (1996] ECR I-6699, paragraph 25</REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> — constitutes a new head of claim, obviously not preceded by the requisite pre-litigation procedure that ought to have been initiated in accordance with the rules laid down by the EC Treaty.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>46.</NO.P><TXT>On those grounds, I propose that the Court declare inadmissible the new head of claim set out by the Commission in its reply in place of the original complaint.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><P>The obligation to ensure that credit or financial institutions undertake customer identification</P></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>The position of the Commission</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>47.</NO.P><TXT>As we saw above, Article 3 of the Directive provides that the Member States are to ensure that the credit or financial institutions require identification of their regular and — in the case of transactions amounting to ECU <FT TYPE="NUMBER">15000</FT> or more — occasional customers, in order to prevent anonymity benefiting persons engaged in money laundering. The Commission interprets this provision as the expression of a general principle — introduced by the Directive as part of a gradual process of increasing awareness, at an international level, of the risks and dangers of money laundering — inimical to any form of banking or financial anonymity, based on the assumption that anonymity <HT TYPE="ITALIC">objectively</HT> encourages the emergence of criminal activity geared to laundering the proceeds of illegal activity. In that context, the Commission refers explicitly<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0056" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See, in particular, paragraph 44 of the application and paragraph 8 of the reply.</P></NOTE> to the initiatives undertaken in the main international forums (the United Nations and Council of Europe, for instance) and, more particularly, the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, set up in June 1989 by the Paris summit of the seven most developed countries.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0057" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>This structure is also mentioned in the seventh recital of the directive.</P></NOTE> Of particular importance from that point of view then are the provisions of Article 6(5) and (6) of the Directive, according to which, in the event of doubt as to whether customers are acting on their own behalf or where it is certain that they are not acting on their own behalf, the credit or financial institutions are to obtain information as to the real identity of the persons on whose behalf those customers are acting and, wherever there is suspicion of money laundering, they are always to identify the customer.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>48.</NO.P><TXT>Pursuing that line of reasoning, the Commission takes the view that the abovementioned<?PAGE NO="I-7853"?> Article 3 of the Directive applies to all cases in which a customer establishes regular business relations with a credit or financial institution, or an occasional customer carries out transactions with such an institution. In particular, no account is to be taken of the nature of the business relations or occasional transactions, as their purpose, special features or characteristics are held to have no bearing on the identification requirement established under the Directive. To that end, Article 3(1) of the Directive specifically refers to the opening of accounts or savings accounts and the offering of safe custody facilities, but that list is not exhaustive: the Directive in fact refers to all transactions that involve the movement of capital,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0058" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See Council Directive 88/361/EEC of <DATE ISO="19880624">24 June 1988</DATE> for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="178" DATE.PUB="1988" PAGE.FIRST="5">OJ 1988 L 178, p. 5</REF.DOC.OJ>), the annexes to which contain a detailed description of the various capital movements and the relevant transactions and operations.</P></NOTE> so as to guarantee its effectiveness in combating money laundering.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>The plea of illegality entered by the Austrian Government</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>49.</NO.P><TXT>The Austrian Government challenges the Commission's interpretation of Article 3 of the Directive with reference to anonymous accounts and transactions. According to the Austrian Government, that provision ought to be interpreted exclusively in the light of the legislation on the basis of which the Council adopted the Directive, namely Article 57(2), first and second sentences, and Article 100a of the EEC Treaty, the former concerning the pursuit of activities as a self-employed person in the context of the right of establishment, and the latter the approximation of national legislation concerning the internal market. Therefore, the obligation to require customer identification provided for and governed by Article 3 of the Directive relates solely to <QUOT.START ID="QS0074" REF.END="QE0074" CODE="2018"/>transactions which jeopardise the free movement of capital within the internal market by making it possible to launder capital<QUOT.END ID="QE0074" REF.START="QS0074" CODE="2019"/>.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0059" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Defence, at paragraph IV.1, citing an opinion by Professor Georg Ress.</P></NOTE> Any other interpretation would have the effect of removing the Directive from within the limits of the authority by virtue of which the Council adopted the Directive and, therefore, render illegal the provisions of Article 3 on the general obligation to require identification of the customers of credit or financial institutions.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0060" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>The Austrian Government raises the problem of the illegality of only Article 3 of the directive. See, on that point, the statement of defence, at paragraph 3.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>50.</NO.P><TXT>Based on the above observations, the Austrian Government enters a plea of illegality, based on Article 184 of the EC Treaty (now Article 241 EC), in relation to Article 3 of the Directive as construed by the Commission. The Austrian Government contends that a plea of that nature is admissible in the context of these proceedings, the purpose of which is to establish whether there has been a failure to fulfil an obligation under Community law, specifically because the Austrian Government did not have an opportunity to challenge, in the form of an action for<?PAGE NO="I-7854"?> annulment, the legal basis of the provision at issue.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0061" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Defence, at paragraph IV.3 and Chapter 3 of the rejoinder, in which the defendant complains that, in this case, <QUOT.START ID="QS0075" REF.END="QE0075" CODE="2018"/>we are dealing... with a directive the time-limit for the transposition of which had expired long before Austria acceded to the European Union<QUOT.END ID="QE0075" REF.START="QS0075" CODE="2019"/>.</P></NOTE> Moreover, the Austrian Government intimates that the Court could, of its own motion, assess the legality of that provision.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0062" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Defence, at the end of paragraph IV.3: <QUOT.START ID="QS0076" REF.END="QE0076" CODE="2018"/>Article 184 of the Treaty does not make clear whether the Court can, of its own motion, analyse a defect in a legal act in the context of infringement proceedings.<QUOT.END ID="QE0076" REF.START="QS0076" CODE="2019"/></P></NOTE></TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>Opinion of the Advocate General on the plea of illegality</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>51.</NO.P><TXT>Let me straight away make the point that, in my view, in the context of proceedings to establish whether it has been in breach of Community law, a Member State cannot enter a plea of illegality in relation to a directive — or an individual provision of a directive — with which it is accused of failing to comply.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>52.</NO.P><TXT>The Court has had occasion to state, with reference to its case-law, that <QUOT.START ID="QS0077" REF.END="QE0077" CODE="2018"/>to permit a Member State to whom a decision adopted under the first subparagraph of Article 93(2) has been addressed to call in issue the validity of that decision when an application referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 93(2) has been lodged, in spite of the expiry of the period laid down in the third paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty, would be impossible to reconcile with the principles governing the legal remedies established by the Treaty and would jeopardise the stability of that system and the principle of legal certainty on which it is based<QUOT.END ID="QE0077" REF.START="QS0077" CODE="2019"/><NOTE NOTE.ID="E0063" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="156/77" YEAR="1978" PAGE.ECR="1881">156/77 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Belgium</HT> [1978] ECR 1881, paragraph 23</REF.DOC.ECR> and Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="322/82" YEAR="1983" PAGE.ECR="3689">322/82 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Italy</HT> [1983] ECR 3689, paragraph 10</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> and that <QUOT.START ID="QS0078" REF.END="QE0078" CODE="2018"/>the system of remedies set up by the Treaty distinguishes between the remedies provided for in Articles 169 and 170, which permit a declaration that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations, and those contained in Articles 173 and 175, which permit judicial review of the lawfulness of measures adopted by the Community institutions, or the failure to adopt such measures. These remedies have different objectives and are subject to different rules. In the absence of a provision of the Treaty expressly permitting it to do so, a Member State cannot therefore plead the unlawfulness of an action for a declaration that it has failed to fulfil its obligations arising out of its failure to implement that decision<QUOT.END ID="QE0078" REF.START="QS0078" CODE="2019"/>,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0064" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="226/87" YEAR="1988" PAGE.ECR="3611">226/87 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Greece</HT> [1988] ECR 3611, paragraph 14</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> it being understood that an objection of that kind <QUOT.START ID="QS0079" REF.END="QE0079" CODE="2018"/>could be upheld only if the measure at issue contained such particularly serious and manifest defects that it could be deemed nonexistent.<QUOT.END ID="QE0079" REF.START="QS0079" CODE="2019"/><NOTE NOTE.ID="E0065" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Ibidem, paragraph 16. See also Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="15/85" YEAR="1987" PAGE.ECR="1005">15/85 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Consorzio cooperative d'Abruzzo</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> [1987] ECR 1005</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> In relation to regulations, specifically mentioned in Article 184 of the EC Treaty, the Court has emphasised that the latter provision <QUOT.START ID="QS0080" REF.END="QE0080" CODE="2018"/>gives expression to a general principle conferring upon any party to proceedings the right to challenge, for the purpose of obtaining the annulment of a decision of direct and individual concern to that party, the validity of previous acts of the institutions which form the legal basis of the decision which is being attacked, if that party was not entitled under Article 173 of the Treaty to bring a direct action challenging<?PAGE NO="I-7855"?> those acts by which it was thus affected without having been in a position to ask that they be declared void.<QUOT.END ID="QE0080" REF.START="QS0080" CODE="2019"/><NOTE NOTE.ID="E0066" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="92/78" YEAR="1979" PAGE.ECR="777">92/78 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Simmenthal</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> [1979] ECR 777, paragraph 39</REF.DOC.ECR>. That ruling marks the culmination of a process of reflection which began with Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="2/57" YEAR="1958" PAGE.ECR="199">2/57 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Compagnie des Hauts Fourneaux de Chasse</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">High Authority</HT> [19581 ECR 199</REF.DOC.ECR> and Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="9/56" YEAR="1958" PAGE.ECR="133">9/56 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Meroni</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">High Authority</HT> [1958] ECR 133</REF.DOC.ECR>, and continued with Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="32/65" YEAR="1966" PAGE.ECR="389">32/65 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Italy</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council and Commission</HT> [1966] ECR 389</REF.DOC.ECR>. That approach was not always rigorously applied by the Court. For instance, in Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="116/82" YEAR="1986" PAGE.ECR="2519">116/82 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Germany</HT> [1986] ECR 2519, paragraph 8</REF.DOC.ECR>, Germany was allowed to challenge the legality of the regulation with which it was accusedof failing to comply.</P></NOTE> It seems to me to be superfluous to dwell further on the abovementioned decisions which speak for themselves and bar a Member State from availing itself of the procedural mechanism of a plea of illegality in the context of infringement proceedings.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0067" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Although that exclusion is open to criticism in terms of respect of the principle of the legality of Community action; see, in that context, the Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-258/89" YEAR="1991" PAGE.ECR="I-3977">C-258/89 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Spain</HT> [1991] ECR I-3977, points 13 to 31</REF.DOC.ECR>, and the legal literature cited therein.</P></NOTE> I would add that that bar was clearly reiterated by the Court,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0068" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-74/91" YEAR="1992" PAGE.ECR="I-5437">C-74/91 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Germany</HT> [1992] ECR I-5437</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> including with reference to a directive with which the Commission was accusing a Member State of failure to comply. In that case, the Federal Republic of Germany entered a plea of illegality in relation to Article 26 of the Sixth VAT Directive (Directive 77/388/EEC), claiming that the provision was invalid. The Court referred explicitly to paragraph 14 of the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Greece,</HT> cited above, and added that a Member State cannot <QUOT.START ID="QS0081" REF.END="QE0081" CODE="2018"/>plead the unlawfulness of a directive which the Commission criticises it for not having implemented<QUOT.END ID="QE0081" REF.START="QS0081" CODE="2019"/>,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0069" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>ibidem, paragraph 10.</P></NOTE> and further pointed out — as it had already done in paragraph 16 of its judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Greece</HT> — that the position could be different <QUOT.START ID="QS0082" REF.END="QE0082" CODE="2018"/>only if the measure at issue contained such particularly serious and manifest defects that it could be deemed nonexistent<QUOT.END ID="QE0082" REF.START="QS0082" CODE="2019"/>,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0070" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>ibidem, paragraph 11.</P></NOTE> a plea which was not, however, entered by the German Government in that case.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>53.</NO.P><TXT>In accordance with the abovementioned developments in case-law, I am convinced that, in this case, the Austrian Government may not plead the illegality of Article 3 of the Directive, a provision in relation to which the Commission accuses it of failing to fulfil an obligation.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0071" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>I expressed similar views at point 27 of my recent Opinion of <DATE ISO="20000120">20 January 2000</DATE> in Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-206/98" YEAR="2000" PAGE.ECR="I-3509">C-206/98 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Belgium</HT>, (2000) ECR I-3509</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> It is true that, in its rejoinder, the Austrian Government emphasises that <QUOT.START ID="QS0083" REF.END="QE0083" CODE="2018"/>it is only according to the interpretation advanced by the Commission that the directive exceeds Community competence<QUOT.END ID="QE0083" REF.START="QS0083" CODE="2019"/>.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0072" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Rejoinder, Chapter 3.</P></NOTE> But that does not change the incontestable fact that the plea entered by the Austrian Government calls into question the legal basis of the provision with which it is accused of failing to comply, and that is precluded for the reasons set out above. Moreover, the Austrian Government does not advance arguments designed to show that the Directive, and in particular Article 3 thereof, contains such particularly serious and manifest defects that it could be deemed nonexistent, the only circumstance able to justify resorting to a plea of illegality. The defendant in fact takes the view that Article 3 of the Directive, as interpreted by the Commission, exceeds Community competence, that is to say suffers from lack of competence within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 173 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, the second paragraph of Article 230 EC), but does not appear to view that provision in terms of an <QUOT.START ID="QS0084" REF.END="QE0084" CODE="2018"/>inexistent act<QUOT.END ID="QE0084" REF.START="QS0084" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="I-7856"?><NP><NO.P>54.</NO.P><TXT>The Austrian Government does, however, claim not to have had an opportunity to challenge, by bringing an action for annulment, the validity of Article 3 of the Directive, since the time-limit for transposition of the latter had already expired when Austria acceded to the European Union. In other words, the Austrian Government contends that the Directive was part of the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">acquis communautaire</HT> and that the Act of Accession did not afford the new Member States the possibility of seeking the annulment of Community acts already in force on <DATE ISO="19950101">1 January 1995</DATE>, or in relation to which the time-limit for transposition had expired in any event. That argument basically seeks to challenge the validity of obligations which Austria entered into freely by acceding to the European Union; it cannot, therefore, be upheld. I would recall in that connection that, according to case-law: <QUOT.START ID="QS0085" REF.END="QE0085" CODE="2018"/>Acts of Accession are not acts of the institutions, the validity of whose provisions can be challenged before the Court<QUOT.END ID="QE0085" REF.START="QS0085" CODE="2019"/>.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0073" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-313/89" YEAR="1991" PAGE.ECR="I-5231">C-313/89 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Spain</HT> [1991] ECR I-5231, paragraph 10</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> The Commission is, moreover, right to state in its reply<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0074" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Reply, at paragraph 50.</P></NOTE> that Austria <QUOT.START ID="QS0086" REF.END="QE0086" CODE="2018"/>never claimed during the accession negotiations that the directive fell outside Community competence to regulate the sector, and made no statement whatsoever to that effect<QUOT.END ID="QE0086" REF.START="QS0086" CODE="2019"/>. If the Austrian Government considered that the Directive should be construed in a particular way, it would have been wiser to request that a specific reference to the interpretative criterion it wished to see applied be inserted into the Act of Accession or at least to attach to the Act of Accession a declaration to that effect. But it is common ground that no such basic precautions were taken at the time of accession; it has therefore to be assumed that the Austrian Government gave its unconditional assent to the legal basis and substance of the directive. Moreover, the Austrian Government never initiated the procedure laid down in Article 13(1) of the Directive for referring to the <QUOT.START ID="QS0087" REF.END="QE0087" CODE="2018"/>contact committee<QUOT.END ID="QE0087" REF.START="QS0087" CODE="2019"/> problems raised by the Commission's extensive interpretation of the obligations arising out of Article 3 of the Directive.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>55.</NO.P><TXT>With that in mind, I do not consider it appropriate to raise in this case the sensitive question of the possibility open to the Court of assessing of its own motion the relevant provision of the Directive. It actually seems to me that the real objective of the Austrian Government in this case is to challenge the Commission's <HT TYPE="ITALIC">extensive</HT> interpretation of the requirement that the credit or financial institutions undertake identification of their customers, and that the doubts expressed by the Austrian Government concerning the legitimacy of the Directive are basically a means of achieving that objective. In my view, it is not therefore necessary for the purposes of this dispute to dwell further on the legal basis of the Directive. It is, however, necessary positively to establish whether the interpretation the Commission chose to give to the obligation in question is justified in relation to the specific complaints addressed to the Austrian Government.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0075" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>This is the same methodological approach the Court adopted in Case C-258/89, cited in footnote 66 above, in which it examined the interpretation — and not the legitimacy — of the regulation with which the Commission accused Spain of failing to comply.</P></NOTE> That is what I propose to do below.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="I-7857"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>Opinion of the Advocate General on the interpretation of Article 3 of the Directive</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>56.</NO.P><TXT>I am persuaded that the money laundering directive is fully consonant with the basic substance of the provisions of the EEC Treaty — Articles 57 and 100a — on the basis of which the Council adopted the directive. I base that view on the following considerations.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>57.</NO.P><TXT>The directive does not exceed Community competence in relation to the freedom of establishment and the internal market; it actually enhances the possibilities they offer in order to guarantee that the integrated financial area created within the Community does not become a field of activity for organised crime but a privileged arena for the economic activity of those operators who, by exercising their right of establishment in a manner compatible with Community interests, enjoy the advantages of an internal market founded on clear-cut and transparent rules. In that way, both access to credit and financial activities and the exercise of those activities are promoted by the provisions designed to combat money laundering, and the operation of the internal market is strengthened by the gradual elimination of illegal capital flows, with positive results designed to have an impact on the whole of the Community's financial system. It is true that combating money laundering is not strictly speaking the aim of the Directive, bearing in mind the legal bases which underpin it, but it certainly represents an essential tool for the effective pursuit of the objectives the Directive itself legitimately pursues. It follows that the provisions of the Directive have, if they are to fulfil their objectives, to be applied across the board, with no possibility of exemptions, gaps, or worse still, special treatment for certain Member States. In other words, I consider that if the system of customer identification provided for in Article 3 of the Directive is to be truly effective, it must be deemed to be an hermetic system and, therefore, apply without distinction to all business relations and all transactions to which the provisions of Article 3 refer, regardless of their nature, their legal or financial features and, above all, their actual or presumed purpose.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0076" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>To that same effect, see Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-28/95" YEAR="1997" PAGE.ECR="I-4161">C-28/95 Leur-Bloem (1997] ECR I-4161</REF.DOC.ECR>, according to paragraph 36 of which, a directive adopted on the basis or Article 100 of the EC Treaty (now Article 94 EC) applies <QUOT.START ID="QS0088" REF.END="QE0088" CODE="2018"/>without distinction to all [operations for which it provides]... irrespective of the reasons, whether financial economic or simply fiscal, for those operations.<QUOT.END ID="QE0088" REF.START="QS0088" CODE="2019"/></P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>58.</NO.P><TXT>In that context, the wording of Article 3(1) of the Directive does not seem to me to give rise to doubts of interpretation. The provision actually refers to business relations, of a credit or financial nature, which are entered into on a regular basis between a bank and its customer. The concept of the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">stability</HT> of the link thus established emerges from the terminology used for that purpose in the provision at issue which requires customers to be identified when they are <QUOT.START ID="QS0089" REF.END="QE0089" CODE="2018"/>entering into business relations<QUOT.END ID="QE0089" REF.START="QS0089" CODE="2019"/> with banks, as well as the reference, inserted purely by way of example, to <QUOT.START ID="QS0090" REF.END="QE0090" CODE="2018"/>savings accounts<QUOT.END ID="QE0090" REF.START="QS0090" CODE="2019"/> and <QUOT.START ID="QS0091" REF.END="QE0091" CODE="2018"/>safe custody facilities<QUOT.END ID="QE0091" REF.START="QS0091" CODE="2019"/>. In other words, the directive <HT TYPE="ITALIC">always</HT> requires identification where an individual becomes a regular customer of a credit or financial institution.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="I-7858"?><NP><NO.P>59.</NO.P><TXT>However, I consider that Article 3(1) of the Directive does not extend to individual transactions carried out as part of a bank's credit or financial activity, whether those transactions are carried out by a regular customer of the bank, who has already been identified for that very reason, or are carried out with the bank by an occasional customer, in which case Article 3(2) applies, together with the quantitative threshold it contains. That interpretation seems to me to follow from logical criteria,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0077" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>The Council and the Commission also gave the same interpretation of Article 3(1) and (2) of the directive in a number of written and oral statements in the course of the cooperation procedure, emphasising that the customers to whom Article 3(1) refers are entering into long-term relations with the bank, whereas the customers referred to in Article 3(2) have occasional contact with the bank, time-limited because of the occasional nature of the transactions carried out and therefore without lasting effect.</P></NOTE> as well as the actual wording of Article 3(2), which refers to <QUOT.START ID="QS0092" REF.END="QE0092" CODE="2018"/>any transaction with customers other than those referred to in paragraph 1<QUOT.END ID="QE0092" REF.START="QS0092" CODE="2019"/>. It would in fact be utterly superfluous for a bank to undertake formal identification of one of its own <HT TYPE="ITALIC">regular</HT> customers every time that customer carried out a financial transaction. However, in order to ensure that the aim of the directive is pursued, it is necessary, and reasonable, for the bank to identify an <HT TYPE="ITALIC">occasional</HT> customer who undertakes a transaction without entering into a regular relationship with the bank. In that connection, Article 3(2) is of specific assistance because it sets an upper limit — ECU <FT TYPE="NUMBER">15000</FT> — which triggers the requirement for credit or financial institutions to undertake formal identification.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>60.</NO.P><TXT>From that perspective, the role of Article 3(5) is to guarantee that the identification requirement in the case of customers — whether regular or occasional — who act as fronts is properly carried out: knowledge of the <QUOT.START ID="QS0093" REF.END="QE0093" CODE="2018"/>real identity of the persons on whose behalf those customers are acting<QUOT.END ID="QE0093" REF.START="QS0093" CODE="2019"/> is in fact essential if the provisions of Article 3(1) and (2) are not to be deprived of effectiveness. For its part, Article 3(6) — which requires identification <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in every case</HT> wherever there is <QUOT.START ID="QS0094" REF.END="QE0094" CODE="2018"/>suspicion of money laundering<QUOT.END ID="QE0094" REF.START="QS0094" CODE="2019"/> — provides added coherence to the whole system of customer identification, by eliminating all gaps within the range of transactions subject to verification of the operator's identity.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><P>The alleged infringement of the identification requirement in relation to the Austrian legislation on savings accounts</P></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>The Commission's accusations</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>61.</NO.P><TXT>The Commission first accuses Austria of failing to observe the customer identification requirement, in accordance with Article 3(1), (5) and (6) of the Directive, in the context of the Austrian legislation governing savings accounts (<QUOT.START ID="QS0095" REF.END="QE0095" CODE="2018"/>Sparbücher<QUOT.END ID="QE0095" REF.START="QS0095" CODE="2019"/>). More particularly, in the form of order sought, the Commission directs two specific complaints against the Austrian Government: (a) Austria's failure to provide for<?PAGE NO="I-7859"?> customer identification whenever a savings account is opened as of <DATE ISO="19940101">1 January 1994</DATE>, and (b) Austria's failure to provide for customer identification where transactions are undertaken in relation to savings accounts opened before or after <DATE ISO="19940101">1 January 1994</DATE>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>62.</NO.P><TXT>According to the Commission, Article 3(1) of the Directive requires the credit or financial institutions to undertake identification of their customers <QUOT.START ID="QS0096" REF.END="QE0096" CODE="2018"/>when entering into business relations<QUOT.END ID="QE0096" REF.START="QS0096" CODE="2019"/>, that is to say when they establish lasting links with the institution, without it being possible to make a distinction based on the nature of the business relations. Savings accounts are therefore included without exception in the scope of the Directive. However, Austrian banking legislation, and in particular Paragraph 40 of the BWG, continues to exempt savings accounts from the identification requirement, on spurious grounds. Article 3(2) meantime provides for a general identification requirement covering all credit and financial transactions <QUOT.START ID="QS0097" REF.END="QE0097" CODE="2018"/>involving a sum amounting to ECU <FT TYPE="NUMBER">15000</FT> or more<QUOT.END ID="QE0097" REF.START="QS0097" CODE="2019"/> entered into with occasional customers. Regardless of the date on which they were opened, transactions relating to savings accounts fall within the scope of that provision from the time it was put into effect by Austria. However, Paragraph 40 of the BWG does not lay down the identification requirement for transactions relating to savings accounts. The sole — albeit limited — exceptions to the system of anonymity relate to <QUOT.START ID="QS0098" REF.END="QE0098" CODE="2018"/>foreigners<QUOT.END ID="QE0098" REF.START="QS0098" CODE="2019"/>, that is to say individuals who are not resident in Austrian territory,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0078" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Identification is required if <QUOT.START ID="QS0099" REF.END="QE0099" CODE="2018"/>foreigners<QUOT.END ID="QE0099" REF.START="QS0099" CODE="2019"/> are opening savings accounts and where funds received from <QUOT.START ID="QS0100" REF.END="QE0100" CODE="2018"/>foreigners<QUOT.END ID="QE0100" REF.START="QS0100" CODE="2019"/> are being paid into such accounts. See paragraphs 8.2.2 and 8.2.3 of official communication DL 2/91 of the Austrian National Bank.</P></NOTE> whereas once residents have proved that they are resident in Austria, identification is not required unless an account is opened in a foreign currency. Moreover, these are derogations based on acts (the official communications of the Austrian National Bank) of doubtful legal validity.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0079" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Reply, at paragraph 14.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>63.</NO.P><TXT>The Commission further contends that the system of anonymity that applies in Austria to savings accounts and the transactions relating to them undermines the effectiveness of Article 3(5) and (6) of the Directive, according to which, in the event of doubt as to whether the customers are acting on their own behalf, or where it is certain that they are not acting on their own behalf, the credit or financial institutions must always obtain information as to the real identity of the persons on whose behalf they are acting and, wherever there is suspicion of money laundering, always carry out customer identification even where the amount of the transaction is lower than the threshold laid down in Article 3(2). In the first example, the national legislation is patently incompatible with the Directive, since the rule on anonymity prevents the bank from setting in motion the procedure for establishing the real identity of the principal.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0080" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Application, at paragraph 39.</P></NOTE> In the second, it would be difficult to confirm suspicions that transactions relating to anonymous savings accounts involve money laundering because <QUOT.START ID="QS0101" REF.END="QE0101" CODE="2018"/>verifying the<?PAGE NO="I-7860"?> identity of a customer undertaking a transaction relating to an anonymous savings account is of no practical use and in no way makes it possible to arrive at conclusions as to the real economic circumstances<QUOT.END ID="QE0101" REF.START="QS0101" CODE="2019"/>.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0081" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Application, at patagraph 40. In paragtaph 41, the Commission adds that the carrying out of transactions <QUOT.START ID="QS0102" REF.END="QE0102" CODE="2018"/>on an anonymous account ought, per se, to cause the credit or financial institution to entertain justified suspicions of money laundering.<QUOT.END ID="QE0102" REF.START="QS0102" CODE="2019"/></P></NOTE></TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>The Austrian Government's arguments in defence</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>64.</NO.P><TXT>The Austrian Government acknowledges that Paragraph 40 of the BWG provides for a derogation from the customer identification requirement for savings accounts and related transactions, but contends that this derogation is offset by the provisions of official communication DL 2/91 of the Austrian National Bank which require verification of the customer's place of residence,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0082" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>To be more precise, paragraph 8.2.2 of official communication DL 2/91 refers to <QUOT.START ID="QS0103" REF.END="QE0103" CODE="2018"/>status in telation to foteign exchange arrangements<QUOT.END ID="QE0103" REF.START="QS0103" CODE="2019"/> (<QUOT.START ID="QS0104" REF.END="QE0104" CODE="2018"/>devisenrechtliche Status<QUOT.END ID="QE0104" REF.START="QS0104" CODE="2019"/>), concerning whether or not the customer is a <QUOT.START ID="QS0105" REF.END="QE0105" CODE="2018"/>foreignet<QUOT.END ID="QE0105" REF.START="QS0105" CODE="2019"/> (<QUOT.START ID="QS0106" REF.END="QE0106" CODE="2018"/>Ausländer<QUOT.END ID="QE0106" REF.START="QS0106" CODE="2019"/>), that is to say not resident in Austria. See paragraph III.A. 1.3 of the statement of defence.</P></NOTE> and that this is equivalent to a kind of personal identification. In any event, identification <HT TYPE="ITALIC">always</HT> takes place where a savings account is being opened for a nonresident, where residents are opening accounts in foreign currency, and where deposits are being paid into savings accounts from funds received from nonresidents for the purpose of administering or maintaining those accounts.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>65.</NO.P><TXT>The Austrian Government further contends that the savings accounts provided for under the BWG do not fall within the scope of Article 3(1) of the Directive because — since their main purpose is investment — they are in the nature of bearer bonds and ought therefore to be subject to the legal arrangements governing stocks.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0083" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Defence, at paragraph III.A. 1.4; rejoinder, at paragraph 2.1.4. The Austrian Government cites an opinion by Professor Markus Achatz.</P></NOTE> Maintaining anonymity is not therefore incompatible with the money laundering directive: a customer who opens a savings account is not entering into business relations with the bank, but is actually acquiring a financial product and ought therefore to be identified only if the transaction involves a sum of ECU <FT TYPE="NUMBER">15000</FT> or more, as provided for in Article 3(2) of the Directive.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>66.</NO.P><TXT>The Austrian Government advances other arguments to demonstrate that the arrangements for savings accounts are compatible with the Directive.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>67.</NO.P><TXT>In the first place, according to the Austrian Government, the savings accounts cannot be used for money laundering. The only anonymous transactions that are possible, once the account has been opened, are in fact cash payments and withdrawals, carried out on presentation of a passbook, in which they are recorded. Moreover, even for those transactions, Austrian banking law requires identification of the person making the deposit or withdrawal wherever<?PAGE NO="I-7861"?> there is suspicion of money laundering.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0084" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Defence, at paragraph III.A.1.1.(b).</P></NOTE> It is not, however, possible to issue cheques or transfer instructions from such accounts, and non-cash transactions are subject to the normal rules of customer identification. Payments from third parties may be made into a savings account but not from another savings account: that means that the person making the payment is subject to the identification requirement in accordance with the Directive, either if the transaction is made from an account in regard to which he has already been identified or if this is an occasional transaction, in which case he will be identified if the amount of the transaction exceeds the threshold laid down in the directive (ECU <FT TYPE="NUMBER">15000</FT>) and transposed into Austrian law (ATS <FT TYPE="NUMBER">200000</FT>).<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0085" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Rejoinder, at paragraph 2.1.1.</P></NOTE> In other words, it is impossible for third parties <QUOT.START ID="QS0107" REF.END="QE0107" CODE="2018"/>to make anonymous payments into a savings account<QUOT.END ID="QE0107" REF.START="QS0107" CODE="2019"/>.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0086" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Rejoinder, at paragraph 2.1.3.</P></NOTE> The combination of these particular features makes savings accounts unsuited to the requirements of money launderers, who need to be able to transfer substantial amounts of dirty money rapidly and securely from a distance.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>68.</NO.P><TXT>In the second place, anonymous savings accounts — about 95% of all savings accounts<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0087" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>According to data supplied by the Commission (application, at paragraph 72), in 1996, there were about 26 million anonymous savings accounts in Austria for a population of approximately 7.5 million.</P></NOTE> — are widely distributed among all groups within Austrian society and traditionally meet the <QUOT.START ID="QS0108" REF.END="QE0108" CODE="2018"/>psychological need for security and discretion<QUOT.END ID="QE0108" REF.START="QS0108" CODE="2019"/>, a need felt more particularly by the elderly, who associate the idea of a named account with the period of National Socialism when anonymous savings accounts were abolished.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0088" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Defence, at paragraph III.A.1.1(e), and rejoinder, at paragraph 2.1.3. The agents for the Austrian Government devoted some time to explaining these psychological reasons at the hearing of <DATE ISO="20000315">15 March 2000</DATE>, and also maintained that the existence of anonymous savings accounts helps protect family requirements in the broad sense, by enabling one partner to conceal from the other the extent of their own savings.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>69.</NO.P><TXT>Thirdly and finally, according to the Austrian authorities, the aim of the directive is solely to catch financial transactions genuinely likely to promote money laundering. But since savings accounts cannot be used for that purpose, to make them indiscriminately subject to the identification requirement would exceed what is necessary to implement the directive and therefore infringe the principle of proportionality laid down in the third paragraph of Article 3b of the EC Treaty (now the third paragraph of Article 5 EC), according to which: <QUOT.START ID="QS0109" REF.END="QE0109" CODE="2018"/>Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of [this] Treaty<QUOT.END ID="QE0109" REF.START="QS0109" CODE="2019"/>.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0089" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>This argument in defence is, moreover, closely linked to the plea of illegality entered by the Austrian Government and analysed above.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>70.</NO.P><TXT>At the hearing of <DATE ISO="20000315">15 March 2000</DATE>, the agents for the Austrian Government announced that, following a decision by the Austrian Council of Ministers, the Austrian Government would soon be tabling, in the Nationalrat, a draft law<?PAGE NO="I-7862"?> abolishing anonymous savings accounts. As of <DATE ISO="20001101">1 November 2000</DATE>, it will no longer be possible to open anonymous savings accounts or make anonymous payments into existing accounts and the question of anonymous accounts opened before <DATE ISO="20001101">1 November 2000</DATE> will have been finally resolved by 2002.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>Opinion of the Advocate General</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>71.</NO.P><TXT>In order to determine whether the Republic of Austria has in fact failed to fulfil its obligations under the Directive, by retaining the system of anonymous savings accounts, I consider it necessary to ascertain the scope of the complaints raised by the Commission, whether they are well founded and whether, and to what extent, the justification put forward by the defendant government can be upheld.</TXT></NP><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>—</NO.P><TXT>Scope of the complaints concerning savings accounts</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>72.</NO.P><TXT>The question of the actual scope of the complaints is particularly important, since the Commission's criticisms are imprecise and ambiguous with regard to the date from which the complaints take effect, the substance of the complaints and the provisions which have been infringed.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>73.</NO.P><TXT>According to the Commission, the actions it criticises commenced on <DATE ISO="19940101">1 January 1994</DATE>, that is to say the date of entry into force of the EEA Agreement. I have already expressed the view that the obligation to comply with the money laundering directive took effect for the Republic of Austria from <DATE ISO="19950101">1 January 1995</DATE>, the date on which Austria acceded to the European Union. It is not therefore possible to address to the Austrian Government complaints which refer, albeit in part only, to periods before that date.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>74.</NO.P><TXT>As regards the substance of the complaints, the situation is more complex and requires a separate analysis of each of the two complaints the Commission has addressed to Austria.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>75.</NO.P><TXT>In the first place, the Commission accuses the Republic of Austria of failing to provide for the identification of (all) customers when a savings account is being opened, but itself acknowledges<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0090" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Application, at paragraph 69.</P></NOTE> that, in practice, the credit or financial institutions <HT TYPE="ITALIC">always</HT> establish the identity of the customer if the account is opened by an individual who is not resident in Austria or on that nonresident's behalf, or by an individual resident in Austria but using the account for foreign currency.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0091" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>It is unclear whether and to what extent it is possible, under Austrian law, to open savings accounts in foreign currency. That point is not, however, material for the purposes of this case.</P></NOTE> It is further clear from the documents in the case that identification is also required in instances in which funds received from nonresidents are deposited in a savings account in order to administer or maintain it:<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0092" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Paragraph 8.2.3 of official communication DL 2/91 of the National Bank of Austria.</P></NOTE> that is not<?PAGE NO="I-7863"?> disputed by the Commission. Therefore, the Commission's first complaint actually concerns only the opening of anonymous savings accounts, not held in foreign currency, by and on behalf of Austrian residents.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>76.</NO.P><TXT>Secondly, according to Austrian legislation, the only transactions which may be carried out anonymously are cash payments and withdrawals, transactions usually carried out on presentation of a passbook (payable to bearer), in which they are recorded. In contrast, Paragraph 32(3) of the BWG lays down that transfers may not be made nor cheques issued from a savings account, and the Commission does not dispute that. The Austrian Government has further demonstrated,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0093" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Defence, at paragraph III.A.1.1.(a).</P></NOTE> without contradiction from the Commission, that transactions relating to savings accounts which are not made in cash are subject to the normal rules of customer identification. It is also possible for third parties to make payments into a savings account but — as the Austrian Government has demonstrated without contradiction from the Commission<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0094" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Rejoinder, at paragraphs 2.1.1 and 2.1.3.</P></NOTE> — <HT TYPE="ITALIC">not</HT> from another savings account, as a result of which third parties cannot in any event pay funds anonymously into a savings account. Therefore, the Commission's second complaint can refer only to anonymous cash payments and withdrawals into and from savings accounts.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>77.</NO.P><TXT>As regards, finally, the provisions of the money laundering directive, which the Commission accuses Austria of failing to observe, I consider that this has to refer exclusively to Article 3(1) and (5). It is true that the Commission accuses the Austrian Government of failing to fulfil its obligations under Article 3(6) of the Directive, according to which the credit or financial institutions are <HT TYPE="ITALIC">always</HT> required to identify customers where there is suspicion of money laundering, but it is also true that the Commission furnishes not a shred of evidence in support of that claim. In point of fact, the Austrian Government has demonstrated,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0095" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Defence, at paragraph III.A.1.1.(b).</P></NOTE> without being contradicted by the Commission, that Paragraph 40(1.3) of the BWG, which transposed into Austrian law the abovementioned obligation arising out of the Directive, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">always</HT> requires customer identification where there is suspicion of money laundering and therefore applies <HT TYPE="ITALIC">also</HT> to savings accounts and the transactions relating to them. Therefore, the Austrian Government's failure to fulfil the obligation in question has not been proven, and that complaint cannot be upheld.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>78.</NO.P><TXT>To conclude, the two complaints the Commission raises in relation to the system of anonymity provided in Austria in relation to savings accounts need to be reworded. Basically, the Austrian Government is being accused of having failed to observe the obligations laid own in Article 3(1) and (5) of the Directive, in so far as that Government did not make provision, as of <DATE ISO="19950101">1 January 1995</DATE>, for the identification of customers resident in Austria whenever: (a)<?PAGE NO="I-7864"?> they were opening a savings account in ATS; (b) cash payments and withdrawals were being made into and out of a savings account. It is therefore necessary to examine what foundation these accusations have, once reformulated.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>—</NO.P><TXT>Validity of the complaints concerning savings accounts</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>79.</NO.P><TXT>The first of the Commission's two complaints, as reworded in accordance with the above considerations, is, in my view, well founded, given that, by retaining, after accession, the system of anonymity whenever savings accounts are opened, the Republic of Austria has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 3(1) and (5) of the money laundering directive. I base that analysis on the following considerations.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>80.</NO.P><TXT>Contrary to what the Austrian Government maintains, Austrian savings accounts definitely fall within the scope of Article 3(1) of the Directive. They are in fact covered by the general concept of <QUOT.START ID="QS0110" REF.END="QE0110" CODE="2018"/>business relations<QUOT.END ID="QE0110" REF.START="QS0110" CODE="2019"/> established between customer and bank, referred to in Article 3(1), and are defined by Paragraph 31 of the BWG as monetary deposits basically intended for investment, that is to say in the same terms the Directive employs to indicate accounts and savings accounts, as examples — but not the only examples — of the concept of business relations.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0096" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See also the travaux préparatoires for the directive, in particular the Commission proposal of <DATE ISO="19900428">28 April 1990</DATE> (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="C" NO.OJ="106" DATE.PUB="1990" PAGE.FIRST="6">OJ 1990 C 106, p. 6</REF.DOC.OJ>) as amended on <DATE ISO="19901219">19 December 1990</DATE> (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="C" NO.OJ="319" DATE.PUB="1990" PAGE.FIRST="9">OJ 1990 C 319, p. 9</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> It should also be noted that Paragraph 30(1.1) of the BWG equates savings accounts with the other business relations established between bank and customer, and then provides, in relation to such accounts, a specific derogation from the requirement that the bank undertake customer identification. That provision is patently inconsistent with the Austrian Government's submissions concerning the claim that the savings accounts are in the nature of stocks and shares. In fact, even though the passbooks payable to bearer can be used to move funds deposited in savings accounts, what matters, for the purposes of applying the Directive, is the element of business relations which are being established between the customer, even if that person is anonymous, and the credit or financial institution which holds and pays interest on the funds deposited, as a result of, first, the opening, and then, the administration, of these accounts. Those business relations are long-term and have all the features of accounts or savings accounts to which — by way of illustration — Article 3(1) of the Directive refers. Therefore the customer identification requirement must also apply to savings accounts, since, otherwise, the whole system set in place by the Directive to combat money laundering could be seriously undermined.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>81.</NO.P><TXT>Furthermore, I consider it to be established that, currently, the opening of savings accounts in Austria is not subject to the customer identification requirement.<?PAGE NO="I-7865"?> The Austrian Government's argument in defence, based on the criterion of verifying residence laid down in official communication DL 2/91 of the Austrian National Bank, does not, in my view, carry conviction. In point of fact, verification of a customer's status in relation to the foreign exchange system (<QUOT.START ID="QS0111" REF.END="QE0111" CODE="2018"/>devisenrechtlicher Status<QUOT.END ID="QE0111" REF.START="QS0111" CODE="2019"/>) is used by the bank solely to establish whether or not the customer is a <QUOT.START ID="QS0112" REF.END="QE0112" CODE="2018"/>foreigner<QUOT.END ID="QE0112" REF.START="QS0112" CODE="2019"/> (<QUOT.START ID="QS0113" REF.END="QE0113" CODE="2018"/>Ausländer<QUOT.END ID="QE0113" REF.START="QS0113" CODE="2019"/>), that is to say is not resident in Austria, in order to apply to that customer, if necessary, the requisite system of compulsory identification. But if the customer somehow proves he is resident, the credit or financial institution is not required to check his identity because of the derogation provided for in Paragraph 40(1.1) of the BWG. That point is not disputed by the Austrian Government. Furthermore, a customer's residence and identity are two different things, and verification of the former does not necessarily involve checking the latter, whatever the actual method a bank uses. In any event, the criterion of verification of residence was laid down by an act — an official communication of the Austrian National Bank — whose legal nature has not been clarified by the Austrian authorities,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0097" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Though it would have been in their interest to do so.</P></NOTE> but which appears, at first sight, to be inappropriate for transposing the content of a directive.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0098" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Particularly in view of the settled case-law according to which a directive has, as a rule, to be transposed by means of national provisions of a binding nature which are not subject to amendment and which have the same legal force as all other national provisions to be amended or supplemented. See, among many, Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-207/96" YEAR="1997" PAGE.ECR="I-6869">C-207/96 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Italy</HT> [1997] ECR I-6869, paragraph 26</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>82.</NO.P><TXT>Therefore, the infringement of Article 3(1) of the Directive seems to me to be established as regards the retention, after <DATE ISO="19950101">1 January 1995</DATE>, of the possibility for customers resident in Austria to open anonymous savings accounts in ATS.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>83.</NO.P><TXT>I do not, however, consider to be well founded, in the light of Article 3(1) of the Directive, the second of the Commission's complaints concerning the system of transactions relating to savings accounts.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>84.</NO.P><TXT>It is true that the system of anonymity provided for savings accounts also applies to the cash transactions — the payments and withdrawals — relating to them, as the Austrian Government itself acknowledges. Where these transactions are below the minimum threshold laid down, there is, in fact, no obligation to identify the customer who is carrying out the transactions by presenting a savings passbook payable to bearer, even if that customer is not the named account holder.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0099" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Paragraph 32(2) of the BWG appears to permit payments into savings accounts to be made even if the passbook is not presented.</P></NOTE> But it is Article 3(2) — rather than Article 3(1) — of the Directive that seems not to have been properly transposed in relation to these transactions. The Commission is not, however, seeking a declaration that Article 3(2) of the Directive has been infringed, since neither the reasoned opinion nor the application refer to that provision. In fact, for the reasons set out above, Article 3(1) can refer only to the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">opening</HT> of savings accounts — interpreted as a means of establishing business relations — and not<?PAGE NO="I-7866"?> the individual <QUOT.START ID="QS0114" REF.END="QE0114" CODE="2018"/>transactions<QUOT.END ID="QE0114" REF.START="QS0114" CODE="2019"/> which are covered by Article 3(2). Therefore, the Commission's second complaint must be rejected, as being without proper legal basis.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>85.</NO.P><TXT>However, it seems to me probable — as the Commission claims — that the system of anonymity provided for savings accounts undermines the effectiveness of Article 3(5) of the Directive, according to which, in the event of doubt as to whether the customers are acting on their own behalf, or where it is certain that they are not acting on their own behalf, <QUOT.START ID="QS0115" REF.END="QE0115" CODE="2018"/>the credit or financial institutions shall take reasonable measures to obtain information as to the real identity of the persons on whose behalf those customers are acting<QUOT.END ID="QE0115" REF.START="QS0115" CODE="2019"/>. In point of fact, if the customer is allowed to remain anonymous, the banks have no way of knowing whether or not he is acting on his own behalf. In that context, I would go so far as to say that customer anonymity is inimical <HT TYPE="ITALIC">per se</HT> to the practical effectiveness of Article 3(5). In those terms, it seems significant that, in transposing the provision in question, Paragraph 40(2) of the BWG made specific provision for a derogation when savings accounts are opened.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>86.</NO.P><TXT>Consequently, the Commission has also demonstrated that the Austrian Government has infringed Article 3(5) of the Directive.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>—</NO.P><TXT>The justification advanced by the Austrian Government</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>87.</NO.P><TXT>As we have seen, the Austrian Government advances three arguments to justify the fact that, by retaining the system of anonymous savings accounts and anonymous transactions relating to them, it failed to comply with Article 3(1) and (5) of the Directive. It maintains, first of all, that the savings accounts cannot be used for money laundering; secondly, that those accounts respond to a need for security and discretion of a large section of the resident population; and, thirdly, that to apply to savings accounts the provisions on compulsory identification would not be proportionate in the light of the aim of the Directive.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>88.</NO.P><TXT>None of the arguments in defence advanced by the Austrian Government are based on the possible restrictions on the right of establishment permitted under the first paragraph of Article 55 of the EC Treaty (now the first paragraph of Article 45 EC) on the exercise of official authority and Article 56(1) of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 46(1) EC) on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. Furthermore, since this is a harmonising directive, also based on the abovementioned Article 100a of the EEC Treaty, recourse to<?PAGE NO="I-7867"?> possible grounds for justification based on Article 36 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 30 EC) — which do not, in any event, have anything to do with the grounds for justification advanced by the Austrian Government in this case — would be incompatible with case-law which recognises neither the relevance nor the validity of such grounds.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0100" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>That applies particularly to grounds for justification concerning the protection of health. See, in particular, Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="5/77" YEAR="1977" PAGE.ECR="1555">5/77 Tedeschi [1977] ECR 1555, paragraph 35</REF.DOC.ECR>; Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="247/84" YEAR="1985" PAGE.ECR="3887">247/84 Motte [1985] ECR 3887, paragraph 16</REF.DOC.ECR> and, most recently, Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-112/97" YEAR="1999" PAGE.ECR="I-1821">C-112/97 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Italy</HT> [1999] ECR I-1821, paragraph 54</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>89.</NO.P><TXT>But there is another reason why the arguments of the Austrian Government are unconvincing. It cites the alleged unsuitability of anonymous savings accounts for use as a means of laundering dirty money and the fact that the Austrian people are accustomed and profoundly attached to anonymous accounts,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0101" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>In that connection, I would point out that, on the basis of settled case-law, a Member State may not, in any event, rely on domestic problems to justify failing to fulfil obligations arising out of a directive. See, among many, Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="225/86" YEAR="1988" PAGE.ECR="2271">225/86 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Italy</HT> [1988] ECR 2271, paragraph 10</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> to justify keeping in place an <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ad hoc</HT> legal system that fails to comply with the programme of abolishing anonymity promoted by the Community legislature. That being so, the effect of the line of defence adopted by Austria is to deprive the money laundering directive of any effectiveness, since it opens up a chink that organised crime could use to its advantage and, in the final analysis, substitutes its own assessment of the risks of anonymous savings accounts for the view clearly expressed by the Council in the Directive. That is tantamount to calling into question the legality of the relevant provisions of the Directive itself, and — as I pointed out above — the defendant Government is not permitted to do that, in the current circumstances. I cannot overemphasise that, according to case-law, a Member State cannot raise the objection that failure to comply with a directive <QUOT.START ID="QS0116" REF.END="QE0116" CODE="2018"/>has had no adverse consequences for the functioning of the internal market or of that directive<QUOT.END ID="QE0116" REF.START="QS0116" CODE="2019"/>.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0102" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-263/96" YEAR="1997" PAGE.ECR="I-7453">C-263/96 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Belgium</HT> [1997] ECR I-7453, paragraph 30</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>90.</NO.P><TXT>Finally, as regards the allegation that application of the Directive to savings accounts infringes the principle of proportionality, I would point out that, while it is clear that a Member State may cite justification for failing to fulfil an obligation under Community law only in so far as that justification is necessary and proportionate in relation to the objective pursued, that does not apply where the Commission accuses a Member State of failing to comply with an obligation of that nature. In that situation, the Commission has only to demonstrate that the infringement exists but does not have to prove that the obligation is proportionate in relation to the EC Treaty. Were that not the case, a Member State would basically be able to use the principle of proportionality to call into question the legal basis of a Community act at will in the context of infringement proceedings, and that cannot be allowed for the reasons set out above.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="I-7868"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><P>The alleged infringement of the customer identification requirement in relation to the Austrian legislation on securities accounts</P></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>The Commission's complaints</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>91.</NO.P><TXT>The Commission then accuses Austria of failing properly to implement Article 3(1), (5) and (6) of the Directive in relation to the arrangements applicable to securities, because the Austrian Government required customer identification when a securities account was opened only as of <DATE ISO="19960801">1 August 1996</DATE>, and not as of <DATE ISO="19940101">1 January 1994</DATE>; and required customer identification for transactions from or to existing securities accounts only in respect of the acceptance and acquisition of securities destined for such accounts, according to the provisions of Paragraph 40(5) of the BWG.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>92.</NO.P><TXT>The Commission sets out those complaints in its application, which reproduces the content of its reasoned opinion of <DATE ISO="19970221">21 February 1997</DATE> word for word. However, the letter of formal notice of <DATE ISO="19960214">14 February 1996</DATE> contained a general reference to the requirement that, on the one hand, <QUOT.START ID="QS0117" REF.END="QE0117" CODE="2018"/>anonymous accounts opened after <DATE ISO="19940101">1 January 1994</DATE> should be subject to <HT TYPE="ITALIC">automatic</HT> and <HT TYPE="ITALIC">retroactive</HT> identification,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0103" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Commission letter of <DATE ISO="19960214">14 February 1996</DATE>, attached at annex 1 to the application, conclusions (<QUOT.START ID="QS0118" REF.END="QE0118" CODE="2018"/>Schlussfolgerungen<QUOT.END ID="QE0118" REF.START="QS0118" CODE="2019"/>), p. 5 (my emphasis).</P></NOTE> and, on the other, the identification requirement should cover every transaction relating to an anonymous account<QUOT.END ID="QE0117" REF.START="QS0117" CODE="2019"/>.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0104" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Ibidem.</P></NOTE> It must be pointed out that, as of <DATE ISO="19960801">1 August 1996</DATE> — that is to say after the Commission dispatched the letter of formal notice and before the reasoned opinion was issued — Austrian legislation on securities accounts was amended, with effect from that date, to require customer identification whenever securities accounts are opened and whenever transactions involving the acceptance and acquisition of securities are carried out.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>93.</NO.P><TXT>In the application, the Commission explains that, in its view, the measures adopted by the Austrian Government during 1996 are not sufficient to guarantee compliance with the provisions of Article 3(1), (5) and (6) of the Directive in relation to securities accounts. Those provisions were transposed belatedly, and the abolition of anonymous securities accounts and the transactions relating to them was not given retroactive effect. Furthermore, restricting the customer identification requirement to just some of the transactions able to be carried out in relation to securities accounts in existence as at <DATE ISO="19960801">1 August 1996</DATE> meant that those accounts could be used for money laundering, and that is clearly incompatible with the aim of the Directive.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="I-7869"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>The Austrian Government's arguments in defence</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>94.</NO.P><TXT>The Austrian Government acknowledges that it required customer identification where securities accounts are opened only with effect from <DATE ISO="19960801">1 August 1996</DATE>. It basically gives two reasons to justify this: the need to protect the legitimate expectations of economic operators who had opened securities accounts before that date and the need to prevent substantial capital flows deposited in such accounts being transferred to third countries.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>95.</NO.P><TXT>In setting out the first reason, the Austrian Government emphasised that it would not be appropriate to extend the new system of customer identification retroactively to securities accounts opened before <DATE ISO="19960801">1 August 1996</DATE> because that would have damaged the relationship of trust established between customers and the credit or financial institutions with which they had deposited their securities. That relationship of trust merits protection because it affects individuals' assets, their existing contractual relationship with the bank and, in the final analysis, the system of ownership of securities.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0105" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Defence, at paragraph III.B.5.</P></NOTE> Against that backdrop, the solution of gradually abolishing anonymity had the advantage of avoiding over-abrupt changes to the system of securities accounts and allowing customers to take their time in selecting different forms of investment.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>96.</NO.P><TXT>In setting out the second reason, the Austrian Government highlights the serious risks that would result for the Austrian and, more generally, the European Union's economy if there were an <QUOT.START ID="QS0119" REF.END="QE0119" CODE="2018"/>uncontrolled withdrawal<QUOT.END ID="QE0119" REF.START="QS0119" CODE="2019"/> (<QUOT.START ID="QS0120" REF.END="QE0120" CODE="2018"/>ungeordneter Aussteigen<QUOT.END ID="QE0120" REF.START="QS0120" CODE="2019"/>)<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0106" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Ibidem, p. 27.</P></NOTE> from Austria's credit and financial markets of a substantial volume of capital, which could be diverted to other tax havens if anonymity were suddenly abolished. It is, in particular, possible that an exodus of that nature might trigger an excessive rise in interest rates, with serious repercussions for Austria's budgetary stability and — in the longer term — the whole of the European financial system.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>97.</NO.P><TXT>The Austrian Government also makes the point that, of the transactions able to be carried out in relation to anonymous securities accounts in existence at <DATE ISO="19960801">1 August 1996</DATE>, only the acceptance and acquisition of securities were subject to the identification requirement because these were the only transactions that might be of interest to money launderers. In other respects, anonymous securities accounts do not lend themselves to criminal activity, because, after the abovementioned date, no new<?PAGE NO="I-7870"?> security could be deposited in them anonymously,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0107" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Defence, at paragraph III.B.3. Rejoinder, at paragraph 2.4.1.</P></NOTE> and the administration of the existing funds was limited to the life of the stocks or shares purchased on the capital market, which is not usually extended by the issuing bodies.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0108" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Rejoinder, at paragraph 2.4.1, p. 15:</P></NOTE></TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>Opinion of the Advocate General</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>98.</NO.P><TXT>The method of analysis employed in relation to the earlier complaints can also be applied to this new series of complaints. It is necessary, in this context, to ascertain the scope of the complaints the Commission addresses to Austria, whether they are well founded and whether, and to what extent, the justification put forward by the defendant government can be upheld.</TXT></NP><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>—</NO.P><TXT>Scope of the complaints relating to securities accounts</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>99.</NO.P><TXT>For the reasons set out above, I consider that the criticisms the Commission directs at Austria apply only as of <DATE ISO="19950101">1 January 1995</DATE>, and cannot relate to the failure to comply with Article 3(1) and (5) of the Directive. In terms of the substance, the situation is clear: the Commission is basically criticising Austria for failing to abolish anonymous securities accounts as of <DATE ISO="19950101">1 January 1995</DATE>, and not requiring customer identification for transactions relating to existing securities accounts other than the acceptance and acquisition of new securities.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>—</NO.P><TXT>Admissibility and validity of the complaints concerning securities accounts</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>100.</NO.P><TXT>I consider that both these complaints by the Commission are admissible. It is true that they were explicitly set out for the first time in the reasoned opinion and that, therefore, formally speaking at least, they do not appear to mirror the complaints contained in the letter of formal notice of <DATE ISO="19960214">14 February 1996</DATE>, which simply called for the abolition of anonymous securities accounts and the transactions relating to them; but it is also true that, in the letter of formal notice, the Commission made the point that securities accounts should <QUOT.START ID="QS0121" REF.END="QE0121" CODE="2018"/>be subject to automatic and retroactive identification<QUOT.END ID="QE0121" REF.START="QS0121" CODE="2019"/>, thereby clearly implying that the Austrian authorities ought to have transposed that element of the Directive from the date — <DATE ISO="19950101">1 January 1995</DATE> — they were obliged to comply with the requirements of the Directive. However, although the Austrian Government did transpose that element of the Directive, it did so belatedly and, moreover, with effect only from <DATE ISO="19960101">1 January 1996</DATE>. In those circumstances, by rewording the complaints in the reasoned<?PAGE NO="I-7871"?> opinion the Commission did no more than adjust the terminology to reflect the new position. In this case, we can therefore speak in terms of a <HT TYPE="ITALIC">lessening</HT> of the complaints, in the sense that the Commission is asking the Court to find that there was a failure to fulfil an obligation for the period between <DATE ISO="19950101">1 January 1995</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19960801">1 August 1996</DATE> and not — as in the case of the obligation to prohibit money laundering — a change in the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">actual substance</HT> of the complaint.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>101.</NO.P><TXT>That being so, I consider to be well founded — with reference to Article 3(1) and (5) of the Directive — the first of the two complaints, concerning the date from which the obligation to identify customers when securities accounts are opened applies. In that connection, it is sufficient to record that, at the date set in the reasoned opinion, Austria had not abolished the system of anonymity for securities accounts with effect from <DATE ISO="19950101">1 January 1995</DATE>, but only from a later date, thereby creating, to its own advantage, an exemption not provided for in the Directive for the period between <DATE ISO="19950101">1 January 1995</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19960801">1 August 1996</DATE>. The Court, moreover, has long since ruled that: <QUOT.START ID="QS0122" REF.END="QE0122" CODE="2018"/>Although the provisions of a directive are no less binding on the Member States to which they are addressed than the provisions of any other rule of Community law, such an effect attaches <HT TYPE="ITALIC">a fortiori</HT> to the provisions relating to the periods allowed for implementing the measures prescribed, in particular since the existence of differences in the rules applied in the Member States after these periods have expired might result in discrimination.<QUOT.END ID="QE0122" REF.START="QS0122" CODE="2019"/><NOTE NOTE.ID="E0109" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="52/75" YEAR="1976" PAGE.ECR="277">52/75 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Italy</HT> [1976] ECR 277, paragraph 10</REF.DOC.ECR>. See also Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="79/72" YEAR="1973" PAGE.ECR="667">79/72 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Italy</HT> [1973] ECR 667, paragraph 7</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>102.</NO.P><TXT>For the same reasons that I explained when analysing the earlier complaints, I do not, however, consider the Commission's second complaint concerning transactions relating to securities accounts to be well founded, in the light of Article 3(1) of the Directive.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>—</NO.P><TXT>The arguments in defence relied on by the Austrian Government</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>103.</NO.P><TXT>The Austrian Government basically advances two arguments to justify its belated introduction of the customer identification requirement in relation to securities accounts: the protection of legitimate expectations and the danger of an exodus of capital to third countries.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>104.</NO.P><TXT>Neither of those grounds for justification is among the grounds permitted by the EC Treaty as possible restrictions on the right of establishment or — in terms of the internal market — the free movement of goods. In reality, the reasons the Austrian Government cites in defence of its decision not to abolish anonymous securities accounts before <DATE ISO="19960801">1 August 1996</DATE> relate to domestic difficulties — respect for the needs of savers — which would make it difficult to apply the new rules on securities accounts retroactively. But these problems<?PAGE NO="I-7872"?> do not match up with the concept — evolved in the Court's case-law — of it being <QUOT.START ID="QS0123" REF.END="QE0123" CODE="2018"/>absolutely impossible<QUOT.END ID="QE0123" REF.START="QS0123" CODE="2019"/><NOTE NOTE.ID="E0110" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="52/84" YEAR="1986" PAGE.ECR="89">52/84 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Belgium</HT> [1986] ECR 89, paragraph 16</REF.DOC.ECR>. See also Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="213/85" YEAR="1988" PAGE.ECR="281">213/85 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Netherlands</HT> [1988] ECR 281, paragraph 22</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> to comply with a Community obligation, the only circumstance that could justify a Member State's failure to fulfil an obligation. They cannot therefore be held to constitute justification.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>105.</NO.P><TXT>In particular, I find the Austrian Government's argument in defence concerning the protection of legitimate expectations to be inconsistent. In the first place, according to case-law,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0111" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See, among many, Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="120/86" YEAR="1988" PAGE.ECR="2321">120/86 Mulder [1988] ECR 2321, paragraph 27</REF.DOC.ECR>, Joined Cases <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-133/93+C-300/93+C-362/93" YEAR="1994" PAGE.ECR="I-4863">C-133/93, C-300/93 and C-362/93 Crispoltini and Others [1994] ECR I-4863, paragraph 57</REF.DOC.ECR> and Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-68/95" YEAR="1996" PAGE.ECR="I-6065">C-68/95 T. Fort [1996] ECR I-6065, paragraph 40</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> the principle may be relied on by economic operators whose interests are damaged by Community acts, but, as a rule at least, not by Member States criticised for failing to fulfil obligations arising out of such acts, with the sole exception of the quite specific case of the recovery of unduly paid aid,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0112" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See, among many, Joined Cases <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="205/82 to 215/82" YEAR="1983" PAGE.ECR="2633">205/82 to 215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor and Others [1983] ECR 2633, Paragraph 33</REF.DOC.ECR> and Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-24/95" YEAR="1997" PAGE.ECR="I-1591">C-24/95 Alcan Deutschland [1997] ECR I-1591, paragraph 38</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> which does not arise in this case. Secondly, the decision in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Tögel,</HT><NOTE NOTE.ID="E0113" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-76/97" YEAR="1998" PAGE.ECR="I-5357">C-76/97 [1998] ECR I-5357</REF.DOC.ECR>. The sector in Question concerns appeals procedures for public works and supply contracts.</P></NOTE> to which Austria refers in the rejoinder, does not actually run counter to the abovementioned case-law since it emphasises that where a directive has not been transposed by the requisite time-limit, the national court must, as far as possible, ensure that the national law is construed in a manner compatible with the directive,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0114" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Ibidem, paragraph 28.</P></NOTE> in accordance with settled case-law.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0115" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See, in particular, Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-106/89" YEAR="1990" PAGE.ECR="I-4135">C-106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR I-4135, paragraph 8</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> I would add that in this case I very much doubt whether the need of savers to maintain anonymous securities accounts can be considered an interest worth protecting, particularly in the light of the possible criminal implications that anonymous bank accounts are <HT TYPE="ITALIC">objectively</HT> likely to encourage. Those same savers, moreover, knew that, as of <DATE ISO="19950101">1 January 1995</DATE>, Austria was obliged to require customer identification for <HT TYPE="ITALIC">all</HT> business relations established from that date.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>106.</NO.P><TXT>I consider to be particularly unacceptable the position the Austrian Government takes up in relation to the possible exodus of capital to hypothetical tax havens that could be triggered as a result of the retroactive abolition of securities accounts. As the Commission points out,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0116" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Reply, at paragraph 42.</P></NOTE> without contradiction, it is hard to understand what economic reasons honest savers could have for channelling their capital out of Austria to other destinations, if the system of<?PAGE NO="I-7873"?> anonymous securities accounts itself were abolished, but the rates of return on capital invested in securities remained unchanged. If, however, Austria is alluding to the fact that any dirty money <QUOT.START ID="QS0124" REF.END="QE0124" CODE="2018"/>parked<QUOT.END ID="QE0124" REF.START="QS0124" CODE="2019"/> in anonymous accounts could rapidly disappear if the system of anonymity were abolished with retroactive effect, that is all the more reason why the difficulties cited by the Austrian Government may not in any event be taken into consideration.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><P>Costs</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>107.</NO.P><TXT>In accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 69(3) of the Rules of Procedure, where each party succeeds on some and fails on other heads, the Court may order that the costs be shared or that the parties bear their own costs. Since I am proposing to uphold the Commission's application in part only, I consider that the parties should bear their own costs.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><P>Conclusion</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>108.</NO.P><TXT>In the light of the foregoing I propose that the Court declare that:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="ARAB"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(1)</NO.P><TXT>The Court of Justice is not competent to rule on the alleged failures of the Republic of Austria to comply with Community law in relation to the period before its accession to the European Union.</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(2)</NO.P><TXT>The plea of illegality entered by the Austrian Government is inadmissible.</TXT></NP></ITEM><?PAGE NO="I-7874"?><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(3)</NO.P><TXT>The Republic of Austria has railed to fulfil its obligations under Article 3(1) and (5) of Council Directive 91/308/EEC of <DATE ISO="19910610">10 June 1991</DATE> on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering by:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="DASH"><ITEM><P>failing to provide, with effect from <DATE ISO="19950101">1 January 1995</DATE>, for the identification of customers resident in Austria whenever savings accounts are opened in ATS;</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>providing for customer identification whenever securities accounts are opened only with effect from <DATE ISO="19960801">1 August 1996</DATE>.</P></ITEM></LIST></P></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(4)</NO.P><TXT>For the rest, the application is rejected.</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(5)</NO.P><TXT>The parties must bear their own costs.</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></P></NP></GR.SEQ></CONTENTS.CONCLUSION></CONCLUSION>