On 2 June 2008, Mr Pérez Retamero concluded with TNT a ‘contract governing the provision of transport services’. In accordance with that contract, TNT entrusted to Mr Pérez Retamero the task of delivering goods on the territory of Catalonia (Spain), processing documents for customs clearance (in accordance with precise instructions), loading, stowing, unloading, and offloading the goods carried and, finally, arranging for the collection of amounts payable for dispatches. That contract provided furthermore that TNT could change, wholly or partly, and unilaterally, the principles and rules applicable to transport services. A mobile phone equipped with a card supplied by Vodafone was provided to Mr Pérez Retamero so that he could perform his work. Also in accordance with that contract, Mr Pérez Retamero had to take out a transport insurance policy and, in any event, assume responsibility for loss or destruction of the goods and for delivery delays. The initial term of the contract was fixed at six months. However, that contract could be extended for successive periods of six months. The remuneration for services provided by the interested party consisted of a lump sum amount payable for each day covered and paid monthly. The contract at issue stipulated that the vehicle used had to display the colours and advertising chosen by TNT. Mr Pérez Retamero also declared that he was licenced to carry on a transport activity. Annex I to that contract provided that the carrier would have a supervisor.

That contract was extended or others were subsequently concluded, but the contents of those contracts remained, essentially, the same.

From January 2014, while still performing the same work, Mr Pérez Retamero began issuing invoices for the services supplied to Sapirod, contracted by TNT to ensure the transport services concerned. The cards for access to TNT premises were directly issued by the latter to the carriers. On that card, Mr Pérez Retamero was identified as an ‘employed driver’.

Mr Pérez Retamero was the owner of a van with a maximum load capacity of 2 590 kg and for which he carried a transport licence authorising him to carry out transport services.

On 17 February 2015, Sapirod informed Mr Pérez Retamero orally that it could no longer offer him any transport services. That information was confirmed by letter of 6 March 2015.

On 17 March 2015, Mr Pérez Retamero brought an action before the Juzgado de lo Social No 3 de Barcelona (Labour Court, Barcelona, Spain) seeking to establish that he was bound by an employment contract with Sapirod and that his dismissal was, therefore, unlawful. In addition to that claim, he challenged TNT for unlawfully making workers available and, therefore, he sought an order finding those two companies jointly and severally liable.

In support of his action, Mr Pérez Retamero claimed that all of the criteria or elements which characterise an employment relationship, such as subordination, that the work is carried out under the direction of another and inclusion within the organisation of an undertaking, were fulfilled, so that, in this case, it had to be concluded that there was not a commercial relationship, but indeed an employment contract. The objective exclusion provided for by Article 1(3)(g) of the Workers’ Statute is contrary to Directive 2002/15, so that he cannot be classified as a ‘self-employed driver’, within the meaning of Article 3(e) of that directive.

Before the referring court, Sapirod claimed, in particular, that there was no contradiction between Article 1(3)(g) of the Workers’ Statute and Article 3 of Directive 2002/15, since, in both of those provisions, the holding of a ‘licence or an administrative authorisation’ authorising the provision of road transport services is the decisive criterion excluding the existence of an employment relationship. The fact that that provision of EU law does not expressly refer to the fact that the interested party is the owner of the vehicle or has a power of disposal over it is not relevant.

Before the referring court, TNT contended, in particular, that it follows from recital 5 of Directive 2002/15 that the latter must not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives set out in Article 1 thereof and that that directive is therefore not a valid legislative instrument in order to make a distinction between the exercise of the activity of a carrier in the context of an employment relationship and the exercise of that activity as a self-employed driver.

According to the referring court, although the object of Directive 2002/15 does not consist in defining the concepts of ‘employed worker’ and ‘self-employed worker’, the classification at issue becomes essential due to the system of responsibility it involves. If the objective of EU law in the field of transport consisted in harmonising the rules of competition, the respective concepts of ‘mobile worker’ and ‘self-employed driver’, in Article 3(d) and (e) of that directive, should be the same in all the Member States.

In those circumstances, the Juzgado de lo Social No 3 de Barcelona (Labour Court, Barcelona) decided to stay proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1)Must the definition of “mobile worker” given in Article 3(d) of Directive 2002/15 … be interpreted as precluding domestic legal provisions such as Article 1.3(g) of the Workers’ Statute, which provides that “persons providing a transport service by virtue of administrative authorisations of which they are the holders, carried out … using vehicles … of which ownership or a direct power of disposal is vested in them cannot be regarded as ‘mobile workers’”?

(2)Must the second subparagraph of Article 3(e) of Directive 2002/15 … be interpreted as meaning that, if none or only one of the criteria laid down for a person to be regarded as a “self-employed driver” is fulfilled, the view must be taken that the person concerned is a “mobile worker”?’

The admissibility of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling was contested by Sapirod, TNT, the Spanish Government and the European Commission, in their respective written observations, particularly on the ground that the dispute at issue in the main proceedings does not fall within the scope of application of Directive 2002/15 and that the interpretation of that directive is therefore not necessary for the resolution of that dispute.

According to settled case-law, the procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU is a means of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts. It follows that it is for the national courts alone which are seised of the case and are responsible for the judgment to be delivered to determine, in view of the special features of each case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable them to give their judgment and the relevance of the questions which they put to the Court (see, inter alia, judgments of 17 July 1997, Leur-Bloem, C‑28/95, EU:C:1997:369 paragraph 24, and of 7 July 2011, Agafiţei and Others, C‑310/10, EU:C:2011:467, paragraph 25).

Consequently, where questions submitted by national courts concern the interpretation of a provision of European Union law, the Court is, in principle, obliged to give a ruling (see, inter alia, judgments of 17 July 1997, Leur-Bloem, C‑28/95, EU:C:1997:369 paragraph 25, and of 7 July 2011, Agafiţei and Others, C‑310/10, EU:C:2011:467, paragraph 26).

Nevertheless, the Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to enable it to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, judgments of 11 July 2006, Chacón Navas, C‑13/05, EU:C:2006:456, paragraph 33, and of 7 July 2011, Agafiţei and Others, C‑310/10, EU:C:2011:467, paragraph 27).

It is therefore apparent from settled case-law that a reference by a national court can be rejected if, inter alia, it is obvious that European Union law cannot be applied, either directly or indirectly, to the circumstances of the case (judgment of 7 July 2011, Agafiţei and Others, C‑310/10, EU:C:2011:467, paragraph 28).

In this case, it should be noted that the referring court seeks guidance from the Court on the interpretation of Directive 2002/15 without having established that a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings comes within the scope of that directive.

In that regard, it must be noted, first, that it follows from Article 1 of Directive 2002/15 that its purpose is to lay down minimum requirements on the organisation of working time, in order to improve the health and safety protection of persons performing mobile road transport activities, to improve road safety and to align conditions of competition.

Secondly, in accordance with Article 3 of Directive 2002/15, the definitions provided for therein are established ‘[f]or the purposes of this Directive’. Therefore, the interpretation of the concepts of ‘mobile worker’ and ‘self-employed driver’, defined in Article 3(d) and (e) of that directive, cannot go beyond the scope of that directive.

It must be noted that the dispute in the main proceedings, which pertains to an action challenging a dismissal, relates not to a question about the organisation of working time, but to whether the person concerned must be classified as a ‘mobile worker’ and therefore as an employed person for the purposes of the application of national labour legislation and, more particularly, legislation on dismissals.

Therefore, it must be concluded that a dispute such as that in the main proceedings does not come within the scope of Directive 2002/15 and that the concepts in Article 3(d) and (e) of that directive, consequently, cannot apply to that dispute.

It follows that Article 3(d) and (e) of Directive 2002/15 is not necessary for the resolution of the dispute in the main proceedings.

It must, therefore, be held that the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Juzgado de lo Social No 3 de Barcelona (Labour Court, Barcelona) are inadmissible.

Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.