<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><JUDGMENT xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://formex.publications.europa.eu/schema/formex-04.cj-20080212.xd"><BIB.JUDGMENT><REF.CASE FILE="ECRT11992ENA.0300102101.case.xml"><NO.CASE>T-13/89</NO.CASE></REF.CASE><NO.CELEX>61989A0013</NO.CELEX><NO.SEQ>0005.0002</NO.SEQ><PAGE.FIRST>1026</PAGE.FIRST><PAGE.SEQ>1</PAGE.SEQ><PAGE.LAST>1154</PAGE.LAST><PAGE.TOTAL>129</PAGE.TOTAL><AUTHOR>T</AUTHOR></BIB.JUDGMENT><CURR.TITLE><LEFT>JUDGMENT OF <DATE ISO="19920310">10.3.1992</DATE> —CASE T-13/89</LEFT><RIGHT>ICI v COMMISSION</RIGHT></CURR.TITLE><TITLE><TI><P><HT TYPE="UC">Judgment of the Court of First Instance</HT> (First Chamber)</P><P><DATE ISO="19920310">10 March 1992</DATE><NOTE NOTE.ID="E0001" NUMBERING="STAR"><P>Language of the case: English.</P></NOTE></P></TI></TITLE><TOC><TITLE><TI><P>Contents</P></TI></TITLE><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Facts and background to the action</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1030</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Procedure</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1039</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Forms of order sought by the parties</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1041</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Substance</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1042</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The rights of the defence</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1043</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>1.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Nondisclosure of documents upon notification of the statement of objections</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1043</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>2.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Nondisclosure of the hearing officer's report</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1045</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>3.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Premature judgment and preconceived views</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1046</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Proof of the infringement</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1047</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>1.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The findings of fact</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1047</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>A.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The floor-price agreement and the EATP meeting of <DATE ISO="19771122">22 November 1977</DATE></ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1047</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(a)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The contested decision</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1047</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(b)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Arguments of the parties</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1049</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(c)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Assessment by the Court</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1050</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>B.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The system of regular meetings</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1054</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(a)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The contested decision</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1054</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(b)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Arguments of the parties</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1055</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(c)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Assessment by the Court</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1057</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><?PAGE NO="II-1027"?><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>C.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The price initiatives</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1062</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(a)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The contested decision</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1062</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(b)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Arguments of the parties</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1069</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(c)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Assessment by the Court</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1075</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>D.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The measures designed to facilitate the implementation of the price initiatives</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1082</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(a)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The contested decision</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1082</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(b)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Arguments of the parties</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1083</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(c)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Assessment by the Court</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1085</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>E.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Target tonnages and quotas</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1089</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(a)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The contested decision</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1089</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(b)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Arguments of the parties</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1092</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(c)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Assessment by the Court</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1097</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>F.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Conclusion</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1106</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>2.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The application of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1107</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>A.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Legal characterization</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1107</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(a)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The contested decision</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1107</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(b)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Arguments of the parties</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1110</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(c)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Assessment by the Court</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1113</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>B.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Object or effect restrictive of competition</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1117</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(a)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The contested decision</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1117</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(b)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Arguments of the parties</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1120</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(c)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Assessment by the Court</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1125</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><?PAGE NO="II-1028"?><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>C.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Effect on trade between Member States</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1126</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(a)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The contested decision</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1126</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(b)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Arguments of the parties</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1127</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(c)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Assessment by the Court</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1128</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>D.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Nature of the agreements on target prices and sales volume targets</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1129</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>3.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Conclusion</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1131</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The statement of reasons</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1131</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The fine</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1133</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>1.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The limitation period</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1133</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>2.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Duration of the infringement</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1134</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>3.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The gravity of the infringement</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1136</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>A.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The applicant's limited role</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1136</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>B.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Lack of individualization in the criteria for determining the fines</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1140</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>C.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The alleged failure to take proper account of the effects of the infringement</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1142</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>D.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The claim that insufficient account was taken of the situation of economic crisis</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1145</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>E.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The turnover to be taken into account</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1146</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>F.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The principle of equal treatment</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1147</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>G.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The extent of the applicant's cooperation</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1150</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK></TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The reopening of the oral procedure</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1153</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Costs</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>II-1154</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK></TOC><?PAGE NO="II-1029"?><JUDGMENT.INIT><P>In Case T-13/89,</P></JUDGMENT.INIT><PARTIES><PLAINTIFS><P><HT TYPE="BOLD">Imperial Chemical Industries pic,</HT> a company incorporated under English law, having its registered office at Imperial Chemical House, Millbank, London (United Kingdom), represented by David Vaughan QC, of the Inner Temple, Victor O. White and Richard J. Coles, Solicitors, and by D. Anderson, Barrister, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the Chambers of Maître L. H. Dupong, 14a Rue des Bains,</P><PARTY.STATUS>applicant,</PARTY.STATUS></PLAINTIFS><AGAINST>v</AGAINST><DEFENDANTS><P><HT TYPE="BOLD">Commission of the European Communities,</HT> represented by Anthony McClellan, Principal Legal Adviser, and Karen Banks, a member of its Legal Service, acting as Agents, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the office of R. Hayder, a representative of its Legal Service, Wagner Centre, Kirchberg,</P><PARTY.STATUS>defendant,</PARTY.STATUS></DEFENDANTS></PARTIES><P>APPLICATION for the annulment of the Commission's decision of <DATE ISO="19860423">23 April 1986</DATE> relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/31.149-Polypro-pylene, <REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="230" DATE.PUB="1986" PAGE.FIRST="1">Official Journal 1986 L 230, p. 1</REF.DOC.OJ>),</P><PREAMBLE><PREAMBLE.INIT><P>THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (First Chamber),</P><P>composed of: J. L. Cruz Vilaça, President, R. Schintgen, D. A. O. Edward, H. Kirschner and K. Lenaerts, Judges,</P><P>Advocate General: B. Vesterdorf, Registrar: H. Jung,</P></PREAMBLE.INIT><GR.VISA><VISA>having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing held from <DATE ISO="19901210">10</DATE> to <DATE ISO="19901215">15 December 1990</DATE>,</VISA><VISA>after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on <DATE ISO="19910710">10 July 1991</DATE>,</VISA></GR.VISA><PREAMBLE.FINAL><P>gives the following</P></PREAMBLE.FINAL></PREAMBLE><?PAGE NO="II-1030"?><CONTENTS.JUDGMENT><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><P>Judgment</P></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>Facts and background to the action</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>1</NO.P><TXT>This case concerns a Commission decision fining fifteen producers of polypropylene for infringing Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty. The product which is the subject-matter of the contested decision (hereinafter referred to as <QUOT.START ID="QS0001" REF.END="QE0001" CODE="2018"/>the Decision<QUOT.END ID="QE0001" REF.START="QS0001" CODE="2019"/>), polypropylene, is one of the principal bulk thermoplastic polymers. It is sold by the producers to processors for conversion into finished or semi-finished products. The largest producers of polypropylene have a range of more than 100 different grades covering a wide range of end uses. The major basic grades of polypropylene are raffia, homopolymer injection moulding, copolymer injection moulding, highimpact copolymer and film. The undertakings to which the Decision is addressed are all major petrochemical producers.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>2</NO.P><TXT>The west European market for polypropylene is supplied almost exclusively from European-based production facilities. Before 1977, that market was supplied by ten producers, namely Montedison (now Montepolimeri SpA), Hoechst AG, Imperial Chemical Industries PLC and Shell International Chemical Company Limited (called <QUOT.START ID="QS0002" REF.END="QE0002" CODE="2018"/>the big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0002" REF.START="QS0002" CODE="2019"/>), which together account for 64% of the market, Enichem Anic SpA in Italy, Rhône-Poulenc SA in France, Alcudia in Spain, Chemische Werke Hüls and BASF AG in Germany and the nationalized Austrian producer Chemie Linz AG. Following the expiry of the controlling patents held by Montedison, seven new producers came on stream in western Europe in 1977: Amoco and Hercules Chemicals NV in Belgium, ATO Chimie SA and Solvay et Cie SA in France, SIR in Italy, DSM NV in the Netherlands and Taqsa in Spain. Saga Petrokjemi AS &amp; Co, a Norwegian producer, came on stream in the middle of 1978, and Petrofina SA in 1980. The arrival of the new producers, with nameplate capacity of some <FT TYPE="NUMBER">480000</FT> tonnes, brought a substantial increase in installed capacity in western Europe which for several years was not matched by the increase in demand in that market. This led to low rates of utilization of production capacity, which, however, rose progressively between 1977 and 1983, increasing from 60% to 90%. According to the Decision, supply and demand were roughly in balance from 1982. However, during most of the period covered by the investigation (1977-1983), the polypropylene market was reported to be characterized by either low profitability or substantial losses, owing in particular to the extent of the fixed costs and to the increase in the cost of the raw material, propylene. According to the Decision (point 8), in 1983 Montepolimeri SpA held 18% of the European polypropylene market, Imperial Chemical Industries PLC,<?PAGE NO="II-1031"?> Shell International Chemical Company Limited and Hoechst AG each held 11%, Hercules Chemicals NV slightly below 6%, ATO Chimie SA, BASF AG, DSM NV, Chemische Werke Hüls, Chemie Linz AG, Solvay et Cie SA and Saga Petrokjemi AS &amp; Co from 3 to 5% and Petrofina SA about 2%. The Decision states that there was a substantial trade in polypropylene between Member States because each of the EEC producers operating at that time supplied the product in most, if not all, Member States.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>3</NO.P><TXT>Imperial Chemical Industries PLC was one of the producers supplying the polypropylene market in 1977 and is one of the <QUOT.START ID="QS0003" REF.END="QE0003" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0003" REF.START="QS0003" CODE="2019"/>. Its market share was between about 10.6 and 11.4%.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>4</NO.P><TXT>On <DATE ISO="19831013">13</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19831014">14 October 1983</DATE>, Commission officials, acting pursuant to Article 14(3) of Council Regulation No 17 of <DATE ISO="19620206">6 February 1962</DATE>, the first regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty (Official Journal, English Special Edition 1959-1962, p. 87, hereinafter referred to as <QUOT.START ID="QS0004" REF.END="QE0004" CODE="2018"/>Regulation No 17<QUOT.END ID="QE0004" REF.START="QS0004" CODE="2019"/>), carried out simultaneous investigations at the premises of the following undertakings, producers of polypropylene supplying the Community market:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="DASH"><ITEM><P>ATO Chimie SA, now Atochem (<QUOT.START ID="QS0005" REF.END="QE0005" CODE="2018"/>ATO<QUOT.END ID="QE0005" REF.START="QS0005" CODE="2019"/>),</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>BASF AG (<QUOT.START ID="QS0006" REF.END="QE0006" CODE="2018"/>BASF<QUOT.END ID="QE0006" REF.START="QS0006" CODE="2019"/>),</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>DSM NV (<QUOT.START ID="QS0007" REF.END="QE0007" CODE="2018"/>DSM<QUOT.END ID="QE0007" REF.START="QS0007" CODE="2019"/>),</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>Hercules Chemicals NV (<QUOT.START ID="QS0008" REF.END="QE0008" CODE="2018"/>Hercules<QUOT.END ID="QE0008" REF.START="QS0008" CODE="2019"/>),</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>Hoechst AG (<QUOT.START ID="QS0009" REF.END="QE0009" CODE="2018"/>Hoechst<QUOT.END ID="QE0009" REF.START="QS0009" CODE="2019"/>),</P></ITEM><?PAGE NO="II-1032"?><ITEM><P>Chemische Werke Hüls (<QUOT.START ID="QS0010" REF.END="QE0010" CODE="2018"/>Hüls<QUOT.END ID="QE0010" REF.START="QS0010" CODE="2019"/>),</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>Imperial Chemical Industries PLC (<QUOT.START ID="QS0011" REF.END="QE0011" CODE="2018"/>ICI<QUOT.END ID="QE0011" REF.START="QS0011" CODE="2019"/>),</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>Montepolimeri SpA, now Montedipe (<QUOT.START ID="QS0012" REF.END="QE0012" CODE="2018"/>Monte<QUOT.END ID="QE0012" REF.START="QS0012" CODE="2019"/>),</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>Shell International Chemical Company Limited (<QUOT.START ID="QS0013" REF.END="QE0013" CODE="2018"/>Shell<QUOT.END ID="QE0013" REF.START="QS0013" CODE="2019"/>),</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>Solvay et Cie SA (<QUOT.START ID="QS0014" REF.END="QE0014" CODE="2018"/>Solva<QUOT.END ID="QE0014" REF.START="QS0014" CODE="2019"/>),</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>BP Chimie (<QUOT.START ID="QS0015" REF.END="QE0015" CODE="2018"/>BP<QUOT.END ID="QE0015" REF.START="QS0015" CODE="2019"/>).</P></ITEM></LIST></P><P>No investigations were carried out at the premises of Rhône-Poulenc SA (<QUOT.START ID="QS0016" REF.END="QE0016" CODE="2018"/>Rhône-Poulenc<QUOT.END ID="QE0016" REF.START="QS0016" CODE="2019"/>) or at the premises of Enichem Anic SpA.</P></NP><NP><NO.P>5</NO.P><TXT>Following the investigations, the Commission addressed requests for information under Article 11 of Regulation No 17 (hereinafter referred to as <QUOT.START ID="QS0017" REF.END="QE0017" CODE="2018"/>the request for information<QUOT.END ID="QE0017" REF.START="QS0017" CODE="2019"/>), not only to the undertakings mentioned above but also to the following undertakings:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="DASH"><ITEM><P>Amoco,</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>Chemie Linz AG (<QUOT.START ID="QS0018" REF.END="QE0018" CODE="2018"/>Linz<QUOT.END ID="QE0018" REF.START="QS0018" CODE="2019"/>),</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>Saga Petrokjemi AS &amp; Co, which is now part of Statoil (<QUOT.START ID="QS0019" REF.END="QE0019" CODE="2018"/>Statoil<QUOT.END ID="QE0019" REF.START="QS0019" CODE="2019"/>),</P></ITEM><?PAGE NO="II-1033"?><ITEM><P>Petrofina SA (<QUOT.START ID="QS0020" REF.END="QE0020" CODE="2018"/>Petrofina<QUOT.END ID="QE0020" REF.START="QS0020" CODE="2019"/>),</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>Enichem Anic SpA (<QUOT.START ID="QS0021" REF.END="QE0021" CODE="2018"/>Anic<QUOT.END ID="QE0021" REF.START="QS0021" CODE="2019"/>).</P></ITEM></LIST></P><P>Linz, which is an Austrian undertaking, contested the Commission's jurisdiction and declined to reply to the request for information. In accordance with Article 14(2) of Regulation No 17, the Commission officials then carried out investigations at the premises of Anic and Saga Petrochemicals UIC Ltd, the United Kingdom subsidiary of Saga, and of the selling agents of Linz established in the United Kingdom and in the Federal Republic of Germany. No request for information was sent to Rhône-Poulenc.</P></NP><NP><NO.P>6</NO.P><TXT>The evidence obtained during the course of those investigations and pursuant to the requests for information led the Commission to form the view that between 1977 and 1983 the producers concerned had, in contravention of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, by a series of price initiatives, regularly set target prices and developed a system of annual volume control to share out the available market between them according to agreed percentage or tonnage targets. On <DATE ISO="19840430">30 April 1984</DATE>, the Commission therefore decided to open the proceedings provided for by Article 3(1) of Regulation No 17 and in May 1984 sent a written statement of objections to the undertakings mentioned above with the exception of Anic and Rhône-Poulenc. All the addressees submitted written answers.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>7</NO.P><TXT>On <DATE ISO="19841024">24 October 1984</DATE>, the hearing officer appointed by the Commission met the legal advisers of the addressees of the statements of objections in order to agree certain procedural arrangements for the hearing provided for as a part of the administrative procedure, which was to begin on <DATE ISO="19841112">12 November 1984</DATE>. At that meeting the Commission announced, as a result of the arguments advanced by the undertakings in their replies to the statement of objections, that it would shortly send them further material complementing the evidence already served on them regarding the implementation of price initiatives. On <DATE ISO="19841031">31 October 1984</DATE>, the Commission sent to the legal advisers of the undertakings a bundle of documents consisting of copies of the price instructions given by the producers to their sales offices together with tables summarizing those documents. In order to ensure the protection of business secrets, the sending of that material was made subject to certain conditions; in particular, the documents were not to be made known to the<?PAGE NO="II-1034"?> commercial services of the undertakings. The lawyers of a number of undertakings refused to accept those conditions and returned the documentation before the oral hearing.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>8</NO.P><TXT>In view of the information supplied in the written replies to the statement of objections, the Commission decided to extend the proceedings to Anic and Rhône-Poulenc. To that end, a statement of objections, similar to the statement of objections addressed to the other fifteen undertakings, was sent to those two undertakings on <DATE ISO="19841025">25 October 1984</DATE>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>9</NO.P><TXT>The first session of the oral hearing took place from <DATE ISO="19841112">12</DATE> to <DATE ISO="19841120">20 November 1984</DATE>. During that session all the undertakings were heard, with the exception of Shell (which refused to take part in any hearing) and Anic, ICI and Rhône-Poulenc (which considered that they had not had sufficient opportunity to prepare their case).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>10</NO.P><TXT>At that session, several undertakings refused to deal with the matters raised in the documentation sent to them on <DATE ISO="19841031">31 October 1984</DATE>, asserting that the Commission had completely changed the direction of its case and that at the very least they should have the opportunity to make written observations. Other undertakings claimed that they had had insufficient time to examine the documents in question before the hearing. A joint letter to that effect was sent to the Commission on <DATE ISO="19841128">28 November 1984</DATE> by the lawyers of BASF, DSM, Hercules, Hoechst, ICI, Linz, Monte, Petrofina and Solvay. In a letter of <DATE ISO="19841204">4 December 1984</DATE>, Hüls associated itself with the view taken in the joint letter.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>11</NO.P><TXT>Consequently, on <DATE ISO="19850329">29 March 1985</DATE> the Commission sent to the undertakings a new set of documentation, setting out price instructions given by the undertakings to their sales offices, accompanied by price tables, as well as a summary of the evidence relating to each price initiative for which documents were available. It requested the undertakings to reply both in writing and at further sessions of the oral hearing and stated that it was removing the original restrictions on disclosure to commercial departments.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1035"?><NP><NO.P>12</NO.P><TXT>By another letter of the same date the Commission replied to the argument raised by the lawyers that it had not clearly defined the legal nature of the alleged cartel under Article 85(1) and invited the undertakings to submit written and oral observations.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>13</NO.P><TXT>A second session of the oral hearing took place from <DATE ISO="19850708">8</DATE> to <DATE ISO="19850711">11 July 1985</DATE> and on <DATE ISO="19850725">25 July 1985</DATE>. Anic, ICI and Rhône-Poulenc submitted their observations and the other undertakings (with the exception of Shell) commented on the matters raised in the Commission's two letters of <DATE ISO="19850329">29 March 1985</DATE>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>14</NO.P><TXT>The preliminary draft of the minutes of the oral hearing, together with all other relevant documentation, was given to the Members of the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions (hereinafter referred to as <QUOT.START ID="QS0022" REF.END="QE0022" CODE="2018"/>the Advisory Committee<QUOT.END ID="QE0022" REF.START="QS0022" CODE="2019"/>) on <DATE ISO="19851119">19 November 1985</DATE> and sent to the applicants on <DATE ISO="19851125">25 November 1985</DATE>. The Advisory Committee gave its opinion at its 170th meeting on <DATE ISO="19851205">5</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19851206">6 December 1985</DATE>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>15</NO.P><TXT> At the end of that procedure, the Commission adopted the contested decision of <DATE ISO="19860423">23 April 1986</DATE>, which has the following operative part:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><ARTICLE IDENTIFIER="001"><TI.ART><QUOT.START ID="QS0023" REF.END="QE0023" CODE="2018"/>Article 1</TI.ART><ALINEA><P>ANIC SpA, ATO Chemie SA (now Atochem), BASF AG, DSM NV, Hercules Chemicals NV, Hoechst AG, Chemische Werke Hüls (now Hüls AG), ICI PLC, Chemische Werke LINZ, Montepolimeri SpA (now Montedipe), Petrofina SA, Rhône-Poulenc SA, Shell International Chemical Co. Ltd, Solvay &amp; Cie and SAGA Petrokjemi AG &amp; Co. (now part of Statoil) have infringed Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty, by participating:</P><LIST TYPE="DASH"><ITEM><P>in the case of ANIC, from about November 1977 until a date in late 1982 or early 1983,</P></ITEM><?PAGE NO="II-1036"?><ITEM><P>in the case of Rhône-Poulenc, from about November 1977 until the end of 1980,</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>in the case of Petrofina, from 1980 until at least November 1983,</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>in the case of Hoechst, ICI, Montepolimeri and Shell from about mid-1977 until at least November 1983,</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>in the case of Hercules, LINZ and SAGA and Solvay from about November 1977 until at least November 1983,</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>in the case of ATO, from at least 1978 until at least November 1983,</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>in the case of BASF, DSM and Hüls, from some time between 1977 and 1979 until at least November 1983,</P></ITEM></LIST></ALINEA><ALINEA><P>in an agreement and concerted practice originating in mid-1977 by which the producers supplying polypropylene in the territory of the EEC:</P><LIST TYPE="alpha"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(a)</NO.P><TXT>contacted each other and met regularly (from the beginning of 1981, twice each month) in a series of secret meetings so as to discuss and determine their commercial policies;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(b)</NO.P><TXT>set <QUOT.START ID="QS0024" REF.END="QE0024" CODE="201C"/>target<QUOT.END ID="QE0024" REF.START="QS0024" CODE="201D"/> (or minimum) prices from time to time for the sale of the product in each Member State of the EEC;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(c)</NO.P><TXT>agreed various measures designed to facilitate the implementation of such target prices, including (principally) temporary restrictions on output, the exchange of detailed information on their deliveries, the holding of local meetings and from late 1982 a system of <QUOT.START ID="QS0025" REF.END="QE0025" CODE="201C"/>account management<QUOT.END ID="QE0025" REF.START="QS0025" CODE="201D"/> designed to implement price rises to individual customers;</TXT></NP></ITEM><?PAGE NO="II-1037"?><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(d)</NO.P><TXT>introduced simultaneous price increase implementing the said targets;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(e)</NO.P><TXT>shared the market by allocating to each producer an annual sales target or <QUOT.START ID="QS0026" REF.END="QE0026" CODE="201C"/>quota<QUOT.END ID="QE0026" REF.START="QS0026" CODE="201D"/> (1979, 1980 and for at least part of 1983) or in default of a definitive agreement covering the whole year by requiring producers to limit their sales in each month by reference to some previous period (1981, 1982).</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></ALINEA></ARTICLE><ARTICLE IDENTIFIER="002"><TI.ART>Article 2</TI.ART><ALINEA>The undertakings named in Article 1 shall forthwith bring the said infringement to an end (if they have not already done so) and shall henceforth refrain in relation to their polypropylene operations from any agreement or concerted practice which may have the same or similar object or effect, including any exchange of information of the kind normally covered by business secrecy by which the participants are directly or indirectly informed of the output, deliveries, stock levels, selling prices, costs or investment plans of other individual producers, or by which they might be able to monitor adherence to any express or tacit agreement or to any concerned practice covering prices or market snaring inside the EEC. Any scheme for the exchange of general information to which the producers subscribe (such as Fides) shall be so conducted as to exclude any information from which the behaviour of individual producers can be identified and in particular the undertakings shall refrain from exchanging between themselves any additional information of competitive significance not covered by such a system.</ALINEA></ARTICLE><ARTICLE IDENTIFIER="003"><TI.ART>Article 3</TI.ART><ALINEA><P>The following fines are hereby imposed on the undertakings named herein in respect of the infringement found in Article 1 :</P><LIST TYPE="roman"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(i)</NO.P><TXT>ANIC SpA, a fine of <FT TYPE="NUMBER">750000</FT> ECU, or Lit <FT TYPE="NUMBER">1103692500</FT>;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(ii)</NO.P><TXT>Atochem, a fine of <FT TYPE="NUMBER">1750000</FT> ECU, or FF <FT TYPE="NUMBER">11973325</FT>;</TXT></NP></ITEM><?PAGE NO="II-1038"?><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(iii)</NO.P><TXT>BASF AG, a fine of <FT TYPE="NUMBER">2500000</FT> ECU, or DM <FT TYPE="NUMBER">5362225</FT>;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(iv)</NO.P><TXT>DSM NV, a fine of <FT TYPE="NUMBER">2750000</FT> ECU, or Fl <FT TYPE="NUMBER">6657640</FT>;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(v)</NO.P><TXT>Hercules Chemicals NV, a fine of <FT TYPE="NUMBER">2750000</FT> ECU, or Bfrs <FT TYPE="NUMBER">120569620</FT>;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(vi)</NO.P><TXT>Hoechst AG, a fine of <FT TYPE="NUMBER">9000000</FT> ECU, or DM <FT TYPE="NUMBER">19304010</FT>;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(vii)</NO.P><TXT>Hüls AG, a fine of <FT TYPE="NUMBER">2750000</FT> ECU, or DM <FT TYPE="NUMBER">5898447</FT>.50;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(viii)</NO.P><TXT>ICI PLC, a fine of <FT TYPE="NUMBER">10000000</FT> ECU, or £<FT TYPE="NUMBER">6447970</FT>;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(ix)</NO.P><TXT>Chemische Werke LINZ, a fine of <FT TYPE="NUMBER">1000000</FT> ECU, or Lit <FT TYPE="NUMBER">1471590000</FT>;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(x)</NO.P><TXT>Montedipe, a fine of <FT TYPE="NUMBER">11000000</FT> ECU, or Lit <FT TYPE="NUMBER">16187490000</FT>;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>ii(xi)</NO.P><TXT>Petrofina SA, a fine of <FT TYPE="NUMBER">600000</FT> ECU, or Bfrs <FT TYPE="NUMBER">26306100</FT>;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(xii)</NO.P><TXT>Rhône-Poulenc SA, a fine of <FT TYPE="NUMBER">500000</FT> ECU, or FF <FT TYPE="NUMBER">3420950</FT>;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(xiii)</NO.P><TXT>Shell International Chemical Co. Ltd, a fine of <FT TYPE="NUMBER">9000000</FT> ECU, or £<FT TYPE="NUMBER">5803173</FT>;</TXT></NP></ITEM><?PAGE NO="II-1039"?><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(xiv)</NO.P><TXT>Solvay &amp; Cie, a fine of <FT TYPE="NUMBER">2500000</FT> ECU, or Bfrs <FT TYPE="NUMBER">109608750</FT>;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(xv)</NO.P><TXT>Statoil Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS (now incorporating SAGA Petrokjemi), a fine of <FT TYPE="NUMBER">1000000</FT> ECU or £<FT TYPE="NUMBER">644797</FT>.</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></ALINEA></ARTICLE><ARTICLE IDENTIFIER="004"><TI.ART>Article 4</TI.ART><ALINEA>...</ALINEA></ARTICLE><ARTICLE IDENTIFIER="005"><TI.ART>Article 5</TI.ART><ALINEA>...<QUOT.END ID="QE0023" REF.START="QS0023" CODE="2019"/></ALINEA></ARTICLE></QUOT.S></P></NP><NP><NO.P>16</NO.P><TXT>On <DATE ISO="19860708">8 July 1986</DATE>, the definitive minutes of the hearings, incorporating the textual corrections, additions and deletions requested by the applicants, was sent to them.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>Procedure</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>17</NO.P><TXT>These are the circumstances in which, by application lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on <DATE ISO="19860806">6 August 1986</DATE>, the applicant brought this action seeking annulment of the Decision. Thirteen of the fourteen other addressees of the Decision have also brought actions for its annulment (Cases T-l/89 to T-4/89, T-6/89 to T-12/89, T-14/89 and T-15/89).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>18</NO.P><TXT>By a separate document lodged on the same day, ICI requested the Court of Justice, pursuant to Article 91 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, to order the Commission to produce the documents which it had refused to disclose to it. That application was dismissed by order of the Court of Justice of <DATE ISO="19861211">11 December 1986</DATE> (Case 212/86 R <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ICI</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission,</HT> not published in the Reports of Cases before the Court).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>19</NO.P><TXT>The written procedure took place entirely before the Court of Justice.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1040"?><NP><NO.P>20</NO.P><TXT>By order of <DATE ISO="19891115">15 November 1989</DATE>, the Court of Justice referred this case and the thirteen other cases to the Court of First Instance, pursuant to Article 14 of the Council Decision of <DATE ISO="19881024">24 October 1988</DATE> establishing a Court of First Instance of the European Communities (hereinafter referred to as <QUOT.START ID="QS0027" REF.END="QE0027" CODE="2018"/>the Council Decision of <DATE ISO="19881024">24 October 1988</DATE><QUOT.END ID="QE0027" REF.START="QS0027" CODE="2019"/>)</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>21</NO.P><TXT>Pursuant to Article 2(3) of the Council Decision of <DATE ISO="19881024">24 October 1988</DATE>, an Advocate General was designated by the President of the Court of First Instance.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>22</NO.P><TXT>By letter of <DATE ISO="19900503">3 May 1990</DATE>, the Registrar of the Court of First Instance invited the parties to an informal meeting in order to determine the arrangements for the oral procedure. That meeting took place on <DATE ISO="19900628">28 June 1990</DATE>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>23</NO.P><TXT>By letter of <DATE ISO="19900709">9 July 1990</DATE>, the Registrar of the Court of First Instance requested the parties to submit their observations on the possible joinder of Cases T-l/89 to T-4/89 and T-6/89 to T-15/89 for the purposes of the oral procedure. No party had any objection on this point.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>24</NO.P><TXT>By order of <DATE ISO="19900925">25 September 1990</DATE>, the Court joined the abovementioned cases for the purposes of the oral procedure, on account of the connection between them, in accordance with Article 43 of the Rules of Procedure, then applicable <HT TYPE="ITALIC">mutatis mutandis</HT> to the procedure before the Court of First Instance by virtue of the third paragraph of Article 11 of the Council Decision of <DATE ISO="19881024">24 October 1988</DATE>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>25</NO.P><TXT>By order of <DATE ISO="19901115">15 November 1990</DATE> the Court adjudicated on the requests for confidential treatment lodged by the applicants in Cases T-2/89, T-3/89, T-9/89, T-ll/89, T-12/89 and T-13/89 and granted them in part.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1041"?><NP><NO.P>26</NO.P><TXT>By letters lodged at the Registry of the Court between <DATE ISO="19901009">9 October</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19901129">29 November 1990</DATE>, the parties replied to the questions put to them by the Court in a letter sent to them by the Registrar on <DATE ISO="19900719">19 July 1990</DATE>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>27</NO.P><TXT>In the light of the answers provided to its questions, on hearing the report of the Judge Rapporteur and after hearing the views of the Advocate General the Court decided to open the oral procedure without any preparatory inquiry.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>28</NO.P><TXT>The parties presented oral argument and answered questions from the Court at the hearing which took place from <DATE ISO="19901210">10</DATE> to <DATE ISO="19901215">15 December 1990</DATE>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>29</NO.P><TXT>The Advocate General delivered his Opinion at the sitting on <DATE ISO="19910710">10 July 1991</DATE>.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>Forms of order sought by the parties</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>30</NO.P><TXT>ICI claims that the Court should:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="roman"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(i)</NO.P><TXT>annul the Commission's decision of <DATE ISO="19860423">23 April 1986</DATE> (IV/31.149 — Polypropylene) in so far as it concerns ICI;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(ii)</NO.P><TXT>cancel or reduce the fine imposed on ICI;</TXT></NP></ITEM><?PAGE NO="II-1042"?><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(iii)</NO.P><TXT>if ICI were obliged to pay the fine at the present stage without being able to suspend payment, order the Commission to repay to ICI the fine paid or the appropriate proportion thereof, together with interest at the rate of 1% over the lending rate set by the bank in the United Kingdom referred to in Article 4 of the decision;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(iv)</NO.P><TXT>order the Commission to pay ICI's costs.</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></P><P>The Commission claims that the Court should:</P><P><LIST TYPE="roman"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(i)</NO.P><TXT>dismiss the application;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(ii)</NO.P><TXT>order the applicant to pay the costs.</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></P></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>Substance</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>31</NO.P><TXT>The Tribunal considers that it is necessary to examine, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">first,</HT> the applicant's grounds of challenge relating to a breach of the rights of the defence allegedly committed by the Commission in so far as it (1) failed to disclose to the applicant documents on which it based the Decision, (2) did not communicate to the applicant the hearing officer's report and (3) made a premature judgment based on preconceived ideas; <HT TYPE="ITALIC">secondly,</HT> the grounds of challenge relating to proof of the infringement concerning (1) the findings of fact made by the Commission and (2) the application to those facts of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty whereby it is contended that the Commission (A) did not correctly define the infringement, (B) did not correctly assess the anticompetitive object or effect or (C) did not correctly assess how trade between Member States was affected; <HT TYPE="ITALIC">thirdly,</HT> the grounds of challenge relating to the reasoning of the Decision; and, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">fourthly,</HT> the grounds of challenge relating to the determination of the fine, which is alleged to be (1) partially time-barred, (2) disproportionate to the duration of the alleged infringement and (3) disproportionate to the gravity of the alleged infringement.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="II-1043"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>The rights of the defence</P></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>1.</NO.P><TXT>Nondisclosure of documents upon notification of the statement of objections</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>32</NO.P><TXT>The applicant contends that when the Commission notified it of the statement of objections it did not send it 14 documents or sets of documents on which it based the Decision and that the Commission thus made it impossible for it to explain their contents. The documents concerned consist of documents obtained at the premises of ATO relating to the exchange of information on deliveries by the French producers and the operation of quotas on the French market in 1979 (Decision, point 15(h)), a document allegedly found at the premises of Solvay dated <DATE ISO="19771206">6 December 1977</DATE> (Decision, point 16, penultimate paragraph), two sets of minutes of Shell internal meetings held on <DATE ISO="19790705">5 July</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19790912">12 September 1979</DATE> (Decision, points 29 and 31), a Solvay internal document comparing <QUOT.START ID="QS0028" REF.END="QE0028" CODE="2018"/>achieved prices<QUOT.END ID="QE0028" REF.START="QS0028" CODE="2019"/> for October and November 1980 with <QUOT.START ID="QS0029" REF.END="QE0029" CODE="2018"/>list prices<QUOT.END ID="QE0029" REF.START="QS0029" CODE="2019"/> for January 1981 (Decision, point 32), a reminder sent by Solvay to its sales offices on <DATE ISO="19810717">17 July 1981</DATE> (Decision, point 35), a Shell document relating to the fixing of a price target on <DATE ISO="19811101">1 November 1981</DATE> (Decision, point 36, first paragraph), a Hercules note showing that in December 1981 the target price was revised downwards (Decision, point 36, second paragraph), an internal Hoechst note dated <DATE ISO="19830606">6 June 1983</DATE> fixing a minimum price from 1 July of that year and a Linz telex of <DATE ISO="19830608">8 June 1983</DATE> (Decision, point 49), two Shell documents headed <QUOT.START ID="QS0030" REF.END="QE0030" CODE="2018"/>PP W. Europe — Pricing<QUOT.END ID="QE0030" REF.START="QS0030" CODE="2019"/> and <QUOT.START ID="QS0031" REF.END="QE0031" CODE="2018"/>Market quality report<QUOT.END ID="QE0031" REF.START="QS0031" CODE="2019"/> (Decision, point 49), an internal ATO note dated <DATE ISO="19830928">28 September 1983</DATE> (Decision, point 51) and, finally, a planning document relating to the first quarter of 1983 found at the premises of Shell (Decision, point 63, third paragraph, and point 64).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>33</NO.P><TXT>The Commission states that the documents mentioned in points 15, 32 or 35 of the Decision were made available to the applicant during the access-to-file procedure. Linz's telex of <DATE ISO="19830608">8 June 1983</DATE> was disclosed as Appendix Linz HI to the letter of <DATE ISO="19850329">29 March 1985</DATE>. In a very limited number of cases, it considered that the documents contained sensitive business information of a particular producer and consequently did not allow access by other producers. It concludes that none of the documents cited by the applicant was in any event essential to the case since those documents either did not concern ICI or merely confirmed other documents. Indeed, the applicant has not attempted to explain how its rights of defence could have been affected by the nondisclosure of the documents in question.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1044"?><NP><NO.P>34</NO.P><TXT>The Court notes that, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the important point is not the documents as such but the conclusions which the Commission has drawn from them, and if those documents were not mentioned in the statement of objections, the undertaking concerned was entitled to take the view that they were of no importance for the purposes of the case. By not informing an undertaking that certain documents would be used in the Decision, the Commission prevented it from putting forward at the appropriate time its view of the probative value of such documents. It follows that those documents cannot be regarded as admissible evidence as far as it is concerned (judgment of the Court of Justice in Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="107/82" YEAR="1983" PAGE.ECR="3151">107/82 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">AEG-Telefunken AG</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> [1983] ECR 3151, paragraph 27</REF.DOC.ECR>, and see most recently the judgment of <DATE ISO="19910703">3 July 1991</DATE> in Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-62/86" YEAR="1991" PAGE.ECR="I-3359">C-62/86 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">AKZO Chemie</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> [1991] ECR I-3359, at paragraph 21</REF.DOC.ECR>).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>35</NO.P><TXT>In this instance, only the documents mentioned in the main or specific statements of objections or in the letter of <DATE ISO="19850329">29 March 1985</DATE>, or those appended to them without being specifically mentioned therein, may be treated as admissible evidence as against the applicant in the present case. As far as the documents which are appended to the statements of objections but which are not mentioned therein are concerned, they may be used in the Decision as against the applicant only if the applicant could reasonably deduce from the statements of objections the conclusions which the Commission intended to draw from them.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>36</NO.P><TXT>It follows that, of the documents mentioned by the applicant, only Linz's telex dated <DATE ISO="19830608">8 June 1983</DATE> may be used as evidence against the applicant, since it was mentioned in the letter of <DATE ISO="19850329">29 March 1985</DATE>, of which it also forms Appendix Linz HI. The other documents referred to by the applicant may not be considered to be evidence admissible against it in the present case.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>37</NO.P><TXT>The question whether the last-mentioned documents provide essential support for the findings of fact made by the Commission against the applicant in the Decision falls to be considered by the Court in its examination of the question whether those findings are well founded.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="II-1045"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>2.</NO.P><TXT>Nondisclosure of the hearing officer's report</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>38</NO.P><TXT>The applicant contends that the hearing officer's report was not made available to it despite the request to this effect which it made to the Commission. It points out that it requested the Court of Justice, under Article 91 of the Rules of Procedure, to order the Commission to produce this report, in which, according to the applicant, the hearing officer acknowledged the existence of intense competition on the market. It is aware that this application was dismissed by an order of the Court of Justice of <DATE ISO="19861211">11 December 1986</DATE> (Case 212/86 R <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ICI</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission,</HT> not published in the Reports of Cases before the Court, paragraphs 5 to 8) but nevertheless requests the Court of First Instance to order the production of that report or at least to take note of it owing to the weaknesses of the Commission's argument as to the substance.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>39</NO.P><TXT>The Commission relies on the aforementioned order which the Court of Justice made in Case 212/86 R (paragraph 7) as authority for refusing to disclose the hearing officer's report. It considers that there is no reason to reverse that order.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>40</NO.P><TXT>This Court holds that the rights of the defence do not require that undertakings involved in proceedings under Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty should be able to comment on the hearing officer's report, which is a purely internal Commission document. On this question the Court of Justice has held that the hearing officer's report is in the nature of an opinion for the Commission, which is in no way bound to follow it, and that the report does not therefore constitute a decisive factor which must be taken into account by the Community court in performing its judicial review (order of <DATE ISO="19861211">11 December 1986</DATE> in Case 212/86 R, cited above, paragraphs 5 to 8). Respect for the rights of the defence is ensured to the requisite legal standard if the various bodies involved in drawing up the final decision have been properly informed of the arguments put forward by the undertakings in response to the objections notified to them by the Commission and to the evidence presented by the Commission in support of those objections (judgment of the Court of Justice in Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="322/81" YEAR="1983" PAGE.ECR="3461">322/81 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie-Michelin NV</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> [1983] ECR 3461, paragraph 7 at p. 3498</REF.DOC.ECR>).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>41</NO.P><TXT>It is to be noted in this regard that the purpose of the hearing officer's report is neither to supplement or correct the undertakings' arguments nor to set forth fresh objections or adduce fresh evidence against the undertakings but to express the<?PAGE NO="II-1046"?> opinion of a Commission official with a view to the adoption of a decision by the Commission. It follows, first, that respect for the rights of the defence does not give the undertakings the right to demand disclosure of the hearing officer's report so as to be able to comment upon it (see the judgment of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="43/82+63/82" YEAR="1984" PAGE.ECR="19">43 and 63/82 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Vereniging ter Bevordering van het Vlaamse Boekwezen, VBVB, and Vereniging ter Bevordering van de Belangen des Boekhandels, VBBB</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> [1984] ECR 19, paragraph 25 at p. 58</REF.DOC.ECR>) and, secondly, that there is no reason for this Court to order the Commission to produce that report.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>42</NO.P><TXT>Consequently, this ground of challenge must be dismissed.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>3.</NO.P><TXT>Premature judgment and preconceived views</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>43</NO.P><TXT>The applicant contends that the Commission failed in its duties imposed on it by the case-law of the Court of Justice and its own stated views (Judgment of the Court of Justice in Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="86/82" YEAR="1984" PAGE.ECR="883">86/82 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hasselblad (GB) Limited</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> [1984] ECR 883</REF.DOC.ECR>, Opinion at pages 914 and 915, and paragraph 45 of the Commission's <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Fifteenth Report on Competition Policy)</HT> in not approaching the matter with an open mind and in prejudging the issue, although it moderated its position to a certain extent following the submission of ICI's observations and the hearing of ICI. This premature judgment led the Commission to conclude that the infringements were of the <QUOT.START ID="QS0032" REF.END="QE0032" CODE="2018"/>utmost gravity<QUOT.END ID="QE0032" REF.START="QS0032" CODE="2019"/>, to impose such a large fine and, despite the contrary view taken by the hearing officer, to refuse to recognize the existence of intense competition on the market during the period in question and the total lack of effect on the market, particularly on prices, of any arrangement made between the producers. Thus, the Commission showed that it was determined not to have its preconceived views affected by the detailed evidence, studies and experts' reports.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>44</NO.P><TXT>The Commission contends that it cannot be accused of having prejudged the issue since the position taken in the Decision is justified and was reached after taking account of the arguments of the parties. Thus, in the present case, the Commission was convinced by the large body of evidence which cannot be reconciled with the applicant's argument that there was <QUOT.START ID="QS0033" REF.END="QE0033" CODE="2018"/>intense competition<QUOT.END ID="QE0033" REF.START="QS0033" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1047"?><NP><NO.P>45</NO.P><TXT>The Court holds that the question whether the Commission came to a premature judgment based on preconceived ideas is indissociable from the question whether the findings of fact made by the Commission in the Decision are supported by the evidence which it has produced. Since this is a question of substance related to proof of the infringement, it must be examined at a later stage together with the other questions relating to proof of the infringement.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>Proof of the infringement</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>46</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (point 80, first paragraph), from 1977 onwards the polypropylene producers supplying the EEC had been party to a whole complex of schemes, arrangements and measures decided on in the framework of a system of regular meetings and continuous contact. The Decision (point 80, second paragraph) goes on to state that the overall plan of the producers was to meet and reach agreement upon specific matters.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>47</NO.P><TXT>It is therefore necessary to verify first of all whether the Commission has established to the requisite legal standard its findings of fact relating to (A) the floor-price agreement and the meeting of the European Association for Textile Polyolefins (EATP) on <DATE ISO="19771122">22 November 1977</DATE>, (B) the system of regular meetings, (C) the price initiatives, (D) the measures designed to facilitate the implementation of the price initiatives and (E) the fixing of target tonnages and quotas, taking into account (a) the contested decision and (b) the arguments of the parties, before going on to (c) an assessment of them; it will then be necessary to review the application of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty to those facts.</TXT></NP><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>1.</NO.P><TXT>The findings of fact</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>A.</NO.P><TXT>The floor-price agreement and the EATP meeting of <DATE ISO="19771122">22 November 1977</DATE></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(a)</NO.P><TXT>The contested decision</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>48</NO.P><TXT>The Decision (point 16, first, second and third paragraphs; see also point 67, first paragraph) states that during 1977, after seven new polypropylene producers came on stream in western Europe, the established producers initiated discussions with a<?PAGE NO="II-1048"?> view to avoiding a substantial drop in price levels and attendant losses. As part of those discussions the major producers, Monte, Hoechst, ICI and Shell, initiated a <QUOT.START ID="QS0034" REF.END="QE0034" CODE="2018"/>floor-price agreement<QUOT.END ID="QE0034" REF.START="QS0034" CODE="2019"/> which was to be in operation by <DATE ISO="19770801">1 August 1977</DATE>. The original arrangement did not involve volume control but if it proved successful tonnage restrictions were envisaged for 1978. That agreement was to run for an initial period of four months and details of it were communicated to other producers, including Hercules, whose marketing director noted as the basis for floor prices for the major grades for each Member State a raffia grade market price of DM 1.25/kg.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>49</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (point 16, fifth paragraph), ICI and Shell admit that there were contacts with other producers as to how the price slide could be checked. According to ICI, a price level may have been suggested below which prices should not be permitted to fall. It is confirmed by ICI and Shell that discussions were not limited to the <QUOT.START ID="QS0035" REF.END="QE0035" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0035" REF.START="QS0035" CODE="2019"/>. Precise details of the operation of the floor-price agreement could not be ascertained. However, by November 1977, when the raffia price was reported as having fallen to around DM 1.00/kg, Monte announced an increase to DM 1.30/kg due to take effect on 1 December, and on 25 November the trade press quoted the other three majors as expressing their support for the move, with similar increases planned from the same date or later in December.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>50</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (point 17, first and second paragraphs), it was at about this time that the system of regular meetings of the polypropylene producers began, and ICI claims that meetings were not held until December 1977 but has admitted that contact was occurring between producers before that date, probably by telephone and on an <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ad hoc</HT> basis. Shell says that its executives <QUOT.START ID="QS0036" REF.END="QE0036" CODE="2018"/>may have had discussions concerning price with Monte in or about November 1977 and Monte may have suggested the possibility of increasing prices and may have sought (Shell's) views on its reactions to any increase<QUOT.END ID="QE0036" REF.START="QS0036" CODE="2019"/>. In the third paragraph of point 17 of the Decision it is stated that while there is no direct evidence of any group meetings being held to fix prices before December 1977, the producers were already informing meetings of a trade association of customers, the EATP, held in May and November of 1977, of the perceived need for common action to be taken<?PAGE NO="II-1049"?> to improve price levels. In May 1977 Hercules had stressed that the <QUOT.START ID="QS0037" REF.END="QE0037" CODE="2018"/>traditional industry leaders<QUOT.END ID="QE0037" REF.START="QS0037" CODE="2019"/> should take the initiative, while Hoechst had indicated its belief that prices needed to rise by 30 to 40%.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>51</NO.P><TXT>It is in that context that the complaint is made against the applicant (Decision, point 17, fourth paragraph; point 78, third paragraph; and point 104, second paragraph) that, like Hercules, Hoechst, Linz, Rhône-Poulenc, Saga and Solvay, it stated that it would be supporting the announcement made by Monte in an article appearing in the trade press <HT TYPE="ITALIC">(European Chemical News,</HT> hereinafter referred to as <QUOT.START ID="QS0038" REF.END="QE0038" CODE="2018"/>ECN<QUOT.END ID="QE0038" REF.START="QS0038" CODE="2019"/>) on <DATE ISO="19771118">18 November 1977</DATE> of its intention to raise the price of raffia to Dm 1.30/kg as from 1 December. The various statements made in this regard at the EATP meeting held on <DATE ISO="19771122">22 November 1977</DATE>, as recorded in the minutes, show that the DM 1.30/kg level set by Monte had been accepted by the other producers as a general industry <QUOT.START ID="QS0039" REF.END="QE0039" CODE="2018"/>target<QUOT.END ID="QE0039" REF.START="QS0039" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(b)</NO.P><TXT>Arguments of the parties</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>52</NO.P><TXT>The applicant maintains that although producers did have contacts by telephone during 1977, they did not result in a real agreement since if that had been the case the parties would have attempted to implement it. In this case, however, those contacts had no effect on the market since the floor price was not reached. The document on which the Commission relies in this regard, namely a handwritten note made by Hercules's marketing director (main statement of objections, Appendix 2) is ambiguous.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>53</NO.P><TXT>It also points out that the EATP meetings could not in any way have formed the framework for the implementation of that agreement, since those meetings took place at the request of industrial customers who wished to be informed in particular about foreseeable price moves, and it is therefore absurd to regard them as a forum for enabling the producers to present a united front to their customers.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1050"?><NP><NO.P>54</NO.P><TXT>The Commission states that its finding that a floor-price agreement had been made among the <QUOT.START ID="QS0040" REF.END="QE0040" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0040" REF.START="QS0040" CODE="2019"/> as early as 1977 is based on a handwritten note of Hercules's marketing director. The existence of that agreement is borne out by several documents and items of evidence: first, by Shell's and ICI's replies to the statement of objections, in which they admitted that the producers were in contact with another in order to decide how to stop the price slide and, in ICI's case, that minimum price levels <QUOT.START ID="QS0041" REF.END="QE0041" CODE="2018"/>may have been suggested<QUOT.END ID="QE0041" REF.START="QS0041" CODE="2019"/>; secondly, by Monte's announcement in ECN of an increase in prices bringing them to a level close to the floor price (main statement of objections, Appendix 3); and, thirdly, by the support simultaneously given to that price increase by the three other <QUOT.START ID="QS0042" REF.END="QE0042" CODE="2018"/>majors<QUOT.END ID="QE0042" REF.START="QS0042" CODE="2019"/> and six other producers at the EATP meeting on <DATE ISO="19771122">22 November 1977</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 6).</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(c)</NO.P><TXT>Assessment by the Court</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>55</NO.P><TXT>The question is, first, whether the applicant supported the floor-price agreement which the Commission alleges was made in mid-1977 and, secondly, whether the applicant participated in the fixing of a target price of DM 1.30/kg for <DATE ISO="19771201">1 December 1977</DATE>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>56</NO.P><TXT>As regards the first question, the Court notes that in its reply to the statement of objections the applicant admitted that in mid-1977</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0043" REF.END="QE0043" CODE="2018"/>the producers were faced with the inevitable prospect of heavy losses. In the light of this, producers may well have made contact with each other to see what could be done to halt the slide in prices and suggested a price level below which prices should not be allowed to fall if the burden of losses was to be stemmed. This would almost certainly have been done by telephone discussions between producers since there were not then in existence the various meetings of producers of the kind that started at the end of 1977 ... <QUOT.END ID="QE0043" REF.START="QS0043" CODE="2019"/>.</P></QUOT.S></P><?PAGE NO="II-1051"?><P>The Court also notes that the applicant denies that those discussions resulted in an agreement confined to the <QUOT.START ID="QS0044" REF.END="QE0044" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0044" REF.START="QS0044" CODE="2019"/>:</P><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0045" REF.END="QE0045" CODE="2018"/>the ICI employees are certain that there was no agreement or arrangement between the four named producers in mid-1977 to the exclusion of the other producers. If there had been discussions on <QUOT.START ID="QS0046" REF.END="QE0046" CODE="201C"/>floor prices<QUOT.END ID="QE0046" REF.START="QS0046" CODE="201D"/> at that time as the note [of Hercules] appears to suggest then it is most unlikely that any such discussions would have been confined only to the four main producers but would have also included most of the polypropylene producers<QUOT.END ID="QE0045" REF.START="QS0045" CODE="2019"/>.</P></QUOT.S></P></NP><NP><NO.P>57</NO.P><TXT>It is in the light of those circumstances that the note written by Hercules' marketing director (main statement of objections, Appendix 2), in which the Commission sees the expression of a common purpose between the <QUOT.START ID="QS0047" REF.END="QE0047" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0047" REF.START="QS0047" CODE="2019"/>, must be examined. That note reads as follows:</TXT><?PAGE NO="II-1052"?><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0048" REF.END="QE0048" CODE="2018"/>Major producers have made agreement (Mont., Hoechst, Shell, ICI) 1. No tonnage control; 2. System floor prices — DOM less for importers; 3. Floor prices from July 1. definitely Aug. 1st when present contracts expire; 4. Importers restrict to 20% for 1000 tonnes; 5. Floor prices for 4 month period only — alternative is for existing; 6. Com.[panies] to meet Oct. to review progress; 7. Subject [of the] scheme working — Tonnage restrictions would operate next year.<QUOT.END ID="QE0048" REF.START="QS0048" CODE="2019"/> [There then follows a list of prices for three grades of polypropylene in four national currencies, including DM 1.25/kg for raffia.]</P></NP><NP><NO.P>58</NO.P><TXT>Given that the applicant does not specifically deny that an agreement on floor prices was made but only that the agreement was confined to the <QUOT.START ID="QS0049" REF.END="QE0049" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0049" REF.START="QS0049" CODE="2019"/>, that it adduces no evidence to shake the conclusions which the Commission draws from the note of Hercules's marketing director and that it admits that at that time the producers were discussing price levels below which prices should not fall, the Court finds that a common purpose emerged between a number of producers, including the applicant, concerning the fixing of floor prices, without there being any need to establish whether producers other than the <QUOT.START ID="QS0050" REF.END="QE0050" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0050" REF.START="QS0050" CODE="2019"/> agreed to those prices.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>59</NO.P><TXT>The fact that the agreed floor prices could not be achieved does not tell against the applicant's agreement to those prices since the Court considers that, even if that fact is assumed to be established, it would at the most tend to show that the floor prices were not implemented. However, far from asserting that the floor prices were achieved, the Decision (point 16, last paragraph) states that the price of raffia had fallen to around DM 1.00/kg in November 1977.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>60</NO.P><TXT>The second question to be considered is whether, in the light of the contacts between certain producers during 1977 and the fixing of floor prices by some of them, the statements made by the applicant and other producers at the EATP meeting on <DATE ISO="19771122">22 November 1977</DATE> constitute the expression of a common purpose between them concerning a target price of DM 1.30/kg for <DATE ISO="19771201">1 December 1977</DATE>.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1053"?><NP><NO.P>61</NO.P><TXT>The Court considers that this is indeed so. At the EATP meeting on <DATE ISO="19770527">27 May 1977</DATE>, the applicant stated, after Hercules had suggested that the traditional industry <QUOT.START ID="QS0051" REF.END="QE0051" CODE="2018"/>leaders<QUOT.END ID="QE0051" REF.START="QS0051" CODE="2019"/> should bring some order out of the chaos on the market, that ICI <QUOT.START ID="QS0052" REF.END="QE0052" CODE="2018"/>would give every support to such a move providing through all this that they could see a reasonable return for themselves in the future<QUOT.END ID="QE0052" REF.START="QS0052" CODE="2019"/> (main statement of objections, Appendix 5); in mid-1977, a floor price of DM 1.25/kg was fixed by at least the <QUOT.START ID="QS0053" REF.END="QE0053" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0053" REF.START="QS0053" CODE="2019"/> and Hercules was informed about it; at the EATP meeting on <DATE ISO="19771122">22 November 1977</DATE>, the applicant stated that:</TXT><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0054" REF.END="QE0054" CODE="2018"/>We will seek every opportunity to increase our polymer prices and do earnestly request your support in this. The announcement by MONTEDISON last Friday in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">European Chemical News</HT> shows that there is an upward movement in prices already and we support MONTEDISON in this. I do not have specific details of what we propose but we will be informing our customers veiy shortly. Our aim longer term is for DM 1, 60 per kilo<QUOT.END ID="QE0054" REF.START="QS0054" CODE="2019"/> (main statement of objections, Appendix 6).</P><P>At the meeting on <DATE ISO="19780526">26 May 1978</DATE>, the producers reviewed the results of the preceding meeting and the applicant stated:</P><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0055" REF.END="QE0055" CODE="2018"/>ICI is very disappointed that the price levels and stability discussed in Paris [on <DATE ISO="19771122">22 November 1977</DATE>] have not been achieved, because I think they would have been beneficial to the industry as a whole<QUOT.END ID="QE0055" REF.START="QS0055" CODE="2019"/>(main statement of objections, Appendix 7)</P></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1054"?><NP><NO.P>62</NO.P><TXT>The organized attendance of customers at the various EATP meetings does not weaken the foregoing findings, since the purpose of the statements made at them was to convince customers of the need to see prices rising and of the inevitability of the increases announced.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>63</NO.P><TXT>It follows that the Commission has established to the requisite legal standard, first, that the applicant was one of the producers which arrived at a common purpose concerning floor prices in mid-1977 and, secondly, that in furtherance of that purpose it made statements at the EATP meeting on <DATE ISO="19771122">22 November 1977</DATE> which also constituted the expression of a common purpose between the applicant and other producers regarding the fixing of a target price of DM 1.30/kg for <DATE ISO="19771201">1 December 1977</DATE>.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>B.</NO.P><TXT>The system of regular meetings</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(a)</NO.P><TXT>The contested decision</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>64</NO.P><TXT>The Decision (point 17) states that the system of regular meetings of polypropylene producers began at about the end of November 1977. It goes on to state that ICI claims that meetings were not held until December 1977 (that is to say, after Monte's announcement) but admitted that contact was occurring between producers before that date.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>65</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (point 18, first paragraph), at least six meetings were held during 1978 between senior managers responsible for the overall direction of the polypropylene business of some of the producers (<QUOT.START ID="QS0056" REF.END="QE0056" CODE="2018"/>bosses<QUOT.END ID="QE0056" REF.START="QS0056" CODE="2019"/>). This system soon evolved to include a lower tier of meetings attended by managers possessing more detailed marketing knowledge (<QUOT.START ID="QS0057" REF.END="QE0057" CODE="2018"/>experts<QUOT.END ID="QE0057" REF.START="QS0057" CODE="2019"/>) (ICI's reply to the request for information under Article 11 of Regulation No 17, main statement of objections, Appendix 8). The Decision asserts that the applicant was a regular participant at those meetings until September 1983 and that it took over the chairmanship of them from the middle of 1982, a responsibility which it accepted on condition that more determined efforts were made by the producers to increase prices before the end of the year (point 18, third paragraph, and point 19, second paragraph).</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1055"?><NP><NO.P>66</NO.P><TXT>In point 21 the Decision states that the purposes of these regular meetings were, in particular, the setting of target prices and sales volumes and the monitoring of their observance by the producers.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>67</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (point 68, second and third paragraphs), at the end of 1982 the <QUOT.START ID="QS0058" REF.END="QE0058" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0058" REF.START="QS0058" CODE="2019"/> began to meet in restricted session the day before each bosses' meeting. These so-called <QUOT.START ID="QS0059" REF.END="QE0059" CODE="2018"/>pre-meetings<QUOT.END ID="QE0059" REF.START="QS0059" CODE="2019"/> provided a forum in which the four major producers could agree a position between themselves prior to the full meeting in order to encourage moves towards price stability by adopting a united approach. ICI admitted that the topics discussed in pre-meetings were the same as those dealt with by the bosses' meetings which followed, but Shell denied that the <QUOT.START ID="QS0060" REF.END="QE0060" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0060" REF.START="QS0060" CODE="2019"/> meetings were in any sense preparatory to a plenary meeting or involved coordination on a common stance before the next meeting. The Decision states, however, that the records of some of those meetings (in October 1982 and May 1983) disprove this claim of Shell.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(b)</NO.P><TXT>Arguments of the parties</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>68</NO.P><TXT>The applicant does not deny having participated in the meetings which the Commission alleges took place but considers that the Commission exaggerates their importance. It states that the meetings were few in number and irregular and that the evidentiary value of the notes of the meetings is questionable because the notes were supplemented after the meetings by personal remarks and comparisons.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>69</NO.P><TXT>As regards the purpose of the meetings, it emphasizes that the meetings rarely ended in real agreement and that, in any event, the commitment necessary to implement such an agreement was lacking. Furthermore, the agreements were not systematic and the initiatives regarding prices and sales volumes were haphazard. Finally, the applicant points out that the discussions were also concerned with matters other than exchanges of views on prices and volumes, such as the analysis of the market through the Fides data exchange system, which the Commission does not mention.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1056"?><NP><NO.P>70</NO.P><TXT>The applicant maintains that the Commission overestimates the role which it played in assuming the chairmanship of those meetings after mid-1982 since its apparently active role was only a purely administrative function involving no particular responsibility. It further contends that the Commission likewise exaggerates the importance of some meetings between the <QUOT.START ID="QS0061" REF.END="QE0061" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0061" REF.START="QS0061" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>71</NO.P><TXT>The Commission states that ICI's participation in the meetings of the cartel is clear from its reply to the request for information (main statement of objections, Appendix 8), which sets out in Annex 1 all the <QUOT.START ID="QS0062" REF.END="QE0062" CODE="2018"/>bosses<QUOT.END ID="QE0062" REF.START="QS0062" CODE="201D"/> and <QUOT.START ID="QS0063" REF.END="QE0063" CODE="2018"/>experts<QUOT.END ID="QE0063" REF.START="QS0063" CODE="201D"/> meetings which ICI attended (in total 54 meetings were held between January 1980 and September 1983). To those meetings it adds the meeting of <DATE ISO="19790926">26</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19790927">27 September 1979</DATE> in which ICI admits, in the body of its reply, having participated and a meeting of <DATE ISO="19820310">10 March 1982</DATE> for which the Commission has a note written by Hercules (main statement of objections, Appendix 23) and claims to have a note written by ICI.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>72</NO.P><TXT>It states that the notes of the meetings which were held from <DATE ISO="19820513">13 May</DATE> to <DATE ISO="19821202">2 December 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendices 24 to 26 and 28 to 33) show that the meetings were a standing forum for communication and agreement among the producers, that they were organized well in advance, that the producers had to abide by the measures which had been agreed and that they were conducted as an ongoing system.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>73</NO.P><TXT>It asserts that the notes of the meetings of <DATE ISO="19820820">20 August</DATE>, <DATE ISO="19821006">6 October</DATE>, <DATE ISO="19821102">2 November</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19821221">21 December 1982</DATE> and an internal ICI note (main statement of objections, Appendices 28, 31, 32, 34 and 35) prove the leading played by ICI during those meetings and in the cartel.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>74</NO.P><TXT>Referring to points 67 and 68 of the Decision, the Commission considers that, as a member of the <QUOT.START ID="QS0064" REF.END="QE0064" CODE="2018"/>club<QUOT.END ID="QE0064" REF.START="QS0064" CODE="2019"/> of the <QUOT.START ID="QS0065" REF.END="QE0065" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0065" REF.START="QS0065" CODE="2019"/>, ICI bears particular responsibility in the infringements committed. Its role in that capacity is clear from numerous documents (main statement of objections, Appendices 8, 9, 19, 64, 87, 94 to 100) which mostly report the discussions between the <QUOT.START ID="QS0066" REF.END="QE0066" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0066" REF.START="QS0066" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="II-1057"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(c)</NO.P><TXT>Assessment by the Court</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>75</NO.P><TXT>The Court notes that the applicant does not deny having participated in the meetings which the Commission, in the Decision, alleges were held. However, the applicant denies the significance and purpose of those meetings.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>76</NO.P><TXT>In this regard, the Court considers that the Commission was fully entitled to take the view, based on the information which was provided by the applicant in its reply to the request for information (main statement of objections, Appendix 8) and was borne out by numerous meeting notes (see the main statement of objections, Appendices 12, 17 and 23 to 34), that the purpose of the meetings was, in particular, to fix target prices and sales volumes. Indeed, that reply contains the following passages:</TXT><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0067" REF.END="QE0067" CODE="2018"/>Generally speaking however, the concept of recommending <QUOT.START ID="QS0068" REF.END="QE0068" CODE="201C"/>Target Prices<QUOT.END ID="QE0068" REF.START="QS0068" CODE="201D"/> was developed during the early meetings which took place in 1978<QUOT.END ID="QE0067" REF.START="QS0067" CODE="2019"/>; <QUOT.START ID="QS0069" REF.END="QE0069" CODE="2018"/><QUOT.START ID="QS0070" REF.END="QE0070" CODE="201C"/>Target prices<QUOT.END ID="QE0070" REF.START="QS0070" CODE="201D"/> for the basic grade of each principal category of polypropylene as proposed by producers from time to time since <DATE ISO="19790101">1 January 1979</DATE> are set forth in Schedule ... <QUOT.END ID="QE0069" REF.START="QS0069" CODE="2019"/>;</P><?PAGE NO="II-1058"?><P>and</P><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0071" REF.END="QE0071" CODE="2018"/>A number of proposals for the volume of individual producers were discussed at meetings.<QUOT.END ID="QE0071" REF.START="QS0071" CODE="2019"/></P></QUOT.S></P></NP><NP><NO.P>77</NO.P><TXT>As far as the evidentiary value of the meeting notes with regard to their purpose is concerned, it must be observed that the contents of those notes are confirmed by various documents, such as a number of tables relating to the sales volumes of the various producers — of which some were found on the applicant's premises — and price instructions broadly corresponding in their amount and date of entry into force to the target prices mentioned in those meeting notes. Similarly, the replies of the various producers to the requests for information addressed to them by the Commission bear out in the aggregate the contents of those notes.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>78</NO.P><TXT>Consequently, the Commission was able to take the view that the meeting notes found at the premises of ICI reflected fairly objectively what went on at those meetings which were chaired by different members of Id's staff, which increased the need for them properly to inform those members of ICI staff who did not attend particular meetings about what had transpired at them by making notes of them.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>79</NO.P><TXT>As regards the addition to the notes of remarks and comparisons for the author's own use, it must be observed that those additions, if assumed to be proved, were necessarily made in continuation of the meetings and did not change the meaning of the notes. In particular, the comparisons made in some meeting notes, such as those reporting on meetings held from September to November 1982 (main statement of objections, Appendices 30 to 32), must, if they were added afterwards, have been based on figures provided by the other producers either during the meetings themselves or on the fringe of the meetings.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>80</NO.P><TXT>In addition, in explaining the organization of marketing <QUOT.START ID="QS0072" REF.END="QE0072" CODE="2018"/>experts<QUOT.END ID="QE0072" REF.START="QS0072" CODE="201D"/> meetings as well as <QUOT.START ID="QS0073" REF.END="QE0073" CODE="2018"/>bosses<QUOT.END ID="QE0073" REF.START="QS0073" CODE="201D"/> meetings from the end of 1978 or the beginning of 1979, ICI's reply to<?PAGE NO="II-1059"?> the request for information reveals that the discussions about the fixing of target prices and sales volumes became increasingly concrete and precise, whereas in 1978 the <QUOT.START ID="QS0074" REF.END="QE0074" CODE="2018"/>bosses<QUOT.END ID="QE0074" REF.START="QS0074" CODE="2019"/> had confined themselves to developing the actual concept of target prices.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>81</NO.P><TXT>Besides the passages set forth above, the following statement appears in ICI's reply to the request for information: <QUOT.START ID="QS0075" REF.END="QE0075" CODE="2018"/>Only <QUOT.START ID="QS0076" REF.END="QE0076" CODE="201C"/>Bosses<QUOT.END ID="QE0076" REF.START="QS0076" CODE="201D"/> and <QUOT.START ID="QS0077" REF.END="QE0077" CODE="201C"/>Experts<QUOT.END ID="QE0077" REF.START="QS0077" CODE="201D"/> meetings came to be held on a monthly basis<QUOT.END ID="QE0075" REF.START="QS0075" CODE="2019"/>. The Commission was fully entitled to deduce from that reply, as well as from the identical nature and purpose of the meetings, that they were part of a system of regular meetings.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>82</NO.P><TXT>The particular role played by the applicant in the meetings as from August 1982 is apparent first of all from the note of the first meeting held under its chairmanship (main statement of objections, Appendix 28), which reads as follows:</TXT><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0078" REF.END="QE0078" CODE="2018"/>This was the first bosses&#x2019; meeting under the new arrangements. It was stressed that acceptance of responsibility for leading the group was conditional on seeing real progress on prices before the end of the year. The ground rules were:</P><P><LIST TYPE="alpha"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(a)</NO.P><TXT>Apart from the well known exceptions all companies should participate.</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(b)</NO.P><TXT>The level of participation had to be right i. e. individuals had to be capable of committing their companies.</TXT></NP></ITEM><?PAGE NO="II-1060"?><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(c)</NO.P><TXT>Companies had to give the highest priority to making progress by making available the right amount of effort/time.</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(d)</NO.P><TXT>Accept + agree a control system on market shares to be ready for use by the beginning of 1983.</TXT><P>In order to overcome the current lack of trust and confidence it was stressed that companies should only commit themselves when they knew they could deliver. If after agreeing to a particular course of action a company found the consequences too onerous they should at least wait to the next meeting/call for an extraordinary meeting before abandoning the planned action.<QUOT.END ID="QE0078" REF.START="QS0078" CODE="2019"/></P></NP></ITEM></LIST></P></NP><NP><NO.P>83</NO.P><TXT>As chairman of the meetings, the applicant took numerous initiatives, particularly concerning the fixing of sales volume targets. This was the case in particular in December 1982 when the applicant entered into bilateral discussions with various producers (main statement of objections, Appendices 74 to 84) with a view to fixing quotas for 1983 and on that basis produced a synthesis (main statement of<?PAGE NO="II-1061"?> objections, Appendices 85 to 87) and proposed quota schemes (main statement of objections, Appendices 70 and 84).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>84</NO.P><TXT>As regards the particular role played by the <QUOT.START ID="QS0079" REF.END="QE0079" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0079" REF.START="QS0079" CODE="2019"/> in the system of meetings, it must be noted that ICI does not deny that meetings between the <QUOT.START ID="QS0080" REF.END="QE0080" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0080" REF.START="QS0080" CODE="2019"/> took place on <DATE ISO="19810615">15 June 1981</DATE> in the absence of Hoechst, on <DATE ISO="19821013">13 October</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19821220">20 December 1982</DATE>, and on <DATE ISO="19830112">12 January</DATE>, <DATE ISO="19830215">15 February</DATE>, <DATE ISO="19830413">13 April</DATE>, <DATE ISO="19830519">19 May</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19830822">22 August 1983</DATE> (Decision, Table 5, and main statement of objections, Appendix 64).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>85</NO.P><TXT>After December 1982, those meetings of the <QUOT.START ID="QS0081" REF.END="QE0081" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0081" REF.START="QS0081" CODE="2019"/> took place the day before the <QUOT.START ID="QS0082" REF.END="QE0082" CODE="2018"/>bosses<QUOT.END ID="QE0082" REF.START="QS0082" CODE="201D"/> meetings, and their purpose was to determine the steps which they could take together in order to bring about a rise in prices, as is shown by the summary note prepared by an ICI employee in order to inform one of his colleagues about what had transpired at a pre-meeting on <DATE ISO="19830519">19 May 1983</DATE> which the <QUOT.START ID="QS0083" REF.END="QE0083" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0083" REF.START="QS0083" CODE="2019"/> had attended (main statement of objections, Appendix 101). That note mentions a proposal to be submitted to the <QUOT.START ID="QS0084" REF.END="QE0084" CODE="2018"/>bosses<QUOT.END ID="QE0084" REF.START="QS0084" CODE="201D"/> meeting on 20 May. With regard to that note, ICI states in its reply to the request for information:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0085" REF.END="QE0085" CODE="2018"/>A meeting of the <QUOT.START ID="QS0086" REF.END="QE0086" CODE="201C"/>Big Four<QUOT.END ID="QE0086" REF.START="QS0086" CODE="201D"/> which had taken place on <DATE ISO="19830519">19 May 1983</DATE> immediately prior to a <QUOT.START ID="QS0087" REF.END="QE0087" CODE="201C"/>Bosses<QUOT.END ID="QE0087" REF.START="QS0087" CODE="201D"/> meeting held on 20 May. The <QUOT.START ID="QS0088" REF.END="QE0088" CODE="201C"/>Big Four Pre-meeting<QUOT.END ID="QE0088" REF.START="QS0088" CODE="201D"/> took place in Barcelona. [... ] the outcome of the meeting was a proposal for a <QUOT.START ID="QS0089" REF.END="QE0089" CODE="201C"/>Target Price<QUOT.END ID="QE0089" REF.START="QS0089" CODE="201D"/> for raffia of DM 1.85/kg with effect from <DATE ISO="19830701">1 July 1983</DATE>.<QUOT.END ID="QE0085" REF.START="QS0085" CODE="2019"/></P></QUOT.S></P><?PAGE NO="II-1062"?><P>It is also to be observed that the note of the <QUOT.START ID="QS0090" REF.END="QE0090" CODE="2018"/>experts<QUOT.END ID="QE0090" REF.START="QS0090" CODE="201D"/> meeting on <DATE ISO="19830601">1 June 1983</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 40) states:</P><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0091" REF.END="QE0091" CODE="2018"/>those present reaffirmed complete commitment to the 1.85 move to be achieved by 1 July. Shell was reported to have committed themselves to the move and would lead publicly in ECN<QUOT.END ID="QE0091" REF.START="QS0091" CODE="2019"/>.</P></QUOT.S></P><P>In the aforementioned summary note it is stated: <QUOT.START ID="QS0092" REF.END="QE0092" CODE="2018"/>Shell to lead — ECN article 2 weeks. ICI informed<QUOT.END ID="QE0092" REF.START="QS0092" CODE="2019"/>.</P></NP><NP><NO.P>86</NO.P><TXT>It follows that the Commission has established to the requisite legal standard that the applicant participated in all the regular meetings of polypropylene producers which the Commission alleges were held between December 1977 and September 1983, that the purpose of those meetings was, in particular, to set price and sales volume targets, that the applicant chaired those meetings from August 1982 and that those meetings were part of a system.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>C.</NO.P><TXT>The price initiatives</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(a)</NO.P><TXT>The contested decision</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>87</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (points 28 to 51), a system for fixing price targets was implemented through price initiatives of which six could be identified, the first lasting from July to December 1979, the second from January to May 1981, the third from August to December 1981, the fourth from June to July 1982, the fifth from September to November 1982 and the sixth from July to November 1983.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1063"?><NP><NO.P>88</NO.P><TXT>With regard to the first of those price initiatives, the Commission (Decision, point 29) states that it has no detailed evidence of any meetings held or price initiatives undertaken in the first part of 1979. However, a note of a meeting held on <DATE ISO="19790926">26</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19790927">27 September 1979</DATE> shows that a price initiative had been planned based on a raffia grade price of DM 1.90/kg applicable from 1 July and DM 2.05/kg from 1 September. The Commission has price instructions from certain producers, including ICI, showing that those producers had given orders to their sales offices to apply this price level or its equivalent in national currencies from 1 September, in most cases before the planned price increase was announced in the trade press (Decision, point 30).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>89</NO.P><TXT>However, since it was difficult to get further price increases, the producers decided at the meeting held on <DATE ISO="19790926">26</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19790927">27 September 1979</DATE> to postpone the date for implementing the target by several months until <DATE ISO="19791201">1 December 1979</DATE>, the new plan being to <QUOT.START ID="QS0093" REF.END="QE0093" CODE="2018"/>hold<QUOT.END ID="QE0093" REF.START="QS0093" CODE="2019"/> the existing levels over October with the possibility of an immediate step increase to 1.90 or DM 1.95/kg in November (Decision, point 31, first and second paragraphs).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>90</NO.P><TXT>As regards the second price initiative, the Commission, whilst admitting (in point 32 of the Decision) that no meeting notes were found for 1980, states that at least seven producers' meetings were held in that year (reference is made to Table 3 of the Decision). Although at the beginning of the year producers were reported in the trade press as favouring a strong price push during 1980, a substantial fall occurred in market prices to a level of DM 1.20/kg or less before they began to stabilize in about September of that year. Price instructions issued by a number of producers — DSM, Hoechst, Linz, Monte, Saga and ICI — indicated that in order to reestablish price levels targets were set for December 1980—January 1981 based on raffia at DM 1.50/kg, homopolymer at DM 1.70/kg and copolymer DM 1.95 to 2.00/kg. A Solvay internal document includes a table comparing <QUOT.START ID="QS0094" REF.END="QE0094" CODE="2018"/>achieved prices<QUOT.END ID="QE0094" REF.START="QS0094" CODE="2019"/> for October and November 1980 with what are referred to as <QUOT.START ID="QS0095" REF.END="QE0095" CODE="2018"/>list prices<QUOT.END ID="QE0095" REF.START="QS0095" CODE="2019"/> for January 1981 of DM 1.50/1.70/2.00. The original plan was to apply these levels from <DATE ISO="19801201">1 December 1980</DATE> (a meeting was held in Zurich on 13 to 15 October) but this initiative was postponed to <DATE ISO="19810101">1 January 1981</DATE>.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1064"?><NP><NO.P>91</NO.P><TXT>The Decision (point 33) then refers to ICI's participation in two meetings in January 1981, at which it was decided that a price increase, fixed in December 1980 for <DATE ISO="19810201">1 February 1981</DATE>, was required in two stages on the basis of DM 1.75/kg for raffia: the 1 February target was to remain at DM 1.75/kg and a target of DM 2.00/kg was to be introduced <QUOT.START ID="QS0096" REF.END="QE0096" CODE="2018"/>without exception<QUOT.END ID="QE0096" REF.START="QS0096" CODE="2019"/> from 1 March. A table was drawn up in six national currencies of the target prices for six principal grades, to come into effect on <DATE ISO="19810201">1 February</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19810301">1 March 1981</DATE>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>92</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (point 34), the plan to move to DM 2.00/kg on 1 March not, however, appear to have succeeded. The producers modified thenexpectations and now hoped to reach the DM 1.75/kg level by March. An experts' meeting, of which no record survives, was held in Amsterdam on <DATE ISO="19810325">25 March 1981</DATE> but immediately afterwards at least BASF, DSM, ICI, Monte and Shell gave instructions to raise target (or <QUOT.START ID="QS0097" REF.END="QE0097" CODE="2018"/>list<QUOT.END ID="QE0097" REF.START="QS0097" CODE="2019"/>) prices to the equivalent of DM 2.15/kg for raffia, effective on 1 May. Hoechst gave identical instructions for 1 May but was some four weeks behind the others in doing so. Some of the producers allowed their sales offices flexibility to apply <QUOT.START ID="QS0098" REF.END="QE0098" CODE="2018"/>minimum<QUOT.END ID="QE0098" REF.START="QS0098" CODE="2019"/> or <QUOT.START ID="QS0099" REF.END="QE0099" CODE="2018"/>rock bottom<QUOT.END ID="QE0099" REF.START="QS0099" CODE="2019"/> prices somewhat below the agreed targets. During the first part of 1981 there was a strong upward movement in prices, but despite the fact that the 1 May increase was strongly promoted by the producers momentum was not maintained. By midyear the producers anticipated either a stabilizing of price levels or even some downward movement as demand fell during the summer.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>93</NO.P><TXT>As regards the third price initiative, the Decision (point 35) states that Shell and ICI had already foreseen a further price initiative in September/October 1981 in June of that year when the slowing down of the first-quarter price rise had become apparent. Shell, ICI and Monte met on <DATE ISO="19810615">15 June 1981</DATE> to discuss methods of implementing higher prices in the market. Within a few days of this meeting both ICI and Shell instructed their sales offices to prepare the market place for a major rise in September based on a plan to move the raffia price to DM 2.30/kg. Solvay also reminded its Benelux sales office on <DATE ISO="19810717">17 July 1981</DATE> to warn customers of a substantial price increase due to take effect on 1 September, the exact amount of which was to be decided in the last week of July, when an experts' meeting was planned for <DATE ISO="19810728">28 July 1981</DATE>. The original plan to go for DM 2.30/kg in September 1981 was revised, probably at this meeting, with the planned level for August back<?PAGE NO="II-1065"?> to DM 2.00/kg for raffia. The September price was to be DM 2.20/kg. A handwritten note obtained at the premises of Hercules and dated <DATE ISO="19810729">29 July 1981</DATE> (the day after the meeting, which Hercules probably did not attend) lists these prices as the Official' prices for August and September and refers in cryptic terms to the source of the information. More meetings were held in Geneva on 4 August and in Vienna on <DATE ISO="19810821">21 August 1981</DATE>. Following these sessions, new instructions were given by producers to go for a price of DM 2.30/kg on 1 October. BASF, DSM, Hoechst, ICI, Monte and Shell gave virtually identical price instructions to implement these prices in September and October.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>94</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (point 36), the plan now was to move during September and October 1981 to a <QUOT.START ID="QS0100" REF.END="QE0100" CODE="2018"/>base price<QUOT.END ID="QE0100" REF.START="QS0100" CODE="2019"/> level of 2.20 to DM 2.30/kg for raffia. A Shell document indicates that originally a further step increase to DM 2.50/kg on 1 November had been mooted but was abandoned. Reports from the various producers showed that during September prices increased and the initiative continued into October 1981 reaching achieved market prices of some DM 2.00 to 2.10/kg for raffia. A Hercules note shows that during December 1981 the target of DM 2.30/kg was revised downwards to a more realistic DM 2.15/kg, but reports that <QUOT.START ID="QS0101" REF.END="QE0101" CODE="2018"/>general determination got prices up to DM 2.05, the closest ever to published (sic) target prices<QUOT.END ID="QE0101" REF.START="QS0101" CODE="2019"/>. By the end of 1981, the trade press was reporting polypropylene market prices as raffia DM 1.95 to 2.10/kg, some 20 pfennig below the producers' targets. Capacity utilization was said to be running at a <QUOT.START ID="QS0102" REF.END="QE0102" CODE="2018"/>healthy<QUOT.END ID="QE0102" REF.START="QS0102" CODE="2019"/>80%.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>95</NO.P><TXT>The fourth price initiative of June to July 1982 took place as supply and demand returned into balance on the market. That initiative was decided upon at the producers' meeting of <DATE ISO="19820513">13 May 1982</DATE> at which ICI participated and during which a detailed table of price targets for 1 June was drawn up for various grades of polypropylene in various national currencies (DM 2.00/kg for raffia) (Decision, points 37, 38 and 39, first paragraph).</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1066"?><NP><NO.P>96</NO.P><TXT>The meeting of <DATE ISO="19820513">13 May 1982</DATE> was followed by price instructions from ATO, BASF, Hoechst, Hercules, Hüls, ICI, Linz, Monte and Shell, corresponding, with a few insignificant exceptions, to the target prices set at the meeting (Decision, point 39, second paragraph). At the meeting on <DATE ISO="19820609">9 June 1982</DATE>, the producers were able to announce only modest increases.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>97</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (paragraph 40), the applicant also participated in the fifth price initiative of September-November 1982 decided upon at the meeting on <DATE ISO="19820720">20</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19820721">21 July 1982</DATE>, the aim of which was to achieve a price of DM 2.00/kg by 1 September and DM 2.10/kg by 1 October.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>98</NO.P><TXT>It was at the meeting of 20 August that ICI took over the chairmanship of the meetings from Monte and this was the occasion on which it was sought to obtain from producers further expressions of <QUOT.START ID="QS0103" REF.END="QE0103" CODE="2018"/>commitment<QUOT.END ID="QE0103" REF.START="QS0103" CODE="2019"/> to a significant increase of prices by the end of the year and agreement to a quota control system to be ready for use by the beginning of 1983. It was with this in view that a senior director from ICI's Petrochemicals and Plastics Division met each of the other producers in a series of visits. Those visits were the subject of a briefing note headed Object of visits' found at the premises of ICI, which sets out a number of questions to be put to the other producers as regards their commitment to the initiative to come into force on 1 September.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>99</NO.P><TXT>Following the meetings of <DATE ISO="19820820">20 August</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19820902">2 September 1982</DATE>, ATO, DSM, Hercules, Hoechst, Hüls, ICI, Linz, Monte and Shell gave price instructions in accordance with the price target set at those meetings (Decision, point 43).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>100</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (point 44), at the meeting on <DATE ISO="19820921">21 September 1982</DATE>, in which the applicant participated, an examination of the measures taken to achieve the target previously set was undertaken and the undertakings expressed general support for a proposal to raise the price to DM 2.10/kg by November-December 1982. That increase was confirmed at the meeting on <DATE ISO="19821006">6 October 1982</DATE>.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1067"?><NP><NO.P>101</NO.P><TXT>Following the meeting on <DATE ISO="19821006">6 October 1982</DATE>, BASF, DSM, Hercules, Hoechst, Hüls, ICI, Linz, Monte, Shell and Saga gave price instructions applying the increase decided upon (Decision, point 44, second paragraph).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>102</NO.P><TXT>Like ATO, BASF, DSM, Hercules, Hoechst, Hüls, Linz, Monte and Saga, the applicant supplied the Commission with price instructions issued to its local sales offices, which corresponded not only with each other in terms of amount and timing but also with the target-price table attached to ICI's account of the <QUOT.START ID="QS0104" REF.END="QE0104" CODE="2018"/>experts<QUOT.END ID="QE0104" REF.START="QS0104" CODE="201D"/> meeting held on <DATE ISO="19820902">2 September 1982</DATE> (Decision, point 45, second paragraph).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>103</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (point 46, second paragraph), the December 1982 meeting resulted in an agreement that the level planned for November-December was to be established by the end of January 1983.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>104</NO.P><TXT>Finally, according to the Decision (point 47), the applicant participated in the sixth price initiative of July-November 1983. At the meeting on <DATE ISO="19830503">3 May 1983</DATE>, it was agreed that the producers would tiy to apply a price target of DM 2.00/kg in June 1983. However, at the meeting on <DATE ISO="19830520">20 May 1983</DATE>, the target previously set was postponed until September and an intermediate target was fixed for 1 July (DM 1.85/kg). Subsequently, at a meeting on <DATE ISO="19830601">1 June 1983</DATE>, the producers present, including ICI, reaffirmed complete commitment to the DM 1.85/kg increase. On that occasion, it was agreed that Shell would lead publicly in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">European Chemical News</HT> (ECN).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>105</NO.P><TXT>The Decision (point 49) states that after the meeting of <DATE ISO="19830520">20 May 1983</DATE>, ICI, DSM, BASF, Hoechst, Linz, Shell, Hercules, ATO, Petrofina and Solvay issued instructions to their sales offices to apply from 1 July a price table based on DM 1.85/kg for raffia. It goes on to state that only fragmented price instructions were obtained from ATO and Petrofina but these confirmed that these producers were implementing the new price levels, somewhat belatedly in the case of Petrofina and Solvay. The Decision concludes that, with the exception of Hüls, for which the<?PAGE NO="II-1068"?> Commission found no price instructions for July 1983, all the producers which had attended the meetings or had promised support for the new price target of DM 1.85/kg are shown to have given instructions to implement the new price.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>106</NO.P><TXT>The Decision (point 50) also points out that further meetings, in which all the regular participants took part, took place on <DATE ISO="19860616">16 June</DATE>, <DATE ISO="19830706">6</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19830721">21 July</DATE>, <DATE ISO="19830810">10</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19830823">23 August</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19830905">5</DATE>, <DATE ISO="19830915">15</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19830929">29 September 1983</DATE>. At the end of July and beginning of August 1983, BASF, DSM, Hercules, Hoechst, Hüls, ICI, Linz, Solvay, Monte and Saga all issued price instructions to their various national sales offices for application from 1 September based on raffia at DM 2.00/kg, whilst a Shell internal note of 11 August, relating to its prices in the United Kingdom, indicated that its United Kingdom subsidiary was <QUOT.START ID="QS0105" REF.END="QE0105" CODE="2018"/>promoting<QUOT.END ID="QE0105" REF.START="QS0105" CODE="2019"/> basic prices to be in force on 1 September corresponding to the targets fixed by the other producers. By the end of the month, however, Shell was instructing the United Kingdom sales office to postpone the full increase until the other producers had established the desired basic level. The Decision states that, with minor exceptions, those instructions were identical by grade and currency.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>107</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (point 50, last paragraph), the instructions obtained from the producers show that it was later decided to maintain the impetus of the September move with further steps based on raffia at DM 2.10/kg on 1 October, rising to DM 2.25/kg on 1 November. It is further stated (point 51, first paragraph) that BASF, Hoechst, Hüls, ICI, Linz, Monte and Solvay each sent instructions to their sales offices setting identical prices for October and November, with Hercules initially fixing slightly lower prices.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>108</NO.P><TXT>The Decision (point 51, third paragraph) states that an internal note obtained at the premises of ATO and dated <DATE ISO="19830928">28 September 1983</DATE> shows a table headed <QUOT.START ID="QS0106" REF.END="QE0106" CODE="2018"/>Rappel du prix de cota (sic)<QUOT.END ID="QE0106" REF.START="QS0106" CODE="2019"/> giving for various countries prices for September and October for the three main grades of polypropylene which are identical to those of BASF, DSM, Hoechst, Hüls, ICI, Linz, Monte and Solvay. During the investigation at the premises of ATO in October 1983 the representatives of the undertaking confirmed that these prices were communicated to sales offices.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1069"?><NP><NO.P>109</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (point 105, fourth paragraph), whatever the date of the last meeting, the infringement lasted until November 1983, since the agreement continued to produce its effects at least until that time, November being the last month for which it is known that target prices were agreed and price instructions issued.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>110</NO.P><TXT>Finally, the Decision (point 51, last paragraph) points out that, according to the trade press, by the end of 1983 polypropylene prices had <QUOT.START ID="QS0107" REF.END="QE0107" CODE="2018"/>firmed<QUOT.END ID="QE0107" REF.START="QS0107" CODE="2019"/> to reach a raffia market price of DM 2.08 to 2.15/kg (compared with the reported target of DM 2.25/kg).</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(b)</NO.P><TXT>Arguments of the parties</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>111</NO.P><TXT>Whilst not disputing its participation in any particular price initiative, the applicant denies a number of contentions made by the Commission in the Decision concerning price instructions, the links between the price initiatives and the system of meetings and the movement in actual prices in relation to the target prices.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>112</NO.P><TXT>As regards the relationship between target prices and price instructions, the applicant considers that the Commission makes an artificial link between the <QUOT.START ID="QS0108" REF.END="QE0108" CODE="2018"/>targets<QUOT.END ID="QE0108" REF.START="QS0108" CODE="2019"/> communicated to sales branches and the target prices which were sometimes determined during producer meetings. The Commission's contentions regarding the uniformity and simultaneity of the price instructions and the representative nature of the periods selected by the Commission to demonstrate that character were not supported by the facts and were disproved by a detailed analysis of the Commission's own tables, which shows that the Commission made selective use of the price instructions and sometimes referred to instructions issued prior to meetings.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>113</NO.P><TXT>In this connection, the applicant complains first of all that the Commission arbitrarily selected four months in the period from January 1982 to September 1983 in order to prove that the price instructions given by ICI matched those given by the other producers. If the 16 months of that period for which price instructions are<?PAGE NO="II-1070"?> available are considered, they correspond for only four months if no account is taken of the discounts given and for only one month if discounts are taken into account.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>114</NO.P><TXT>It likewise denies that the price instructions of the various producers were given simultaneously. It points out that during 1982, for example, several weeks often separated the first price instruction given by a producer and the last instruction (between three and eight weeks). It points out that the same is true for the price instructions given for July and September 1983. Furthermore, in both 1982 and 1983 some price instructions were issued before the meetings at which the target prices which they were supposed to implement had been set according to the Commission. Thus, on <DATE ISO="19820503">3 May 1982</DATE>, two producers (BASF and DSM) gave instructions for the price of raffia to be increased to DM 2.00/kg on <DATE ISO="19820601">1 June 1982</DATE>, that is to say before the meeting held on <DATE ISO="19820513">13 May 1982</DATE> at which that target price was allegedly set. Similarly, five producers gave instructions for the price to be increased to DM 1.85/kg on <DATE ISO="19830701">1 July 1983</DATE>, before the meeting of <DATE ISO="19830601">1 June 1983</DATE> at which that target price was set.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>115</NO.P><TXT>The applicant also disputes that the price instructions given by the various producers were uniform. It points out, for example, that the Commission failed to take account, in its analysis of the price instructions given for June 1982, of differing price instructions given by DSM and Hercules and, for July 1983, of price instructions given by Hercules and Shell. Furthermore, the Commission also failed to take account of the fact that some price instructions corresponding to the price targets were altered at a later stage by fresh instructions which differed from both the price instructions issued by the other producers and the target prices.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>116</NO.P><TXT>The applicant also claims that the Commission arbitrarily selected, from amongst the price instructions used for the purposes of its comparison, sometimes the list price and at other times the minimum price and systematically chose the price which corresponded to the target price. This was the case, it claims, with the price instructions given by Monte and Hercules for July 1983 and with those given by BP for September 1983.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1071"?><NP><NO.P>117</NO.P><TXT>Finally, the applicant points out that the Commission has not taken account of the fact that some price instructions issued by DSM and Hercules left a wide margin of discretion to the sales offices and that ICI's price-fixing system was such that its price instructions were simply indicative and subject to discussion depending on the state of the market.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>118</NO.P><TXT>It also states that, even if the Commission had established a high degree of uniformity between price instructions, it would still face the burden of proving, which it has not done, that this uniformity had its origins in a target-price consensus and not in conscious and normal price parallelism in an oligopolistic market. In any event, the existence of a link between the target prices and the price instructions of producers cannot constitute evidence of implementation and of an effect on the market unless, of course, the existence of a link between the price instructions and the prices obtained is simultaneously established by equally convincing evidence.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>119</NO.P><TXT>As regards the link between the price instructions and the prices obtained, the applicant points out that the price instructions had no effect on the prices obtained on the market, in particular on account of the applicant's internal system of price formation and because they were communicated to customers only rarely. The differences between price instructions and the prices obtained were the result not of discounts but of an independent pricing policy. The Commission, which seems in fact to have admitted the lack of any relationship between the price instructions and the prices obtained (Decision, point 74), ought to have drawn the conclusion that the measures in question had no effect on prices or on competition.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>120</NO.P><TXT>As regards the relationship between target prices and prices achieved, the applicant contends that there was wide variance between the target prices and its own achieved prices, as is shown in particular by an audit carried out by an independent firm of auditors, Coopers &amp; Lybrand (hereinafter referred to as <QUOT.START ID="QS0109" REF.END="QE0109" CODE="2018"/>the Coopers &amp; Lybrand audit<QUOT.END ID="QE0109" REF.START="QS0109" CODE="2019"/>) and an econometric study carried out by Professor Budd. In his study Professor Budd explains in particular that the causal link was the exact converse of the one alleged by the Commission: the <QUOT.START ID="QS0110" REF.END="QE0110" CODE="2018"/>targets<QUOT.END ID="QE0110" REF.START="QS0110" CODE="2019"/> merely confirmed changes in price already found, and had no effect on subsequent price<?PAGE NO="II-1072"?> changes. The Commission naturally contests those explanations, but it does so, in the applicant's view, in a vague and shallow manner which reveals its lack of understanding of economics.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>121</NO.P><TXT>The applicant states that price levels are controlled by a large number of variables and, as regards the period in question, the price movements can be explained satisfactorily by, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">inter alia,</HT> the imbalance between supply and demand, changes in raw material prices and the general economic environment, as is shown by Professor Budd's study and the evidence of Mr Freeman, ICFs chief economist. This was accepted by the Commission (Decision, point 73) but is in contradiction with point 90 of its Decision where it states that the cartel had appreciable effects.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>122</NO.P><TXT>It also states that by selecting certain <QUOT.START ID="QS0111" REF.END="QE0111" CODE="2018"/>initiatives<QUOT.END ID="QE0111" REF.START="QS0111" CODE="2019"/> extending over a period of 26 months (compared with the period of 77 months of the alleged cartel) the Commission is able to ignore those periods in which the disparities between <QUOT.START ID="QS0112" REF.END="QE0112" CODE="2018"/>target<QUOT.END ID="QE0112" REF.START="QS0112" CODE="2019"/> prices and achieved prices are even more obvious.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>123</NO.P><TXT>Finally, the applicant objects to the taking into account of the period subsequent to the last meeting since it brought any infringements to an end as soon as the Commission's investigation began.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>124</NO.P><TXT>The Commission states that the producers were trying to fix actual selling prices and that they did fix target selling prices, even if their efforts were not always fully successful.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>125</NO.P><TXT>The meeting notes (main statement of objections, Appendices 17, 24, 27 to 30, 33 and 38) show, in the Commission's view, that the target prices reflected concrete<?PAGE NO="II-1073"?> agreements reached by the producers and that they were intended and generally expected to be applied, in particular by pressurizing uncooperative producers.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>126</NO.P><TXT>It considers that there was a link between the target prices applied in the form of instructions addressed to sales departments and the target prices discussed at the meetings. The argument that it was a mere coincidence (the price instructions being the result of separate decisions taken by each producer) is not credible and not borne out by the evidence.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>127</NO.P><TXT>In the Commission's view, econometric studies are ineffective in the face of documentary evidence. They may only be used to establish that price parallelism is not attributable to collusion when there is no evidence of collusion, which is not the case here since a large number of notes of producers' meetings exists.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>128</NO.P><TXT>As regards the price initiative of January-May 1981, the Commission points out in particular that the note of the January 1981 meetings (main statement of objections, Appendix 17) proves that price agreements for February and March were made at those meetings since that note states in particular:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0113" REF.END="QE0113" CODE="2018"/>It was generally agreed that a step change in prices was needed and that... the industry should be aiming for a minimum of DM 2.00/kg<QUOT.END ID="QE0113" REF.START="QS0113" CODE="2019"/>.</P></QUOT.S></P><P>That document, it adds, is indicative of the veiy specific character of the decisions taken during the meetings and the determination to apply them, which is itself confirmed by the matching price instructions issued by the various producers<?PAGE NO="II-1074"?> (particular objections, ICI, Appendix 9; main statement of objections, Appendix 19; letter of <DATE ISO="19850329">29 March 1985</DATE>, Appendix C).</P></NP><NP><NO.P>129</NO.P><TXT>Likewise, the Commission considers that ICI's participation in the price initiative of June-July 1982 is proved by the notes of the meetings of <DATE ISO="19820513">13 May 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 24) and <DATE ISO="19820609">9 June 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 25). According to those documents, a target price of DM 2.00/kg for <DATE ISO="19820601">1 June 1982</DATE> was set and implemented by price instructions issued by a number of producers (letter of <DATE ISO="19850329">29 March 1985</DATE>, Appendix F).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>130</NO.P><TXT>According to the Commission, the notes of meetings held between <DATE ISO="19820721">21 July 1982</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19821221">21 December 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendices 26 to 34) prove ICFs participation in the price initiative of September-December 1982, which comprised the setting of a series of target prices and their implementation by matching price instructions from most of the producers (particular statement of objections, ICI, Appendix 12; letter of <DATE ISO="19850329">29 March 1985</DATE>, Appendix G).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>131</NO.P><TXT>It states that ICI's participation in the price initiative of July-November 1983 is clear, first, from the notes of meetings held on <DATE ISO="19830503">3 May 1983</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19830601">1 June 1983</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendices 38 and 40), which indicate that target prices were set for May, June and July 1983, and, secondly, from the price instructions which were issued pursuant to the meetings by most of the producers and related to a period from July to November 1983 (letter of <DATE ISO="19850329">29 March 1985</DATE>, Appendices H and I; main statement of objections, Appendices 42 to 51).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>132</NO.P><TXT>The Commission states that even if it were proved that there was no connection between the price instructions and the prices obtained on the market, that would not alter the infringement, since Article 85 prohibits agreements which have the object of distorting competition, whatever their effect. However, the Commission asserts that the target prices served as a basis for negotiations with customers and that the prices achieved followed a pattern of close parallel movement with target<?PAGE NO="II-1075"?> prices. It recognizes, as it did in the Decision (point 74), that the target prices were not always fully achieved, although the gap between the target prices and the actual prices is exaggerated by the applicant. It argues that proof of infringement of Article 85 by the producers does not depend upon proof that their unlawful behaviour achieved the anticipated result.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>133</NO.P><TXT>It contends that ICI's argument that if there was a link between the target prices and the prices achieved, the link consisted only in the fact that achieved prices influenced target prices and not vice versa is artificial and contrary to common sense. On the contrary, clear contemporaneous evidence shows that the producers used their target prices to <QUOT.START ID="QS0114" REF.END="QE0114" CODE="2018"/>push<QUOT.END ID="QE0114" REF.START="QS0114" CODE="2019"/> market prices (main statement of objections, Appendices 22, 24, 31, 36 and 39, as well as Appendices 26, 28, 29 and 38). Such evidence cannot be disregarded on the basis of a <HT TYPE="ITALIC">post hoc</HT> econometric study.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>134</NO.P><TXT>In the Commission's view, it is incorrect to say that all of the polypropylene price movements recorded during the period in question can be explained away on the basis of factors operating on a normal market. That assertion, based solely on theoretical economic analyses, is contradicted by the documents and the facts.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>135</NO.P><TXT>Finally, the Commission considers that it was entitled to take into account the period subsequent to the ending of the meetings since the effects of the infringement continued to last beyond the meetings, as is shown by the matching price instructions of the various producers which related to a period continuing until November 1983 (letter of <DATE ISO="19850329">29 March 1985</DATE>, Appendix I).</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(c)</NO.P><TXT>Assessment by the Court</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>136</NO.P><TXT>The Court finds that the records of the regular meetings of polypropylene producers show that the producers which participated in those meetings agreed to the price initiatives mentioned in the Decision. For example, the note of the meeting on <DATE ISO="19820513">13 May 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 24) states:</TXT><?PAGE NO="II-1076"?><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0115" REF.END="QE0115" CODE="2018"/>everyone felt that there was a veiy good opportunity to get a price rise through before the holidays + after some debate settled on DM 2.00 from 1st June (UK 14th June). Individual country figures are shown in the attached table<QUOT.END ID="QE0115" REF.START="QS0115" CODE="2019"/>.</P></QUOT.S></P></NP><NP><NO.P>137</NO.P><TXT>Since it has been established to the requisite legal standard that the applicant participated in those meetings, it cannot assert that it did not support the price initiatives which were decided on, planned and monitored at those meetings, without providing any evidence to corroborate that assertion. In the absence of such evidence, there is no reason to believe that the applicant would not have supported those initiatives, unlike other participants at the meetings.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>138</NO.P><TXT>In this regard, it must be noted that the applicant does not specifically deny participating in any particular price initiative but contends that it never undertook to observe the target prices; that, it claims, is borne out, first, by its internal pricing policy in so far as its price instructions did not correspond to the target prices set at the meetings and, secondly, by its external pricing policy in so far as the prices which it charged on the market were independent of both the target prices and its internal pricing instructions.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>139</NO.P><TXT>None of those arguments can be accepted as evidence capable of corroborating the applicant's assertion that it did not subscribe to the agreed price initiatives.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1077"?><NP><NO.P>140</NO.P><TXT>As far as the first argument is concerned, the applicant's criticisms made during the administrative procedure, to which it refers in its application, as regards the similarity and simultaneity of its price instructions in relation to those of other producers and to the target prices set at meetings in 1982 and 1983, were partly taken into account in the Decision. In Tables 7 A to 7N the Decision reproduces both the similarities and the differences between the applicant's price instructions and those of other producers or the target prices set at the meetings. Consequently, the Commission correctly described the applicant's situation. In this regard, it must be added that the selection made by the Commission between the various price instructions of the applicant did not falsely portray the applicant's situation but is inherent in the synthesis undertaken in the Decision's tables.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>141</NO.P><TXT>As regards the choice of the periods to which the analysis of the price instructions of the various producers relates, that choice was dictated not by premature judgments but by the evidence possessed by the Commission, such as the coexistence of notes of meetings referring to target prices and price instructions issued by the various producers.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>142</NO.P><TXT>As regards the consequences which the applicant seeks to draw from the partial lack of simultaneity of its price instructions for 1982 and 1983, the Court considers that, in the present case, the length of time separating the price instructions of the various producers as between themselves and in relation to the meetings at which the target prices were set is likewise not apt to weaken the evidence advanced by the Commission. The length of that delay does not lead to the conclusion that the applicant issued its instructions on the basis of an independent assessment of the market, since it had learned at the meetings the prices which its competitors had in view. Moreover, almost all of the applicant's price instructions were issued within the five days which followed the meeting at which the Commission contends a target price was set (even though this is not the case with the price instruction issued for November 1983 on 27 September of that year (see the Decision, Table 7N)).</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1078"?><NP><NO.P>143</NO.P><TXT>Furthermore, as regards the price initiative of June-July 1982, the Court finds that, contrary to the applicant's contentions, it is not true that two producers (BASF and DSM) issued instructions to their sales offices on <DATE ISO="19820503">3 May 1982</DATE> to raise the price of raffia to DM 2.00/kg the following 1st of June, that is to say before the meeting on <DATE ISO="19820513">13 May 1982</DATE> at which that target price was set. Although BASF did instruct its sales office in the United Kingdom, on <DATE ISO="19820503">3 May 1982</DATE>, to apply prices expressed in pounds sterling for raffia, homopolymer and copolymer as from mid-June 1982 (letter of <DATE ISO="19850329">29 March 1985</DATE>, Appendix BASF Fl), prices which proved to have been adopted at the meeting of <DATE ISO="19820513">13 May 1982</DATE> for implementation from mid-June 1982 (main statement of objections, Appendix 24), it was not until <DATE ISO="19820519">19 May 1982</DATE> that it issued its price instructions, expressed in German marks, French francs and Italian lira, to its sales offices in Germany, France and Italy (letter of <DATE ISO="19850329">29 March 1985</DATE>, Appendix BASF F2). Those instructions are DM 2.00/kg for raffia and correspond in the main to the target prices set at the meeting on <DATE ISO="19820513">13 May 1982</DATE>, as is apparent from Table 7H of the Decision. As far as DSM is concerned, it is sufficient to point out that this producer stated in reply to a question from the Court that there were no price instructions issued by it on <DATE ISO="19820503">3 May 1982</DATE>, despite the assertion to that effect contained in the Commission's letter of <DATE ISO="19850329">29 March 1985</DATE> but not repeated in the Decision and that neither the applicant nor the Commission has contradicted that reply of DSM. Thus, the Decision merely states that price instructions for June 1982 were not available for DSM (point 39, third paragraph, and Table 7H). Consequently, the applicant's argument does not in any way weaken the Commission's finding that the target prices set at the meeting on <DATE ISO="19820513">13 May 1982</DATE> were implemented by the producers by means of the price instructions mentioned in the second paragraph of point 39 and in Table 7H of the Decision.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>144</NO.P><TXT>It must also be observed that, as the applicant had to admit at the hearing, it is not true that in May 1983 five producers issued price instructions prior to the meeting at which, according to the Commission, the target price which they were prepared to implement had been set. It is clear from points 47 and 49 of the Decision that the process of setting a target price for July 1983 went on during the meetings of <DATE ISO="19830503">3 May</DATE>, <DATE ISO="19830520">20 May</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19830601">1 June 1983</DATE>, which is borne out by the notes of the first and third of those meetings (main statement of objections, Appendices 38 and 40), and not only during the meeting of <DATE ISO="19830601">1 June 1983</DATE>, as the applicant stated in its pleadings submitted to the Court. Thus, the price instructions of Monte (17 May), ICI (23 May), DSM (25 May), BASF (27 May) and Hoechst (30 May) were all issued after one of the relevant meetings.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1079"?><NP><NO.P>145</NO.P><TXT>As regards the lack of uniformity of the price instructions issued by the producers, it is to be noted that, contrary to the applicant's assertions, the Commission took full account, in Table 7H of the Decision, of the divergent character of the price instructions given by Hercules for <DATE ISO="19820601">1 June 1982</DATE> and did not set out or mention in the table or in the second paragraph of point 39 of the Decision any price instruction for DSM, as was noted in the third paragraph of point 39. As far as Shell's price instruction for copolymer is concerned, it is to be observed that the Commission has corrected in Table 7K of the Decision the error which it had made in its letter of <DATE ISO="19850329">29 March 1985</DATE>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>146</NO.P><TXT>Likewise, the Commission rightly took no account of the fact that some undertakings, such as the applicant, Shell or Hoechst, sometimes altered the price instructions which they had given following a particular meeting, since such alterations merely indicate that, when a price initiative proved to have failed, the producers took account of this and modified their prices. This fact was taken into account in the Decision in so far as it often acknowledges the failure of price initiatives.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>147</NO.P><TXT>As regards the fact that the Commission at times used list prices and at other times minimum prices in its analysis of price instructions, it is to be noted that this is the result of the Commission's taking into account varying degrees of flexibility of the price-fixing systems of the producers who did not all have the same ideas about the function of list prices and minimum prices, so that the Commission had to refer, in the case of each producer, to the price which the producer used as its basis in price negotiations with its customers, whatever that price was called.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>148</NO.P><TXT>The fact that the applicant implemented only partially the price initiatives agreed upon cannot disprove that it subscribed to them at the meetings, especially when the notes of those meetings do not reveal any difference of view between the applicant and the other participants at the meetings about those initiatives.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1080"?><NP><NO.P>149</NO.P><TXT>Furthermore, the applicant cannot effectively argue that its price instructions were purely internal since, although they were indeed purely internal inasmuch as they were sent by headquarters to the sales offices, they were nevertheless sent with a view to their being carried out and therefore in order to produce directly or indirectly external effects, which negates their internal character.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>150</NO.P><TXT>As regards the second argument, which relates to ICFs external pricing policy — that is to say the prices which it charged on the market — the Decision does not contain any assertion to the effect that the applicant charged prices which always corresponded to the target prices agreed at the meetings, which shows that the contested decision likewise does not rely on the applicant's implementation of the outcome of meetings in order to establish that it participated in the fixing of those target prices. Any difference between the prices actually obtained on the market by the applicant and the target prices fixed at the meetings, even if actually proven, would not gainsay the applicant's participation in the fixing of target prices at the meetings but would at the most tend to show that the applicant did not put the decisions reached in those meetings into effect.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>151</NO.P><TXT>Consequently, in the present case, the applicant cannot derive any favourable argument from its pricing policy, either internal or external, in order to establish that it did not subscribe to the price initiatives decided on, organized and monitored at the meetings in which it participated.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>152</NO.P><TXT>Furthermore, the Commission was fully entitled to deduce from ICFs reply to the request for information (main statement of objections, Appendix 8), in which it is stated that:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0116" REF.END="QE0116" CODE="2018"/><QUOT.START ID="QS0117" REF.END="QE0117" CODE="201C"/>Target prices<QUOT.END ID="QE0117" REF.START="QS0117" CODE="201D"/> for the basic grade of each principal category of polypropylene as proposed by producers from time to time since <DATE ISO="19790101">1 January 1979</DATE> are set forth in Schedule ... <QUOT.END ID="QE0116" REF.START="QS0116" CODE="2019"/></P></QUOT.S></P><?PAGE NO="II-1081"?><P>that those initiatives were pan of a system of fixing target prices.</P></NP><NP><NO.P>153</NO.P><TXT>Finally, although the last meeting of producers proved by the Commission to have taken place was that held on <DATE ISO="19830929">29 September 1983</DATE>, the fact remains that between <DATE ISO="19830920">20 September</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19831025">25 October 1983</DATE> various producers (BASF, Hercules, Hoechst, Hüls, ICI, Linz, Monte, Solvay and Saga) sent out matching price instructions (letter of <DATE ISO="19850329">29 March 1985</DATE>, Appendix I) scheduled to enter into force on <DATE ISO="19831101">1 November 1983</DATE>, and the Commission could therefore reasonably take the view that the meetings of producers had continued to produce their effects until November 1983.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>154</NO.P><TXT>Moreover, in order to support the foregoing findings of fact, the Commission did not need to use documents which it had not mentioned in its statements of objections or which it had not disclosed to the applicant.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>155</NO.P><TXT>It follows that the Commission has established to the requisite legal standard that the applicant was one of the polypropylene producers amongst whom there emerged common intentions concerning the price initiatives mentioned in the Decision and that those initiatives were part of a system.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="II-1082"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>D.</NO.P><TXT>The measures designed to facilitate the implementation of the price initiatives</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(a)</NO.P><TXT>The contested decision</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>156</NO.P><TXT>In the Decision (Article 1(c) and point 27; see also point 42) the Commission asserts that the applicant agreed with the other producers various measures designed to facilitate the implementation of target prices, such as temporary restrictions on output, exchanges of detailed information on their deliveries, the holding of local meetings and, from the end of September 1982, a system of <QUOT.START ID="QS0118" REF.END="QE0118" CODE="2018"/>account management<QUOT.END ID="QE0118" REF.START="QS0118" CODE="2019"/> designed to implement price rises to individual customers.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>157</NO.P><TXT>As regards the system of <QUOT.START ID="QS0119" REF.END="QE0119" CODE="2018"/>account management<QUOT.END ID="QE0119" REF.START="QS0119" CODE="2019"/>, whose later more refined form, <QUOT.START ID="QS0120" REF.END="QE0120" CODE="2018"/>account leadership<QUOT.END ID="QE0120" REF.START="QS0120" CODE="2019"/>, dates from December 1982, the applicant, like all the producers, was nominated coordinator or <QUOT.START ID="QS0121" REF.END="QE0121" CODE="2018"/>leader<QUOT.END ID="QE0121" REF.START="QS0121" CODE="2019"/> for at least one major customer, in respect of whom it was charged with secretly coordinating its dealings with suppliers. Under that system, customers were identified in Belgium, Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom and a <QUOT.START ID="QS0122" REF.END="QE0122" CODE="2018"/>coordinator<QUOT.END ID="QE0122" REF.START="QS0122" CODE="2019"/> was nominated for each of them. In December 1982, a more general adoption of the system was proposed, with an account leader named for each major customer who would guide, discuss and organize price moves. Other producers which had regular dealings with the customer were known as <QUOT.START ID="QS0123" REF.END="QE0123" CODE="2018"/>contenders<QUOT.END ID="QE0123" REF.START="QS0123" CODE="2019"/> and would cooperate with the account leader in quoting prices to the customer in question. In order to <QUOT.START ID="QS0124" REF.END="QE0124" CODE="2018"/>protect<QUOT.END ID="QE0124" REF.START="QS0124" CODE="2019"/> the account leader and the contenders, any other producers approached by the customers were to quote prices higher than the desired target. Despite ICI's assertions, according to which the scheme collapsed after only a few months of partial and ineffective operation, the Commission states in the Decision that a full note of the meeting held on <DATE ISO="19830503">3 May 1983</DATE> shows that at that time detailed discussions took place on individual customers, on the prices offered or to be offered to them by each producer, and on the volumes supplied or on order.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1083"?><NP><NO.P>158</NO.P><TXT>The Decision (point 20) also asserts that ICI attended local meetings held to discuss implementation on a national level of arrangements agreed in the full sessions.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(b)</NO.P><TXT>Arguments of the parties</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>159</NO.P><TXT>The applicant emphasizes that the increase in exports to overseas markets was not the effect of collusion on the diversion of supplies to those markets, for which the Commission does not, according to the applicant, adduce any conclusive evidence, but of the desire of producers to increase the utilization of their production capacity. In any case, such a solution would have been totally unrealistic owing in particular to the time needed for its implementation. The applicant also points out that it could not defend itself against this allegation, which was not contained in the statement of objections.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>160</NO.P><TXT>The applicant contends that, although the producers did talk about stocks at the meeting on <DATE ISO="19820721">21 July 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 26), its conduct was independent inasmuch as its stocks remained high and it did not reduce its production in order to reduce them. It also states that the exchanges of information on the prices charged (main statement of objections, Appendices 27 to 33) were totally anonymous since the information was exchanged through the Fides system.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>161</NO.P><TXT>The applicant maintains that in the beginning the system of <QUOT.START ID="QS0125" REF.END="QE0125" CODE="2018"/>account leadership<QUOT.END ID="QE0125" REF.START="QS0125" CODE="2019"/> was very incomplete and that it was not implemented. As evidence it points out that the note of the meeting of <DATE ISO="19821202">2 December 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 33) indicates that the idea of managing accounts was proposed. That document also proves, in its view, that the system of <QUOT.START ID="QS0126" REF.END="QE0126" CODE="2018"/>account leadership<QUOT.END ID="QE0126" REF.START="QS0126" CODE="2019"/> was not adopted in September 1982.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>162</NO.P><TXT>The applicant admits, however, that the only attempt to implement the proposed system was made at the meeting held in March 1983 (main statement of objections, Appendix 37) but it claims that it is clear from the note of that meeting that its implementation did not go beyond the stage of the sharing of information.</TXT><?PAGE NO="II-1084"?><P>Id's conclusion is that attempts were certainly made but that they could not have any influence on the prices obtained, as is shown by the Coopers &amp; Lybrand audit.</P></NP><NP><NO.P>163</NO.P><TXT>It also admits to having participated in numerous local meetings but considers that they did not have the significance which the Commission attributes to them.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>164</NO.P><TXT>The Commission, on the other hand, considers that the note of the meeting held on <DATE ISO="19790926">26</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19790927">27 September 1979</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 12) proves that the producers attempted to divert supplies of polypropylene to overseas markets in order to support prices. In its view, this is also shown by the notes of the meetings held on 13 May and 21 September (main statement of objections, Appendices 24 and 30), as was indicated in point 79 of the statement of objections.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>165</NO.P><TXT>It states that it is clear from the notes of the meetings held in May and August 1982 (main statement of objections, Appendices 24 and 26 to 28) that ICI participated in the producers' efforts to cause distortions in the channels of trade between States, in particular in order to counteract the effect of the price-freezing system in France (main statement of objections, Appendices 27 and 28), and that it also took part in the exchanges of information on unilateral reductions of production and on stocks (main statement of objections, Appendices 24, 26 and 27).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>166</NO.P><TXT>The Commission states that the note of the meeting held on <DATE ISO="19820902">2 September 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 29) shows that it was at that meeting, in which ICI participated, that the concept of the <QUOT.START ID="QS0127" REF.END="QE0127" CODE="2018"/>account leadership<QUOT.END ID="QE0127" REF.START="QS0127" CODE="2019"/> system was born. The Commission states that the note shows that the system was very complete from the very beginning since it specified <QUOT.START ID="QS0128" REF.END="QE0128" CODE="2018"/>account leaders<QUOT.END ID="QE0128" REF.START="QS0128" CODE="2019"/>, <QUOT.START ID="QS0129" REF.END="QE0129" CODE="2018"/>contenders<QUOT.END ID="QE0129" REF.START="QS0129" CODE="2019"/> and <QUOT.START ID="QS0130" REF.END="QE0130" CODE="2018"/>interested suppliers<QUOT.END ID="QE0130" REF.START="QS0130" CODE="2019"/> for a large number of customers.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>167</NO.P><TXT>It further states that the note of the meeting held on <DATE ISO="19821202">2 December 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 33) does not in any way disprove that the <QUOT.START ID="QS0131" REF.END="QE0131" CODE="2018"/>account leadership<QUOT.END ID="QE0131" REF.START="QS0131" CODE="2019"/> system was adopted after September, as ICI contends, since that note states that the idea of account management was proposed for more<?PAGE NO="II-1085"?> general adoption. That document, which comprises a very detailed table of customers and <QUOT.START ID="QS0132" REF.END="QE0132" CODE="2018"/>account leaders<QUOT.END ID="QE0132" REF.START="QS0132" CODE="2019"/>, proves that the system was implemented since it is unlikely that the producers would have drawn up such a table if there had been no agreement to implement it.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>168</NO.P><TXT>The Commission considers that the note of the meeting of March 1983 (main statement of objections, Appendix 37) proves, like the previous ones (main statement of objections, Appendices 29 and 33), that ICI participated in the <QUOT.START ID="QS0133" REF.END="QE0133" CODE="2018"/>account leadership<QUOT.END ID="QE0133" REF.START="QS0133" CODE="2019"/> system.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>169</NO.P><TXT>According to the Commission, ICI participated in numerous local meetings, such as that held in October 1982 for which a meeting note exists (main statement of objections, Appendix 10).</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(c)</NO.P><TXT>Assessment by the Court</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>170</NO.P><TXT>The Court considers that point 27 of the Decision is to be interpreted in the light of the second paragraph of point 26, not as contending that each of the producers committed itself individually to adopt all the measures mentioned there but as asserting that at various times those producers adopted at those meetings together with the other producers a set of measures mentioned in the Decision and designed to bring about conditions favourable to an increase in prices, in particular by artificially reducing the supply of polypropylene, and that the implementation of the various measures involved was by common agreement shared between the various producers according to their specific situation.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>171</NO.P><TXT>It must be concluded that in participating in the meetings during which that set of measures was adopted (in particular those of <DATE ISO="19820513">13 May</DATE>, <DATE ISO="19820902">2</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19820921">21 September 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendices 24, 29, 30)), the applicant subscribed to it, since it has not adduced any evidence to prove the contrary. In this regard, the adoption of the system of <QUOT.START ID="QS0134" REF.END="QE0134" CODE="2018"/>account leadership<QUOT.END ID="QE0134" REF.START="QS0134" CODE="2019"/> is clear from the following passage appearing in the record of the meeting of <DATE ISO="19820902">2 September 1982</DATE>:</TXT><?PAGE NO="II-1086"?><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0135" REF.END="QE0135" CODE="2018"/>about the dangers of everyone quoting exactly DM 2.00 A.&#x201C;s point was accepted but rather than go below DM 2.00 it was suggested &amp; generally agreed that others than the major producers at individual accounts should quote a few pfs higher. Whilst customer tourism was clearly to be avoided for the next month or two it was accepted that it would be very difficult for companies to refuse to quote at all when, as was likely, customers tried to avoid paying higher prices to the regular suppliers. In such cases producers would quote but at above the minimum levels for October<QUOT.END ID="QE0135" REF.START="QS0135" CODE="2019"/>.</P></QUOT.S></P><P>Similarly, at the meeting of <DATE ISO="19820921">21 September 1982</DATE>, in which the applicant participated, it was stated: <QUOT.START ID="QS0136" REF.END="QE0136" CODE="2018"/>In support of the move, BASF, Hercules and Hoechst said they would be taking plant off line temporarily<QUOT.END ID="QE0136" REF.START="QS0136" CODE="2019"/> and at the meeting of <DATE ISO="19820513">13 May 1982</DATE> Fina stated: <QUOT.START ID="QS0137" REF.END="QE0137" CODE="2018"/>Plant will be shut down for 20 days in August<QUOT.END ID="QE0137" REF.START="QS0137" CODE="2019"/>.</P></NP><NP><NO.P>172</NO.P><TXT>As regards the question of <QUOT.START ID="QS0138" REF.END="QE0138" CODE="2018"/>account leadership<QUOT.END ID="QE0138" REF.START="QS0138" CODE="2019"/>, the Court finds that it is clear from the notes of the meetings of <DATE ISO="19820902">2 September 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 29), <DATE ISO="19821202">2 December 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 33) and of spring 1983 (main statement of objections, Appendix 37), which were all attended by the applicant, that during those meetings the producers present at them agreed to that system. As far as the note of the meeting held on <DATE ISO="19821202">2 December 1982</DATE> is concerned, it confirms that the system had already been adopted at the meeting in September since it states: <QUOT.START ID="QS0139" REF.END="QE0139" CODE="2018"/>The idea of account management was proposed for more general adoption &amp; a list of customers/account leaders drawn up<QUOT.END ID="QE0139" REF.START="QS0139" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1087"?><NP><NO.P>173</NO.P><TXT>The implementation of this system is evidenced by the note of the meeting of <DATE ISO="19830503">3 May 1983</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 38), in which it is stated:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0140" REF.END="QE0140" CODE="2018"/>A long discussion took place on Jacob Holm who is asking for quotations for the 3rd quarter. It was agreed not to do this and to restrict offers to the end of June, April/May levels were at Dkr 6.30 (DM 1.72). Hercules were definitely in and should not have been so. To protect BASF, it was agreed that CWH[iils] + ICI would quote Dkr 6.75 from now to end June (DM 1.85) ... <QUOT.END ID="QE0140" REF.START="QS0140" CODE="2019"/>.</P></QUOT.S></P><P>Such implementation is confirmed by the applicant's own reply to the request for information (main statement of objections, Appendix 8), in which it is stated in relation to that meeting note:</P><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0141" REF.END="QE0141" CODE="2018"/>In the Spring of 1983 there was a partial attempt by some producers to operate the <QUOT.START ID="QS0142" REF.END="QE0142" CODE="201C"/>Account Leadership<QUOT.END ID="QE0142" REF.START="QS0142" CODE="201D"/> scheme... Since Hercules had not declared to the <QUOT.START ID="QS0143" REF.END="QE0143" CODE="201C"/>Account Leader<QUOT.END ID="QE0143" REF.START="QS0143" CODE="201D"/> its interest in supplying Jacob Holm, the statement was made at this meeting in relation to Jacob Holm that <QUOT.START ID="QS0144" REF.END="QE0144" CODE="201C"/>Hercules were definitely in and<?PAGE NO="II-1088"?> should not have been so<QUOT.END ID="QE0144" REF.START="QS0144" CODE="201D"/>. It should be made clear that this statement refers only to the Jacob Holm account and not to the Danish market. It was because of such action by Hercules and others that the <QUOT.START ID="QS0145" REF.END="QE0145" CODE="201C"/>Account Leadership<QUOT.END ID="QE0145" REF.START="QS0145" CODE="201D"/> scheme collapsed after at most two months of partial and ineffective operation. The method by which Hüls and ICI should have protected BASF was by quoting a price of DK 6.75 for the supply of raffia grade polypropylene to Jacob Holm until the end of June<QUOT.END ID="QE0141" REF.START="QS0141" CODE="2019"/>.</P></QUOT.S></P></NP><NP><NO.P>174</NO.P><TXT>The Court further finds that at the meeting of <DATE ISO="19820720">20</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19820721">21 July 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 26) the applicant participated in an exchange of information on the state of stocks after which the following conclusion was reached:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0146" REF.END="QE0146" CODE="2018"/>Stocks at the end of May had risen to 270 Kt + MP (Montepolimeri) estimated that they could reach 300 Kt by the end of August. This was at variance with professed statements about stock control policies where every company except Saga said stocks had to be kept down to 5-6 weeks cover + production reduced if the level looked like being exceeded. Saga said that they would be running their plant flat out + that stocks would rise to 9-9 1/2 weeks over the holiday period<QUOT.END ID="QE0146" REF.START="QS0146" CODE="2019"/>.</P></QUOT.S></P></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1089"?><NP><NO.P>175</NO.P><TXT>Finally, the Court notes that the applicant does not dispute that it took part in local meetings and that the purpose of those meetings is evidenced in particular by the note of the meeting of <DATE ISO="19820812">12 August 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 27), which shows that those meetings were intended to ensure the implementation, at local level, of a particular price initiative and by the note of the local meeting held in the United Kingdom on <DATE ISO="19821018">18 October 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 10).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>176</NO.P><TXT>It follows from the foregoing that the Commission has established to the requisite legal standard that the applicant was one of the polypropylene producers amongst whom there emerged common intentions concerning the measures designed to facilitate the implementation of the price initiatives mentioned in the Decision.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>E.</NO.P><TXT> Target tonnages and quotas</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(a)</NO.P><TXT>The contested decision</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>177</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (point 31, third paragraph), it was <QUOT.START ID="QS0147" REF.END="QE0147" CODE="2018"/>recognized that a tight quota system [was] essential<QUOT.END ID="QE0147" REF.START="QS0147" CODE="2019"/> at the meeting held on <DATE ISO="19790926">26</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19790927">27 September 1979</DATE>, the note of which refers to a scheme proposed or agreed in Zurich to limit monthly sales to 80% of the average achieved during the first eight months of the year.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>178</NO.P><TXT>The Decision (point 52) further points out that before August 1982 various schemes for sharing the market were applied. While percentage shares of the estimated available business had been allocated to each producer, there was not at this stage any systematic limitation in advance of overall production. Thus, estimates of the total market had to be revised on a rolling basis and the sales (in tonnes) of each producer had to be adjusted to fit the percentage entitlement.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1090"?><NP><NO.P>179</NO.P><TXT>Volume targets (in tonnes) were set for 1979 based in part at least on sales in the preceding three years. Tables found at the premises of ICI show the <QUOT.START ID="QS0148" REF.END="QE0148" CODE="2018"/>revised target<QUOT.END ID="QE0148" REF.START="QS0148" CODE="2019"/> for each producer for 1979 compared with actual tonnage sales achieved during that period in Western Europe (Decision, point 54).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>180</NO.P><TXT>By the end of February 1980, volume targets — again expressed in tonnage terms — had been agreed for 1980 by the producers, based on an expected market of <FT TYPE="NUMBER">1390000</FT> tonnes. According to the Decision (point 55), a number of tables showing the <QUOT.START ID="QS0149" REF.END="QE0149" CODE="2018"/>agreed targets<QUOT.END ID="QE0149" REF.START="QS0149" CODE="2019"/> for each producer for 1980 were found at the premises of ATO and ICI. The original estimated total market available proved overoptimistic and the quota of each producer had to be revised downwards to fit total consumption during the year of only <FT TYPE="NUMBER">1200000</FT> tonnes. Except for ICI and DSM, the sales achieved by the various producers were largely in line with their targets.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>181</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (point 56), the sharing of the market for 1981 was the subject of prolonged and complex negotiations. At the meetings in January 1981, it was agreed that as a temporary measure to help to achieve the February/March price initiative each producer would restrict monthly sales to one-twelfth of 85% of the 1980 <QUOT.START ID="QS0150" REF.END="QE0150" CODE="2018"/>target<QUOT.END ID="QE0150" REF.START="QS0150" CODE="2019"/>. In preparation for a more permanent scheme, each producer communicated to the meeting the tonnage it hoped to sell during 1981. However, added together, those <QUOT.START ID="QS0151" REF.END="QE0151" CODE="2018"/>aspirations<QUOT.END ID="QE0151" REF.START="QS0151" CODE="2019"/> largely exceeded total forecast demand. In spite of various compromise schemes put forward by Shell and ICI, no definitive quota agreement was reached for 1981. As a stopgap measure the producers took the previous year's quota of each producer as a theoretical entitlement and reported their actual sales each month to the meeting. In this way actual sales were monitored against a notional split of the available market based on the 1980 quota (Decision, point 57).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>182</NO.P><TXT>The Decision (point 58) states that for a 1982 scheme complicated quota proposals were advanced which attempted to reconcile divergent factors such as previous achievements, market aspirations and available capacity. The total market to be<?PAGE NO="II-1091"?> divided was estimated at <FT TYPE="NUMBER">1450000</FT> tonnes. Some producers submitted detailed plans for market sharing while others were content to communicate only their own tonnage aspirations. At the meeting on <DATE ISO="19820310">10 March 1982</DATE> Monte and ICI tried to reach an agreement. The Decision (point 58, last paragraph) states, however, that, as in 1981, no definitive agreement was reached and for the first half of the year the monthly sales for each producer were communicated during the meetings and monitored against its achieved percentage share in the previous year. According to the Decision (point 59), in the August 1982 meeting, negotiations for an agreement on quotas for 1983 were held and ICI held bilateral discussions with each of the producers on the new system. However, pending the introduction of such a quota scheme, producers were required in the second part of 1982 to aim to restrict their monthly sales to the same percentage of the overall market which each of them had achieved in the first six months of 1982. Thus, in 1982, the market shares had reached a relative equilibrium (described by ATO as a <QUOT.START ID="QS0152" REF.END="QE0152" CODE="2018"/>quasiconsensus<QUOT.END ID="QE0152" REF.START="QS0152" CODE="2019"/> and, among the majors, ICI and Shell remained at about 11% with Hoechst slightly below at 10.5%). Monte, always the largest producer, had advanced slightly to take a 15% market share compared with 14.2% the previous year.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>183</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (point 60), for 1983, ICI invited each producer to indicate its own quota ambitions and suggestions for what percentage each of the others should be allowed. Monte, Anic, ATO, DSM, Linz, Saga and Solvay, as well as the German producers via BASF, submitted their own detailed proposals. The various proposals were then processed by computer to obtain an average which was compared with the individual percentage <QUOT.START ID="QS0153" REF.END="QE0153" CODE="2018"/>aspirations<QUOT.END ID="QE0153" REF.START="QS0153" CODE="2019"/> of each producer. Those steps enabled ICI to propose guidelines for a new framework agreement for 1983. Those proposals were discussed at the meetings of November and December 1982. A proposal initially restricted to the first quarter of the year was discussed at the meeting on <DATE ISO="19821202">2 December 1982</DATE>. The note of that meeting drawn up by ICI shows that ATO, DSM, Hoechst, Hüls, ICI, Monte and Solvay, as well as Hercules, found their allocated quota <QUOT.START ID="QS0154" REF.END="QE0154" CODE="2018"/>acceptable<QUOT.END ID="QE0154" REF.START="QS0154" CODE="2019"/> (Decision, point 63). Those facts are borne out by the ICI note of a telephone conversation with Hercules of <DATE ISO="19821203">3 December 1982</DATE>.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1092"?><NP><NO.P>184</NO.P><TXT>The Decision (point 63, third paragraph) states that a document found at the premises of Shell confirms that an agreement was made, since it endeavoured not to exceed its quota. That document also confirms that a volume control scheme was continued into the second quarter of 1983 since, in order to keep its market share in the second quarter close to 11%, national sales companies in the Shell group were ordered to reduce their sales. The existence of that agreement is confirmed by the note of the meeting on <DATE ISO="19830601">1 June 1983</DATE>, which, although not mentioning quotas, relates to exchanges of details of the tonnages sold by each producer in the previous month, which would indicate that some quota system was in operation (Decision, point 64).</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(b)</NO.P><TXT>Arguments of the parties</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>185</NO.P><TXT>The applicant claims that the Commission, aware that no agreement on prices could be implemented without sales volume restrictions, has attempted unsuccessfully to prove the existence of a quota system, taking provisional proposals and exchanges of view which came to nothing for agreements.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>186</NO.P><TXT>It states that the Commission's arguments regarding implementation of the supposed agreements by ICI are weaker still. No quota system could have been implemented unless all the producers participated and mechanisms were agreed to correct or regulate variances from any proposed quota. However, those essential prerequisites were absent in this case, in particular because of the diverging interests of the producers. As proof of this it relies in particular on the study by Professor Budd which, in its view, showed that the changes in market shares were not influenced by any targets regarding sales volumes.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>187</NO.P><TXT>The applicant considers that the evidence produced by the Commission does not prove that it participated in a quota system in 1979. The table found on its<?PAGE NO="II-1093"?> premises, headed <QUOT.START ID="QS0155" REF.END="QE0155" CODE="2018"/>Producers' Sales to West Europe<QUOT.END ID="QE0155" REF.START="QS0155" CODE="2019"/> (main statement of objections, Appendix 55), setting out, against the sales volumes of the various producers for the years 1976 to 1979, <QUOT.START ID="QS0156" REF.END="QE0156" CODE="2018"/>revised targets 1979<QUOT.END ID="QE0156" REF.START="QS0156" CODE="2019"/>, cannot be accepted as evidence of the existence of a volume control system since there is nothing to suggest that the <QUOT.START ID="QS0157" REF.END="QE0157" CODE="2018"/>targets<QUOT.END ID="QE0157" REF.START="QS0157" CODE="2019"/> in question constituted anything other than individual aspirations. It further states that the documents found at the premises of ATO do not concern it and that the note of the meeting of <DATE ISO="19790926">26</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19790927">27 September 1979</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 12) proves by its wording that no quota system had yet been adopted in 1979 since the adoption of such a system was only envisaged. It also points out that it is clear from Table 8 (1979) of the Decision that the various producers did not adhere to the targets and that ICI's market share in 1979 was 5.5% lower than its targets.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>188</NO.P><TXT>It states that in 1980 there was in fact no true meeting of minds and, therefore, no implementation of the targets. In its view, there is a wide divergence between the actual figures and the revised figures, as the figures in Table 8 (1980) of the Decision show.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>189</NO.P><TXT>According to the applicant, the Commission was forced to admit that no definitive quota agreement was reached for 1981. Put in its context, the passage from the note of the January 1981 meetings (main statement of objections, Appendix 17) cited in the Decision (point 56, second paragraph) does not constitute the expression of an agreement but a general exhortation. It states that it is apparent from the notes of the May and June meetings (main statement of objections, Appendix 64) that no producer considered any such agreement to be in force. Once again, it adds, it is clear from Table 8 (1981) of the Decision that the sales figures differed considerably from the alleged targets. Finally, it considers that the monitoring by the producers of their sales figures against a notional division of the available market based on the 1980 quotas cannot in any event amount to volume control and can only have been of academic or historical interest. In its view, this is borne out by the fact that the note of the meeting of <DATE ISO="19820820">20 August 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 28) refers to a <QUOT.START ID="QS0158" REF.END="QE0158" CODE="2018"/>notional quota<QUOT.END ID="QE0158" REF.START="QS0158" CODE="2019"/> and not to an actual quota.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1094"?><NP><NO.P>190</NO.P><TXT>It states that, as regards 1982, the Commission once more admits the absence of agreement on sales volume targets or quotas. As regards the note of the meeting of <DATE ISO="19820820">20 August 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 28), the applicant contends that the Commission distorts its meaning in deducing from it that the producers were required, in the second part of 1982, to aim to restrict their monthly sales to the same percentage of the overall market which each had achieved in the first six months of 1982 since the note states that the undertakings should aim to restrain their September volume to the market share achieved for the period from January to June. In its view, proof that volume controls were never agreed or implemented in 1982 and that the figures achieved by the various undertakings did not match the targets is provided by Table 8 (1982) to the Decision. Finally, it contends that the Commission is wrong to maintain, on the basis of the annual ATO report (main statement of objections, Appendix 72), that, compared with previous years, the market shares of the medium-sized producers were stable since the market shares of some undertakings, such as Linz and Petrofina, changed considerably.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>191</NO.P><TXT>As far as 1983 is concerned, the applicant contends that the Commission has mistaken a proposal for an effective agreement. It explains that the proposal which it made (main statement of objections, Appendix 86) was <QUOT.START ID="QS0159" REF.END="QE0159" CODE="2018"/>acceptable<QUOT.END ID="QE0159" REF.START="QS0159" CODE="2019"/> to only nine of the sixteen producers and that conditions were attached even to some of these <QUOT.START ID="QS0160" REF.END="QE0160" CODE="2018"/>acceptances<QUOT.END ID="QE0160" REF.START="QS0160" CODE="2019"/>, as is indicated by the note of the meeting of <DATE ISO="19821202">2 December 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 33). It concludes that it is clear that effective agreement was never reached and that the proposal could never have succeeded and could not therefore be implemented. Moreover, the guidelines referred to in point 61 of the Decision were never discussed, those guidelines being a purely internal document, as is shown by some of the comments made in the note itself. Finally, ICI argues that the existence of an agreement is disproved by the discrepancy between the growth in actual production and the targets set. By way of conclusion, it points out that, contrary to the Commission's arguments, the market shares of the <QUOT.START ID="QS0161" REF.END="QE0161" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0161" REF.START="QS0161" CODE="2019"/> increased between 1980 and 1982, as is demonstrated, in ICI's view, by a comparison of two tables produced by the Commission (main statement of objections, Appendices 61 and 87).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>192</NO.P><TXT>The Commission, on the other hand, states that point 54 et seq. of the Decision provides a general survey of the quota system which was applied over a number of years and in which ICI was closely involved.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1095"?><NP><NO.P>193</NO.P><TXT>As regards 1979, it states that ICI's participation in a quota agreement is apparent from an undated table headed <QUOT.START ID="QS0162" REF.END="QE0162" CODE="2018"/>Producers' Sales to West Europe<QUOT.END ID="QE0162" REF.START="QS0162" CODE="2019"/>, found at the premises of ICI (main statement of objections, Appendix 55), setting out for all the polypropylene producers of western Europe the sale figures in kilotonnes for 1976, 1977 and 1978 and figures under the headings <QUOT.START ID="QS0163" REF.END="QE0163" CODE="2018"/>1979 actual<QUOT.END ID="QE0163" REF.START="QS0163" CODE="2019"/> and <QUOT.START ID="QS0164" REF.END="QE0164" CODE="2018"/>revised target<QUOT.END ID="QE0164" REF.START="QS0164" CODE="2019"/>. The precise data contained in that document are of the kind not known by competitors in a <QUOT.START ID="QS0165" REF.END="QE0165" CODE="2018"/>normal<QUOT.END ID="QE0165" REF.START="QS0165" CODE="2019"/> competitive situation and therefore presuppose participation by ICI and the other producers in the preparation of that document.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>194</NO.P><TXT>As regards 1980, the Commission contends that an agreement on quotas was made. It bases this contention essentially on a table dated <DATE ISO="19800226">26 February 1980</DATE> found at the premises of ATO (main statement of objections, Appendix 60) and headed <QUOT.START ID="QS0166" REF.END="QE0166" CODE="2018"/>Polypropylene — Sales target 1980 (kt)<QUOT.END ID="QE0166" REF.START="QS0166" CODE="2019"/>, which compares for all the producers of western Europe a <QUOT.START ID="QS0167" REF.END="QE0167" CODE="2018"/>1980 target<QUOT.END ID="QE0167" REF.START="QS0167" CODE="2019"/>, <QUOT.START ID="QS0168" REF.END="QE0168" CODE="2018"/>Opening suggestions<QUOT.END ID="QE0168" REF.START="QS0168" CODE="2019"/>, <QUOT.START ID="QS0169" REF.END="QE0169" CODE="2018"/>proposed adjustments<QUOT.END ID="QE0169" REF.START="QS0169" CODE="2019"/> and <QUOT.START ID="QS0170" REF.END="QE0170" CODE="2018"/>agreed targets 1980<QUOT.END ID="QE0170" REF.START="QS0170" CODE="2019"/>. That document shows the process whereby quotas were drawn up. This analysis is confirmed, in the Commission's view, by the note of the two January 1981 meetings (main statement of objections, Appendix 17) at which sales volume targets were compared with the quantities actually sold by the producers. It emphasizes that the aim of the quota system was to stabilize market shares. That is why, in its view, the agreements related to market shares, which were then converted into tonnages for use as reference figures, since if they were not converted it would not have been possible to determine from which point in time a participant in the cartel had to restrain his sales in order to comply with the agreements. For that puipose, it was essential to forecast the total volume of sales. Since the initial forecasts for 1980 proved to be too optimistic, the total volume of sales originally anticipated had to be adjusted several times, leading to adjustments in the tonnages allocated to each of the undertakings.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>195</NO.P><TXT>The Commission recognizes that no definitive quota agreement could be reached for 1981. It states, however, that the producers reached agreement at the beginning of 1981 on a temporary scheme limiting monthly sales to V12 of 85% of the targets which had been agreed for 1980, as is evidenced by the note of the January 1981 meetings (main statement of objections, Appendix 17). Secondly, the<?PAGE NO="II-1096"?> producers monitored each other's actual sales on a monthly basis, as is shown in particular by a table dated <DATE ISO="19811221">21 December 1981</DATE> found at the premises of ICI, setting out the monthly sales of the various producers in 1981 (main statement of objections, Appendix 67). Thirdly, ICI, Shell and Monte met twice, on <DATE ISO="19810527">27 May</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19810615">15 June 1981</DATE>, in order to discuss proposals for quota agreements (main statement of objections, Appendix 64).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>196</NO.P><TXT>As regards 1982, the Commission states that no definitive agreement could be reached, despite the efforts made in this direction which, in its view, are proved by the various quota schemes discovered. However, a provisional solution was found in the form of a specific orientation of sales according to the figures for the previous year. The Commission states that the existence of discussions on the setting of quotas emerges from a large number of documents. Among those documents, reference must be made above all to the meeting notes drawn up by ICI, from which it is clear that information was exchanged on the quantities sold (main statement of objections, Appendices 24 to 26 and 31 to 33). Reference should also be made to various schemes found at the premises of ICI (main statement of objections, Appendices 69 and 71) and a fairly comprehensive proposal for 1982 originating from ICI (main statement of objections, Appendix 70). The Commission states that two documents (main statement of objections, Appendix 32; specific objections, ICI, Appendix 30) show that when the producers wished to obtain an increase in their market shares they had to give reasons.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>197</NO.P><TXT>As regards 1983, the Commission considers that a quota agreement could have been made. It bases that assertion on notes of telephone conversations between ICI and other producers (main statement of objections, Appendices 74 to 84) which show that ICI invited each producer to communicate its own ambitions as well as its view of the percentage which the others should be allowed, on documents relating to the processing of the information thus collected (main statement of objections, Appendix 85) and on schemes drawn up by ICI (main statement of objections, Appendices 86 and 87). A number of meeting notes describe the course of the negotiations on a proposal limited to the first quarter of 1983 (main statement of objections, Appendices 32 to 34). An internal Shell document (main statement of objections, Appendix 90) shows that such a system was agreed for the first two quarters of 1983. This is corroborated by the note of the meeting of <DATE ISO="19830601">1 June 1983</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 40), which, while not referring to quotas, describes exchanges of information on the tonnages sold by each producer in the previous month of May.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="II-1097"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(c)</NO.P><TXT>Assessment by the Court</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>198</NO.P><TXT>It has already been found that from the outset the applicant regularly participated in the periodic meetings of polypropylene producers at which discussions relating to the sales volumes of the various producers were held and information exchanged on that subject.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>199</NO.P><TXT>Concurrently with Id's participation in the meetings, its name appears in various tables found on its premises (main statement of objections, Appendices 55 to 61) whose contents clearly show that the tables were drawn up for the purpose of determining sales volume targets. Most of the applicants have admitted in their replies to a written question from the Court that it would not have been possible to draw up those tables on the basis of the statistics available under the Fides system. In fact, in its reply to the request for information (main statement of objections, Appendix 8) ICI stated with reference to one of those tables that <QUOT.START ID="QS0171" REF.END="QE0171" CODE="2018"/>the source of information for actual historic figures in this table would have been the producers themselves<QUOT.END ID="QE0171" REF.START="QS0171" CODE="2019"/>. The Commission was therefore entitled to take the view that the data contained in those tables had, as far as ICI is concerned, been provided by ICI in the course of the meetings in which it participated.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>200</NO.P><TXT>The terms used in the tables relating to the years 1979 and 1980 (such as <QUOT.START ID="QS0172" REF.END="QE0172" CODE="2018"/>revised target<QUOT.END ID="QE0172" REF.START="QS0172" CODE="2019"/>, <QUOT.START ID="QS0173" REF.END="QE0173" CODE="2018"/>Opening suggestions<QUOT.END ID="QE0173" REF.START="QS0173" CODE="2019"/>, <QUOT.START ID="QS0174" REF.END="QE0174" CODE="2018"/>proposed adjustments<QUOT.END ID="QE0174" REF.START="QS0174" CODE="2019"/>, <QUOT.START ID="QS0175" REF.END="QE0175" CODE="2018"/>agreed targets<QUOT.END ID="QE0175" REF.START="QS0175" CODE="2019"/>) justify the conclusion that the producers had arrived at a common purpose.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>201</NO.P><TXT>As regards the year 1979 in particular, having regard both to the whole of the note of the meeting of <DATE ISO="19790926">26</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19790927">27 September 1979</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 12) and to the undated table taken from the premises of ICI (main statement of objections, Appendix 55) headed <QUOT.START ID="QS0176" REF.END="QE0176" CODE="2018"/>Producers' Sales to West Europe<QUOT.END ID="QE0176" REF.START="QS0176" CODE="2019"/>, which sets out for all the polypropylene producers of western Europe the sales figures in kilotonnes for 1976, 1977 and 1978 and figures under the headings <QUOT.START ID="QS0177" REF.END="QE0177" CODE="2018"/>1979 actual<QUOT.END ID="QE0177" REF.START="QS0177" CODE="2019"/>, <QUOT.START ID="QS0178" REF.END="QE0178" CODE="2018"/>revised target<QUOT.END ID="QE0178" REF.START="QS0178" CODE="2019"/> and <QUOT.START ID="QS0179" REF.END="QE0179" CODE="2018"/>79<QUOT.END ID="QE0179" REF.START="QS0179" CODE="2019"/>, it is apparent that the need to tighten the quota system agreed for 1979 for the last three months of that year was recognized at that meeting. The term <QUOT.START ID="QS0180" REF.END="QE0180" CODE="2018"/>tight<QUOT.END ID="QE0180" REF.START="QS0180" CODE="2019"/>, read in conjunction with the restriction to 80% of one-twelfth of planned annual sales, indicates that the<?PAGE NO="II-1098"?> scheme originally planned for 1979 had to be made tighter for those last three months. That interpretation of the note is borne out by the abovementioned table because it contains, under the heading <QUOT.START ID="QS0181" REF.END="QE0181" CODE="2018"/>79<QUOT.END ID="QE0181" REF.START="QS0181" CODE="2019"/> in the last column to the right of the column headed <QUOT.START ID="QS0182" REF.END="QE0182" CODE="2018"/>revised target<QUOT.END ID="QE0182" REF.START="QS0182" CODE="2019"/>, figures which must correspond to the quotas initially fixed. These had to be circumscribed because they had been drawn up on the basis of an overoptimistic market evaluation, as was also the case in 1980. The reference in the third paragraph of point 31 of the Decision, to a scheme <QUOT.START ID="QS0183" REF.END="QE0183" CODE="2018"/>proposed or agreed in Zurich to limit monthly sales to 80% of the average achieved during the first eight months of the year<QUOT.END ID="QE0183" REF.START="QS0183" CODE="2019"/> does not tell against these findings. That reference, read in conjunction with point 54 of the Decision, is to be taken as meaning that sales volume targets had already been set initially for the monthly sales of the first eight months of 1979.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>202</NO.P><TXT>As regards the year 1980, the Court finds that it is clear from the table dated <DATE ISO="19800226">26 February 1980</DATE> found at the premises of ATO (main statement of objections, Appendix 60), which contains a column headed <QUOT.START ID="QS0184" REF.END="QE0184" CODE="2018"/>agreed targets 1980<QUOT.END ID="QE0184" REF.START="QS0184" CODE="2019"/> and from the note of the January 1981 meetings (main statement of objections, Appendix 17) at which producers, not including the applicant, compared the quantities actually sold (<QUOT.START ID="QS0185" REF.END="QE0185" CODE="2018"/>Actual kt<QUOT.END ID="QE0185" REF.START="QS0185" CODE="2019"/>) with the targets set (<QUOT.START ID="QS0186" REF.END="QE0186" CODE="2018"/>Target kt<QUOT.END ID="QE0186" REF.START="QS0186" CODE="2019"/>), that sales volume targets were set for the whole of the year. Those documents are further supported by a table dated <DATE ISO="19801008">8 October 1980</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 57) comparing two columns, one setting out the <QUOT.START ID="QS0187" REF.END="QE0187" CODE="2018"/>1980 Nameplate Capacity<QUOT.END ID="QE0187" REF.START="QS0187" CODE="2019"/>and the other the <QUOT.START ID="QS0188" REF.END="QE0188" CODE="2018"/>1980 Quota<QUOT.END ID="QE0188" REF.START="QS0188" CODE="2019"/> for the various producers.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>203</NO.P><TXT>As regards the differences between the figures set out as <QUOT.START ID="QS0189" REF.END="QE0189" CODE="2018"/>quotas<QUOT.END ID="QE0189" REF.START="QS0189" CODE="2019"/> in the tables, it is to be noted, first, that they are small and, secondly, that they are due to the adjustment of the tonnages corresponding to the market shares allocated to the various producers. Such adjustments, made necessary by the change in the overall market, must be considered to be a normal operation in a quota system when the participants in the system make a mistake in their estimate of total demand, as was the case for 1980 in this instance.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1099"?><NP><NO.P>204</NO.P><TXT>As regards the year 1981, the complaint against the producers is that they took part in negotiations in order to reach a quota agreement for that year and that in that context they communicated their <QUOT.START ID="QS0190" REF.END="QE0190" CODE="2018"/>aspirations<QUOT.END ID="QE0190" REF.START="QS0190" CODE="2019"/> and, pending such an agreement, agreed as a temporary measure to restrict their monthly sales to one-twelfth of 85% of the <QUOT.START ID="QS0191" REF.END="QE0191" CODE="2018"/>target<QUOT.END ID="QE0191" REF.START="QS0191" CODE="2019"/> agreed for 1980 during February and March 1981, that they took the previous year's quota as a theoretical entitlement for the rest of the year, that they reported their sales each month to the meetings and, finally, that they monitored whether the sales matched their theoretical quota allocated to them.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>205</NO.P><TXT>The existence of negotiations between the producers in order to achieve the establishment of a quota system and the communication of their <QUOT.START ID="QS0192" REF.END="QE0192" CODE="2018"/>aspirations<QUOT.END ID="QE0192" REF.START="QS0192" CODE="2019"/> during those negotiations are attested by various pieces of evidence such as tables setting out, for each producer, its <QUOT.START ID="QS0193" REF.END="QE0193" CODE="2018"/>actual<QUOT.END ID="QE0193" REF.START="QS0193" CODE="2019"/> figures and <QUOT.START ID="QS0194" REF.END="QE0194" CODE="2018"/>targets<QUOT.END ID="QE0194" REF.START="QS0194" CODE="2019"/> for the years 1979 and 1980 and its <QUOT.START ID="QS0195" REF.END="QE0195" CODE="2018"/>aspirations<QUOT.END ID="QE0195" REF.START="QS0195" CODE="2019"/> for 1981 (main statement of objections, Appendices 59 and 61); a table written in Italian (main statement of objections, Appendix 62) setting out, for each producer, its quota for 1980, the proposals of other producers as to the quota to be allocated to it for 1981 and its own <QUOT.START ID="QS0196" REF.END="QE0196" CODE="2018"/>aspirations<QUOT.END ID="QE0196" REF.START="QS0196" CODE="2019"/> for 1981, and an ICI internal note (main statement of objections, Appendix 63) describing the progress of those negotiations in which it is stated:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0197" REF.END="QE0197" CODE="2018"/>Taking the various alternatives discussed at yesterday's meeting we would prefeito limit the volume to be shared to no more than the market is expected to reach in 1981, say 1.35 million tonnes. Although there has been no further discussion with Shell, the four majors could set the lead by accepting a reduction in their 1980 target market share of about 0.35% provided the more ambitious smaller producers such as Solvay, Saga, DSM, Chemie Linz, Anic/SIR also tempered their demands. Provided the majors are in agreement the anomalies could be best handled by individual discussions at Senior level, if possible before the meeting in Zurich<QUOT.END ID="QE0197" REF.START="QS0197" CODE="2019"/>.</P></QUOT.S></P><?PAGE NO="II-1100"?><P>That document is accompanied by a compromise proposal, supported by figures, which compares the result obtained for each producer in relation to 1980 (<QUOT.START ID="QS0198" REF.END="QE0198" CODE="2018"/>% of 1980 target<QUOT.END ID="QE0198" REF.START="QS0198" CODE="2019"/>)</P></NP><NP><NO.P>206</NO.P><TXT>The adoption of temporary measures consisting in a reduction of monthly sales to one-twelfth of 85% of the target agreed for the previous year during February and March 1981 is apparent from the note of the meetings of January 1981, in which it is stated:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0199" REF.END="QE0199" CODE="2018"/>In the meantime [February-March] monthly volume would be restricted to V12 of 85% of the 1980 target with a freeze on customers<QUOT.END ID="QE0199" REF.START="QS0199" CODE="2019"/>.</P></QUOT.S></P><P>The applicant cannot claim that such a precise indication constitutes a general exhortation.</P></NP><NP><NO.P>207</NO.P><TXT>The fact that the producers each took their previous year's quota as a theoretical entitlement for the rest of the year and monitored whether sales matched that quota by exchanging their sales figures each month is established by the combination of three documents: first, a table dated <DATE ISO="19811221">21 December 1981</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 67) setting out for each producer its sales broken down by month, the last three columns, relating to the months of November and December and the annual total, having been added by hand; secondly, an undated table written in Italian entitled <QUOT.START ID="QS0200" REF.END="QE0200" CODE="2018"/>Scarti per società<QUOT.END ID="QE0200" REF.START="QS0200" CODE="2019"/> (<QUOT.START ID="QS0201" REF.END="QE0201" CODE="2018"/>Differences company by company<QUOT.END ID="QE0201" REF.START="QS0201" CODE="2019"/>) and found at the premises of ICI (main statement of objections, Appendix 65), comparing for each producer for the period January-December 1981 the <QUOT.START ID="QS0202" REF.END="QE0202" CODE="2018"/>actual<QUOT.END ID="QE0202" REF.START="QS0202" CODE="2019"/> sales figures with the <QUOT.START ID="QS0203" REF.END="QE0203" CODE="2018"/>theoretic<QUOT.END ID="QE0203" REF.START="QS0203" CODE="2019"/> figures; and finally, an undated table found at the premises of ICI (main statement of objections, Appendix 68) comparing for each<?PAGE NO="II-1101"?> producer for the period January-November 1981 sales figures and market shares with those for 1979 and 1980 and making a forward projection to the end of the year.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>208</NO.P><TXT>The first table shows that the producers exchanged their monthly sales figures. Combined with the comparisons made between those figures and the figures achieved in 1980 (comparisons made in two other tables covering the same period) such an exchange information which an independent operator would keep strictly secret as confidential business information corroborates the conclusions reached in the Decision.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>209</NO.P><TXT>The applicant's participation in those various activities is apparent, first, from its participation in the meetings at which those activities took place, in particular the January 1981 meetings, and, secondly, from the fact that its name appears in the various documents mentioned above. Furthermore, in those documents are set out figures with regard to which ICI in fact stated in its reply to a written question from the Court — to which other applicants refer in their own reply — that it would not have been possible to ascertain them on the basis of the statistical data available under the Fides system.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>210</NO.P><TXT>As regards 1982, the complaint against the producers is that they took part in negotiations in order to reach an agreement on quotas for that year; that in that connection they communicated their tonnage aspirations; that, failing a definitive agreement, they communicated at meetings their monthly sales figures during the first half of the year, comparing them with the percentage achieved during the previous year and, during the second half of the year, attempting to restrict their monthly sales to the same percentage of the overall market achieved in the first six months of that year.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>211</NO.P><TXT>The existence of negotiations between the producers with a view to introducing a quota system and the communication of their aspirations during those negotiations are evidenced, firstly, by a document entitled <QUOT.START ID="QS0204" REF.END="QE0204" CODE="2018"/>Scheme for discussions <QUOT.START ID="QS0205" REF.END="QE0205" CODE="201C"/>quota<?PAGE NO="II-1102"?> system 1982<QUOT.END ID="QE0205" REF.START="QS0205" CODE="201D"/><QUOT.END ID="QE0204" REF.START="QS0204" CODE="2019"/> (main statement of objections, Annex 69), which contains, for all the addressees of the Decision with the exception of Hercules, the tonnage to which each producer considered itself entitled and, in addition, for some of them (all the producers except Anic, Linz, Petrofina, Shell and Solvay), the tonnage which in their own view had to be allocated to the other producers; secondly, by an ICI note entitled <QUOT.START ID="QS0206" REF.END="QE0206" CODE="2018"/>Polypropylene 1982, Guidelines<QUOT.END ID="QE0206" REF.START="QS0206" CODE="2019"/> (main statement of objections, Appendix 70(a)), in which ICI analyses the negotiations in progress; thirdly, by a table dated <DATE ISO="19820217">17 February 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 70(b)), in which various sale-sharing proposals are compared — one of which, entitled <QUOT.START ID="QS0207" REF.END="QE0207" CODE="2018"/>ICI Original Scheme<QUOT.END ID="QE0207" REF.START="QS0207" CODE="2019"/>, has undergone, in another handwritten table, minor adjustments made by Monte in a column entitled <QUOT.START ID="QS0208" REF.END="QE0208" CODE="2018"/>Milliavacca 27/1/82<QUOT.END ID="QE0208" REF.START="QS0208" CODE="2019"/> (the name is that of a Monte employee) (main statement of objections, Appendix 70(c)) — and, lastly, by a table written in Italian (main statement of objections, Appendix 71) which is a complex proposal (mentioned in the second paragraph <HT TYPE="ITALIC">infine</HT> of point 58 of the Decision).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>212</NO.P><TXT>The measures adopted for the first half of the year are established by the note of the meeting on <DATE ISO="19820513">13 May 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 24), which states <HT TYPE="ITALIC">inter alia:</HT></TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0209" REF.END="QE0209" CODE="2018"/>To support the move a number of other actions are needed (a) limit sales volume to some agreed prop, of normal sales<QUOT.END ID="QE0209" REF.START="QS0209" CODE="2019"/>.</P></QUOT.S></P><P>The implementation of those measures is evidenced by the note of the meeting of <DATE ISO="19820609">9 June 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 25) to which is attached a table setting out for each producer the <QUOT.START ID="QS0210" REF.END="QE0210" CODE="2018"/>actual<QUOT.END ID="QE0210" REF.START="QS0210" CODE="2019"/> figure for its sales for the months from January to April 1982 compared with a figure representing the <QUOT.START ID="QS0211" REF.END="QE0211" CODE="2018"/>theoretical based on 1981 av[erage] market share<QUOT.END ID="QE0211" REF.START="QS0211" CODE="2019"/>, and by the note of the meeting held on <DATE ISO="19820720">20</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19820721">21 July 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 26) as regards the period January-May 1982 and by that of <DATE ISO="19820820">20 August 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 28) as regards the period from January to July 1982. In this regard, the theoretical nature of the quota serving as a reference for the<?PAGE NO="II-1103"?> comparison with actual monthly sales is due to the fact that no quota could be agreed for the whole of 1981, yet it does not deprive that comparison of its significance as a method of monitoring the restriction of monthly sales by reference to the previous year.</P></NP><NP><NO.P>213</NO.P><TXT>The measures adopted for the second half are proved by the note of the meeting of <DATE ISO="19821006">6 October 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 31), which states: <QUOT.START ID="QS0212" REF.END="QE0212" CODE="2018"/>In October this would also mean restraining sales to the Jan/June achieved market share of a market estimated at 100 kt<QUOT.END ID="QE0212" REF.START="QS0212" CODE="2019"/> and then <QUOT.START ID="QS0213" REF.END="QE0213" CODE="2018"/>Performance against target in September was reviewed<QUOT.END ID="QE0213" REF.START="QS0213" CODE="2019"/>. Attached to that note is a table entitled <QUOT.START ID="QS0214" REF.END="QE0214" CODE="2018"/>September provisional sales versus target (based on Jan-June market share applied to demand estimated] at 120 Kt)<QUOT.END ID="QE0214" REF.START="QS0214" CODE="2019"/>. The continuation of those measures is confirmed by the note of the meeting of <DATE ISO="19821202">2 December 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 33) to which is attached a table comparing, for November 1982, the <QUOT.START ID="QS0215" REF.END="QE0215" CODE="2018"/>Actual<QUOT.END ID="QE0215" REF.START="QS0215" CODE="2019"/> sales with the <QUOT.START ID="QS0216" REF.END="QE0216" CODE="2018"/>Theoretical<QUOT.END ID="QE0216" REF.START="QS0216" CODE="2019"/> figures calculated from the <QUOT.START ID="QS0217" REF.END="QE0217" CODE="2018"/>J-June % of 125 Kt<QUOT.END ID="QE0217" REF.START="QS0217" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>214</NO.P><TXT>The Court finds that, as regards the year 1981 and the two halves of 1982, the Commission was entitled to conclude from the mutual monitoring, conducted at the regular meetings, of the implementation of a system for restricting monthly sales by reference to a previous period that that system had been adopted by the participants at the meetings.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>215</NO.P><TXT>As regards 1983, the Court finds that it is clear from the documents produced by the Commission (main statement of objections, Appendices 33, 85 and 87) that at the end of 1982 and the beginning of 1983 the polypropylene producers discussed a quota system for 1983, that the applicant participated in the meetings at which<?PAGE NO="II-1104"?> those discussions took place and that on those occasions it supplied data relating to its sales.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>216</NO.P><TXT>It follows that the applicant participated in the negotiations held with a view to arriving at a quota system for 1983.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>217</NO.P><TXT>As regards the question whether those negotiations actually succeeded as far as the first two quarters of 1983 are concerned, as is asserted in the Decision (point 63, third paragraph, and point 64), it is clear from the note of the meeting on <DATE ISO="19830601">1 June 1983</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 40) that the applicant indicated at that meeting its sales figures for May, as did nine other undertakings. Moreover, the following passage appears in the record of an internal meeting of the Shell group on <DATE ISO="19830317">17 March 1983</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 90):</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0218" REF.END="QE0218" CODE="2018"/>... and would lead to a market share of approaching 12% and well above the agreed Shell target of 11%. Accordingly the following reduced sales targets were set and agreed by the integrated companies<QUOT.END ID="QE0218" REF.START="QS0218" CODE="2019"/>.</P></QUOT.S></P><P>The new tonnages are given, after which it is noted that:</P><?PAGE NO="II-1105"?><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0219" REF.END="QE0219" CODE="2018"/>this would be 11.2 Pet of a market of 395 kt. The situation will be monitored carefully and any change from this agreed plan would need to be discussed beforehand with the other PIMS members<QUOT.END ID="QE0219" REF.START="QS0219" CODE="2019"/>.</P></QUOT.S></P></NP><NP><NO.P>218</NO.P><TXT>The Court finds in this regard that the Commission was entitled to conclude from the combination of those two documents that the negotiations between the producers had led to the introduction of a quota system. The internal note of the Shell group shows that that undertaking was asking its national sales companies to reduce their sales, not in order to reduce the overall sales volume of the Shell group, but in order to restrict the group's share of the overall market to 11%. Such a restriction expressed in terms of market share can be explained only in connection with a quota system. Furthermore, the note of the meeting on <DATE ISO="19830601">1 June 1983</DATE> constitutes additional evidence of the existence of such a system, since an exchange of information on the monthly sales of the various producers has the primary purpose of monitoring compliance with the commitments made.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>219</NO.P><TXT>Finally, the 11% figure for Shell's market share appears not only in the Shell internal note but also in two other documents, namely an ICI internal note in which ICI states that Shell is proposing this figure for itself, Hoechst and ICI (main statement of objections, Appendix 87) and the note drawn up by ICI of a meeting held on <DATE ISO="19821129">29 November 1982</DATE> between ICI and Shell at which the previous proposal was referred to (main statement of objections, Appendix 99).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>220</NO.P><TXT>Owing to the identical aim of the various measures for restricting sales volumes — namely to reduce the pressure exerted on prices by excess supply — the Commission was entitled to conclude that those measures were part of a quota system.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>221</NO.P><TXT>For the rest, the Court finds that the applicant's arguments tend not to prove directly that it did not participate in the fixing of sales volume targets but to demonstrate that those targets were not adhered to by the producers, a fact which,<?PAGE NO="II-1106"?> in the applicant's view, invalidates any conclusion that such targets were set. It is to be observed in this regard that the Decision acknowledges that the sales volume targets were not adhered to, which shows that the Decision likewise does not rely on implementation by the applicant of the decisions reached in the discussions on sales volume targets in order to prove that the applicant participated in the fixing of those targets.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>222</NO.P><TXT>In any event, in participating in the meetings at which various producers were criticized after not adhering to what had been agreed, the applicant took part in making those criticisms and by this means exerted pressure on those producers.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>223</NO.P><TXT>It is also to be observed that, in order to support the foregoing findings of fact, the Commission had no need to use documents which it had not mentioned in its statements of objections or which it had not disclosed to the applicant.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>224</NO.P><TXT>Having regard to the foregoing considerations, it must be concluded that the Commission has established to the requisite legal standard that the applicant was one of the polypropylene producers amongst whom common purposes emerged in relation to sales volume targets for 1979, 1980 and the first half of 1983 and to the restriction of their monthly sales by reference to a previous period for the years 1981 and 1982 which are mentioned in the Decision and which formed part of a quota system.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>F.</NO.P><TXT>Conclusion</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>225</NO.P><TXT>It follows that the Commission has proved, to the requisite legal standard, that all the findings of fact which it made in the contested decision against the applicant are correct and that, consequently, contrary to the applicant's contention, it observed the rules governing the burden of proof. It also follows that the Commission did not come to a premature or preconceived judgment on the basis of the evidence which it adduces in support of its findings of fact.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="II-1107"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>2.</NO.P><TXT>The application of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>A.</NO.P><TXT>Legal characterization</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(a)</NO.P><TXT>The contested decision</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>226</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (point 81, first paragraph), the whole complex of schemes and arrangements decided on in the context of a system of regular and institutionalized meetings constituted a single continuing <QUOT.START ID="QS0220" REF.END="QE0220" CODE="2018"/>agreement<QUOT.END ID="QE0220" REF.START="QS0220" CODE="2019"/> within the meaning of Article 85(1).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>227</NO.P><TXT>In the present case, the producers, by subscribing to a common plan to regulate prices and supply on the polypropylene market, participated in an overall framework agreement which was manifested in a series of more detailed sub-agreements worked out from time to time (Decision, point 81, third paragraph).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>228</NO.P><TXT>The Decision (point 82, first paragraph) goes on to state that in the detailed working out of the overall plan express agreement was reached in many areas, such as individual price initiatives and annual quota schemes. In some cases the producers may not have reached a consensus on a definitive scheme, such as quotas for 1981 and 1982. However, their adoption of stopgap measures including exchange of information and the monitoring of actual monthly sales against achievements in some previous reference period not only involved an express agreement to set up and operate such measures but also indicated an implied agreement to maintain as far as possible the respective positions of the producers.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>229</NO.P><TXT>As regards more specifically the December 1977 initiative, the Decision states (in the third paragraph of point 82) that even in front of customers at the EATP meetings producers like Hercules, Hoechst, ICI, LINZ, Rhône-Poulenc, SAGA and Solvay were stressing the perceived need for concerted action to increase prices. There was further contact on pricing between the producers outside the EATP meetings. In the light of these admitted contacts the Commission considers that behind the device of one or more producers complaining of inadequate levels of profitability and suggesting joint action while the others expressed <QUOT.START ID="QS0221" REF.END="QE0221" CODE="2018"/>support<QUOT.END ID="QE0221" REF.START="QS0221" CODE="2019"/> for such moves lay on existing agreement on pricing. It adds that even in the absence<?PAGE NO="II-1108"?> of further contacts such a device might still indicate a sufficient consensus for an agreement within the meaning of Article 85(1).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>230</NO.P><TXT>The conclusion that there was one continuing agreement was not altered by the fact that some producers inevitably were not present at every meeting. Any <QUOT.START ID="QS0222" REF.END="QE0222" CODE="2018"/>initiative<QUOT.END ID="QE0222" REF.START="QS0222" CODE="2019"/> took several months to plan and to implement and it would make little difference to the involvement of a producer if it was absent on occasion (Decision, point 83, first paragraph).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>231</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (point 86, first paragraph), the operation of the cartel, being based on a common and detailed plan, constituted an <QUOT.START ID="QS0223" REF.END="QE0223" CODE="2018"/>agreement<QUOT.END ID="QE0223" REF.START="QS0223" CODE="2019"/> within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>232</NO.P><TXT>The Decision states (in point 86, second paragraph) that the concepts of <QUOT.START ID="QS0224" REF.END="QE0224" CODE="2018"/>agreements<QUOT.END ID="QE0224" REF.START="QS0224" CODE="2019"/> and <QUOT.START ID="QS0225" REF.END="QE0225" CODE="2018"/>concerted practices<QUOT.END ID="QE0225" REF.START="QS0225" CODE="2019"/> are distinct, but cases may arise where collusion presents some of the elements of both forms of prohibited cooperation.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>233</NO.P><TXT>A concerted practice relates to a form of cooperation between undertakings which, without having reached the stage where an agreement properly so-called has been concluded, knowingly substitutes practical cooperation for the risks of competition (Decision, point 86, third paragraph).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>234</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (point 87, first paragraph), the object of the Treaty in creating a separate concept of concerted practice was to forestall the possibility of undertakings evading the application of Article 85(1) by colluding in an anticompetitive manner falling short of a definite agreement by, for example, informing each other in advance of the attitude each intends to adopt, so that each could regulate its commercial conduct in the knowledge that its competitors would<?PAGE NO="II-1109"?> behave in the same way (see the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case 48/69 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission,</HT> cited above).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>235</NO.P><TXT>In its judgment in Joined Cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114/73 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">(Suiker Unie</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission,</HT> cited above) the Court of Justice held that the criteria of coordination and cooperation laid down by its case-law, which in no way require the working out of an actual plan, must be understood in the light of the concept inherent in the competition provisions of the Treaty according to which each economic operator must determine independently the commercial policy which he intends to adopt in the common market. This requirement of independence does not deprive undertakings of the right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing or anticipated conduct of their competitors but it does strictly preclude any direct or indirect contact between them the object or effect whereof is either to influence the conduct on the market of an actual or potential competitor or to disclose to such a competitor the course of conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or contemplate adopting on the market (Decision, point 87, second paragraph). Such conduct may fall under Article 85(1) as a <QUOT.START ID="QS0226" REF.END="QE0226" CODE="2018"/>concerted practice<QUOT.END ID="QE0226" REF.START="QS0226" CODE="2019"/> even where the parties have not reached agreement in advance on a common plan defining their action in the market but adopt or adhere to collusive devices which facilitate the coordination of their commercial behaviour (Decision, point 87, third paragraph, first sentence).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>236</NO.P><TXT>The Decision also points out (point 87, third paragraph, third sentence) that, in a complex cartel, some producers at one time or another might not express their definite assent to a particular course of action agreed by the others but nevertheless indicate their general support for the scheme in question and conduct themselves accordingly. In certain respects, therefore, the continuing cooperation and collusion of the producers in the implementation of the overall agreement may display the characteristics of a concerted practice (Decision, point 87, fourth paragraph, second sentence).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>237</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (point 87, fifth paragraph), the importance of the concept of a concerted practice does not thus result so much from the distinction between it and an <QUOT.START ID="QS0227" REF.END="QE0227" CODE="2018"/>agreement<QUOT.END ID="QE0227" REF.START="QS0227" CODE="2019"/> as from the distinction between forms of collusion falling under Article 85(1) and mere parallel behaviour with no element of concertation.<?PAGE NO="II-1110"?> Nothing therefore turns in the present case upon the precise form taken by the collusive arrangements.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>238</NO.P><TXT>In the Decision (paragraph 88, first and sentence paragraphs) it is stated that most of the producers, having argued during the administrative procedure that their conduct in relation to alleged price initiatives did not result from any <QUOT.START ID="QS0228" REF.END="QE0228" CODE="2018"/>agreement<QUOT.END ID="QE0228" REF.START="QS0228" CODE="2019"/> within the meaning of Article 85 (see the Decision, point 82), went on to assert that it could not form the basis of a finding of concerted practice either. The latter concept, they argued, required some <QUOT.START ID="QS0229" REF.END="QE0229" CODE="2018"/>overt act<QUOT.END ID="QE0229" REF.START="QS0229" CODE="2019"/> in the market, which was claimed to be wholly absent from the present case: no pricelists or <QUOT.START ID="QS0230" REF.END="QE0230" CODE="2018"/>target prices<QUOT.END ID="QE0230" REF.START="QS0230" CODE="2019"/> were ever communicated to customers. This argument is rejected in the Decision: were it necessary in the present case to rely on proof of a concerted practice, the requirement for some steps to be taken by the participants to realise their common object was fully met. The various price initiatives were a matter of record. It was also undeniable that the individual producers took parallel action to implement them. The steps taken by the producers both individually and collectively were apparent from the documentary evidence: meeting reports, internal memoranda, instructions and circulars to sales offices and letters to customers. It was wholly irrelevant whether or not they <QUOT.START ID="QS0231" REF.END="QE0231" CODE="2018"/>published<QUOT.END ID="QE0231" REF.START="QS0231" CODE="2019"/> price lists. The price instructions themselves provided not only the best available evidence of the action taken by each producer to implement the common object but also by their content and timing reinforced the evidence of collusion.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(b)</NO.P><TXT>Arguments of the parties</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>239</NO.P><TXT>The applicant contests the Commission's view that, although it is possible to distinguish conceptually between an agreement and a concerted practice, the question of the matter to be proved is not significantly affected. According to the applicant, which refers to the Opinion of Mr Advocate General Gand in the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Quinine</HT> cases (judgment of the Court of Justice in Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="41/69" YEAR="1970" PAGE.ECR="661">41/69 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">AC F Chernie/arma NVv Commission</HT> [1970] ECR 661</REF.DOC.ECR>), the distinction between those two concepts is not of <QUOT.START ID="QS0232" REF.END="QE0232" CODE="2018"/>negligible importance<QUOT.END ID="QE0232" REF.START="QS0232" CODE="2019"/>, in particular as far as the matter to be proved is concerned.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>240</NO.P><TXT>It submits that in order to establish the existence of an agreement it is necessary to prove the existence not only of consensus but also of a sufficient commitment to<?PAGE NO="II-1111"?> the objectives of the agreement and a sufficient degree of mutual obligation. ICI does admit the existence of unilateral commitments which were reflected in the reiteration by the undertakings of their personal commitment during the meetings. But it contends that the Commission may not deduce any meeting of minds from those commitments whose unilateral character prove, on the contrary, the lack of any prior general commitment and the absence of consensus.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>241</NO.P><TXT>According to the applicant, a concerted practice requires conduct in the marketplace on the part of the participants, as is clear of the word <QUOT.START ID="QS0233" REF.END="QE0233" CODE="2018"/>practice<QUOT.END ID="QE0233" REF.START="QS0233" CODE="2019"/>. However, the Commission has not established the existence of such conduct, which cannot be constituted by the sending to sales offices of internal price instructions, as the Commission claims, since these are rarely communicated to customers and since ICI published practically no price lists, which were usually for internal use.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>242</NO.P><TXT>According to the Commission, on the other hand, the question whether collusion or a cartel is to be described for legal purposes as an agreement or concerted practice within the meaning of Article 85 or whether the collusion has elements of both is of negligible importance. In its view, the terms <QUOT.START ID="QS0234" REF.END="QE0234" CODE="2018"/>agreement<QUOT.END ID="QE0234" REF.START="QS0234" CODE="2019"/> and <QUOT.START ID="QS0235" REF.END="QE0235" CODE="2018"/>concerted practice<QUOT.END ID="QE0235" REF.START="QS0235" CODE="2019"/> subsume the various types of arrangements by which competitors, instead of determining their future competitive conduct in complete independence, mutually accept a limitation of their freedom of action on the market as a result of direct or indirect contacts between them.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>243</NO.P><TXT>The Commission submits that the purpose of using the various terms found in Article 85 is to prohibit the whole gamut of collusive devices and not to prescribe a different treatment for each of them. It is therefore irrelevant where the line of demarcation is to be drawn between terms designed to encompass the whole range of prohibited behaviour. The <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ratio legis</HT> of the inclusion in Article 85 of the term <QUOT.START ID="QS0236" REF.END="QE0236" CODE="2018"/>concerted practice<QUOT.END ID="QE0236" REF.START="QS0236" CODE="2019"/> is to cover, besides agreements, those types of collusion which merely reflect a form of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">defacto</HT> coordination or practical cooperation but which are nevertheless capable of distorting competition (judgment in Case 48/69 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ICI</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission,</HT> cited above, paragraphs 64 to 66).</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1112"?><NP><NO.P>244</NO.P><TXT>It states that, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice (judgment in Joined Cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114/73 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Suiker Unie</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission,</HT> cited above, paragraphs 173 and 174), it is a matter of precluding any direct or indirect contact between operators, the object or effect whereof is either to influence the conduct on the market of an actual or potential competitor or to disclose to such a competitor the course of conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt, or contemplate adopting, on the market. A concerted practice therefore exists wherever there is contact between competitors prior to their behaviour on the market.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>245</NO.P><TXT>In the Commission's view, there is a concerted practice as soon as there is concerted action having as its purpose the restriction of the autonomy of the undertakings in relation to one another, even if no actual conduct has been found on the market. In its view, the argument revolves around the meaning of the word <QUOT.START ID="QS0237" REF.END="QE0237" CODE="2018"/>practice<QUOT.END ID="QE0237" REF.START="QS0237" CODE="2019"/>. It opposes the argument put forward by ICI that the word has the narrow meaning of <QUOT.START ID="QS0238" REF.END="QE0238" CODE="2018"/>conduct on the market<QUOT.END ID="QE0238" REF.START="QS0238" CODE="2019"/>. In its view, the word can cover the mere act of participating in contacts, provided that they have as their purpose the restriction of the undertakings' autonomy.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>246</NO.P><TXT>The Commission goes on to argue that if the two requirements — concerted action and conduct on the market — were required for the existence of a concerted practice, as ICI suggests, a whole gamut of practices having as their purpose, but not necessarily as their effect, the distortion of competition on the common market would not be caught by Article 85. Part of the purpose of Article 85 would thus be frustrated. Furthermore, that view is not in accordance with the case -law of the Court of Justice concerning the concept of concerted practice (judgment in Case 48/69 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ICI m Commission,</HT> cited above, paragraph 66; judgment in Joined Cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114/73 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Suiker Unie</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission,</HT> cited above, paragraph 26; and judgment in Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="172/80" YEAR="1981" PAGE.ECR="2021">172/80 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Züchner</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Bayerische Vereinsbank AG</HT> [1981] ECR 2021, paragraph 14</REF.DOC.ECR>). Although those judgments each mention practices on the market, they are not mentioned as an element constituting the infringement, as the applicant maintains, but as a factual element from which the concerted action may be deduced. According to that case-law, no actual conduct on the market is required. All that is required is contact between economic operators, characteristic of their abandonment of their necessary autonomy.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1113"?><NP><NO.P>247</NO.P><TXT>In the Commission's view, it is not therefore necessary, in order for there to be an infringement of Article 85, for the undertakings to have put into practice that which they have discussed together. The offence under Article 85(1) exists in full once the intention to substitute cooperation for the risks of competition has materialized in cooperation, without there necessarily being, after the event, conduct on the market which may be found.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>248</NO.P><TXT>From this the Commission concludes that, as far as the question of evidence is concerned, the agreement and the concerted practice may be proved by means of both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. In the present case, it had no need to use circumstantial evidence, such as parallelism of conduct on the market, since it possessed direct evidence of the collusion consisting in particular of the meeting notes.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>249</NO.P><TXT>The Commission concludes by stating that it was entitled to describe the infringement found in the present case primarily as an agreement and, alternatively and in so far as is necessary, as a concerted practice.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>250</NO.P><TXT>As regards the existence of an agreement, the Commission states that the producers repeatedly showed their commitment and that it is not necessary to take into account the fact that the degree of support of certain participants may have fluctuated during the period. That commitment was shown in the price instructions given by the producers, in particular by ICI, which confirmed the reality of the agreements.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(c)</NO.P><TXT>Assessment by the Court</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>251</NO.P><TXT>Contrary to the applicant's assertions, the Commission characterized each factual element found against the applicant as either an agreement or a concerted practice for the purposes of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty. It is apparent from the second paragraph of point 80, the third paragraph of point 81 and the first paragraph of point 82 of the Decision, read together, that the Commission characterized each of those different elements primarily as an <QUOT.START ID="QS0239" REF.END="QE0239" CODE="2018"/>agreement<QUOT.END ID="QE0239" REF.START="QS0239" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1114"?><NP><NO.P>252</NO.P><TXT>It is likewise apparent from the second and third paragraphs of point 86, the third paragraph of point 87 and point 88 of the Decision, read together, that the Commission in the alternative characterized the elements of the infringement as <QUOT.START ID="QS0240" REF.END="QE0240" CODE="2018"/>concerted practices<QUOT.END ID="QE0240" REF.START="QS0240" CODE="2019"/> where those elements either did not enable the conclusion to be drawn that the parties had reached agreement in advance on a common plan defining their action on the market but had adopted or adhered to collusive devices which facilitated the coordination of their commercial behaviour, or did not, owing to the complexity of the cartel, make it possible to establish that some producers had expressed their definite assent to a particular course of action agreed by the others, although they had indicated their general support for the scheme in question and conducted themselves accordingly. The Decision thus concludes that in certain respects the continuing cooperation and collusion of the producers in the implementation of an overall agreement may display the characteristics of a concerted practice.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>253</NO.P><TXT>Since it is clear from the case-law of the Court of Justice that in order for there to be an agreement within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty it is sufficient that the undertakings in question should have expressed their joint intention to conduct themselves on the market in a specific way (see the judgment in Case 41/69 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">AC F Chemiefarma</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission,</HT> cited above, paragraph 112, and the judgment in Joined Cases <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="209/78—215/78+218/78" YEAR="1980" PAGE.ECR="3125">209 to 215 and 218/78 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Van Landewyck</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> [1980] ECR 3125, paragraph 86</REF.DOC.ECR>), this Court holds that the Commission was entitled to treat the common intentions existing between the applicant and the other polypropylene producers, which the Commission has proved to the requisite legal standard and which related to floor prices in 1977, price initiatives, measures designed to facilitate the implementation of the price initiatives, sales volume targets for the years 1979 and 1980 and the first half of 1983 and measures for restricting monthly sales by reference to a previous period for 1981 and 1982, as agreements within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>254</NO.P><TXT>Furthermore, having established to the requisite legal standard that the effects of the price initiatives continued to last until November 1983, the Commission was fully entitled to take the view that the infringement continued until at least November 1983. It is indeed clear from the case-law of the Court of Justice that Article 85 is also applicable to agreements which are no longer in force but which continue to produce their effects after they have formally ceased to be in force (judgment in Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="243/83" YEAR="1985" PAGE.ECR="2015">243/83 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Binon &amp; Cie SA</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Agence et Messagerie de la Presse SA</HT> [1985] ECR 2015, paragraph 17</REF.DOC.ECR>).</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1115"?><NP><NO.P>255</NO.P><TXT>For a definition of the concept of concerted practice, reference must be made to the case-law of the Court of Justice, which shows that the criteria of coordination and cooperation previously laid down by that Court must be understood in the light of the concept inherent in the competition provisions of the EEC Treaty according to which each economic operator must determine independently the policy which he intends to adopt on the common market. Although this requirement of independence does not deprive economic operators of the right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing and anticipated conduct of their competitors, it does, however, strictly preclude any direct or indirect contact between such operators the object or effect whereof is either to influence the conduct on the market of an actual or potential competitor or to disclose to such a competitor the course of conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or contemplate adopting on the market (judgment in Joined Cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114/73 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Suiker Unie and Others</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission,</HT> cited above, paragraphs 173 and 174).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>256</NO.P><TXT>In the present case, the applicant participated in meetings concerning the fixing of price and sales volume targets during which information was exchanged between competitors about the prices they wished to see charged on the market, the prices they intended to charge, their profitability thresholds, the sales volume restrictions they judged to be necessary, their sales figures or the identity of their customers. Through its participation in those meetings, it took part, together with its competitors, in concerted action the purpose of which was to influence their conduct on the market and to disclose to each other the course of conduct which each of the producers itself contemplated adopting on the market.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>257</NO.P><TXT>Accordingly, not only did the applicant pursue the aim of eliminating in advance uncertainty about the future conduct of its competitors but also, in determining the policy which it intended to follow on the market, it could not fail to take account, directly or indirectly, of the information obtained during the course of those meetings. Similarly, in determining the policy which they intended to follow, its competitors were bound to take into account, directly or indirectly, the information disclosed to them by the applicant about the course of conduct which the applicant itself had decided upon or which it contemplated adopting on the market.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1116"?><NP><NO.P>258</NO.P><TXT>The Commission was therefore justified, in the alternative, having regard to their purpose, in categorizing the regular meetings of polypropylene producers in which the applicant participated between December 1977 and September 1983 as concerted practices within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>259</NO.P><TXT>As regards the question whether the Commission was entitled to find that there was a single infringement, described in Article 1 of the Decision as <QUOT.START ID="QS0241" REF.END="QE0241" CODE="2018"/>an agreement and concerted practice<QUOT.END ID="QE0241" REF.START="QS0241" CODE="2019"/>, the Court points out that, in view of their identical purpose, the various concerted practices followed and agreements concluded formed part of schemes of regular meetings, target-price fixing and quota fixing.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>260</NO.P><TXT>Those schemes were part of a series of efforts made by the undertakings in question, in pursuit of a single economic aim, namely to distort the normal movement of prices on the market in polypropylene. It would thus be artificial to split up such continuous conduct, characterized by a single purpose, by treating it as consisting of a number of separate infringements. The fact is that the applicant took part — over a period of years — in an integrated set of schemes constituting a single infringement, which progressively manifested itself in both unlawful agreements and unlawful concerted practices.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>261</NO.P><TXT>The Commission was also entitled to characterize that single infringement as <QUOT.START ID="QS0242" REF.END="QE0242" CODE="2018"/>an agreement and a concerted practice<QUOT.END ID="QE0242" REF.START="QS0242" CODE="2019"/>, since the infringement involved at one and the same time factual elements to be characterized as <QUOT.START ID="QS0243" REF.END="QE0243" CODE="2018"/>agreements<QUOT.END ID="QE0243" REF.START="QS0243" CODE="2019"/> and factual elements to be characterized as <QUOT.START ID="QS0244" REF.END="QE0244" CODE="2018"/>concerted practices<QUOT.END ID="QE0244" REF.START="QS0244" CODE="2019"/>. Given such a complex infringement, the dual characterization by the Commission in Article 1 of the Decision must be understood not as requiring, simultaneously and cumulatively, proof that each of those factual elements presents the constituent elements both of an agreement and of a concerted practice, but rather as referring to a complex whole comprising a number of factual elements some of which were characterized as agreements and others as concerted practices for the purposes of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty, which lays down no specific category for a complex infringement of this type.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1117"?><NP><NO.P>262</NO.P><TXT>Consequently, the applicant's ground of challenge must be dismissed.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>B.</NO.P><TXT>Object or effect restrictive of competition</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(a)</NO.P><TXT>The contested decision</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>263</NO.P><TXT>The Decision (point 89, first paragraph) points out that Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty expressly mentions as restrictive of competition agreements which directly or indirectly fix selling prices or share markets between producers, which are the essential characteristics of the agreements under consideration in the present case.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>264</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (point 89, second, third and fourth paragraphs), the basic purpose behind the institution of the system of regular meetings and the continuing collusion of the producers was to achieve price increases by means of a complex of agreements and arrangements. By planning common action on price initiatives with target prices for each grade and national currency effective from an agreed date, the producers aimed to eliminate the risks which would be involved in any unilateral attempt to increase prices. Thus, the various quota systems and other mechanisms designed to accommodate the divergent interests of the established producers and the newcomers all had as their ultimate objective the creation of artificial conditions of stability favourable to price rises.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>265</NO.P><TXT>In pursuit of those objectives, the producers were aiming at the organization of the polypropylene market on a basis which substituted for the free operation of competitive forces an institutionalized and systematic collusion between producers which amounted to a cartel (Decision, point 89, fifth paragraph).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>266</NO.P><TXT>The Decision states (in point 90, first and second paragraphs) that it is not strictly necessary, for the application of Article 85(1), given the overtly anticompetitive object of the agreement, for an adverse effect upon competition to be demonstrated. However, in the present case, the evidence shows that the agreement did in fact produce an appreciable effect upon competitive conditions.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1118"?><NP><NO.P>267</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (point 90, third and fourth paragraphs), the agreement in meetings of target prices for each grade and national currency was implemented by the producers all using price instructions to their national sales offices or agents which then had to inform customers of the new price levels. Customers were thus faced with a uniform basic price in each currency for each major grade. Individual customers might benefit from special conditions or discounts, some producers might delay the planned increase or make concessions and some producers might fix their actual prices for some grades or in some countries slightly below the targets while still determining such prices in the context of a general move by all the other producers. However, the setting of a particular price level which was then presented to the market as <QUOT.START ID="QS0245" REF.END="QE0245" CODE="2018"/>the list price<QUOT.END ID="QE0245" REF.START="QS0245" CODE="2019"/> or <QUOT.START ID="QS0246" REF.END="QE0246" CODE="2018"/>the official price<QUOT.END ID="QE0246" REF.START="QS0246" CODE="2019"/> meant that the opportunities for customers to negotiate with producers were already circumscribed and they were deprived of many of the benefits which would otherwise be available from the free play of competitive forces.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>268</NO.P><TXT>In the last paragraph of point 90 the Decision states that the documentary evidence, including the market reports of the producers themselves, shows the existence in the marketplace of concerted price initiatives involving all producers and the close link between these initiatives and the system of regular meetings.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>269</NO.P><TXT>Whilst it is conceded (in the first paragraph of point 91 of the Decision) that the achieved price level generally lagged behind the <QUOT.START ID="QS0247" REF.END="QE0247" CODE="2018"/>targets<QUOT.END ID="QE0247" REF.START="QS0247" CODE="2019"/> and that price initiatives tended to run out of momentum, sometimes eventually resulting in a sharp drop in prices, it is pointed out that the graphs relied upon by the producers themselves show a regular pattern over the years of close parallel movement of target and actual levels. During the period covered by known price initiatives, the price achieved each month moved up toward the agreed target. When there was a sudden price <QUOT.START ID="QS0248" REF.END="QE0248" CODE="2018"/>collapse<QUOT.END ID="QE0248" REF.START="QS0248" CODE="2019"/> (for example, when propylene prices fell) this was arrested by fixing a new and much lower target and the upward trend was reestablished, the success of such a tactic being particularly marked in July to November 1983.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1119"?><NP><NO.P>270</NO.P><TXT>According to the Decision (point 91, second paragraph), the deliveries of most producers in the years when a system was in operation did not generally show a sharp variance from the quota or target which had been allocated.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>271</NO.P><TXT>The Decision concludes (in point 92, first paragraph) that the fact that in practice the cartelization of the market was incomplete and did not entirely exclude the operation of competitive forces does not preclude application of Article 85. Given the large number of producers, their divergent commercial interests and the absence of any enforceable measures of constraint in the event of noncompliance by a producer with agreed arrangements, no cartel could control totally the activities of its participants. The Decision (point 92, last paragraph) also rejects the undertakings' argument that in the absence of their arrangements market developments would have been the same. It points out that what might have occurred had there been no agreement is a matter of speculation but that it is significant that the producers themselves acknowledged the effectiveness of their meetings in rejecting the suggestion in May 1982 that they cease to meet, since it was considered better, if supply and demand were in equilibrium, to take active steps to move prices up rather than leave it to the market.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>272</NO.P><TXT>In point 73 it is stated that the Commission has in any event never maintained that the system of regular meetings controlled fully the operations and sales of the producers or was the only factor affecting the price levels of polypropylene. Indeed the evidence relied upon by the Commission shows that the producers recognized that the market was affected by matters such as changes in demand or raw material price increases beyond their control. In deciding upon the amount, timing, modalities and chances of success of a planned price initiative those market factors had to be taken into account by the producers. One of the main purposes of the meetings, however, was to try to coordinate the response of the producers to such factors. It may also be that price was determined to a large extent by conditions of supply and demand but the documentaiy evidence shows that by means of their volume control or quota systems the producers were attempting to manipulate those conditions.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="II-1120"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(b)</NO.P><TXT>Arguments of the parties</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>273</NO.P><TXT>The applicant notes that, in the Commission's view, the object of the cartel was to substitute for the free operation of competitive forces an institutionalized and systematic collusion between producers amounting to a cartel. In the applicant's view, however, what matters in ascertaining whether an agreement or a concerted practice has an anticompetitive object is not the subjective intention of the participants but the actual object of the arrangements. That object must be assessed objectively, that is to say in the light of the actual economic context (judgment of the Court of Justice in Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="56/65" YEAR="1966" PAGE.ECR="235">56/65 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Société Technique Minière</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH</HT> [1966] ECR 235</REF.DOC.ECR>, in Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="5/69" YEAR="1969" PAGE.ECR="295">5/69 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Franz Volk</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Établissements J. Verwaecke</HT> [1969] ECR 295</REF.DOC.ECR>, and in Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="CST" NO.CASE="99/79" YEAR="1980" PAGE.ECR="2511">99/79 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Lancôme S. A and Costar France Nederland B.V.M Etos B. V. and Albert Heyn Supermart B. V.</HT> [1980] ECR 2511, paragraph 24</REF.DOC.ECR>). The Commission must, moreover, prove, on the basis of objective facts, that there was a sufficient probability that the object could be achieved. The assessment of an arrangement cannot be divorced from its actual effects upon competition, even if it is only the object of the arrangement which is being considered. That is particularly true in the present case in so far as there is no written agreement.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>274</NO.P><TXT>The applicant considers that, in view of the intense competition prevailing in the polypropylene sector and the fact that prices, sales volumes and market developments were determined by competitive forces, it was highly unlikely that any anticompetitive action could have had the slightest effect on the market. The Commission is therefore condemning the undertakings for their intentions.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>275</NO.P><TXT>The applicant claims that the Commission ought to have made an analysis of the economic effect of the cartel in order to justify its finding in the Decision (points 90 to 92) that there was an appreciable effect upon the market. The only method recognized by the Court for assessing impact on competition is economic analysis, which enables a link to be established between the object or intention, on the one hand, and the actual effect on the market, on the other (judgment of the Court of Justice in Case 99/79 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Lancôme,</HT> cited above).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>276</NO.P><TXT>According to the applicant, the Decision is marked by an almost complete absence of economic arguments, the Commission merely relying on bold assertions, showing its preference for <QUOT.START ID="QS0249" REF.END="QE0249" CODE="2018"/>gut feeling<QUOT.END ID="QE0249" REF.START="QS0249" CODE="2019"/> over the very concept of economic analysis. Thus, the Commission makes no attempt to address ICI's detailed analysis<?PAGE NO="II-1121"?> regarding the alleged link between the meetings and the prominent facts of the marketplace, nor the economic evidence of Mr Freeman and Professor Budd, which was confirmed by Professor Albach of the University of Bonn. These studies and experts' reports show that the characteristics of the polypropylene industry were such that any attempt to operate a cartel would have been unlikely to succeed, that during the whole period in question the conduct of ICI and the other producers was consistent with sound competition and incompatible with collusion, that actual prices were determined by market forces and not by <QUOT.START ID="QS0250" REF.END="QE0250" CODE="2018"/>target<QUOT.END ID="QE0250" REF.START="QS0250" CODE="2019"/> prices and that movements in market shares were not related to any quotas and that, consequently, this period was characterized by the intensity of the competition which was not impaired in any way by the alleged collusion.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>277</NO.P><TXT>According to the applicant, the Decision and defence submitted to the Court by the Commission are confused and ambiguous as to the effects of the producers' behaviour on competitive conditions: those effects are described at times as appreciable (Decision, point 90), at times as insignificant (points 73 and 108), and at other times as nonexistent (point 91). In particular, on the question whether the presentation of target prices to customers in the form of price instructions reduced the possibilities of negotiation and resulted in higher prices than would otherwise have prevailed, on the question whether the introduction of a quota system led to a fall in production and an increase in prices, and on the question whether the arrangements regarding prices and sales volumes distorted competition by disrupting the structure of trade between Member States, the Commission's case is obscure and, in any event, based on mere hypotheses.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>278</NO.P><TXT>It again emphasizes that the methods used by the Commission to make up for the lack of an economic analysis are unsatisfactory. For example, the Commission is unjustified in regarding the fact that the producers engaged in price and volume discussions or their belief that prices would rise due to the collusion as proof of there being an effect on the market. Moreover, the Commission's use of economic or statistical language cannot hide the fact that its assertions are not supported by any thorough analysis.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1122"?><NP><NO.P>279</NO.P><TXT>Finally, the applicant claims that the Commission must establish that the quotas or targets influenced actual production to a measurable degree and that production was not determined by market forces; that, even if this was so, the determination of quotas or targets enabled producers with a reasonable degree of certainty to predict the actions of their competitors and that quotas or targets led to a lack of competitive terms offered to consumers or inefficiency at the expense of consumers (Decision of <DATE ISO="19711223">23 December 1971</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Nederlandse Cement-Handekmaatschapppij,</HT> <REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="022" DATE.PUB="1972" PAGE.FIRST="16">Official Journal 1972 L 22, p. 16</REF.DOC.OJ>).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>280</NO.P><TXT>As regards the role of new producers, ICI contends that, contrary to what the Commission states, there was no significant correlation between trends in market share and membership of one of the two categories <QUOT.START ID="QS0251" REF.END="QE0251" CODE="2018"/>new producers<QUOT.END ID="QE0251" REF.START="QS0251" CODE="2019"/> and <QUOT.START ID="QS0252" REF.END="QE0252" CODE="2018"/>larger firms<QUOT.END ID="QE0252" REF.START="QS0252" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>281</NO.P><TXT>The Commission replies that ICI's argument concerning the object of the cartel is based on a wrong analysis of the case-law. It does not follow at all from that case-law that it is necessary to demonstrate the effects of an anticompetitive arrangement when, as in this case, the anticompetitive object is clear from the terms and nature of the arrangement itself. The most that may be deduced from that case-law is the requirement of a potential effect.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>282</NO.P><TXT>The Commission states that the complaints made by the applicant in relation to the effects of the cartel are based first of all on its wrong idea as to the kind of economic impact which the Commission should, in its view, have to show before it can make a finding of infringement of Article 85. The Commission states that it made it perfectly clear in the Decision (points 90 to 92) what kind of economic impact the cartel had.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>283</NO.P><TXT>It further states that in the present case it adduced strong evidence of both the potential and actual effects of the arrangements which amply meet the requirements of the case-law.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1123"?><NP><NO.P>284</NO.P><TXT>The Commission explains that contemporaneous evidence of the facts alleged, such as the meeting notes, showing that the producers themselves believed that prices could be, and were being, pushed up was, in its view, preferable to <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ex post facto</HT> economic theorizing to the opposite effect. In order to assess the effectiveness of the cartel, it was entitled to rely on the records of meetings, from which it is apparent that the producers not only expressed their desire that prices should rise or their confidence that they could be increased as a result of collusion but also affirmed that their efforts had been effective in raising prices, as is shown, for example, by the following passages:</TXT><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0253" REF.END="QE0253" CODE="2018"/>General determination got prices up to DM 2.05 the closest ever to published target prices<QUOT.END ID="QE0253" REF.START="QS0253" CODE="2019"/> (main statement of objections, Appendix 22)</P><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0254" REF.END="QE0254" CODE="2018"/>On the basis of this review eveiyone felt that there was a veiy good opportunity to get a price rise through before the holidays<QUOT.END ID="QE0254" REF.START="QS0254" CODE="2019"/> (main statement of objections, Appendix 24)</P><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0255" REF.END="QE0255" CODE="2018"/>The need for security was emphasized as was our determination to have a concerted push rather than a protracted crawl towards higher prices<QUOT.END ID="QE0255" REF.START="QS0255" CODE="2019"/> (main statement of objections, Appendix 31)</P><?PAGE NO="II-1124"?><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0256" REF.END="QE0256" CODE="2018"/>The fall in polypropylene prices appears to have halted... The producers, however, plan to increase prices and have set targets... They are reasonably confident of achieving these targets<QUOT.END ID="QE0256" REF.START="QS0256" CODE="2019"/> (main statement of objections, Appendix 36)</P><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0257" REF.END="QE0257" CODE="2018"/>It would be silly not to try for a price increase under these conditions and we are aiming for a raffia level of around 2 DM in September. It is obviously impossible to make such a jump in one step and we have therefore decided to make an interim move which will be implemented now... <QUOT.END ID="QE0257" REF.START="QS0257" CODE="2019"/> (main statement of objections, Appendix 39).</P></NP><NP><NO.P>285</NO.P><TXT>In the Commission's view, the judgment which the Court of Justice gave in the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Lancôme</HT> case (Case 99/79, cited above), relied upon by the applicant, does not establish a requirement for economic studies but simply the requirement <QUOT.START ID="QS0258" REF.END="QE0258" CODE="2018"/>to examine the competition within the actual context in which it would occur in the absence of the agreement in dispute<QUOT.END ID="QE0258" REF.START="QS0258" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>286</NO.P><TXT>The Commission maintains that the Decision is perfectly clear and consistent with regard to the effects of the cartel and that ICI's complaints are based on a misrepresentation of the passages in the Decision (points 73 and 74, 90 to 92 and 108) relating to the effect of the price and quota agreements. The effects were not total but appreciable.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>287</NO.P><TXT>The Commission points out that the question whether the fixing of quotas was fully or partially achieved is secondary. It contests ICI's argument concerning the conditions under which it may be concluded that an agreement on quotas is caught<?PAGE NO="II-1125"?> by Article 85(1). In its view, that argument is based on an incorrect interpretation of the judgment of the Court of Justice in the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Cementhandelaren</HT> case (Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="8/72" YEAR="1972" PAGE.ECR="977">8/72 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Vereniging van Cementhandelaren</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> [1972] ECR 977</REF.DOC.ECR>).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>288</NO.P><TXT>With regard to new producers, the Commission points out that all it was saying was that some fluctuation was to be expected, given the volatile state of the market and that, moreover, it did not claim that all the producers adhered exactly to their allocated targets.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(c)</NO.P><TXT>Assessment by the Court</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>289</NO.P><TXT>ICI's line of argument seeks to demonstrate that its participation in the regular meetings of polypropylene producers was not caught by Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty since its competitive conduct on the market showed that that participation had no anticompetitive object or effect. The applicant claims, in particular, that the requirement for an anticompetitive object must be interpreted as requiring a potential effect on competition and contends that in the present case the economic studies which it has produced demonstrated that it was impossible for the cartel to have any effect on the market.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>290</NO.P><TXT>Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty prohibits as incompatible with the common market all agreements between undertakings or concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in particular those which consist in directly or indirectly fixing purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions and in sharing markets or sources of supply.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>291</NO.P><TXT>The Court repeats that it is clear from its assessments relating to the findings of fact made by the Commission that the purpose of the regular meetings which the applicant attended together with competitors was, in particular, to fix price targets and sales volumes.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1126"?><NP><NO.P>292</NO.P><TXT>In this regard, it is to be noted that various producers have stated, in the pleadings which they have submitted to the Court, that the prices charged for polypropylene on the European market were lower than the world prices for polypropylene. In those circumstances, it cannot be ruled out that agreements concluded between an overwhelming majority of the polypropylene producers, if they had been strictly observed, might have had an effect on the market.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>293</NO.P><TXT>Even if the agreements were not always successful, they were apt to have an effect on competition and therefore had an anticompetitive object within the meaning which the applicant attributes to that term. In this regard, it is to be noted that this analysis is borne out by the view which the producers themselves held about the effect of their agreements, that view being evidenced in particular by the passages in the meeting notes cited by the Commission and by the analyses which the producers made during their meetings (see the notes for <DATE ISO="19820921">21 September</DATE>, <DATE ISO="19821006">6 October</DATE>, <DATE ISO="19821102">2 November</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19821202">2 December 1982</DATE>, main statement of objections, Appendices 30 to 33), which show that the price targets set at the meetings by and large came to be reflected on the market. The applicant's participation in those meetings was not therefore without an anticompetitive object within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>294</NO.P><TXT>As regards the extent of the actual effects of the infringement found and proved by the Commission, this will be examined in the review of the fine imposed on the applicant.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>295</NO.P><TXT>It follows that this ground of challenge must be dismissed.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>C.</NO.P><TXT> Effect on trade between Member States</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(a)</NO.P><TXT>The contested decision</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>296</NO.P><TXT>The Decision states (point 93, first paragraph) that the agreement between the producers was apt to have an appreciable effect upon trade between Member States.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1127"?><NP><NO.P>297</NO.P><TXT>In the present case, the pervasive nature of the collusive agreement, which covered virtually all trade throughout the EEC (and other western European countries) in a major industrial product, must automatically have resulted in the diversion of trade from the channels which would have developed in the absence of such an agreement (Decision, point 93, third paragraph). Fixing prices at an artificial level by agreement rather than by leaving the market to find its own balance impaired the structure of competition throughout the Community. The undertakings were relieved of the immediate need to respond to market forces and deal with the claimed excess capacity problem (Decision, point 93, fourth paragraph).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>298</NO.P><TXT>In point 94 of the Decision the Commission finds that the fixing of target prices for each Member State, although needing to take some account of the prevailing local conditions — discussed in detail in national meetings — must have distorted the pattern of trade and the effect on price levels of differences in efficiency between producers. The system of account leadership, in directing customers to particular named producers, aggravated the effect of the pricing arrangements. The Commission acknowledges that in setting quotas or targets the producers did not break the allocation down by Member State or by region. However, the very existence of a quota or target would operate to restrict the opportunities open to a producer.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(b)</NO.P><TXT>Arguments of the parties</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>299</NO.P><TXT>The applicant objects that, although it demonstrated during the administrative proceedings that there has always been an exceptionally high and increasing degree of inter-State trade on the polypropylene market, the Commission claims that inter-State trade and the structure of competition were appreciably affected by the arrangements, whilst recognizing that the quotas were not allocated per State or per region and that no penalty was provided for in the event of their nonobservance.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1128"?><NP><NO.P>300</NO.P><TXT>In the applicant's view, which it bases on economic studies, the discussions which took place at the meetings did not have the slightest effect on trade between Member States, either to increase it or to reduce it, nor did they have any effect upon the competitive structure. The Commission has failed to prove the contrary (points 93 and 94 of the Decision are, in its view, mere conjecture).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>301</NO.P><TXT>The applicant states that the Commission wholly fails to acknowledge the inevitable economic consequences of such a high degree of inter-State trade and that such a degree of trade shows the transparency of the market, the lack of any restrictions on sales or of any price agreement and the existence of fierce price competition.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>302</NO.P><TXT>In reply to those points the Commission states that an agreement on prices must inevitably have the effect of diverting trade from the channels which would otherwise have developed and that the fixing of prices at an artificial level impairs the structure of competition through the Community. This is not cast in doubt by the acknowledged fact that the volume of trade in polypropylene between the Member States was large.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>303</NO.P><TXT>It adds that, contrary to ICFs contentions, a division of the market is not necessarily achieved through export bans. Any agreement between producers having as its object a restriction of deliveries by each producer to a certain level constitutes a division of the market.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>(c)</NO.P><TXT>Assessment by the Court</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>304</NO.P><TXT>Contrary to the applicant's assertions, the Commission was not required to demonstrate that its participation in an agreement and a concerted practice had had an appreciable effect on trade between Member States. All that is required by Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty is that anticompetitive agreements and concerted practices should be capable of having an effect on trade between Member States. In this regard, it must be concluded that the restrictions on competition found to exist were likely to distort trade patterns from the course which they would<?PAGE NO="II-1129"?> otherwise have followed (see the judgment of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Van Landewyck and Others</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission,</HT> cited above, paragraph 172).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>305</NO.P><TXT>It follows that the Commission has established to the requisite legal standard, in points 93 and 94 of its Decision, that the infringement in which the applicant participated was apt to affect trade between Member States, and it is not necessary for it to demonstrate that the applicant's individual participation affected trade between Member States.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>306</NO.P><TXT>The applicant's ground of challenge cannot therefore be upheld.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>D.</NO.P><TXT>Nature of the agreements on target prices and sales volume targets</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>307</NO.P><TXT>The applicant contends that only arrangements adopted in order to fix actual prices, margins, discounts or terms of payment (Decision of <DATE ISO="19780720">20 July 1978</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">GB-Inno-BM/ Fedetab,</HT> <REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="244" DATE.PUB="1978" PAGE.FIRST="29">Official Journal L 244, p. 29</REF.DOC.OJ>; Decision of <DATE ISO="19730703">3 July 1973</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Gas Water Heaters,</HT> <REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="217" DATE.PUB="1973" PAGE.FIRST="34">Official Journal 1973 L 217, p. 34</REF.DOC.OJ>), those having an actual effect on prices and altering the normal conditions of the market or those enabling the participants to predict competitors' pricing policy with a reasonable degree of certainty are unlawful under Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty (judgment of the Court of Justice in Case 8/72 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Vereniging van Cementhandelaren,</HT> cited above).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>308</NO.P><TXT>In its view, however, the determination of target prices is not an infringement of Article 85 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">per se,</HT> even if the fixing of selling prices or the partitioning of the market do constitute infringements. In order to determine in a particular case whether the setting of target prices does in fact amount to such an infringement, it<?PAGE NO="II-1130"?> is necessary for the Commission to establish, with credible evidence, on the facts of the particular case, that target prices influenced selling prices to a measurable degree and that prices were not determined by market forces and that, even if that were so, the setting of target prices enabled sellers with a reasonable degree of certainty to predict the selling policy of their competitors. The applicant contends that the Commission has failed to establish either of those matters, which, moreover, are contradicted by the factual and economic evidence.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>309</NO.P><TXT>The Commission replies that, contrary to the applicant's contentions, an agreement having as its object the determination of target prices is caught by the prohibition laid down in Article 85(1) even if it has no actual proven effects on the market. The applicant's argument is based on a wrong interpretation of the judgment in the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Cementhandelaren</HT> case (cited above, paragraphs 19 and 21), which also prohibits the fixing of target prices. Finally, the Commission disputes the applicant's argument that it is necessary to establish that the target prices influenced actual prices to a measurable degree and that the fixing of those target prices must enable producers to predict the selling policy of their competitors.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>310</NO.P><TXT>The Court considers that for the purposes of the application of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty the fixing of target prices constitutes direct or indirect fixing of selling prices as mentioned, by way of example, in point (a) of that provision, which prohibits all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which have an anticompetitive object or effect.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>311</NO.P><TXT>The purpose of Article 85(1), and in particular of point (a) thereof, is to prohibit undertakings from distorting the normal formation of prices on the markets. It is clear, however, from the note of the meeting held on <DATE ISO="19820513">13 May 1982</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 24) that the object of the agreements made by the producers at the meetings was to fix a price level higher than that which they could expect to see if they determined their prices independently. Thus, it was at that meeting that the applicant noted, after Solvay had proposed to end the meetings following the restoration of balance between supply and demand, that:</TXT><?PAGE NO="II-1131"?><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0259" REF.END="QE0259" CODE="2018"/>The general response was that it was always better to talk than not and that if supply + demand were so closely in balance we should be taking active steps to move prices up rather than let them find their own level<QUOT.END ID="QE0259" REF.START="QS0259" CODE="2019"/>.</P></QUOT.S></P><P>The Court therefore considers that the distinction made by the applicant between the fixing of target prices and the fixing of prices is a purely semantic distinction which has no relevance.</P></NP><NP><NO.P>312</NO.P><TXT>It follows that this ground of challenge must be dismissed.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>3.</NO.P><TXT>Conclusion</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>313</NO.P><TXT>From all the foregoing considerations it follows that all the applicant's grounds of challenge relating to the findings of fact and to the application of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty by the Commission in the contested decision must be dismissed.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>The statement of reasons</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>314</NO.P><TXT>The applicant contends that the Decision is wrongly or insufficiently reasoned. In its view, it follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice (Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="24/62" YEAR="1963" PAGE.ECR="63">24/62 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Federal Republic of Germany</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> [1963] ECR 63</REF.DOC.ECR>; Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="73/74" YEAR="1975" PAGE.ECR="1491">73/74 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Groupement des Fabricants de Papiers Pe'mts de Belgique and Others</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> [1975] ECR 1491</REF.DOC.ECR>; Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="323/82" YEAR="1984" PAGE.ECR="3809">323/82 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Intermitís SA</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> [1984] ECR 3809</REF.DOC.ECR>; Joined Cases <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="296/82+318/82" YEAR="1985" PAGE.ECR="809">296 and 318/82 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Kingdom of the Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek B. V.</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> [1985] ECR 809</REF.DOC.ECR>; Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="203/85" YEAR="1986" PAGE.ECR="2049">203/85 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Nicolet Instrument GmbH</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Flughafen</HT> [1986] ECR 2049</REF.DOC.ECR>; Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="258/84" YEAR="1987" PAGE.ECR="1923">258/84 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Nippon Seiko KK</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> [1987] ECR 1923, paragraph 28</REF.DOC.ECR>) that the<?PAGE NO="II-1132"?> reasons of a decision should set out the principal rules of law and of fact upon which it is based and that it should set out clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the Community authority. In the present case, the Decision does not set out in a clear and relevant manner the evidence on which it is based in so far as it deals with matters of law and of fact, in particular with the economic aspects and the fines. Furthermore, the Decision does not indicate that the Commission took account of much of the evidence adduced by the applicant relating to its conduct on the market and the lack of effects of the cartel.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>315</NO.P><TXT>In the reply, the applicant further states that throughout the administrative proceedings the Commission failed to identify, or to identify with sufficient particularity, the nature of the allegations and findings made against the producers in relation to the effect, as to both prices and quotas, of any arrangements there might have been. In particular, the Commission changed its view during the administrative proceedings and contradicted itself on the question of the actual achievement of target prices and target quotas.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>316</NO.P><TXT>The Commission replies that ICI confuses sufficient reasoning with correct reasoning. It states that the Decision is particularly long and detailed and that it deals with all the principal arguments advanced during the administrative proceedings.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>317</NO.P><TXT>The Commission contends that the submission that the Decision lacks sufficient detail constitutes a new submission which must be rejected on this ground under Article 42(2) of the Rules of Procedure. In any event, the submission is not well founded.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>318</NO.P><TXT>This Court observes that the Court of Justice has consistently held (see in particular its judgment in Joined Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Van Landewyck,</HT> cited above, paragraph 66, and its judgment in Joined Cases <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="240/82—242/82+261/82+262/82+268/82+269/82" YEAR="1985" PAGE.ECR="3831">240 to 242, 261, 262, 268 and 269/82 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Stichting Sigarettenindustrie</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> [1985] ECR 3831, paragraph 88</REF.DOC.ECR>) that, although under Article 190 of the EEC Treaty the Commission is obliged to state the reasons on which its decisions are based, mentioning the factual and legal elements which provide the legal basis for the measure and the considerations which have led it to adopt its decision, it is not required to discuss all the issues of fact and of law raised by every party during the administrative<?PAGE NO="II-1133"?> proceedings. It follows that the Commission is not obliged to answer those points of fact and law which it considers irrelevant.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>319</NO.P><TXT>It is clear from the assessments of this Court relating to the proof of the infringement as against the applicant that none of the documents and arguments which it has put forward cast any different light on the findings of fact made by the Commission. This applies in particular to the documents and arguments relating to the price initiatives, the measures designed to facilitate the implementation of the price initiatives and the target tonnages and quotas.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>320</NO.P><TXT>Moreover, the Court perceives no intrinsic contradiction in those findings of fact and considers that the Commission did not change its position in this regard.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>321</NO.P><TXT>Consequently, this ground of complaint must be dismissed.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>The fine</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>322</NO.P><TXT>The applicant complains that the Commission infringed Article 15 of Regulation No 17 by not properly assessing in the Decision the duration and gravity of the infringement it was found to have committed.</TXT></NP><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>1.</NO.P><TXT>The limitation period</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>323</NO.P><TXT>The applicant maintains that, even if there was a floor-price agreement in 1977, it is covered by the five-year limitation period laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2988/74 of the Council of <DATE ISO="19741126">26 November 1974</DATE> concerning limitation periods in proceedings and the enforcement of sanctions under the rules of the European Economic Community relating to transport and competition (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="319" DATE.PUB="1974" PAGE.FIRST="1">Official Journal 1974<?PAGE NO="II-1134"?> No L 319, p. 1</REF.DOC.OJ>) since, owing to the different nature of the floor-price agreement and the meetings which, as the Commission acknowledges, were held after December 1977, the Commission cannot presume that the infringement was of a continuing or repeated character within the meaning of Article 1(2) of that regulation.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>324</NO.P><TXT>The Commission maintains that the floor-price agreement is not covered by the limitation rule since there is a clear link between the floor-price agreement and the agreements covering the subsequent periods and that, consequently, the infringement must be described as continuous.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>325</NO.P><TXT>The Court notes that under Article 1(2) of Regulation No 2988/74 the five-year limitation period applying to the Commission's power to impose fines begins to run, in the case of continuing or repeated infringements, on the day on which the infringement ceases.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>326</NO.P><TXT>In the present case, it follows from the Court's assessments relating to proof of the infringement that the applicant participated without interruption in a single infringement which began in mid-1977, when it subscribed to the floor-price agreement, and continued until November 1983.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>327</NO.P><TXT>Consequently, the applicant cannot rely on the limitation period relating to the imposition of fines.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>2.</NO.P><TXT>Duration of the infringement</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>328</NO.P><TXT>The applicant considers that the Commission is wrong to take the commencement of the infringement back to a date earlier than December 1977 since it does not have sufficient evidence of the conclusion of a floor-price agreement and consideration of that agreement is in any event precluded by prescription.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1135"?><NP><NO.P>329</NO.P><TXT>It points out that the Decision recognizes that the infringement in its most serious aspects did not exist before the end of 1978 (point 107, third paragraph).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>330</NO.P><TXT>The applicant also observes that the infringement was not continuous, since the price initiatives extended over only 26 months, the system of quotas was not the subject of an agreement in 1981 and 1982 and the simultaneous application of those two systems, essential for the functioning of the cartel, extended at the most only over a period of less than 10 months. Owing to the sporadic nature of the cartel, the Commission was not therefore entitled to take into consideration the whole period between 1977 and 1983.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>331</NO.P><TXT>As regards the question when the infringement came to an end, the applicant contends that the Commission has not adduced any evidence in support of its assertions relating to ICI's participation <QUOT.START ID="QS0260" REF.END="QE0260" CODE="2018"/>at least until November 1983<QUOT.END ID="QE0260" REF.START="QS0260" CODE="2019"/> or to the effects of the agreement until that date. Consequently, the Commission ought to have found that the infringements had ceased by the time its investigation began, as was the case in the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Peroxygen Products</HT> case and the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Zinc Producers Group</HT> case (Decision of <DATE ISO="19841123">23 November 1984</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Peroxygen Products,</HT> <REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="035" DATE.PUB="1985" PAGE.FIRST="1">Official Journal 1985 L 35, p. 1</REF.DOC.OJ>, and Decision of <DATE ISO="19840806">6 August 1984</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Zinc Producers Group,</HT> <REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="220" DATE.PUB="1984" PAGE.FIRST="27">Official Journal L 220, p. 27</REF.DOC.OJ>).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>332</NO.P><TXT>The applicant concludes that it must benefit from a reduction in the duration of its participation in the infringement and therefore from a substantial and proportionate reduction in the fine (judgments of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="6/73+7/73" YEAR="1974" PAGE.ECR="223">6 and 7/73 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corporation</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> [1974] ECR 223, Opinion at p. 262</REF.DOC.ECR>, and in Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="85/76" YEAR="1979" PAGE.ECR="461">85/76 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hoffmann-La Roche w Commission</HT> [1979] ECR 461</REF.DOC.ECR>).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>333</NO.P><TXT>The Commission replies that it correctly assessed the duration of the infringement. In this regard, it states that the period prior to 1979 must be taken into account, even though the intensity of the infringement was not so great at that time, which is a factor which it states it took into account.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1136"?><NP><NO.P>334</NO.P><TXT>The Commission considers that the argument as to the sporadic nature of the infringement is refuted by the fact that the efforts made by the producers to apply the agreed price increases were continuous in nature.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>335</NO.P><TXT>As regards the question when the infringement came to an end, the Commission maintains that the effects of the agreement continued until at least November 1983, which is the last month in respect of which it is proved that target prices were agreed and implemented and submits that it therefore rightly took into consideration the period from September to November 1983 when determining the amount of the fine.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>336</NO.P><TXT>The Court would point out that it has already found that the Commission properly assessed the duration of the period during which the applicant infringed Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty and that it was therefore entitled to consider that it amounted to a single infringement.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>337</NO.P><TXT>It follows that this ground of challenge must be dismissed.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>3.</NO.P><TXT> The gravity of the infringement</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>A.</NO.P><TXT>The applicant's limited role</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>338</NO.P><TXT>The applicant claims that the Commission asserts, without adducing the slightest proof, that the <QUOT.START ID="QS0261" REF.END="QE0261" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0261" REF.START="QS0261" CODE="2019"/> had particular responsibility in the infringement. That assertion conflicts with that made in the Decision (point 109, sixth paragraph) to the effect that no substantial distinction can be made between the producers on the basis of their individual degree of commitment to the agreed arrangements.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>339</NO.P><TXT>It contends that in reality it was not more committed that the other producers, that its apparently active role was purely administrative, that its greater participation<?PAGE NO="II-1137"?> was due to its size on the market (which cannot be taken into account twice at this level) and that the <QUOT.START ID="QS0262" REF.END="QE0262" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0262" REF.START="QS0262" CODE="2019"/> neither influenced nor directed the meetings.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>340</NO.P><TXT>The Commission, referring to points 67 and 68 of the Decision, takes the view that, as a member of the <QUOT.START ID="QS0263" REF.END="QE0263" CODE="2018"/>club<QUOT.END ID="QE0263" REF.START="QS0263" CODE="2019"/> of the <QUOT.START ID="QS0264" REF.END="QE0264" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0264" REF.START="QS0264" CODE="2019"/>, ICI bears particular responsibility in the infringements committed. Its role in this respect is clear from a number of documents (main statement of objections, Appendices 8, 9, 19, 64, 87, 94 to 100), which mostly report discussions between the <QUOT.START ID="QS0265" REF.END="QE0265" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0265" REF.START="QS0265" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>341</NO.P><TXT>The Court notes that after August 1982 the applicant assumed the chairmanship of the regular meetings of polypropylene producers. The chairing of the meetings was not a purely administrative task, as is shown by the role played by the applicant in the discussions conducted with a view to concluding quota agreements for the years 1982 and 1983, that role being evidenced by the meeting notes for the second half of 1982 (main statement of objections, Appendices 28 to 34) and the notes of meetings or of bilateral contacts between the applicant and other producers (main statement of objections, Appendices 75 to 77, 79 to 81, 83, 88, 89, 93, 95 and 98), or as is also shown by the summaiy notes and the marketsharing schemes drawn up by the applicant (main statement of objections, Appendices 33, 70 and 84 to 87) and the efforts which it made to ensure that the price agreements were adhered to, those efforts being evidenced in particular by an ICI note headed <QUOT.START ID="QS0266" REF.END="QE0266" CODE="2018"/>Pricing actions from December meeting<QUOT.END ID="QE0266" REF.START="QS0266" CODE="2019"/> (main statement of objections, Appendix 34), which shows that the applicant made contact with certain producers in order to persuade them to adhere to the price agreements.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>342</NO.P><TXT>As regards the part played by the applicant in the infringement, it must also be noted that it participated in the preparatory meetings of the <QUOT.START ID="QS0267" REF.END="QE0267" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0267" REF.START="QS0267" CODE="2019"/>. In this regard, a note relating to the meeting attended by representatives of ICI, Shell and Monte on <DATE ISO="19810615">15 June 1981</DATE> (main statement of objections, Appendix 64) shows that those producers envisaged the following solutions in order to resolve the difficulties encountered on the market:</TXT><?PAGE NO="II-1138"?><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0268" REF.END="QE0268" CODE="2018"/>Possible solutions included (a) sanctions (not a great success so far on PVC), (b) control production which is within the power of the bosses (L. thought propylene availability might scupper this), (c) quotas which Z. favoured by L. discounted, (d) new initiative by the 4 majors whereby they accommodated the hooligans in Europe and made up the loss by sales in ROW markets. Given that W European sales would probably not exceed 105 kt/month for the next few months and then not over 125 kt for the remainder of the year say 115 kt average for July-Sept and exports continued at 30 kt/month there would still be a surplus of capacity of 10 kt/month. Shared by the Big Four each would have to drop 2.5 kt/m in Europe equivalent to 30 kt/yr of say 2.3% market share. I said that despite L.&#x201C;s contention about ROW prices that such a proposal would be totally unacceptable to us, (e) a flat price increase of say 20 pf/kg wef 1st July — this avoid unrealistic requirements for the lowest priced business<QUOT.END ID="QE0268" REF.START="QS0268" CODE="2019"/>.</P></QUOT.S></P><P>Similarly, a note written by an ICI employee headed <QUOT.START ID="QS0269" REF.END="QE0269" CODE="2018"/>Sharing the pain<QUOT.END ID="QE0269" REF.START="QS0269" CODE="2019"/> and dated at the beginning of the second half of 1982 (main statement of objections, Appendix 98) states that the introduction of a compensation scheme for reductions in sales volumes <QUOT.START ID="QS0270" REF.END="QE0270" CODE="2018"/>might provide useful elements for the understanding between the<?PAGE NO="II-1139"?> <QUOT.START ID="QS0271" REF.END="QE0271" CODE="201C"/>Big Four<QUOT.END ID="QE0271" REF.START="QS0271" CODE="201D"/><QUOT.END ID="QE0270" REF.START="QS0270" CODE="2019"/>. In its reply to the request for information (main statement of objections, Appendix 8), the applicant stated with regard to that document that:</P><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0272" REF.END="QE0272" CODE="2018"/>The <QUOT.START ID="QS0273" REF.END="QE0273" CODE="201C"/>understanding<QUOT.END ID="QE0273" REF.START="QS0273" CODE="201D"/> between the <QUOT.START ID="QS0274" REF.END="QE0274" CODE="201C"/>Big Four<QUOT.END ID="QE0274" REF.START="QS0274" CODE="201D"/> was recognition that if the prices were to be increased then the <QUOT.START ID="QS0275" REF.END="QE0275" CODE="201C"/>Big Four<QUOT.END ID="QE0275" REF.START="QS0275" CODE="201D"/> producers would have to give a strong lead, even at the expense of their own sales volume. It was thought that a <QUOT.START ID="QS0276" REF.END="QE0276" CODE="201C"/>Compensation Arrangement<QUOT.END ID="QE0276" REF.START="QS0276" CODE="201D"/> between these four producers might have made it easier for them to contemplate the possibility of a commitment on <QUOT.START ID="QS0277" REF.END="QE0277" CODE="201C"/>Target Prices<QUOT.END ID="QE0277" REF.START="QS0277" CODE="201D"/>.<QUOT.END ID="QE0272" REF.START="QS0272" CODE="2019"/>.</P></QUOT.S></P><P>Those items of evidence show that the <QUOT.START ID="QS0278" REF.END="QE0278" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0278" REF.START="QS0278" CODE="2019"/> were aware of the special role which they had to play in the initiatives designed to raise prices. Thus, a Shell internal note dated October 1982 (main statement of objections, Appendix 94) again refers to the price initiatives of the <QUOT.START ID="QS0279" REF.END="QE0279" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0279" REF.START="QS0279" CODE="2019"/>.</P></NP><NP><NO.P>343</NO.P><TXT>The Court finds that it is clear from the evidence set out above and from its assessments relating to proof of the infringement that the Commission has correctly established the role played by the applicant in the infringement and that the Commission indicated in the first paragraph of point 109 of the Decision that it took account of that role when determining the amount of the fine. On this point, it is to be noted that there is no contradiction between the first three paragraphs of point 109 and the sixth paragraph of point 109 since the latter paragraph refers only to the smaller producers.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>344</NO.P><TXT>The Court also finds that the facts established show, by their intrinsic gravity — in particular the fixing of price and sales volume targets — that the applicant did not act rashly or even through lack of care but intentionally.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1140"?><NP><NO.P>345</NO.P><TXT>Consequently, this ground of challenge must be dismissed.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>B.</NO.P><TXT>Lack of individualization in the criteria for determining the fines</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>346</NO.P><TXT>The applicant complains that the Commission did not indicate the extent to which it had taken into account each of the factors involved in the determination of the amount of the fine. It asks the Commission to indicate how it weighted those different factors and to explain the formula which it used, as it did in the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Wood pulp</HT> case (Decision of <DATE ISO="19841219">19 December 1984</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Wood pulp,</HT> <REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="085" DATE.PUB="1985" PAGE.FIRST="1">Official Journal 1985 L 85, p. 1</REF.DOC.OJ>) and as the Court of Justice compelled it to do in the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">IAŽ International</HT> case (judgment in Joined Cases <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="96/82—102/82+104/82+105/82+108/82+110/82" YEAR="1983" PAGE.ECR="3369">96 to 102, 104, 105, 108 and 110/82 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">IAZ International Belgium NVand Others</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission (ANSEALT)</HT> [1983] ECR 3369</REF.DOC.ECR>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>347</NO.P><TXT>It goes on to argue that the Commission has not explained the method of calculating the fines and does not have a consistent position regarding the nature and scope of the factors to be taken into account in the determination of the fines.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>348</NO.P><TXT>The Commission replies that it indicated in points 107 to 109 of the Decision the various factors which it took into account when setting the amount of the fines and that consequently the fine imposed on the applicant is sufficiently reasoned.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>349</NO.P><TXT>The Commission states that when imposing the penalties in this case it acted in accordance with its established policy and the fining principles enunciated by the Court of Justice. It points out that since 1979 it has applied a consistent policy of enforcing competition laws by imposing heavier fines, in particular for the categories of infringements well established in Community law and for particularly serious infringements, like those in this case, so as to reinforce the deterrent effect of penalties. That policy has been approved by the Court of Justice (judgment in Joined Cases <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="100/82—103/80" YEAR="1983" PAGE.ECR="1825">100 to 103/80 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Musique Diffusion Français SA and Others</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission (<QUOT.START ID="QS0280" REF.END="QE0280" CODE="2018"/>Pioneer<QUOT.END ID="QE0280" REF.START="QS0280" CODE="2019"/>)</HT> [1983] ECR 1825, paragraphs 106 and 109</REF.DOC.ECR>), which has also accepted on many occasions that the determination of penalties involves the assessment of a complex array of factors (judgment in the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Pioneer</HT> case, cited<?PAGE NO="II-1141"?> above, paragraph 120, and judgment in Joined Cases 96 to 102, 104, 105, 108 and 110/82 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">IAZ International Belgium NVv Commission,</HT> cited above, paragraph 52).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>350</NO.P><TXT>The Commission states that it is in a particularly good position to make such an assessment, which it claims cannot be overturned except in the case of material error of fact or law.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>351</NO.P><TXT>As regards the <QUOT.START ID="QS0281" REF.END="QE0281" CODE="2018"/>method<QUOT.END ID="QE0281" REF.START="QS0281" CODE="2019"/> of calculating the fines, the Commission maintains that it is not possible to apply a simple mathematical formula valid in all cases and that a complex series of factors must be applied to the circumstances of the case.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>352</NO.P><TXT>The Court notes that in order to determine the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant the Commission first defined the criteria for setting the general level of the fines imposed on the undertakings to which the Decision is addressed (point 108 of the Decision) and then defined the criteria for achieving a fair balance between the fines imposed on each of those undertakings (point 109 of the Decision).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>353</NO.P><TXT>The Court considers that the criteria set out in point 108 of the Decision amply justify the general level of the fines imposed on the undertakings to which the Decision is addressed. In this regard, particular emphasis must be placed on the clear nature of the infringement of Article 85(1) of the Treaty and in particular of points (a), (b) and (c) of that provision, whose terms were known to the polypropylene producers, which acted intentionally and in the greatest secrecy.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>354</NO.P><TXT>The Court also considers that the four criteria mentioned in point 109 of the Decision are relevant and sufficient for the purpose of achieving a fair balance between the fines imposed on each undertaking.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1142"?><NP><NO.P>355</NO.P><TXT>As regards the first two criteria mentioned in point 109 of the Decision — the role played by each of the undertakings in the collusive arrangements and the period of time during which they participated in the infringement —, it must be noted that, since the statement of reasons relating to the determination of the amount of the fine must be interpreted with reference to all the reasons stated in the Decision, the Commission sufficiently individualized the way in which it took account of those criteria in the applicant's case.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>356</NO.P><TXT>As regards the last two criteria — the respective deliveries of the various polypropylene producers to the Community and the total turnover of each of the undertakings —, the Court finds, on the basis of the figures which it requested from the Commission, the accuracy of which has not been challenged by the applicant, that those criteria were not applied unfairly when the fine imposed on the applicant was determined in relation to the fines imposed on other producers.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>357</NO.P><TXT>The Court also finds that it follows from its assessments relating to the findings of fact made by the Commission in order to prove the infringement that the various arguments to which the Commission has, according to the applicant, not replied lack any factual basis.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>358</NO.P><TXT>It follows that this ground of challenge must be dismissed.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>C.</NO.P><TXT>The alleged failure to take proper account of the effects of the infringement</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>359</NO.P><TXT>The applicant maintains that, according to the Commission's published views and practice <HT TYPE="ITALIC">{Thirteenth and Fourteenth Reports on Competition Policy;</HT> Decisions of <DATE ISO="19721123">23 November 1972</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Pittsburgh Corning,</HT> <REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="272" DATE.PUB="1972" PAGE.FIRST="35">Official Journal L 272, p. 35</REF.DOC.OJ>, and of <DATE ISO="19771208">8 December 1977</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hugin-Liptons,</HT> <REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="022" DATE.PUB="1978" PAGE.FIRST="23">Official Journal 1978 L 22, p. 23</REF.DOC.OJ>) and according to the case-law of the Court of Justice (judgments in Case 41/69 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">AC F Chemiefarma,</HT> cited above; Joined Cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114/73 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Suiker Unie,</HT> cited above; Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="35/83" YEAR="1985" PAGE.ECR="363">35/83 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">BAT Cigaretten-Fabriken GmbH</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> [1985] ECR 363</REF.DOC.ECR>), the effects of an infringement constitute an essential or very important element for determining its gravity. The Commission<?PAGE NO="II-1143"?> should take into account the extent to which the infringement is contrary to the objective of the rules of competition. In this regard, the Commission did not take account of the expansion in trade, the unilateral and autonomous conduct of the undertakings in question and the advantages for consumers which benefited from particularly low prices.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>360</NO.P><TXT>It repeats its claim that the Court should order the Commission to disclose to ICI and to the Court the hearing officer's report, which, in its view, contains exonerating evidence as far as the effects are concerned, as well as the documents relating to the statements which were made to the press by the Commission's representatives when the Decision was adopted, according to which the cartel allegedly had the effect of raising prices by 15 to 40%. In this regard, ICI considers that the evidence which it has produced during the proceedings and the Commission's failure to advance any argument with regard to the effects of the infringement justify its claim, despite the order made by the Court of Justice on <DATE ISO="19861211">11 December 1986</DATE> (order in Case 212/86 R <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ICI</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission,</HT> cited above).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>361</NO.P><TXT>The Commission observes that the applicant's protestations about the cartel's lack of effect are to no avail. It maintains that it did take account, in determining the amount of the fines, of the fact that the price initiatives generally did not achieve their objective in full (Decision, point 108). This was already more than the Commission was obliged to do, since not only arrangements which have anticompetitive effects but also those which have anticompetitive objects are caught by Article 85. However, the Commission did not have to take into account the expansion in trade, the producers' unilateral efforts to decrease their production and increase efficiency or the relatively low level of prices, factors which are immaterial for assessing the harmful effects of the cartel with regard to the objectives of the competition rules.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>362</NO.P><TXT>As regards the question of the production of its case file, the Commission sees no reason for the Court to reverse the abovementioned order of <DATE ISO="19861211">11 December 1986</DATE> and points out that ICI has not managed to establish the relevance of its claim.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>363</NO.P><TXT>The Court notes that the Commission distinguished two types of effect produced by the infringement. The first type of effect consisted in the fact that following the agreement in meetings of target prices the producers all instructed their sales<?PAGE NO="II-1144"?> offices to implement that price level; the <QUOT.START ID="QS0282" REF.END="QE0282" CODE="2018"/>targets<QUOT.END ID="QE0282" REF.START="QS0282" CODE="2019"/> thus served as the basis for the negotiation of prices with customers. This led the Commission to conclude that in the present case the evidence showed that the agreement did in fact produce an appreciable effect upon competitive conditions (Decision, point 74, second paragraph, with a reference to point 90). The second type of effect consisted in the fact that movements in prices charged to individual customers as compared with the target prices set in the course of particular price initiatives were consistent with the account given in the documentation found at the premises of ICI and other producers concerning the implementation of the price initiatives (Decision, point 74, sixth paragraph).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>364</NO.P><TXT>The first type of effect has been proved to the requisite legal standard by the Commission from the many price instructions given by the various producers which are consistent with one another as well as with the target prices fixed at the meetings, which were manifestly meant to serve as the basis for the negotiation of prices with customers.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>365</NO.P><TXT>As regards effects of the second type, the Commission had no reason to doubt the accuracy of the analyses carried out by the producers themselves during their meetings (see in particular the notes of the meetings of <DATE ISO="19820921">21 September</DATE>, <DATE ISO="19821006">6 October</DATE>, <DATE ISO="19821102">2 November</DATE> and <DATE ISO="19821202">2 December 1982</DATE>, main statement of objections, Appendices 30 to 33). These show that the target prices set at the meetings were largely achieved on the market and that, even if the Coopers &amp; Lybrand audit and the economic studies commissioned by certain producers were to prove that the analyses made by the producers themselves at their meetings were wrong, that fact is not conducive to a reduction of the fine since the Commission indicated in the last indent of point 108 of the Decision that it took into account, in mitigation of the penalties, the fact that price initiatives generally had not achieved their objective in full and that in the last resort there were no measures of constraint to ensure compliance with quotas or other measures.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>366</NO.P><TXT>Since the grounds of the Decision relating to the determination of the amount of the fines must be read in the light of the other grounds of the Decision, it must be concluded that the Commission rightly took full account of the first type of effect and that it took account of the limited character of the second type of effect. In this regard, it must be noted that the applicant has not indicated in what way the<?PAGE NO="II-1145"?> limited character of the second type of effect was not sufficiently taken into account in mitigation of the amount of the fines.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>367</NO.P><TXT>As regards the applicant's claim for production of the documents which served as a basis for the press conference at which the Commission stated that the infringement had had the effect of increasing the level of prices by 15 to 40%, the Court considers that the applicant has not placed before it any fresh evidence capable of proving that the Decision was motivated by considerations different from those set out therein with regard to the effects of the infringement. Consequently, there are no grounds in the present case for this Court to reopen the order which the Court of Justice made on <DATE ISO="19861211">11 December 1986</DATE> by which it dismissed the claim for the production of the Commission's internal documents relating to the press conference in question.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>368</NO.P><TXT>Consequently, this ground of challenge must be dismissed.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>D.</NO.P><TXT>The claim that insufficient account was taken of the situation of economic crisis</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>369</NO.P><TXT>The applicant maintains that the Commission ought to have taken into account the economic context in which the infringement was committed: the profits or losses made, as it has done in previous decisions (Decision of <DATE ISO="19751217">17 December 1975</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">United Brands,</HT> <REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="095" DATE.PUB="1976" PAGE.FIRST="1">Official Journal 1976 L 95, p. 1</REF.DOC.OJ>, and Decision of <DATE ISO="19781212">12 December 1978</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Kawasaki,</HT> <REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="016" DATE.PUB="1979" PAGE.FIRST="9">Official Journal 1979 L 16, p. 9</REF.DOC.OJ>) and as the Court of Justice did in its judgment in Joined Cases 100 to 103/80 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Pioneer,</HT> cited above; the extent of the damage done to consumers or customers (Commission Decision of <DATE ISO="19761221">21 December 1976</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Tbeal- Watts,</HT> <REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="039" DATE.PUB="1977" PAGE.FIRST="19">Official Journal 1977 L 39, p. 19</REF.DOC.OJ>, Decision of <DATE ISO="19781212">12 December 1978</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Kawasaki,</HT> cited above and Decision of <DATE ISO="19791128">28 November 1979</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Floral,</HT> <REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="039" DATE.PUB="1980" PAGE.FIRST="51">Official Journal 1980 L 39, p. 51</REF.DOC.OJ>; judgment of the Court of Justice in the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Suiker Unie</HT> case, cited above), and the effects of the infringements (Commission Decision of <DATE ISO="19781212">12 December 1978</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Kawasaki,</HT> cited above, and Decision of <DATE ISO="19841219">19 December 1984</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Wood pulp,</HT> cited above; judgment of the Court of Justice in Case 35/83 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">BAT,</HT> cited above).</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1146"?><NP><NO.P>370</NO.P><TXT>The Commission replies that it correctly took into account the economic context, mitigating the fines owing to the economic difficulties of the sector.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>371</NO.P><TXT>The Court finds that the Commission expressly indicated in the last indent of point 108 of the Decision that it took account of the fact that the undertakings had incurred substantial losses on their polypropylene operations over a considerable period, which demonstrates not only that the Commission took account of the losses but also that it thereby took account of the unfavourable economic conditions prevailing in the sector (judgment of the Court of Justice in Case 322/81 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Michelin,</HT> cited above, paragraph 111 et seq.) with a view to determining, having regard also to the other criteria mentioned in point 108, the general level of the fines.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>372</NO.P><TXT>Moreover, the fact that in previous cases the Commission had considered that, in view of the factual circumstances, account had to be taken of the crisis affecting the economic sector in question cannot oblige the Commission to take similar account of such a situation in the present case since it has been proved to the requisite legal standard that the undertakings to which the Decision is addressed committed a particularly serious infringement of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>373</NO.P><TXT>It follows that this ground of challenge must be dismissed.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>E.</NO.P><TXT>The turnover to be taken into account</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>374</NO.P><TXT>The applicant points out that the fine was wrongly fixed on the basis of the total turnover of the undertaking, when the Commission had itself drawn attention to the dangers of such a practice in the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Wood pulp</HT> cases (Decision of <DATE ISO="19841219">19 December 1984</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Wood pulp,</HT> cited above), and that the Court of Justice had also censured the practice in the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Pioneer</HT> case (judgment in Joined Cases 100 to 103/81, cited above). The amount of the fine represents an excessively high percentage of ICI's external polypropylene sales to the Community in the period 1979 to 1983.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1147"?><NP><NO.P>375</NO.P><TXT>The Commission states that although it took account of the size and the market share of the undertakings concerned in assessing the gravity of the infringement, it did not attach any particular importance to this factor. Moreover, the amount of the fine did not exceed 10% of Id's turnover on the polypropylene market in the business year preceding the Decision nor, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">a fortiori,</HT> 10% of the total turnover of the undertaking.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>376</NO.P><TXT>This Court finds that it is clear from the case-law of the Court of Justice (judgment in Joined Cases 100 to 103/80 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Pioneer,</HT> cited above, paragraph 119) that the reference in Article 15(1) of Regulation No 17 making 10% of the turnover in the preceding business year the upper limit for a fine exceeding ECU <FT TYPE="NUMBER">1000000</FT> must be understood as referring to 10% of total turnover.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>377</NO.P><TXT>In the present case, the Commission did not therefore exceed the limit laid down in Article 15(1) of Regulation No 17.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>378</NO.P><TXT>Moreover, the Commission did not base its decision exclusively or even preponderantly on the applicant's turnover in calculating the fine which it imposed upon it.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>379</NO.P><TXT>Consequently, this ground of challenge must be dismissed.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>F.</NO.P><TXT>The principle of equal treatment</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>380</NO.P><TXT>The applicant claims in substance that the Commission infringed the principle of equal treatment in two ways: first, by imposing on the applicant a fine disproportionate to fines imposed in previous cases and, secondly, by imposing upon it a fine which was excessive in relation to those imposed on the other undertakings to which the Decision was addressed.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1148"?><NP><NO.P>381</NO.P><TXT>It states that although the Commission is indeed entitled to have regard to deterrent effect in fixing the level of fines, the need for deterrence should not vary substantially between cases involving infringements of similar type and gravity (judgment of the Court of Justice in the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Pioneer</HT> case, cited above, and judgment in the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Stichting Sigaretten Industrie</HT> case, cited above), in order to avoid discrimination between undertakings in comparable situations. In the present case, an unjustified distinction was made between the <QUOT.START ID="QS0283" REF.END="QE0283" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0283" REF.START="QS0283" CODE="2019"/> and the other incriminated parties. Secondly, the fine was discriminatory and excessive in relation to those imposed in other recent decisions relating to infringements of Article 85 which were at least as serious, since actual prices were fixed, markets shared, customers injured and competition eliminated (Decision of <DATE ISO="19831017">17 October 1983</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Cast Iron &amp; Steels,</HT> <REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="317" DATE.PUB="1983" PAGE.FIRST="1">Official Journal 1983 L 317, p. 1</REF.DOC.OJ>; Decision of <DATE ISO="19840806">6 August 1984</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Zinc Producer Group,</HT> cited above; Decision of <DATE ISO="19881207">7 December 1988</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Flat Glass,</HT> <REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="033" DATE.PUB="1989" PAGE.FIRST="44">Official Journal 1989 L 33, p. 44</REF.DOC.OJ>; Decision of <DATE ISO="19841123">23 November 1984</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Peroxygen Products,</HT> cited above; and Decision of <DATE ISO="19841219">19 December 1984</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Wood pulp,</HT> cited above).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>382</NO.P><TXT>Relying in particular on the point of view expressed both by the Commission itself in its <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy</HT> and by the Opinion of Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn in the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Pioneer</HT> case (judgment in Joined Cases 100 to 103/80, cited above, Opinion at p. 1930), the applicant argues that, whilst each case must be evaluated in its own particular circumstances, the Commission must nevertheless base its decisions on previous decisions and judgments when fixing the scale of fines, in order to avoid any infringement of the principle of protection of the legitimate expectations and create a coherent body of competition law.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>383</NO.P><TXT>The Commission replies that, contrary to what the applicant contends, the Court of Justice has clearly accepted in its judgment in the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Pioneer</HT> case (Joined Cases 100 to 103/80, cited above) that the time may come when the Commission, in order to ensure the application of the Community's competition policy, may legitimately decide to raise the level of fines for certain types of infringement. Given the fact that it is difficult to imagine an infringement of the competition rules more flagrant than the present case, the Commission considers that it was entitled to impose fines which were a true deterrent.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1149"?><NP><NO.P>384</NO.P><TXT>In the rejoinder, the Commission contests the applicant's interpretation of the Opinion delivered by Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn in the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Pioneer</HT> case (cited above). The Advocate General accepted that the Commission was entitled to subject undertakings to heavier fines than may have been applied in the past even for similar infringements, as did the Court of Justice in its judgment in that case.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>385</NO.P><TXT>This Court holds that it is clear from the case-law of the Court of Justice that the Commission's power to impose fines on undertakings which intentionally or negligently commit an infringement of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty is one of the means conferred on the Commission in order to enable it to carry out the supervisory task conferred on it by Community law. That task certainly includes the duty to investigate and punish individual infringements, but it also encompasses the duty to pursue a general policy designed to apply, in competition matters, the principles laid down by the EEC Treaty and to guide the conduct of undertakings in the light of those principles. It was for that reason that the Court of Justice held that in assessing the gravity of an infringement for the purpose of fixing the amount of the fine the Commission must take into consideration not only the particular circumstances of the case but also the context in which the infringement occurs and must ensure that its action has the necessary deterrent effect, especially as regards those types of infringement which are particularly harmful to the attainment of the objectives of the Community. The Court went on to state that it was open to the Commission to have regard to the fact that, although infringements of a specific type were established as being unlawful at the outset of Community competition policy, they were still relatively frequent on account of the profit that some of the undertakings concerned are able to derive from them and, consequently, it was open to the Commission to raise the level of fines so as to reinforce their deterrent effect. The Court concluded that the fact that in the past the Commission had imposed fines of a certain level for certain types of infringement did not mean that it was estopped from raising that level within the limits indicated in Regulation No 17 if that was necessary to ensure the implementation of Community competition policy (judgment in Joined Cases 100 to 103/80 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Pioneer,</HT> cited above, paragraphs 105 to 109).</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>386</NO.P><TXT>In view of those considerations, the Court finds that the Commission rightly described the fixing of target prices and of sales volumes as well as the adoption of measures designed to facilitate the implementation of target prices as a particularly<?PAGE NO="II-1150"?> grave and clear infringement, intended to distort the normal formation of prices on the polypropylene market.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>387</NO.P><TXT>The Court also considers that the comparison of the fine imposed on the applicant with those imposed on the other addressees of the Decision reveals no discrimination, having regard to the duration and particular gravity of the infringement found against it.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>388</NO.P><TXT>This ground of challenge must therefore be dismissed.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>G.</NO.P><TXT>The extent of the applicant's cooperation</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>389</NO.P><TXT>The applicant maintains that the Commission has not taken account of Id's cooperation in the investigation, whereas the Commission has held in previous cases (Decision of <DATE ISO="19841219">19 December 1984</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Wood pulp,</HT> cited above) that such cooperation should entail a significant reduction in the fine, possibly as much as 50%. It further states that as soon as it became aware of the investigation it took measures to prevent such infringements from occurring again.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>390</NO.P><TXT>The Commission states that although ICI claims that it cooperated with the Commission during the investigation and brought the infringement to an end once it was aware of the opening of the investigation, that attitude was taken into consideration but is naturally not sufficient in order to erase the infringement.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>391</NO.P><TXT>The Court notes first of all that in reply to a question asked at the hearing the Commission confirmed that ICI was one of the <QUOT.START ID="QS0284" REF.END="QE0284" CODE="2018"/>very few<QUOT.END ID="QE0284" REF.START="QS0284" CODE="2019"/> producers which cooperated in the Commission's investigation referred to in the last paragraph of point 109 of the Decision.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="II-1151"?><NP><NO.P>392</NO.P><TXT>An analysis of point 109 of the Decision shows that, for its cooperation in the Commission's investigation, the applicant benefited from a fine reduction of ECU <FT TYPE="NUMBER">1000000</FT> at the most. The second and third paragraphs of point 109 distinguish between, on the one hand, Monte and ICI, which consecutively held the chairmanship of the regular meetings of polypropylene producers and, on the other hand, Hoechst and Shell, which, whilst belonging to the <QUOT.START ID="QS0285" REF.END="QE0285" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0285" REF.START="QS0285" CODE="2019"/>, played a lesser role in the <QUOT.START ID="QS0286" REF.END="QE0286" CODE="2018"/>unofficial directorate<QUOT.END ID="QE0286" REF.START="QS0286" CODE="2019"/> formed by the <QUOT.START ID="QS0287" REF.END="QE0287" CODE="2018"/>big four<QUOT.END ID="QE0287" REF.START="QS0287" CODE="2019"/>. That is why the two latter undertakings were fined ECU <FT TYPE="NUMBER">9000000</FT> whilst the fine imposed on Monte was ECU <FT TYPE="NUMBER">11000000</FT> and the fine imposed on the applicant ECU <FT TYPE="NUMBER">10000000</FT>. The difference of ECU <FT TYPE="NUMBER">1000000</FT> between the fine imposed on the applicant and the fine imposed on Monte is not necessarily accounted for solely by the taking into account of ICI's cooperation in the investigation but may also be partially due to the account taken of the <QUOT.START ID="QS0288" REF.END="QE0288" CODE="2018"/>respective deliveries of polypropylene to the Community<QUOT.END ID="QE0288" REF.START="QS0288" CODE="2019"/> of the two undertakings, those of Monte being appreciably higher than the applicant's.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>393</NO.P><TXT>Since the fine imposed on the applicant was reduced by less than 10% on account of its cooperation in the investigation, the Court considers that, having regard to the very detailed reply given by the applicant to the request for information, which concerned not only its own activities but also those of all the undertakings concerned, and without which it would have been much more difficult for the Commission to establish and bring to an end the infringement which is the subject of the Decision, greater account than that taken by the Commission should be taken of the applicant's cooperation in order to determine the amount of the fine to be imposed upon it. Even though the applicant's cooperation was not forthcoming until after the Commission had found compromising documents on its premises, it would have been more difficult for the Commission to understand the significance of those documents and of those which it had taken from other producers' premises and to draw the necessaiy inferences from those documents so as to establish the existence of the infringement and bring it to an end if it had not had the benefit of the applicant's reply to the request for information.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>394</NO.P><TXT>Consequently, the Court, exercising its unlimited jurisdiction, considers that the fine imposed on the applicant should be reduced by a further ECU <FT TYPE="NUMBER">1000000</FT>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>395</NO.P><TXT>Moreover, whilst it is indeed important that the applicant took steps to prevent fresh infringements of Community competition law from being committed by<?PAGE NO="II-1152"?> members of its staff in the future, that circumstance does not alter the fact that an infringement has been found to have been committed in the present case. It must be added in this regard that, here again, the fact that in a previous case the Commission considered that, having regard to the factual circumstances, account should be taken of the steps taken by the undertaking in question in order to prevent fresh infringements of Community competition law from occurring in the future cannot oblige it to take account in the same way of similar measures in the present case since the Commission emphasized in the Decision (point 108) that the infringement of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty was particularly serious and had been committed intentionally and in conditions of great secrecy. It follows that the fine is not to be reduced on this account.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>396</NO.P><TXT>In its application ICI asks the Court <QUOT.START ID="QS0289" REF.END="QE0289" CODE="2018"/>if ICI were to pay the fine at this stage and not to suspend payment according to terms set out in the letter from the Commission to ICI enclosing the Decision<QUOT.END ID="QE0289" REF.START="QS0289" CODE="2019"/>, to order the Commission <QUOT.START ID="QS0290" REF.END="QE0290" CODE="2018"/>to repay to ICI the fine paid or the appropriate proportion thereof, together with interest at the rate of 1% over the lending rate set by the bank in the United Kingdom referred to in Article 4 of the Decision<QUOT.END ID="QE0290" REF.START="QS0290" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>397</NO.P><TXT>The very wording of the applicant's claim shows that it is conditional in so far as it depends on the applicant's having to pay the fine without being able to suspend payment of it. The claim was conditional at the application stage because the period laid down in Article 4 of the Decision for the payment of the fine was three months from notification of the Decision to the applicant. Since the period for bringing this action, in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 173 of the EEC Treaty, was two months from that notification and, consequently, when this action was brought the applicant had not yet decided to pay the fine or to furnish a bank guarantee and undertake to pay interest, as proposed by the Commission in its letter of <DATE ISO="19860522">22 May 1986</DATE> notifying the applicant of the Decision.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>398</NO.P><TXT>The Court observes that at no stage in the proceedings subsequent to the expiry of the time limit laid down in Article 4 of the Decision, when the applicant had to decide either to pay the fine or to furnish a bank guarantee, has the applicant stated that the claim under consideration was no longer conditional; in particular, it confined itself to stating in the reply that it repeated the conclusions of its application. By failing to negate the conditional nature of this claim, the applicant<?PAGE NO="II-1153"?> has not expressed its claim in a definite manner. The claim must therefore be considered inadmissible under Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Economic Community and Article 38(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and Article 44(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance (judgment of the Court of Justice in Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="188/73" YEAR="1974" PAGE.ECR="1099">188/73 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Grassi</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Council</HT> [1974] ECR 1099, at paragraph 7</REF.DOC.ECR>).</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>The reopening of the oral procedure</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>399</NO.P><TXT>By a letter lodged at the Court Registry on <DATE ISO="19920304">4 March 1992</DATE> the applicant asked the Court to reopen the oral procedure and order measures of inquiry as a result of the statements made by the Commission at the hearing in Cases T-79/89, T-84/89 to T-86/89, T-89/89, T-91/89, T-92/89, T-94/89, T-96/89, T-98/89, T-102/89 and T-104/89.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>400</NO.P><TXT>After hearing the views of the Advocate General once again, the Court considers that it is not necessary to order the reopening of the oral procedure in accordance with Article 62 of the Rules of Procedure or to order measures of inquiry as requested by the applicant.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>401</NO.P><TXT>It must be stated that the judgment delivered in the abovementioned cases (judgement of <DATE ISO="19920227">27 February 1992</DATE> in Cases <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="T-79/89+T-84/89—T-86/89+T-89/89+T-91/89+T-92/89+T-94/89+T-96/89+T-98/89+T-102/89+T-104/89" YEAR="1992" PAGE.ECR="II-315">T-79/89, T-84/89 to T-86/89, T-89/89, T-91/89, T-92/89, T-94/89, T-96/89, T-98/89, T-102/89 and T-104/89 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">BASF and Others</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> [1992] ECR II-315</REF.DOC.ECR>) does not in itself justify the reopening of the oral procedure in this case. The Court observes that a measure which has been notified and published must be presumed to be valid. It is thus for a person who seeks to allege the lack of formal validity or the inexistence of a measure to provide the Court with grounds enabling it to look behind the apparent validity of the measure which has been formally notified and published. In this case the applicants have not put forward any evidence to suggest that the measure notified and published had not been approved or adopted by the members of the Commission acting as a college. In particular, in contrast to the PVC cases O'udgement in Cases T-79/89, T-84/89 to T-86/89, T-89/89, T-91/89, T-92/89, T-94/89, T-96/89, T-98/89, T-102/89 and T-104/89, cited above, paragraphs 32 et seq.), the applicants have not put forward any evidence that the principle of the inalterability of the adopted measure was infringed by a change to the text of the Decision after the meeting of the college of Commissioners at which it was adopted.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="II-1154"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>Costs</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>402</NO.P><TXT>Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party's pleadings. Since the application has failed in all essential respects and the Commission has applied for costs to be awarded against the applicant, the latter must be ordered to pay the costs, including those of the proceedings brought before the Court of Justice under Article 91 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><JURISDICTION><INTRO><P>On those grounds,</P><P>THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (First Chamber)</P><P>hereby:</P></INTRO><LIST TYPE="ARAB"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>1.</NO.P><TXT>Sets the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant in Article 3 of the Commission's decision of <DATE ISO="19860423">23 April 1986</DATE> (IV/31.149-Polypropylene, <REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="230" DATE.PUB="1986" PAGE.FIRST="1">Official Journal L 230, p. 1</REF.DOC.OJ>) at ECU <FT TYPE="NUMBER">9000000</FT> or UK£ <FT TYPE="NUMBER">5803173</FT>;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>2.</NO.P><TXT>Dismisses the remainder of the application;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>3.</NO.P><TXT>Orders the applicant to pay the costs, including the costs of the proceedings brought before the Court of Justice under Article 91 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></JURISDICTION></CONTENTS.JUDGMENT><SIGNATURE.CASE><P>Cruz Vilaça</P><P>Schintgen</P><P>Edward</P><P>Kirschner</P><P>Lenaerts</P><P>Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on <DATE ISO="19920310">10 March 1992</DATE>.</P><SIGNATORY><P>H. Jung</P><P>Registrar</P></SIGNATORY><SIGNATORY><P>J. L. Cruz Vilaça</P><P>President</P></SIGNATORY></SIGNATURE.CASE></JUDGMENT>