The President [of the Parliament] announced that she had received from the French authorities on 26 April 2000 a letter from Mr Védrine, French Foreign Minister, and Mr Moscovici, Minister in Charge of European Affairs, dated 20 April 2000, enclosing a dossier concerning the withdrawal of [the appellant's] parliamentary mandate. She announced that she would refer this dossier to the Legal Affairs Committee pursuant to Rule 7(4), second subparagraph ...

Madam President,

The Legal Affairs Committee and Internal Market Committee resumed the examination of the position of Mr Jean-Marie Le Pen at its meeting on 16 May 2000. The Committee is aware that the French Prime Minister s decree, notified to Mr Le Pen on 5 April 2000 and published in the Journal officiel de la République française on 22 April 2000, is now enforceable. However, the Committee notes that, as mentioned in the letter notifying the party concerned of the decree, the latter is entitled to bring proceedings before the Conseil d'État accompanied by a request for suspension of operation of the decree.

In the light of the decision yesterday not to recommend for the time being that the Parliament take formal note of the decree concerning Mr Le Pen, the Committee considered the possible ways forward. In support of this decision, the case of Mr Tapie was raised as a precedent to be followed, with the effect that the European Parliament should take formal note of the decree of disqualification from holding office only after expiry of the period prescribed for bringing proceedings before the Conseil d'État, or after the decision of that court, as the case may be.

Following the opinion of our Legal Affairs and Internal Market Committee, it seems to me to be right, having regard to the irreversible nature of disqualification from holding office, that the European Parliament should take formal notice of the decree only after expiry of the period prescribed for bringing proceedings before the Conseil d'État or after the decision of the latter, as the case may be.

We expect the European Parliament to act in compliance with Community law and take note, by means of a vote, of Mr Le Pen's disqualification from holding office as soon as possible, failing which we reserve the right to take legal action.

I must inform you that on 19 October 2000, I received official notification from the relevant authorities of the French Republic of a ruling by the Council of State on 6 October 2000 rejecting the appeal lodged by Mr Jean-Marie Le Pen against the decree of the French Prime Minister on 31 March 2000 terminating his mandate as Member of the European Parliament.

I must also inform you that I have received a copy of a request for clemency for Mr Le Pen presented to Mr Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, by Mr Charles de Gaulle, Mr Carl Lang, Mr Jean-Claude Martinez and Mr Bruno Gollnisch.

Madam President, the Legal Affairs and Internal Market Committee, following its deliberations of 15 and 16 May last, recommended the suspension of the communication in plenary session of the Parliament's declaration of the disqualification of Mr Jean-Marie Le Pen from holding office. I stress that the Legal Affairs Committee recommended that this communication be suspended until the expiry of the period available to Mr Le Pen for bringing proceedings before the French Conseil d'État or the resolution of those proceedings. I quote here the letter of 17 May that you yourself, Madam President, read out to the Parliament.

The Conseil d'État — as you have stated — has dismissed those proceedings and has duly informed us of this fact. Consequently, there are no further grounds for postponing this announcement to the Parliament, which is mandatory as a matter of primary law, specifically under Article 12(2) of the [1976 Act].

The request for clemency that you have mentioned, Madam President, does not alter the situation, because it is not a legal proceeding. As its name suggests, it is the act of a public authority that does not concern the decree of the French Government which, in accordance with the recommendation of the Legal Affairs Committee, must be notified in plenary session.

Pursuant to Article 12(2) of the [1976 Act], the European Parliament takes note of the notification from the French government confirming the removal from office of Mr Jean-Marie Le Pen.

77.According to settled case-law, only measures which produce binding legal effects such as to affect the interests of an applicant, by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position may be the subject of an action for annulment under Article 230 EC (Case 60/81 IBM v Commission [1981] ECR 2639, paragraph 9, and Case T-87/96 Assicurazioni Generali and Unicredito v Commission [1999] ECR II-203, paragraph 37). Thus, an action for annulment is available in the case of all measures adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have legal effects (Case 22/70 Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263, paragraph 42).78.In the present case, the contested act is the declaration of the President of the Parliament in the plenary session of 23 October 2000 by which, in accordance with Article 12(2) of the [1976 Act], the ... Parliament takes note of the notification of the French Government declaring the disqualification of [the applicant] from holding office.79.It is, therefore, necessary to examine whether that declaration produced binding legal effects such as to affect the interests of the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position.80.It is necessary, in that respect, to note the legal context in which that declaration was made.81.It is not in dispute that, at the material time in the present case, no uniform electoral procedure for the election of Members of the European Parliament had been adopted.82.Accordingly, pursuant to Article 7(2) of the 1976 Act, the electoral procedure for that election continued to be governed by the national provisions in each Member State.83.Thus, in particular, it follows from the first subparagraph of Article 12(2) of the 1976 Act, that the application of national provisions in force in a Member State could bring about a vacancy for a seat of a Member of the European Parliament.84.In application of the 1976 Act, the French Republic adopted, in particular, the 1977 Law. Article 2 of that law provides that the election of Members of the European Parliament is governed by Title I of Book I of the Electoral Code and the provisions of the following chapters. Article 5 of the same law, placed in Chapter III on Conditions of eligibility, ineligibility and incompatibility, provides in particular that Articles LO 127 to LO 130-1 of the Electoral Code shall apply to the election of [Members of the European Parliament], that ineligibility arising during the term of office shall bring that term to an end and that ineligibility will be declared by decree.85.Article 12(2) of the 1976 Act draws a distinction between two situations in which seats of Members of the European Parliament become vacant.86.The first situation, referred to in the first subparagraph of that provision, covers cases where the vacancy arises from the application of national provisions. The second situation, referred to in the second subparagraph of the same provision, covers all other cases.87.Contrary to the applicant's contention in that regard, the first situation is not at all confined to the cases of incompatibility referred to in Article 6 of the 1976 Act, but also includes cases of ineligibility. Whilst it is true that Article 6(3) of the 1976 Act states that Members of the European Parliament to whom paragraphs 1 and 2 become applicable are to be replaced in accordance with Article 12, it cannot be inferred from that reference that that article concerns solely cases of incompatibility covered by Article 6(1) and (2). It is to be observed, furthermore, that nowhere does Article 12 refer to the concept of incompatibility, but uses the much wider concept of vacancy [of the seat].88.In the first situation covered by Article 12(2) of the 1976 Act the role of the Parliament is confined to taking note that the seat of the person concerned is vacant. In the second situation, which covers, for example, the resignation of one of its Members, the Parliament shall establish that there is a vacancy and inform the Member State thereof.89.In the present case, since the contested act was adopted pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 12(2) of the 1976 Act, it is necessary to determine the scope of the process of taking note prescribed by that provision.90.It should be pointed out, in that regard, that the process of taking note refers not to the disqualification from office of the person concerned but to the simple fact that his seat has become vacant as a result of the application of national provisions. In other words, the role of the Parliament is not to bring about the disqualification from office, as the applicant claims, but merely to take note of the declaration, already made by the national authorities, that the seat is vacant, that is to say, of a preexisting legal situation resulting exclusively from a decision of those authorities.91.The Parliament's power of verification in that context is particularly limited. It is essentially confined to verifying whether the seat of the person concerned is in fact vacant. In particular, contrary to the applicant's contention, it is not for the Parliament to verify that the procedure laid down by the applicable national law or the fundamental rights of the person concerned have been respected. That power belongs exclusively to the competent national courts or, as the case may be, to the European Court of Human Rights. It should be noted, moreover, in that regard that, in the present case, the applicant has specifically asserted his rights before both the French Conseil d'État and the European Court of Human Rights. It should also be noted that the Parliament itself never claimed, either in its written pleadings or at the hearing, to have a power of verification as wide as that alleged by the applicant.92.It should be added that such a wide concept of the Parliament's power of verification under the first subparagraph of Article 12(2) of the 1976 Act would imply that it would be open to that institution to challenge the very lawfulness of the disqualification declared by the national authorities and to refuse to take note that a seat was vacant if it considered that it was faced with an irregularity. Rule 8(9) of the Rules of Procedure alone contemplates the possibility for the Parliament to refuse the vacancy of a seat and then only where it is called upon to establish such a vacancy and where there is material inaccuracy or vitiated consent. It would be paradoxical if the Parliament were to have a greater discretion in cases where it is required simply to take note of the vacancy of a seat established by the national authorities than in cases where it itself establishes the vacancy of a seat.93.Those findings are in no way contradicted by the wording of the second subparagraph of Article 7(4) of the Rules of Procedure. As the Parliament and the French Republic rightly point out, that provision applies upstream of the disqualification and therefore of the vacancy of the seat. It provides for the President of the Parliament to refer the matter to the competent committee where the competent authorities of the Member States initiate a procedure which might lead to the disqualification of a [Member of the European Parliament] from holding office. Once that procedure is completed and the vacancy of the seat of the person concerned has been established by the competent national authorities, it remains only for the Parliament to take note of that vacancy, pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 12(2) of the 1976 Act. In any event, pursuant to the principle of the hierarchy of norms, a provision of the Rules of Procedure cannot allow derogation from the provisions of the 1976 Act and confer on the Parliament wider powers than it holds under that act.94.Nor are those findings undermined by the fact that, until 23 October 2000, the applicant continued to sit in the Parliament and to receive the allowances from that institution and that, until 24 October 2000, the French authorities paid him his salary. It is not in dispute between the parties that the decree of 31 March 2000 was enforceable. The fact that the Parliament did not take note of that decree as soon as it was notified by the French authorities, but at a later date, and the fact that certain practical consequences for the applicant flowed from it cannot alter the legal consequences which attach to that notification pursuant to Article 12(2) of the 1976 Act.95.The applicants arguments, first, that Article 5 of the 1977 Law compromises parliamentary independence and constitutes an intolerable interference in its functions and, second, that there is a general principle that the disqualification must be declared by the parliamentary assembly concerned, are unfounded. As has already been pointed out in paragraph 83 above, it is plain from the express wording of the first subparagraph of Article 12(2) of the 1976 Act that a seat of a Member of the European Parliament may become vacant pursuant to the national provisions in force in a Member State. Since no uniform electoral procedure had been adopted at the material time, that provision, and therefore the 1977 Law, were fully applicable. Whatever the development of the Parliament's powers, new powers cannot render inapplicable provisions of primary law, such as the 1976 Act, in the absence of express repeal by a text of equal rank.96.For the same reasons, the applicant's argument founded on the primacy of Community law is wholly irrelevant. In the present case, there is neither contradiction nor conflict between national law and Community law.97.It follows from all the foregoing considerations that, in the present case, the decree of 31 March 2000 is the measure which produced binding legal effects such as to prejudice the interests of the applicant. The contested act was not intended to produce legal effects of its own, distinct from those of that decree.98.It must, therefore, be found that the contested act is not capable of being the subject of an action for annulment under Article 230 EC. Accordingly, the present application must be dismissed as inadmissible without there being any need to address the other pleas in law and arguments on admissibility.

(1)dismiss the appeal;(2)order the appellant to bear the costs.