<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><CONCLUSION NNC="YES" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://formex.publications.europa.eu/schema/formex-05.00-20081231.xd"><BIB.CONCLUSION><REF.CASE FILE="ECRCJ2007ENB.0700644101.case.xml"><NO.CASE>C-288/05</NO.CASE></REF.CASE><NO.CELEX>62005C0288</NO.CELEX><NO.SEQ>0007.0001</NO.SEQ><PAGE.FIRST.ECR>6445</PAGE.FIRST.ECR><PAGE.SEQ>1</PAGE.SEQ><PAGE.LAST.ECR>6469</PAGE.LAST.ECR><PAGE.TOTAL>25</PAGE.TOTAL></BIB.CONCLUSION><CURR.TITLE><LEFT>OPINION OF MS SHARPSTON — CASE C-288/05</LEFT><RIGHT>KRETZINGER</RIGHT></CURR.TITLE><CONTENTS.CONCLUSION><TITLE><TI><P><HT TYPE="UC">Opinion of Advocate General</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="UC">Sharpston</HT></P><P>delivered on <DATE ISO="20061205">5 December 2006</DATE><NOTE NOTE.ID="E0001" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Original language: English.</P></NOTE></P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>1.</NO.P><TXT>In this reference for a preliminary ruling, the Fifth Criminal Division of the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) seeks clarification of what is meant by <QUOT.START ID="QS0001" REF.END="QE0001" CODE="2018"/>the same acts<QUOT.END ID="QE0001" REF.START="QS0001" CODE="2019"/> and by the concept of <QUOT.START ID="QS0002" REF.END="QE0002" CODE="2018"/>enforcement<QUOT.END ID="QE0002" REF.START="QS0002" CODE="2019"/> of a criminal penalty in Article 54 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of <DATE ISO="19850614">14 June 1985</DATE><NOTE NOTE.ID="E0002" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P><REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="239" DATE.PUB="2000" PAGE.FIRST="19">OJ 2000 L 239, p. 19</REF.DOC.OJ>.</P></NOTE> (<QUOT.START ID="QS0003" REF.END="QE0003" CODE="2018"/>the CISA<QUOT.END ID="QE0003" REF.START="QS0003" CODE="2019"/>). The national court also wishes to know whether the definition of enforcement is affected by the implementation into national law of the Council Framework Decision of <DATE ISO="20020613">13 June 2002</DATE> on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0003" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P><REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="190" DATE.PUB="2002" PAGE.FIRST="1">OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1</REF.DOC.OJ>.</P></NOTE> (<QUOT.START ID="QS0004" REF.END="QE0004" CODE="2018"/>the Framework Decision<QUOT.END ID="QE0004" REF.START="QS0004" CODE="2019"/>).</TXT></NP><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><P>Relevant provisions</P></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>The CISA</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>2.</NO.P><TXT>Pursuant to Article 1 of the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0004" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Annexed by the Treaty of Amsterdam to the Treaty on the European Union (<QUOT.START ID="QS0005" REF.END="QE0005" CODE="2018"/>TEU<QUOT.END ID="QE0005" REF.START="QS0005" CODE="2019"/> ) and to the Treaty establishing the European Community.</P></NOTE> (<QUOT.START ID="QS0006" REF.END="QE0006" CODE="2018"/>the Protocol<QUOT.END ID="QE0006" REF.START="QS0006" CODE="2019"/>), 13 Member States, including Italy and Germany, are authorised to establish closer cooperation among themselves within the scope of the so-called <QUOT.START ID="QS0007" REF.END="QE0007" CODE="2018"/>Schengen acquis<QUOT.END ID="QE0007" REF.START="QS0007" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>3.</NO.P><TXT>The annex to the Protocol defines the <QUOT.START ID="QS0008" REF.END="QE0008" CODE="2018"/>Schengen acquis<QUOT.END ID="QE0008" REF.START="QS0008" CODE="2019"/> as including the Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, signed at Schengen on <DATE ISO="19850614">14 June 1985</DATE><NOTE NOTE.ID="E0005" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P><REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="239" DATE.PUB="2000" PAGE.FIRST="13">OJ 2000 L 239, p. 13</REF.DOC.OJ>.</P></NOTE> (the <QUOT.START ID="QS0009" REF.END="QE0009" CODE="2018"/>Schengen Agreement<QUOT.END ID="QE0009" REF.START="QS0009" CODE="2019"/>) and, in particular, the CISA.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>4.</NO.P><TXT>The Protocol provides that, from the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam,<?PAGE NO="I-6446"?> namely <DATE ISO="19990501">1 May 1999</DATE>, the Schengen acquis is to apply immediately to the 13 Member States referred to in Article 1 of the Protocol.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0006" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Article 2(1), first subparagraph.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>5.</NO.P><TXT>Articles 54 to 58 of the CISA together constitute Chapter 3 (entitled <QUOT.START ID="QS0010" REF.END="QE0010" CODE="2018"/>Application of the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ne bis in idem</HT> principle<QUOT.END ID="QE0010" REF.START="QS0010" CODE="2019"/>) of Title III, which deals with <QUOT.START ID="QS0011" REF.END="QE0011" CODE="2018"/>Police and Security<QUOT.END ID="QE0011" REF.START="QS0011" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>6.</NO.P><TXT>Article 54 provides that <QUOT.START ID="QS0012" REF.END="QE0012" CODE="2018"/>a person whose trial has been finally disposed of in one Contracting Party may not be prosecuted in another Contracting Party for the same acts provided that, if a penalty has been imposed, it has been enforced, is actually in the process of being enforced or can no longer be enforced under the laws of the sentencing Contracting Party<QUOT.END ID="QE0012" REF.START="QS0012" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>7.</NO.P><TXT>Article 55 entitles a Contracting Party, <QUOT.START ID="QS0013" REF.END="QE0013" CODE="2018"/>when ratifying, accepting or approving this Convention, to declare that it is not bound by Article 54<QUOT.END ID="QE0013" REF.START="QS0013" CODE="2019"/> where the acts to which the foreign judgment relates took place in whole or in part in its own territory, they constitute an offence against national security or other equally essential interests of that Contracting Party and/or they were committed by officials of that Contracting Party in violation of the duties of their office.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>8.</NO.P><TXT>Article 56 provides that <QUOT.START ID="QS0014" REF.END="QE0014" CODE="2018"/>if a further prosecution is brought in a Contracting Party against a person whose trial, in respect of the same acts, has been finally disposed of in another Contracting Party, any period of deprivation of liberty served in the latter Contracting Party arising from those acts shall be deducted from any penalty imposed. To the extent permitted by national law, penalties not involving deprivation of liberty shall also be taken into account<QUOT.END ID="QE0014" REF.START="QS0014" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>The Framework Decision</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>9.</NO.P><TXT>The Framework Decision was adopted under Title VI of the EU Treaty, <QUOT.START ID="QS0015" REF.END="QE0015" CODE="2018"/>Provisions on Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters<QUOT.END ID="QE0015" REF.START="QS0015" CODE="2019"/>, and in particular on the basis of Articles 31(a) and (b) and 34(2) (b) thereof.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>10.</NO.P><TXT>It is, as recital 6 in its preamble notes, <QUOT.START ID="QS0016" REF.END="QE0016" CODE="2018"/>the first concrete measure in the field of criminal law implementing the principle of mutual recognition which the [1999] European Council [of Tampere] referred to as the <QUOT.START ID="QS0017" REF.END="QE0017" CODE="201C"/>cornerstone<QUOT.END ID="QE0017" REF.START="QS0017" CODE="201D"/> of judicial cooperation<QUOT.END ID="QE0016" REF.START="QS0016" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="I-6447"?><NP><NO.P>11.</NO.P><TXT>The main aims of the Framework Decision are twofold: first, to abolish formal extradition procedures among Member States in respect of persons who are fleeing from justice after having been finally sentenced and, second, to speed up extradition procedures in respect of persons suspected of having committed an offence. The existing system of extradition between Member States is to be replaced by a new, simplified and swifter system for surrender of persons in the above categories between judicial authorities for the purposes of execution of criminal sentences or prosecution of criminal offences.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0007" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Recital 5.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>12.</NO.P><TXT>According to recital 10, <QUOT.START ID="QS0018" REF.END="QE0018" CODE="2018"/>the mechanism of the European arrest warrant is based on a high level of confidence between Member States.<QUOT.END ID="QE0018" REF.START="QS0018" CODE="2019"/></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>13.</NO.P><TXT>Article 1(1) defines the European arrest warrant as a judicial decision issued by a Member State (<QUOT.START ID="QS0019" REF.END="QE0019" CODE="2018"/>the issuing Member State<QUOT.END ID="QE0019" REF.START="QS0019" CODE="2019"/>) with a view to the arrest and surrender by another Member State (<QUOT.START ID="QS0020" REF.END="QE0020" CODE="2018"/>the Member State of execution<QUOT.END ID="QE0020" REF.START="QS0020" CODE="2019"/>) of a requested person, for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order. Under Article 1(2), Member States are required to execute any European arrest warrant on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in accordance with the provisions of the Framework Decision.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>14.</NO.P><TXT>Article 2(1) defines the scope of the European arrest warrant: <QUOT.START ID="QS0021" REF.END="QE0021" CODE="2018"/>a European arrest warrant may be issued for acts punishable by the law of the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 12 months or, where a sentence has been passed or a detention order has been made, for sentences of at least four months<QUOT.END ID="QE0021" REF.START="QS0021" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>15.</NO.P><TXT>Article 2(2) contains a list of offences which, if they are punishable in the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three years, shall give rise to surrender pursuant to a European arrest warrant. Article 2(4) provides that <QUOT.START ID="QS0022" REF.END="QE0022" CODE="2018"/>for offences other than those covered by paragraph 2, surrender may be subject to the condition that the acts for which the European arrest warrant has been issued constitute an offence under the law of the executing Member State, whatever the constituent elements or however it is described<QUOT.END ID="QE0022" REF.START="QS0022" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>16.</NO.P><TXT>Article 3 sets out grounds on which the judicial authority of the Member State of execution must refuse to execute the European arrest warrant, including cases in which<?PAGE NO="I-6448"?> it <QUOT.START ID="QS0023" REF.END="QE0023" CODE="2018"/>is informed that the requested person has been finally judged by a Member State in respect of the same acts provided that, where there has been sentence, the sentence has been served or is currently being served or may no longer be executed under the law of the sentencing Member State<QUOT.END ID="QE0023" REF.START="QS0023" CODE="2019"/>.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0008" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Article 3(2).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>17.</NO.P><TXT>Article 4 sets out grounds on which the executing judicial authority may refuse to execute a European arrest warrant. A refusal to execute is permitted, inter alia, in the following cases:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="DASH"><ITEM><P>where the person who is the subject of the European arrest warrant is being prosecuted in the Member State of execution for the same act as that on which the European arrest warrant is based (Article 4(2));</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>where the judicial authorities of the Member State of execution have decided either not to prosecute for the offence on which the European arrest warrant is based or to halt proceedings, or where a final judgment has been passed upon the requested person in a Member State, in respect of the same acts, which prevents further proceedings (Article 4(3));</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>if the executing judicial authority is informed that the requested person has been finally judged by a third State in respect of the same acts provided that, where there has been sentence, the sentence has been served or is currently being served or may no longer be executed under the law of the sentencing country (Article 4(5)).</P></ITEM></LIST></P></NP><NP><NO.P>18.</NO.P><TXT>Article 5 regulates the guarantees to be given by the issuing Member State in particular cases. Article 5(1) provides that <QUOT.START ID="QS0024" REF.END="QE0024" CODE="2018"/>where the European arrest warrant has been issued for the purposes of executing a sentence or a detention order imposed by a decision rendered <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia</HT> and if the person concerned has not been summoned in person or otherwise informed of the date and place of the hearing which led to the decision rendered <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia,</HT> surrender may be subject to the condition that the issuing judicial authority gives an assurance deemed adequate to guarantee the person who is the subject of the European arrest warrant that he or she will have an opportunity to apply for a retrial of the case in the issuing Member State and to be present at the judgment<QUOT.END ID="QE0024" REF.START="QS0024" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>19.</NO.P><TXT>Article 34 requires Member States to take the necessary measures to comply with the provisions of the Framework Decision by <DATE ISO="20031231">31 December 2003</DATE>.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="I-6449"?><NP><NO.P>20.</NO.P><TXT>The Commission noted in its submissions that whereas Italy had properly implemented the Framework Decision into national law, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Constitutional Court) had declared the law implementing the Framework Decision in Germany void by judgment of <DATE ISO="20050718">18 July 2005</DATE>. As a result, a new implementing law was adopted by the Bundestag on <DATE ISO="20060720">20 July 2006</DATE>, shortly after the hearing in the present case took place. It entered into force on <DATE ISO="20060802">2 August 2006</DATE>.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0009" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Bundesgesetzblatt 2006 Teil I Nr. 6 of 25.07.06.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>The national proceedings and the questions referred</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>21.</NO.P><TXT>Mr Kretzinger's appeal against his conviction by the Landgericht Augsburg (Augsburg Regional Court) is pending before the referring court. That court gives the following description of the facts in the main proceedings.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>22.</NO.P><TXT>On two occasions, in May 1999 and in April 2000, Mr Kretzinger transported cigarettes, smuggled into Greece by third parties, by lorry through Italy and Germany, bound for the United Kingdom. They were concealed under other loads. They were not presented for customs clearance at any point.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>23.</NO.P><TXT>The first consignment, consisting of <FT TYPE="NUMBER">34500</FT> cartons of smuggled cigarettes, was seized by officials of the Italian Guardia di Finanza on <DATE ISO="19990503">3 May 1999</DATE>. Mr Kretzinger was held briefly in Italian police custody and/or on remand pending trial. On <DATE ISO="20010222">22 February 2001</DATE>, allowing the appeal brought by the Public Prosecutor against the decision of acquittal at first instance, the Corte d Appello di Venezia found him guilty, after a trial <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia,</HT> of importing and being in possession of <FT TYPE="NUMBER">6900</FT> kilograms of contraband foreign tobacco, and of failing to pay customs duty on that tobacco. It imposed <QUOT.START ID="QS0025" REF.END="QE0025" CODE="2018"/>a custodial sentence of one year and eight months ... in respect of both of the offences with which he was charged<QUOT.END ID="QE0025" REF.START="QS0025" CODE="2019"/>. It appears that the sentence was suspended. Under Italian law, that judgment has now become final.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>24.</NO.P><TXT>The second consignment consisted of <FT TYPE="NUMBER">14927</FT> cartons of contraband cigarettes. Mr Kretzinger was stopped by the Italian Guardia di Finanza on <DATE ISO="20000412">12 April 2000</DATE>. Again, he was held briefly in Italian police custody and/or on remand pending trial. By judgment of <DATE ISO="20010125">25 January 2001</DATE> the Tribunale di Ancona imposed, again <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia</HT> and applying the same provisions of Italian law, a custodial sentence of two years (not suspended). That judgment has also become final under Italian law.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>25.</NO.P><TXT>The referring court notes that, despite several attempts to obtain clarification of those judgments, it has been unable to<?PAGE NO="I-6450"?> establish with certainty precisely which import duties each judgment applied to, and in particular whether either or both encompassed any charges relating to, or sentence imposed for, customs fraud.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>26.</NO.P><TXT>Mr Kretzinger was charged before the Landgericht Ausburg with evading the customs duties which had arisen on the initial importation of the smuggled goods into Greece (an offence under paragraph 374 of the German Tax Code) and was found guilty. The Landgericht sentenced him to one year and ten months imprisonment in relation to the first consignment and one year s imprisonment in relation the second consignment.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>27.</NO.P><TXT>The Landgericht Augsburg was aware of the Italian convictions, but noted that the sentences imposed on Mr Kretzinger in Italy had not been enforced. It took the view that, although the same two cigarette shipments formed the factual basis of the two convictions in Italy and of its own decisions, Article 54 of the CISA was not applicable.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>28.</NO.P><TXT>The Italian authorities appear to have taken no steps under the Framework Decision in order to enforce the convictions in Italy.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>29.</NO.P><TXT>Mr Kretzinger appealed to the Criminal Division of the Bundesgerichtshof (the referring court) on a point of law. That court has doubts about the compatibility with EU law of the reasoning adopted by the Landgericht Augsburg.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>30.</NO.P><TXT>In particular, it questions the latters conclusion that Mr Kretzinger s convictions in Italy do not give rise to the application of the rule of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ne bis in idem</HT> as embodied in Article 54 of the CISA and, therefore, do not bar further criminal proceedings in Germany. It wonders whether, as a result of a single journey from Greece to northern Europe, a smuggler can be punished in separate criminal proceedings in every Member State through which he passes for the revenue offence committed each time he crosses a border, so that he may have to serve each of those sentences consecutively, or whether a sentence passed in one Member State in respect of (only) one part of that single smuggling journey can bar further prosecutions throughout Europe&#x2019;.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>31.</NO.P><TXT>The referring court therefore asks the Court to give a preliminary ruling on the following questions:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><LIST TYPE="ARAB"><ITEM><NP><NO.P><QUOT.START ID="QS0026" REF.END="QE0026" CODE="2018"/>(1)</NO.P><TXT>Is it a criminal prosecution of <QUOT.START ID="QS0027" REF.END="QE0027" CODE="201C"/>the same acts<QUOT.END ID="QE0027" REF.START="QS0027" CODE="201D"/> within the meaning of Article 54 of the CISA if a defendant has been<?PAGE NO="I-6451"?> convicted by an Italian court of importing contraband foreign tobacco into Italy and of being in possession of it there, as well as of failing to pay duty at the border on importing the tobacco, and is subsequently convicted by a German court — in connection with his earlier receipt of the same goods in Greece — of being party to evasion in relation to the (technically) Greek import duty that arose when the goods were previously imported by third parties, in so far as the defendant had intended from the outset to transport the goods to the United Kingdom via Italy, after taking delivery of them in Greece?</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(2)</NO.P><TXT>Has a penalty <QUOT.START ID="QS0028" REF.END="QE0028" CODE="201C"/>been enforced<QUOT.END ID="QE0028" REF.START="QS0028" CODE="201D"/> or is it <QUOT.START ID="QS0029" REF.END="QE0029" CODE="201C"/>actually in the process of being enforced<QUOT.END ID="QE0029" REF.START="QS0029" CODE="201D"/> within the meaning of Article 54 of the CISA:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="alpha"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(a)</NO.P><TXT>if the defendant was given a custodial sentence, the enforcement of which was suspended in accordance with the law of the State in which judgment was given;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(b)</NO.P><TXT>if the defendant was for a short time taken into police custody and/or held on remand pending trial, and that detention would count towards any subsequent enforcement of the penalty of imprisonment under the law of the State in which judgment was given?</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></P></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(3)</NO.P><TXT>Is the interpretation of the notion of enforcement for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA affected by</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="alpha"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(a)</NO.P><TXT>the fact that, having transposed the Council Framework Decision of <DATE ISO="20020613">13 June 2002</DATE> on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="190" DATE.PUB="2002" PAGE.FIRST="1">OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1</REF.DOC.OJ>) into national law, the (first) State in which judgment was given is in a position at any time to enforce its judgment which, under national law, is final and binding;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(b)</NO.P><TXT>the fact that a request for judicial assistance by the State in which judgment was given, with a view to extraditing the convicted person or enforcing judgment within that State, might not automatically be complied with because judgment was given <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia?</HT><QUOT.END ID="QE0026" REF.START="QS0026" CODE="2019"/></TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></P></NP></ITEM></LIST></QUOT.S></P></NP><NP><NO.P>32.</NO.P><TXT>Written observations have been submitted by the Governments of Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, Spain and Sweden, and by the Commission. Counsel for Mr Kretzinger was appointed only after the deadline for the written procedure had expired. For that reason the main submissions for Mr Kretzinger were presented at<?PAGE NO="I-6452"?> the hearing on <DATE ISO="20060704">4 July 2006</DATE>, at which Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the Commission also presented oral argument.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>33.</NO.P><TXT>It should be noted that the written observations were submitted before the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Van Esbroeck.</HT><NOTE NOTE.ID="E0010" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>The Court's judgment in Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-436/04" YEAR="2006" PAGE.ECR="I-2333">C-436/04 Van Esbroeck [2006] ECR I-2333</REF.DOC.ECR>, was given on <DATE ISO="20060309">9 March 2006</DATE>. Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer had delivered his Opinion on <DATE ISO="20051020">20 October 2005</DATE>.</P></NOTE> However, the hearing took place after that judgment was delivered.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><P>Assessment</P></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>The first question</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>34.</NO.P><TXT>By its first question, the referring court asks essentially what the term <QUOT.START ID="QS0030" REF.END="QE0030" CODE="2018"/>same acts<QUOT.END ID="QE0030" REF.START="QS0030" CODE="2019"/> in Article 54 of the CISA means and, in particular, whether one may regard the transportation by lorry of smuggled goods from Greece, through Italy and Germany, bound for the United Kingdom as constituting a single act for the purposes of that provision in so far as the defendant had intended from the outset to transport the goods from Greece to the United Kingdom.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>35.</NO.P><TXT>I consider that the issues raised by the first question have now been resolved by <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Van Esbroeck,</HT> as confirmed by subsequent case-law.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0011" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-150/05" YEAR="2006" PAGE.ECR="I-9327">C-150/05 Van Straaten [2006] ECR I-9327</REF.DOC.ECR> and Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-467/04" YEAR="2006" PAGE.ECR="I-9199">C-467/04 Gasparini [2006] ECR I-9199</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>36.</NO.P><TXT>In <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Van Esbroeck</HT> the Court held that the <QUOT.START ID="QS0031" REF.END="QE0031" CODE="2018"/>only relevant criterion<QUOT.END ID="QE0031" REF.START="QS0031" CODE="2019"/> for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA is that there should be an <QUOT.START ID="QS0032" REF.END="QE0032" CODE="2018"/>identity of the material facts, understood in the sense of the existence of a set of concrete circumstances which are inextricably linked together<QUOT.END ID="QE0032" REF.START="QS0032" CODE="2019"/>.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0012" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>At paragraph 36.</P></NOTE> Material facts qualify as the <QUOT.START ID="QS0033" REF.END="QE0033" CODE="2018"/>same acts<QUOT.END ID="QE0033" REF.START="QS0033" CODE="2019"/> if they constitute a set of facts which are inextricably linked together in time, in space and by their subject-matter&#x2019;.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0013" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>At paragraph 37.</P></NOTE> The Court declined to hold that either identity of the protected legal interest or identity of the legal classification of the acts was required for the acts to be categorised as the <QUOT.START ID="QS0034" REF.END="QE0034" CODE="2018"/>same acts<QUOT.END ID="QE0034" REF.START="QS0034" CODE="2019"/> for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0014" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Van Esbroeck, cited in footnote 10, paragraphs 31, 32 and 35. In the case of concurrent Community and national sanctions for the same acts in the field of competition law, the Court has additionally required that for the principle of ne bis in idem to apply, the legal interest protected by the Community and the national rules has to be identical. For the reasons that I gave in my Opinion in Gasparini, cited in footnote 11 above, at points 155 to 158, I take the view that the apparent contradiction between the two strands of case-law can be resolved.</P></NOTE> It is for the national court to determine, on the facts, whether <QUOT.START ID="QS0035" REF.END="QE0035" CODE="2018"/>the material acts at issue constitute a set of facts which are inextricably linked together in time, in space and by their subject-matter<QUOT.END ID="QE0035" REF.START="QS0035" CODE="2019"/>.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0015" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>At paragraph 38.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="I-6453"?><NP><NO.P>37.</NO.P><TXT>It follows from <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Van Esbroeck</HT> that it is for the national court to examine whether the prosecutions against Mr Kretzinger in Germany for smuggling the cigarettes into Greece, and in Italy for smuggling the same goods into Italy, relate to acts which are inextricably linked together in time, in space and by their subject-matter.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>38.</NO.P><TXT>In that respect, the national court should bear in mind that, in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Van Esbroeck,</HT> the Court observed that a sequence of events consisting of linked export and import transactions <QUOT.START ID="QS0036" REF.END="QE0036" CODE="2018"/>may, in principle, constitute a set of facts which, by their very nature, are inextricably linked<QUOT.END ID="QE0036" REF.START="QS0036" CODE="2019"/>.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0016" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Paragraph 37.</P></NOTE> As Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer correctly stressed in that case, <QUOT.START ID="QS0037" REF.END="QE0037" CODE="2018"/>it is ludicrous to refer to import and export in a territory governed by a legal system which, in essence, is designed to remove borders for both persons and goods<QUOT.END ID="QE0037" REF.START="QS0037" CODE="2019"/>.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0017" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Point 52 of his Opinion, cited in footnote 10 above.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>39.</NO.P><TXT>The same reasoning may apply by analogy here. The referring court indicates that Mr Kretzinger had intended to transport the smuggled goods in question by land from their point of entry into the Community (Greece) to their final destination (the United Kingdom) in a single journey. That necessarily involved successive crossings of internal EU borders. Those crossings are distinct stages of a single overall course of action and may not artificially be severed. They may, in principle, be regarded as linked in time, in space and (by virtue of the final aim of the journey of which they form part and the unity of intention underlying them) by their subject-matter. The smuggling of cigarettes into Greece (the German prosecution) and the smuggling of the same cigarettes into Italy as the lorry crossed the Italian border on its way to its final destination in the United Kingdom (the Italian prosecutions) appear therefore to be based on <QUOT.START ID="QS0038" REF.END="QE0038" CODE="2018"/>the same acts<QUOT.END ID="QE0038" REF.START="QS0038" CODE="2019"/> for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>40.</NO.P><TXT>I therefore propose that the Court answers the first question as follows:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0039" REF.END="QE0039" CODE="2018"/>The phrase <QUOT.START ID="QS0040" REF.END="QE0040" CODE="201C"/>the same acts<QUOT.END ID="QE0040" REF.START="QS0040" CODE="201D"/> in Article 54 of the CISA refers to identity of material facts, understood as a set of concrete circumstances which are inextricably linked together in time, in space and by their subject-matter. The determination of whether the facts in the main proceedings are so linked is a matter for the competent national court. However, where a defendant intended from the outset to transport smuggled goods from their point of entry to a final destination in the Community in a single operation, any successive crossings of internal borders in the course of that<?PAGE NO="I-6454"?> operation may, in principle, be regarded as acts which are inextricably linked for that purpose.<QUOT.END ID="QE0039" REF.START="QS0039" CODE="2019"/></P></QUOT.S></P></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>The second question</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>41.</NO.P><TXT>The second question consists of two branches.</TXT></NP><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><P>2(a) The first branch</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>42.</NO.P><TXT>The referring court asks whether a suspended custodial sentence issued under national law may be considered to be a penalty which has <QUOT.START ID="QS0041" REF.END="QE0041" CODE="2018"/>been enforced<QUOT.END ID="QE0041" REF.START="QS0041" CODE="2019"/> or is <QUOT.START ID="QS0042" REF.END="QE0042" CODE="2018"/>actually in the process of being enforced<QUOT.END ID="QE0042" REF.START="QS0042" CODE="2019"/> for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA. In what follows, I shall refer to those two requirements as <QUOT.START ID="QS0043" REF.END="QE0043" CODE="2018"/>the enforcement condition<QUOT.END ID="QE0043" REF.START="QS0043" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>43.</NO.P><TXT>I agree with all the parties submitting observations that for the purposes of the principle of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ne bis in idem</HT> in Article 54 of the CISA a suspended custodial sentence amounts to a penalty which has either <QUOT.START ID="QS0044" REF.END="QE0044" CODE="2018"/>been enforced<QUOT.END ID="QE0044" REF.START="QS0044" CODE="2019"/> or is <QUOT.START ID="QS0045" REF.END="QE0045" CODE="2018"/>actually in the process of being enforced<QUOT.END ID="QE0045" REF.START="QS0045" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>44.</NO.P><TXT>Even a brief comparative law survey demonstrates that, although the detailed requirements may vary from one Member State to another, all recognise the concept that a custodial sentence imposed on a defendant who has been found guilty may, by way of reducing the severity of the sentence, be suspended in particular circumstances. The underlying philosophy is that, for relatively short terms of imprisonment imposed on offenders who are thought to be unlikely to re-offend, it is not in the interests of society — and equally not in the interests of the individual concerned — to expose them to the negative impact of prison life. Reintegration of the offender is better ensured by suspending the sentence, subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions by the offender during the probation period.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>45.</NO.P><TXT>The circumstances in which a sentence is suspended vary as between national legal systems, but present overall substantial similarities. They relate to the seriousness of the offence (and thus to the applicable penalty) and to the personal circumstances of the offender. The sentencing judge usually enjoys some discretion when assessing the latter.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>46.</NO.P><TXT>Suspension of a custodial sentence is always made dependent on the offender respecting certain conditions imposed by the competent court over the probation period. These conditions vary as between Member States, and also depend on the circumstances of the case. The competent authorities monitor the offender's compliance with those conditions and the competent<?PAGE NO="I-6455"?> court retains the power to activate the suspended sentence if they are broken. Usually, activation is discretionary, but it may sometimes be mandatory. In general, conviction for another criminal offence will trigger the suspended sentence.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>47.</NO.P><TXT>If the suspended sentence is activated, the full sentence of imprisonment originally imposed must then be served.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>48.</NO.P><TXT>If, however, the offender respects the conditions applicable during the probation period, he is then (depending on the Member State) either recorded as having duly served his sentence or regarded as though the offence and the conviction had never taken place.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>49.</NO.P><TXT>Viewed substantively, a suspended custodial sentence incorporates within it a penalty which is being enforced. A person subject to a suspended custodial sentence has been tried, convicted and sentenced. By virtue of the probation period during which that person must respect certain compulsory conditions, his normal freedom of action is temporarily circumscribed. He also knows that, if he breaches the conditions of the suspension, he is likely to go to prison to serve the custodial sentence. He lives with that sword of Damocles hanging over his head.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>50.</NO.P><TXT>It is therefore clear that a suspended custodial sentence does indeed <QUOT.START ID="QS0046" REF.END="QE0046" CODE="2018"/>penalise<QUOT.END ID="QE0046" REF.START="QS0046" CODE="2019"/> the offender, albeit to a lesser extent than an immediate custodial sentence. As a result it should, during its currency, be regarded as a penalty which <QUOT.START ID="QS0047" REF.END="QE0047" CODE="2018"/>has been enforced [or] is actually being enforced<QUOT.END ID="QE0047" REF.START="QS0047" CODE="2019"/> within the meaning of Article 54 of the CISA.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>51.</NO.P><TXT>I also note that, within a <HT TYPE="ITALIC">national</HT> context, a person subject to a suspended sentence is generally regarded as benefiting from the principle of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ne bis in idem.</HT> He has already been placed in jeopardy once and should not have to run the risk of prosecution in respect of the same facts a second time.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0018" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>C.f. the analysis of the association between the rule against double jeopardy and the principle of ne bis in idem set out at points 72 to 77 of my Opinion in Gasparini, cited in footnote 11 above.</P></NOTE> I do not see any reason why the conclusion should be different in the context of the Schengen agreement.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>52.</NO.P><TXT>I therefore suggest that the Court should answer question 2(a) as follows:</TXT><P>A custodial sentence, the enforcement of which has been suspended provided that,<?PAGE NO="I-6456"?> during a fixed period of time, the offender respects certain conditions set in accordance with the law of the State in which judgment was given, is a penalty that has been enforced or is actually in the process of being enforced within the meaning of Article 54 of the CISA and, provided the other conditions under that provision are met, gives rise to the application of the principle of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ne bis in idem</HT> enshrined in that article&#x2019;.</P></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><P>2(b) The second branch</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>53.</NO.P><TXT>The referring court asks whether the enforcement condition in Article 54 of the CISA is fulfilled if the defendant is taken for a short time into police custody and/or held on remand pending trial, and that detention would count towards any subsequent enforcement of the penalty of imprisonment under the law of the State in which judgment was given. For convenience, I shall refer to the latter concept as the <QUOT.START ID="QS0048" REF.END="QE0048" CODE="2018"/>principle of set-off<QUOT.END ID="QE0048" REF.START="QS0048" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>54.</NO.P><TXT>The referring court has explicitly limited the scope of its question to the case where the detention periods pending trial are of a short duration. It is, however, not clear from the order for reference whether the brief periods of detention served by Mr Kretzinger in Italy<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0019" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>The order for reference indicates that Mr Kretzinger spent only one day in police custody in relation to the first prosecution. No information on that point is available as regards the second prosecution in Ancona.</P></NOTE> were spent in police custody for questioning without the intervention of a judge, or whether he was also remanded in custody pending trial by a decision of the competent judge. The question of the referring court explicitly mentions both types of detention. For that reason, and also in the light of the written observations submitted, I will examine, first, detention on remand pending trial in general, whatever its duration, and, second, time spent in police custody.</TXT></NP><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>—</NO.P><TXT>Detention on remand pending trial</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>55.</NO.P><TXT>It is helpful to begin with two preliminary observations.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>56.</NO.P><TXT>First, detention on remand pending trial is a sensitive area of criminal law and policy in democratic societies in so far as it protects the public interest at the expense of individual freedom. The general rule is that citizens may not be deprived of their individual freedom unless they have been convicted of a criminal offence by a competent court<?PAGE NO="I-6457"?> following a process established by law.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0020" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See Article 5(1)(c) and (3) of the ECHR.</P></NOTE> For precisely that reason, preventive detention is subject to strict procedural and material safeguards under the European Convention of Human Rights (<QUOT.START ID="QS0049" REF.END="QE0049" CODE="2018"/>ECHR<QUOT.END ID="QE0049" REF.START="QS0049" CODE="2019"/>).<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0021" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>There is abundant case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 5(1)(c) and (3) of the ECHR. See in particular, Ječius v. Lithuania, No. 34578/97 ECHR 2000-IX.</P></NOTE> Similarly, persons subjected to pre-trial detention who are subsequently released without charge, or tried but acquitted, may, under certain circumstances, be entitled to compensation.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0022" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>As is the case, for instance, in France.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>57.</NO.P><TXT>Second, the aim of pre-trial detention is not (and could not be) the punishment of the defendant for a criminal offence of which he has yet to be convicted. As the European Court of Human Rights has pointed out, the aim of detention pending trial is to avert the risk that the accused will fail to appear for trial, or that, if released, he may take action to prejudice the administration of justice, commit further offences or cause public disorder.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0023" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See, for instance, Smirnova v. Russia, Nos 46133/99 and 48183/99, § 59 ECHR 2003-IX and the case-law cited therein.</P></NOTE> Thus, as Germany, Spain and Austria indicate, pre-trial detention precedes any sentence or resolution of the criminal proceedings.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>58.</NO.P><TXT>Turning now to the question raised, I agree with all parties submitting observations (with the obvious exception of Mr Kretzinger) that periods of detention on remand cannot automatically be considered to be (partial or full) enforcement of a penalty for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>59.</NO.P><TXT>Article 54 of the CISA applies only once the <QUOT.START ID="QS0050" REF.END="QE0050" CODE="2018"/>trial has been disposed of<QUOT.END ID="QE0050" REF.START="QS0050" CODE="2019"/>. Detention on remand takes place pending trial. It thus by definition occurs before the trial <QUOT.START ID="QS0051" REF.END="QE0051" CODE="2018"/>is disposed of<QUOT.END ID="QE0051" REF.START="QS0051" CODE="2019"/> in accordance with the applicable rules. On a literal interpretation, Article 54 of the CISA therefore cannot apply to such periods, even if these are, by virtue of national law, to be taken into account for the purposes of any subsequent custodial sentence.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>60.</NO.P><TXT>Furthermore, the aims of detention pending trial are quite different from those pursued by society when enforcing a penalty.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0024" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See point 57 above.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="I-6458"?><NP><NO.P>61.</NO.P><TXT>I thus reject the argument that a person who has been subject to detention pending trial (especially if the detention was for a short time) has thereby necessarily satisfied the enforcement condition under Article 54 of the CISA.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>62.</NO.P><TXT>That being said, as Mr Kretzinger, Austria, the Netherlands and the Commission submit, there may be circumstances where pre-trial detention will have that effect. If the defendant who has been detained pending trial is subsequently convicted and receives a custodial sentence, the trial has been finally disposed of and — at that point — the first condition for the application of Article 54 of the CISA is met. In those circumstances, the question is whether the time spent in detention pending trial, which under national law must count towards the enforcement of the custodial sentence imposed, can be held to satisfy the enforcement condition in Article 54 of the CISA.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>63.</NO.P><TXT>In answering that question, two scenarios need to be distinguished.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>64.</NO.P><TXT>In the first scenario, the time spent in detention pending trial is at least equal to the term of imprisonment imposed in the final custodial sentence. So far as I have ascertained, the criminal law systems of all Member States contain some version of the principle of set-off<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0025" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>That principle is specifically referred to as <HT TYPE="ITALIC">principe d'imputation</HT> in French criminal law or <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Anrechnungsprinzip</HT> in German criminal law. See also the decision of the House of Lords in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Regina</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Governor of Her Majesty's Prison Brockhill, Ex parte Evans</HT> (No 2) [2001] 2 AC 19, where Lord Hope of Craighead referred to <QUOT.START ID="QS0052" REF.END="QE0052" CODE="2018"/>the broad principle ... that periods spent in custody before trial or sentence which are attributable only to the offence for which the offender is being sentenced are to be taken into account in calculating the length of the period which the offender must spend in custody after he has been sentenced<QUOT.END ID="QE0052" REF.START="QS0052" CODE="2019"/>. That principle is also reflected in Article 26(1) of the Framework Decision (which is part of Chapter 3, entitled <QUOT.START ID="QS0053" REF.END="QE0053" CODE="2018"/>Effects of the surrender<QUOT.END ID="QE0053" REF.START="QS0053" CODE="2019"/>), according to which <QUOT.START ID="QS0054" REF.END="QE0054" CODE="2018"/>the issuing Member State shall deduct all periods of detention arising from the execution of a European arrest warrant from the total period of detention to be served in the issuing Member State as a result of a custodial sentence or detention order being passed<QUOT.END ID="QE0054" REF.START="QS0054" CODE="2019"/>. In some Member States, such as Germany and parts of the United Kingdom, sentencing rules allow the competent judge to reject the application of the principle for reasons relating to the behaviour of the offender while on remand. Any departure must however be duly justified.</P></NOTE> when any custodial sentence is enforced. As counsel for Kretzinger and Spain rightly point out, this principle is a specific manifestation of the general principle of proportionality in criminal justice (and, I may add, of natural justice): the sentence must be in proportion to the offence. Thus, under national law, deprivation of liberty pending trial is to be deducted from any terms of imprisonment finally imposed by sentence. Where the former periods are at least equal in duration to the latter, the custodial sentence is regarded as having being served by the time spent in detention pending trial. Otherwise the offender would be subjected to a harsher penalty than society considers appropriate for that offence.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>65.</NO.P><TXT>The same conclusion applies for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA. In fact, that conclusion is unavoidable if one considers, as I do, that the principle of set-off<?PAGE NO="I-6459"?> arises from applying the requirements of natural justice and the principle of proportionality in criminal justice, and that, as such, it enjoys the status of a general principle of EU law.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0026" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See the analysis in points 53 to 64 of my Opinion in Case C-367/05 Kraaijenbrink, which I have also delivered today.</P></NOTE> It follows that, even if national law did <HT TYPE="ITALIC">not</HT> provide for any principle of set-off,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0027" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>That possibility is of course merely theoretical. As I have explained above, all national criminal laws recognise the principle of set-off detention periods pending trial.</P></NOTE> EU law would require Member States to treat the enforcement condition in Article 54 of the CISA as being satisfied where a convicted defendant has been held in custody on remand in one Member State for a period equal to, or greater than, the length of the custodial sentence imposed in another Member State for the same acts. As a result, any further criminal proceedings against the same person for the same material facts would be precluded by Article 54 of the CISA.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>66.</NO.P><TXT>In the second scenario, the periods spent in detention pending trial are less than the length of the final custodial sentence. Within that scenario, two situations need to be distinguished.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>67.</NO.P><TXT>In the first situation, the offender goes on to serve the remainder of his term of imprisonment (that is, the difference between the time spent in detention and the custodial sentence imposed).<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0028" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Or completes the probation period associated with a suspended (custodial) sentence, as described above.</P></NOTE> It is obvious that since the penalty is <QUOT.START ID="QS0055" REF.END="QE0055" CODE="2018"/>actually in the process of being enforced<QUOT.END ID="QE0055" REF.START="QS0055" CODE="2019"/>, the enforcement condition in Article 54 of the CISA is satisfied. Assuming the other conditions in Article 54 of the CISA are fulfilled, other Member States must refrain from prosecuting that offender a second time on the basis of the same facts.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>68.</NO.P><TXT>In the second situation, the offender has served periods of detention pending trial, but is at liberty when the custodial sentence is passed. The penalty cannot be held to have been fully enforced (since part of the sentence is still to be served), nor is it actually in the process of being enforced (since the defendant is not in prison). The enforcement condition is therefore not met. In those circumstances, the defendant cannot rely on Article 54 of the CISA if further criminal proceedings are brought against him in another Member State for the same acts.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>69.</NO.P><TXT>In the latter case, an offender would nevertheless be able to rely by virtue of Community law on the principle of set-off in order to have any time served on remand in the first Member State deducted from the term of imprisonment imposed by the sentence in the second Member State.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="I-6460"?><NP><NO.P>70.</NO.P><TXT>As I have indicated above, I consider the principle of set-off to be a general principle of EU law arising from the principles of proportionality in criminal law and of natural justice, which is distinct from, although related to, the principle of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ne bis in idem.</HT> As such, it can be relied upon directly by the offender.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>71.</NO.P><TXT>Even if the Court were to reject that proposition, Article 56 of the CISA<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0029" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>I regard Article 56 of the CISA as merely spelling out the general principle of set-off (which applies to any previous penalty imposed for the same acts, whatever its nature) for the purposes of Schengen and only in so far as penalties involving deprivation of liberty are concerned. The fact that Articles 54 and 56 are both in Chapter 3 of Title III of the CISA, under the heading <QUOT.START ID="QS0056" REF.END="QE0056" CODE="2018"/>Application of the ne bis in idem principle<QUOT.END ID="QE0056" REF.START="QS0056" CODE="2019"/>, does in my view not detract from the fact that they are two autonomous principles in EU law. I discuss the principle of set-off in my Opinion in Kraaijenbrink, cited in footnote 26 above, at points 53 to 64 and refer to that analysis.</P></NOTE> would still oblige, as the Commission and Sweden submit, a Member State to set off any period of detention served by the defendant in another Member State against any custodial sentence it wished to impose.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>72.</NO.P><TXT>The broad drafting of Article 56 of the CISA indicates that it applies when, for whatever reason, a prosecution against the same defendant is initiated in a Member State despite the fact that his trial for the same acts has been disposed of in another Member State.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0030" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>In Kraaijenbrink, cited in footnote 26 above, the Dutch Government vehemently opposed the Commission's oral submissions to this effect. See point 54 of my Opinion in that case.</P></NOTE> One can see that that might happen either where one of the derogations in Article 55 of the CISA applies, or where the trial has been <QUOT.START ID="QS0057" REF.END="QE0057" CODE="2018"/>disposed of<QUOT.END ID="QE0057" REF.START="QS0057" CODE="2019"/> but the enforcement condition in Article 54 of the CISA has not been fulfilled. In other circumstances, the principle of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ne bis in idem</HT> in Article 54 of the CISA would apply.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>—</NO.P><TXT>Time spent in police custody</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>73.</NO.P><TXT>In most Member States the police are permitted to hold a suspect in custody for a brief period of time in order to question him or to carry out preliminary inquiries. In general, such periods may not exceed between 48 and 72 hours, within which the suspect must be brought before a competent judge, who must decide whether to authorise further police detention, remand the defendant in custody or release him, with or without charging him.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0031" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>The arrangements for detaining terrorist suspects in police custody may be less liberal.</P></NOTE> As with remand in custody pending trial (and for the same reasons relating to the primacy of individual liberty, essential democratic values and respect of the rule of law), police custody is subject to stringent conditions under Article 5(1)(c) and (3) of the ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0032" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>The leading case is <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Brogan and Others</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">the United Kingdom,</HT> judgment of <DATE ISO="19881129">29 November 1988</DATE>, series A No. 145-B.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="I-6461"?><NP><NO.P>74.</NO.P><TXT>I see no valid reason why periods spent in police custody should be treated differently to time spent on remand pending trial for the purposes of the enforcement condition in Article 54 of the CISA.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0033" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>It is true that some national systems provide that some periods of detention in police custody (usually those not exceeding 24 hours in length) are not to be deducted from any final term of imprisonment imposed by sentence. That constitutes a negligible exception to the normal rule.</P></NOTE> The same reasoning applies, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">mutatis mutandis.</HT></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>75.</NO.P><TXT>I therefore suggest that the Court should answer the second branch of the second question as follows:</TXT><P>Periods spent by a defendant in police custody and/or on remand pending trial in one Member State are not to be considered as a penalty that has been enforced or that is actually in the process of being enforced for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA, unless those periods are at least equal to any term of imprisonment imposed by the sentence finally disposing of the trial in relation to which the defendant has been in police custody or in remand.</P></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><P>The third question</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>76.</NO.P><TXT>In its third question the referring court enquires as to the effect, if any, of the Framework Decision on the interpretation of the <QUOT.START ID="QS0058" REF.END="QE0058" CODE="2018"/>enforcement condition<QUOT.END ID="QE0058" REF.START="QS0058" CODE="2019"/> in Article 54 of the CISA. The third question also consists of two branches.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>77.</NO.P><TXT>As I have indicated<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0034" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Point 20 above.</P></NOTE> the law implementing the Framework Decision in Germany was annulled by the Bundesverfassungsgericht on <DATE ISO="20050718">18 July 2005</DATE>, just one day before the present request for a preliminary ruling was lodged before the Court. The Framework Decision appears at present not to be applicable in Germany. However, a new implementing law was adopted on <DATE ISO="20060720">20 July 2006</DATE>, and entered into force on <DATE ISO="20060802">2 August 2006</DATE>, after the hearing in the present case took place.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>78.</NO.P><TXT>As the Czech Republic has pointed out, it is not obvious why an answer to the second branch of the third question — which asks about the effects of sentences passed following a trial <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia</HT> and, more particularly, of Article 5(1) of the Framework Decision, on Article 54 of the CISA — is relevant to the outcome of the proceedings before the national court. The Italian authorities have not issued a European arrest warrant. Nor, according to the order for reference, are they about to do so.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="I-6462"?><NP><NO.P>79.</NO.P><TXT>On those grounds the third question is arguably merely hypothetical and therefore inadmissible pursuant to the case-law.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0035" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See, for instance, Van Straaten, cited in footnote 11 above, paragraph 34.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>80.</NO.P><TXT>However, on the basis of the information available, it is possible that those questions, which clearly raise a point of interpretation of EU law, may be relevant to the main proceedings. Only the referring court can make that assessment. Consequently, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0036" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Ibid., paragraph 33.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>81.</NO.P><TXT>Furthermore, as regards the second branch, the referring court notes in its order for reference that the status of sentences rendered after a trial <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia</HT> by foreign courts is a matter of some controversy in Germany. It therefore seems that an answer to the question might indeed be of assistance to the referring court in considering how such sentences should be treated, irrespective of Article 5(1) of the Framework Decision, in the context of Article 54 of the CISA.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>82.</NO.P><TXT>I will therefore suggest a reply to both branches of the third question.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>83.</NO.P><TXT>I also note that the third question envisages the situation in which a European arrest warrant is issued for the purposes of <QUOT.START ID="QS0059" REF.END="QE0059" CODE="2018"/>executing a custodial sentence or detention order<QUOT.END ID="QE0059" REF.START="QS0059" CODE="2019"/> against the requested person. My analysis is limited to those circumstances.</TXT></NP><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><P>3(a) The first branch</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>84.</NO.P><TXT>The first branch asks in essence whether the interpretation of the concept of <QUOT.START ID="QS0060" REF.END="QE0060" CODE="2018"/>enforcement<QUOT.END ID="QE0060" REF.START="QS0060" CODE="2019"/> for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA is affected by the fact that, under the Framework Decision as implemented in national law, the issuing Member State (in this case Italy) in which final sentence was passed may request the arrest and surrender of the defendant from the executing Member State (in this case Germany) in order to enforce that judgment at any time.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>85.</NO.P><TXT>I cannot see how the Framework Decision affects the interpretation of the enforcement condition in Article 54 of the CISA.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="I-6463"?><NP><NO.P>86.</NO.P><TXT>Article 1 of the Framework Decision provides that the purpose of the issuing of an arrest warrant is the arrest and surrender by another Member State of a requested person, for the purposes of <QUOT.START ID="QS0061" REF.END="QE0061" CODE="2018"/>conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order<QUOT.END ID="QE0061" REF.START="QS0061" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>87.</NO.P><TXT>Article 3(2) of the Framework Decision expressly lists, as one of the grounds for mandatory non-execution of a European arrest warrant, the case in which <QUOT.START ID="QS0062" REF.END="QE0062" CODE="2018"/>the judicial authority of the Member State of execution ... is informed that the requested person has been finally judged by a Member State in respect of the same acts provided that, where there has been sentence, the sentence has been served or is currently being served or may no longer be executed under the law of the sentencing Member State<QUOT.END ID="QE0062" REF.START="QS0062" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>88.</NO.P><TXT>It follows from those provisions, and as matter of logic, that where a European arrest warrant for the purposes of executing a custodial sentence is issued after trial and conviction, the enforcement condition in Article 54 of the CISA is, by definition, not met. Clearly, a European arrest warrant for the execution of a custodial sentence is issued precisely because the sentence in question has <HT TYPE="ITALIC">not</HT> been enforced or is not in the process of being enforced. Article 54 of the CISA cannot therefore apply. It follows irresistibly that, in those circumstances, a Member State is not prevented by the principle of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ne bis in idem</HT> from commencing criminal proceedings for the same acts, even if the offender in question has been tried and convicted for the same acts in another Member State.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>89.</NO.P><TXT>Thus, it is clear from the Framework Decision itself that the actual issue of a European arrest warrant, let alone the mere possibility that it might be issued in the future, has no implications for the principle of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ne bis in idem.</HT> On the contrary, as Article 3(2) shows, the principle of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ne bis in idem</HT> governs whether a European arrest warrant issued under the Framework Decision will, or will not, be executed.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>90.</NO.P><TXT>That conclusion is further warranted by the fact that, as noted by Austria in its observations, the parties to the Schengen Agreement<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0037" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Whereas the Framework Decision applies to all EU Member States, the CISA is only applicable to those Member States which have fully implemented the Schengen acquis, plus Norway and Iceland as contracting parties to the CISA and the United Kingdom and Ireland as regards, inter alia, Articles 54 to 58 of the CISA. See point 75 of my Opinion in Gasparini, cited in footnote 11 above.</P></NOTE> are not the same as those subject to the Framework Decision. If the application of the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ne bis in idem</HT> principle in Article 54 of the CISA were dependent on the provisions of the Framework Decision, the result would be legal uncertainty.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="I-6464"?><NP><NO.P>91.</NO.P><TXT>I therefore suggest that the Court should answer the first branch of the third question in the following terms:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0063" REF.END="QE0063" CODE="2018"/>The concept of enforcement for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA is not affected by the fact that a Member State in which a defendant has been sentenced by a final and binding judgment under national law may at any time issue a European arrest warrant for the surrender of that defendant so as to enforce that sentence under the Council Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States<QUOT.END ID="QE0063" REF.START="QS0063" CODE="2019"/>.</P></QUOT.S></P></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><P>3(b) The second branch</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>92.</NO.P><TXT>The second branch of the third question asks in essence whether the interpretation of the enforcement condition in Article 54 of the CISA is affected by the fact that the sentence which is the subject-matter of the European arrest warrant was passed after a trial <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia.</HT></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>93.</NO.P><TXT>The referring court analyses that question by reference to Article 5(1) of the Framework Decision. It considers that the possibility of insisting on a retrial as a precondition for surrender in the circumstances envisaged by that provision may cast doubt on whether the Italian convictions are properly to be categorised as trials which have been <QUOT.START ID="QS0064" REF.END="QE0064" CODE="2018"/>finally disposed of<QUOT.END ID="QE0064" REF.START="QS0064" CODE="2019"/> for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA (assuming that the term <QUOT.START ID="QS0065" REF.END="QE0065" CODE="2018"/>final<QUOT.END ID="QE0065" REF.START="QS0065" CODE="2019"/> is not to be defined solely by reference to domestic legislation). It draws attention to the possibility that acts which concern several Member States and which are directed also against the Community's financial interests could effectively remain unpunished. That would be the case if one Member State's judgment <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia</HT> had the effect of barring prosecutions in other Member States, but the judgment <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia</HT> was never enforced and the State in which judgment was given made no effort to enforce it.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0038" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>In the referring court's view, that is precisely what has happened in respect of the sentences imposed in Italy.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>94.</NO.P><TXT>The wording of the question concentrates on the impact that sentences passed after trials <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia</HT> in the first Member State may have on the interpretation of the enforcement condition contained in Article 54 of the CISA. However, as several parties submitting observations have correctly noted, the substance of the referring court's question appears, rather, to be whether sentences <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia</HT> should be considered to be decisions <QUOT.START ID="QS0066" REF.END="QE0066" CODE="2018"/>finally disposing<QUOT.END ID="QE0066" REF.START="QS0066" CODE="2019"/> of a trial for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>95.</NO.P><TXT>Article 5(1) of the Framework Decision expressly considers the implications of sentences<?PAGE NO="I-6465"?> imposed after a trial <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia</HT> for the purposes of a European arrest warrant. Article 5(1) provides that, if the requested person <QUOT.START ID="QS0067" REF.END="QE0067" CODE="2018"/>has not been summoned in person or otherwise informed of the date and place of the hearing which led to the decision rendered <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia,</HT><QUOT.END ID="QE0067" REF.START="QS0067" CODE="2019"/> the executing Member State is entitled to make the surrender of that person subject to the condition that <QUOT.START ID="QS0068" REF.END="QE0068" CODE="2018"/>the issuing judicial authority give an assurance deemed adequate to guarantee that he or she will have an opportunity to apply for a retrial of the case in the issuing Member State and to be present at the judgment<QUOT.END ID="QE0068" REF.START="QS0068" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>96.</NO.P><TXT>That provision reflects the requirements laid down by the European Court of Human Rights in its case-law on Article 6 of the ECHR (right to a fair trial). Pursuant to that case-law (and contrary to the position advanced by Poland), trials <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia</HT> are not of themselves incompatible with Article 6 of the Convention. They must, however, be carried out in accordance with the strict procedural and substantive requirements set out by the ECHR so as to prevent a denial of justice. In essence, trials <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia</HT> are permissible under the ECHR only where it is unequivocally established that the defendant has waived his right to attend the trial or has deliberately absented himself from the jurisdiction.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0039" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>The principles applying to trials in absentia have recently been summarised by the European Court of Human Rights in Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], No. 56581/00, § 81 et seq., ECHR 2006.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>97.</NO.P><TXT>If one takes the second branch of the third question literally, the straightforward answer (as Spain correctly observes) must be that the fact that final sentences are rendered following a trial <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia</HT> is of no relevance to the enforcement condition under Article 54 of the CISA. The issuing of a European arrest warrant for the purposes of enforcing a sentence <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia</HT> implies, by definition, that the enforcement condition in Article 54 of the CISA is not met. Whether it is not met because the defendant was sentenced <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia</HT> (so that the sentence was never likely to be enforced) or because the defendant absented himself after sentence can make no difference to the plain fact that there has been no enforcement of the sentence. By necessary corollary, the fact that the execution or non-execution of that warrant may be affected by Article 5(1) of the Framework Decision can have no bearing on the correct interpretation of Article 54 of the CISA.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0040" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See the analysis at points 85 to 90 above in respect of the first branch of the third question, which is equally applicable here.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>98.</NO.P><TXT>As I have indicated, behind the actual question referred lies the question of whether, in the light of Article 5 of the Framework Decision, a judgment after a trial <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia</HT> is to be considered as a decision <QUOT.START ID="QS0069" REF.END="QE0069" CODE="2018"/>finally disposing<QUOT.END ID="QE0069" REF.START="QS0069" CODE="2019"/> of a trial for the purposes<?PAGE NO="I-6466"?> of Article 54 of the CISA. Part of the answer to that question is to be found in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Gözütok and Brügge.</HT><NOTE NOTE.ID="E0041" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR EDITION="GEN" NO.CASE="C-187/01" YEAR="2003" PAGE.ECR="I-1345">C-187/01 [2003] ECR I-1345</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> In that case, the Court held that decisions which under national law definitively bar further proceedings or definitively discontinue prosecutions were to be considered as decisions which <QUOT.START ID="QS0070" REF.END="QE0070" CODE="2018"/>finally disposed of<QUOT.END ID="QE0070" REF.START="QS0070" CODE="2019"/> a trial for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>99.</NO.P><TXT>Clearly, as both the Courts decision in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Gözütok and Brügge</HT> and the wording of Article 54 of the CISA itself imply, it is for the domestic legal order of the sentencing Member State to determine whether, and in what circumstances, a judgment, including one arrived at after a trial <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia,</HT> definitively bars further criminal proceedings for the same acts under national law and is a decision that finally disposes of a trial. That conclusion is in line with other international instruments, in particular Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the ECHR, regulating the application of the principle of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ne bis in idem</HT> at the domestic level. All those instruments leave it to the domestic legal system in question to determine what is a final decision definitively disposing of criminal proceedings.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0042" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See also Article 14(7) of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provides that <QUOT.START ID="QS0071" REF.END="QE0071" CODE="2018"/>no one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country<QUOT.END ID="QE0071" REF.START="QS0071" CODE="2019"/>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>100.</NO.P><TXT>When assessing a claim based on Article 54 of the CISA by a defendant convicted <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia</HT> in a Member State, all other Member States are therefore bound by whether the sentencing Member State treats a judgment following a trial <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia</HT> as a decision <QUOT.START ID="QS0072" REF.END="QE0072" CODE="2018"/>finally disposing<QUOT.END ID="QE0072" REF.START="QS0072" CODE="2019"/> of the trial. If so, and the other conditions in Article 54 of the CISA are met, that judgment will trigger the application of the principle of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ne bis in idem</HT> in the supranational Schengen context, in accordance with the principle of mutual trust on which Article 54 of the CISA is rounded.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0043" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See Gözütok and Brügge, cited in footnote 41 above.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>101.</NO.P><TXT>That conclusion is subject to one important proviso. The trial <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia</HT> which led to the judgment must have complied with the requirements laid down by Article 6 of the ECHR. By virtue of the general principles of EU law and Article 6(1) and (2) EU, those requirements are applicable by extension in the EU context. A judgment following a trial <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia</HT> which had been issued in a manner that contravened the ECHR, even if it were regarded as valid and final under national law, would ipso facto violate those general principles of EU law that encapsulate basic and fundamental human rights. As a result, it could not lawfully be regarded as a judgment <QUOT.START ID="QS0073" REF.END="QE0073" CODE="2018"/>finally disposing<QUOT.END ID="QE0073" REF.START="QS0073" CODE="2019"/> of a trial for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="I-6467"?><NP><NO.P>102.</NO.P><TXT>That is, indeed, precisely why the wording of Article 5(1) of the Framework Decision echoes the conditions laid down by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 6 of the ECHR for determining when a sentence <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia</HT> is valid.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>103.</NO.P><TXT>I therefore suggest that the Court answers the second branch of the third question as follows:</TXT><P>The concept of enforcement for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA is not affected by the fact that, under Article 5(1) of the Framework Decision, the judicial authorities of the executing Member State are not required automatically to execute a European arrest warrant issued to enforce sentence imposed upon conviction after a trial <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia.</HT></P><P>Where, under the legal system of the sentencing Member State, a decision reached following a trial <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia</HT> definitively bars further criminal proceedings, that decision finally disposes of the trial for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA, provided that the trial complied with the requirements of Article 6 EU and general principles of Community law guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights as enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms'.</P></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><P>Conclusion</P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>104.</NO.P><TXT>In view of the foregoing I consider that the Court should reply to the preliminary questions posed by the referring court as follows:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="ARAB"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(1)</NO.P><TXT>The phrase <QUOT.START ID="QS0074" REF.END="QE0074" CODE="2018"/>the same acts<QUOT.END ID="QE0074" REF.START="QS0074" CODE="2019"/> in Article 54 of the CISA refers to identity of material facts, understood as a set of concrete circumstances which are inextricably<?PAGE NO="I-6468"?> linked together in time, in space and by their subject-matter. The determination of whether the facts in the main proceedings are so linked is a matter for the competent national court. However, where a defendant intended from the outset to transport smuggled goods from their point of entry to a final destination in the Community in a single operation, any successive crossings of internal borders in the course of that operation may, in principle, be regarded as acts which are inextricably linked for that purpose.</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(2)</NO.P><TXT><LIST TYPE="alpha"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(a)</NO.P><TXT>A custodial sentence, the enforcement of which has been suspended provided that, during a fixed period of time, the offender respects certain conditions set in accordance with the law of the State in which judgment was given, is a penalty that has been enforced or is actually in the process of being enforced within the meaning of Article 54 of the CISA and, provided the other conditions under that provision are met, gives rise to the application of the principle of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ne bis in idem</HT> enshrined in that article.</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(2) (b)</NO.P><TXT>Periods spent by a defendant in police custody and/or on remand pending trial in one Member State are not to be considered as a penalty that has been enforced or that is actually in the process of being enforced for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA, unless those periods are at least equal to any term of imprisonment imposed by the sentence finally disposing of the trial in relation to which the defendant has been in police custody or in remand.</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(3)</NO.P><TXT><LIST TYPE="alpha"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(a)</NO.P><TXT>The concept of enforcement for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA is not affected by the fact that a Member State in which a defendant has been sentenced by a final and binding judgment under national law may at any time issue a European arrest warrant for the surrender of that defendant so as to enforce that sentence under the Council Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States.</TXT></NP></ITEM><?PAGE NO="I-6469"?><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(3) (b)</NO.P><TXT>The concept of enforcement for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA is not affected by the fact that, under Article 5(1) of the Framework Decision, the judicial authorities of the executing Member State are not required automatically to execute a European arrest warrant issued to enforce sentence imposed upon conviction after a trial <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia.</HT></TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></TXT><P>Where, under the legal system of the sentencing Member State, a decision reached following a trial <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in absentia</HT> definitively bars further criminal proceedings, that decision finally disposes of the trial for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA, provided that the trial complied with the requirements of Article 6 EU and general principles of Community law guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights as enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.</P></NP></ITEM></LIST></P></NP></GR.SEQ></CONTENTS.CONCLUSION></CONCLUSION>