Article 36/24(1) of the Law of 22 February 1998 provides: ‘In the event of a sudden crisis on the financial markets or in the event of a serious threat of a systemic crisis, the King, with a view to limiting the extent or the consequences of that crisis, may, after obtaining the opinion of the bank:

(1)adopt complementary regulations or regulations overriding the Law of 9 July 1975 on the supervision of insurance undertakings, the Law of 2 January 1991 on the sovereign debt securities market and monetary policy instruments, the Law of 22 March 1993 relating to the status and control of credit institutions, the Law of 6 April 1995 relating to the status and supervision of investment undertakings, the Law of 2 August 2002 on supervision of the financial sector and financial services, Book VIII, Title III, Chapter II, Section III, of the Companies Code, and Royal Decree No 62 on the deposit of fungible financial instruments and the winding up of those instruments, coordinated by the Royal Decree of 27 January 2004;

(2)put in place a system for granting a State guarantee in respect of commitments entered into by the institutions, subject to the supervision prescribed by the aforementioned laws, that He shall determine, or grant the State guarantee in respect of certain claims held by those institutions;

(3)put in place, if necessary by means of regulations adopted in accordance with subparagraph 1, a system for granting the State guarantee with a view to refunding to members who are natural persons their share of the capital of cooperatives, recognised in accordance with the Royal Decree of 8 January 1962 laying down the conditions governing the recognition of national cooperative groupings and cooperatives, which are institutions subject to the supervision prescribed by the aforementioned laws or at least half of the assets of which are invested in such institutions;

…’

Article 3 of the koninklijk besluit tot uitvoering van de wet van 15 oktober 2008 houdende maatregelen ter bevordering van de financiële stabiliteit en inzonderheid tot instelling van een staatsgarantie voor verstrekte kredieten en andere verrichtingen in het kader van de financiële stabiliteit, voor wat betreft de bescherming van de deposito’s, de levensverzekeringen en het kapitaal van erkende coöperatieve vennootschappen, en tot wijziging van de wet van 2 augustus 2002 betreffende het toezicht op de financiële sector en de financiële diensten (Royal Decree implementing the Law of 15 October 2008 on measures to promote financial stability and introducing in particular a State guarantee on credits granted and other operations conducted in the context of financial stability, concerning deposit protection, life assurance and the capital of recognised cooperatives, and amending the Law of 2 August 2002 on supervision of the financial sector and financial services), of 14 November 2008 (Belgisch Staatsblad, 17 November 2008, p. 61285), as amended by the koninklijk besluit (Royal Decree) of 10 October 2011 (Belgisch Staatsblad, 12 October 2011, p. 62641) (‘Royal Decree of 14 November 2008’) provides: ‘A fund called “Special protection fund for deposits, life assurance and the capital of recognised cooperatives” shall be set up in the Belgian Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (Deposit and Consignment Office). The King shall regulate the organisation and functioning of the fund referred to in paragraph 1.’

Article 4(3) of the Royal Decree of 14 November 2008 provides: ‘Cooperatives, recognised in accordance with the Royal Decree of 8 January 1962 laying down the conditions governing the recognition of national cooperative groupings and cooperatives, which are institutions subject to the supervision referred to in Article 36/24(2) of the Law of 22 February 1998 or at least half of the assets of which are invested directly or indirectly in such institutions, may participate at their request. The request referred to in the first paragraph must be sent by registered letter to the Minister of Finance. …’

Article 1(1) of the koninklijk besluit tot toekenning van een garantie tot bescherming van het kapitaal van erkende coöperatieve vennootschapen (Royal Decree granting a guarantee to protect the capital of recognised cooperatives) of 7 November 2011 (Belgisch Staatsblad, 18 November 2011, p. 68640) (‘Royal Decree of 7 November 2011’) provides: ‘In accordance with Article 4(3) of the Royal Decree of 14 November 2008, the request for protection of the capital of the following recognised cooperatives shall be granted:

[Arcopar]

[Arcofin]

[Arcoplus]

…’

In accordance with Article 3 of the Royal Decree of 7 November 2011, the latter entered into force on 14 October 2011.

Some of the interested parties referred to in Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union who submitted observations to the Court have expressed doubts relating to the admissibility of the questions posed by the referring court, on the ground that those questions are not connected with the issue of the main proceedings. Since that dispute concerns only Belgian constitutional law, Directive 94/19 and Articles 107 and 108 TFEU do not relate to it.

In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is in principle required to give a ruling (judgments of 15 January 2013, Križan and Others, C‑416/10, EU:C:2013:8, paragraph 53, and of 5 March 2015, Banco Privado Português and Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português, C‑667/13, EU:C:2015:151, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

It follows that questions relating to EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgments of 15 January 2013, Križan and Others, C‑416/10, EU:C:2013:8, paragraph 54, and of 30 May 2013, Halaf, C‑528/11, EU:C:2013:342, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

In this case, it is apparent from the order for reference that the Grondwettelijk Hof (Constitutional Court) is ruling on the question whether the first subparagraph of Article 36/24(1), point 3, of the Law of 22 February 1998 infringes the principle of equality and non-discrimination guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 of the Belgian Constitution, in so far as it establishes a difference in treatment between the shareholders, being natural persons, of recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector, and the shareholders, being natural persons, of other companies operating in that sector.

As pointed out, in essence, by the Advocate General in points 30 and 31 of her Opinion, it follows both from that decision and from the answer given by the referring court in response to the request for clarification sent to it by the Court under Article 101 of its Rules of Procedure, that that court considers that, before ruling on the compatibility with the Belgian Constitution of the guarantee of shares of individual members of recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector, authorised by the first subparagraph of Article 36/24(1), point 3, of the Law of 22 February 1998, it must determine whether that provision is compatible with EU law. Therefore, should it prove that the guarantee scheme at issue in the main proceedings was imposed by Directive 94/19, a difference in treatment between the shareholders, being natural persons, of recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector, on the one hand, and the shareholders, being natural persons, of other companies operating in that sector, on the other hand, could be justified. If, on the other hand, it should prove the case that EU law precludes such a guarantee scheme, on the ground that it is not compatible with the provisions of Directive 94/19 or with Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, a difference in treatment between those shareholders could not be justified.

In those circumstances, it is not obvious that the interpretation of EU law sought by the referring court bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose.

Therefore, the referring court’s questions must be declared admissible.

By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Articles 2 and 3 of Directive 94/19, read, as the case may be, in conjunction with Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter and the general principle of equal treatment, must be interpreted as requiring Member States to adopt a scheme to guarantee the shares of recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, and, in the event of an answer in the negative, whether they preclude a Member State from adopting such a scheme.

Under the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Directive 94/19, Member States are to ensure that within their territory one or more deposit-guarantee schemes are introduced and officially recognised.

In order to assess the scope of the obligation imposed by that provision on Member States so as to determine whether that obligation involves adopting a scheme to guarantee the shares of recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, it is necessary to examine whether such shares come within the material and personal scope of application of Directive 94/19.

As regards, in the first place, the material scope of application of Directive 94/19, it is apparent from the very title of that directive that it relates to ‘deposit’ guarantee schemes. Under the first subparagraph of Article 1(1) of that directive, ‘deposit’ means, for the purposes of that directive, first, any credit balance which results from funds left in an account or from temporary situations deriving from normal banking transactions and which a credit institution must repay under the legal and contractual conditions applicable, and, secondly, any debt evidenced by a certificate issued by that credit institution.

It is apparent from the file available to the Court that the shares of companies such as recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector at issue in the main proceedings do not fall within that definition. As the Advocate General stated in point 40 of her Opinion, it appears that such shares are essentially participations in the own capital of the undertaking concerned, whereas the deposits referred to in Directive 94/19 are distinguished by the fact that they form part of the borrowed capital of a credit institution.

Moreover, although the deposits must, in accordance with the definition in the first subparagraph of Article 1 of Directive 94/19, be repaid to their depositors under the legal and contractual conditions applicable, the amount received, in the case of withdrawal, by the holder of shares in recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector at issue in the main proceedings, reflects those undertakings’ performance. The acquisition of such shares is thus more comparable to the acquisition of shares in companies, with respect to which no guarantees are provided by Directive 94/19, than to a payment made into a bank account.

Moreover, contrary to the apparent views of the Belgian Government, shares of recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, cannot be equated with the shares of British or Irish building societies, which are regarded as deposits for the purposes of the second subparagraph of Article 1(1) of Directive 94/19.

First, that special extension of the concept of ‘deposit’ relates by its very wording only to shares in British and Irish building societies, and not shares in recognised Belgian cooperatives operating in the financial sector. Nothing in the wording or in the origin of the second subparagraph of Article 1(1) of Directive 94/19 suggests that that provision is not intended to cover instruments other than those which are expressly referred to therein. Secondly, that provision expressly excludes from that extension shares in those building societies which are of a capital nature. Shares in recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, constitute, as is apparent from paragraph 66 of the present judgment, a participation in the own capital of a company.

As regards, in the second place, the personal scope of application of Directive 94/19, it should be noted that both types of deposit referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 1(1) of that directive have in common the fact that they were made with a credit institution. Therefore, in order for it to be possible to regard the shares in recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector as being ‘deposits’, within the meaning of Directive 94/19, it is, in any event, necessary that those undertakings can be regarded as ‘credit institutions’, within the meaning of that directive.

In that regard, Article 1(4) of Directive 94/19 defines the concept of ‘credit institution’ as covering undertakings the business of which is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for their own account. It is not apparent either from the order for reference or from the observations submitted before the Court that those undertakings’ activity consists in granting credits for their own account. It does not appear that such undertakings receive deposits from the public or grant regularly, like banks, credits for their own account.

It follows that shares in recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, come within neither the material nor the personal scope of application of Directive 94/19. Consequently, it cannot be concluded that the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Directive 94/19 imposes on Member States the obligation to adopt a scheme to guarantee shares in recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector such as that at issue in the main proceedings.

That conclusion is not called into question in the light of the general principle of equal treatment, also raised by the referring court in its first question.

In that regard, the Court has already held that the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EU law, enshrined in Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter, which requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, inter alia, the judgment of 14 September 2010, Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission and Others, C‑550/07 P, EU:C:2010:512, paragraphs 54 and 55 and the case-law cited).

As is apparent from paragraphs 65 to 72 of the present judgment and as the Advocate General pointed out in point 49 of her Opinion, from the point of view of the subject matter of the EU-law deposit guarantee scheme, shares of recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, are different from deposits made with credit institutions, and that is so even though they may resemble traditional savings products in many respects, in particular due to their taxation, their regulation by the State and their popularity with the public.

It is therefore necessary to examine the question whether Directive 94/19 precludes Member States from adopting a guarantee scheme as regards shares in recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector such as those at issue in the main proceedings.

In that regard, it must be noted that, in accordance with the second indent of Article 2 of Directive 94/19, all instruments which fall within the definition of ‘own funds’, as set out in Article 2 of Directive 89/299, are excluded from any repayment by guarantee schemes.

Article 2 of Directive 89/299 covers only the unconsolidated own funds ‘of credit institutions’, which are defined, in accordance with Article 1(2) of that directive, referring to Article 1 of Directive 77/780, as amended by Directive 86/524, as undertakings whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for their own account. That definition is, moreover, the same as that in Article 1(4) of Directive 94/19.

However, as is apparent from paragraph 71 of the present judgment, recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, do not come within that definition of credit institutions.

In that context, it should be noted that Article 57 of Directive 2006/48, which replaces Directive 89/299, covers also the unconsolidated own funds of ‘credit institutions’, which are also defined, in Article 4(1) of the first of those directives, in the same way as the credit institutions covered by Directive 94/19.

In those circumstances, the extension of a deposit guarantee scheme, such as that provided for under Belgian law, to shares in recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, does not appear, in itself, to be incompatible with the second indent of Article 2 of Directive 94/19.

That interpretation is supported by the fact that Directive 94/19, as is apparent from recitals 8, 16 and 17 thereof, merely provides for a minimum level of harmonisation in matters relating to deposit guarantees.

Although the provisions of Directive 94/19 do not, therefore, prevent Member States from extending to shares in recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector the deposit-guarantee scheme provided for by their national legislation in accordance with those provisions, such an extension must not undermine the practical effectiveness of the deposit-guarantee scheme that that directive requires them to establish (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 November 2006, Lidl Italia, C‑315/05, EU:C:2006:736, paragraph 48) or infringe the provisions of the FEU Treaty, in particular Articles 107 and 108 TFEU.

As was, in essence, stated by the Advocate General in point 58 of her Opinion, it cannot be ruled out that the practical effectiveness of the deposit-guarantee imposed by EU law is undermined where a Member State considerably encumbered its national deposit-guarantee scheme predominantly with risks not directly related to the purpose of that scheme. The higher the risks to be secured are, the more the deposit guarantee is watered down and the less the deposit-guarantee scheme is able, from the same resources, to contribute towards the attainment of the objective pursued by Directive 94/19, which, as is apparent from recital 1 thereof, is to protect savers in the event of the unavailability of deposits made in credit institutions and of increasing the stability of the banking system (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 September 2015, Surmačs, C‑127/14, EU:C:2015:522, paragraph 21).

It is therefore for the referring court to determine whether the adoption of a guarantee scheme concerning shares in recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, is liable to undermine the practical effectiveness of the deposit-guarantee scheme provided for by Belgian legislation in accordance with Directive 94/19.

In that regard, the referring court must in particular take into account the fact that the adoption of such a scheme concerning shares in recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, benefit, in this case, a large number of small investors of the Belgian deposit-guarantee scheme, and the fact that the ARCO Group cooperatives, which were admitted to that guarantee scheme a short time before the guarantee provided for by that scheme was invoked, did not make any contribution in the past towards the financing of the scheme.

In the light of all the above considerations, the answer to the first question is that Articles 2 and 3 of Directive 94/19 must be interpreted as not requiring Member States to adopt a scheme to guarantee shares in recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, and as not precluding Member States from adopting such a scheme, in so far as that scheme does not undermine the practical effectiveness of the deposit-guarantee scheme that that directive requires Member States to establish, which is a matter to be determined by the referring court, and provided that it complies with the FEU Treaty, in particular with Articles 107 and 108 TFEU.

By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the decision of 3 July 2014 infringes Article 107 TFEU, first, and Article 296 TFEU, secondly, in so far as that decision classifies the scheme to guarantee shares in recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector at issue in the main proceedings as new State aid.

As regards, first, Article 107 TFEU, it is settled case-law that classification as State aid, for the purposes of that provision, requires all the following conditions to be fulfilled. First, there must be intervention by the State or through State resources. Secondly, the intervention must be liable to affect trade between Member States. Thirdly, it must confer an advantage on the recipient. Fourthly, it must distort or threaten to distort competition (see, inter alia, judgments of 10 June 2010, Fallimento Traghetti del Mediterraneo, C‑140/09, EU:C:2010:335, paragraph 31, and of 29 March 2012, 3M Italia, C‑417/10, EU:C:2012:184, paragraph 37).

Although the fact that the scheme to guarantee shares in recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector at issue in the main proceedings is the responsibility of the State and that that scheme involves State resources is not contested in itself, the ARCO Group cooperatives and the Belgian Government consider, on the contrary, that the other three conditions allowing that guarantee scheme to be classified as ‘State aid’, are not satisfied. They contest the fact that that scheme confers a selective advantage on the ARCO Group cooperatives, that it affects trade between Member States and that it distorts competition. It is therefore necessary to examine whether those three conditions are satisfied, in order to determine whether the Commission could validly classify that scheme as ‘State aid’ in the decision of 3 July 2014.

As regards the condition relating to the advantage conferred by the scheme to guarantee shares in recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector at issue in the main proceedings on the ARCO Group cooperatives, it should be noted, first, that, in recitals 82 to 84 of the decision of 3 July 2014, the Commission considered that ARCO was the only real beneficiary of the scheme.

According to the ARCO Group cooperatives, that scheme does not however benefit them, but seeks to confer an advantage on the individual members of recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector and on the Dexia Bank, of which that group was one of the main shareholders and which the scheme to guarantee shares in recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector at issue in the main proceedings was intended to help rescue.

In that regard, it must be observed that measures which, whatever their form, are likely directly or indirectly to favour certain undertakings or are to be regarded as an economic advantage which the recipient undertaking would not have obtained under normal market conditions are regarded as aid (see, inter alia, judgments of 8 May 2013, Libert and Others, C‑197/11 and C‑203/11, EU:C:2013:288, paragraph 83, and of 3 April 2014, France v Commission, C‑559/12 P, EU:C:2014:217, paragraph 94 and the case-law cited).

As noted by the Advocate General in points 74 to 76 of her Opinion, there is no doubt that the ARCO Group benefits from the scheme to guarantee shares in recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector at issue in the main proceedings, which the ARCO Group cooperatives moreover, unlike the other recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector, themselves applied to join and, subsequently, derived the benefit thereof. It was that guarantee scheme alone which protected the ARCO Group from the imminent flight of private investors in that group and was thus able, at the same time, to participate, as main shareholder, in the recapitalisation of Dexia Bank.

The fact that other interested parties, namely the individual shareholders of the ARCO Group cooperatives and the Dexia Bank, were also able to benefit from certain advantages under that guarantee scheme does not mean that that group must not be regarded as the beneficiary thereof.

Secondly, it should be noted that Article 107(1) TFEU prohibits State aid ‘favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’, that is to say, selective aid (judgments of 28 July 2011, Mediaset v Commission, C‑403/10 P, not published, EU:C:2011:533, paragraph 36, and of 14 January 2015, Eventech, C‑518/13, EU:C:2015:9, paragraph 54).

In the present case, although the Commission considered, in recital 101 of the decision of 3 July 2014, that the scheme to guarantee shares in recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector at issue in the main proceedings is a ‘clearly selective’ measure, the ARCO Group cooperatives contest the selective character of that guarantee scheme.

In that regard, it follows from the Court’s settled case-law that Article 107(1) TFEU requires an assessment of whether, under a particular legal regime, a national measure is such as to favour ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’ in comparison with others which, in the light of the objective pursued by that regime, are in a comparable factual and legal situation (judgments of 28 July 2011, Mediaset v Commission, C‑403/10 P, not published, EU:C:2011:533, paragraph 36, and of 14 January 2015, Eventech, C‑518/13, EU:C:2015:9, paragraph 55; of this date, Commission v Hansestadt Lübeck, C‑524/14 P, paragraph 41, and of this date, Commission v World Duty Free Group and Others, C‑20/15 P and C‑21/15 P, paragraph 54).

As is apparent from paragraphs 65 to 83 of the present judgment, the Kingdom of Belgium extended the deposit-guarantee scheme provided for by Belgian legislation to shares in recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector, such as those at issue in the main proceedings. The benefit of that guarantee scheme confers an economic advantage on those cooperatives in relation to other economic operators which offer for sale participations in their ownership in the form of shares without benefiting from such a guarantee scheme.

As pointed out by the Advocate General in point 81 of her Opinion, the recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector, such as the ARCO Group cooperatives, are, in the light of the objective pursued by the deposit-guarantee scheme and consisting, as is apparent from recital 1 of Directive 94/19, in protecting savers in the event of the unavailability of deposits made in credit institutions and in increasing the stability of the banking system, in a factual and legal situation comparable, despite certain specificities resulting from the legal form of those cooperatives, to that of other economic operators, whether or not they are cooperatives, which offer for sale participations in their ownership in the form of shares, by making available to the public a form of capital investment which is not covered by the deposit-guarantee regime.

Consequently, the extension of the guarantee scheme provided for by Belgian legislation to shares in cooperatives operating in the financial sector has the effect of conferring an economic advantage on those cooperatives in relation to other economic operators which are, in the light of the objective pursued by that scheme, in a factual and legal situation comparable to that of those cooperatives and, therefore, has a selective character.

As regards the conditions relating to the effect of the scheme to guarantee the shares of recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector at issue in the main proceedings on trade between Member States and the distortion of competition capable of being caused by that scheme, it should be noted that, for the purpose of categorising a national measure as State aid, it is not necessary to establish that the aid has a real effect on trade between Member States and that competition is actually being distorted, it being necessary only to examine whether that aid is liable to affect such trade and distort competition (judgments of 29 April 2004, Italy v Commission, C‑372/97, EU:C:2004:234, paragraph 44; of 15 December 2005, Unicredito Italiano, C‑148/04, EU:C:2005:774, paragraph 54; and of 19 March 2015, OTP Bank, C‑672/13, EU:C:2015:185, paragraph 54).

In this case, it appears, first, that the Commission could consider, in paragraph 108 of the decision of 3 July 2014, that, as a result of the guarantee scheme at issue in the main proceedings, the ARCO Group was able to maintain its market share over a longer period and did not suffer from capital outflows, or they only occurred later and at a lower level than would have been the case if it had not benefited from that scheme and that, consequently, the other actors, which had to compete on their merits and could not rely on that guarantee scheme, were not able to benefit from capital that would otherwise have been available for investment.

Secondly, when aid granted by a Member State strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in trade between Member States, that undertaking must be regarded as affected by that aid (see, inter alia, judgments of 10 January 2006, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others, C‑222/04, EU:C:2006:8, paragraph 141, and of 8 May 2013, Libert and Others, C‑197/11 and C‑203/11, EU:C:2013:288, paragraph 77). In that regard, it is not necessary that the beneficiary undertaking itself be involved in trade between Member States. Where a Member State grants aid to an undertaking, internal activity may be maintained or increased as a result, so that the opportunities for undertakings established in other Member States to penetrate the market in that Member State are thereby reduced (judgment of 8 May 2013, Libert and Others, C‑197/11 and C‑203/11, EU:C:2013:288, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).

The Court has also held that the fact that an economic sector, such as that of financial services, has been involved in a significant liberalisation process at EU level, enhancing the competition that may already have resulted from the free movement of capital provided for in the Treaty, may serve to determine that the aid has a real or potential effect on competition and affects trade between Member States (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 January 2006, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others, C‑222/04, EU:C:2006:8, paragraphs 142 and 145, and of 5 March 2015, Banco Privado Português and Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português, C‑667/13, EU:C:2015:151, paragraph 51).

The fact, invoked by the Belgian Government and the ARCO Group cooperatives, that the value of shares held by individual members of cooperatives operating in the financial sector is generally low is not capable of ruling out that the guarantee scheme at issue in the main proceedings distorts competition and affects trade between Member States.

The effects of the guarantee scheme at issue in the main proceedings on trade between Member States must be assessed by reference to all of the shares of recognised cooperatives operating in the financial sector which it covers and not by reference to the protected capital of an individual private member of a cooperative. In any event, according to the Court’s case-law, the relatively small amount of aid or the relatively small size of the undertaking which receives it does not as such exclude the possibility that trade between Member States might be affected (judgments of 24 July 2003, Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg, C‑280/00, EU:C:2003:415, paragraph 81, and of 14 January 2015, Eventech, C‑518/13, EU:C:2015:9, paragraph 68).

It follows that the Commission was entitled to consider that the conditions relating to the distortion of competition and the fact that trade between Member States is affected were satisfied in the present case.

As regards, in the second place, Article 296 TFEU, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the classification of the guarantee scheme at issue in the main proceedings as ‘State aid’, within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, is sufficiently reasoned in the decision of 3 July 2014.

It is clear from the settled case-law of the Court that the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the measure at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent court to exercise its power of review (judgments of 15 April 2008, Nuova Agricast, C‑390/06, EU:C:2008:224, paragraph 79, and of 5 March 2015, Banco Privado Português and Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português, C‑667/13, EU:C:2015:151, paragraph 44).

Since, in order for a measure to be categorised as ‘State aid’ for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU, all the conditions set out in that provision must be fulfilled, a Commission decision categorising a national measure as State aid must set out the reasons why that institution takes the view that the State measure in question fulfils all of those conditions (judgment of 5 March 2015, Banco Privado Português and Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português, C‑667/13, EU:C:2015:151, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).

In the present case, the decision of 3 July 2014 fulfils those requirements.

It must be concluded that that decision is reasoned to the requisite degree in that it sets out clearly and unequivocally, in recitals 91 to 110 thereof, the reasons why the Commission concluded that each of the conditions referred to in Article 107(1) TFEU was fulfilled in this case.

In that context, it should be noted that it is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, to that effect, judgments of 24 November 2005, Italy v Commission, C‑138/03, C‑324/03 and C‑431/03, EU:C:2005:714, paragraph 55, and of 19 March 2015, Dole Food and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe v Commission, C‑286/13 P, EU:C:2015:184, paragraph 94).

Moreover, as the Commission noted, it seems that some of the arguments raised by the ARCO Group cooperatives in support of an alleged failure to provide adequate reasons, such as they are set out in the order for reference, seek to challenge the merits of the decision of 3 July 2014 rather than the reasoning thereof. The same applies to the argument invoked by those cooperatives against the case-law cited by the Commission in support of the existence of an advantage, and to those presented by those cooperatives concerning the conditions relating to the distortion of competition and to the fact that trade between Member States is affected.

The Court has held that the obligation laid down in the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU to state reasons is an essential procedural requirement that must be distinguished from the question whether the reasoning is well founded, which goes to the substantive legality of the measure at issue (see judgment of 17 September 2015, Total v Commission, C‑597/13 P, EU:C:2015:613, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).

It follows that examination of the second question has disclosed nothing capable of affecting the validity of the decision of 3 July 2014.

In view of the answer to the second question, there is no need to answer the third question.

By its fourth to sixth questions, which should be considered together, the referring court asks, in essence, first, whether Article 108(3) TFEU must be interpreted as precluding the implementation of the guarantee scheme at issue in the main proceedings and, secondly, whether the decision of 3 July 2014 infringes that provision concerning the date on which the Commission considers that the State aid declared by it was put into effect.

It must be noted that the first sentence of Article 108(3) TFEU imposes on the Member States an obligation to inform the Commission of any plans to grant or alter aid. According to the last sentence of Article 108(3) TFEU, a Member State planning to grant aid may not put its proposed measures into effect until that procedure has resulted in a final decision by the Commission. The prohibition laid down by that provision is designed to ensure that aid cannot become operational before the Commission has had a reasonable period in which to study the proposed measures in detail and, if necessary, to initiate the procedure provided for in Article 108(2) TFEU (judgment of 5 March 2015, Banco Privado Português and Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português, C‑667/13, EU:C:2015:151, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).

Article 108(3) TFEU thus establishes a prior control of plans to grant new aid (see judgments of 11 December 1973, Lorenz, 120/73, EU:C:1973:152, paragraph 2; of 21 November 2013, Deutsche Lufthansa, C‑284/12, EU:C:2013:755, paragraph 25; and of 5 March 2015, Banco Privado Português and Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português, C‑667/13, EU:C:2015:151, paragraph 58).

It follows from the settled case-law of the Court that an aid measure which is put into effect in infringement of the obligations arising from Article 108(3) TFEU is unlawful (judgment of 5 March 2015, Banco Privado Português and Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português, C‑667/13, EU:C:2015:151, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).

In this case, it is apparent from recital 1 of the decision of 3 July 2014 that the guarantee scheme at issue in the main proceedings was notified to the Commission only on 7 November 2011, that is to say on the date the application for capital protection by that guarantee scheme made by the ARCO Group cooperatives was accepted by the Royal Decree of that date.

A notification made at such a late stage cannot be regarded as being ‘in sufficient time’ within the meaning of Article 108(3) TFEU.

It is true that recital 110 of the decision of 3 July 2014, which states that the elements constituting State aid were in place at the latest when the Royal Decree of 10 October 2011 was adopted, but that the advantage created by the guarantee scheme at issue in the main proceedings was already in existence as from the announcement by the Belgian Government on 10 October 2008 that such a measure would be created, does not allow the date on which the Commission considers that the guarantee scheme at issue in the main proceedings was put into effect to be determined unequivocally.

However, without it being necessary to determine whether the State aid declared by the decision of 3 July 2014 was implemented immediately upon the announcement by the Belgian Government in a press release, on 10 October 2008, only by the Royal Decree of 7 November 2011 or, alternatively, on one of the days between those two dates mentioned by the referring court, it must be stated that, in so far as the beneficiaries of the guarantee scheme at issue in the main proceedings acquired the right to be admitted to that scheme at the latest in accordance with the Royal Decree of 7 November 2011, the notification of that scheme on that date took place, in any event, when that scheme was no longer in ‘draft form’ within the meaning of Article 108(3) TFEU. Consequently, as was stated by the Advocate General in point 118 of her Opinion, the principle of preliminary review by the Commission was infringed.

It follows that the Commission was entitled, in any event, to conclude, in recital 143 of the decision of 3 July 2014, that ‘[the Kingdom of] Belgium ha[d] unlawfully implemented [the guarantee scheme at issue in the main proceedings] in breach of Article 108(3) [TFEU]’.

In the light of all the above considerations, the answer to the fourth to sixth questions is that Article 108(3) TFEU must be interpreted as precluding a guarantee scheme such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in so far as the latter was put into effect in infringement of the obligations arising from that provision.

The examination of those questions has disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the decision of 3 July 2014.