<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><CONCLUSION NNC="YES" xmlns:fmx="http://opoce" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://formex.publications.europa.eu/schema/formex-05.58-20161101.xd"><BIB.CONCLUSION><REF.CASE FILE="n.a."><NO.CASE>C-360/15</NO.CASE><NO.CASE>C-31/16</NO.CASE></REF.CASE><NO.CELEX>62015CC0360</NO.CELEX><NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2017:397">EU:C:2017:397</NO.ECLI><NO.SEQ>0001</NO.SEQ><PAGE.FIRST.ECR>1</PAGE.FIRST.ECR><PAGE.SEQ>1</PAGE.SEQ><PAGE.LAST.ECR>32</PAGE.LAST.ECR><PAGE.TOTAL>32</PAGE.TOTAL></BIB.CONCLUSION><CURR.TITLE><PAGE.HEADER><P>OPINION OF MR SZPUNAR – JOINED CASES C‑360/15 AND C‑31/16</P><P>X AND VISSER</P></PAGE.HEADER></CURR.TITLE><TITLE><TI><P><HT TYPE="UC">Opinion of Advocate General</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="UC">Szpunar</HT></P><P>delivered on <DATE ISO="20170518">18 May 2017</DATE><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0001"><P>Original language: English.</P></NOTE></P></TI><STI><P><HT TYPE="BOLD">Joined Cases C‑360/15 and C‑31/16</HT></P><P>College van Burgemeester en Wethouders van de gemeente Amersfoort</P><P>v</P><P>X BV</P><P><HT TYPE="NORMAL">(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Supreme Court of the Netherlands))</HT></P></STI></TITLE><INTERMEDIATE><INDEX IDX.CLOSE=")" SEPARATOR=" – " IDX.OPEN="("><KEYWORD>Directive 2006/123/EC</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Scope</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Article 2(2)(c)</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Article 2(3)</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Activities related to the provision of electronic networks</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Directive 2002/20</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Article 13</KEYWORD></INDEX></INTERMEDIATE><TITLE><TI><P><HT TYPE="BOLD">and</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="BOLD">Visser Vastgoed Beleggingen BV</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="BOLD">v</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="BOLD">Raad van de gemeente Appingedam</HT></P><P>(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State (Council of State, Netherlands))</P></TI></TITLE><CONTENTS.CONCLUSION><INDEX IDX.CLOSE=")" SEPARATOR=" – " IDX.OPEN="("><KEYWORD>Directive 2006/123/EC</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Establishment of Service Providers</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Scope</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Recital 9</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Article 4(1)</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Concept of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0001" ID="QS0001"/>service<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0001" CODE="2019" ID="QE0001"/></KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Retail</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Municipal zoning plan</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Article 15(2)(a)</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Territorial restriction</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Article 15(3)</KEYWORD><KEYWORD>Protection of the urban environment</KEYWORD></INDEX><TOC><TITLE><TI><P>Table of contents</P></TI></TITLE><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>I.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Introduction</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>3</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>II.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Legal framework</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>5</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>A.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>EU law</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>5</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>1.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Directive 2006/123 on services in the internal market</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>5</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>2.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>EU law on administrative fees in relation to the installation of electronic communications networks</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>7</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>B.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Netherlands law</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>8</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><?PAGE NO="2"?><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>1.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Selected provisions of the Netherlands telecommunications code</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>8</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>2.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0002" ID="QS0002"/>Leges<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0002" CODE="2019" ID="QE0002"/> in the Commune of Amersfoort</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>9</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>3.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Provisions governing zoning maps in the Netherlands and the Commune of Appingedam</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>9</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK></TOC.BLK></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>III.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The actions in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>10</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>A.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>C-360/15, X</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>10</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>B.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>C-31/16, Visser</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>11</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>IV.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>The procedure before the Court</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>12</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>V.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Analysis</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>12</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>A.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Case C-360/15, X</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>12</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>1.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>On the scope of Directive 2006/123 (Questions 1 to 3)</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>12</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(a)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Article 2 of Directive 2006/123 (Question 1)</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>12</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>1)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>On Article 2(2)(c) of Directive 2006/123</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>13</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>2)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>On Article 2(3) of Directive 2006/123</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>16</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(b)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>On recital 9 of Directive 2006/123 (Question 3)</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>16</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(c)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>On purely internal situations (Question 2)</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>16</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>2.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Questions 4 and 5</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>17</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>B.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Case C‑31/16, Visser</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>17</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>1.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>On Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/123 (Question 1)</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>17</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(a)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Self-employed economic activity… provided for remuneration</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>17</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(b)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>… as referred to in Article 57 TFEU</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>18</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(c)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Restrictive interpretation because of primary law?</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>19</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>1)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Freedom of establishment</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>20</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>2)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Free movement of goods</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>20</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>i)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Searching for a centre of gravity</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>21</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>ii)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Applying simultaneously</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>21</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>iii)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Applying successively</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>22</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>3)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Case Rina Services and Others</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>22</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(d)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Further considerations</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>23</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(e)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Conclusion</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>24</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK></TOC.BLK><?PAGE NO="3"?><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>2.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>On purely internal situations (Question 4)</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>24</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>3.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>On possible cross-border elements (Question 3)</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>27</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>4.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Zoning plan under Directive 2006/123 (Questions 2 and 5)</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>27</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(a)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>On authorisations</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>27</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(b)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>On requirements</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>28</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(c)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>On recital 9 of Directive 2006/123</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>28</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(d)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>On Article 14(5) of Directive 2006/123</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>29</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>(e)</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>On Article 15 of Directive 2006/123</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>30</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>5.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>On Articles 34 and 49 TFEU (Question 6)</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>31</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK></TOC.BLK></TOC.BLK><TOC.BLK><TOC.ITEM><NO.ITEM>VI.</NO.ITEM><ITEM.CONT>Conclusion</ITEM.CONT><ITEM.REF>31</ITEM.REF></TOC.ITEM></TOC.BLK></TOC><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">I.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Introduction</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0001"><NO.P>1.</NO.P><TXT>The internal market with its fundamental freedoms not only constitutes the historical legal cornerstone of the Treaties and their central organisational principle, but has also, since the outset of the integration process, been characterised by its dynamism. It is one of the stated aims of the Union<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0002"><P>See Article 3(3) TEU.</P></NOTE> and stands prominently in the FEU Treaty in Title I of Part Three. Legally defined since the Single European Act as <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0003" ID="QS0003"/>an area in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0003" CODE="2019" ID="QE0003"/>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0003"><P>See Article 26(2) TFEU.</P></NOTE> it aims to provide for a free flow of products and factors of production within the Union, against the background of the economic concept of comparative advantage.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0004"><P>See Müller-Graff, P.-Chr., <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0004" ID="QS0004"/>Die Verfassungsziele der Europäischen Union<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0004" CODE="2019" ID="QE0004"/>, point 113, in Dauses, M.A., <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Handbuch des EU-Wirtschaftsrechts, Band 1, EL 31</HT>, C. H. Beck, Munich, 2016.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0002"><NO.P>2.</NO.P><TXT>While I would not want to go so far as asserting that the internal market is a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0005" ID="QS0005"/>living instrument<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0005" CODE="2019" ID="QE0005"/>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0005"><P>Not least, because I would not want to be accused of plagiarism by the European Court of Human Rights which, as is well known, uses this terminology when it comes to interpreting the ECHR since its judgment of <DATE ISO="19780425">25 April 1978</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Tyrer v. The United Kingdom</HT>, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1978:0425JUD000585672, § 31.</P></NOTE> it can nevertheless be stated that, even more than most other policy areas of the Union, the law of the internal market constitutes a moving target. It is situated between two tectonic plates: on the one hand, the market freedoms, and, on the other, the Member States’ desire to regulate interests of a non-economic kind, those interests being such as to differ from national polity to national polity. The founding fathers of the Treaties were not blind: by opting for a horizontal policy area which cross-cuts and has implications for virtually any other (national) policy area,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0006"><P>Indeed, any policy area recognised as justification to a restriction, be it explicitly mentioned in the FEU Treaty or as developed by the Court of Justice in the form of a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0006" ID="QS0006"/>mandatory requirement<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0006" CODE="2019" ID="QE0006"/> (or <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0007" ID="QS0007"/>imperative requirement<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0007" CODE="2019" ID="QE0007"/> or <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0008" ID="QS0008"/>overriding reason relating to the public interest<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0008" CODE="2019" ID="QE0008"/>).</P></NOTE> this dynamism with its corresponding disruptive elements is part of the internal market’s DNA.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="4"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0003"><NO.P>3.</NO.P><TXT>The Court has, over the years, kept abreast of this dynamism and has done so in different ways: at times it has fuelled it,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0007"><P>By, for instance, recognising that the restrictions to the fundamental freedoms go beyond a mere principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, see, as regards goods, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19740711">11 July 1974</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Dassonville</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>8/74</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1974:82">EU:C:1974:82</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>), concerning establishment, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19951130">30 November 1995</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Gebhard</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑55/94</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1995:411">EU:C:1995:411</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>), and with respect to services, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19910725">25 July 1991</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Säger</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑76/90</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1991:331">EU:C:1991:331</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> at other times it has moderated it.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0008"><P>By, for instance, limiting the scope of the free movement of goods in the judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19931124">24 November 1993</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Keck and Mithouard</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑267/91 and C‑268/91</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1993:905">EU:C:1993:905</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>), or, indeed, by regularly allowing for justified restrictions on the part of the Member States and by developing its case-law on grounds of justification not expressly referred to in the FEU Treaty.</P></NOTE> But it always interpreted the Treaty provisions in a way which reflected the economic and social reality of the day (of a judgment).<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0009"><P>To give the most benign examples: by recognising, in judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19790220">20 February 1979</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Rewe-Zentral</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>120/78</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1979:42">EU:C:1979:42</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0009" ID="QS0009"/><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Cassis de Dijon</HT><QUOT.END REF.START="QS0009" CODE="2019" ID="QE0009"/>), for goods and in judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19951130">30 November 1995</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Gebhard</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑55/94</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1995:411">EU:C:1995:411</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>), for establishment, that Member States could resort to grounds of justification other than those expressly contained in the FEU Treaty, the Court took into account, for instance, that there is such a thing as consumer protection or protection of the environment – concepts that were not on the minds of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0010" ID="QS0010"/>the Masters of the Treaties<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0010" CODE="2019" ID="QE0010"/> in 1957.</P></NOTE> </TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0004"><NO.P>4.</NO.P><TXT>Traditionally, the bulk of the Court’s case-law has occurred in the context of free movement of goods and it is here that most concepts have their origin. Examples include many findings referred to already above, such as the finding, in principle,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0010"><P>The notable exception being the free movement of workers, see judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20000606">6 June 2000</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Angonese</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑281/98</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2000:296">EU:C:2000:296</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> that the freedoms are directed at the Member States, and that they do not apply in purely internal situations.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0011"><P>Although, in practice, it is often easy to construe a situation with a cross-border element, see judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20151001">1 October 2015</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Trijber and Harmsen</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑340/14 and C‑341/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:641">EU:C:2015:641</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>), and although the Court has been liberal when it comes to accepting preliminary references in cases the facts of which are clearly confined to a single Member State (for an authoritative summary of the case-law as it stands, see judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20161115">15 November 2016</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Ullens de Schooten</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑268/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:874">EU:C:2016:874</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> When assessing national measures which potentially violate more than one Treaty freedom, a tendency can be found to deal with such cases under the heading of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0011" ID="QS0011"/>goods<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0011" CODE="2019" ID="QE0011"/>. Establishment and services for a long time were overshadowed by this case-law. Yet, they gained ground over the years, leading, too, to a substantive body of case-law, be it in the case of direct application of these freedoms in the context of preliminary references or through infringement procedures against the Member States concerned.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0005"><NO.P>5.</NO.P><TXT>The EU legislature considered that such a case-by-case approach was not enough to genuinely remove barriers to the freedom of establishment for providers in Member States and barriers to the free movement of services between Member States and to guarantee recipients and providers the legal certainty necessary for the exercise in practice of these two fundamental freedoms of the FEU Treaty.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0012"><P>See recitals 5 and 6 of Directive 2006/123.</P></NOTE> Accordingly, Directive 2006/123/EC<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0013"><P>Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20061212">12 December 2006</DATE> on services in the internal market (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="376" PAGE.FIRST="36" DATE.PUB="2006">OJ 2006 L 376, p. 36</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE>was adopted, following a lengthy process which entailed substantive changes to the initial proposal.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0014"><P>See Wathelet, M., <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0012" ID="QS0012"/>La genèse de la directive <QUOT.START CODE="201C" REF.END="QE0013" ID="QS0013"/>services<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0013" CODE="201D" ID="QE0013"/><QUOT.END REF.START="QS0012" CODE="2019" ID="QE0012"/>, in Ferrari-Breeur (ed.), <HT TYPE="ITALIC">La directive <QUOT.START CODE="201C" REF.END="QE0014" ID="QS0014"/>services</HT><QUOT.END REF.START="QS0014" CODE="201D" ID="QE0014"/>, Bruylant, Brussels 2011, pp. 21-31, at pp. 23-25.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0006"><NO.P>6.</NO.P><TXT>This directive, which had to be transposed by Member States into national law by the end of 2009,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0015"><P>See Article 44(1) of Directive 2006/123.</P></NOTE> has not, as yet, generated an enormous amount of case-law before the Court.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0016"><P>This could be interpreted as a good sign in the sense that the directive meets its purported aim of providing for legal clarity, thereby reducing litigation.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0007"><NO.P>7.</NO.P><TXT>The present two requests for a preliminary ruling from the two highest Netherlands courts (in their respective domains), the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Supreme Court of the Netherlands) and the Raad van State (Council of State, Netherlands), raise a number of fundamental questions on Directive 2006/123.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0008"><NO.P>8.</NO.P><TXT>As will be seen in detail in the analysis, my main contention in both cases is that Directive 2006/123 should be interpreted in line with its purported objective and against the background of the accomplishment of the internal market, while taking into account legal and economic reality in the twenty-first century. In doing so, the Court should recognise that the service sector is evolving and<?PAGE NO="5"?> that it constitutes an area with a large economic potential. The Court should not be afraid to interpret Directive 2006/123 in the way it has interpreted provisions of the internal market in the past: mindful of the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">telos</HT>, in light of present-day circumstances, and with due respect to Member States’ desire to (continue to) regulate activities of a non‑commercial nature.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">II.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Legal framework</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">A.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">EU law</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">1.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Directive 2006/123 on services in the internal market</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0009"><NO.P>9.</NO.P><TXT>Recitals 9 and 33 of Directive 2006/123 read:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><CONSID><NP><NO.P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0015" ID="QS0015"/>(9)</NO.P><TXT>This Directive applies only to requirements which affect the access to, or the exercise of, a service activity. Therefore, it does not apply to requirements, such as road traffic rules, rules concerning the development or use of land, town and country planning, building standards as well as administrative penalties imposed for non-compliance with such rules which do not specifically regulate or specifically affect the service activity but have to be respected by providers in the course of carrying out their economic activity in the same way as by individuals acting in their private capacity.</TXT></NP></CONSID><P>...</P><CONSID><NP><NO.P>(33)</NO.P><TXT>The services covered by this Directive concern a wide variety of ever-changing activities .... The services covered are also services provided both to businesses and to consumers, such as legal or fiscal advice ...; distributive trades; the organisation of trade fairs ...; Those activities may involve services requiring the proximity of provider and recipient, services requiring travel by the recipient or the provider and services which may be provided at a distance, including via the Internet.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0015" CODE="2019" ID="QE0015"/></TXT></NP></CONSID></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0010"><NO.P>10.</NO.P><TXT>Article 2 of Directive 2006/123 is headed <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0016" ID="QS0016"/>Scope<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0016" CODE="2019" ID="QE0016"/> and worded as follows:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><PARAG IDENTIFIER="002.001"><NO.PARAG><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0017" ID="QS0017"/>1.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>This Directive shall apply to services supplied by providers established in a Member State.</ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="002.002"><NO.PARAG>2.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA><P>This Directive shall not apply to the following activities:</P><P>...</P><P><LIST TYPE="alpha"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(c)</NO.P><TXT>electronic communications services and networks, and associated facilities and services, with respect to matters covered by Directives 2002/19/EC,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0017"><P>Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20020307">7 March 2002</DATE> on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive, <REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="108" PAGE.FIRST="7" DATE.PUB="2002">OJ 2002 L 108, p. 7</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> 2002/20/EC,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0018"><P>Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20020307">7 March 2002</DATE> on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive, <REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="108" PAGE.FIRST="21" DATE.PUB="2002">OJ 2002 L 108, p. 21</REF.DOC.OJ>), as amended by Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20091125">25 November 2009</DATE> (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="337" PAGE.FIRST="37" DATE.PUB="2009">OJ 2009 L 337, p. 37</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> 2002/21/EC,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0019"><P>Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20020307">7 March 2002</DATE> on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive, <REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="108" PAGE.FIRST="33" DATE.PUB="2002">OJ 2002 L 108, p. 33</REF.DOC.OJ>), as amended by Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20091125">25 November 2009</DATE> (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="337" PAGE.FIRST="37" DATE.PUB="2009">OJ 2009 L 337, p. 37</REF.DOC.OJ>) and as corrected (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="241" PAGE.FIRST="8" DATE.PUB="2013">OJ 2013 L 241, p. 8</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> 2002/22/EC<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0020"><P>Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20020307">7 March 2002</DATE> on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive, <REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="108" PAGE.FIRST="51" DATE.PUB="2002">OJ 2002 L 108, p. 51</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> and 2002/58/EC;</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></P><?PAGE NO="6"?><P>...</P></ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="002.003"><NO.PARAG>3.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>This Directive shall not apply to the field of taxation.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0017" CODE="2019" ID="QE0017"/></ALINEA></PARAG></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0011"><NO.P>11.</NO.P><TXT>According to Article 3(3) of Directive 2006/123:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><ALINEA><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0018" ID="QS0018"/>Member States shall apply the provisions of this Directive in compliance with the rules of the Treaty on the right of establishment and the free movement of services.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0018" CODE="2019" ID="QE0018"/></ALINEA></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0012"><NO.P>12.</NO.P><TXT>Article 4 of Directive 2006/123 is headed <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0019" ID="QS0019"/>Definitions<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0019" CODE="2019" ID="QE0019"/> and contains the following provisions:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><ALINEA><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0020" ID="QS0020"/>For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions shall apply:</P><LIST TYPE="ARAB"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>1)</NO.P><TXT><QUOT.START CODE="201C" REF.END="QE0021" ID="QS0021"/>service<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0021" CODE="201D" ID="QE0021"/> means any self-employed economic activity, normally provided for remuneration, as referred to in Article 50 of the Treaty;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>2)</NO.P><TXT><QUOT.START CODE="201C" REF.END="QE0022" ID="QS0022"/>provider<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0022" CODE="201D" ID="QE0022"/> means any natural person who is a national of a Member State, or any legal person as referred to in Article 48 of the Treaty and established in a Member State, who offers or provides a service;</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST><P>...</P><LIST TYPE="ARAB"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>5)</NO.P><TXT><QUOT.START CODE="201C" REF.END="QE0023" ID="QS0023"/>establishment<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0023" CODE="201D" ID="QE0023"/> means the actual pursuit of an economic activity, as referred to in Article 43 of the Treaty, by the provider for an indefinite period and through a stable infrastructure from where the business of providing services is actually carried out;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>6)</NO.P><TXT><QUOT.START CODE="201C" REF.END="QE0024" ID="QS0024"/>authorisation scheme<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0024" CODE="201D" ID="QE0024"/> means any procedure under which a provider or recipient is in effect required to take steps in order to obtain from a competent authority a formal decision, or an implied decision, concerning access to a service activity or the exercise thereof;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>7)</NO.P><TXT><QUOT.START CODE="201C" REF.END="QE0025" ID="QS0025"/>requirement<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0025" CODE="201D" ID="QE0025"/> means any obligation, prohibition, condition or limit provided for in the laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States or in consequence of case-law, administrative practice, the rules of professional bodies, or the collective rules of professional associations or other professional organisations, adopted in the exercise of their legal autonomy; rules laid down in collective agreements negotiated by the social partners shall not as such be seen as requirements within the meaning of this Directive;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>8)</NO.P><TXT><QUOT.START CODE="201C" REF.END="QE0026" ID="QS0026"/>overriding reasons relating to the public interest<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0026" CODE="201D" ID="QE0026"/> means reasons recognised as such in the case law of the Court of Justice, including the following grounds: ... the protection of the environment and the urban environment ...<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0020" CODE="2019" ID="QE0020"/></TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></ALINEA></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0013"><NO.P>13.</NO.P><TXT>Article 14 of Directive 2006/123 is headed <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0027" ID="QS0027"/>Prohibited requirements<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0027" CODE="2019" ID="QE0027"/> and stipulates:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><ALINEA><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0028" ID="QS0028"/>Member States shall not make access to, or the exercise of, a service activity in their territory subject to compliance with any of the following:</P><P>...</P><P><LIST TYPE="ARAB"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>5)</NO.P><TXT>the case-by-case application of an economic test making the granting of authorisation subject to proof of the existence of an economic need or market demand, an assessment of the potential or current economic effects of the activity or an assessment of the appropriateness of the activity in relation to the economic planning objectives set by the competent authority; this prohibition shall not concern planning requirements which do not pursue economic aims but serve overriding reasons relating to the public interest;</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></P><?PAGE NO="7"?><P>…<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0028" CODE="2019" ID="QE0028"/></P></ALINEA></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0014"><NO.P>14.</NO.P><TXT>Article 15 of the same directive is headed <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0029" ID="QS0029"/>Requirements to be evaluated<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0029" CODE="2019" ID="QE0029"/> and contains the following provision in paragraph 2:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><ALINEA><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0030" ID="QS0030"/>Member States shall examine whether their legal system makes access to a service activity or the exercise of it subject to compliance with any of the following non-discriminatory requirements:</P><LIST TYPE="alpha"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(a)</NO.P><TXT>quantitative or territorial restrictions, in particular in the form of limits fixed according to population or of a minimum geographical distance between providers;</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST><P>...<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0030" CODE="2019" ID="QE0030"/></P></ALINEA></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">2.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">EU law on administrative fees in relation to the installation of electronic communications networks</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0015"><NO.P>15.</NO.P><TXT>Directive 2002/21 defines an <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0031" ID="QS0031"/>electronic communications network<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0031" CODE="2019" ID="QE0031"/> in Article 2(a) as follows:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0032" ID="QS0032"/><QUOT.START CODE="201C" REF.END="QE0033" ID="QS0033"/>electronic communications network<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0033" CODE="201D" ID="QE0033"/> means transmission systems and, where applicable, switching or routing equipment and other resources, including network elements which are not active, which permit the conveyance of signals by wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, fixed (circuit- and packet-switched, including internet) and mobile terrestrial networks, electricity cable systems, to the extent that they are used for the purpose of transmitting signals, networks used for radio and television broadcasting, and cable television networks, irrespective of the type of information conveyed<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0032" CODE="2019" ID="QE0032"/></P></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0016"><NO.P>16.</NO.P><TXT>Article 11 of that directive is headed <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0034" ID="QS0034"/>Rights of Way<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0034" CODE="2019" ID="QE0034"/> and contains the following provisions in paragraph 1:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><ALINEA><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0035" ID="QS0035"/>Member States shall ensure that when a competent authority considers:</P><LIST TYPE="NDASH"><ITEM><P>an application for the granting of rights to install facilities on, over or under public or private property to an undertaking authorised to provide public communications networks, or</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>an application for the granting of rights to install facilities on, over or under public property to an undertaking authorised to provide electronic communications networks other than to the public,</P></ITEM></LIST><P>the competent authority:</P><LIST TYPE="NDASH"><ITEM><P>acts on the basis of simple, efficient, transparent and publicly available procedures, applied without discrimination and without delay, and in any event makes its decision within six months of the application, except in cases of expropriation, and</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>follows the principles of transparency and non-discrimination in attaching conditions to any such rights.</P></ITEM></LIST><P>The abovementioned procedures can differ depending on whether the applicant is providing public communications networks or not.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0035" CODE="2019" ID="QE0035"/></P></ALINEA></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0017"><NO.P>17.</NO.P><TXT>Directive 2002/20 applies the same definitions as Directive 2002/21. Article 1(2) of Directive 2002/20 provides that the directive applies to <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0036" ID="QS0036"/>authorisations for the provision of electronic communications networks and services<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0036" CODE="2019" ID="QE0036"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="8"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0018"><NO.P>18.</NO.P><TXT>Articles 12 and 13 of Directive 2002/20 read as follows:</TXT><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><ARTICLE IDENTIFIER="012"><TI.ART><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0037" ID="QS0037"/>Article 12</TI.ART><STI.ART>Administrative charges</STI.ART><PARAG IDENTIFIER="012.001"><NO.PARAG>1.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA><P>Any administrative charges imposed on undertakings providing a service or a network under the general authorisation or to whom a right of use has been granted shall:</P><P><LIST TYPE="alpha"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(a)</NO.P><TXT>in total, cover only the administrative costs which will be incurred in the management, control and enforcement of the general authorisation scheme and of rights of use and of specific obligations as referred to in Article 6(2), which may include costs for international cooperation, harmonisation and standardisation, market analysis, monitoring compliance and other market control, as well as regulatory work involving preparation and enforcement of secondary legislation and administrative decisions, such as decisions on access and interconnection; and</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(b)</NO.P><TXT>be imposed upon the individual undertakings in an objective, transparent and proportionate manner which minimises additional administrative costs and attendant charges.</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></P></ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="012.002"><NO.PARAG>2.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>Where national regulatory authorities impose administrative charges, they shall publish a yearly overview of their administrative costs and of the total sum of the charges collected. In the light of the difference between the total sum of the charges and the administrative costs, appropriate adjustments shall be made.</ALINEA></PARAG></ARTICLE><ARTICLE IDENTIFIER="013"><TI.ART>Article 13</TI.ART><ALINEA>Fees for rights of use and rights to install facilities</ALINEA><ALINEA>Member States may allow the relevant authority to impose fees for the rights of use for radio frequencies or numbers or rights to install facilities on, over or under public or private property which reflect the need to ensure the optimal use of these resources. Member States shall ensure that such fees shall be objectively justified, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate in relation to their intended purpose and shall take into account the objectives in Article 8 of [Directive 2002/21].<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0037" CODE="2019" ID="QE0037"/></ALINEA></ARTICLE></QUOT.S></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">B.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Netherlands law</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">1.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Selected provisions of the Netherlands telecommunications code</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0019"><NO.P>19.</NO.P><TXT>Article 5.2, paragraph 1, of the Telecommunicatiewet (Law on Telecommunications) obliges the titleholder or manager of public land to permit the installation and maintenance of cables for the public electronic communications networks.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0020"><NO.P>20.</NO.P><TXT>Article 5.4 of the same law lays down two conditions under which the works on the ground can be executed:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><PARAG IDENTIFIER="005.001"><NO.PARAG><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0038" ID="QS0038"/>1.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA><P>The provider of a public electronic communications network who intends carrying out work in or on public land in connection with the installation, maintenance or removal of cables shall only carry out such work if:</P><LIST TYPE="alpha"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>a.</NO.P><TXT>it has notified, in writing, the municipal council of the municipality within the territory of which the work is to be carried out of its intention to do so, and</TXT></NP></ITEM><?PAGE NO="9"?><ITEM><NP><NO.P>b.</NO.P><TXT>it has obtained the consent of the municipal council regarding the location, timing, and manner of performance of the work concerned.</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="005.002"><NO.PARAG>2.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>For reasons of public order, safety, the prevention or limitation of nuisance, the accessibility of land or buildings, or underground planning, the municipal council may attach conditions to the consent decision.</ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="005.003"><NO.PARAG>3.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA><P>Those conditions may relate only to the following:</P><LIST TYPE="alpha"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>a.</NO.P><TXT>the location of the work;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>b.</NO.P><TXT>the timing of the work, on the understanding that the permitted time of commencement may, unless there are compelling reasons in the public interest as referred to in paragraph 2, be no later than 12 months after the date of issue of the consent decision;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>c.</NO.P><TXT>the manner of performance of the work;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>d.</NO.P><TXT>the promotion of shared use of facilities;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>e.</NO.P><TXT>the coordination of the proposed work with the managers of other operations on the land.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0038" CODE="2019" ID="QE0038"/></TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></ALINEA></PARAG></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">2.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC"><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0039" ID="QS0039"/>Leges<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0039" CODE="2019" ID="QE0039"/> in the Commune of Amersfoort</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0021"><NO.P>21.</NO.P><TXT>Article 1 of the Verordening leges 2010 (2010 Regulation on fees/charges) of the Council of the Municipality of Amersfoort (Reg.nr. 3214976) (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0040" ID="QS0040"/>the Verordening<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0040" CODE="2019" ID="QE0040"/>) provides that <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0041" ID="QS0041"/>leges<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0041" CODE="2019" ID="QE0041"/> (fees/charges) are charged for all services provided by or on behalf of the Council according to the table of rates attached to the Verordening.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0022"><NO.P>22.</NO.P><TXT>The table attached to the Verordening, under Chapter 19, specifies the rate in respect for the processing of an application to obtain consent regarding the timing, location and manner of performance of the work as referred to in Article 5.4 of the Telecommunicatiewet. The rate differs depending on the length of the cable to be laid.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">3.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Provisions governing zoning maps in the Netherlands and the Commune of Appingedam</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0023"><NO.P>23.</NO.P><TXT>Article 3.1, paragraph 1, of the Netherlands Wet ruimtelijke ordening (Law on Spatial Planning) of <DATE ISO="20080701">1 July 2008</DATE> attributes to municipal councils the power to draw up zoning maps that designate certain territory of the municipality to specific categories of buildings or buildings used for specific activities. Paragraph 2 of the same Article 3.1 defines that the zoning plan shall have a validity of ten years.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0024"><NO.P>24.</NO.P><TXT>According to Article 3.1.2, paragraph 2.b, of the Besluit ruimtelijke ordening (Decree on Spatial Planning) municipalities may designate certain zones for retailers or hotels cafes and restaurants. It is clear from the explanation of the referring court that the Council of the Municipality of Appingedam made use of this power:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><ALINEA><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0042" ID="QS0042"/>The scheme in Article 18(18.1) of the Plan Rules is a so-called retail mix scheme (<QUOT.START CODE="201C" REF.END="QE0043" ID="QS0043"/>brancheringsregeling<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0043" CODE="201D" ID="QE0043"/>). It is a scheme which only permits certain types of retail trade, and not others. Based on the present scheme, apart from a number of subsidiary activities, only bulky goods retail trade is permitted. The scheme does not provide for the possibility of derogation. However, a person may apply for an authorisation (known in the Netherlands as an environmental permit) to<?PAGE NO="10"?> deviate from the zoning plan on the basis of Article 2.12(1) of the Wet algemene bepalingen omgevingsrecht (Law establishing general provisions on environmental law). The Raad (Council) included the scheme in the zoning plan with a view to maintaining the viability of the city centre and to prevent vacant premises in the inner city area.<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0042" CODE="2019" ID="QE0042"/></ALINEA></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">III.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">The actions in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">A.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">C-360/15, X</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0025"><NO.P>25.</NO.P><TXT>The firm X BV (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0044" ID="QS0044"/>X<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0044" CODE="2019" ID="QE0044"/>) was commissioned to construct a fibre‑optics network in the municipality of Amersfoort. It obtained the necessary consent of the municipality for undertaking the cable installation work. Subsequently, the municipality presented X with a statement of fees/charges totalling EUR <FT TYPE="NUMBER">149949</FT> linked to the permissions granted.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0026"><NO.P>26.</NO.P><TXT>X challenged the fees/charges before the Rechtbank (District Court) in Utrecht. An appeal was brought against the judgment of that court before the Gerechtshof (Regional Court of Appeal) Arnhem-Leeuwarden, which delivered a judgment on <DATE ISO="20130702">2 July 2013</DATE>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0027"><NO.P>27.</NO.P><TXT>The Municipal Council of Amersfoort brought an appeal against the judgment of the Gerechtshof (Regional Court of Appeal) before the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Supreme Court of the Netherlands). As the compatibility of the fees/charges with Directive 2002/20, Directive 2002/21, and Directive 2006/123 was unclear, the Supreme Court decided to stay the proceedings on <DATE ISO="20150605">5 June 2015</DATE> and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><LIST TYPE="OTHER"><ITEM><NP><NO.P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0045" ID="QS0045"/>(1)</NO.P><TXT>Must Article 2(3) of Directive 2006/123 be interpreted as meaning that that provision applies to the levying of fees/charges (<QUOT.START CODE="201C" REF.END="QE0046" ID="QS0046"/>leges<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0046" CODE="201D" ID="QE0046"/>) by an authority of a Member State in respect of the processing of an application for consent with regard to the timing, location and manner of performance of excavation works associated with the installation of cables for a public electronic communications network?</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(2)</NO.P><TXT>Must Chapter III of Directive 2006/123 be interpreted as meaning that it also applies in purely internal situations?</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(3)</NO.P><TXT>Must Directive 2006/123, against the background of recital 9 in the preamble thereof, be interpreted as meaning that that directive does not apply to national rules which require the intention to carry out excavation work in connection with the installation, maintenance and removal of cables for a public electronic telecommunications network to be notified to the municipal council, and on the basis of which the latter is not competent to prohibit that work but is, however, competent to impose conditions in respect of the location, timing and manner of performance of the work and of the promotion of shared use of facilities and the coordination of the work with the managers of other constructions works on the land?</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(4)</NO.P><TXT>Must Article 4(6) of Directive 2006/123 be interpreted as meaning that that provision applies to a consent decision with regard to the location, timing and manner of performance of excavation work in connection with the installation of cables for a public electronic telecommunications network, without the relevant authority of a Member State being competent to prohibit that work as such?</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(5)</NO.P><TXT><LIST TYPE="OTHER"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(A)</NO.P><TXT>If, given the answers to the foregoing questions, Article 13(2) of Directive 2006/123 is applicable in the present case, does that provision have direct effect?</TXT></NP></ITEM><?PAGE NO="11"?><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(B)</NO.P><TXT>If the answer to Question 5(A) is in the affirmative, does Article 13(2) of Directive 2006/123 mean that the costs which may be charged may be calculated on the basis of the estimated costs for all application procedures, or on the basis of the costs of all applications such as the one at issue here, or on the basis of individual applications?</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(C)</NO.P><TXT>If the answer to Question 5(A) is in the affirmative, according to which criteria must indirect and fixed costs be allocated to authorisation applications in accordance with Article 13(2) of Directive 2006/123?<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0045" CODE="2019" ID="QE0045"/></TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></QUOT.S></P></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">B.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">C-31/16, Visser</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0028"><NO.P>28.</NO.P><TXT>The Council of Appingedam, by decision of <DATE ISO="20130619">19 June 2013</DATE>, adopted a zoning plan which designated an area outside the town centre called the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0047" ID="QS0047"/>Woonplein<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0047" CODE="2019" ID="QE0047"/> as a shopping area exclusively for retail trade in bulky goods. The zoning plan specifies that it was, inter alia, adopted <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0048" ID="QS0048"/>with a view to maintaining the viability of the city centre and to prevent vacant premises in the inner city area<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0048" CODE="2019" ID="QE0048"/>. The Woonplein thus accommodates retail establishments for the likes of home furnishings, do-it-yourself articles, building materials, garden items, cycling, equestrian equipment and automotive materials.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0029"><NO.P>29.</NO.P><TXT>Visser Vastgoed Beleggingen BV (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0049" ID="QS0049"/>Visser<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0049" CODE="2019" ID="QE0049"/>), a company which owns commercial surfaces at the Woonplein, would like to rent out shop premises to Bristol BV, which, in turn, wishes to establish a retail outlet for its shoe and clothing discount chain.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0030"><NO.P>30.</NO.P><TXT>Visser challenged the decision establishing the zoning plan of <DATE ISO="20130619">19 June 2013</DATE> before the Chamber for Contentious Administrative Proceedings of the Council of State of the Netherlands, claiming that the zoning plan was incompatible with the provisions of Directive 2006/123. On <DATE ISO="20160113">13 January 2016</DATE>, the Chamber decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice:</TXT><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><LIST TYPE="OTHER"><ITEM><NP><NO.P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0050" ID="QS0050"/>(1)</NO.P><TXT>Should the term <QUOT.START CODE="201C" REF.END="QE0051" ID="QS0051"/>service<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0051" CODE="201D" ID="QE0051"/> in Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/123 be interpreted as meaning that retail trade consisting of the sale of goods such as shoes and clothing to consumers is a service to which the provisions of Directive 2006/123 apply under Article 2(1) of that directive?</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(2)</NO.P><TXT>The scheme as referred to [in the order for the preliminary reference] seeks to prohibit certain forms of retail trade, such as the sale of shoes and clothing, in areas outside the city centre with a view to maintaining the viability of the city centre and preventing vacant premises in inner city areas.</TXT><P>Does a rule relating to such a scheme, having regard to recital 9 of Directive 2006/123, fall outside the scope of Directive 2006/123, because such rules must be regarded as pertaining to <QUOT.START CODE="201C" REF.END="QE0052" ID="QS0052"/>town and country planning … which do not specifically regulate or specifically affect the service activity but have to be respected by providers in the course of carrying out their economic activity in the same way as by individuals acting in their private capacity<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0052" CODE="201D" ID="QE0052"/>?</P></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(3)</NO.P><TXT>Is it sufficient in order to assume that a cross-border situation exists, that it cannot be excluded that a retail business from another Member State would be able to establish itself locally or that the customers of the retail business could be from another Member State, or should there be actual evidence thereof?</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(4)</NO.P><TXT>Is Chapter III (freedom of establishment) of Directive 2006/123 applicable to purely internal situations, or is the assessment of the question of whether that chapter applies governed by the case-law of the Court of Justice concerning Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment and the free movement of services in purely internal situations?</TXT></NP></ITEM><?PAGE NO="12"?><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(5a)</NO.P><TXT>Does a scheme as referred to [in the order for the preliminary reference] which is included in a zoning plan fall within the scope of the term <QUOT.START CODE="201C" REF.END="QE0053" ID="QS0053"/>requirement<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0053" CODE="201D" ID="QE0053"/> as referred to in Article 4(7), and Article 14(5), of Directive 2006/123, and not within the scope of the term <QUOT.START CODE="201C" REF.END="QE0054" ID="QS0054"/>authorisation scheme<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0054" CODE="201D" ID="QE0054"/> as referred to in Article 4(6), and Articles 9 and 10 of Directive 2006/123?</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(5b)</NO.P><TXT>Do Article 14(5) of Directive 2006/123 – if a scheme as referred to [in the order for the preliminary reference] falls within the scope of the term <QUOT.START CODE="201C" REF.END="QE0055" ID="QS0055"/>requirement<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0055" CODE="201D" ID="QE0055"/> – or Articles 9 and 10 of Directive 2006/123 – if a scheme as referred to [in the order for the preliminary reference] falls within the scope of the term <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0056" ID="QS0056"/>authorisation<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0056" CODE="2019" ID="QE0056"/> – preclude a municipality from adopting a scheme as referred to [in the order for the preliminary reference]?</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(6)</NO.P><TXT>Does a scheme as referred to [in the order for the preliminary reference] fall within the scope of Articles 34 to 36 TFEU, or of Articles 49 to 55 TFEU and, if so, do the exceptions recognised by the Court of Justice apply, provided they are proportionate?<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0050" CODE="2019" ID="QE0050"/></TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></QUOT.S></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">IV.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">The procedure before the Court</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0031"><NO.P>31.</NO.P><TXT>The respective orders for reference were received at the Court Registry on <DATE ISO="20150713">13 July 2015</DATE> (Case C‑360/15) and on <DATE ISO="20160118">18 January 2016</DATE> (Case C‑31/16). Written observations were submitted by the parties in the main proceedings, the Netherlands Government and the Commission (in both cases) and by the Czech Government (Case C‑360/15) and the Irish, Italian, German and Polish Governments (Case C‑31/16). By decision of the President of the Court of <DATE ISO="20160123">23 January 2016</DATE>, the cases were joined for the purposes of the oral procedure and the judgment.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0032"><NO.P>32.</NO.P><TXT>The parties in the main proceedings, the Netherlands and German Governments and the Commission took part at the hearing, which was held on <DATE ISO="20170214">14 February 2017</DATE>.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">V.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Analysis</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">A.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Case C-360/15, X</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0033"><NO.P>33.</NO.P><TXT>The first three questions deal with the scope of Directive 2006/123, whereas questions 4 and 5 relate to the substantive provisions of that directive.</TXT></NP.ECR><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">1.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">On the scope of Directive 2006/123 (Questions 1 to 3)</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(a)</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Article 2 of Directive 2006/123 (Question 1)</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0034"><NO.P>34.</NO.P><TXT>By its first question the referring court seeks to ascertain whether Article 2(3) of Directive 2006/123 is to be interpreted as covering the levying of fees/charges by an authority of a Member State in respect of the processing of an application for consent with regard to the timing, location and manner of performance of excavation works associated with the installation of cables for a public electronic communications network.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0035"><NO.P>35.</NO.P><TXT>The scope of Directive 2006/123 is determined by its Article 2. Article 2(1) stipulates that it applies to services supplied by providers established in a Member State. Article 2(2) excludes a range of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">activities</HT> from the scope of the directive, such as (subparagraph (c)): <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0057" ID="QS0057"/>electronic communications services and networks, and associated facilities and services, with respect to matters covered by Directives 2002/19/EC, 2002/20/EC, 2002/21/EC, 2002/22/EC and 2002/58/EC<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0057" CODE="2019" ID="QE0057"/>. Article 2(3) then specifies that the directive does not apply to the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">field</HT> of taxation.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="13"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0036"><NO.P>36.</NO.P><TXT>I infer from this structure that one should only turn to the examination of Article 2(3) of Directive 2006/123 if the requirements of Article 2(1) are fulfilled, and if the application of the directive is not already precluded by Article 2(2).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0037"><NO.P>37.</NO.P><TXT>The referring court appears to presuppose that the application of the directive is not precluded because of one of the activities listed in Article 2(2) of Directive 2006/123. As I am not, however, entirely convinced by this finding,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0021"><P>Besides, the parties to the main proceedings as well as the Netherlands harbour doubts regarding the interpretation of Article 2(2)(c) of Directive 2006/123 as carried out by the referring court.</P></NOTE> I shall first examine Article 2(2) before turning to Article 2(3) of the directive.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0038"><NO.P>38.</NO.P><TXT>I will therefore first address the question whether the laying of cables for the purpose of creating a glass-fibre network is a matter which falls within the exception of Article 2(2)(c) of Directive 2006/123.</TXT></NP.ECR><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">1)</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">On Article 2(2)(c) of Directive 2006/123</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0039"><NO.P>39.</NO.P><TXT>The EU regulatory framework for telecommunications consists of Directive 2002/21 and four specific directives, one of which is Directive 2002/20.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0022"><P>See recital 5 of Directive 2002/21. The other directives are Directive 2002/19, Directive 2002/22, and Directive 97/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="19971215">15 December 1997</DATE> concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="024" PAGE.FIRST="1" DATE.PUB="1998">OJ 1998 L 24, p. 1</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0040"><NO.P>40.</NO.P><TXT>Directive 2002/21 contains common provisions and sets out the definitions and scope of the regulatory framework that applies to all electronic communications networks, regardless of how data is transmitted.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0023"><P>Articles 1 and 2 of Directive 2002/21; see also Bell, R.S.K./Ray, N., <HT TYPE="ITALIC">EU Electronic Communications Law</HT>, Richmond Law &amp; Tax, 2004, p. 24.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0041"><NO.P>41.</NO.P><TXT>The aim of Directive 2002/20 is to ensure that only the least onerous authorisation system possible is used to authorise the provision of electronic networks.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0024"><P>Recital 7 of Directive 2002/20.</P></NOTE> It replaces and does away with the previous system of individual licenses for network activities with a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0058" ID="QS0058"/>general authorisation<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0058" CODE="2019" ID="QE0058"/> that grants certain minimum rights to the network operator.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0025"><P>Recital 36 of Directive 2002/20.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0042"><NO.P>42.</NO.P><TXT>The installation of a fibre-optics network the purpose of which is to transmit data for electronic communication constitutes an <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0059" ID="QS0059"/>electronic communications network<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0059" CODE="2019" ID="QE0059"/> within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Directive 2002/21.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0026"><P>Given that the exact purpose of the network does not emerge from the facts submitted to the Court. It is for the referring court to establish whether the network constitutes, in addition, a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0060" ID="QS0060"/>public communications network<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0060" CODE="2019" ID="QE0060"/> as defined by Article 2(d) of Directive 2002/21.</P></NOTE> X’s activities therefore fall within the scope of application of provisions of the EU regulatory framework for telecommunications.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0043"><NO.P>43.</NO.P><TXT>This finding does not, however, as such, imply that the conditions of Article 2(2)(c) of Directive 2006/123 are fulfilled, given that that provision specifically refers to <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0061" ID="QS0061"/>matters covered by<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0061" CODE="2019" ID="QE0061"/> the directives on electronic communications services and networks. Ergo, we have to continue analysing whether fees/charges such as the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0062" ID="QS0062"/>leges<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0062" CODE="2019" ID="QE0062"/> in the main proceedings are, in effect, matters covered by those directives.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="14"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0044"><NO.P>44.</NO.P><TXT>Article 12 of Directive 2002/20 limits charges levied by a national regulatory authority. It refers to charges imposed on undertakings providing a service or a network <HT TYPE="ITALIC">under the general authorisation or to whom a right of use</HT><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0027"><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0063" ID="QS0063"/>Rights of use<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0063" CODE="2019" ID="QE0063"/> refer to the rights granting use of radio frequencies (see Article 5 of Directive 2002/20). However, this bears no relevance for the present case.</P></NOTE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">has been granted</HT>. It has been held applicable in procedures granting a general authorisation or attributing a right of use.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0028"><P>See e.g. judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20130627">27 June 2013</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Vodafone Malta and Mobisle Communications</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑71/12</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2013:431">EU:C:2013:431</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0021">21</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> et seq.).</P></NOTE> In the context of the present procedure, however, it is not applicable, for there is no general authorisation<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0029"><P>A charge not linked to a general authorisation is not caught by Article 12 of Directive 2002/20. See judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20151217">17 December 2015</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Proximus</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑454/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:819">EU:C:2015:819</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0022">22</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20150917">17 September 2015</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Fratelli De Pra and SAIV</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑416/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:617">EU:C:2015:617</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0041">41</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> or right of use involved and, crucially, the Municipality of Amersfoort is not a national regulatory authority.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0030"><P>As the Netherlands Government has not notified that commune to the Commission as a national regulatory authority. Such non-notification has been considered by the Court as sufficient for excluding the quality of national regulatory authority for a commune, see, for instance, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20131107">7 November 2013</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">UPC Nederland</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑518/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2013:709">EU:C:2013:709</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0053">53</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0045"><NO.P>45.</NO.P><TXT>Article 13 of Directive 2002/20 could be of relevance, however. Its scope of application is certainly broader in that it goes beyond the procedure related to general authorisations.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0046"><NO.P>46.</NO.P><TXT>Pursuant to Article 13 <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0064" ID="QS0064"/>Member States may allow the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">relevant authority</HT> to impose fees for ... rights to install facilities<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0064" CODE="2019" ID="QE0064"/>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0031"><P>Emphasis added.</P></NOTE> Unlike Article 12, it makes no reference to general authorisations or a national regulatory authority. Instead, it mirrors the wording of Article 11(1) of Directive 2002/21 (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0065" ID="QS0065"/>Rights of way<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0065" CODE="2019" ID="QE0065"/>), according to which rights of way may be granted by a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0066" ID="QS0066"/>competent authority<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0066" CODE="2019" ID="QE0066"/>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0032"><P>In the French and German language versions, Article 11 of Directive 2002/21 and Article 13 of Directive 2002/20 employ the same terms (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0067" ID="QS0067"/>autorité compétente<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0067" CODE="2019" ID="QE0067"/> or <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0068" ID="QS0068"/>zuständige Behörde<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0068" CODE="2019" ID="QE0068"/>), whereas in the English language version there is a slight linguistic difference between a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0069" ID="QS0069"/>relevant authority<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0069" CODE="2019" ID="QE0069"/> (Article 13 of Directive 2002/20) and a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0070" ID="QS0070"/>competent authority<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0070" CODE="2019" ID="QE0070"/> (Article 11 of Directive 2002/21). In my view, however, there can be no doubt that both Article 11 of Directive 2002/21 and Article 13 of Directive 2002/20 refer to the same kind of authorities.</P></NOTE> This makes sense, as charges introduced by local authorities governing rights of way can be as dissuasive as charges introduced in the course of the procedure of a general authorisation.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0033"><P>Indeed, it emerges from the Commission Communication on its 1999 public consultation on the new regulatory framework (COM(2000) 239 final, pp. 8-9) that the perceived problem by Telecoms operators were the overburdening licencing schemes by national regulators. As the attribution of radio frequencies and numbers necessitates some sort of authorisation scheme, fees for rights of way were regarded as an extra cost to these authorisations and licences.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0047"><NO.P>47.</NO.P><TXT>Such an interpretation is, moreover, corroborated by the purpose of Directive 2002/20 which is to render market access less onerous.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0034"><P>See recital 1 of that directive.</P></NOTE> In this context, according to settled case-law, Member States may not, within the framework of Directive 2002/20, levy any charges or fees in relation to the provision of networks and electronic communication services other than those provided for by that directive.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0035"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20120712">12 July 2012</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Vodafone España and France Telecom España</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑55/11, C‑57/11 and C‑58/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2012:446">EU:C:2012:446</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0028">28</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited).</P></NOTE> It would be inconsistent if the absence of a requirement for a general authorisation by a national regulatory authority could undermine this protection of market access afforded by Directive 2002/20.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0048"><NO.P>48.</NO.P><TXT>The overall objectives of the telecommunications framework<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0036"><P>Article 8 of Directive 2002/21.</P></NOTE> support a broad reading of Article 13 of Directive 2002/20. The goal set out in Article 8(2)(a) of Directive 2002/21 is to ensure that users derive maximum benefit in terms of choice, price, and quality. The cost of permits for civil engineering works for electronic networks affects the prices end-users have to pay for access to the network in their region, and whether they can receive access to the network at all.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0037"><P>On the possibility that administrative costs distort competition see also Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Joined Cases <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Vodafone España</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑55/11, C‑57/11 and C‑58/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2012:162">EU:C:2012:162</NO.ECLI>, points <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0062">62</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0064">64</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> Onerous<?PAGE NO="15"?> procedures to install facilities can have a similar effect as obstacles in the form of authorisation schemes. The scope of application of Article 13 of Directive 2002/20 is therefore not limited to the context of a specific general authorisation, but encompasses other fees for installing facilities that are necessary for the market entry of communications providers.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0038"><P>It is worth noting that the regulatory framework applies to all electronic communications and not just to telephone providers, where a general authorisation scheme is usually necessary for the fact that a limited set of numbers and available radio frequencies needs to be attributed in a fair way.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0049"><NO.P>49.</NO.P><TXT>Such an interpretation of Article 13 of Directive 2002/20 is also in line with the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Vodafone España and France Telecom España</HT> judgment,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0039"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20120712">12 July 2012</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑55/11, C‑57/11 and C‑58/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2012:446">EU:C:2012:446</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0034">34</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0035">35</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> where the Court held that Article 13 precluded a regionally imposed tax on the usage of third-party phone pylons. There are obviously substantial differences between the measure in question in the main proceedings and the one at issue in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Vodafone España and France Telecom España</HT>, but the judgment clarified two important points that are applicable to the current case.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0050"><NO.P>50.</NO.P><TXT>First, the tax at issue in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Vodafone España and France Telecom España</HT> increased the cost of establishment of new providers as opposed to those which already owned infrastructure.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0040"><P>Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Joined Cases <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Vodafone España</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑55/11, C‑57/11 and C‑58/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2012:162">EU:C:2012:162</NO.ECLI>, point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0063">63</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> Similarly, the charges/fees in the present case raise the cost of the installation of facilities and place providers which do not already own infrastructure in the municipality at a disadvantage to those who do.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0051"><NO.P>51.</NO.P><TXT>Secondly, the tax at issue in that case was charged by a municipality which was not a national regulatory authority. Due to the broader scope of Article 13, and as the municipalities were the competent authorities for approving the installation of facilities, that provision applied in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Vodafone España and France Telecom España</HT>. The same should apply to the present case.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0052"><NO.P>52.</NO.P><TXT>It should be added that in subsequent cases on the issue of general taxes as opposed to charges on the installation of facilities, the Court found Directive 2002/20 not to be applicable.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0041"><P>In <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Belgacom and Mobistar</HT>, the case concerned a general tax which had to be paid based on the ground occupied and unlinked to the installation of a facility, see judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20140904">4 September 2014</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑256/13 and C‑264/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2149">EU:C:2014:2149</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0036">36</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0037">37</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); in a similar way, the Court did not apply Directive 2002/20 to municipal legislation charging a tax on all telecommunication equipment in judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20151217">17 December 2015</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Proximus</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑454/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:819">EU:C:2015:819</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>). Neither in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Proximus</HT> (paragraph 28) nor in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Belgacom and Mobistar</HT> (paragraph 36) were the fees related to the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">installation</HT> of facilities, nor did the taxes have the character of making the market entry more onerous for new entrants that did not already have infrastructure installed.</P></NOTE> As regards the measure at issue, however, there can be no doubt that fees/charges were charged for the installation of a facility. In laying cables on private or public ground, X makes use of a right of way in the sense of Article 11 of Directive 2002/21 as transposed by the Netherlands Telecommunications Law.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0042"><P>According to the Netherlands Government, the Netherlands legislator transposed this article in Article 5.4 of the Telecommunication laws which grants the network provider the right to lay cables after having accorded time and place of the works with the competent municipality.</P></NOTE> Article 13 of Directive 2002/20 is the specification of this right of way when it comes to the installation of telecommunication facilities, an activity the laying of cables is undoubtedly part of.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0053"><NO.P>53.</NO.P><TXT>The matter is therefore covered by Article 13 of Directive 2002/20, which is why, pursuant to Article 2(2)(c) of Directive 2006/123, the latter directive does not apply to the case at issue.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0054"><NO.P>54.</NO.P><TXT>The question of whether national measures such as the charges/fees levied in the case of the main proceedings are compatible with Article 13 of Directive 2002/20, a directly-applicable<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0043"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20120712">12 July 2012</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Vodafone España and France Telecom España</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑55/11, C‑57/11 and C‑58/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2012:446">EU:C:2012:446</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0039">39</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> provision which can be relied upon by individuals, requires findings of fact, which should be dealt with by the referring court. Moreover, it is not a subject of the present proceedings.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="16"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">2)</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">On Article 2(3) of Directive 2006/123</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0055"><NO.P>55.</NO.P><TXT>On a hypothetical basis, for the eventuality that the Court should consider that the requirements of Article 2(2)(c) of Directive 2006/123 are not fulfilled, we shall now examine whether a measure such as the fees/charges pertain to the field of taxation (Article 2(3) of Directive 2006/123).</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0056"><NO.P>56.</NO.P><TXT>The term <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0071" ID="QS0071"/>taxation<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0071" CODE="2019" ID="QE0071"/> is to be interpreted autonomously, in line with settled case-law of the Court, according to which the need for a uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope normally to be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0044"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19840118">18 January 1984</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Ekro</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>327/82</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1984:11">EU:C:1984:11</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0011">11</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>). See also judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20000919">19 September 2000</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Linster</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑287/98</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2000:468">EU:C:2000:468</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0043">43</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20140904">4 September 2014</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Germanwings</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑452/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:2141">EU:C:2014:2141</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0016">16</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0057"><NO.P>57.</NO.P><TXT>There is an essential difference between a tax that contributes to the general revenue of a public entity and an administrative charge in return for a specific service.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0058"><NO.P>58.</NO.P><TXT>In the present case, even if the competent municipality charged an amount exceeding the cost of the administrative procedure of processing the application for consent with regard to the timing, location and manner of performance of the excavation works, the mere fact that such a possible surplus levied contributes to the general budget of the municipality does not convert the charge into a general tax. The levying of the charge only occurs in the course of the administrative procedure. Entities cannot convert an administrative charge into a tax, and thus escape the application of Directive 2006/123, simply because the amount charged exceeds the costs for handling the administrative procedure. Such an interpretation of Article 2(3) would run counter to the purpose of Article 13(2) of Directive 2006/123, which is to limit charges incurred in the granting of authorisations to service providers.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0059"><NO.P>59.</NO.P><TXT>I therefore take the view that national measures such as the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">leges</HT> of the main proceedings do not constitute a tax since they are levied on the occasion of the municipal service of processing the application for consent with regard to the timing, location and manner of performance of the excavation works.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(b)</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">On recital 9 of Directive 2006/123 (Question 3)</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0060"><NO.P>60.</NO.P><TXT>As, by virtue of Article 2(2)(c) of Directive 2006/123, that directive does not, in my view, apply in a situation such as that of the case at issue, Question 3 on the meaning of recital 9 of the preamble of that directive, in the context of the proceedings of the case before the referring court, is hypothetical and does not need to be answered.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(c)</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">On purely internal situations (Question 2)</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0061"><NO.P>61.</NO.P><TXT>Question 2 deals with purely internal situations under Chapter III of Directive 2006/123. That question also being hypothetical in nature in the context of the present case, I shall (only) deal with it below in C‑31/16, Visser.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="17"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">2.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Questions 4 and 5</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0062"><NO.P>62.</NO.P><TXT>Given that I propose that the Court should hold that Directive 2006/123 is not applicable to a case such as that at issue and that Questions 4 and 5 are referred on the assumption that the directive applies, they are hypothetical. I should, in addition, like to stress that the regime established by Directive 2006/123, when it comes to authorisations and their schemes (Chapter III, Section 1) and (prohibited) requirements (Section 2), is not geared towards the densely-regulated and highly technical area of telecommunications – which is precisely the reason why this area falls, as we have seen above, outside the scope of Directive 2006/123.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0045"><P>See also recitals 19 and 20 of Directive 2006/123.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">B.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Case C‑31/16, Visser</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">1.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">On Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/123 (Question 1)</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0063"><NO.P>63.</NO.P><TXT>By its first question, the referring court, in essence, asks the Court whether retail trade consisting of the sale of goods such as shoes and clothing to consumers falls within the scope of Directive 2006/123.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0064"><NO.P>64.</NO.P><TXT>This question is posed by the referring court against the following background: Visser owns commercial premises which it would like to rent out to Bristol BV, a firm wishing to establish a retail outlet for its shoe and clothing discount chain. Bristol BV seeks to rely on Chapter III of the directive, entitled <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0072" ID="QS0072"/>Freedom of establishment for providers<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0072" CODE="2019" ID="QE0072"/>. The question is, therefore, whether Bristol BV is a <HT TYPE="ITALIC">service</HT> provider which can rely on the provisions of Directive 2006/123.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0065"><NO.P>65.</NO.P><TXT>Ultimately, as shall be seen in more detail below, under this seemingly benign question (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0073" ID="QS0073"/>Why should retail not be a service?<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0073" CODE="2019" ID="QE0073"/>) looms the bigger, more delicate issue of the relationship between Directive 2006/123 and the fundamental freedoms, enshrined in the FEU Treaty as well as the issue of the relationship between those fundamental freedoms and possible implications for Directive 2006/123.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0066"><NO.P>66.</NO.P><TXT>While the Government of the Netherlands is of the opinion that in a situation such as that of the case at issue, retail should not be regarded as a service, Visser and the Governments of Italy and Poland as well as the Commission believe it should.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0067"><NO.P>67.</NO.P><TXT>By virtue of Article 2(1) of Directive 2006/123, the directive applies to services supplied by providers established in a Member State.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0068"><NO.P>68.</NO.P><TXT>Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/123 defines <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0074" ID="QS0074"/>service<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0074" CODE="2019" ID="QE0074"/> as <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0075" ID="QS0075"/>any self-employed economic activity, normally provided for remuneration, as referred to in [Article 57 TFEU]<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0075" CODE="2019" ID="QE0075"/>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0046"><P>See also judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20140227">27 February 2014</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">OSA</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑351/12</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:110">EU:C:2014:110</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0058">58</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> Article 57 TFEU, in turn, specifies, in its first paragraph, that <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0076" ID="QS0076"/>[s]ervices shall be considered to be <QUOT.START CODE="201C" REF.END="QE0077" ID="QS0077"/>services<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0077" CODE="201D" ID="QE0077"/> within the meaning of the Treaties where they are normally provided for remuneration, in so far as they are not governed by the provisions relating to freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0076" CODE="2019" ID="QE0076"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(a)</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Self-employed economic activity… provided for remuneration</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0069"><NO.P>69.</NO.P><TXT>The first part of the definition of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0078" ID="QS0078"/>service<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0078" CODE="2019" ID="QE0078"/> is rather straightforward: the selling of shoes or clothing constitutes a self‑employed economic activity, provided for remuneration.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="18"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0070"><NO.P>70.</NO.P><TXT>Recital 33 of the directive<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0047"><P>On the value of recitals as a tool of interpretation, in particular as regards Directive 2006/123, see point 132 and footnote 123 of this Opinion.</P></NOTE> explicitly lists distributive trades<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0048"><P><QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0079" ID="QS0079"/>Distributive trades<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0079" CODE="2019" ID="QE0079"/> is the term commonly employed by the Commission to cover retail and similar activities, see e.g. p. 3 of the Communication setting up a retail action plan COM(2013)36 final. It is also worth noting that the original Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the state of the internal market for services, presented under the first stage of the Internal Market Strategy for Services (COM(2002) 441 final) mentioned <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0080" ID="QS0080"/>retail<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0080" CODE="2019" ID="QE0080"/> a striking 35 times. I am well aware that the report constituted the basis for the initial draft of the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Bolkestein</HT> directive, which was, subsequently subject to major modifications. That said, I am not under the impression that the objectives and provisions of the directive were altered in so far as the material scope and the activities covered are concerned. The contentious issues at the time were rather, as is all too well known, the country-of-origin principle and its various legal consequences and ramifications. On this last aspect, see Obwexer, W., Ianc, Sinziana, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0081" ID="QS0081"/>Das binnenmarktliche Recht der Dienstleistungsfreiheit<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0081" CODE="2019" ID="QE0081"/>, in Müller-Graff, P.-Chr. (ed.), <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Europäisches Wirtschaftsordnungsrecht (Enzyklopädie Europarecht, Band 4)</HT>, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2015, pp. 397-448, at pp. 428-429.</P></NOTE> as one of the activities covered by the directive.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0049"><P>It should be stressed that, previously, the Court has already contented itself with a reference to recital 33 so as to hold that services of certification fell within the scope of the directive: see judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20150616">16 June 2015</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Rina Services and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑593/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:399">EU:C:2015:399</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0024">24</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE>Recital 47 of the directive, moreover, mentions, albeit in passing, in the context of authorisation schemes, hypermarkets. Such markets undeniably also have a distributive function as far as goods are concerned. To complete the picture, recital 76 of the directive states that only restrictions applying to goods <HT TYPE="ITALIC">as such</HT> (as opposed to, as I would have it, the distribution of goods) are not concerned by the directive.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0071"><NO.P>71.</NO.P><TXT>In addition to this, the Commission’s non-binding but nevertheless enlightening<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0050"><P>See my Opinions in Joined Cases <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Trijber and Harmsen</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑340/14 and C‑341/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:505">EU:C:2015:505</NO.ECLI>, points <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0036">36</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0054">54</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>) and in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hiebler</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑293/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:472">EU:C:2015:472</NO.ECLI>, point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0069">69</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>). See also Opinions of <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE>Advocate General Cruz Villalón in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Femarbel</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑57/12</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2013:171">EU:C:2013:171</NO.ECLI>, point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0022">22</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>) and in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Rina Services and Rina</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑593/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:159">EU:C:2015:159</NO.ECLI>, point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0039">39</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> Handbook on the implementation of the Services Directive,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0051"><P>See Handbook on the implementation of the Services Directive, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007, point 2.1.1, available at http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/handbook-on-implementation-of-the-services-directive-pbKM7807096/. The Commission’s position, as expressed in the Handbook is perhaps not surprising since the Commission’s agenda appears to have been, right from the start, to include distributive trades within the scope of Directive 2006/123.</P></NOTE> which has, moreover, also been resorted to by the Court in interpreting Directive 2006/123,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0052"><P>See judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20151223">23 December 2015</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hiebler</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑293/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:843">EU:C:2015:843</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0032">32</REF.NP.ECR>, <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0053">53</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0073">73</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20130711">11 July 2013</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Femarbel</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑57/12</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2013:517">EU:C:2013:517</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0037">37</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> refers to <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0082" ID="QS0082"/>distributive trades (including retail and wholesale of goods and services)<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0082" CODE="2019" ID="QE0082"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0072"><NO.P>72.</NO.P><TXT>Furthermore, a look at the drafting history of the directive reveals that the European Parliament initially attempted to remove the reference to <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0083" ID="QS0083"/>distributive trades<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0083" CODE="2019" ID="QE0083"/> during the first reading,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0053"><P>See position of the Parliament in the first reading. The Parliament proposed to delete recital 14 of the Commission’s Proposal.</P></NOTE> presumably with the intention of excluding retail services from the directive. The Council, however, reinstated such a reference in the draft.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0054"><P>See recital 33.</P></NOTE> This reference stayed until the adoption of the directive.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(b)</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">… as referred to in Article 57 TFEU</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0073"><NO.P>73.</NO.P><TXT>But what about the second part of the first paragraph of Article 57 TFEU, as referred to in Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/123 (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0084" ID="QS0084"/>in so far as they [the services] are not governed by the provisions relating to the freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0084" CODE="2019" ID="QE0084"/>)?</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0074"><NO.P>74.</NO.P><TXT>This raises the question whether the services at issue – selling of shoes – are not governed by other Treaty freedoms in the sense of Article 57 TFEU, which could mean that they do not fall within the scope of Directive 2006/123.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="19"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0075"><NO.P>75.</NO.P><TXT>Under the system of the FEU Treaty,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0055"><P>See Part III, Title IV, TFEU on free movement of persons, services and capital, which is in turn divided into Chapter 1 (Workers), Chapter 2 (Establishment), Chapter 3 (Services) and Chapter 4 (Capital and payments).</P></NOTE> the free movement of persons consists of the two separate freedoms of movement of dependent persons (workers) and independent persons (establishment). Ergo, freedom of establishment comes under the term <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0085" ID="QS0085"/>persons<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0085" CODE="2019" ID="QE0085"/> in the first paragraph of Article 57 TFEU.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0056"><P>This systematic finding does not in any way alter the fact that the freedom to provide services primarily relates to service as a product. See, in this respect, Müller-Graff, P.-Chr., in Streinz, R. (ed.), <HT TYPE="ITALIC">EUV/AEUV Kommentar</HT>, C. H. Beck, Munich, 2<HT TYPE="SUP">nd</HT> edition, 2012, Artikel 56 AEUV, point 7.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0076"><NO.P>76.</NO.P><TXT>Let us, for a moment, imagine that Bristol BV’s activity was one of establishment. This would imply that its situation would, under the FEU Treaty, be governed by the rules on freedom of establishment (as a sub-category of free movement of persons), which would, in turn, mean that we would not be in the presence of a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0086" ID="QS0086"/>service<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0086" CODE="2019" ID="QE0086"/> within the meaning of Article 57 TFEU, which would imply that we are outside the scope of Directive 2006/123. Following such a finding, Chapter III of Directive 2006/123 on freedom of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">establishment</HT> for providers would be deprived of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">any</HT> scope.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0057"><P>See also Klamert, M., <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Services Liberalization in the EU and the WTO</HT>, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 177.</P></NOTE> Unless one considered Chapter III for this reason to be <HT TYPE="ITALIC">per se</HT> contrary to primary law, the conclusion that Chapter III has no scope cannot be accepted.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0077"><NO.P>77.</NO.P><TXT>Accordingly, either the term <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0087" ID="QS0087"/>service activity<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0087" CODE="2019" ID="QE0087"/> under Chapter III of Directive 2006/123 must have a meaning distinct from the general definition under Article 4 of Directive 2006/123 or Article 4 of Directive 2006/123 is not intended to refer Article 57 TFEU in so far as establishment of providers is concerned. For reasons of clarity, I would opt for the latter approach and hold that the directive applies also to economic activities falling under freedom of establishment within the meaning of the FEU Treaty, but which also include a service element.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0058"><P>See also, albeit with reference to Chapter III of Directive 2006/123, Klamert, M., ibid.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0078"><NO.P>78.</NO.P><TXT>On a more general note, the difference in terminology between the FEU Treaty and Directive 2006/123 indicates the different methods employed by the FEU Treaty, on the one hand, and by the directive, on the other, in order to attain the objective of eliminating restrictions on freedom to provide services. The FEU Treaty primarily targets <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0088" ID="QS0088"/>restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Union<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0088" CODE="2019" ID="QE0088"/>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0059"><P>See Article 56(1) TFEU.</P></NOTE> It pursues <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0089" ID="QS0089"/>negative integration<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0089" CODE="2019" ID="QE0089"/> by prohibiting barriers to trade in services.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0060"><P>In Article 57, second and third paragraphs, TFEU, it refers to <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0090" ID="QS0090"/>activities<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0090" CODE="2019" ID="QE0090"/>, but it does so in an illustrative context.</P></NOTE> Directive 2006/123 by contrast lays the emphasis on and specifically targets service <HT TYPE="ITALIC">activities</HT>. As an act of secondary law, it can, with a higher degree of detail, address the problems encountered by service providers when they are faced with obstacles. This is why – in line with its legal basis –<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0061"><P>Article 53 TFEU specifically refers to <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0091" ID="QS0091"/>activities<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0091" CODE="2019" ID="QE0091"/>.</P></NOTE> it focuses on the activity of service providers and its entire structure is geared towards service activities.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0062"><P>The term <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0092" ID="QS0092"/>activity<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0092" CODE="2019" ID="QE0092"/>, in singular or plural is employed a striking 146 times in the directive: 85 instances in the preamble and 61 in the provisions of the directive. In contrast, the term <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0093" ID="QS0093"/>barrier(s)<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0093" CODE="2019" ID="QE0093"/> is referred to 15 times, and only in the preamble, whereas the term <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0094" ID="QS0094"/>restriction(s)<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0094" CODE="2019" ID="QE0094"/> is resorted to in 20 instances: 15 in the preamble and 5 in the provisions.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0079"><NO.P>79.</NO.P><TXT>The reference to Article 57 TFEU in Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/123 does not, therefore, have any bearing on the question whether retail is a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0095" ID="QS0095"/>service<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0095" CODE="2019" ID="QE0095"/> under Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/123.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0080"><NO.P>80.</NO.P><TXT>Retail should therefore be considered to be a service under Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/123.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(c)</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Restrictive interpretation because of primary law?</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0081"><NO.P>81.</NO.P><TXT>The question which remains in the context of the interpretation of Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/123 is whether primary law is conducive to a restrictive interpretation of that provision with the effect that retail could not be considered a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0096" ID="QS0096"/>service<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0096" CODE="2019" ID="QE0096"/> for the purposes of Directive 2006/123.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="20"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0082"><NO.P>82.</NO.P><TXT>My answer to this is <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0097" ID="QS0097"/>no<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0097" CODE="2019" ID="QE0097"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">1)</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Freedom of establishment</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0083"><NO.P>83.</NO.P><TXT>Even under the FEU Treaty (only),<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0063"><P>And notwithstanding the question of purely internal situations, discussed below.</P></NOTE> Bristol BV’s activity would, in my view, come under freedom of establishment, as I shall now demonstrate by referring to case-law of the Court.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0084"><NO.P>84.</NO.P><TXT>In situations concerning establishment, which involve another fundamental freedom, typically those relating to goods or services,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0064"><P>In situations where someone establishes him or herself to sell goods or offer services.</P></NOTE> the Court appears to me consistently to apply freedom of establishment pursuant to Article 49 TFEU.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0065"><P>See judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19990511">11 May 1999</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Pfeiffer</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑255/97</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1999:240">EU:C:1999:240</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0026">26</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20110324">24 March 2011</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Spain</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑400/08</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:172">EU:C:2011:172</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0070">70</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0072">72</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), and, more recently, of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20140205">5 February 2014</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hervis Sport- és Divatkereskedelmi</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑385/12</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2014:47">EU:C:2014:47</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0024">24</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> I see the underlying reason for such an approach as being that establishment typically and inherently incorporates aspects of other fundamental freedoms almost by definition. To put it schematically: capital is needed for the setting-up; people help to construct and manage, goods need to be transported from A to B. All this to enable a (natural or legal) person to establish itself.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0085"><NO.P>85.</NO.P><TXT>By treating all these matters under <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0098" ID="QS0098"/>establishment<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0098" CODE="2019" ID="QE0098"/>, the Court appears to me to focus on the actual activity of establishment rather than the ultimate finality of such establishment. The Court does not, in such a situation, look at the goods or services to be provided by the established undertaking.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0086"><NO.P>86.</NO.P><TXT>Under such case-law and in the absence of Directive 2006/123, the setting-up of a retail store as in the case at issue in the main proceedings would presumably therefore fall within the freedom of establishment. In such circumstances I do not see how treating the case at issue under Chapter III of the directive on establishment of service providers would be contrary to such case‑law.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">2)</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Free movement of goods</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0087"><NO.P>87.</NO.P><TXT>Given that the case at issue is about establishment, we do not need to pursue the relationship between Directive 2006/123 and primary law any further. In order to forestall any misapprehensions about the relationship between goods and services and in light of questions raised during the oral procedure I do, nevertheless, deem it helpful to pursue this question further within the present Opinion.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0088"><NO.P>88.</NO.P><TXT>At the outset, it should be stressed that the fact that, as a result of the first paragraph of Article 57 TFEU, the freedom to provide services is residual in relation to the other freedoms in no way implies that there is an order of priority between the fundamental freedoms.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0066"><P>See, by way of example, Müller-Graff, P.-Chr., in Streinz, R. (ed.), <HT TYPE="ITALIC">EUV/AEUV Kommentar</HT>, C. H. Beck, Munich, 2<HT TYPE="SUP">nd</HT> edition, 2012, Artikel 56 AEUV, point 8; and Tiedje, J., in von der Groeben, H., Schwarze, J., Hatje, A. (eds), <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Europäisches Unionsrecht (Kommentar), Band 1</HT>, 7<HT TYPE="SUP">th</HT> ed., Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2015, Artikel 57 AEUV, point 30.</P></NOTE> The Court has made clear that although in the definition of the concept of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0099" ID="QS0099"/>services<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0099" CODE="2019" ID="QE0099"/> laid down in the first paragraph of Article 57 TFEU it is specified that services <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0100" ID="QS0100"/>are not governed by the provisions relating to freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0100" CODE="2019" ID="QE0100"/>, that relates to the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">definition</HT> of that concept and <HT TYPE="ITALIC">does not establish any order of priority</HT> between the freedom to provide services and the other fundamental freedoms. Crucially, the Court held that the concept of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0101" ID="QS0101"/>services<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0101" CODE="2019" ID="QE0101"/> covers services which are not governed by other freedoms, in order to ensure that all economic activity falls within the scope of the fundamental freedoms.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0067"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20061003">3 October 2006</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Fidium Finanz</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑452/04</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2006:631">EU:C:2006:631</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0032">32</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> The freedom to provide services is, therefore, not a subsidiary but a residual freedom.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="21"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0089"><NO.P>89.</NO.P><TXT>Where cases involve both goods and services, the Court’s case-law varies. Three approaches can be distinguished: examining one freedom only on the basis of a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0102" ID="QS0102"/>centre of gravity test<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0102" CODE="2019" ID="QE0102"/>, examining both freedoms together, and examining one freedom after another. Let us briefly look at these three approaches in turn.</TXT></NP.ECR><GR.SEQ LEVEL="6"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">i)</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Searching for a centre of gravity</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0090"><NO.P>90.</NO.P><TXT>This is the classical test of default resorted to by the Court. Here, the Court consistently holds that where a national measure affects both the freedom to provide services and the free movement of goods, the Court will, in principle, examine the measure in relation to just one of those two fundamental freedoms if it is clear that, in the circumstances of the case, one of those freedoms is entirely secondary in relation to the other and may be attached to it.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0068"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20041014">14 October 2004</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Omega</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑36/02</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2004:614">EU:C:2004:614</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0026">26</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> and the case-law cited). In legal writing see, by way of example, Frenz, W., <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Handbuch Europarecht</HT>, Band 1 Europäische Grundfreiheiten, Springer, 2. ed. 2012, p. 31, Rz. 74, and Hatzopoulos, V., <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0103" ID="QS0103"/>Recent Developments in the Case Law of the ECJ in the Field of Services<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0103" CODE="2019" ID="QE0103"/>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Common Market Law Review</HT>, 2000, vol. 37, p. 51.</P></NOTE> In this context, the Court has tended to deal with cases of retail under the free movement of goods.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0069"><P>See, for instance, judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20000113">13 January 2000</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">TK-Heimdienst</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑254/98</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2000:12">EU:C:2000:12</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>). Also, a prohibition of sale at a loss was examined under the provisions of free movement of goods: see judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19931124">24 November 1993</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Keck and Mithouard</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑267/91 and C‑268/91</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1993:905">EU:C:1993:905</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0010">10</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>). As is well known, the Court in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Keck and Mithouard</HT> considered even that freedom not to apply.</P></NOTE> The Court does not, however, deny that there are multiple aspects to one economic activity from the point of view of the fundamental freedoms, even if it has analysed a case solely from the perspective of just one freedom.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0091"><NO.P>91.</NO.P><TXT>For instance, in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Burmanjer and Others</HT>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0070"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20050526">26 May 2005</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑20/03</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2005:307">EU:C:2005:307</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> the Court held that it could not be excluded that the sale of a product may be accompanied by an activity with <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0104" ID="QS0104"/>services<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0104" CODE="2019" ID="QE0104"/> aspects. Nonetheless, that fact could not be sufficient, by itself, to classify an economic operation such as itinerant trading as a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0105" ID="QS0105"/>provision of services<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0105" CODE="2019" ID="QE0105"/> within the meaning of Article 56 TFEU. Instead, it must be established, in each case, whether that service is or is not wholly secondary in relation to the elements concerning the free movement of goods.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0071"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20050526">26 May 2005</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Burmanjer and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑20/03</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2005:307">EU:C:2005:307</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0034">34</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> Consistent with this approach, cases where the services aspect is very strong, such as in advertisement,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0072"><P>Judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19740430">30 April 1974</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Sacchi</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>155/73</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1974:40">EU:C:1974:40</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>), and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19800318">18 March 1980</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Debauve and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>52/79</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1980:83">EU:C:1980:83</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>). A case on trade fairs came under the freedom to provide services and the freedom of establishment: see judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20020115">15 January 2002</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Italy</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑439/99</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2002:14">EU:C:2002:14</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>). Coffeeshops were scrutinised under the freedom to provide services: see judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20101216">16 December 2010</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Josemans</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑137/09</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2010:774">EU:C:2010:774</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0050">50</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> were dealt with under the freedom to provide services.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0073"><P>One exception in the appreciation of advertisements in terms of the delimitation of fundamental freedoms is the judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20040325">25 March 2004</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Karner</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑71/02</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2004:181">EU:C:2004:181</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0047">47</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), where the Court implied that advertising falls into the ambit of multiple freedoms, but then found the goods aspect to be predominant.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0092"><NO.P>92.</NO.P><TXT>The logic of the centre of gravity test is this: in a situation where the Court is called upon to interpret primary law only, it is natural that it focuses on the predominant fundamental freedom. Why should it carry out the same test for another freedom, only to reach the same result? After all, the fundamental freedoms all have the same objective: to remove barriers to trade within the internal market. Whether a specific situation is caught by, say, Article 49 TFEU only, Article 34 TFEU only, Articles 34 and 56 TFEU or Article 56 TFEU only, is, in the vast majority of cases, not necessarily of crucial importance.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="6"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">ii)</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Applying simultaneously</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0093"><NO.P>93.</NO.P><TXT>Both freedoms have been considered by the Court together in a technical case of prior authorisation procedures for the marketing of (mainly) decoders for television signals.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0074"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20020122">22 January 2002</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Canal Satélite Digital</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑390/99</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2002:34">EU:C:2002:34</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0029">29</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> The reason for such a simultaneous analysis is surely that, in the provision of digital television services, services and goods are closely interrelated.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0075"><P>See Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Canal Satélite Digital</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑390/99</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2001:147">EU:C:2001:147</NO.ECLI>, point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0035">35</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="22"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="6"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">iii)</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Applying successively</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0094"><NO.P>94.</NO.P><TXT>Two freedoms have been examined one after another by the Court notably in cases on advertising.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0076"><P>See judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19970709">9 July 1997</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">De Agostini and TV-Shop</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑34/95 to C‑36/95</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1997:344">EU:C:1997:344</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0039">39</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0048">48</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20010308">8 March 2001</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Gourmet International Products</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑405/98</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2001:135">EU:C:2001:135</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0013">13</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0035">35</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> It is noticeable that the Court in such cases of successive examination offered no reasons for why it did so.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0077"><P>Neither did, incidentally, Advocate General Jacobs in either of those cases. See his Opinions in Joined Cases <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">De Agostini and TV-Shop</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑34/95 to C‑36/95</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1996:333">EU:C:1996:333</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>) and in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Gourmet International Products</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑405/98</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2000:690">EU:C:2000:690</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> My explanation is that a centre of gravity approach was not evident. I would add that this line of case-law on taking the successive approach is to be seen in the light of the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Keck and Mithouard</HT> judgment:<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0078"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19931124">24 November 1993</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑267/91 and C‑268/91</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1993:905">EU:C:1993:905</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> by adopting such an approach the Court made clear that measures which could potentially constitute selling arrangements falling outside the scope of the free movement of goods pursuant to <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Keck and Mithouard</HT> could, in addition, be analysed under another Treaty freedom.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0079"><P>Such a precision was, in my view, necessary, given that, in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Keck and Mithouard</HT> itself, the Court did not consider fundamental freedoms other than the free movement of goods: see judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19931124">24 November 1993</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑267/91 and C‑268/91</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1993:905">EU:C:1993:905</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0006">6</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0095"><NO.P>95.</NO.P><TXT>I infer, from the fact that the Court resorts to different approaches, that there are situations in which the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0106" ID="QS0106"/>centre of gravity<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0106" CODE="2019" ID="QE0106"/> approach, which is, almost mechanically, about quantity (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0107" ID="QS0107"/>Which freedom has the greatest weight?<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0107" CODE="2019" ID="QE0107"/>), reaches its limits in a situation in which one cannot simply disregard as completely secondary a particular fundamental freedom. That is why, for the present case, I have a preference for the third approach, as, otherwise, the services aspect inherent in retail would not be recognised.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0096"><NO.P>96.</NO.P><TXT>As a consequence, I do not see how, in the case at issue, primary law would restrict an interpretation of Directive 2006/123 on its own terms.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0097"><NO.P>97.</NO.P><TXT>This finding is, moreover, corroborated by the way the Court has thus far interpreted Directive 2006/123, as I should now like to illustrate.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="5"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">3)</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Case Rina Services and Others</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0098"><NO.P>98.</NO.P><TXT>Here, the legal findings we can draw from <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Rina Services and Others</HT><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0080"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20150616">16 June 2015</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑593/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:399">EU:C:2015:399</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>). As pointed out by Advocate General Cruz Villalón in his Opinion in that case, this was the first case in which the provisions of Directive 2006/123 applied in practice: see his Opinion in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Rina Services and Rina</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑593/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:159">EU:C:2015:159</NO.ECLI>, point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0001">1</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> are of fundamental importance. The arguably main legal issue of that case was whether a requirement prohibited under Article 14 of Directive 2006/123<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0081"><P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">In casu</HT> a Member State’s legislation requiring companies classified as certification bodies to have their registered office in that Member State.</P></NOTE> could be justified under the FEU Treaty. While the argument was made that Article 14 of Directive 2006/123 could not preclude such a justification because the latter amounted to a provision in primary law,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0082"><P>Article 52(1) TFEU.</P></NOTE> the Court was crystal clear: sitting as the Grand Chamber it ruled that given that Article 14 did not provide for a possibility of justification, there was no such possibility. In this connection the Court specifically addressed Article 3(3) of Directive 2006/123.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0083"><P>According to which Member States are to apply its provisions <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0108" ID="QS0108"/>in compliance with the rules of the FEU Treaty on the right of establishment and the free movement of services<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0108" CODE="2019" ID="QE0108"/>.</P></NOTE> Referring exclusively to the terms, system and <HT TYPE="ITALIC">telos</HT> of the directive, the Court thus demonstrated considerable deference to choices made by the EU legislature.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0084"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20150616">16 June 2015</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Rina Services and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑593/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:399">EU:C:2015:399</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0036">36</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0040">40</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>). This was reiterated in judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20160223">23 February 2016</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hungary</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑179/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:108">EU:C:2016:108</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0047">47</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="23"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0099"><NO.P>99.</NO.P><TXT>For me, the overall rationale underlying the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Rina Services and Others</HT> judgment is that the EU legislature may promote the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">freedom</HT> aspect of the fundamental freedoms at the inevitable expense of their <HT TYPE="ITALIC">justification</HT> aspect. Indeed, it lies in the nature of harmonisation to define, level out and, if considered appropriate by the EU legislature, restrict grounds of justification so as to create a level playing field for economic operators. Put illustratively, in such a situation the <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0109" ID="QS0109"/>winner<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0109" CODE="2019" ID="QE0109"/> is the EU fundamental freedom, as well as the economic operator intending to rely on this freedom – which is fully in line with the objectives of the FEU Treaty.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0085"><P>See also Schönberger, Chr., <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0110" ID="QS0110"/>Normenkontrollen im EG-Föderalismus: die Logik gegenläufiger Hierarchisierungen im Gemeinschaftsrecht<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0110" CODE="2019" ID="QE0110"/>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Europarecht</HT>, 2003, pp. 600-627, at p. 621, according to whom primary law is to be understood more as the motor, rather than the limit, of harmonisation measures.</P></NOTE> The legality and legitimacy of such an outcome lies, in my view, in the respect for the legislative procedure provided for by the FEU Treaty.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0100"><NO.P>100.</NO.P><TXT>Primary law does not, therefore, have any bearing on the question whether retail is a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0111" ID="QS0111"/>service<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0111" CODE="2019" ID="QE0111"/> under Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/123.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(d)</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Further considerations</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0101"><NO.P>101.</NO.P><TXT>I would also like to take the opportunity to place the present case into its wider context.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0102"><NO.P>102.</NO.P><TXT>Present day circumstances imply that the activity of retail, though ultimately linked to distributing goods, is a service in its own right and should be recognised as such. In the past (and, in particular, at the time of the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Keck and Mithouard</HT> judgment<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0086"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19931124">24 November 1993</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑267/91 and C‑268/91</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1993:905">EU:C:1993:905</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE>) it may have been the primary means of distributing goods. Mail order delivery on the basis of catalogue sales may have existed, but this was certainly marginal. Since then, with the arrival of the internet in virtually every household (and smartphone), retail has faced competition from new directions which has forced it to undergo a profound transformation. Nowadays, to a far greater extent than in the past, retail not only consists of merely selling a product, but also of advising, counselling and offering follow-up services.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0087"><P>See Kotler, P./Armstrong, G., <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Principles of Marketing</HT>, 14<HT TYPE="SUP">th</HT> ed., Pearson Prentice Hall, 2012, Chapter on Retail, pp. 374‑394, at p. 384.</P></NOTE> Under present day conditions it is an activity which is not merely ancillary to a product.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0103"><NO.P>103.</NO.P><TXT>As occurs often in the case of new legislation, new questions arise in the course of application of that legal instrument that cannot be answered by merely resorting to the Court’s previous case-law on the four freedoms. This is especially striking in the context of establishment, where the distinction between establishment for the purposes of distributing goods and establishment for the purposes of providing a service was of no relevance under the FEU Treaty provisions. I thus see no reason why previous case-law on the delimitation between the freedom to provide services and the free movement of goods should stand in the way of applying Directive 2006/123 to retailers, as intended by its clear wording. On the contrary, the case-law of the Court hitherto indicates that the distinction between goods and services has always been non-exclusive. The evolution of the service economy, where it becomes normal for the customer to expect a multitude of services when and even after they buy a product, increases the overlap between the two poles, and distributive trades are at the core of this overlap. The legislator chose to include them within the scope of Directive 2006/123 knowing that the activity would further evolve towards offering more services, which is in line with case-law of the Court that always acknowledged the fact that certain activities contain aspects protected by multiple freedoms.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0104"><NO.P>104.</NO.P><TXT>To sum up, I do not think that the case-law to date can or should be interpreted in such a way as to exclude the activity of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0112" ID="QS0112"/>retail<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0112" CODE="2019" ID="QE0112"/> from the scope of Directive 2006/123.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="24"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(e)</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Conclusion</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0105"><NO.P>105.</NO.P><TXT>My conclusion on the first question is therefore that <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0113" ID="QS0113"/>retail<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0113" CODE="2019" ID="QE0113"/> activity consisting of the sale of goods such as shoes and clothing to consumers falls within the definition of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0114" ID="QS0114"/>service<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0114" CODE="2019" ID="QE0114"/> in Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/123.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">2.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">On purely internal situations (Question 4)</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0106"><NO.P>106.</NO.P><TXT>By its fourth question in Case C‑31/16, the referring court seeks to establish whether Chapter III of Directive 2006/123, entitled <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0115" ID="QS0115"/>Freedom of establishment for providers<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0115" CODE="2019" ID="QE0115"/>, is applicable in situations the facts of which are confined to a single Member State of the EU.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0107"><NO.P>107.</NO.P><TXT>It is not the first time that this question has been referred to the Court of Justice. Indeed, in case <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Trijber and Harmsen</HT>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0088"><P>See Question 2 in Case C‑340/14 and Question 1 in Case C‑341/14, respectively paragraphs 28 and 37 in judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20151001">1 October 2015</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑340/14 and C‑341/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:641">EU:C:2015:641</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> the Raad van State (Council of State), had already asked the same question.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0108"><NO.P>108.</NO.P><TXT>In my Opinion in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Trijber and Harmsen</HT>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0089"><P>See Joined cases <REF.DOC.ECR><NO.CASE>C‑340/14 and C‑341/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:505">EU:C:2015:505</NO.ECLI>, points <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0049">49</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0057">57</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> I proposed to answer that question in the affirmative. As I have laid out in detail in that case, a textual, systemic, historical and teleological interpretation of the provisions of Directive 2006/123 points to Chapter III on freedom of establishment for providers applying not only in cross-border, but also in purely internal, situations.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0090"><P>The Court, in that case, saw no need to address and therefore declined to answer the question of purely internal situations, given that, in both cases the situations which were the subject of the questions referred were not purely internal: see judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20151001">1 October 2015</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Trijber and Harmsen</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑340/14 and C‑341/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:641">EU:C:2015:641</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0042">42</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> While I refer the Court, as to the details of my reasoning, to that Opinion, in summary I considered the following: regarding the wording of the legal bases in the FEU Treaty, there is no difference between <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0116" ID="QS0116"/>coordination<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0116" CODE="2019" ID="QE0116"/>, <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0117" ID="QS0117"/>approximation<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0117" CODE="2019" ID="QE0117"/> and <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0118" ID="QS0118"/>harmonisation<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0118" CODE="2019" ID="QE0118"/>; harmonisation in the domain of the internal market can cover situations not covered by the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the FEU Treaty; the provisions of Chapter III of Directive 2006/123 do not make any reference to cross-border activity, whereas those of Chapter IV do, and draft amendments to limit the whole directive to cross-border situations were rejected.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0109"><NO.P>109.</NO.P><TXT>I have not had a change of mind on this question since my Opinion in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Trijber and Harmsen</HT>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0091"><P>I subsequently reiterated my view in my Opinions in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hiebler</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑293/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:472">EU:C:2015:472</NO.ECLI>, point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0024">24</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>) and in Joined Cases <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Promoimpresa and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑458/14 and C‑67/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:122">EU:C:2016:122</NO.ECLI>, point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0050">50</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> In this Opinion I shall therefore limit myself to addressing additional arguments raised in the context of the current procedure as well as to the Court’s case-law on Directive 2006/123.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0110"><NO.P>110.</NO.P><TXT>First, the difference in wording between the provisions of Chapter III and those of Chapter IV is crucial: establishment under the directive is supposed to cover all internal service provision (Chapter III). Economic operators should not be discouraged from establishing themselves in a Member State in the first place. For the rest, that is to say temporary provision of services, a cross-border element is inherent. Ergo, Chapter IV necessarily and logically requires the existence of a cross-border element.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0111"><NO.P>111.</NO.P><TXT>Secondly, those provisions,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0092"><P>See, by way of example, Article 5(3) of Directive 2006/123.</P></NOTE> or even chapters,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0093"><P>See, for instance, Chapter VI of the directive.</P></NOTE> of Directive 2006/123 which specifically refer to <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0119" ID="QS0119"/>another Member State<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0119" CODE="2019" ID="QE0119"/> and thereby to a cross-border situation should be regarded as applying specifically to cross-border situations which in no way prejudge other provisions of the directive applying in purely internal situations.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="25"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0112"><NO.P>112.</NO.P><TXT>Thirdly, it cannot be said that the legal basis of the directive, that is to say Articles 53 and 62 TFEU,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0094"><P>Formerly Articles 47(2) and 55 EC.</P></NOTE> only confers competence for addressing cross-border situations. Indeed, as the Commission stressed during the course of the hearing, the wording of Article 53(2) TFEU according to which, in the case of the medical and allied and pharmaceutical professions, the progressive abolition of restrictions is dependent upon coordination of the conditions for their exercise <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in</HT> the various Member States, points in the opposite direction.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0113"><NO.P>113.</NO.P><TXT>Moreover, Article 53 TFEU has already been resorted to by the EU legislature as a legal basis in situations which went beyond merely cross-border ones. This provision appears to me to be used consistently as the standard (and only) legal basis for harmonisation<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0095"><P>The Court itself refers to <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0120" ID="QS0120"/>harmonisation<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0120" CODE="2019" ID="QE0120"/> in this respect: see judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20041012">12 October 2004</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Paul and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑222/02</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2004:606">EU:C:2004:606</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0036">36</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> in the domain of services. In particular, this is the case for the voluminous harmonisation in the sector of financial services. By way of example, I should like to mention the directives on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0096"><P>Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20140515">15 May 2014</DATE> establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="173" PAGE.FIRST="190" DATE.PUB="2014">OJ 2014 L 173, p. 190</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> on markets in financial instruments (MiFiD)<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0097"><P>Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20040421">21 April 2004</DATE> on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="145" PAGE.FIRST="1" DATE.PUB="2004">OJ 2004 L 145, p. 1</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> and on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0098"><P>Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20060614">14 June 2006</DATE> on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (recast) (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="177" PAGE.FIRST="201" DATE.PUB="2006">OJ 2006 L 177, p. 201</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> I have not come across a judgment of the Court on any of those directives where, in the context of Article 53 TFEU, an issue was made of the legal basis with respect to purely internal situations.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0099"><P>Even though these included a case where the Court sat as full Court (see judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20041012">12 October 2004</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Paul and Others</HT></NAME.CASE>, <NO.CASE>C‑222/02</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2004:606">EU:C:2004:606</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>), which concerned First Council Directive 77/780/EEC of <DATE ISO="19771212">12 December 1977</DATE> on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="322" PAGE.FIRST="30" DATE.PUB="1977">OJ 1977 L 322, p. 30</REF.DOC.OJ>), Council Directive 89/299/EEC of <DATE ISO="19890417">17 April 1989</DATE> on the own funds of credit institutions (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="124" PAGE.FIRST="16" DATE.PUB="1989">OJ 1989 L 124, p. 16</REF.DOC.OJ>), and Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC of <DATE ISO="19891215">15 December 1989</DATE> on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and amending Directive 77/780/EEC (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="386" PAGE.FIRST="1" DATE.PUB="1989">OJ 1989 L 386, p. 1</REF.DOC.OJ>), all of which had been adopted under Article 53 TFEU.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0114"><NO.P>114.</NO.P><TXT>Fourthly, we should examine the judicial practice of the Court. Here, it emerges that the Court interprets the provisions of Chapter III of Directive 2006/123 in situations which are purely internal in nature, without seeking a cross-border element nor resorting to its general case‑law on the admissibility of preliminary references which arise out of purely internal situations, as now summarised (and clarified) in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Ullens de Schooten</HT>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0100"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20161115">15 November 2016</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑268/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:874">EU:C:2016:874</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0115"><NO.P>115.</NO.P><TXT>In order to avoid any confusion, I would like to stress the fundamental difference between the following two questions: (a) does a directive cover situations which are purely internal in nature and (b) should the Court reply to a question even though the disputes in the main proceedings are confined within a single Member State.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0101"><P>See also my Opinion in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">The Gibraltar Betting and Gaming Association</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑591/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2017:32">EU:C:2017:32</NO.ECLI>, point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0062">62</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> Question a) concerns the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">material scope</HT> of a directive. It is a question of <HT TYPE="ITALIC">substance</HT>. If the answer to this question is <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0121" ID="QS0121"/>yes<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0121" CODE="2019" ID="QE0121"/>, the matter ends there in the sense that no search for any possible cross-border elements is necessary. Question (b) on the other hand is not of a substantial, but of a formal nature. It is about the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">admissibility</HT> of a case. One only needs to analyse Question (b) if the answer to question (a) is <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0122" ID="QS0122"/>no<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0122" CODE="2019" ID="QE0122"/>. <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Ullens de Schooten</HT><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0102"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20161115">15 November 2016</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑268/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:874">EU:C:2016:874</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> deals with Question (b).</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="26"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0116"><NO.P>116.</NO.P><TXT>In <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Rina Services and Others</HT>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0103"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20150616">16 June 2015</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑593/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:399">EU:C:2015:399</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>). Advocate General Cruz Villalón addressed the issue in his Opinion and came to the conclusion that there were sufficient (potential) cross-border elements: see his Opinion in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Rina Services and Rina</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑593/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:159">EU:C:2015:159</NO.ECLI>, points <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0014">14</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0015">15</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>). It should, nevertheless, be noted that the Advocate General did not address the question of whether purely internal situations fall under Chapter III of Directive 2006/123.</P></NOTE> a case on national legislation requiring companies classified as certification bodies to have their registered office in a particular Member State, although the facts of the case in the main proceedings were clearly confined to one Member State only, the Court, without addressing this issue, interpreted the provisions of Chapter III of Directive 2006/123. Subsequently, in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Trijber and Harmsen</HT>, the Court did not answer the question whether the provisions of Chapter III of Directive 2006/123 apply in a purely internal situation. Instead, it looked for and found sufficient cross-border elements.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0104"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20151001">1 October 2015</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑340/14 and C‑341/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:641">EU:C:2015:641</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0042">42</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> Such an approach changed with <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hiebler</HT>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0105"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20151223">23 December 2015</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑293/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:843">EU:C:2015:843</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> The facts in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hiebler</HT>, a case about territorial restrictions allowing chimney sweeps to offer their services merely in the sweeping area in which they are resident were confined to one Member State.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0106"><P>They were even confined to a region within the Member State concerned, which, as I argued in my Opinion was without relevance, as a cross-border element was not necessary, see my Opinion in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hiebler</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑293/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:472">EU:C:2015:472</NO.ECLI>, points <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0023">23</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0024">24</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> The Court made no mention of a compulsory cross-border element and directly proceeded to an examination of the questions referred.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0107"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20151223">23 December 2015</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hiebler</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑293/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:843">EU:C:2015:843</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0027">27</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> et seq.).</P></NOTE> The same goes for the judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Promoimpresa and Others</HT><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0108"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20160714">14 July 2016</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑458/14 and C‑67/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:558">EU:C:2016:558</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> which was about national legislation under which the period of validity of concessions of State‑owned maritime and lakeside property was automatically extended. Again, although the facts of the case before the referring court were confined to one Member State,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0109"><P>In my Opinion in Joined Cases <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Promoimpresa and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑458/14 and C‑67/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:122">EU:C:2016:122</NO.ECLI>, point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0050">50</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), I reiterated my view that the provisions of Chapter III of Directive 2006/123 on freedom of establishment are applicable whether or not there is a cross-border element.</P></NOTE> the Court, without making an issue of this confinement, interpreted the provisions of Chapter III.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0110"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20160714">14 July 2016</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Promoimpresa and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑458/14 and C‑67/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:558">EU:C:2016:558</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0027">27</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR> et seq.)</P></NOTE> By contrast, when it analysed Article 49 TFEU, it required a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0123" ID="QS0123"/>cross-border interest<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0123" CODE="2019" ID="QE0123"/>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0111"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20160714">14 July 2016</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Promoimpresa and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑458/14 and C‑67/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:558">EU:C:2016:558</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0068">68</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> Furthermore, in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hemming and Others</HT>, a case about the requirement for the payment of a fee in the context of an application for an authorisation, all the facts were set in London. Neither the Court<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0112"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20161116">16 November 2016</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hemming and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑316/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:879">EU:C:2016:879</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> nor the Advocate General<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0113"><P>See Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hemming and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑316/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:618">EU:C:2016:618</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> addressed that question.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0117"><NO.P>117.</NO.P><TXT>In summary, I read the abovementioned cases where there was a purely internal situation in the following manner: by interpreting the provisions of Chapter III of Directive 2006/123, the Court presupposed that those provisions do apply in a purely internal situation.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0114"><P>Case-notes in legal literature have also drawn this conclusion, in so far as they analysed that question. See, for instance, Reinstadler, A., Reinalter, A., <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0124" ID="QS0124"/>Partikuläre Anwendung der RL 2006/123/EG auf rein innerstaatliche Sachverhalte?<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0124" CODE="2019" ID="QE0124"/>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Zeitschrift für Europarecht, internationales Privatrecht und Rechtsvergleichung</HT>, 2016, pp. 124-126, at p. 125; Korte, S., <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0125" ID="QS0125"/>Dienstleistungsfreiheit: Gebietsbeschränkungen für Rauchfangkehrer<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0125" CODE="2019" ID="QE0125"/>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht</HT>, 2014, pp. 224-229, at p. 228; and Streinz, R., <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0126" ID="QS0126"/>Anwendungsbereich der DienstleistungsRL bei rein innerstaatlichen Sachverhalten; Kohärenz und Systematik als Maßstab für die Verhältnismäßigkeit der territorialen Beschränkung von Gewerbekonzessionen<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0126" CODE="2019" ID="QE0126"/>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Juristische Schulung</HT>, 2016, pp. 759-761, at p. 761. Critical, with respect to my Opinion in Joined Cases <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Trijber and Harmsen</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑340/14 and C‑341/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:505">EU:C:2015:505</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>), Schiff, A., <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0127" ID="QS0127"/>Zur Anwendbarkeit der Dienstleistungsrichtlinie auf Inlandssachverhalte<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0127" CODE="2019" ID="QE0127"/>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Zeitschrift für europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht</HT>, 2015, pp. 899-904, at p. 901.</P></NOTE> As they fell within the material scope of Directive 2006/123, there was no need to look for any possible or potential cross-border elements.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0118"><NO.P>118.</NO.P><TXT>Not surprisingly, I would propose that the Court in the case at issue should follow this case-law, which is why my answer to the fourth question is that the provisions of Chapter III of Directive 2006/123 are applicable to situations such as those in the main proceedings, regardless of whether or not all the factors are confined within a single Member State.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><?PAGE NO="27"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">3.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">On possible cross-border elements (Question 3)</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0119"><NO.P>119.</NO.P><TXT>On the basis of the reply proposed to the fourth question, the third question becomes hypothetical.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0115"><P>See also point 115 of this Opinion.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">4.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Zoning plan under Directive 2006/123 (Questions 2 and 5)</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0120"><NO.P>120.</NO.P><TXT>By the second and fifth questions, the referring court, in essence, seeks to ascertain whether the provisions of Directive 2006/123 preclude a municipal zoning plan such as the one at issue in the main proceedings, according to which an area is designated for retail trade in bulky goods, to the exclusion of a retail outlet for a shoe and clothing discount chain.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0121"><NO.P>121.</NO.P><TXT>Given that the establishment of a retail outlet such as that in the main proceedings is of a permanent nature, the relevant provisions for the appraisal of this question are to be found in Chapter III of the directive, on <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0128" ID="QS0128"/>freedom of establishment for providers<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0128" CODE="2019" ID="QE0128"/>. This Chapter III is, in turn divided into two sections: one on authorisations, dealing with authorisation schemes and relevant conditions and procedures (Section 1, that is Articles 9 to 13 of Directive 2006/123) and one on requirements prohibited or subject to evaluation (Section 2, that is Articles 14 and 15 of Directive 2006/123). The applicability of these sections depends on whether the zoning plan at issue constitutes a restriction in the form of an <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0129" ID="QS0129"/>authorisation scheme<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0129" CODE="2019" ID="QE0129"/> within the meaning of Article 4(6) of Directive 2006/123 or in the form of a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0130" ID="QS0130"/>requirement<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0130" CODE="2019" ID="QE0130"/> under Article 4(7) of that directive.</TXT></NP.ECR><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(a)</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">On authorisations</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0122"><NO.P>122.</NO.P><TXT>An <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0131" ID="QS0131"/>authorisation scheme<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0131" CODE="2019" ID="QE0131"/>, which triggers the applicability of Articles 9 to 13 of Directive 2006/123, is, pursuant to Article 4(6) of that directive, any procedure under which a provider or recipient is in effect required to take steps in order to obtain from a competent authority a formal or an implied decision, concerning access to a service activity or exercise thereof.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0123"><NO.P>123.</NO.P><TXT>A decision is typically, though not necessarily in every instance, directed at an individual (natural or legal) person. This is not the case for a zoning plan, which is a document drafted independently in advance. In other words, while compliance with the zoning plan may be necessary to commence a service activity, the zoning plan itself is an act of a municipal council <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ex ante</HT> and <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in abstracto</HT>. It follows that a zoning plan does not constitute an authorisation scheme.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0124"><NO.P>124.</NO.P><TXT>Such an understanding of the terms <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0132" ID="QS0132"/>authorisation scheme<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0132" CODE="2019" ID="QE0132"/> seems to me to be corroborated by the case-law of the Court.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0125"><NO.P>125.</NO.P><TXT>Though the Court has, to my knowledge, not yet had to lay down in detail the distinction between an <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0133" ID="QS0133"/>authorisation scheme<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0133" CODE="2019" ID="QE0133"/> and other forms of restriction, it has been confronted in three instances with cases of authorisation schemes under Directive 2006/123: <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Trijber and Harmsen</HT>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0116"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20151001">1 October 2015</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑340/14 and C‑341/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:641">EU:C:2015:641</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Promoimpresa and Others</HT><NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0117"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20160714">14 July 2016</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑458/14 and C‑67/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:558">EU:C:2016:558</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> and <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hemming and Others</HT>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0118"><P>Judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20161116">16 November 2016</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑316/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:879">EU:C:2016:879</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> At stake was always a decision by an administrative authority which was necessary before the service provider could commence its activity. In a similar vein, the EFTA Court classified a system of permits for builders in Norway as an authorisation scheme within the meaning of Article 16(2)(b)<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0119"><P>Judgment of the EFTA Court of <DATE ISO="20150928">28 September 2015</DATE>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">EFTA Surveillance Authority</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">The Kingdom of Norway</HT>, EFTA Court Report 2015-484, paragraph 50.</P></NOTE> of Directive 2006/123, as a permit was necessary for a building company starting construction work in Norway.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="28"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0126"><NO.P>126.</NO.P><TXT>In all these cases the service provider (1) needed to request a decision from an authority, (2) received a decision addressed to it <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in concreto</HT> and (3) that decision and the compliance therewith was a prerequisite for the service provider to commence its activity.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0120"><P>See the wording of Article 4(6), my emphasis: <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0134" ID="QS0134"/><QUOT.START CODE="201C" REF.END="QE0135" ID="QS0135"/>authorisation scheme<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0135" CODE="201D" ID="QE0135"/> means any procedure under which a provider or recipient is in effect <HT TYPE="ITALIC">required to take steps</HT> in order to <HT TYPE="ITALIC">obtain from a competent authority a formal decision</HT>, or an implied decision, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">concerning access to a service activity or the exercise thereof</HT><QUOT.END REF.START="QS0134" CODE="201D" ID="QE0134"/>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0127"><NO.P>127.</NO.P><TXT>None of these three elements is present in the case at issue, which is why I hold the view that a zoning plan such as the one in the main proceedings does not constitute an authorisation scheme in the sense of Article 4(6) of Directive 2006/123.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(b)</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">On requirements</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0128"><NO.P>128.</NO.P><TXT>A <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0136" ID="QS0136"/>requirement<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0136" CODE="2019" ID="QE0136"/> under Article 4(7) is <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0137" ID="QS0137"/>any obligation, prohibition, condition or limit provided for in the laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0137" CODE="2019" ID="QE0137"/>.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0121"><P>Or in consequence of case-law, administrative practice, the rules of professional bodies, or the collective rules of professional associations or other professional organisations, adopted in the exercise of their legal autonomy.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0129"><NO.P>129.</NO.P><TXT>A zoning plan such as that of the municipality of Appingedam is an administrative provision which constitutes a <HT TYPE="ITALIC">conditio sine qua non</HT> for an economic operator to establish itself in such a municipality. It thus falls under the definition of a <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0138" ID="QS0138"/>requirement<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0138" CODE="2019" ID="QE0138"/> within the meaning of Directive 2006/123.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(c)</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">On recital 9 of Directive 2006/123</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0130"><NO.P>130.</NO.P><TXT>Before we go on to examine Articles 14 and 15 of Directive 2006/123, we must address the issue, raised by the referring court, whether recital 9 of that directive has as its effect to exclude a measure such as a zoning plan from the scope of the directive.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0131"><NO.P>131.</NO.P><TXT>Recital 9 of the directive states that the directive <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0139" ID="QS0139"/>applies only to requirements which affect the access to, or the exercise of, a service activity. Therefore, it does not apply to requirements, such as road traffic rules, rules concerning the development or use of land, town and country planning, building standards as well as administrative penalties imposed for non-compliance with such rules which do not specifically regulate or specifically affect the service activity but have to be respected by providers in the course of carrying out their economic activity in the same way as by individuals acting in their private capacity<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0139" CODE="2019" ID="QE0139"/>.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0132"><NO.P>132.</NO.P><TXT>It is well known that while recitals of EU legal acts do not have any independent legal value,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0122"><P>Judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19981119">19 November 1998</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Nilsson and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑162/97</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1998:554">EU:C:1998:554</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0054">54</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20051124">24 November 2005</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Deutsches Milch-Kontor</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑136/04</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2005:716">EU:C:2005:716</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0032">32</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), and Opinion of <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE>Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">TeliaSonera Finland</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑192/08</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2009:309">EU:C:2009:309</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0087">87</REF.NP.ECR> to <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0089">89</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> the Court frequently resorts to them in interpreting provisions of an EU legal act and has also already done so with respect to Directive 2006/123.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0123"><P>See judgments of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20130508">8 May 2013</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑197/11 and C‑203/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2013:288">EU:C:2013:288</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0104">104</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>); of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20150616">16 June 2015</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Rina Services and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑593/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:399">EU:C:2015:399</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0024">24</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0038">38</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20151001">1 October 2015</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Trijber and Harmsen</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑340/14 and C‑341/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:641">EU:C:2015:641</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0044">44</REF.NP.ECR>, <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0049">49</REF.NP.ECR>, <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0052">52</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0053">53</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20151223">23 December 2015</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hiebler</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑293/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:843">EU:C:2015:843</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0041">41</REF.NP.ECR>, <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0044">44</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0073">73</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20160714">14 July 2016</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Promoimpresa and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑458/14 and C‑67/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:558">EU:C:2016:558</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0039">39</REF.NP.ECR>, <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0044">44</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0048">48</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20160223">23 February 2016</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hungary</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑179/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:108">EU:C:2016:108</NO.ECLI>, paragraphs <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0062">62</REF.NP.ECR>, <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0063">63</REF.NP.ECR>, <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0088">88</REF.NP.ECR>, <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0106">106</REF.NP.ECR> and <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0111">111</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>), and of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20161116">16 November 2016</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hemming and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑316/15</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:879">EU:C:2016:879</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0028">28</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> In the EU legal order they are descriptive and not prescriptive in nature. Indeed, the question of their legal value does not normally arise for the simple reason that, typically, the recitals are reflected in the legal provisions of a directive. Good legislative practice by the political institutions of the EU tends to aim at a situation in which the recitals provide a factual background to the provisions of a legal text.</TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="29"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0133"><NO.P>133.</NO.P><TXT>Recital 9, however, is not reflected elsewhere in the directive in the sense that it mirrors one of the (prescriptive) provisions. As a consequence, the areas listed in that recital are therefore not <HT TYPE="ITALIC">per se</HT> exempted from Directive 2006/123, just because they happen to be mentioned in that recital. The directive does not, therefore, contain a blind spot when it comes to zoning plans.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0134"><NO.P>134.</NO.P><TXT>In so far as some parties to the proceedings have invoked the Court’s judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Libert and Others</HT>,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0124"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20130508">8 May 2013</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑197/11 and C‑203/11</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2013:288">EU:C:2013:288</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0104">104</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> suffice it to state that, although recital 9 was mentioned in that judgment, the reason why the Court considered measures relating to social housing to fall outside the scope of Directive 2006/123 was the unambiguous wording of Article 2(2)(j) of that directive.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0125"><P>According to which the directive does not apply to social services relating to social housing.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0135"><NO.P>135.</NO.P><TXT>This does not mean, however, that that recital is devoid of interpretative value. I read recital 9 against the backdrop of Member States’ obligation pursuant to Article 15(7) of Directive 2006/123 to notify the Commission of newly enacted requirements and of their obligation pursuant to Article 39(1)(b) of Directive 2006/123 to present a report to the Commission, containing the information specified in Article 15(5), on requirements to be evaluated. Surely, it cannot be expected of Member States that they should notify the Commission of each and every zoning plan, as a measure of town and country planning.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0136"><NO.P>136.</NO.P><TXT>Ergo, recital 9 clarifies that in most cases urban planning laws do not constitute requirements under Directive 2006/123. The majority of urban planning laws, particularly those applicable <HT TYPE="ITALIC">erga omnes</HT>, do not affect service providers as they do not lay down a condition affecting a provider’s service.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0126"><P>See also Rodin, S., <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0140" ID="QS0140"/>Scope of the Services Directive 2006/123/EC<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0140" CODE="2019" ID="QE0140"/>, in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Conference notes Internal Market for Services</HT>, University of Maribor, 2009, p. 21, and Klamert, M., <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Services Liberalization in the EU and the WTO</HT>, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 285.</P></NOTE> Directive 2006/123 protects a services provider from burdens that affect service providers more than citizens who do not provide services, but it is clear that the directive does not intend to eradicate general administrative necessities such as building standards, road traffic rules or urban planning laws. Not everything that might have the most incidental effect on the freedom of establishment should constitute a requirement.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0137"><NO.P>137.</NO.P><TXT>By contrast, recital 9 does not imply that a zoning plan is excluded from the scope of the directive altogether. Indeed, it may be that the zoning plan affects service providers specifically. Territorial restrictions (Article 15(2)) and authorisations for hypermarkets (recital 47) are expressly referred to in the directive. Moreover, in my understanding, any rule, regardless of its origin, which has as its effect higher establishment costs for service providers, falls, in principle within the scope of Directive 2006/123.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0138"><NO.P>138.</NO.P><TXT>The measure at issue, namely a prohibition on pursuing certain retail activities in a certain area, creates such additional establishment costs and is, thus, caught by Directive 2006/123.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0139"><NO.P>139.</NO.P><TXT>In the light of recital 9 of Directive 2006/123, a zoning plan such as the one at issue is not, therefore, excluded from the directive’s scope.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(d)</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">On Article 14(5) of Directive 2006/123</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0140"><NO.P>140.</NO.P><TXT>Article 14 of Directive 2006/123, on prohibited requirements, lists eight requirements which Member States can under no circumstances enact when it comes to the access to or the exercise of a service activity in their territory. This <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0141" ID="QS0141"/>black list<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0141" CODE="2019" ID="QE0141"/> seeks to ensure the systematic and swift removal of certain restrictions on freedom of establishment, regarded by the EU legislature and the case-law of the Court as adversely affecting the proper functioning of the internal market.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0127"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20150616">16 June 2015</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Rina Services and Others</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑593/13</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:399">EU:C:2015:399</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0039">39</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="30"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0141"><NO.P>141.</NO.P><TXT>Article 14(5) of Directive 2006/123, in short, prohibits making establishment subject to a case-by-case application of an economic test. While there seems to be a certain economic element to a zoning plan which forbids certain retail activities in certain areas, the measure falls outside Article 14(5) of Directive 2006/123. There is neither a case-by-case test applied before establishment, nor does the economic element of the measure seem to be predominant<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0128"><P>In the legal literature, the purpose of Article 14(5) is seen as being a test of economic demand (<QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0142" ID="QS0142"/>Bedarfsplanung<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0142" CODE="2019" ID="QE0142"/>), see e.g. Schlachter, M./Ohler, Chr., <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Europäische Dienstleistungsrichtlinie, Handkommentar</HT>, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2008, Artikel 14, point 16.</P></NOTE> (see analysis on the justification below).</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="4"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">(e)</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">On Article 15 of Directive 2006/123</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0142"><NO.P>142.</NO.P><TXT>The question which remains to be examined is whether the zoning plan comes under Article 15(2)(a) of Directive 2006/123,<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0129"><P>Article 15 is directly applicable and can be relied upon by individuals against a Member State: see my Opinion in <REF.DOC.ECR><NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hiebler</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑293/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2015:472">EU:C:2015:472</NO.ECLI>, point <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0053">53</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> which precludes quantitative or territorial restrictions.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0143"><NO.P>143.</NO.P><TXT>As rightly pointed out by the Italian Government in its observations on the case, a zoning plan such as that in the case at issue constitutes such a territorial restriction.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0130"><P>See also points 6.2.5 and points 6.3.1 of the Commission Handbook on the Services Directive.</P></NOTE> The plan limits the potential space on which service providers can establish themselves, but it does not limit their number provided sufficient space is designated for their activities.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0144"><NO.P>144.</NO.P><TXT>Such a restriction can only be justified if the conditions listed in Article 15(3) are satisfied.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0131"><P>The wording of Article 15(3) of the directive is reminiscent of the Court’s formulation, in judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="19951130">30 November 1995</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Gebhard</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑55/94</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:1995:411">EU:C:1995:411</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0037">37</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>). See also Davies, G., <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0143" ID="QS0143"/>The Services Directive: extending the country of origin principle, and reforming public administration<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0143" CODE="2019" ID="QE0143"/>, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">European Law Review</HT>, vol. 32, 2007, pp. 232‑245, at p. 234. On the requirements of Article 15(3) of the directive, see, moreover, Botman, M. R., <HT TYPE="ITALIC">De Dienstenrichtlijn in Nederland</HT>, Boom Juridische uitgevers, Den Haag, 2015, Chapter 7, § 4.1.2, p. 275.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0145"><NO.P>145.</NO.P><TXT>The assessment of facts under this provision is ultimately to be carried out by the referring court. On the basis of the information available, however, the measure at issue, that is to say the attribution of specific selling spaces, appears to me to be justified under Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/123.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0146"><NO.P>146.</NO.P><TXT>We are in the presence of an indistinctly applicable measure, which applies in law and in fact in the same way to all service providers and which does not discriminate, directly or indirectly, on the basis of nationality.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0147"><NO.P>147.</NO.P><TXT>The protection of the urban environment, invoked as an overriding reason relating to public interest, is recognised in Article 4(8) of Directive 2006/123<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0132"><P>It is, in addition, referred to as an overriding reason relating to the public interest in recitals 40, 56 and 66 of Directive 2006/123. Recital 40 even specifies expressly that it includes town and country planning in the protection of the urban environment.</P></NOTE> which codifies, in this respect previous case-law on Article 56 TFEU.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0133"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20011129">29 November 2001</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">De Coster</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑17/00</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2001:651">EU:C:2001:651</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0038">38</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> A town may have an interest in contributing, by way of a zoning plan, to its centre retaining its vitality and maintaining its original character. Regulating which shops can be set up where can, in general, be part of such a policy. Moreover, a town may also want to influence the volume and flow of traffic inside and outside of town. It should be added that the measure in question is not an economic one in the sense that its purpose and effect is to favour certain retailers over others. It is rather about the way of life in a town and is very close to a cultural policy, which is also recognised as an overriding reason relating to the public interest in Article 4(8) of Directive 2006/123.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0134"><P>Even if cultural policy had not appeared in the case-law of the Court before the adoption of the directive, as is pointed out by Barnard, C., <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0144" ID="QS0144"/>Unravelling the services directive<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0144" CODE="2019" ID="QE0144"/>, 45 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Common Market Law Review</HT>, 2008, pp. 323-396, at p. 354.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR><?PAGE NO="31"?><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0148"><NO.P>148.</NO.P><TXT>The measure seems proportionate and not to exceed what is necessary in attaining its aim. Shopping centres outside the town centre have a self-reinforcing effect. Once some shops are outside the town centre and inhabitants take their cars there, that location also becomes more attractive to other shops which hitherto settled in the town centre. The only way to avoid the negative consequences of increased traffic and empty inner cities is thus to restrict the possibilities for service providers to settle outside the town centre.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0149"><NO.P>149.</NO.P><TXT>In this context and crucially, it has been also made clear by the municipality in the case at issue that the measure does not prevent the establishment of the service providers in the town as such, since there is sufficient retail space available at affordable prices.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0135"><P>The situation is thus strikingly different from the facts in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Spain</HT>, where a Spanish law systematically excluded a certain type of retail outlet: see judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20110324">24 March 2011</DATE> (<NO.CASE>C‑400/08</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2011:172">EU:C:2011:172</NO.ECLI></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE> Indeed, there seems to be no indication that the zoning plan indirectly limits the number of retailers in the municipality.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0150"><NO.P>150.</NO.P><TXT>As stated, whereas there seems to be no reason to assume the measure is disproportionate, this will be for the referring court to verify. Should the referring court come to the conclusion that the surfaces are limited to such an extent that providers such as Bristol BV cannot establish themselves or are deterred from doing so, the measure fails the proportionality test and would thus be precluded by Article 15 of Directive 2006/123.</TXT></NP.ECR><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0151"><NO.P>151.</NO.P><TXT>The answer to the second and fifth questions should therefore be that a zoning plan such as that in the case at issue which only permits certain types of retail constitutes a territorial restriction within the meaning of Article 15(2)(a) of Directive 2006/123, which can be justified on the basis of Article 15(3) of that directive, if it is proven that it pursues the aim of protection of the urban environment in a proportionate manner.</TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="3"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">5.</HT></HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD"><HT TYPE="ITALIC">On Articles 34 and 49 TFEU (Question 6)</HT></HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0152"><NO.P>152.</NO.P><TXT>In the light of the proposed reply to the previous questions, given that the case at hand falls within the scope of Directive 2006/123, an analysis with respect to the Treaty freedoms is not necessary.<NOTE TYPE="FOOTNOTE" NUMBERING="ARAB" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES" NOTE.ID="E0136"><P>See judgment of <REF.DOC.ECR><DATE ISO="20160223">23 February 2016</DATE>, <NAME.CASE><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hungary</HT></NAME.CASE> (<NO.CASE>C‑179/14</NO.CASE>, <NO.ECLI ECLI="ECLI:EU:C:2016:108">EU:C:2016:108</NO.ECLI>, paragraph <REF.NP.ECR REF="NP0118">118</REF.NP.ECR></REF.DOC.ECR>).</P></NOTE></TXT></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P><HT TYPE="BOLD">VI.</HT></NO.P><TXT><HT TYPE="BOLD">Conclusion</HT></TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP.ECR IDENTIFIER="NP0153"><NO.P>153.</NO.P><TXT>In light of all the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court should answer the questions referred by the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Supreme Court of the Netherlands) and the Raad van State (Council of State, Netherlands) as follows:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="ARAB"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(1)</NO.P><TXT>Fees/charges, such as those at issue in the main proceedings in Case C‑360/15, levied by an authority of a Member State in respect of the processing of an application for consent with regard to the timing, location and manner of performance of excavation works associated with the installation of cables for a public electronic communications network fall within the scope of Article 2(2)(c) of Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20061212">12 December 2006</DATE> on services in the internal market. They do not pertain to the field of taxation within the meaning of Article 2(3) of Directive 2006/123.</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(2)</NO.P><TXT>A retail activity consisting of the sale of goods such as shoes and clothing to consumers falls within the definition of <QUOT.START CODE="2018" REF.END="QE0145" ID="QS0145"/>service<QUOT.END REF.START="QS0145" CODE="2019" ID="QE0145"/> in Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/123.</TXT></NP></ITEM><?PAGE NO="32"?><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(3)</NO.P><TXT>The provisions of Chapter III of Directive 2006/123 are applicable to situations such as those in the main proceedings in Case C‑31/16, regardless of whether or not all the factors are confined within a single Member State.</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(4)</NO.P><TXT>A zoning plan, such as the one in the case at issue in the main proceedings in Case C‑31/16, which only permits certain types of retail constitutes a territorial restriction within the meaning of Article 15(2)(a) of Directive 2006/123, which can be justified on the basis of Article 15(3) of that directive, if it is proven that it pursues the protection of the urban environment in a proportionate manner.</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></P></NP.ECR></GR.SEQ></CONTENTS.CONCLUSION></CONCLUSION>