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2.7.2026

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – European Grids Package

(COM(2025) 1005 final)

and

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, amending Regulations (EU) 2019/942, (EU) 2019/943 and (EU) 2024/1789 and repealing Regulation (EU) 2022/869

(COM(2025) 1006 final – 2025/0399 (COD))

and

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives (EU) 2018/2001, (EU) 2019/944, (EU) 2024/1788 as regards acceleration of permit-granting procedures

(COM(2025) 1007 final – 2025/0400 (COD))

(C/2026/3238)

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1. RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE (EESC):

1.1. emphasises the importance of a sustainable, secure and affordable energy supply as a public good for EU prosperity, economic and social development and competitiveness;

1.2. notes that grid development should be well coordinated with the current requirements arising from renewable energy integration as well as with the targeted energy mix and the structure of electricity generation;

1.3. believes it essential to prioritise the efficient use of existing grids, placing grid optimisation before grid expansion, supported by grid flexibility solutions;

1.4. stresses that increased flexibility in grid use must come with enhanced protection for vulnerable groups and consumers with limited flexibility potential. This protection should be extended to include energy-intensive industrial actors with limited flexibility potential and industrial actors whose production processes require a continuous, stable electricity supply for operational integrity and safety;

1.5. calls for cost-reflective grid tariffs to also be developed on the generation side. EU caps on feed-in charges should be raised, thereby enabling sufficiently differentiated and cost-reflective feed-in charges, to incentivise grid-supportive behaviour. Tariffs should ensure investment predictability, provide effective alternatives to charges through flexibility solutions, and help ease the financial burden on consumers;

1.6. notes that decentralised energy generation through the promotion of energy communities and the use of storage can help reduce the need for grid expansion and increase public acceptance of the energy transition; also highlights the importance of incentives for grid-supportive use of storage and other flexibility options (for example, through grid tariffs) and for increased self-consumption;

1.7. underlines the importance of EU coordination to ensure a form of governance that enables efficient grid expansion, while pointing out that responsibility for planning and oversight should remain with national authorities as long as grid expansion costs as well as costs for congestion management and grid stability are borne at the national level. While the ultimate responsibility for planning and supervision is to remain with the national authorities, early, structured and transparent stakeholder inclusion is key to efficient and publicly supported grid expansion;

1.8. underlines that the grid digitalisation process must extend fully to distribution networks, including smart substations, real-time monitoring, advanced forecasting and interoperable data platforms. Regulatory authorities could use digital grid twins to monitor grid operators' expansion plans. Furthermore, national regulatory authorities should take national energy and climate plans into account before approving network development plans; Governance should also include monitoring of the effectiveness of planning and development in the Member States;

1.9. supports increasing the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), since EU planning should be complemented by EU funds. The use of CEF funds should promote EU value creation and be accompanied by socio-economic conditionalities developed and agreed by the national social partners, ensuring compliance with labour-law standards as provided for in EU and national law, and collective bargaining agreements, while not leading to undue discrimination against certain types of companies or Member States, and also enabling innovation, SME participation and timely project delivery;

1.10. supports the Commission's efforts to spread the costs of new investments in the grid infrastructure across different regions, amongst other things, by improving the cross-border cost-allocation. At the same time, the Committee stresses that further measures are needed to spread the costs of existing grid infrastructure more evenly, for example by expanding the Inter-TSO-Compensation Fund (ITC);

1.11. urges the Commission to critically revisit the proposal to allocate 25 % of transmission system operators' (TSOs) congestion revenues to projects of common interest (PCIs). As these revenues are already earmarked for investments of cross-border and international relevance ⁽¹⁾, it remains unclear how stricter ring-fencing would improve the current framework. While the EESC agrees with the need to ramp up grid infrastructure and calls for timely use of all available funds, it also recognises that network users in transit countries already bear substantial costs for infrastructure that is heavily used internationally. Congestion revenues should therefore, in any case, be allocated to projects within the respective host countries or for which there is a clear benefit in the country that accumulated the revenues;

1.12. emphasises that financing for the grid expansion needs to be improved, particularly regarding affordability, and highlights that new financing models should primarily aim to reduce financing costs for grid expansion;

1.13. argues that public co-financing for grid expansion should play a central role, noting that public financing is generally less costly, as it can be provided without profit motives (e.g. European Investment Bank (EIB) financing), and also notes that public financing is important for security of supply to avoid financing risks for critical energy network infrastructure;

1.14. suggests introducing state-backed hybrid capital for investments in the grid infrastructure which should be borrowed at a comparably low interest rate due to government guarantees while being declared as equity on the network operator's balance sheet and thus lowering financing costs considerably. Regulatory authorities should pass this interest rate advantage on to network users, increasing affordability of network tariffs. Such public co-financing should take the heterogeneity of grid operators into account;

1.15. points out that regulatory authorities should better reflect the low-risk profile of grid operators in cost assessments, noting that often network users bear both price and volume risks, and that grid operators are often backed by public ownership with implicit guarantees. Any new financing vehicles should be appropriately reflected in regulation;

1.16. emphasises that the development and modernisation of Europe's energy network must catalyse socio-economic stability. Investment in infrastructure should be linked to regional development plans, ensuring that workers in carbon-intensive industries (coal, gas, etc.) are prioritised for new jobs;

1.17. highlights that energy networks are part of critical infrastructure and that energy supply is central also for security reasons, especially in geopolitically challenging times ⁽²⁾;

1.18. calls for public investments in electricity grids to be handled in accordance with the EESC's position in opinion TEN/851. The Committee therefore stresses that grid expansion should be recognised as a security-related infrastructure measure and explicitly covered by the financing and support provisions of the SAFE Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 ⁽³⁾, as a central component of Europe's security, resilience and defence capabilities;

⁽¹⁾ Article 19, Regulation 2019/943.

⁽²⁾ The critical link between Energy Security and the European Defence Industry.

⁽³⁾ Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument (OJ L, 2025/1106, 28.5.2025, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj>).

1.19. highlights the need for affected stakeholders, including local communities, landowners, civil society organisations and businesses, to be given extensive means to participate and be included in the environmental assessments as well as in the planning process, stressing that such participation shall be put in place in line with a clearly defined framework, facilitating effective engagement, and include access to clear information, sufficient time for feedback, public hearings and transparent consideration of stakeholder input in final decisions, while not hindering fast rollout of decarbonisation effort and security of supply. The EESC notes that only through such measures can public acceptance of the energy transition be achieved, and that redistribution of benefits cannot replace citizen participation;

1.20. emphasises that to accelerate the energy transition, authorities need to be equipped with sufficient resources (for digitalisation, staffing and simplification procedures) in order to carry out permitting procedures in an efficient way; also calls for appropriate safeguards like transparency requirements, quality assurance and protection of the rights of third/interested parties with regard to the planned tacit consent and overriding public interest in the approval procedure;

1.21. emphasises the central role of distribution system operators (DSOs) in enabling the energy transition, noting that the majority of renewable generation, electrified demand and flexibility resources are connected at distribution level; stresses that DSOs must be adequately empowered, resourced and incentivised to manage increasingly complex and decentralised grids;

1.22. stresses the need for clear and harmonised EU rules governing the interaction between DSOs, aggregators and market participants, ensuring non-discriminatory access to flexibility markets and avoiding conflicts of interest.

2. EXPLANATORY NOTES

Argument in support of recommendation 1.1

2.1. The economic importance of the energy system is a central argument of the Draghi report. Furthermore, academic literature ⁽⁴⁾ has highlighted the pivotal role of energy prices in overall inflation. The EESC therefore underlines the need to lower network costs to avoid further increases in grid tariffs.

Arguments in support of recommendations 1.4 to 1.5

2.2. Over EUR 1,2 trillion in investments into electricity grids will be needed by 2040, according to the Grid Package Communication. These investments translate directly into higher grid tariffs.

2.3. While flexibility measures help to make optimal use of the power grid, incentives must be targeted precisely where actual flexibility potential exists. This requires a realistic view of consumers' flexibility options. Households with smart devices, heating pumps or electric vehicles typically show a higher degree of flexibility, whereas other consumers are constricted by technical and social conditions (e.g. working hours). Consumers (households and businesses) with limited flexibility potential must not be unduly burdened.

2.4. Energy-intensive industries and industrial consumers contribute to system flexibility through load management, demand response or ancillary services. However, many industrial processes require a stable electricity supply to ensure operational continuity and safety. Their flexibility is structurally limited, while exposure to supply gaps and price volatility driven by fluctuating renewable generation often forces industrial users to procure electricity at marginal prices. Flexibility obligations for industrial consumers must therefore be supported by fair compensation mechanisms and any further tariff adjustments must be balanced to avoid shifting grid expansion costs heavily onto industrial consumers or other network users.

⁽⁴⁾ e.g. Weber et al., (2024), 'Inflation in times of overlapping emergencies', *Industrial and Corporate Change*, Volume 33, Issue 2.

Arguments in support of recommendation 1.6

2.5. Network tariffs should reflect costs and thereby incentivise efficient grid usage. Commission Regulation (EU) 838/2010 ⁽⁵⁾ should therefore be revised in order guarantee that tariffs reflect costs.

2.6. Power generators cause grid costs that depend both on their location and on their mode of operation. Location becomes particularly relevant when there is insufficient grid capacity available at the intended production site, or when generation is located far from consumption centres, resulting in greater transmission requirements. Network use is also relevant, since it determines how efficiently existing grid capacities are used and whether this creates a need for additional grid expansion or for additional grid-stabilising measures (such as congestion management).

2.7. The polluter-pays principle ensures that the costs caused by grid use are internalised. If the grid is used inefficiently and costs arise as a result, these additional costs should, to a certain extent, be borne by those who cause them. It is for this reason that it is imperative that grid tariffs reflect costs. This approach is fundamental to incentivise cost-efficient behaviour on the injection side too.

2.8. Injection tariffs directly and indirectly lower the tariffs that have to be borne by consumers. Incentives for a more efficient grid use by generators lower overall investment needs and thereby lower overall tariffs indirectly. At the same time, since tariffs are meant to cover network costs, when generators have to carry a larger share of network costs, consumer tariffs are lowered directly.

2.9. Carefully designed injection tariffs are necessary in order to internalise network costs caused by injection into the grid. The current Commission Regulation (EU) 838/2010 limits injection tariffs to EUR 0,5 per MWh, contradicting the obligation for tariffs to reflect costs, as set out in Regulation (EU) 2019/943 ⁽⁶⁾. While adaptations need to be carried out carefully, the limits for injection tariffs should be increased substantially. In order to minimise regional market distortions, the limit could be replaced by maximum and minimum limits. Market distortions can further be decreased by designing feed-in tariffs as load-based tariffs instead of volume-based tariffs.

Argument in support of recommendations 1.7 to 1.9

2.10. In the common European electricity market, it would be sensible to strengthen the joint coordination of grid development to increase cost-efficiency. This helps to avoid costly parallel infrastructures and bottlenecks. This coordination could be done by European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), as pointed out in EESC opinion TEN/823. The coordination should go beyond existing measures such as the 10-year Network Development Plan (TYNDP).

2.11. Moreover, EU grid planning and coordination must take into account the specific requirements of energy-intensive industries. As they progressively electrify their production processes to decarbonise, their electricity demand will increase substantially, with requirements that differ fundamentally from general consumer demand.

⁽⁵⁾ Commission Regulation (EU) No 838/2010 of 23 September 2010 on laying down guidelines relating to the inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism and a common regulatory approach to transmission charging (OJ L 250, 24.9.2010, p. 5, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2010/838/oj>).

⁽⁶⁾ Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity (OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 54, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/943/oj>).

Argument in support of recommendations 1.10 to 1.12

2.12. Common coordination also requires common financing, e.g. through the CEF, as well as through other cost-sharing mechanisms, such as the ITC fund, as set out in Commission Regulation (EU) 838/2010. An increase in these funds is fundamental to help both remote regions and landlocked countries, whose grid expansion needs are particularly high due to transit flows. This holds especially true due to the fact that the Commission's proposals focus on additional grid infrastructure. However, transit flows lead to further costs, either for existing infrastructure or for grid operation (such as redispatch or congestion management).

Arguments in support of recommendations 1.13 to 1.18

2.13. Electricity grids are a natural monopoly in the field of essential public services and are therefore subject to strict regulation. The costs of maintaining, operating and expanding the grids are consequently covered through regulated network tariffs paid by grid users. This creates a highly secure revenue stream for grid operators. Compared to companies operating in competitive markets, grid operators face very limited risks, as both price and volume risks are, in many cases, borne by grid users. For investors, energy networks therefore represent a very secure, long-term and profitable investment.

2.14. Affordable network tariffs are crucial for the public acceptance of grid expansion and the energy transition, as well as for EU economic development and its industrial competitiveness. The financing of grid expansion should therefore always be considered from the perspective of affordability. Energy affordability remains especially crucial for energy-intensive industries, where electricity costs constitute a critical input and a key determinant of competitiveness. Grid expansion must not become a driver of electricity price increases that would accelerate deindustrialisation in the Union. The EESC therefore underlines the need for appropriate compensatory mechanisms during the transition and grid expansion phase, including targeted exemptions from State aid frameworks.

2.15. Despite the highly secure market environment and generous regulatory returns for grid operators, smaller operators may, in some cases, face financing difficulties. Even for larger grid operators, investors often demand higher regulatory returns. This points to a market failure, as the low investment risks associated with electricity grids may not be properly recognised. This can be addressed by using state guarantees, which must, crucially, be accompanied by lower regulatory returns.

Argument in support of recommendations 1.19 and 1.20

2.16. Research on public participation in energy transitions highlights that participatory processes enhance transparency, trust and legitimacy, fostering democratic support for energy projects. Early engagement helps address concerns, improves procedural justice and lays the groundwork for broader societal buy-in ⁽⁷⁾. While the Commission acknowledges the importance of public participation and environmental protection, it puts forward only a few concrete measures to guarantee high-quality public participation and environmental protection. The legislative proposals tighten some of the requirements of the existing renewable energy directive (RED III), which already lead to restrictions under environmental protection law even though RED III has not been implemented in some countries and its effectiveness therefore cannot be assessed yet.

⁽⁷⁾ <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364032125003661>.

3. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Amendment 1

linked to recommendation 1.20

COM(2025) 1007 final

Amend Article 1(3) of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives (EU) 2018/2001, (EU) 2019/944, (EU) 2024/1788 as regards acceleration of permit-granting procedures

Text proposed by the European Commission	EESC amendment
In Article 15d, the following paragraphs 3 and 4 are added	In Article 15d, the following paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 are added: [...] 5. Member States shall ensure that permit-granting procedures for the installation of energy production or storage with a total installed capacity of more than 100 kW as well as the installation of power lines with a voltage over 100 kV and connected voltage transformation substations comply with the transparency and public participation requirements set out in Article 9 of [TEN-E-Regulation].

Reason

See recommendation 1.20.

Amendment 2

linked to recommendation 1.19

COM(2025) 1007 final

Amend Article 1(5) of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives (EU) 2018/2001, (EU) 2019/944, (EU) 2024/1788 as regards acceleration of permit-granting procedures

Text proposed by the European Commission	EESC amendment
(b) the following paragraph 3 is added: ‘3. In the permit-granting procedure referred to in paragraph 1 and in paragraph 2, second subparagraph, Member States shall ensure that the lack of reply by the	(b) the following paragraph 3 is added: ‘3. In the permit-granting procedure referred to in paragraph 1 and in paragraph 2, second subparagraph, Member States shall ensure that the

Text proposed by the European Commission	EESC amendment
<i>relevant competent authorities or entities within the established deadline results in the specific steps to be considered as approved, except for environmental decisions and grid connection permits, or where the principle of administrative tacit approval does not exist in the national legal system of the Member State concerned. All decisions shall be made publicly available, including final decisions granted tacitly.’;</i>	<i>relevant competent authorities are equipped with sufficient resources in order to guarantee that the established deadlines can be met. The Commission should monitor whether Member States comply with this requirement and include their findings in its country-specific recommendations with regard to the European Semester.</i>

Reason

Deadlines can only be met when authorities are equipped with sufficient resources.

Amendment 3

linked to recommendation 1.19

COM(2025) 1007 final

Delete Article 1(8) of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives (EU) 2018/2001, (EU) 2019/944, (EU) 2024/1788 as regards acceleration of permit-granting procedures

Text proposed by the European Commission	EESC amendment
Article 16f is amended as follows: (a) <i>the last two sentences are deleted;</i> (b) <i>the following paragraph is added:</i> <i>Until climate neutrality is achieved, Member States shall ensure that, in the permit-granting procedure, the planning, construction and operation of plants and installations for the production of energy from renewable sources, and their connection to the grid, the related grid itself, storage assets and recharging stations are presumed as being in the overriding public interest and, in such case, are given priority when balancing legal interests other than those referred to in the first paragraph. Member States may exclude the application of this presumption for the purpose of protecting culture heritage on the basis of legal criteria to ensure harmonised implementation.’;</i>	

Reason

This would remove Member States’ ability to make justified exceptions which could be appropriate both for environmental and energy policy reasons, in order to enable a more differentiated expansion of renewables.

Amendment 4

linked to recommendations 1.19 and 1.20

COM(2025) 1007 final

Amend Article 2(1) of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives (EU) 2018/2001, (EU) 2019/944, (EU) 2024/1788 as regards acceleration of permit-granting procedures

Text proposed by the European Commission	EESC amendment
'Article 8	'Article 8
Authorisation procedure	Authorisation procedure
[...]	[...]
5. Where Member States implement a system of authorisation for transmission or distribution system infrastructure for electricity, Member States shall ensure that, where any studies, reports and documentation required for the procedure are missing from the applications, the competent national authorities, in cooperation with other relevant authorities, request the necessary materials from the developer, specifying their scope and level of detail, within three months from the application. Within the same three-month period, the national competent authority shall inform the developer whether the presumptions under paragraph 10 do not apply to the project. <i>After that period, neither the competent authority nor any other relevant authority concerned shall request additional information, studies, reports, or assessments, except in cases where a material change has occurred to the project or its surrounding environment, rendering the initial criteria on which determinations were based no longer appropriate. In such instances, the national competent authority shall provide the project promoter with a well-reasoned justification for the request for additional information.</i>	5. Where Member States implement a system of authorisation for transmission or distribution system infrastructure for electricity, Member States shall ensure that, where any studies, reports and documentation required for the procedure are missing from the applications, the competent national authorities, in cooperation with other relevant authorities, request the necessary materials from the developer, specifying their scope and level of detail, within three months from the application. Within the same three-month period, the national competent authority shall inform the developer whether the presumptions under paragraph 10 do not apply to the project.
6. The time limit established in paragraph 3 of this Article shall apply without prejudice to obligations under applicable Union environmental and energy law, including Directive (EU) 2018/2001, to judicial appeals, remedies and other proceedings before a court or tribunal, and to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, including complaints procedures, non-judicial appeals and remedies, and may be extended for the duration of such procedures.	6. The time limit established in paragraph 3 of this Article shall apply without prejudice to obligations under applicable Union environmental and energy law, including Directive (EU) 2018/2001, to judicial appeals, remedies and other proceedings before a court or tribunal, and to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, including complaints procedures, non-judicial appeals and remedies, and may be extended for the duration of such procedures.
[...]	[...]

Reason

The paragraph could hinder projects from being permitted if the competent authority does not have the additional information needed to make a well-considered decision.

Amendment 5

linked to recommendations 1.19 and 1.20

COM(2025) 1007 final

Amend Article 3(1) of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives (EU) 2018/2001, (EU) 2019/944, (EU) 2024/1788 as regards acceleration of permit-granting procedures

Text proposed by the European Commission	EESC amendment
Article 8 is amended as follows:	Article 8 is amended as follows:
[...]	[...]
(b) the following paragraphs 5a to 5d are inserted:	(b) the following paragraphs 5a to 5d are inserted:
‘5a. Member States shall ensure that, where any studies, reports, or documentation required for the procedure are missing from the applications, the competent national authorities, in cooperation with other relevant authorities concerned, request the necessary materials from the developer, specifying their scope and level of detail, within three months of the application. <i>After that period, neither the competent authority nor any other relevant authority concerned shall request additional information, studies, reports, or assessments, except in cases where a material change has occurred to the project or its surrounding environment, rendering the initial criteria on which determinations were based no longer appropriate. In such instances, the national competent authority shall provide the project promoter with a well-reasoned justification for the request for additional information.</i> 5b. Member States shall ensure that competent national authorities are equipped with adequate technical, financial and human resources to render a decision on the authorisation within the timeframe specified in paragraph 5.	‘5a. Member States shall ensure that, where any studies, reports, or documentation required for the procedure are missing from the applications, the competent national authorities, in cooperation with other relevant authorities concerned, request the necessary materials from the developer, specifying their scope and level of detail, within three months of the application. 5b. Member States shall ensure that competent national authorities are equipped with adequate technical, financial and human resources to render a decision on the authorisation within the timeframe specified in paragraph 5.
[...]	[...]

Reason

The paragraph could hinder projects from being permitted if the competent authority does not have the additional information needed to make a well-considered decision.

Amendment 6

COM(2025) 1007 final

Insert new point 11 to COM(2025)1007 Article 2(3) inserting (Article 40a) – Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives (EU) 2018/2001, (EU) 2019/944, (EU) 2024/1788 as regards acceleration of permit-granting procedures

Text proposed by the European Commission	Amendment
Article 40a	Article 40a
[...]	[...]
10. Where the regulatory authority has made use of its powers under paragraph 8, the relevant tariff regulations shall cover the costs of the investments in question.'	10. Where the regulatory authority has made use of its powers under paragraph 8, the relevant tariff regulations shall cover the costs of the investments in question.'
	11. In exercising their regulatory powers under this Directive, national regulatory authorities shall take due account of the objectives, trajectories and measures set out in the Member State's integrated national energy and climate plan and its updates submitted pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2018/1999. Without prejudice to their independence, national regulatory authorities shall ensure that the regulatory framework governing electricity networks facilitates the timely and cost-efficient development of transmission and distribution infrastructure necessary to support the implementation of the integrated national energy and climate plan.

Reason

Article 40a is introduced in Directive (EU) 2019/944 to regulate network developments and powers to make investment decisions on a national level. The article replaces existing Article 51, for the sake of clarification of legal application of relevant provisions and aims at ensuring full consistency with recent changes in Directive (EU) 2024/1788 and the TEN-E Regulation. However, the Commission version focuses on planning oversight and investment enforcement, not on the broader regulatory framework. The addition of paragraph 11 strengthens coherence between national energy planning and electricity network regulation, without affecting the independence of national regulatory authorities.

Amendment 7

linked to recommendation 1.1

COM(2025) 1006 final

Amend Article 1(2) of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, amending Regulations (EU) 2019/942, (EU) 2019/943 and (EU) 2024/1789 and repealing Regulation (EU) 2022/869

Text proposed by the European Commission	EESC amendment
	(e) guarantee a cost-efficient energy transition, thereby lowering overall European network costs and tariffs.

Reason

See recommendation 1.1.

Amendment 8

linked to recommendations 1.2-1.4, 1.7-1.8

COM(2025) 1006 final

Add new Article 14a of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, amending Regulations (EU) 2019/942, (EU) 2019/943 and (EU) 2024/1789 and repealing Regulation (EU) 2022/869

Text proposed by the European Commission	EESC amendment
	Article 14a Transparency of models & assumptions All assumptions, data, methodological choices, inputs and outputs to the models used for the assessments in Articles 11, 12, 13 and 14 should be made transparent and publicly available.

Reason

Transparency in planning and modelling is essential to ensure credibility, reduce disputes and increase support for projects.

Amendment 9

linked to recommendation 1.11

COM(2025) 1006 final

Delete Article 19 of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, amending Regulations (EU) 2019/942, (EU) 2019/943 and (EU) 2024/1789 and repealing Regulation (EU) 2022/869

Text proposed by the European Commission	EESC amendment
Article 19 Ring-fenced congestion income for projects on the Union list 1. TSOs shall set aside 25 % of the congestion rents not spent for guaranteeing the actual availability of the allocated capacity pursuant to Article 19(2), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and for compensation to offshore renewable electricity generation plant operators pursuant to Article 19(2), point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, for network investments into projects on the Union list relevant to reducing interconnector congestion pursuant Article 19(2), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943.	

Text proposed by the European Commission	EESC amendment
2. TSOs shall place the funds referred to in point 1 of this Article on a separate account line until it can be spent for financing projects on the Union list relevant to reducing interconnector congestion, or until they have demonstrated that the priority objectives set out in Article 19(2), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 have been adequately fulfilled and there is no need for additional cross-border capacity to be built at the borders of the Member States concerned to reduce interconnector congestion. 3. The use of the funds referred to in paragraph 1 shall: (a) address the financing gap of projects on the Union list which have significant benefits outside their hosting countries, taking due account of expected tariff financing; (b) be made transparent in requests for cross-border cost allocation decisions pursuant to Article 17 of this Regulation; (c) avoid double funding and ensure proportionality, transparency and non-discrimination; (d) not compromise the fulfilment of the priority objectives under Article 19(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943. 4. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 23 of this Regulation to supplement this Regulation by specifying the conditions under which TSOs may use the funds referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and the conditions under which the objective of Article 19(2), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is considered adequately fulfilled. 5. Within [6 months] after the entry into force of the delegated acts referred in paragraph 4, the Agency shall update the methodology on the use of revenues from congestion income pursuant to Article 19(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943. The updated methodology shall be consistent with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article and with the delegated acts adopted pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article.	

Reason

See recommendation 1.11.

Amendment 10

linked to recommendations 1.5 and 1.10

COM(2025) 1006 final

Add new Article 19a of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, amending Regulations (EU) 2019/942, (EU) 2019/943 and (EU) 2024/1789 and repealing Regulation (EU) 2022/869

Text proposed by the European Commission	EESC amendment
	Article 19a 1. By [within 6 months after entry into force], the Commission will amend Regulation (EU) 838/2010 in order to: (a) improve the ITC mechanism with respect to cost-reflectivity in terms of transit flows and increase the funds set out in part A of the Annex, point 5.4 in particular. (b) Guarantee national regulatory authorities' discretion with regard to injection tariffs in compliance with the principles set out in Article 18 of regulation (EU) 2019/943, in particular with the principle of cost-reflectivity.

Reason

See recommendations 1.5. and 1.10.

Amendment 11

linked to recommendations 1.12 to 1.13

COM(2025) 1006 final

Amend Article 20 of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, amending Regulations (EU) 2019/942, (EU) 2019/943 and (EU) 2024/1789 and repealing Regulation (EU) 2022/869

Text proposed by the European Commission	EESC amendment
	4. Where a project promoter incurs lower risks due to implicit or explicit government guarantees or due to the takeover of volume or price risks by network users, regulatory authorities shall take this into consideration when determining cost-reflective grid tariffs.

Reason

See recommendations 1.12 to 1.13.

Amendment 12

linked to recommendations 1.12 to 1.15

COM(2025) 1006 final

Amend Article 21 of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, amending Regulations (EU) 2019/942, (EU) 2019/943 and (EU) 2024/1789 and repealing Regulation (EU) 2022/869

Text proposed by the European Commission	EESC amendment
	<i>7. Cost reductions resulting from Union financial assistance or from national financial assistance (e.g. through government subsidies) shall be passed on to network users in the form of lower tariffs.</i>

Reason

See recommendations 1.12 to 1.15.

Amendment 13

linked to recommendation 1.14

COM(2025) 1006 final

Add new Article 22a of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, amending Regulations (EU) 2019/942, (EU) 2019/943 and (EU) 2024/1789 and repealing Regulation (EU) 2022/869

Text proposed by the European Commission	EESC amendment
	<i>Article 22a</i> <i>Enabling public investments in grid infrastructure</i> <i>1. By [within 6 months after entry into force], the Commission will:</i> <i>(a) publish guidelines on public financing instruments for grid infrastructure, aiming at lowering network operators' capital expenses.</i> <i>(b) propose changes to Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 that aim at declaring grid infrastructure as a security-related infrastructure, explicitly covered by the financing and support provisions in that regulation.</i>

Reason

See recommendation 1.14.

Brussels, 18 March 2026.

The President
of the European Economic and Social Committee
Séamus BOLAND

ANNEX

The following amendments, which received at least a quarter of the votes cast, were rejected during the discussion:

Amendment 5

TEN/863

European Grids Package

Tabled by:

DĂRĂBAN Daniela-Raluca
 MASTANTUONO Alena
 RZECZKOWSKA Magdalena
 SÄKKINEN Teppo
 SANZ MARTÍN Yolanda

Point 1.18**Delete point.**

Section opinion	Amendment
<i>calls for public investments in electricity grids to be handled in accordance with the EESC's position in opinion TEN/851. The Committee therefore stresses that grid expansion should be recognised as a security-related infrastructure measure and explicitly covered by the financing and support provisions of the SAFE Regulation (EU) 2025/1106, as a central component of Europe's security, resilience and defence capabilities;</i>	

Reason

The recommendation in essence calls for grid investments to be excluded from the debt rules of the Growth and Stability Pact. The EESC should not call for the exemption of individual policy areas on from the public debt rules without a comprehensive consideration of the impact on fiscal stability and public economies. Additionally, whereas grids are highly important for energy security and therefore broader security, the purpose of SAFE is focused on defence industrial capacity and defence technology. EESC opinion on SAFE – CCMI/243 did not call for the expansion of the scope of the SAFE beyond defence.

Outcome of the vote on the amendment:

Votes in favour: 94
 Votes against: 102
 Abstentions: 13

Amendment 7

TEN/863

European Grids Package

Tabled by:

DĂRĂBAN Daniela-Raluca
MASTANTUONO Alena
RZECZKOWSKA Magdalena
SÄKKINEN Teppo
SANZ MARTÍN Yolanda

Amend EESC Amendment 13

Amendment 13

linked to recommendation 1.14

COM(2025) 1006 final

Add new Article 22a of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, amending Regulations (EU) 2019/942, (EU) 2019/943 and (EU) 2024/1789 and repealing Regulation (EU) 2022/869

Text proposed by the European Commission	
Section opinion	Amendment
Article 22a	Article 22a
Enabling public investments in grid infrastructure	Enabling public investments in grid infrastructure
1. By [within 6 months after entry into force], the Commission will:	1. By [within 6 months after entry into force], the Commission will:
(a) publish guidelines on public financing instruments for grid infrastructure, aiming at lowering network operators’ capital expenses.	(a) publish guidelines on public financing instruments for grid infrastructure, aiming at lowering network operators’ capital expenses.
(b) <u>propose changes to Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 that aim at declaring grid infrastructure as a security-related infrastructure, explicitly covered by the financing and support provisions in that regulation.</u>	(b) <u>assess the need for further measures to strengthen the financing framework for grid infrastructure of strategic importance, including, where appropriate, exploring synergies with existing Union financial instruments and programmes.</u>

Reason given in the opinion	Amendment to the reason given in the opinion
<i>See recommendation 1.14.</i>	

Explanation of proposed changes

Grids are highly important for energy security and therefore broader security, but the purpose of SAFE is focused on defence industrial capacity and defence technology. EESC opinion on SAFE CCMI/243 did not call for the expansion of the scope of the SAFE beyond defence. The proposed amendment would ask to assess the need for further measures to strengthen the financing framework for strategic grid infrastructure but without the linkage to SAFE.

Outcome of the vote on the amendment:

Votes in favour: 94
Votes against: 102
Abstentions: 13

Amendment 6

TEN/863

European Grids Package

Tabled by:

DĂRĂBAN Daniela-Raluca
MASTANTUONO Alena
RZECZKOWSKA Magdalena
SÄKKINEN Teppo
SANZ MARTÍN Yolanda

Delete EESC Amendment 1

Amendment 1

COM(2025) 1007 final

Article 1 (3) of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives (EU) 2018/2001, (EU) 2019/944, (EU) 2024/1788 as regards acceleration of permit-granting procedures

Text proposed by the European Commission
In Article 15d, the following paragraphs 3 and 4 are added

Section opinion	Amendment
In Article 15d, the following paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 are added: [...] <u>5. Member States shall ensure that permit-granting procedures for the installation of energy production or storage with a total installed capacity of more than</u>	in Article 15d, the following paragraphs 3 and 4 are added:

Section opinion	Amendment
<u>100 kW as well as the installation of power lines with a voltage over 100 kV and connected voltage transformation substations comply with the transparency and public participation requirements set out in Article 9 of [TEN-E-Regulation].</u>	
Reason given in the opinion	Amendment to the reason given in the opinion
<i>See recommendation 1.20.</i>	

Explanation of proposed changes

Delete new paragraph proposed by the rapporteur and keep Commission text unchanged.

The EESC is a strong advocate of decarbonisation and fast deployment of clean energy. By limiting network development, we are hindering the development of decarbonisation. There are already robust procedures that concern the involvement of local communities and the civil society, which is important to maintain public support for energy investments. Further regulatory requirements risk to delay needed investments, impact security of supply and bring uncertainty to the projects crucial to meet the demand for electricity. A key goal of the grid package is to speed up the deployment of grid infrastructure and additional requirements for the process are contrary to it.

Outcome of the vote on the amendment:

Votes in favour:	81
Votes against:	115
Abstentions:	18