<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><CONCLUSION NNC="YES" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://formex.publications.europa.eu/schema/formex-05.00-20081231.xd"><BIB.CONCLUSION><REF.CASE FILE="ECRCJ2006ENB.0300271701.case.xml"><NO.CASE>C-206/04 P</NO.CASE></REF.CASE><NO.CELEX>62004C0206</NO.CELEX><NO.SEQ>0001.0001</NO.SEQ><PAGE.FIRST.ECR>2719</PAGE.FIRST.ECR><PAGE.SEQ>1</PAGE.SEQ><PAGE.LAST.ECR>2735</PAGE.LAST.ECR><PAGE.TOTAL>17</PAGE.TOTAL></BIB.CONCLUSION><CURR.TITLE><LEFT>OPINION OF MR RUIZ-JARABO — CASE C-206/04 P</LEFT><RIGHT>MUEHLENS v OHIM</RIGHT></CURR.TITLE><CONTENTS.CONCLUSION><TITLE><TI><P><HT TYPE="UC">Opinion of advocate general</HT></P><P><HT TYPE="UC">Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer</HT></P><P>delivered on <DATE ISO="20051110">10 November 2005</DATE><NOTE NOTE.ID="E0046"><P>Original language: Spanish.</P></NOTE></P></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>1.</NO.P><TXT>This appeal is directed against the judgment delivered by the Court of First Instance (Fourth Chamber) on <DATE ISO="20040303">3 March 2004</DATE>,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0047" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR NO.CASE="C-355/02" YEAR="2004" EDITION="GEN" PAGE.ECR="II-791">C-355/02 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Muehlens</HT> GmbH &amp; Co KG v OHIM [2004] ECR II-791</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> which dismissed the action for annulment brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (<QUOT.START ID="QS0001" REF.END="QE0001" CODE="2018"/>OHIM<QUOT.END ID="QE0001" REF.START="QS0001" CODE="2019"/>), which had dismissed the opposition by the company Mühlens GmbH &amp; Co. KG (<QUOT.START ID="QS0002" REF.END="QE0002" CODE="2018"/>Muehlens<QUOT.END ID="QE0002" REF.START="QS0002" CODE="2019"/>), the owner of the Community figurative mark <QUOT.START ID="QS0003" REF.END="QE0003" CODE="2018"/>Sir<QUOT.END ID="QE0003" REF.START="QS0003" CODE="2019"/> and the appellant in this case, against the word sign <QUOT.START ID="QS0004" REF.END="QE0004" CODE="2018"/>Zirh<QUOT.END ID="QE0004" REF.START="QS0004" CODE="2019"/> for perfumes and cosmetics.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>2.</NO.P><TXT>The issue is once again the interpretation of the term <QUOT.START ID="QS0005" REF.END="QE0005" CODE="2018"/>likelihood of confusion<QUOT.END ID="QE0005" REF.START="QS0005" CODE="2019"/> used in Article 8(1)(b) of the Community Trade Mark Regulation.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0048" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of <DATE ISO="19931220">20 December 1993</DATE> on the Community trade mark (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="011" DATE.PUB="1993" PAGE.FIRST="1">OJ 1993 L 11, p. 1</REF.DOC.OJ>), as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 3288/94 of <DATE ISO="19941222">22 December 1994</DATE> for the implementation of the agreements concluded in the context of the Uruguay Round (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="349" DATE.PUB="1994" PAGE.FIRST="83">OJ 1994 L 349, p. 83</REF.DOC.OJ>), and by Council Regulation (EC) No 422/2004 of <DATE ISO="20040219">19 February 2004</DATE> (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="070" DATE.PUB="2004" PAGE.FIRST="1">OJ 2004 L 70, p. 1</REF.DOC.OJ>).</P></NOTE> The appeal is based on a single plea, divided into two parts, concerning, respectively, the assessment of the existence of that likelihood, having regard to certain ways in which the products bearing the conflicting marks are marketed and the rule developed by the Court of First Instance in earlier judgments to the effect that the predominance of the conceptual elements may counteract phonetic similarities.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>3.</NO.P><TXT>Also of interest is a judgment delivered on <DATE ISO="20040506">6 May 2004</DATE> by the Landgericht (Regional Court) Hamburg (Germany), sitting as a Community trade mark court, in proceedings concerning infringement of an industrial property right between the abovementioned undertakings in respect of those same trade marks, which found in favour of the proprietor of the mark <QUOT.START ID="QS0006" REF.END="QE0006" CODE="2018"/>Sir<QUOT.END ID="QE0006" REF.START="QS0006" CODE="2019"/> and against the proprietor of the mark <QUOT.START ID="QS0007" REF.END="QE0007" CODE="2018"/>Zirh<QUOT.END ID="QE0007" REF.START="QS0007" CODE="2019"/>, taking the view that the likelihood of confusion between them was proved. Although it is not a prerequisite for giving judgment on the substance of this case, that fact deserves some consideration in relation to the European system of trade marks.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="I-2720"?><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>I —</NO.P><TXT>The Community Trade Mark Regulation</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>4.</NO.P><TXT>The abovementioned Regulation No 40/94 is the basic instrument for dealing with the problems inherent in this case.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>5.</NO.P><TXT>According to Article 4 thereof, a Community trade mark may consist of any <QUOT.START ID="QS0008" REF.END="QE0008" CODE="2018"/>signs capable of being represented graphically, particularly words, including personal names, designs, letters, numerals, the shape of goods or of their packaging, provided that such signs are capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings.<QUOT.END ID="QE0008" REF.START="QS0008" CODE="2019"/></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>6.</NO.P><TXT>Article 8 sets out the relative grounds for refusal, among which Article 8(1)(b) states as follows:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><PARAG IDENTIFIER="008.001"><NO.PARAG><QUOT.START ID="QS0009" REF.END="QE0009" CODE="2018"/>1.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA><P>Upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for shall not be registered:</P><LIST TYPE="alpha"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(a)</NO.P><TXT>…</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(b)</NO.P><TXT>if because of its identity with or similarity to the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected; the likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST></ALINEA><ALINEA>…<QUOT.END ID="QE0009" REF.START="QS0009" CODE="2019"/></ALINEA></PARAG></QUOT.S></P></NP><NP><NO.P>7.</NO.P><TXT>Although they do not have a direct bearing on the substance of the case, it is appropriate to consider the provisions of Regulation No 40/94 relating both to the rule applicable in cases of infringement of the rights conferred by those industrial property rights and to Community trade mark courts.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>8.</NO.P><TXT>As regards the first of those aspects, Article 14 provides:</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><PARAG IDENTIFIER="014.001"><NO.PARAG><QUOT.START ID="QS0010" REF.END="QE0010" CODE="2018"/>1.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>The effects of Community trade marks shall be governed solely by the provisions of this Regulation. In other respects, infringement of a Community trade mark shall be governed by the national law relating to infringement of a national trade mark in accordance with the provisions of Title X.</ALINEA></PARAG><?PAGE NO="I-2721"?><PARAG IDENTIFIER="014.002"><NO.PARAG>2.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>…</ALINEA></PARAG><PARAG IDENTIFIER="014.003"><NO.PARAG>3.</NO.PARAG><ALINEA>The rules of procedure to be applied shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Title X.<QUOT.END ID="QE0010" REF.START="QS0010" CODE="2019"/></ALINEA></PARAG></QUOT.S></P></NP><NP><NO.P>9.</NO.P><TXT>In that regard, Article 91(1), contained in the second section, <QUOT.START ID="QS0011" REF.END="QE0011" CODE="2018"/>Disputes concerning the infringement and validity of Community trade marks<QUOT.END ID="QE0011" REF.START="QS0011" CODE="2019"/>, in Title X, headed <QUOT.START ID="QS0012" REF.END="QE0012" CODE="2018"/>Jurisdiction and procedure in legal actions relating to Community trade marks<QUOT.END ID="QE0012" REF.START="QS0012" CODE="2019"/>, requires the Member States to designate in their territories a limited number of <QUOT.START ID="QS0013" REF.END="QE0013" CODE="2018"/>national courts and tribunals of first and second instance, hereinafter referred to as <QUOT.START ID="QS0014" REF.END="QE0014" CODE="201C"/>Community trade mark courts<QUOT.END ID="QE0014" REF.START="QS0014" CODE="201D"/>, which shall perform the functions assigned to them by this regulation<QUOT.END ID="QE0013" REF.START="QS0013" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>10.</NO.P><TXT>Pursuant to Article 92, which appears in the same title and section,</TXT><P><QUOT.S LEVEL="1"><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0015" REF.END="QE0015" CODE="2018"/>The Community trade mark courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction:</P><LIST TYPE="alpha"><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(a)</NO.P><TXT>for all infringement actions and — if they are permitted under national law — actions in respect of threatened infringement relating to Community trade marks;</TXT></NP></ITEM><ITEM><NP><NO.P>(b)</NO.P><TXT>for actions for declaration of non-infringement, if they are permitted under national law;</TXT></NP></ITEM></LIST><P>…<QUOT.END ID="QE0015" REF.START="QS0015" CODE="2019"/>.</P></QUOT.S></P></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>II —</NO.P><TXT>Background to the appeal</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>A —</NO.P><TXT>The facts of the case at first instance</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>11.</NO.P><TXT>On <DATE ISO="19990921">21 September 1999</DATE>, Zirh International Corp. applied to OHIM for registration of the word mark <QUOT.START ID="QS0016" REF.END="QE0016" CODE="2018"/>Zirh<QUOT.END ID="QE0016" REF.START="QS0016" CODE="2019"/> as a Community trade mark, the application being published on <DATE ISO="20000403">3 April 2000</DATE> in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Community Trade Marks Bulletin</HT> No 27/2000.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>12.</NO.P><TXT>The goods and services in respect of which registration was sought are in classes 3, 5 and 42 of the Nice Agreement concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of <DATE ISO="19570615">15 June 1957</DATE>, as revised and amended.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>13.</NO.P><TXT>On <DATE ISO="20000524">24 May 2000</DATE>, pursuant to Article 42 of Regulation No 40/94, Muehlens filed a notice of opposition in respect of all<?PAGE NO="I-2722"?> products and services covered by the application, and in doing so relied on an earlier Community graphic mark which contains the verbal element <QUOT.START ID="QS0017" REF.END="QE0017" CODE="2018"/>Sir<QUOT.END ID="QE0017" REF.START="QS0017" CODE="2019"/> to designate goods in class 3 of the Nice Agreement, corresponding to the description <QUOT.START ID="QS0018" REF.END="QE0018" CODE="2018"/>Perfumery, essential oils, cosmetics, hair lotions, dentifrices, soaps.<QUOT.END ID="QE0018" REF.START="QS0018" CODE="2019"/></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>14.</NO.P><TXT>On <DATE ISO="20001002">2 October 2000</DATE>, Zirh gave details as follows of the types of goods and services covered by its application:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="DASH"><ITEM><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0019" REF.END="QE0019" CODE="2018"/>Soaps; perfumery; essential oils; cosmetics; hair lotions; aftershave lotions; baby, body and face powders; baby and hair shampoos; hair conditioner; shaving balm, cream, gel and lotion; lip balm and gloss; bath and shower gel; skin cream and lotion; deodorants and antiperspirants; facial scrubs; hairstyling preparations; body oil; perfume; skin cleansing cream and lotion; skin moisturiser; skin, deodorant and toilet soaps; sun block preparations and sun screen preparations<QUOT.END ID="QE0019" REF.START="QS0019" CODE="2019"/> in Class 3;</P></ITEM><ITEM><P><QUOT.START ID="QS0020" REF.END="QE0020" CODE="2018"/>Hygienic and beauty care services; hairdressing services; beauty salon services; cosmetic research and development; perfume research and development<QUOT.END ID="QE0020" REF.START="QS0020" CODE="2019"/> in Class 42.</P></ITEM></LIST></P></NP><NP><NO.P>15.</NO.P><TXT>Nevertheless, Muehlens maintained its initial position.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>16.</NO.P><TXT>By decision of <DATE ISO="20010629">29 June 2001</DATE>, the Opposition Division of OHIM rejected the opposition essentially on the ground that the visual and conceptual differences outweighed the phonetic similarity of the signs, with the result that there was no likelihood of confusion between the two marks.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>17.</NO.P><TXT>On <DATE ISO="20010710">10 July 2001</DATE>, Mühlens filed with OHIM a notice of appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division, pursuant to Article 59 of Regulation No 40/94.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>18.</NO.P><TXT>On <DATE ISO="20021001">1 October 2002</DATE>, the OHIM Second Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal and confirmed the contested decision, essentially on the basis that, although the products and services at issue are marketed through the same channels of distribution or points of sale, the differences between the two trade marks outweigh the phonetic similarities of the two signs in some official languages of the European Union.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="I-2723"?><NP><NO.P>19.</NO.P><TXT>Mühlens brought an action for the annulment of that adverse decision by an application received at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on <DATE ISO="20021204">4 December 2002</DATE>.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>B —</NO.P><TXT>The judgment under appeal</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>20.</NO.P><TXT>The application contained a single plea, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94. The applicant emphasised the similarity of the signs <QUOT.START ID="QS0021" REF.END="QE0021" CODE="2018"/>Sir<QUOT.END ID="QE0021" REF.START="QS0021" CODE="2019"/> and <QUOT.START ID="QS0022" REF.END="QE0022" CODE="2018"/>Zirh<QUOT.END ID="QE0022" REF.START="QS0022" CODE="2019"/> when they were pronounced, which, in its view, rendered them identical, particularly in view of the fact that when perfumes and cosmetics are sold, they are not visible to consumers in every case.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>21.</NO.P><TXT>Although it accepted that the trade marks at issue were partially phonetically similar, OHIM denied that such similarity gave rise to any likelihood of confusion, having regard to the considerable conceptual differences between a mark which has a clear meaning in English and one which was merely invented.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>22.</NO.P><TXT>The Court of First Instance, after setting out the criteria laid down in the case-law regarding the likelihood of confusion,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0049" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Paragraphs 34 to 42 of the contested judgment.</P></NOTE> considered whether the degree of similarity between the trade marks at issue was sufficiently great to create a risk of confusion.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>23.</NO.P><TXT>It compared them from the visual, phonetic and conceptual points of view, coming to the conclusion that they were only similar as regards their pronunciation in certain countries.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0050" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Paragraphs 44 to 47 of the contested judgment.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>24.</NO.P><TXT>Next, following the precepts laid down by the Court of Justice to the effect that mere phonetic similarity of marks may create a likelihood of confusion,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0051" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR NO.CASE="C-342/97" YEAR="1999" EDITION="GEN" PAGE.ECR="I-3819">C-342/97 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer</HT> [1999] ECR I-3819, paragraph 28</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> it made an overall assessment of all the relevant factors, concentrating on the overall impression given by the marks at issue, and paying particular attention to their distinctive and dominant elements.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>25.</NO.P><TXT>That examination led to the finding that the word <QUOT.START ID="QS0023" REF.END="QE0023" CODE="2018"/>Sir<QUOT.END ID="QE0023" REF.START="QS0023" CODE="2019"/> had a clear and specific meaning, which the relevant public grasped immediately,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0052" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Of course, consumers in the Slav countries would have detected this rapidly, although not without some surprise as far as perfumes are concerned, because that word, in their respective languages, for example <QUOT.START ID="QS0024" REF.END="QE0024" CODE="2018"/>sýr<QUOT.END ID="QE0024" REF.START="QS0024" CODE="2019"/> in Czech,<QUOT.START ID="QS0025" REF.END="QE0025" CODE="2018"/>ser<QUOT.END ID="QE0025" REF.START="QS0025" CODE="2019"/> (closer to the English pronunciation) in Polish,<QUOT.START ID="QS0026" REF.END="QE0026" CODE="2018"/>sýr<QUOT.END ID="QE0026" REF.START="QS0026" CODE="2019"/> in Slovakian and <QUOT.START ID="QS0027" REF.END="QE0027" CODE="2018"/>sir<QUOT.END ID="QE0027" REF.START="QS0027" CODE="2019"/> in Slovenian, means <QUOT.START ID="QS0028" REF.END="QE0028" CODE="2018"/>cheese<QUOT.END ID="QE0028" REF.START="QS0028" CODE="2019"/>.</P></NOTE> even though it did not refer to any characteristic of the products. It inferred that the phonetic features were outweighed by the conceptual aspects and the visual differences observed, since the trade mark<?PAGE NO="I-2724"?><QUOT.START ID="QS0029" REF.END="QE0029" CODE="2018"/>Sir<QUOT.END ID="QE0029" REF.START="QS0029" CODE="2019"/> included a heraldic device,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0053" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Paragraphs 49 to 51.</P></NOTE> and it applied the rule that it had developed previously<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0054" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>In Case <REF.DOC.ECR NO.CASE="T-292/01" YEAR="2003" EDITION="GEN" PAGE.ECR="II-4335">T-292/01 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Phillips-Van</HT> Heusen Corp. v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">OHIM</HT> [2003] ECR II-4335</REF.DOC.ECR>, it laid down that rule, which was applied subsequently in Joined Cases <REF.DOC.ECR NO.CASE="T-183/02+T-184/02" YEAR="2004" EDITION="GEN" PAGE.ECR="II-965">T-183/02 and T-184/02 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">El</HT> Corte Inglés v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">OHIM</HT> [2004] ECR II-965, paragraph 93</REF.DOC.ECR>, and Case <REF.DOC.ECR NO.CASE="T-185/02" YEAR="2004" EDITION="GEN" PAGE.ECR="II-1739">T-185/02 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Claude</HT> Ruiz-Picasso and Others v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">OHIM</HT> [2004] ECR II-1739</REF.DOC.ECR>, in which appeals are pending.</P></NOTE> concerning the counteraction of phonetic similarities by conceptual divergences.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>26.</NO.P><TXT>The judgment under appeal attributed little importance to the similarity between the marks at issue, considering that the marketing of the goods in question is normally carried out in such a way that the consumers perceive the signs with their eyes and not solely or preponderantly with their ears, contrary to the contention of the applicant and now appellant, which produced no evidence whatsoever to support its thesis.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0055" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Paragraphs 51 to 54.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>27.</NO.P><TXT>Consequently, the Court of First Instance rejected the view that the degree of similarity between the trade marks was great and conducive to confusion regarding the undertaking from which the products and services at issue emanated, despite the fact that they were partially similar, or identical,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0056" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Paragraphs 55 and 56 of the contested judgment.</P></NOTE> dismissing the claim for annulment and the action as a whole.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>III —</NO.P><TXT>Procedure before the Court of Justice and the forms of order sought</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>28.</NO.P><TXT>The Registry of the Court of Justice recorded the lodging of Muehlens's appeal on <DATE ISO="20040506">6 May 2004</DATE> and of OHIM's defence on <DATE ISO="20040727">27 July 2004</DATE>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>29.</NO.P><TXT>The parties lodged a reply and a rejoinder respectively on <DATE ISO="20041020">20 October 2004</DATE> and <DATE ISO="20050128">28 January 2005</DATE>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>30.</NO.P><TXT>The hearing, attended by representatives of Muehlens, OHIM and Zihr International Corp., was held on <DATE ISO="20051006">6 October 2005</DATE>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>31.</NO.P><TXT>The appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="DASH"><ITEM><P>set aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance of <DATE ISO="20040303">3 March 2004</DATE> in Case T-355/02;</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>annul the decision of the OHIM Second Board of Appeal of <DATE ISO="20021001">1 October 2002</DATE> (case R 657/2001-2) concerning opposition<?PAGE NO="I-2725"?> proceedings between Mühlens and Zirh International Corp.;</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>order OHIM to pay the costs.</P></ITEM></LIST></P></NP><NP><NO.P>32.</NO.P><TXT>OHIM, supported by the intervener at first instance, contends that the Court of Justice should:</TXT><P><LIST TYPE="DASH"><ITEM><P>dismiss the appeal;</P></ITEM><ITEM><P>order the appellant to pay the costs.</P></ITEM></LIST></P></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>IV —</NO.P><TXT>Analysis of the plea in law</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>33.</NO.P><TXT>Muehlens puts forward a single plea in law, namely misconstruction of the concept of likelihood of confusion in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94, which it divides into two parts: first it claims that such a likelihood exists, referring, in particular, to the influence that the method of marketing of products and services has on the way in which phonetic, visual and conceptual similarities are taken into account; the other challenges the rule to the effect that, in certain circumstances, phonetic similarities are counteracted by those of a conceptual nature.</TXT></NP><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>A —</NO.P><TXT>The first part of the sole plea</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>34.</NO.P><TXT>It must be pointed out, first of all, that this part of the plea might be viewed as inadmissible, since it seeks reversal of the factual finding as to the lack of any likelihood of confusion made by the Court of First Instance, when, under Article 58 of its Statute, assessments of that kind fall outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0057" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Concerning the scope of judicial review by the Court of Justice in trade mark cases, see my Opinion of <DATE ISO="20020514">14 May 2002</DATE> in the proceedings which gave rise to the judgment of <DATE ISO="20020919">19 September 2002</DATE> in Case <REF.DOC.ECR NO.CASE="C-104/00" YEAR="2002" EDITION="GEN" PAGE.ECR="I-7651">C-104/00 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">DKV</HT> [2002] ECR I-7651, paragraphs 58 to 60</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>35.</NO.P><TXT>Nevertheless, in application of the interpretative principle <HT TYPE="ITALIC">in dubio pro actione</HT>, which favours continuation of the proceedings until a decision is given on the substance and derives from the right to effective judicial protection, a closer look at the various submissions made by the appellant, and at its reply, will enable the true meaning thereof to be disentangled.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="I-2726"?><NP><NO.P>36.</NO.P><TXT>For Mühlens, the infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 derives from the Court of First Instance's disregard of the doctrine of the Court of Justice that mere phonetic similarity of trade marks may give rise to a likelihood of confusion.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0058" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer</HT>, paragraph 28.</P></NOTE> According to the appellant, that similarity automatically gives rise to such a likelihood, thereby rendering visual and conceptual analysis entirely irrelevant.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>37.</NO.P><TXT>In its opinion, the importance of phonetic similarity is reinforced by the fact that customers do not always have the goods in front of them at the time of purchase, since frequently the consumer acquires them in ways in which the pronunciation of the mark plays an important role, such as by way of gifts, mail-order and telephone sales, and recommendations in specialised trade circles, for example in beauty and hairdressing salons and perfumeries.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>38.</NO.P><TXT>To demonstrate this, it annexed to its reply a photocopy of the judgment delivered on <DATE ISO="20040506">6 May 2004</DATE> by the Landgericht Hamburg (Germany) in trade mark infringement proceedings in which the parties and the marks were exactly the same as in the present action. In that judgment, the German court accepted that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks in question, explicitly contradicting the judgment under appeal here, which is of an earlier date.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>39.</NO.P><TXT>OHIM does not challenge the appellant's analysis regarding the phonetic similarity of the marks, but does not accept the preponderant role attributed to it. It also considers that the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer</HT> judgment, cited above, envisages, in paragraph 28, only the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">possibility</HT> that phonetic similarity may create the likelihood of confusion, it being necessary, before such a conclusion is arrived at, for an overall assessment to be made of all the relevant factors and of the products at issue.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>40.</NO.P><TXT>It downplays the importance of the repercussions of the aural communication of the signs in the selling process, describing the examples given by the appellants as inadequate and unrepresentative. In its view, the situations to which they relate do not constitute the general rule, whereas the rules laid down in the case-law of the Court of Justice seek specifically to determine typical or average circumstances.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>41.</NO.P><TXT>In addition, OHIM finds no difficulty with the judgment of the Landgericht Hamburg, provided that the facts were different from those presented to the Court of First Instance; if that were not the case, it would be concerned about the situation that would result from the decision, because it would place the parties in a delicate and almost untenable position, given that national trade mark courts, when evaluating the likelihood of confusion, would be using legal rules different from those indicated by the Community Court which, although a Court of First Instance, exercises a fundamental jurisdiction<?PAGE NO="I-2727"?> in the European Union. The latter aspect, however, has no direct impact on the outcome of this appeal, for which reason it will be considered below, once the plea on which the appeal is based has been fully dealt with.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0059" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See point 58 et seq. below.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>42.</NO.P><TXT>My approach to the admissibility of the appellant's submission having been thus clarified, consideration of this part of the plea must focus on the dicta of the Court of Justice in its judgment in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer</HT>, referred to above, specifically in paragraph 28 thereof, where it states that the possibility cannot be ruled out <QUOT.START ID="QS0030" REF.END="QE0030" CODE="2018"/>that mere aural similarity between trade marks may create a likelihood of confusion<QUOT.END ID="QE0030" REF.START="QS0030" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>43.</NO.P><TXT>Logically, the meaning of that sentence is not absolute, as the appellant contends, since the judgment declares that phonetic similarity is sufficient for a referring court, where the products are similar, to decide that such likelihood exists. A grammatical interpretation of those words suggest that the Court of Justice <HT TYPE="ITALIC">does not rule out</HT> the possibility that such similarity is sufficient to infer that there is a likelihood of confusion, but it does not necessarily require that conclusion to be arrived at merely on the basis of acoustic resonances.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>44.</NO.P><TXT>From the logical and linguistic point of view, where <QUOT.START ID="QS0031" REF.END="QE0031" CODE="2018"/>the possibility is not excluded<QUOT.END ID="QE0031" REF.START="QS0031" CODE="2019"/> that something may happen, it is recognised that it is not very probable and, implicitly, that such an event is unusual. In any case, that statement provides no basis for inferring a general rule according to which it is doubtful that a specific case will arise.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>45.</NO.P><TXT>A comparison with other language versions of that judgment of the Court of Justice supports the proposed interpretation. That is clear, both from the German, the language of the case on that occasion, <QUOT.START ID="QS0032" REF.END="QE0032" CODE="2018"/>sich nicht ausschließen lässt, daß allein die klangliche Ähnlichkeit der Marken eine Verwechslungsgefahr … <HT TYPE="ITALIC">hervorrufen kann</HT><QUOT.END ID="QE0032" REF.START="QS0032" CODE="2019"/>, and from the French, <QUOT.START ID="QS0033" REF.END="QE0033" CODE="2018"/>qu'il ne saurait être exclu que la seule similitude auditive des marques <HT TYPE="ITALIC">puisse créer</HT> un risque de confusion<QUOT.END ID="QE0033" REF.START="QS0033" CODE="2019"/>, or from the English, <QUOT.START ID="QS0034" REF.END="QE0034" CODE="2018"/>it is possible that mere aural similarity between trade marks <HT TYPE="ITALIC">may create</HT> a likelihood of confusion<QUOT.END ID="QE0034" REF.START="QS0034" CODE="2019"/>; this comparison does not purport to be exhaustive, but in order to dispel any doubt, the comparison can also be drawn with the wording in Dutch, <QUOT.START ID="QS0035" REF.END="QE0035" CODE="2018"/>niet valt uit te sluiten, dat de enkele auditieve gelijkenis tussen de merken verwarring … <HT TYPE="ITALIC">kan doen ontstaan</HT><QUOT.END ID="QE0035" REF.START="QS0035" CODE="2019"/>, or in Italian, <QUOT.START ID="QS0036" REF.END="QE0036" CODE="2018"/>non si può escludere che la somiglianza fonetica dei marchi <HT TYPE="ITALIC">possa creare</HT> un rischio di confusione<QUOT.END ID="QE0036" REF.START="QS0036" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>46.</NO.P><TXT>As regards the claim concerning the importance of certain commercial channels in which the products in question are not visible to the consumer, thus making phonetic similarity more important, it must be pointed out, without going into the substance of the problem, that the Court of First Instance, in paragraph 53 of the contested judgment, rejects it only because the applicant<?PAGE NO="I-2728"?> had not made out a sufficient case. Accordingly, Mühlens's criticism of that decision on the ground that it did not attach to those channels of distribution the importance which they allegedly deserve is irrelevant since it relates to a statement made <HT TYPE="ITALIC">merely for the sake of completeness</HT> in paragraph 54, which did not contradict the statement made in the preceding paragraph.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>47.</NO.P><TXT>Furthermore, as regards assessment of the evidence, it must be borne in mind that, pursuant to Article 225 EC and Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, an appeal is to be limited to matters of law, so that the Court of First Instance has sole jurisdiction to establish and adjudicate on the relevant facts, and to weigh the evidence, except where it distorts one or the other.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0060" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR NO.CASE="C-136/92 P" YEAR="1994" EDITION="GEN" PAGE.ECR="I-1981">C-136/92 P <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Brazzelli</HT> Lualdi and Others [1994] ECR I-1981, paragraphs 49 and 66</REF.DOC.ECR>, Joined Cases <REF.DOC.ECR NO.CASE="C-238/99 P+C-244/99 P+C-245/99 P+C-247/99 P+C-250/99 P—C-252/99 P+C-254/99 P" YEAR="2002" EDITION="GEN" PAGE.ECR="I-8375">C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Limburgse</HT> Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> [2002] ECR I-8375, paragraph 194</REF.DOC.ECR>, and Case <REF.DOC.ECR NO.CASE="C-312/00 P" YEAR="2002" EDITION="GEN" PAGE.ECR="I-11355">C-312/00 P <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Camar</HT> and Tico [2002] ECR I-11355, paragraph 69</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> Consequently, the Court of Justice has no authority to review tasks of that kind carried out by the Court of First Instance.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>48.</NO.P><TXT>In view of the foregoing, the first part of the plea should be rejected as unfounded, since there does not appear to have been any infringement whatsoever of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>B —</NO.P><TXT>The second part of the sole plea</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>49.</NO.P><TXT>By the second part of its plea, the appellant challenges the rule of <QUOT.START ID="QS0037" REF.END="QE0037" CODE="2018"/>counteraction<QUOT.END ID="QE0037" REF.START="QS0037" CODE="2019"/> of phonetic similarities by conceptual divergences between signs, employed by the Court of First Instance in a number of judgments.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0061" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Mentioned in footnote 9 to this Opinion.</P></NOTE> First, it criticises the basis of the rule, considering it to be contrary to the case-law of the Court of Justice. Second, it doubts whether, in this case, the English word <QUOT.START ID="QS0038" REF.END="QE0038" CODE="2018"/>sir<QUOT.END ID="QE0038" REF.START="QS0038" CODE="2019"/> has, on the basis of its pronunciation, a meaning that can be grasped by the relevant public.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>50.</NO.P><TXT>In its first assertion, it denies that the overall evaluation of all the factors implies that the signs must be scrutinised from the phonetic, visual and conceptual points of view, because, in its opinion, if the similarity perceived using one of the senses is manifest, it may give rise to a likelihood of confusion — once again making a clear allusion to the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer</HT> judgment already referred to, and specifically to paragraph 28 thereof.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>51.</NO.P><TXT>In that regard, it is appropriate to recall paragraphs 43 to 45 of this Opinion and on that basis to reject the interpretation of the judgment contended for and to focus on its actual terms.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="I-2729"?><NP><NO.P>52.</NO.P><TXT>As regards the appellant's second argument, concerning the meaning of the word <QUOT.START ID="QS0039" REF.END="QE0039" CODE="2018"/>sir<QUOT.END ID="QE0039" REF.START="QS0039" CODE="2019"/>, it must be emphasised, above all, that it concerns a finding of fact made by the Court of First Instance in the proceedings for annulment, which cannot be reviewed by the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 58 of its Statute, as I have already explained. Nevertheless, if that argument is interpreted as calling in question the legality of the abovementioned counteraction rule, it is necessary to throw some light on the matter.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>53.</NO.P><TXT>This is not the first time that the validity of this rule for evaluating the likelihood of confusion has been in issue before the Court of Justice; nor is it the first time that I am giving my views on the matter.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0062" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Opinion in Case C-361/04 P <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Claude</HT> Ruiz-Picasso and Others, in which judgment has not yet been delivered, point 27 et seq.</P></NOTE> The essential case-law derives from the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">SABEL</HT> judgment, in which the Court of Justice held that all the relevant factors of each specific case must be taken into consideration,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0063" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR NO.CASE="C-251/95" YEAR="1997" EDITION="GEN" PAGE.ECR="I-6191">C-251/95 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">SABEL</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Puma</HT> [1997] ECR I-6191, paragraph 22</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> adding that, with regard to the visual, aural or conceptual similarity of the trade marks in question, the global assessment must be based on the overall impression created by them,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0064" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P><HT TYPE="ITALIC">SABEL</HT>, paragraph 23.</P></NOTE> and in particular their distinctive and dominant components.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0065" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>See also <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer</HT>, paragraph 25.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>54.</NO.P><TXT>That evaluation of the visual, phonetic or conceptual elements which are presumed to be decisive is a matter, in each case, for the court hearing the case, in so far as judicial review by the Court of Justice in this area does not extend to purely factual aspects.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>55.</NO.P><TXT>In another Opinion I have already put forward the view<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0066" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Opinion in Case C-361/04 P <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Claude</HT> Ruiz-Picasso and Others, point 35.</P></NOTE> that such a review would only be pertinent where the contested rule was relied on in an absolute and a priori manner without prior individual analysis of the various components, resulting in its automatic application in a way that conflicted with the abovementioned case-law of the Court of Justice. Of course, it would also be necessary for the appellant to allege distortion of the facts,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0067" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR NO.CASE="C-53/92 P" YEAR="1994" EDITION="GEN" PAGE.ECR="I-667">C-53/92 P <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hilti</HT> v <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Commission</HT> [1994] ECR I-667, paragraph 42</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> a possibility not to be taken into account here since no such allegation was made.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>56.</NO.P><TXT>In paragraphs 44 to 47, the contested judgment examined all the components in accordance with that case-law and then, in paragraph 50, dealt with the factor that it considered decisive, the conceptual aspect, which relates to the meaning of the verbal element of the mark <QUOT.START ID="QS0040" REF.END="QE0040" CODE="2018"/>Sir<QUOT.END ID="QE0040" REF.START="QS0040" CODE="2019"/>.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="I-2730"?><NP><NO.P>57.</NO.P><TXT>Consequently, conforming as it does with those rules, the judgment of the Court of First Instance did not in any way whatsoever infringe Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94, for which reason the second part of the sole plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="2"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>C —</NO.P><TXT>The judgment delivered by the Landgericht Hamburg</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>58.</NO.P><TXT>As I stated in point 38 of this Opinion, the Landgericht Hamburg delivered a judgment on <DATE ISO="20040506">6 May 2004</DATE> acknowledging the likelihood of confusion in trade mark infringement proceedings between the appellant in the present proceedings and the intervener at first instance in respect of the same signs.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>59.</NO.P><TXT>That fact is not surprising if we examine the structure of the Community trade mark protection system, although it is not normal, and still less desirable, that it should arise.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>60.</NO.P><TXT>Community and national trade marks do not coexist in watertight compartments without any connection, but rather cohabit in a shared area; even though they do not support each other, they are certainly interrelated, to the extent of being reciprocally permeable,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0068" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>J. Álvarez, <QUOT.START ID="QS0041" REF.END="QE0041" CODE="2018"/>Marca comunitaria y marcas nacionales<QUOT.END ID="QE0041" REF.START="QS0041" CODE="2019"/>, in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Marca</HT> y Diseño Comunitarios, Alberto Bercovitz Rodríguez-Cano (Coord.), Ed. Aranzadi, Pamplona, 1996, p. 191 et seq., in particular p. 195 et seq.</P></NOTE> since, as stated in the preamble to Regulation No 40/94, Community law has not replaced the trade mark laws of the Member States.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0069" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Trade Mark Regulation, fifth recital.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>61.</NO.P><TXT>This correspondence with national law is reflected in cases of infringement of Community trade marks, a field governed by Community law and, on an ancillary basis, the laws of the Member States,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0070" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Article 14(1) of Regulation No 40/94.</P></NOTE> as if the principle of subsidiarity had been inverted.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0071" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>This upending of the well-known Community law principle is an image attributable to E. Gastinel, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">La</HT> marque communautaire, L.G.D.J, Paris, 1998, p. 197.</P></NOTE> Thus, under Article 14 of Regulation No 40/94, whilst the effects of the Community trade mark are governed exclusively by that regulation's provisions, infringements of Community trade marks are governed by the State provisions applicable to national trade marks, a system which, quite rightly, some writers have described as confused.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0072" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>A. Bender, <QUOT.START ID="QS0042" REF.END="QE0042" CODE="2018"/>Artikel 14<QUOT.END ID="QE0042" REF.START="QS0042" CODE="2019"/>, in F.L. Ekey/D. Klippel, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Heidelberger</HT> Komentar <HT TYPE="ITALIC">zum</HT> Markenrecht, CF. Müller, Heidelberg, 2003, p. 953; to the same effect, see E. Gastinel, op. cit, p. 197.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>62.</NO.P><TXT>Jurisdiction to hear actions for infringement of rights conferred by the Community trade mark was attributed solely to the<?PAGE NO="I-2731"?> Community trade mark courts<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0073" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>According to Article 91(1) of Regulation No 40/94, they are national judicial authorities of first and second instance which the Member States have designated to carry out the functions assigned to them. Thus, in contrast to proceedings against measures and decisions of OHIM, the Court of Justice is not their court of last instance, although they continue to be subject to the judicial cooperation mechanism laid down by Article 234 EC. See, in that connection, <QUOT.START ID="QS0043" REF.END="QE0043" CODE="2018"/>Artikel 91<QUOT.END ID="QE0043" REF.START="QS0043" CODE="2019"/>, in F.L Ekey/D. Klippel, op. cit, p. 1248.</P></NOTE> pursuant to Article 92(a) of the Trade Mark Regulation. Thereafter, the regulation appears to be rooted in unstable ground as a result of terminology conducive to uncertainty.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0074" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>The commentators are unanimous. M. Desantes Real, <QUOT.START ID="QS0044" REF.END="QE0044" CODE="2018"/>La marca comunitaria y el Derecho internacional privado<QUOT.END ID="QE0044" REF.START="QS0044" CODE="2019"/>, in Alberto Bercovitz Rodríguez-Cano (Coord.), op. cit., p. 247, also offers a guide to the interpretation of the terms of Regulation No 40/94 in order to identify the applicable law, basically Articles 14(1), 97 and 98.</P></NOTE> In brief, and without undertaking a detailed examination, which would go beyond the scope of the present Opinion, I would draw attention to the following aspects.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>63.</NO.P><TXT>In the procedural area, those courts, after deciding for themselves whether they have jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 93 and 94 of Regulation No 40/94,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0075" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Regarding the problems of provisions of private international law concerning Regulation No 40/94, see M. Desantes Real, op. cit, p. 225 et seq.; P. von Kapff,<QUOT.START ID="QS0045" REF.END="QE0045" CODE="2018"/>Artikel 93<QUOT.END ID="QE0045" REF.START="QS0045" CODE="2019"/> and <QUOT.START ID="QS0046" REF.END="QE0046" CODE="2018"/>Artikel 94<QUOT.END ID="QE0046" REF.START="QS0046" CODE="2019"/> in Ekey/Klippel, op. cit, p. 1249 et seq.; and M. Lobato García-Miján, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">La</HT> marca comunitaria — Aspectos procesales y de Derecho Internacional Privado del Reglamento sobre la marca comunitaria, Publicaciones del Real Colegio de España, Bologna, 1997.</P></NOTE> assume responsibility, under Article 97(3), for applying the provisions in force for actions of that kind within the legal system of the country in which they are located, without prejudice to the specific provisions of the regulation, which are in fact scant and diffuse, despite the unitary and independent orientation which the legislature sought to attribute to them.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0076" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>P. Morenilla Allard, in <HT TYPE="ITALIC">La protección jurisdiccional de la marca comunitaria</HT>, COLEX, Madrid, 1999, p. 141, puts forward the idea that reliance on the procedural rules of the Member States was more of a necessity than an option. To the same effect, see E. Gastinel, op. cit., p. 198.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>64.</NO.P><TXT>From the substantive point of view, Regulation No 40/94 merely grants the proprietor, in Article 9(1) and (2), a <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ius prohibendi</HT> and a right to compensation which is <QUOT.START ID="QS0047" REF.END="QE0047" CODE="2018"/>reasonable<QUOT.END ID="QE0047" REF.START="QS0047" CODE="2019"/> (<HT TYPE="ITALIC">sic</HT>) for events subsequent to publication of the Community trade mark application which, after due publication of registration of the mark, are prohibited. To this must be added the right to ask that a trade mark reproduced in a dictionary, encyclopaedia or any other reference work should be accompanied by an indication that it is a registered trade mark.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0077" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Article 10 of Regulation No 40/94.</P></NOTE> In such cases, there is no mention of the applicable law: the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">ius</HT> and the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">forum</HT> coincide, so that the competent court relies on its own law, which in this case acquires the status of Community law.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0078" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>M. Lobato García-Miján, op. cit., p. 183.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>65.</NO.P><TXT>On the other hand, other rights of action, in particular actions for compensation, are governed by the law of the Member State in which the infringements have<?PAGE NO="I-2732"?> occurred (<HT TYPE="ITALIC">lex loci commissi delictii</HT>), pursuant to Article 98(2) of Regulation No 40/94, with the consequence that the Community trade mark courts are being progressively called on to have recourse to foreign law, thereby detracting from the unitary approach which was intended for industrial property of this kind.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0079" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>A. Von Mühlendahl/D.C. Ohlgart, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Die</HT> Gemeinschaftsmarke, C.H. Beck and Stämpfli &amp; Cie AG, Munich, 1998, pp. 213 and 214.</P></NOTE> Thus, legal provisions and case-law regarding liability for damage vary from one Member State to another, and this has repercussions on the sum which the proprietor of a Community trade mark whose rights have been infringed will obtain by way of compensation in one forum or another,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0080" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>M. Lobato García-Miján, op. cit., p. 187.</P></NOTE> depending on the criteria used to evaluate the loss suffered and the level of compensation.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>66.</NO.P><TXT>For their part, provisional and precautionary measures adopted by the Community trade mark courts are subject to the <HT TYPE="ITALIC">lex fori</HT>, in accordance with Article 99 of Regulation No 40/94. Their scope depends, however, on the origin of their jurisdiction: if it derives from paragraphs 1, 2, 3 or 4 of Article 93, they may be enforced in any Member State; in contrast, those adopted by the Community trade mark court of the place where the harmful event was committed will only take effect in the Member State of that judicial authority.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0081" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>U. Bumiller, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Durchsetzung der Gemeinschaftsmarke in der Europäischen Union</HT>, C.H. Beck, Munich, 1997, p. 21.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>67.</NO.P><TXT>To conclude this outline of the European legislation on the jurisdiction of Community trade mark courts, a very interesting feature must be mentioned, the purpose of which is to avoid conflicting judgments.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>68.</NO.P><TXT>Conscious of the latent danger inherent in this complex web of procedural and substantive provisions, the legislator inserted in Regulation No 40/94 a number of mechanisms to deal with the problem. Attention should be drawn to the 16th recital in the preamble<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0082" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>According to which <QUOT.START ID="QS0048" REF.END="QE0048" CODE="2018"/>… contradictory judgments should be avoided in actions which involve the same acts and the same parties and which are brought on the basis of a Community trade mark and parallel national trade marks …<QUOT.END ID="QE0048" REF.START="QS0048" CODE="2019"/>.</P></NOTE> and to the provisions on related actions (Article 100) and on cases involving circumstances similar<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0083" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>M. Lobato García-Miján, op. cit., p. 219.</P></NOTE> to litispendency (Article 105). Also included in this category is Article 96(7) concerning the powers of the Community trade mark courts in relation to counterclaims.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>69.</NO.P><TXT>All those provisions contemplate the possible suspension of proceedings that are pending or inadmissibility of the originating application, declared either by the Community trade mark court or by another national<?PAGE NO="I-2733"?> judicial authority, the sole justification for this being the avoidance of conflicting decisions, as indicated in the 16th recital to the regulation.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>70.</NO.P><TXT>However, it is not appropriate to dwell on the details of those provisions, since they relate to situations not relevant to the dispute brought before the Landgericht Hamburg, which was not dealing with a counterclaim or a problem of litispendency or related actions in connection with infringement of a national trade mark; the case before it concerned infringement of the rights conferred by a Community trade mark, for which compensation was sought, whilst at the same time the Court of First Instance was dealing with an application for the annulment of a decision of the OHIM Second Board of Appeal on the opposition by the company Mühlens concerning registration of the trade mark <QUOT.START ID="QS0049" REF.END="QE0049" CODE="2018"/>Zirh<QUOT.END ID="QE0049" REF.START="QS0049" CODE="2019"/>. It must be recognised that such a case is not explicitly governed by Regulation No 40/94 or by any other legislative measure.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0084" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Nor is any adequate solution to the Landgericht Hamburg case to be found in Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of <DATE ISO="20040429">29 April 2004</DATE> on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (<REF.DOC.OJ COLL="L" NO.OJ="157" DATE.PUB="2004" PAGE.FIRST="45">OJ 2004 L 157, p. 45</REF.DOC.OJ>), which applies to trade marks by virtue of Article 1 and whose purpose, according to the 10th recital in its preamble, is <QUOT.START ID="QS0050" REF.END="QE0050" CODE="2018"/>to approximate legislative systems [of the Member States relating to protection of intellectual property] so as to ensure a high, equivalent and homogeneous level of protection in the Internal Market<QUOT.END ID="QE0050" REF.START="QS0050" CODE="2019"/>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>71.</NO.P><TXT>Nevertheless, the absence of an express provision does not preclude the application of Community law and the general principles of the Community legal order, in particular those relating to judicial cooperation between national judicial authorities and the Court of Justice, the principle of the effectiveness of Community law and the principle requiring sincere cooperation under Article 10 EC.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>72.</NO.P><TXT>Although the national court plays a preponderant role in the context of Article 234 EC, in submitting or withdrawing a request for an interpretative preliminary ruling as it sees fit,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0085" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>A preliminary reference concerning validity, on the other hand, is compulsory for all national courts (Case <REF.DOC.ECR NO.CASE="314/85" YEAR="1987" EDITION="GEN" PAGE.ECR="4199">314/85 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Foto Frost</HT> [1987] ECR 4199</REF.DOC.ECR>). Regarding the scope of that obligation, however, see the Opinion delivered on <DATE ISO="20050630">30 June 2005</DATE> in Case <REF.DOC.ECR NO.CASE="C-461/03" YEAR="2005" EDITION="GEN">C-461/03 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Gaston</HT> Schul, in which judgment has not yet been delivered, point 60 et seq.</REF.DOC.ECR></P></NOTE> it must not be forgotten that the primary aim of that mechanism of judicial assistance is to guarantee the uniform application of Community law.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0086" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR NO.CASE="13/61" YEAR="1962" EDITION="GEN" PAGE.ECR="45">13/61 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">De Geus en Uitdenbogerd</HT> [1962] ECR 45</REF.DOC.ECR> and Case <REF.DOC.ECR NO.CASE="107/76" YEAR="1977" EDITION="GEN" PAGE.ECR="957">107/76 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Hoffmann-La Roche</HT> [1977] ECR 957, paragraph 5</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>73.</NO.P><TXT>Moreover, as part of the duty of sincere cooperation attached to the Member States, Article 10 EC imposes obligations on the national judicial authorities,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0087" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>In that regard, see A. Von Bogdandy, <QUOT.START ID="QS0051" REF.END="QE0051" CODE="2018"/>Artikel 10<QUOT.END ID="QE0051" REF.START="QS0051" CODE="2019"/> in E. Grabitz/M. Hilf, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Das</HT> Recht der Europäischen Union, C.H. Beck, Munich, 2005, p. 19, paragraph 53 et seq.</P></NOTE> such as that of interpreting Community law in the light of the Community legal order and, in particular, directives.<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0088" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Case <REF.DOC.ECR NO.CASE="C-91/92" YEAR="1994" EDITION="GEN" PAGE.ECR="I-3325">C-91/92 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Faccini</HT> Dori [1994] ECR I-3325, paragraph 22 et seq</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE></TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="I-2734"?><NP><NO.P>74.</NO.P><TXT>Consequently, when a national court gives a decision in which it employs an indeterminate legal concept backed up by a directly applicable Community provision, such as that relating to the likelihood of confusion of Community trade marks, in a manner that openly conflicts with the caselaw of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, compliance with the abovementioned obligations and the great importance of the system of preliminary references require it to have recourse to Article 234 EC in order to avoid the legal uncertainty which, in judicial circles, arises from the coexistence of divergent judgments within the Union.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>75.</NO.P><TXT>The German court's decision rejects the Court of First Instance's thesis that the degree of phonetic similarity between the two trade marks is so insignificant that it will not give rise to any likelihood of confusion, since the degree of identity of the marks is not sufficiently great. In giving reasons for its decision, the Landgericht Hamburg relies on the case-law of the Bundesgerichtshof (German Supreme Court in civil and criminal matters), according to which failure to consider phonetic similarities when evaluating the likelihood of confusion unjustifiably deprives the proprietor of the trade mark of some of the protection to which he is entitled.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>76.</NO.P><TXT>Even if it is accepted that the national judicial authorities to which Article 234(2) EC applies, such as the Landgericht Hamburg, enjoy a degree of latitude as regards preliminary references,<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0089" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>R. Annand and H. Norman, <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Guide</HT> to the Community trade mark, Blackstone Press Limited, London, 1998, p. 210.</P></NOTE> the need for the uniform application of Community law dictates that recourse must be had to Article 234 EC, specifically where the approach taken by a national high court is at odds with that taken by a Community Court, particularly if the decisive impact which a request for a ruling might have had in resolving the dispute is taken into account.</TXT></NP><NP><NO.P>77.</NO.P><TXT>The fact that the decision given by the first German court was open to appeal does not diminish the harm caused, essentially by creating legal uncertainty, as the Commission has emphasised. Faced with such a clear conflict of interpretation of a Community provision, the only course open to that court was to use Article 234 EC;<NOTE NOTE.ID="E0090" NUMBERING.CONTINUED="YES"><P>Such direct affronts to the authority of a Community Court might give rise to liability on the part of the Member State for infringements of Community law attributable to a judicial authority, even if not a supreme court, by extension of the dicta of the Court of Justice in Case <REF.DOC.ECR NO.CASE="C-224/01" YEAR="2003" EDITION="GEN" PAGE.ECR="I-10239">C-224/01 <HT TYPE="ITALIC">Köbler</HT> [2003] ECR I-10239</REF.DOC.ECR>.</P></NOTE> it is to be hoped, however, that an appeal court will mitigate the effects of the situation that has arisen, for the sake of interpretative rigour and the European spirit that has presided over the comportment of the judicial authorities in that country, which has always led the field so far as concerns the sincere cooperation with the Court of Justice provided for by the Treaties.</TXT></NP><?PAGE NO="I-2735"?><NP><NO.P>78.</NO.P><TXT>In short, we should probably not just complain of the way the Landgericht Hamburg has conducted itself in this context; we must also hope that such dysfunctions will be brought to an end and that the legislature will become aware of how urgent it is to improve the complex legislative framework set up to facilitate harmonious development of economic activity in the Community as a whole, achieving full establishment and proper functioning of the internal market within a European Union that is increasingly convinced of the importance of its contribution to the construction of a better continent.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>V —</NO.P><TXT>Costs</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>79.</NO.P><TXT>Since the plea in law put forward by Mühlens has been rejected as unfounded, the appeal must be dismissed and the appellant must be ordered to pay the costs.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ><GR.SEQ LEVEL="1"><TITLE><TI><NP><NO.P>VI —</NO.P><TXT>Conclusion</TXT></NP></TI></TITLE><NP><NO.P>80.</NO.P><TXT>Consequently, in view of the foregoing considerations, I suggest that the Court of Justice dismiss the appeal brought by Muehlens GmbH &amp; Co. KG against the judgment delivered by the Court of First Instance on <DATE ISO="20040303">3 March 2004</DATE> in Case <REF.DOC.ECR NO.CASE="T355/02" YEAR="2004" EDITION="GEN">T-355/02</REF.DOC.ECR> and order the appellant to pay costs of these proceedings.</TXT></NP></GR.SEQ></CONTENTS.CONCLUSION></CONCLUSION>