In addition to the present cases, there are several other cases which have been brought before the Court relating to the reform of the Polish justice system, including requests for preliminary rulings submitted by the Polish Supreme Court (C‑522/18, C‑537/18 and C‑668/18), the Polish Supreme Administrative Court (C‑824/18) and Polish lower courts (C‑558/18, C‑563/18 and C‑623/18), along with two infringement actions lodged by the Commission against Poland (C‑619/18 and C‑192/18). In the interests of clarity, I note that challenges heard by the Court to date on the reform of the Polish justice system have concerned the following: (1) the lowering of the retirement age of Supreme Court judges and granting the President of the Republic the power to extend the active mandate of Supreme Court judges (see judgment of
COM(2017) 835 final,
See, for example, Council of Europe European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion No 904/2017 of
The following cases shall fall within the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Chamber: …
The former version of Article 131 of the 2017 Law on the Supreme Court provided:
The National Council of the Judiciary shall be composed as follows:
According to Article 10 of the 2017 Amending Law on the NCJ, certain provisions, including Article 11a of the Law on the NCJ, entered into force on
Under ex Article 11 of the Law on the NCJ, the 15 judicial members were elected by the judges from among the judges of the Supreme Court (2 members), the administrative courts (2 members), the appellate courts (2 members), the regional and district courts (8 members) and the military courts (1 member).
In establishing the order of the candidates on the list, the team shall first take into account the assessment of the candidates’ qualifications and in addition:
Article 2(1) of Directive 2000/78 states:
The referring court notes that, prior to the entry into force of the 2017 Law on the Supreme Court, that chamber was called the Chamber of Labour Law, Social Security and Public Affairs.
With respect to Case C‑585/18, the referring court indicates that this applies to Supreme Administrative Court judges.
The referring court refers to the judgments of
The referring court mentions in particular the judgments of
The referring court refers to the judgments of
The referring court refers to the judgments of
At the second part of the hearing, the President of the Court stated that while the Disciplinary Chamber cannot participate in the proceedings in the present cases in accordance with the Court’s Rules of Procedure, since it is not among the parties to the main proceedings, as indicated in the references for a preliminary ruling received from the referring court, the Court decided to accept documents filed on
Poland refers in particular to the judgments of
Judgment of
The EFTA Surveillance Authority refers to the judgments of
The applicants refer in that regard to ECtHR,
The applicants refer in particular to the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12, Judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities,
See footnote 3 of this Opinion.
European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), Position Paper of the Board of the ENCJ on the membership of the KRS of Poland, adopted on
Latvia refers in particular to the judgment of
Poland refers in particular to the judgments of
Poland refers in particular to Article 179, combined with Article 144(3), point 17, of the Polish constitution.
The EFTA Surveillance Authority refers to Articles 2, 7 and 49 TEU, Article 53 of the Charter and Council of Europe, European Charter on the statute of judges,
The EFTA Surveillance Authority refers in particular to the decision of the EFTA Court of
The Commission refers to the judgments of
The Commission refers to ECtHR,
The Commission refers in particular to ECtHR,
The EFTA Surveillance Authority refers to the judgments of
The Commission refers to the judgments of
See, in particular, judgments of
See, in that regard, Opinions of Advocate General Wahl in
See, in that regard, judgment of
See, for example, judgments of
See judgment of
See, in that regard, judgment of
This is evident in the Court’s judgment of
Judgment of
See judgment of
See judgment of
See order of
See judgment of
See, in that regard, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in
See, for example, orders of
See judgment of
See, in that regard, judgment of
See judgments of
See judgment of
See judgment of
Judgment of
Judgment of
See, for example, judgment of
See, for example, judgment of
See Advocate General Tanchev in
See Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (
See judgment of
See, in particular, judgments of
See, in that regard, judgment of
See, for example, judgments of
See judgment of
See, for example, judgment of
See, in particular, judgments of
See, for example, judgment of
See, for example, judgment of
See, for example, ECtHR,
See ECtHR,
ECtHR,
ECtHR,
United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers,
See, for example, 2010 Recommendation, footnote 26, point 26; European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, Recommendation on Councils for the Judiciary, 2011 (
See, for example, European Commission For Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion No 403/2006, Judicial Appointments,
See, for example, 1998 European Charter, footnote 32, Explanatory Memorandum, point 1.3; 2007 CCJE Opinion, footnote 81, points 17 to 19; 2010 Recommendation, footnote 26, point 27; Council of Europe Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE), Magna Carta of Judges (Fundamental Principles),
See, for example, 1998 European Charter, footnote 32, point 1.3; 2007 CCJE Opinion, footnote 81, points 25 to 31; 2011 ENCJ Report, footnote 82, point 2.3; 2018 UN Report, footnote 81, points 75 and 76.
See, for example, 2007 CCJE Opinion, footnote 81, point 35; 2018 UN Report, footnote 81, point 83. See also Council of Europe Plan of Action on Strengthening Judicial Independence and Impartiality,
See, for example, 1998 European Charter, footnote 32, point 3.1; 2011 ENCJ Report, footnote 82, point 3.3; 2016 Rule of Law Checklist, footnote 36, point 81; 2018 UN Report, footnote 81, point 48.
That is, 21 NCJ members are appointed by the legislative authorities (15 judicial members + 4 members appointed by the Sejm + 2 members appointed by the Senat, the upper chamber of the Polish Parliament); 1 member is appointed by the President of the Republic; and of the 3 ex officio members, 1 is a member of the executive authority (Minister of Justice) and 2 are members of the judiciary (the First President of the Supreme Court and the President of the Supreme Administrative Court). See point 20 of this Opinion.
See, inter alia, the Commission’s reasoned proposal, footnote 3, recitals 141 to 143; Venice Commission Opinion No 904/2017, footnote 4, points 24 to 26; 2018 UN Report on Poland, footnote 4, points 67 to 69.
It may also be considered that alternative means may be taken to achieve those aims, as indicated by Venice Commission Opinion No 904/2017, footnote 4, point 27; Council of Europe Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO), Addendum to the Fourth Round Evaluation Report on Poland,
See, for example, Commission’s reasoned proposal, footnote 3, recitals 140, 144, 145 and 175; Venice Commission Opinion No 904/2017, footnote 4, points 28 to 31; 2018 UN Report on Poland, footnote 4, point 70.
For a summary, see Trybunał Konstytucyjny (Constitutional Court) press release after the hearing, K 12/18, available at http://trybunal.gov.pl/.
It should be pointed out that, in its Opinion No 904/2017, footnote 4, particularly points 89 to 95, 128 to 131, the Venice Commission considered the combined effects of the Polish legislation on the NCJ and the Disciplinary Chamber, along with other reforms, as posing a grave threat to judicial independence. Also, on
See footnote 20 of this Opinion.
See, for example, judgments of
I note that, according to the 2019 EU Justice Scoreboard, of the 20 Member States surveyed, Poland is the only Member State where appointment of the judicial members of the judicial council is proposed not exclusively by judges and appointed by the Parliament. See Commission Communication, The 2019 EU Justice Scoreboard, COM(2019) 198 final,
Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev,
See, in particular, judgments of
Compare judgment of
See, for example, judgment of
See judgment of
Judgment of
In the alternative, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in conjunction with Article 9(1) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of The same is precluded by the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU.