28.4.2012   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 126/22


Appeal brought on 28 February 2012 by Willem Stols against the judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal of 13 December 2011 in Case F-51/08 RENV Stols v Council

(Case T-95/12 P)

2012/C 126/43

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Willem Stols (Halsteren, Netherlands) (represented by S. Rodrigues, A. Blot and C. Bernard-Glanz, lawyers)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought by the appellant

Declare the present appeal admissible;

Set aside the judgment of 13 December 2011 of the First Chamber of the Civil Service Tribunal of the European Union in Case F-51/08 RENV;

Grant the form of order submitted by him at first instance;

Order the Council to pay the costs of both sets of proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on the following pleas in law.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the Civil Service Tribunal, when it examined the first plea in law submitted at first instance claiming that Article 45(1) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union had been infringed and claiming a manifest error of assessment, infringed European Union law by:

using a criterion which was not provided for under Article 45(1) of the Staff Regulations (see paragraphs 46 and 47 of the judgment under appeal);

providing inadequate reasoning for its judgment and calling into question the classification into two function groups provided for in Article 5 of the Staff Regulations (see paragraphs 52 to 54 of the judgment under appeal); and

providing reasoning which contained substantive inaccuracies and by misreading the language criterion referred to in Article 45(1) of the Staff Regulations (see paragraphs 50 and 51 of the judgment under appeal)

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the Civil Service Tribunal, when examining the second plea in law claiming infringement of Article 59(1) of the Staff Regulations and failure to observe the non-discrimination principle, reached a conclusion lacking all legal foundation, in so far as it rejected the second plea as ineffective because the first plea had not been established, whereas it made several errors of law in concluding that the first plea in law was not established (paragraphs 59 and 60 of the judgment under appeal).