Provisional text
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
RANTOS
delivered on 22 October 2026 (1)
Case C‑153/25
Acea Produzione SpA,
Andromeda PV Srl,
Breva Wind Srl,
Calabria Solar Srl,
ERG Eolica Adriatica Srl,
ERG Eolica Faeto Srl,
Erg Eolica Ginestra Srl,
ERG Solar Piemonte 3 Srl,
ISAB Energy Solare Srl,
Esso Italiana Srl,
Engie Italia SpA,
Engie Global Markets,
Meltemi Energia Srl,
Tamoil Italia SpA,
Engycalor Energia Calore Srl,
Energie SpA,
B&G Servizi Rete ed Extrarete Srl,
SOM SpA
other parties:
Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri,
Olimpia Srl a socio unico [a one-person company],
Verona service
[Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court, Italy)]
( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Internal market for electricity – Regulation (EU) 2022/1854 – Emergency intervention to address high energy prices – Articles 1, 2 and 14 – Temporary solidarity contribution – Equivalent national measures – Adoption of a national measure having a broader personal scope than that of the temporary solidarity contribution – Application in particular to operators already subject to a measure capping revenue – Maintenance of a national measure which cannot be regarded as an equivalent national measure )
I. Introduction
1. Regulation (EU) 2022/1854 (2) established an emergency intervention which was intended to address high energy prices resulting, in particular, from the war in Ukraine, by means of exceptional, targeted and time limited measures. To that end, Article 14 thereof provided for the introduction of a temporary solidarity contribution applicable to certain undertakings in the energy sector, unless Member States had enacted ‘equivalent national measures’.
2. In that context, the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court, Italy), to which a number of questions have been referred regarding the constitutionality of a national measure establishing a levy applicable to undertakings in the energy sector, has doubts as to the interpretation of Articles 1, 2 and 14 of Regulation 2022/1854, read in the light of several of its recitals. (3) More specifically, it seeks, in essence, to determine whether those provisions preclude a Member State from establishing, as an ‘equivalent national measure’ within the meaning of Article 14 of that regulation, a levy the personal scope of which is broader than that of the temporary solidarity contribution provided for in that regulation.
3. This reference for a preliminary ruling, which follows on from a number of recent cases brought before the Court, (4) including Varo Energy Belgium and Others (C‑358/24) and Vermilion Energy Ireland and Others (C‑533/24), in which my Opinions are also being delivered today, (5) offers the Court an opportunity to clarify further its case-law concerning the interpretation of Regulation 2022/1854, which was designed as an exceptional, temporary instrument in the context of an unprecedented energy crisis, and, in particular, to rule on the novel question by what criteria a national measure may be classified as an ‘equivalent national measure’ pursuant to Article 14 of that regulation.
II. Legal framework
A. European Union law
4. According to recitals 6 to 12, 14, 15, 40, 41, 45, 46, 50, 51, 55, 57, 63 and 64 of Regulation 2022/1854:
‘(6) A rapid and coordinated response is therefore needed at Union level. The establishment of an emergency intervention would allow for a temporary mitigation of the risk that electricity prices and the cost of electricity for final customers reach even less sustainable levels and that Member States adopt uncoordinated national measures, which could endanger security of supply at Union level and put an additional burden on the Union’s industry and consumers. …
(7) The current disruptions of gas supplies, reduced availability of certain power generating plants, and the resulting impacts on gas and electricity prices, constitute a severe difficulty in the supply of gas and electricity energy products within the meaning of Article 122(1) [TFEU]. …
(8) The disruption of the energy market, caused by one of the main market players which has artificially reduced the supply of gas in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and the hybrid war which is thereby being carried out, have created a crisis situation which requires the adoption of a set of urgent, temporary and exceptional measures of an economic nature to address the unbearable effects on consumers and companies. …
(9) A united and well-coordinated Union-wide response is needed to tackle the stark increase of electricity prices and their impact on households and industry. Uncoordinated national measures could affect the functioning of the internal energy market, endangering security of supply and leading to further price increases in the Member States most affected by the crisis. Safeguarding the integrity of the internal electricity market is therefore crucial to preserve and enhance the necessary solidarity between Member States.
(10) While some Member States might be more exposed to the effects of a disruption of Russian gas supplies and the resulting price increases, all Member States can contribute to limiting the economic harm caused by such disruption by taking appropriate demand reduction measures. …
(11) Uncoordinated caps on market revenues from electricity produced from generators with lower marginal costs such as renewables, nuclear and lignite (“inframarginal generators”) may lead to significant distortions between generators in the Union, as generators compete Union-wide on a coupled electricity market. A commitment to a joint Union-wide cap on market revenues from inframarginal generators should enable avoidance of such distortions. …
(12) In view of the extreme increase of retail gas and electricity prices, State and public interventions to protect consumers are of particular importance. However, the impact of the gas supply shortages on electricity prices, as well as the possibility to finance support measures from State budget, differ between Member States. If only some Member States with sufficient resources can protect customers and suppliers, this would lead to severe distortions in the internal market. A uniform obligation to pass on the surplus revenues to consumers would allow all Member States to protect their consumers. …
…
(14) The solidarity contribution is an appropriate means to tackle surplus profits, in the event of unforeseen circumstances. Those profits do not correspond to any regular profit that Union companies or permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors would or could have expected to obtain under normal circumstances, had the unpredictable events in the energy markets not have taken place. Therefore, the introduction of a solidarity contribution constitutes a joint and coordinated measure which makes possible, in a spirit of solidarity, the generation of additional proceeds for national authorities to provide financial support to households and companies heavily affected by the soaring energy prices, while ensuring a level playing field across the Union. It should be applied in parallel to the regular corporate taxes levied by each Member State on the companies concerned.
(15) To ensure coherence across energy policy areas, the measures provided for in this Regulation should work as an interdependent package reinforcing each other. All Member States should be able to support consumers, in a targeted manner, through surplus revenues resulting from the cap on market revenues …, and through proceeds from a solidarity contribution imposed on Union companies and permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors. …
…
(40) Given that the generation mix and the cost-structure of power-generating facilities differ greatly among Member States, they should be allowed to maintain or introduce national crisis measures under specific conditions.
(41) In particular, Member States should retain the possibility to further limit the revenues of the producers to which the cap on market revenues applies and to set a specific cap on the market revenues obtained from the sale of electricity produced from hard coal, the price of which can be significantly lower than the price of marginal technologies in some Member States. In order to ensure legal certainty, Member States should also be allowed to maintain or introduce national crisis measures, which limit the market revenues of producers other than those subject to the Union-wide cap on market revenues.
…
(45) Commercial and trading practices as well as the regulatory framework in the electricity sector are markedly different from the fossil fuels sector. Given that the cap on market revenues aims to mimic the market outcome that producers could have expected if global supply chains would function normally in the absence of gas supply disruptions since February 2022, it is necessary for the measure concerning electricity producers to apply to the revenues resulting from the generation of electricity. Conversely, as the temporary solidarity contribution targets the profitability of Union companies and permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors which has significantly increased compared to prior years, it is necessary for it to apply to their profits.
(46) Member States should ensure that the surplus revenues resulting from the application of the cap on market revenues in the field of electricity are passed on to final electricity customers to mitigate the impact of exceptionally high electricity prices. …
…
(50) Without substantially changing their cost structure and increasing their investments, Union companies and permanent establishments generating at least 75% of turnover with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors, have seen their profits spike due to the sudden and unpredictable circumstances of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, reduced supply of energy and increasing demand due to record high temperatures.
(51) The temporary solidarity contribution should act as a redistributing measure to ensure that the companies concerned which have earned surplus profits as a result of the unexpected circumstances, contribute in proportion to the improvement of the energy crisis in the internal market.
…
(55) Member States should take the necessary measures to ensure the full application of the solidarity contribution provided for in this Regulation and should arrange for the necessary adjustments in national law, in particular in order to ensure the timely collection of the solidarity contribution …
…
(57) The use of the proceeds for those purposes reflects the solidarity contribution’s exceptional and temporary nature as a measure that intends to reduce and mitigate the harmful effects of the energy crisis for households and companies across the Union with the objective of protecting the internal market and preventing the risk of further fragmentation. Soaring energy prices affect all Member States. …
…
(63) Member States should apply the solidarity contribution set by this Regulation in their respective territories unless they have enacted equivalent national measures. The objective of the national measure should be deemed similar to the overall objective of the solidarity contribution set by this Regulation when it consists of contributing to the affordability of energy. A national measure should be deemed subject to similar rules as the solidarity contribution where it covers activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors, determines a base, provides for a rate, and ensures that the proceeds of the national measure are used for purposes that are comparable to those of the solidarity contribution.
(64) … The application of the solidarity contribution to the full fiscal year should allow the use of surplus profits for the relevant period, in the public interest of mitigating the consequences of the energy crisis, while leaving an appropriate measure of profits to the companies concerned.’
5. Article 1 of that regulation, entitled ‘Subject matter and scope’, stated:
‘This Regulation establishes an emergency intervention to mitigate the effects of high energy prices through exceptional, targeted and time limited measures. Those measures aim to reduce electricity consumption, to introduce a cap on market revenues that certain producers receive from the generation of electricity and redistribute to final electricity customers in a targeted manner, to enable Member States to apply measures of public intervention in the price setting for the supply of electricity for household customers and SMEs, and to establish rules for a mandatory temporary solidarity contribution from Union companies and permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors to contribute to the affordability of energy for households and companies.’
6. Article 2 of that regulation, entitled ‘Definitions’, specified, in points 17 to 19 and 21:
‘For the purposes of this Regulation, … the following definitions also apply:
…
(17) “Union companies and permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors” means Union companies or permanent establishments generating at least 75% of their turnover from economic activities in the field of the extraction, mining, refining of petroleum or manufacture of coke oven products, as referred to in Regulation (EC) No 1893/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council; [(6)]
(18) “surplus profits” means taxable profits, as determined under national tax rules in the fiscal year 2022 and/or the fiscal year 2023 and for their full duration, accrued from activities carried out at the level of Union companies and permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors which are above a 20% increase of the average of the taxable profits in the four fiscal years starting on or after 1 January 2018;
(19) “solidarity contribution” means a temporary measure intended to address surplus profits of Union companies and permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors to mitigate exceptional price developments in the energy markets for Member States, consumers and companies;
…
(21) “enacted equivalent national measure” means a legislative, regulatory or administrative measure adopted and published by a Member State by 31 December 2022 which contributes to the affordability of energy.’
7. Article 6 of Regulation 2022/1854, entitled ‘Mandatory cap on market revenues’, provided, in paragraph 1 thereof:
‘Market revenues of producers obtained from the generation of electricity from the sources referred to in Article 7(1) shall be capped to a maximum of [EUR] 180 per MWh of electricity produced.’
8. Article 7 of that regulation, entitled ‘Application of the cap on market revenues to electricity producers’, provided, in paragraph 1 thereof:
‘The cap on market revenues provided for in Article 6 shall apply to the market revenues obtained from the sale of electricity produced from the following sources:
(a) wind energy;
(b) solar energy (solar thermal and solar photovoltaic);
(c) geothermal energy;
(d) hydropower without reservoir;
(e) biomass fuel (solid or gaseous biomass fuels), excluding biomethane;
(f) waste;
(g) nuclear energy;
(h) lignite;
(i) crude petroleum products;
(j) peat.’
9. Article 8 of that regulation, entitled ‘National crisis measures’, was worded as follows:
‘1. Member States may:
(a) maintain or introduce measures that further limit the market revenues of producers generating electricity from the sources listed in Article 7(1) …;
…
(c) maintain or introduce national measures to limit the market revenues of producers generating electricity from sources not referred to in Article 7(1);
…
2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 shall, in line with this Regulation:
(a) be proportionate and non-discriminatory;
(b) not jeopardise investment signals;
(c) ensure that the investments and operating costs are covered;
(d) not distort the functioning of electricity wholesale markets, and in particular, not affect the merit order and the price formation on the wholesale market;
(e) be compatible with Union law.’
10. Chapter III of the regulation, entitled ‘Measure concerning the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sector’, contained Articles 14 to 18. In accordance with Article 14 thereof, entitled ‘Support to final energy customers through a temporary solidarity contribution’:
‘1. Surplus profits generated by Union companies and permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors shall be subject to a mandatory temporary solidarity contribution, unless Member States have enacted equivalent national measures.
2. Member States shall ensure that enacted equivalent national measures share similar objectives and are subject to similar rules as the temporary solidarity contribution under this Regulation and generate comparable or higher proceeds to the estimated proceeds from the solidarity contribution.
3. Member States shall adopt and publish measures implementing the mandatory temporary solidarity contribution referred to in paragraph 1 by 31 December 2022.’
11. Article 15 of Regulation 2022/1854, entitled ‘Base for calculating the temporary solidarity contribution’, stated:
‘The temporary solidarity contribution for Union companies and permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors, including those that are part of a consolidated group merely for tax purposes, shall be calculated on the taxable profits, as determined under national tax rules, in the fiscal year 2022 and/or the fiscal year 2023 and for their full duration, which are above a 20% increase of the average of the taxable profits, as determined under national tax rules, in the four fiscal years starting on or after 1 January 2018. If the average of the taxable profits in those four fiscal years is negative, the average taxable profits shall be zero for the purpose of calculating the temporary solidarity contribution.’
12. Article 16 of that regulation, entitled ‘Rate for calculating the temporary solidarity contribution’, provided:
‘1. The rate applicable for calculating the temporary solidarity contribution shall be at least 33% of the base referred to in Article 15.
2. The temporary solidarity contribution shall apply in addition to the regular taxes and levies applicable according to the national law of a Member State.’
13. Article 17 of that regulation, entitled ‘Use of proceeds from the temporary solidarity contribution’, provided, in paragraph 1 thereof:
‘Member States shall use the proceeds from the temporary solidarity contribution with sufficiently timely impact for any of the following purposes:
(a) financial support measures for final energy customers, and in particular vulnerable households, to mitigate the effects of high energy prices, in a targeted manner;
…’
14. According to Article 18 of Regulation 2022/1854, entitled ‘Temporary nature of the solidarity contribution’:
‘The solidarity contribution applied by Member States in accordance with this Regulation shall be of a temporary nature. It shall only apply to surplus profits generated in the fiscal years referred to in Article 15.’
B. Italian law
15. La legge n. 197 – Bilancio di previsione dello Stato per l’anno finanziario 2023 e bilancio pluriennale per il triennio 2023-2025 (Law No 197 on the State budget for the 2023 financial year and multiyear budget for the three-year period 2023-2025) of 29 December 2022 (7) (‘Law No 197’), was, in Article 1(30), (115) and (116) thereof, worded as follows:
‘30. Pursuant to [Regulation 2022/1854], from 1 December 2022 and until 30 June 2023, a cap shall be applied to the market revenues obtained by electricity producers, through a one-way compensation mechanism, in respect of electricity fed into the grid by: (a) plants using renewable sources that do not fall within the scope of Article 15-bis of decreto-legge n. 4 – Misure urgenti in materia di sostegno alle imprese e agli operatori economici, di lavoro, salute e servizi territoriali, connesse all’emergenza da COVID-19, nonché per il contenimento degli effetti degli aumenti dei prezzi nel settore elettrico (Decree-Law No 4 on urgent measures to support businesses and economic operators, labour, health and local services, in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, and to contain the effects of price increases in the electricity sector), of 27 January 2022 [(8)], converted into law, with amendments, by Law No 25 of 28 March 2022; (b) plants using non-renewable sources referred to in Article 7(1) of Regulation 2022/1854.
…
115. In order to limit the effects of the increase in prices and tariffs in the energy sector for companies and consumers, a temporary solidarity contribution, determined in accordance with paragraph 116, shall be established for the year 2023, to be borne by persons carrying out in the territory of the State, for the subsequent sale of goods, the activity of electricity production, persons carrying out the activity of methane gas production or natural gas extraction, persons reselling electricity, methane gas and natural gas and persons carrying out the activity of production, distribution and trade in petroleum products. The contribution shall also be payable by persons who, with a view to subsequent resale, definitively import electricity, natural gas or methane gas or petroleum products or who bring such goods into the territory of the State from other States of the European Union. The contribution shall not be payable by persons carrying out the activity of organising and managing platforms for the exchange of electricity, gas, environmental certificates and fuels, and by small enterprises and micro-enterprises carrying out the activity of retail sale of automotive fuel … The contribution shall be payable if at least 75% of the revenues in the tax period prior to the one in progress on 1 January 2023 derives from the activities indicated in the preceding sentences.
116. The solidarity contribution shall be calculated by applying a rate of 50% to the amount of the share of the total revenue determined for the purposes of corporation tax and relating to the taxation period prior to that applicable on 1 January 2023, which exceeds by at least 10% the average total revenue, as determined for the purposes of corporation tax, received during the four fiscal periods preceding the tax year in progress on 1 January 2022; if the total average revenue is negative, a zero value shall be adopted. In any event, the amount of the extraordinary contribution cannot exceed a share equal to 25% of the net value of the assets at the end of the financial year preceding that beginning on 1 January 2022.’
III. The disputes in the main proceedings, the question referred for a preliminary ruling and the procedure before the Court
16. In nine sets of proceedings brought before Italian courts, (9) those courts have referred to the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court), (10) the referring court, a number of questions as to the constitutionality of certain provisions of Law No 197 establishing a levy applicable to companies in the energy sector (‘the measure at issue in the main proceedings’), observing that those provisions could be in contravention of the Italian Constitution in so far as they are contrary to Regulation 2022/1854. The Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court) decided to join the various sets of proceedings in order to deal with them together, since they concerned the same national provisions and raised broadly the same questions.
17. Accordingly, the referring court is, inter alia, called upon to rule on whether Article 1(115) of Law No 197 is contrary to the Italian Constitution, in so far as it also imposes the temporary solidarity contribution for the year 2023 on operators other than those referred to in Regulation 2022/1854, namely Union companies and permanent establishments which, ‘in essence, carry out most of their activity in the extraction and refinery sectors’.
18. That court states that Article 1(115) of that law established an equivalent national measure within the meaning of Article 14 of Regulation 2022/1854 not only in respect of operators with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors, namely ‘upstream operators’ in the chain of manufacturing and distribution of products derived from hydrocarbons, but also in respect of ‘downstream operators’, that is to say, those engaged in the final phase of that chain and which market and distribute finished products and electricity produced from them.
19. More specifically, the question arises whether the provisions of Regulation 2022/1854 preclude the inclusion, under Article 1(115) of that law, within the scope of operators subject to the temporary solidarity contribution, first, of electricity producers, including inframarginal producers, and resellers, importers and operators bringing that energy into the territory of the State from other EU Member States and, second, of distributors and resellers of petroleum products, methane and natural gas and importers and operators bringing those goods into national territory from other EU Member States. As regards electricity producers already subject to the revenue cap mechanism, that court states that they were only simultaneously subject to the temporary solidarity contribution in respect of December 2022. Therefore, it must be determined whether the provisions of Regulation 2022/1854 preclude the extension of the personal scope of the equivalent national measure established in Article 1(115) of that law.
20. In that regard, the referring court states that, according to its wording, Regulation 2022/1854 provides for the application of the temporary solidarity contribution only to Union companies and permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors under Article 1 and Article 2(17) of that regulation, whereas, in the case of inframarginal energy operators, it establishes a revenue cap mechanism in accordance with Article 1 and Article 2(5) and (9) of that regulation.
21. The referring court also states that a number of recitals of Regulation 2022/1854 (11) seem to confirm the separation of the measures by categories of operators, justified by differing commercial practices and frameworks of reference specific to the sectors concerned. Moreover, according to that court, recital 63 of that regulation makes clear that equivalent national measures should only apply to activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors. Furthermore, certain recitals of that regulation repeatedly refer to the need for a unified and coordinated effort by the European Union, in order to preserve the integrity and proper functioning of the interconnected internal energy market, avoid significant distortions of competition and ensure a level playing field for market operators. (12)
22. In the light of those elements, that court considers that the requirement that the regime established by Regulation 2022/1854 be uniform is essential in order to prevent any fragmentation of the internal market and that the Regulation does not therefore confer on Member States any discretion to extend the personal scope of national measures equivalent to the solidarity contribution. At the very least, that regulation does not allow that contribution to be extended to operators already referred to in it for the purposes of applying the cap on revenues, which might reveal a total or partial incompatibility with the measure at issue in the main proceedings, which extends the circle of operators concerned.
23. However, a number of factors could make the case for the compatibility of the measure at issue in the main proceedings with EU law.
24. In that regard, the referring court states that Regulation 2022/1854 was adopted on the legal basis of Article 122(1) TFEU, which does not entitle the EU legislature to adopt harmonisation measures. Recourse to that legal basis rather than to Article 115 or Article 194(3) TFEU, which require Council unanimity, confirms, according to the referring court, first that that regulation is designed only to respond, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to an economic emergency situation, without harmonising national legislation and, second, that it preserves the general competence of the Member States in matters of direct taxation. In that context, that regulation, although it meets the need to adopt an urgent and coordinated EU response, does not seem to preclude the Member States from being entitled to adopt measures also of a fiscal nature. To that end, it provides for the possibility of maintaining or introducing additional ‘national crisis measures’ applicable both to inframarginal producers and energy chain operators other than those referred to in the Regulation.
25. It follows, according to the referring court, that Regulation 2022/1854 falls within the scope of implementation of the solidarity principle on which the European Union is founded, under Articles 2 and 3 TEU. It more specifically pursues the objective of protecting companies and households exposed to the energy crisis. Unlike other legislative acts governing the energy market, which are solely addressed to EU institutions and Member States, that regulation extends its scope to private undertakings, citizens and consumers in order that they can contribute, by way of redistribution, to the financing of the budgets of the Member States, in particular those with the most limited budgetary room for manoeuvre, through surplus profits made by companies in the energy chain. (13)
26. In that context, the referring court considers, in the first place, that the need to ensure exceptional coordination of interventions in the energy chain in order to avoid any distortion of the internal market, in so far as it is relevant, must be balanced against the principle of solidarity and the other objectives of general interest of the European Union to which Regulation 2022/1854 itself gives prominence, such as the protection of consumers, companies and households and the economic stability of the public finances of the Member States and of the entire euro area.
27. In the second place, the referring court considers that the particular aspects of the Italian energy context must be taken into account. In that regard, it states, first, that Italy is one of the Member States most dependent on natural gas, which represented 48.6% of its energy mix for the year 2022. It states that, during that year, the increases in the price of natural gas – which represented 37.6% of gross available energy – and electricity for final consumers were among the highest recorded in Europe, in spite of the national support measures for companies and households. (14) Second, that court states that there were no particularly significant activities in the petroleum and coal extraction and mining sectors in Italy in 2022. (15) Therefore, the choice of an enlarged scope would make it possible to draw resources deemed sufficient to finance the measures to protect companies and households regarded as necessary at EU level in order to address the exceptional crisis situation. (16)
28. Consequently, the choice to extend the equivalent national measure to other operators which also made surplus profits linked to the particular economic situation during the energy crisis would be justified in the light of the particular characteristics of the national energy crisis and would meet the objective pursued by Regulation 2022/1854, namely to enable the financing of national measures designed to ensure the affordability of energy. Therefore, the enlargement of the circle of operators referred to by the national legislature in order to include surplus profits linked to the particular economic situation could be considered, in the national economic and energy context, to be an equivalent national measure or, in any event, an expression of the general competence of the Member States in the field of direct taxation, exercised in compliance with the principle of solidarity and the objectives of that regulation.
29. In those circumstances, the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘Do Articles 1, 2 and 14 of [Regulation 2022/1854], also read in the light of the relevant recitals (in particular, recitals 6 to 12, 14, 15, 40, 41, 45, 46, 50, 51 and 63), preclude the adoption of a national measure which is equivalent to the solidarity contribution, such as that provided for in Article 1(115) to (119) of [Law No 197], in so far as that measure is also imposed on producers and resellers of electricity, distributors and resellers of petroleum products, resellers of methane gas and natural gas, and those who import electricity, natural gas, methane gas or petroleum products or who bring those goods into the territory of the State from other EU Member States, where they received extraordinary profits linked to the particular economic situation in 2022?’
30. Written observations were submitted to the Court by certain applicants in the main proceedings, (17) Olimpia and Verona Service, the Italian, Belgian and Spanish Governments and the European Commission. Those parties, together with the Finnish Government, also presented oral argument at the joint hearing also in Cases Varo Energy Belgium and Others (C‑358/24) and Vermilion Energy Ireland and Others (C‑533/24) held on 9 June 2026.
IV. Analysis
A. Admissibility of the question for a preliminary ruling
31. Before analysing the only question referred for a preliminary ruling, it is necessary to rule on the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Spanish Government. That government submits that the Court’s reply is not necessary to resolve the disputes before the referring court, since it has no bearing on the validity of the measure at issue in the main proceedings, as the Member State has, in any event, the competence to adopt such fiscal measures, and therefore the request for a preliminary ruling should be rejected as inadmissible.
32. In that regard, I note that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Thus, where the questions referred concern the interpretation or the validity of a rule of EU law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling. (18) It follows that questions relating to EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The refusal of the Court to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court is possible only where it is quite obvious that the ruling sought on the interpretation or validity of a rule of EU law bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual and legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it. (19)
33. However, it must be stated that, in the present case, the applicants in the main proceedings contest the compatibility of the measure at issue in the main proceedings with Regulation 2022/1854. Therefore, the interpretation of that regulation, as requested by the referring court, cannot be regarded as being unrelated to the subject matter of the main proceedings.
34. I would also point out that the Spanish Government’s argument is based on the premiss that Regulation 2022/1854 does not preclude a national measure adopted by a Member State in order to implement the provisions of Chapter III of that regulation on the sole ground that that measure does not fulfil all the conditions required in order to be classified as a ‘temporary solidarity contribution’ or an ‘equivalent national measure’ within the meaning of Article 14. That premiss itself depends on the interpretation of the relevant provisions of that regulation establishing that contribution and therefore effectively anticipates the answer to the question referred to the Court.
35. In those circumstances, it must be stated that the question submitted concerns the interpretation of EU law and that the answer to that question appears to be necessary for the referring court to be able to give judgment. Therefore, I am of the view that the question referred for a preliminary ruling is admissible.
B. Substance
36. By its single question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Articles 1, 2 and 14 of Regulation 2022/1854, read in the light of recitals 6 to 12, 14, 15, 40, 41, 45, 46, 50, 51 and 63 thereof, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation imposing, as an equivalent national measure, a temporary solidarity contribution not only on the Union companies and permanent establishments referred to in Article 14(1) of that regulation, but also on other operators. (20)
37. I would point out, at the outset, that that question raises, in essence, two separate issues. The first consists in determining whether the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings can be classified as an ‘equivalent national measure’ within the meaning of Article 14 of Regulation 2022/1854, even though it imposes the temporary solidarity contribution on operators other than those referred to in paragraph 1 of that provision. The second concerns the consequences to be drawn from that enlargement of the personal scope of the contribution and seeks, in particular, to establish whether that regulation precludes the adoption of such a measure. (21)
38. As regards the first of those issues, I would like to point out that the assessment of the classification of the measure at issue in the main proceedings as an ‘equivalent national measure’ within the meaning of Article 14 of that regulation, and in particular the question of its compatibility with that regulation, is a matter for the referring court, which alone has jurisdiction to interpret national law. However, the Court remains competent to provide it with the guidance on interpreting EU law which it needs in order to make that assessment.
39. I would also point out that the temporary solidarity contribution is one of the extraordinary measures introduced by that regulation in the context of the energy crisis in order to enable Member States to generate additional revenues to support households and companies heavily affected by soaring energy prices. (22) Like the measure capping market revenues obtained by electricity producers using certain energy sources, (23) that contribution relates to the extraordinary profits linked to the particular situation during the energy crisis which would not have been made if the unforeseeable events in the energy markets had not occurred. (24)
40. More specifically, as regards Article 14 of Regulation 2022/1854, I note that that provision provides that surplus profits generated by Union companies and permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors are to be subject to a mandatory temporary solidarity contribution.
41. In accordance with Article 14(2) of that regulation, Member States may adopt, instead of that contribution, ‘equivalent national measures’. Again according to the wording of that provision, those measures must share similar objectives to those of the temporary solidarity contribution and make the companies or permanent establishments concerned subject to similar rules as the temporary solidarity contribution, in order to generate proceeds comparable to the estimated proceeds from the solidarity contribution, but without excluding the possibility of generating higher proceeds. (25)
42. It is apparent from the order for reference that, among the conditions which a national measure must fulfil in order to be classified as an ‘equivalent national measure’, the referring court has doubts only with regard to the condition relating to the application of similar rules to those governing the temporary solidarity contribution. It seeks, in particular, to determine whether the fact that the personal scope of the national measure is broader, from a sectoral point of view, than the personal scope of that contribution is sufficient to preclude such a measure from being subject to similar rules and, therefore, from being classified as an ‘equivalent national measure’.
43. The answer to that question involves, at the outset, defining the personal scope of the temporary solidarity contribution. To that end, it must be examined whether the list of sectors referred to in Article 14(1) of Regulation 2022/1854 is exhaustive and, therefore, whether the scope of an equivalent national measure must be the same as that of that contribution.
44. As regards the personal scope of the temporary solidarity contribution, Article 14(1) and Article 15 of Regulation 2022/1854 state that it applies to Union companies and permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors. Those sectors are, moreover, repeatedly referred to in that regulation, in particular in Article 2(17), (18) and (19) thereof, which define, respectively, the concepts of ‘Union companies or permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors’, ‘surplus profits’ and ‘solidarity contribution’.
45. It is therefore clear from the very wording of those provisions that the EU legislature intended to limit the personal scope of the temporary solidarity contribution, and therefore it cannot be extended to sectors other than the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors.
46. That interpretation is also supported by the main objective pursued by Regulation 2022/1854, consisting in redistributing part of the surplus profits made by certain market participants for the benefit of consumers in order to remedy the energy crisis, (26) and by the particular context which led to its adoption, characterised by the need to adopt, at EU level, unified and coordinated measures in order to address the exceptional circumstances prevailing on the energy market. (27)
47. It follows from the foregoing that the personal scope of the temporary solidarity contribution cannot, in the case of the sectors of activity concerned, exceed that laid down in Article 14(1) of that regulation.
48. I consider that the same applies to equivalent national measures which Member States may adopt under Article 14(2) of that regulation.
49. Although, unlike Article 14(1) of that regulation, paragraph 2 of that article does not expressly mention the sectors of activity to which equivalent national measures must be applied, it requires that they make the companies or permanent establishments concerned subject to ‘similar rules as the temporary solidarity contribution’. In that regard, recital 63 of Regulation 2022/1854 states that an equivalent national measure should be deemed subject to rules similar to those applying to the temporary solidarity contribution where it covers activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors.
50. It is therefore clear from the wording of the relevant provisions of Regulation 2022/1854 recalled in the previous points of this Opinion that the ‘equivalent national measures’ referred to in Article 14(2) of that regulation cover measures which, without necessarily being identical in their form or technical arrangements to the temporary solidarity contribution, (28) make it possible to achieve a result comparable to that pursued by the EU legislature. (29) Although the Member States have, in implementing that regulation, including when adopting such measures, a considerable margin of discretion, it cannot have the effect of calling into question the EU legislature’s choice to limit the personal scope of the measures provided for in Article 14 of that regulation to the sectors expressly referred to in that provision. (30)
51. An interpretation of the concept of ‘equivalent national measure’ allowing the Member States themselves to define the personal scope of the temporary solidarity contribution and, therefore, to impose that contribution on sectors other than those referred to in Article 14(1) of Regulation 2022/1854 could, in my view, undermine both the effectiveness of that provision and the objective of achieving a minimum coordination of the measures adopted by the Member States in the context of the energy crisis.
52. That interpretation would lead to a situation in which Member States applying the temporary solidarity contribution directly would remain bound by the personal scope and the other parameters laid down in Article 14(1) of that regulation, whereas Member States which chose to adopt an equivalent national measure would have much broader discretion enabling them in particular to specify the sectors to which that measure applies. That difference would be difficult to reconcile with the logic of Article 14(2) of that regulation, the purpose of which is not to allow Member States to depart from the harmonised framework established by the EU legislature, but only to authorise them to replace the temporary solidarity contribution with a national measure producing equivalent effects. (31) I therefore consider that such an interpretation would largely deprive of their effect both the temporary solidarity contribution, which was conceived by that regulation as a means of responding to the energy crisis, and the choice made by the EU legislature as to the sectors to which that contribution is to apply. It would also render meaningless the requirement, set out in Article 14(2) of Regulation 2022/1854, that the national measures be ‘equivalent’ to that contribution. (32)
53. It follows from all of the foregoing that, in order for a national measure to be classified as ‘equivalent’ within the meaning of Article 14(2) of Regulation 2022/1854, its scope ratione personae must, in principle, correspond to that of the temporary solidarity contribution, as defined by that provision, and therefore cover the same sectors as those referred to in Article 14(1) of that regulation.
54. However, for the reasons stated below, and contrary to the position maintained by the applicants in the main proceedings, the mere fact that a national measure has a broader personal scope than that defined in Article 14(1) of that regulation, in that it imposes the temporary solidarity contribution not only on companies belonging to the sectors referred to in that provision, but also on companies active in other sectors, is not sufficient, in my view, either to exclude its classification as an ‘equivalent national measure’ within the meaning of Article 14(2) of that regulation, in so far as it applies to the sectors referred to in Article 14(1) thereof, or to establish its incompatibility with that regulation. (33)
55. I would, first of all, point out that Chapter III of Regulation 2022/1854, which contains that Article 14, merely provides for the establishment of the temporary solidarity contribution, without, however, prohibiting Member States from extending the personal scope of that contribution to operators active in economic sectors other than those referred to in that provision. I also note that no other provision of that regulation seems to preclude such extension beyond the sectors identified in that Article 14. (34) That conclusion is also confirmed by several provisions of that regulation permitting Member States to adopt additional measures in parallel with the various mechanisms provided for in the Regulation or to supplement those mechanisms. (35)
56. I note that, with regard to the legal basis on which Regulation 2022/1854 was adopted, namely Article 122(1) TFEU, the purpose of that regulation is neither to bring about an exhaustive harmonisation in taxation matters nor to establish permanent mechanisms in the energy market. On the contrary, it provides for the introduction of exceptional, targeted and temporary measures designed to respond to a particular economic situation. (36) Its objective is therefore to coordinate the interventions of the Member States in the context of the energy crisis by establishing a minimum set of common rules. Since the EU legislature did not intend to regulate exhaustively fiscal matters in respect of the energy market or those relating to the proper functioning of the EU internal market, (37) the Member States retain their competence, in particular in fiscal matters, in respect of situations which do not fall within the scope of that regulation. (38) It follows that they remain, in principle, free to use EU law as a basis for governing situations falling outside that scope and to extend to purely internal situations rules or concepts borrowed from that law.
57. I consider that the first issue raised by the referring court in its question for a preliminary ruling, on whether a national measure loses its status as an ‘equivalent’ measure on the sole ground that it also applies to sectors other than those referred to in Article 14(1) of Regulation 2022/1854, must be answered in the negative, provided that that measure, in the case of the sectors falling within the scope of that provision, fulfils the requirements laid down in it.
58. Since the companies falling within the sectors referred to in Article 14 of that regulation are subject to a national measure and that measure guarantees a result equivalent to that pursued by that provision, the fact that the measure also applies to other sectors cannot, alone, call into question its equivalent nature. In other words, the equivalence of such a measure must be assessed only in respect of the sectors falling within the scope of Article 14 of that regulation. The extension of its scope ratione personae to sectors not referred to in that provision does not therefore affect that assessment, provided that the requirements laid down in that provision are fully met.
59. Following the same logic, the Italian legislature’s choice to group together, in a single legislative act, on the one hand, a temporary solidarity contribution in accordance with the requirements laid down in Article 14 of Regulation 2022/1854 and, on the other hand, an extension of that contribution to companies in sectors not covered by that provision, on the ground that they have also made surplus profits, cannot, in itself, rule out classification of that measure as an ‘equivalent national measure’ within the meaning of Article 14(2) of that regulation. (39) In that regard, I note that Article 14 of that regulation requires Member States to impose either the temporary solidarity contribution provided for in that regulation or an equivalent national measure, without, however, determining the form of national legislative instrument intended to ensure the implementation of that obligation. It is therefore, in principle, for each Member State to determine the most appropriate means of fulfilling the requirements derived from that regulation (including the choice of legal instruments ensuring their application in the domestic legal system), subject to compliance with the framework established by Regulation 2022/1854 and to the preservation of its effectiveness.
60. I consider that Article 14(2) of that regulation requires not that the national measure be equivalent in all aspects, but only with regard to the sectors falling within the personal scope of the temporary solidarity contribution established by that regulation. However, it is not disputed, in the present case, that, although it is extended to other sectors, the measure at issue in the main proceedings, in so far as it applies to the sectors referred to in the Regulation, (40) does not depart from the rules established by it. It cannot therefore be alleged that the Italian legislature adopted a national measure which does not meet the requirements of Regulation 2022/1854.
61. That being clarified, it is necessary now to examine the second issue raised by the referring court in its question for a preliminary ruling on the inferences to be drawn from the enlargement of the personal scope of the temporary solidarity contribution, in particular with regard to the compliance of the national measure at issue in the main proceedings with Regulation 2022/1854.
62. For the reasons explained in the following points of this Opinion, I consider that the fact that the measure at issue in the main proceedings cannot be classified overall as an ‘equivalent national measure’, (41) because of the enlargement of the circle of persons bound by its provisions beyond the sectors referred to in Article 14 of that regulation, is not, in itself, such as to call into question its conformity with that regulation.
63. Since, as I stated in point 60 of this Opinion, the companies active in the sectors referred to in Article 14 of that regulation fall within the scope of the national measure and that measure produces a result equivalent to that sought by that provision, it cannot be alleged that the Italian legislature did not correctly implement the obligation, under Regulation 2022/1854, to establish an equivalent national measure.
64. I would add that it does not seem unreasonable that a Member State, when drawing up an equivalent national measure, should take into consideration the specific characteristics of its national market, in particular the sectors actually represented in it, in order to determine the scope of the temporary solidarity contribution. (42) Therefore, where one of the sectors referred to in Article 14 of Regulation 2022/1854 is absent from the national market or its position in it is only marginal (as seems to apply in the present case in respect of oil or coal extraction activities in Italy (43)), it is not inconceivable that the Member State concerned might seek to ensure the effectiveness of the measure by extending it to adjacent sectors which have also made exceptionally high profits because of the sudden, unexpected circumstances linked to the energy crisis. (44) Such an extension appears even more justified where it enables comparable, or even higher, revenues, to be generated, to those which would have resulted from strict application of Article 14 of that regulation, in order to contribute to the financing of measures to support households and companies. (45)
65. I wish, however, to make clear that, although the Member States, in applying Regulation 2022/1854, have broad discretion as regards the specific measures which they may adopt and retain their competence in fiscal matters, the exercise of that discretion remains subject to compliance with EU law. (46) That discretion cannot, therefore, authorise them to call into question the scope of that regulation or to undermine the effectiveness of the temporary solidarity contribution mechanism established by it, or, more generally, to adopt measures incompatible with EU law. In particular, although the Member States remain free to regulate situations that fall outside the scope of EU law, they cannot exercise that competence in a manner which is liable to impair the effective application of the arrangements established by that regulation or evade its requirements.
66. That said, it must be noted that the order for reference does not contain any evidence to suggest that, in the present case, the extension of the scope of the measure at issue in the main proceedings would have the effect of undermining the effective application of Regulation 2022/1854 or of circumventing its requirements.
67. As regards, finally, the specific situation of electricity producers already subject to the revenue cap measure, (47) I would point out that Regulation 2022/1854 does not expressly preclude the temporary contribution established by the measure at issue in the main proceedings from being applied to companies in the electricity sector which are also subject to the revenue cap measure established in Article 6 of that regulation. On the contrary, Article 8 of that regulation, on ‘national crisis measures’, clearly states in paragraph 1(a) that Member States may maintain or introduce national measures that further limit the market revenues of producers generating electricity from the sources listed in Article 7(1) of that regulation, provided that the conditions laid down in Article 8(2) of that regulation have been fulfilled. (48) It is, however, for the referring court to verify whether those conditions have been fulfilled in the present case.(49)
68. In the light of the foregoing, I consider that the reply to the question for a preliminary ruling should be that Articles 1, 2 and 14 of Regulation 2022/1854, read in the light of recitals 6 to 12, 14, 15, 40, 41, 45, 46, 50, 51 and 63 thereof, must be interpreted as not precluding the adoption of a national measure equivalent to the temporary solidarity contribution which, while applying to the Union companies and permanent establishments referred to in Article 2(17) and subject to that contribution in accordance with Article 14(1) of that regulation, also extends its scope to other categories of economic operators, provided that that extension does not call into question the equivalent nature of that measure in respect of companies falling within the scope of that provision and, as regards the Union companies and permanent establishments referred to in Article 14(1), that measure fulfils the requirements on which the Regulation makes its status as an ‘equivalent national measure’ conditional.
V. Conclusion
69. In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the Court of Justice give the following reply to the question referred for a preliminary ruling by the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court, Italy):
Articles 1, 2 and 14 of Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1854 of 6 October 2022 on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices, read in the light of recitals 6 to 12, 14, 15, 40, 41, 45, 46, 50, 51 and 63 thereof,
must be interpreted as not precluding the adoption of a national measure equivalent to the temporary solidarity contribution which, while applying to the Union companies and permanent establishments referred to in Article 2(17) of that regulation and subject to that contribution in accordance with Article 14(1) of that regulation, also extends its scope to other categories of economic operators, provided that that extension does not call into question the equivalent nature of that measure in respect of companies falling within the scope of that provision and, as regards the Union companies and permanent establishments referred to in Article 14(1), that measure fulfils the requirements on which the regulation makes its status as an ‘equivalent national measure’ conditional.
1 Original language: French.
2 Council Regulation of 6 October 2022 on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices (OJ 2022 L 261 I, p. 1).
3 The referring court refers, in particular, to recitals 6 to 12, 14, 15, 40, 41, 45, 46, 50, 51 and 63 of Regulation 2022/1854.
4 See, in that regard, judgments of 18 December 2025, Electrabel and Others (C‑633/23, EU:C:2025:991), and of 22 January 2026, Secab (C‑423/23, EU:C:2026:32), cases in which I drafted the Opinions. See also my Opinions in Axpo Energy Romania and PPC Renewables Romania (C‑251/24 and C‑392/24, EU:C:2026:521), and 2Valorise Ham and Others (C‑467/24, EU:C:2026:608). Regulation 2022/1854 is, moreover, the subject of several actions for annulment currently pending before the General Court. See, in that connection, Electrawinds Shabla South v Council (T‑759/22), Vermilion Energy Netherlands and Others v Council (T‑775/22), Vermilion Exploration and Production Ireland and Vermilion Energy Ireland v Council (T‑795/22), ExxonMobil Producing Netherlands and Mobil Erdgas Erdöl v Council (T‑802/22), and Petrogas E&P Netherlands v Council (T‑803/22).
5 Those two cases raise, in part, questions identical or similar to that referred in the present case, in particular regarding the provisions of Regulation 2022/1854 relating to the temporary solidarity contribution and to equivalent national measures.
6 Regulation of 20 December 2006 establishing the statistical classification of economic activities NACE Revision 2 and amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 3037/90 as well as certain EC Regulations on specific statistical domains (OJ 2006 L 393, p. 1).
7 Ordinary supplement to GURI No 303, of 29 December 2022.
8 GURI No 21 of 27 January 2022.
9 The courts in question are the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Lazio (Regional Administrative Court, Lazio, Italy), the Corte di Giustizia Tributaria di primo grado di Messina (Tax Court of First Instance, Messina, Italy) and the Corte di Giustizia Tributaria di primo grado di Trieste (Tax Court of First Instance, Trieste, Italy).
10 The companies Acea Produzione SpA, Andromeda PV Srl, Breva Wind Srl, Calabria Solar Srl, ERG Eolica Adriatica Srl, ERG Eolica Faeto Srl, Erg Eolica Ginestra Srl, ERG Solar Piemonte 3 Srl, ISAB Energy Solare Srl, Esso Italiana Srl, Engie Italia SpA, Engie Global Markets, Meltemi Energia Srl, Tamoil Italia SpA, Engycalor Energia Calore Srl, Energie SpA, B&G Servizi Rete ed Extrarete Srl and SOM SpA were parties to the proceedings before that court. The companies Olimpia Srl a socio unico and Verona Service Srl and the President of the Council of Ministers lodged a statement in intervention with that court.
11 The referring court refers, in particular, to recitals 11, 13 to 15, 50 to 59 and 64 and 65 of Regulation 2022/1854.
12 The referring court refers, in particular, recitals 6 to 11, 14 and 15 of Regulation 2022/1854.
13 The referring court refers, in particular, to recitals 6, 11, 12, 14, 46, 50 and 51 of Regulation 2022/1854.
14 By way of illustration, the referring court refers to the July 2023 report of the Ministry of Environment and Energy Security on the national energy situation in 2022. It follows from that report that the difference between the prices paid by companies in Italy and the average prices observed in the European Union rose, in the case of electricity, from 114.2 percentage points in 2020 to 145.8 in 2022 and, in the case of natural gas, from 86 points in 2021 to 115 in 2022. The report also reveals that Italian households bore an additional cost of 125.9 percentage points in the case of electricity and 115 points in the case of natural gas compared to the EU average. Lastly, the prices paid by companies rose in 2022 as compared to 2021 by 72.8% in the case of electricity and 163.6% in the case of natural gas, while fuel prices also increased sharply.
15 The referring court states, in that regard, that, according to the Gestore dei servizi energetici (energy services provider, Italy), those activities represented, respectively, only 1.16% and 8.34% of the national energy mix.
16 As is apparent from the order for reference, the revenues obtained on the basis of a scope identical to that provided for in Regulation 2022/1854 would have been about two times lower than those generated by the measure adopted by the national legislature.
17 Namely Acea Produzione, Andromeda PV, Esso Italiana, Engie Italia, Tamoil Italia, Engycalor Energia Calore, Energie, B&G Servizi Rete ed Extrarete and SOM.
18 See judgment of 11 June 2026, Centro Petroli Roma (C‑386/24, EU:C:2026:471, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).
19 See judgment of 11 June 2026, Centro Petroli Roma (C‑386/24, EU:C:2026:471, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).
20 As stated in point 18 of this Opinion, it is apparent from the order for reference that the Italian legislature extended the scope of the measure at issue in the main proceedings beyond the operators referred to in Article 14 of Regulation 2022/1854 by including in it producers, resellers and importers in the electricity sector and operators acting downstream of petroleum and gas distribution, such as resellers, importers and distributors in the sector.
21 I would point out, in this regard, that, unlike in Varo Energy Belgium and Others (C‑358/24), in which the Grondwettelijk Hof (Constitutional Court, Belgium) is uncertain, in the context of its second question for a preliminary ruling, as to the interpretation of Article 14 of Regulation 2022/1854 for the purpose of assessing the overall compatibility of the equivalent national measure adopted by the Belgian legislature, both in the light of its personal scope and of the calculation method used, the present case is limited to the question of the personal scope of the equivalent national measure established by the Italian legislature pursuant to Article 14(2) of that regulation. See my Opinion in Varo Energy Belgium and Others (C‑358/24, points 60 to 98).
22 See recitals 13 and 14 of Regulation 2022/1854.
23 The revenue cap measure provided for in Article 7 of Regulation 2022/1854 has already given rise to the judgments of 18 December 2025, Electrabel and Others (C‑633/23, EU:C:2025:991), and of 22 January 2026, Secab (C‑423/23, EU:C:2026:32), and to 2Valorise Ham and Others, in which I have recently delivered my Opinion (C‑467/24, EU:C:2026:608).
24 See recital 51 of Regulation 2022/1854.
25 It should be noted, in that regard, that Article 2(21) of Regulation 2022/1854 defines ‘equivalent national measure’ as a legislative, regulatory or administrative measure adopted and published by a Member State by 31 December 2022 which contributes to the affordability of energy.
26 See recital 51 of Regulation 2022/1854.
27 See recitals 6, 9 and 14 of Regulation 2022/1854.
28 In fact, Article 14(2) of Regulation 2022/1854 does not require the equivalent national measure to be identical to the temporary solidarity contribution.
29 That applies also to the amount of the revenues that Member States are called upon to generate through such a measure.
30 I note, in so far as this might be relevant, that the concept of ‘equivalent national measure’ is not employed uniformly in EU law. Depending on the areas concerned, the EU legislature uses related wording, such as ‘equivalent measures’, ‘equivalent technical measures’ or ‘equivalent measures having the same effects’. See, by way of illustration, Directive 2010/31/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the energy performance of buildings (OJ 2010 L 153, p. 13), in particular Articles 14 and 15 thereof; Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (OJ 2010 L 334, p. 17), in particular Articles 14 and 15 thereof; Directive (EU) 2023/1791 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on energy efficiency and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 (OJ 2023 L 231, p. 1), in particular Article 6 thereof, and Regulation (EU) 2024/1747 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Regulations (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 as regards improving the Union’s electricity market design (OJ 2024 L, 2024/1747), in particular Articles 9 and 19d. Those different formulations all refer to an assessment of equivalence essentially based on the effects or results produced by the national measure or the alternative mechanism without, in general, defining the intrinsic characteristics which such a measure or mechanism must display in order to be classified as ‘equivalent’. Article 14 of Regulation 2022/1854 is based, in my view, on a markedly different logic. Although it allows Member States broad discretion in their choice of implementing instrument, it makes recourse to an equivalent national measure subject to a set of specific conditions. Therefore, the equivalence required by that provision cannot be reduced to a purely functional assessment based, notwithstanding its importance, only on the objective pursued or on the effects produced by the national measure. That interpretation is, moreover, supported by the terminology used in Regulation 2022/1854 itself. It distinguishes the ‘equivalent national measures’ referred to in Article 14 thereof from mere ‘national measures’, since the latter expression is used generically in order to designate the various measures that Member States can adopt in the context of the energy crisis, without any particular condition being attached to their content. The same applies, in particular, to the ‘national measures’ referred to in Article 8(1) of that regulation, which may supplement the mechanisms established in the regulation or co-exist with them, without being able to replace them.
31 The possibility of recourse to an equivalent national measure was provided for only as an alternative means for the Member States of pursuing the objectives assigned to the temporary solidarity contribution. However, in the absence of express guidance in that regard, that possibility cannot be interpreted as authorising Member States to depart from the essential elements of the framework defined by the EU legislature.
32 Besides being likely to produce distortions of competition in the internal market by favouring certain producers to the detriment of others – a risk which the EU legislature specifically intended to prevent, as is apparent in particular from recital 11 of Regulation 2022/1854 – such an interpretation would also undermine the very objective of minimum coordination pursued by that regulation. That regulation is founded on the identification, at EU level, of a common set of minimum sectors which are to be subject to a temporary solidarity contribution intended to address the exceptional circumstances affecting the energy market. Allowing Member States to deviate from that set of sectors where they choose to adopt an ‘equivalent’ national measure would amount to conferring an advantage on Member States having recourse to the possibility provided for in Article 14(2) of that regulation over those applying the temporary solidarity contribution directly, even though that possibility is intended solely to ensure functional equivalence between the two mechanisms.
33 Although the exhaustive nature of the list of sectors contained in Article 14(1) of Regulation 2022/1854 has given rise to divergent positions adopted by the parties in their written observations and was also discussed at the hearing, I consider that it is not, on its own, conclusive for resolving the present case.
34 I observe, in that regard, that recital 63 of Regulation 2022/1854 does not preclude sectors other than the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors from being subject to an equivalent national measure. The same applies to recitals 6 to 11, 14 and 15 of that regulation, to which the national court refers in its question for a preliminary ruling, which highlight the need for a joint, coordinated effort at EU level and the consequential obligations for the Member States.
35 See, by way of illustration, regarding the revenue cap measure, Article 8(1)(a) and (c) of Regulation 2022/1854, which provides that Member States may maintain or introduce measures that further limit the market revenues of producers generating electricity from the sources listed in Article 7(1) of that regulation.
36 I note, in that regard, that Article 122(1) TFEU authorises the Council to adopt ‘measures appropriate to the economic situation’ if severe difficulties arise in the supply of certain products, notably in the area of energy.
37 Such legislative interventions would, in fact, have been founded on other legal bases, such as Article 115 and Article 194(3) TFEU. For example, Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU (OJ 2019 L 158, p. 125) and Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity (OJ 2019 L 158, p. 54), which aim to establish a general framework governing the overall functioning of the electricity market, have been adopted on the basis of Article 194 TFEU on the Union policy on energy.
38 I note, moreover, that, even in the case of sectors falling within the scope of the temporary solidarity contribution, recital 14 of Regulation 2022/1854 states that that contribution must be applied ‘in parallel to the regular corporate taxes levied by each Member State on the companies concerned’.
39 In the present case, to require the national legislature to adopt two separate legislative instruments covering, first, companies falling within the sectors referred to in Article 14(1) of Regulation 2022/1854 and, second, companies not falling within those sectors in order for those measures to be compatible with the Regulation would, in my view, be excessively formalistic.
40 It follows from the order for reference that the objective pursued by the Italian temporary solidarity contribution consists precisely in mitigating the effects of the increase in prices and tariffs in the energy sector for companies and consumers, in accordance with Article 1(115) of Law No 197. It is also not disputed that that national provision covers activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors, as laid down in Article 14 of Regulation 2022/1854. Lastly, Article 1(116) of that law establishes a taxable base and a contribution rate analogous to those provided for by the temporary solidarity contribution established by that regulation.
41 As stated in points 57 to 60 of this Opinion, the measure at issue in the main proceedings may be classified as an ‘equivalent national measure’ only with regard to the application of the solidarity contribution to companies in the sectors referred to in Article 14 of Regulation 2022/1854.
42 It is also apparent from the first report from the Commission to the Council concerning the temporary solidarity contribution and the equivalent measures adopted that, within the group of eight Member States which have enacted an equivalent national measure, six have extended its application to economic sectors other than those referred to in Article 14 of Regulation 2022/1854, such as the banking sector (in the Czech Republic), food and retail (in Portugal), and the sale of oil derivatives and other activities in the energy sector (in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary). The Italian legislature, for its part, adopted a pre-existing national measure in the fiscal year 2022 before amending it for the fiscal year 2023 in order to take into account the requirements of that regulation. Thus, like Italy, a number of Member States also imposed a contribution from surplus profits made by companies operating in sectors other than those expressly referred to in Article 14 of that regulation. See, in that regard, report of the Commission to the Council of 30 November 2023, entitled ‘Report on Chapter III of [Regulation 2022/1854]. Solidarity contribution and enacted equivalent measures: stocktaking’ [COM(2023) 768 final], in particular, p. 7.
43 See point 27 of this Opinion.
44 According to recital 63 of Regulation 2022/1854, the objective of an equivalent national measure should be deemed similar to the overall objective of the temporary solidarity contribution set by that regulation when it consists of contributing ‘to the affordability of energy’ for consumers. In the present case, that indeed seems to be the objective pursued by the extension of the scope of the measure at issue in the main proceedings to the surplus profits made by companies active in the electricity production sector or by other operators in the energy sector beyond just those carrying out activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal or refinery sectors.
45 As is apparent from the order for reference, the measure at issue in the main proceedings seems to generate revenues higher than those which would have resulted from the application of the temporary solidarity contribution provided for in Regulation 2022/1854 if it had been limited only to surplus profits made by Union companies and permanent establishments carrying out, in Italy, activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors.
46 See judgment of 22 December 2022, Airbnb Ireland and Airbnb Payments UK (C‑83/21, EU:C:2022:1018, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
47 See point 19 of this Opinion. Moreover, as is apparent from the order for reference, those producers were only simultaneously subject to the temporary solidarity contribution and the revenue cap measure in respect of December 2022.
48 I would point out in that regard that the purpose of Article 8(2) of Regulation 2022/1854 is to frame the discretion available to the Member States in implementing the revenue cap mechanism. That provision seeks, in particular, to ensure that, when a Member State chooses to introduce or maintain national measures further limiting market revenues, the cap adopted is not set arbitrarily and that the fundamental principles of EU energy law are safeguarded. See, in that regard, my Opinion in 2Valorise Ham and Others (C‑467/24, EU:C:2026:608, points 86 and 123).
49 I note, in that regard, that there is nothing in the order for reference to suggest that the measure at issue in the main proceedings does not fulfil the conditions laid down in Article 8(2) of Regulation 2022/1854. I would add that compliance with those conditions must be assessed in the light of the specific circumstances of the present case and not in the abstract. It is therefore for the referring court to verify whether those conditions have actually been fulfilled in the dispute in the main proceedings. To that end, it is for that court to examine, in particular, whether the combination of the national measure at issue in the main proceedings with the revenue capping mechanism applicable to the producers concerned enabled them, first, to cover and recover their operating costs and, second, to ensure a profitability level in accordance with the expectations of a reasonable investor, in order to avoid any unfavourable effects on investments. See, in that regard, my Opinion in 2Valorise Ham and Others (C‑467/24, EU:C:2026:608, point 87).