24.11.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 283/15

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Landesarbeitsgericht Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Germany) lodged on 10 September 2007 — Kathrin Haase, Adolf Oberdorfer, Doreen Kielon, Peter Schulze, Peter Kliem, Dietmar Bössow, Helge Riedel, André Richter, Andreas Schneider v Superfast Ferries SA, Superfast OKTO Maritime Company, Baltic SF VIII LTD

(Case C-413/07)

(2007/C 283/29)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landesarbeitsgericht Mecklenburg-Vorpommern

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Kathrin Haase, Adolf Oberdorfer, Doreen Kielon, Peter Schulze, Peter Kliem, Dietmar Bössow, Helge Riedel, André Richter, Andreas Schneider

Defendants: Superfast Ferries SA, Superfast OKTO Maritime Company, Baltic SF VIII LTD.

Questions referred

1.

Must Article 19(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 (1) be interpreted as meaning that, for employees engaged to work on a particular ship and exclusively working on that particular ship, the ship itself is to be considered as the place where the employee habitually carries out his work?

2.

Must Article 19(2)(a) be interpreted as meaning that — at least in a situation in which the ship that is to be considered as the place of work is not used exclusively or predominantly in the territorial waters of any one country, but for international transport services, such as, in the present case, for regular passenger services between Germany and Finland — the court for the home port or for the port of registry in the country under whose flag the ship sails is to be considered as the court for the habitual place of work?

3.

Must it be assumed that an employee who works exclusively on a particular ship used for international transport services does not habitually carry out his work in any one country and that, therefore, Article 19(2)(b) rather than Article 19(2)(a) has to be applied for the purposes of determining which court — in a country other than the country where the employee is domiciled — has jurisdiction?

4.

If so, must Article 19(2)(b) be interpreted as meaning that the place where the business which engaged the employee is situated can also be an office located in one of the ports regularly visited by the ship, even though it is not operated by the employer itself but by another company entrusted by the employer — by way of a management contract — with organising in its capacity as ‘operator’ the commercial and technical running of its ships, and that company employs, in that office, a ‘crew manager’ who is responsible, inter alia, for coordinating the personnel's assignments, even though employment contracts were not concluded in that office but on the ship by the ship's captain, but where the office was used to issue duty rosters and to receive certificates of incapacity to work and by the ‘crew manager’ working there to give notices of termination of employment ?

5.

If question 4 is to be answered in the affirmative:

a)

Can the purchaser of the ship whose crew members were able, pursuant to Article 19(2)(b), to sue their former employer in the court for the place in which the business which engaged the employee was situated be sued in the same court simply on the basis that the employees who were given notice claim that their contracts of employment were transferred to the purchaser in accordance with provisions on the transfer of undertakings in the national law they claim ought to be applied?

b)

If an action is also brought against the ‘operator’ — identified in question 4 — who gave the notice, can this action be brought in the same court as the action against the former employer?

(1)  OJ L 12, 16.1.2001, p. 1.