C_2010328EN.01001603.xml

4.12.2010

Official Journal of the European Union

C 328/16

Appeal brought on 21 September 2010 by Luigi Marcuccio against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 6 July 2010 in Case T-401/09 Marcuccio v Court of Justice

(Case C-460/10 P)

()

2010/C 328/31

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: Luigi Marcuccio (represented by: G. Cipressa, lawyer)

Other party to the proceedings: Court of Justice of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

—	set aside in its entirety and without exception the order of 6 July 2010 of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) in Case T-401/09 Marcuccio v Court of Justice.

—	declare that the action at first instance, in relation to which the order under appeal was made, was admissible in its entirety and without exception;

—

allow in its entirety and without any exception whatsoever the relief sought at first instance and order the defendant at first instance to reimburse the appellant in respect of all costs, disbursements and fees incurred by him in relation to all proceedings, including the present appeal proceedings;

—	in the alternative, refer the case back to the court at first instance, sitting in a different formation, for a fresh decision.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The order under appeal is unlawful, on the following grounds, inter alia: (a) incorrect and unreasonable interpretation and application of the principle of law relating to Aquilian liability and illogical and unreasoned failure to have regard to the relevant case-law of the European Union; (b) total failure to state reasons, manifest error of assessment, distortion of facts, incomplete and incorrect assessment of the evidence adduced by the appellant, infringement of the the obligation of clare loqui and irrelevant, self-evident, arbitrary, illogical, irrational and unreasonable reasoning; (c) failure to rule on fundamental aspects of the case and total absence of preliminary enquiries; (d) failure to comply with the duty on the part of the court to base its rulings, including in relation to its assessment of the evidence, on the concepts of common knowledge, experience and feeling; (e) incorrect and unreasonable interpretation and application of the rules of law relating to the burden of proof.