20.6.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 141/9


Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 2 April 2009 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Corte d’appello di Milano (Italy)) — Marco Gambazzi v DaimlerChrysler Canada Inc., CIBC Mellon Trust Company

(Case C-394/07) (1)

(Brussels Convention - Recognition and enforcement of judgments - Grounds for refusal - Infringement of public policy in the State in which enforcement is sought - Exclusion of the defendant from the proceedings before the court of the State of origin because of failure to comply with a court order)

2009/C 141/13

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte d'appello di Milano

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Marco Gambazzi

Defendants: DaimlerChrysler Canada Inc., CIBC Mellon Trust Company

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Corte d'appello di Milano — Interpretation of Articles 26 and 27(1) of the Brussels Convention — Decision whose recognition is contrary to public policy in the State in which enforcement is sought — Decision preventing one of the parties from presenting a defence (‘debarment’) because of failure to comply with a court order

Operative part of the judgment

Article 27(1) of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, as amended by the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, by the Convention of 25 October 1982 on the Accession of the Hellenic Republic, by the Convention of 26 May 1989 on the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic, and by the Convention of 29 November 1996 on the Accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden, is to be interpreted as follows:

the court of the State in which enforcement is sought may take into account, with regard to the public policy clause referred to in that article, the fact that the court of the State of origin ruled on the applicant’s claims without hearing the defendant, who entered appearance before it but who was excluded from the proceedings by order on the ground that he had not complied with the obligations imposed by an order made earlier in the same proceedings, if, following a comprehensive assessment of the proceedings and in the light of all the circumstances, it appears to it that that exclusion measure constituted a manifest and disproportionate infringement of the defendant’s right to be heard.


(1)  OJ C 283, 24.11.2007.