21.12.2007   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 313/1

1.

The Court's audit of the operational efficiency of the European Central Bank (ECB) is based on Article 27.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of the ECB (1). The audit subject selected for the 2005 financial year audit was the management of the New ECB Premises (NEP) project. The Court also did a follow-up audit of the efficiency of human resources policy at the ECB.

2.

The ECB will build its new premises in Frankfurt on the site of the ‘Grossmarkthalle’ (former wholesale market). The new ECB premises of about 186 000 square metres will combine the historical buildings with an office tower around 185 metres high. The current budget amounts to around 850 million euro, including around 500 million euro for building costs (2).

3.

The Court's audit objective was to assess the operational efficiency of the management of the NEP project and its compliance with the applicable rules. The Court assessed whether the ECB had:

4.

The audit reviewed the period from September 2001 to August 2006 but excluded the competition for the selection of the building design and the technical aspects of the specifications established by the ECB. The audit also took into consideration subsequent developments of the NEP project.

5.

The established organisational structure for the NEP project allowed the ECB to meet its current needs. This structure was established before the final decision to build, including detailed building specifications, was taken in December 2005.

6.

In 2001, project completion was initially planned for the third quarter of 2008. Since then completion has been postponed to the end of 2011 (3). This is mainly due to the introduction of two phases not originally foreseen: a Revision Phase and an Optimisation Phase. The Revision Phase lasted 10 months followed by an Optimisation Phase of 13 months in which 30 % cost reduction was achieved. However, the delay in the project completion leads to additional renting cost.

7.

The ECB has developed and implemented an appropriate and coherent monitoring, control and reporting strategy.

8.

Regarding risk management, while a risk management framework has been established, some weaknesses have been noted in the risk register. By August 2006, the Court had reviewed the register on risks that was established for the NEP project, detailing for each item a description, potential impact, action, owner and status. The ECB had ranked more than 100 potential risks in the risk register with levels from 1 (low impact and low probability) to 25 (high impact and high probability).

9.

This register did not always provide a clear view of the most risky items, the likelihood of their occurrence and the timeframe: the risks were not always formulated in a coherent way and were sometimes mixed up with sub-risks (4). Furthermore, the various reputation risks were dispersed across the risk register, sometimes with a relatively low ranking (5), and on a number of occasions only a sub-risk was listed in the register or the main risk was omitted.

10.

The general ECB procurement rules and procedures applied for the procurement activities associated with the NEP project were adequate. However, these rules did not provide for a formal appeal procedure and did not define the criteria for excluding abnormally low offers. Although the ECB strives to meet the requirements of the EU Directive (6), the thresholds were not systematically updated according to the requirements of the Directive.

11.

In general, NEP procurements did comply with ECB rules and procedures, but the scoring was sometimes unclear and was based on sub-criteria that were not explicitly foreseen as evaluation criteria. Furthermore, while most exemptions are duly authorised and substantiated, there were cases where the justification for the exemption was questionable or not formally documented.

12.

For a number of tenders, there is no evidence available that best value for money was always achieved. In some of these tenders, the exact scope of services tendered was not sufficiently clear, the offers showed high deviations and the tenderers selected for negotiations were later allowed to significantly change their offers.

13.

The Court found weaknesses in the ECB's controls of procurements related to the work of external consultants. In one case, the controls performed by the ECB on the scoring of the offers were not traceable. In another case, the procurement process was mainly conducted by the external project manager whereas the ECB's participation was not clearly evidenced.

14.

While the initial timing for project completion was too optimistic, overall, the ECB has established an adequate organisational structure to meet its current needs and managed to significantly reduce the overall cost estimate. The ECB has set up an appropriate monitoring, control and reporting framework for the NEP project. Although a specific risk management framework was set up for the NEP project, some weaknesses concerning the risk register were found. The main project weaknesses were noted in the execution of NEP procurements since in some cases the ECB's procurement rules and procedures were not fully respected.

15.

The Court recommends that the ECB should:

16.

The Court carried out a follow-up audit to its 2004 audit of the efficiency of human resources policy at the ECB.

17.

Significant progress has been made regarding the global HR framework, notably with the definition of an HR communication strategy. Other issues were still in the process of implementation, such as the definition of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for all business areas. Furthermore, the new release of the IT system to enhance the reliability and completeness of the data on staff leave and absences has been delayed to 2008. Some specific guidelines and procedures were not yet established, such as the guidelines for part-time work and the rules on disciplinary procedures.