22.5.2010   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 134/25


Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Simvoulio tis Epikratias (Greece) lodged on 11 March 2010 — Navtiliaki Etairia Thasou AE v Ipourgos Emborikis Navtilias

(Case C-128/10)

2010/C 134/38

Language of the case: Greek

Referring court

Simvoulio tis Epikratias (Council of State), Greece

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Navtiliaki Etairia Thasou AE

Defendants: Ipourgos Emborikis Navtilias (Minister for Mercantile Marine)

Question referred

Do the provisions of Articles 1, 2 and 4 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 of 7 December 1992 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member States (maritime cabotage) (OJ 1992 L 364, p. 7), interpreted in accordance with the principle of freedom to provide services, allow national schemes to be adopted, whereby shipowners cannot provide cabotage services without a prior administrative authorisation, when: (a) the purpose of the authorisation system in question is to allow verification of whether, in light of the prevailing conditions in a specific port, the schedules declared by the shipowner can be implemented under conditions of safety for the ship and maintenance of order in the port and verification of the ability of the scheduled vessel to enter a specific port unhindered at the time declared by the shipowner as the preferred time for a specific service without, however, determination in advance in a legal rule of the criteria on the basis of which the authorities rule on such questions, especially in a case where more than one shipowner is interested in entering the same port at the same time; (b) at the same time, the authorisation system in question constitutes a means of imposing public service obligations, inasmuch as it has in that respect the following features: (i) it applies without exception to all scheduled shipping routes to the islands, (ii) it grants the administrative authority responsible for issuing authorisations the broadest discretionary powers in terms of imposing public service obligations, without determining in advance in a legal rule the criteria for the exercise of those powers and without determining in advance the content of the public service obligations which may be imposed?