5.3.2005 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 57/20 |
Reference for a preliminary ruling by the High Court of Justice (England & Wales), Chancery Division, by order of that court dated 21 December 2004, in the case of Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation against Commissioners of Inland Revenue
(Case C-524/04)
(2005/C 57/35)
Language of procedure: English
Reference has been made to the Court of Justice of the European Communities by order of the High Court of Justice (England & Wales), Chancery Division, dated 21 December 2004, which was received at the Court Registry on 31 December 2004 for a preliminary ruling in the case of Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation and Commissioners of Inland Revenue on the following questions:
1. |
Is it contrary to Article 43, 49 or 56 EC for a Member State (‘the State of the borrowing company’) to keep in force and apply provisions such as those in sections 209, 212 and schedule 28AA of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (‘the national provisions’) which impose restrictions upon the ability of a company resident in that Member State (‘the borrowing company’) to deduct for tax purposes interest on loan finance granted by a direct or indirect parent company resident in another Member State in circumstances where the borrowing company would not be subject to such restrictions if the parent company had been resident in the State of the borrowing company? |
2. |
What difference, if any, does it make to the answer to Question 1:
|
3. |
Would it make any difference to the answers to Questions 1 and 2 if it could be shown that the borrowing constituted an abuse of rights or was part of an artificial arrangement designed to circumvent the tax law of the Member State of the borrowing company? If so, what guidance does the Court of Justice think it appropriate to provide as to what constitutes such an abuse or artificial arrangement in the context of cases such as the present? |
4. |
If there is a restriction on the movement of capital between Member States and third countries within article 56 EC, did that restriction exist on 31 December 1993 for the purposes of article 57 EC? |
5. |
In the event that any of the matters referred to in questions 1 or 2 are contrary to Articles 43, 49 or 56 EC, then in circumstances where the borrowing company, or other companies in the borrowing company's group (‘the Claimants’) make the following claims:
|
6. |
In the event that the answer to any part of Question 5 is that the claims are claims for payment of an amount representing a benefit unduly denied:
|
7. |
Does it make any difference whether as a matter of domestic law the claims referred to in Question 6 are brought as restitutionary claims or are brought or have to be brought as claims for damages? |
8. |
What guidance, if any, does the Court of Justice think it appropriate to provide in the present cases as to which circumstances the national court ought to take into consideration when it comes to determine whether there is a sufficiently serious breach within the meaning of the judgment in Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pecheur and Factortame, in particular as to whether, given the state of the case law on the interpretation of the relevant Community provisions, the breach was excusable? |
9. |
As a matter of principle, can there be a direct causal link (within the meaning of the judgment in Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pecheur and Factortame) between any breach of Articles 43, 49 and 56 EC and losses falling into the categories identified in Question 5(a)-(h) that are claimed to flow from it? If so, what guidance, if any, does the Court of Justice think it appropriate to provide as to the circumstances which the national court should take into account in determining whether such a direct causal link exists? |
10. |
In determining the loss or damage for which reparation may be granted, is it open to the national court to have regard to the question of whether injured persons showed reasonable diligence in order to avoid or limit their loss, in particular by availing themselves of legal remedies which could have established that the national provisions did not (by reason of the application of double taxation conventions) have the effect of imposing the restrictions set out in Question 1? Is the answer to this question affected by the beliefs of the parties at the relevant times as to the effect of the double taxation conventions? |