European Commission

Study on climate finance reporting, including methodological issues, producing overview information and assessing emerging requirements

Final report

August 2016

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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016

ISBN 978-92-79-63280-8
doi:10.2834/422987

www.oeko.de

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Reference° CLIMA.A.2/ETU/2015/0011

Berlin, 24.08.2016

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Acknowledgements:

The project team thanks the European Commission for providing a large amount of materials and documents to the project team as well as explanations and clarifications which strongly facilitated the assessment conducted in this report.

Disclaimer:

The content of this report does not necessarily reflect the official opinions of the European Commission or other institutions of the European Union, but solely represents the findings of the project team that was tasked with the project.

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List of Abbreviations

BR	Biennial Report
BR2	Second Biennial Report
CB	Capacity Building
CCAC	Climate and Clean Air Coalition
CDR	Central Data Repository (of Eionet)
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CION	European Commission
COP	Conference of the Parties
CITES	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
CTCN	Climate Technology Centre & Network
CTF	Common Tabular Format
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DEG	Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft
DFI	Development Finance Institution
DG	Directorate General
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EDF	European Development Fund
EIB	European Investment Bank
EPPO	European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
LEAP	Livestock Environmental Assessment and Performance Partnership (under the FAO)
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GHG	Greenhouse gas
IAEA-TCF	International Atomic Energy Agency – Technical Cooperation Fund
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

ICESDF	Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing
ICRAF	International Council for Research in Agroforestry (now: World Agroforestry Centre)
IDA	International Development Association
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IISD-GSI	International Institute for Sustainable Development – Global Subsidies Initiative
IMC	Imputed Multilateral Contribution
IRENA	International Renewable Energy Agency
ITL	International Transaction Log
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
LCR	Low Carbon Resilient
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MMR	Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on a mechanism for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and for reporting other information at national and Union level relevant to climate change and repealing Decision No 280/2004/EC)
MRV	Measurement, Reporting and Verification or Monitoring, Reporting and Verification – the abbreviation is used in both contexts under the UNFCCC
MS	Member State (of the European Union)
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OOF	Other Official Flows
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
TT	Technology Transfer
UN	United Nations
UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNDOCO	United Nations Development Operations Coordination Office
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNF	United Nations Foundation

UNFCCC	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund / today: United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UN-REDD	United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
WFP	United Nations World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

Abstract

The analysis of Member States' reports on provision of financial, technological and capacity building support to developing countries under Article 16 of the EU Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) due by 30 September 2015 and their second biennial reports (BR2) under the UNFCCC due by 1 January 2016 revealed significant differences in the reported finance figures for many countries and showed that there are still considerable inconsistencies in the methodologies used despite past progress in improving monitoring and reporting of climate finance. This also impacts the quality of the aggregation of data at EU level.

A considerable number of improvements have been identified that may enhance transparency without putting additional reporting burden on Member States, with an particular focus on the technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support under the MMR.

The status quo of the current research related to reporting of private climate finance in the UNFCC context was undertaken with the objective to identify approaches that can be incorporated in the methodological guidance and subsequent steps to further advance the tracking of private finance.

In addition, based on the analytical findings in this report and the literature assessed, an input to an EU submission on accounting of finance resources provided and mobilized under the UNFCCC was prepared.

1. Executive Summary

DG Climate Action commissioned Öko-Institut e.V. with this "Study on climate finance reporting, including methodological issues, producing overview information and assessing emerging requirements" for assessing and aggregating the information on climate finance received through the various reporting obligations, improving methodological approaches for reporting climate finance and taking stock of the developments in the field after COP 21 in Paris. The study should assist the EU and its Member States (MS) in improving climate finance reporting in terms of consistency, comparability and accuracy as part of the reporting obligations under Article 16 of the EU Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR)[1] and as part of biennial reports under the UNFCCC[2]. The analysis should also contribute to improving consistency, comparability and accuracy of the aggregate reporting of support conducted by DG Climate Action on the basis of MS' reports.

The analysis of Member States' reports on provision of financial, technological and capacity building support to developing countries under Article 16 of the EU Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) due by 30 September 2015[3] and in their second biennial reports (BR2) under the UNFCCC due by 1 January 2016 shows that there are still considerable inconsistencies in the

[1] OJ, L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 13: Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on a mechanism for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and for reporting other information at national and Union level relevant to climate change and repealing Decision No 280/2004/EC.

[2] Reporting obligations for support provided to developing countries are part of UNFCCC decision 2/CP:17, in particular its Annex I (UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties), UNFCCC decision 19/CP.18 (Common tabular format for "UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties") and UNFCCC decision 9/CP.21 (Methodologies for the reporting of financial information by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention)

[3] The due date for reporting under the MMR is by 30 September (Article 16, paragraph 1 of the MMR), however many Member States' provided the reports only by around mid-October in 2015.

methodologies used by Member States despite past progress in improving monitoring and reporting of climate finance. This also impacts the aggregation of data at EU level.

The quantitative analysis of finance reported under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation and as part of the second biennial reports under the UNFCCC revealed significant differences in the reported finance figures for many countries. It is recommended that Member States improve the consistency of the information and data reported under the MMR reports and in their BRs. There is a risk related to the credibility of EU finance data if figures for national climate finance differ between two reports provided in a short time span of several weeks.

While transparency has already been improved in recent years, the analysis shows that there is scope for further improvements and harmonization of definitions, approaches and categorization. A considerable number of improvements have been identified that may enhance transparency without putting additional reporting burden on Member States. Convergence towards common definitions, methodologies and approaches would also improve consistency and comparability and facilitate the aggregation of finance data at EU level.

The reporting of imputed multilateral contributions for the estimation of climate-specific multilateral finance is complex and needs further discussion in the EU. In this area, the report does not provide a single specific recommendation, but decision trees that can guide further decision-making related the approach to be implemented in the EU.

It is important that further improvements and changes are implemented in a coordinated way in the EU, as part of the ongoing work under the OECD DAC and in the negotiations under the UNFCCC. This report tried to take into account recent improvements decided under the UNFCCC as well as methodological work conducted in the OECD DAC. In the section on recommendations, the report provides a complete overview of potential recommendations and proposals related to finance reporting without differentiating whether such improvements are more appropriate to be implemented as part of EU guidance or OECD guidance.

The findings and recommendations presented in this report were also compiled in a synthesis report “Recommendations related to the technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation Synthesis Report”. The recommendations of a first draft of this synthesis report were discussed at a Workshop of ECCWG-EGI on 11 March 2016 and Member States also provided written feedback to the report. This version of the report the comments received from Member States and from OECD were incorporated. In addition, Greece and Slovenia provided their 2nd biennial report to the UNFCCC in March; hence these two countries were added to the comparative analysis presented in this report. The document “Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support under the MMR” as well as the related reporting tables were adapted to reflect those proposals for improvements on which Member States generally agreed in their feedback to the proposals in the synthesis report.

Task 3 of this study focuses on the key methodological developments in terms of tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions and provides a state of ply of methodological work and discussions on private climate finance.

While several public and private, national and international entities are making efforts into developing methodologies for and actually tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions, the Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance (further referred to

as OECD Research Collaborative) has developed a methodological proposal which compiles state of the art approaches proposed by such entities.

In addition, the chapter also notes parallel but convergent work being done by the MDBs and other development banks and institutions. Their work, however, goes beyond tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions, as it includes all co-finance, public or private, mobilized by the intervention of the MDBs and development banks. While not specific on mobilized private climate finance, the approach to tracking mobilized co-finance is relevant for the scope of this task. MDBs and other development banks and institutions have also been involved in the OECD Research Collaborative.

This chapter does not focus or include figures on private finance mobilized by public interventions, as it focuses exclusively on methodologies to that end.

The steps proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative C framework are considered to be well sequenced. In order to facilitate getting a better idea of the potential for mobilized private finance and while noting that fully implementing the framework might take longer, MS could be requested to, shortly, perform stages 1 and 2. In doing so, each MS would have a clear mapping of all the organizations deploying public instruments to mobilize private climate finance. After such exercise, MS could start collecting data, eventually giving priority to those entities and/or instruments which may have a greater potential for mobilizing private climate finance or, alternatively, to those which pose lesser challenges in data collection and handling. This would constitute a stepwise approach, which would progressively bring MS to the same level of preparedness. Those ready to move faster should be encouraged to do so. The work available on definitions related to private finance seems mature related to the definition of public and private finance. Related to the monitoring of the finance mobilized by public interventions, the causality between the public intervention and the finance mobilized is difficult to assess and there does not seem to be enough confidence and knowledge at the time to opt for something different to blanket causality. Related to attribution of finance mobilized to the specific public interventions, in order to avoid gaps or overlaps, there should be an effort to harmonize approaches, but only in relation to the participants involved in the same instrument. With regards to boundaries to the causality and consequent attribution of mobilized private finance to a given public intervention (e.g. related to time), there is an interest in allowing for different approaches to be tested in order to gain more experience and develop stronger methodological guidance on the matter.

Tracking private finance is no simple endeavour. But there are several organizations that do it from different perspectives, using different methodologies and with different scopes and purposes. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)(through the Coordinated Direct Investment Survey) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (in the annual World Investment Report) have the most extensive and reputed exercise in this regards. But there are others, namely some carried out by private entities, such as the Financial Times with the Financial Times FDI report which captures greenfield investments (new investments in the real economy, which climate relevant investments would be expected to be) and already tracks specific investments in the renewable energy sector. These three approaches were chosen due to their perceived comprehensiveness and credibility and also as a representation of different approaches and scopes. Their inclusion in this report is a mere illustration of specific efforts to collect data on foreign direct investments and do not constitute a proposal to use them for collection of data on climate relevant foreign direct investment mobilized by public interventions. While these exercises are interesting, they are far from being directly useful for the purpose of collecting data on climate relevant private finance mobilized by public instruments. Firstly, because they lack the tools to

identify the relevant public instruments and to establish the causality between such instruments and the private finance mobilized. And secondly, because these exercises do not have the tools to mark the investments as climate relevant in accordance with the relevant methodologies. Current approaches to the attribution of investments to a specific economy sector fall very short of providing a clear signal of climate relevance. If this is very true for mitigation, it is even very much more so for adaptation.

Task 3 also looked at MRV of incentives to and enabling environments for private climate finance. There is ample experience is assessing a given country's friendliness to investment, in particular to private investment. This experience has already been expanded to assess, in a pilot phase only in 17 countries, the enabling environments (friendliness) to investments on sustainable energy (RISE). When this has been done, it seems reasonable to expect that it should be feasible to identify a set of indicators to characterize the relevant enabling environment for climate relevant investments, both in terms of mitigation as well as of adaptation. Plenty of work on that front has already been done, including at the UNFCCC level.

Given that readiness for climate relevant investments cannot be considered in isolation from overall investment friendliness, it seems advisable that any such assessment would take into account the overall investment environment in a given country. In this regard, the climate relevant investment readiness assessment should be a subset, a spin-off of a larger investments environment assessment, such as the Doing Business Report described above, and build upon already existing relevant initiatives such as RISE.

Macro-indicators to be measured in such a specific climate relevant investments friendliness assessment could include:

- The existence of an officially approved Nationally Determined Contribution
- The inclusion of a mitigation component within the NDC
- The inclusion of an adaptation component within the NDC
- The adoption of a low emissions development plan, including detailed mitigation action (with estimated emissions reduction potential)
- The adoption of a national adaptation plan with detailed adaptation measures
- Institutional capacity for implementation of climate policy is established
- Appropriate industry conditions, such as engineering expertise and the enabling infrastructure are present
- A stable financial sector with capacity to support low carbon (development) is present
- Economic instruments that translate policy targets into price incentives that make low carbon technologies more attractive are present

While the collection of the data required to assess climate relevant investment enabling environments could be done via biennial reports to the UNFCCC, it does not seem feasible to adopt guidance on such collection with the required level of detail. Therefore, it is apparently more effective to undertake such an endeavour close but outside the formal UNFCCC process.

In task 4 it had been agreed with DG Climate Action that the study should provide an input for the EU submission on accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions for which a mandate was provided at the 44th session of SBSTA. The submission is due by 29 August 2016 should consider several questions outlined in the SBSTA conclusions:

(a) What are the existing modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions, and what are the challenges and information gaps with respect to these existing modalities;

(b) What accounting modalities need to be developed to serve the Paris Agreement, in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Agreement, and what are the challenges to the development of these accounting modalities and how can these be addressed;

(c) How to ensure that accounting modalities are developed in time to be integrated into the transparency framework established under the Paris Agreement.

In the input under task 4, the existing modalities and definitions used as part of the OECD DAC framework were described as well as the arrangements and methodologies agreed as part of the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR in the EU. Challenges and gaps of the current reporting are summarized taken up some of the findings of this study, but also addressing more general challenges such as the need to not only track global climate finance flows, but also the effectiveness of the use of these flows to achieve the purposes of the Paris agreement. Related to the question what accounting modalities need to be developed to serve the Paris agreement, the principles defined as part of the Paris agreement have been assessed in general terms how they are applicable to the reporting on climate finance.

2. Introduction and background

2.1. Objectives of the project

The study should help the EU and its Member States to improve climate finance reporting. This project aims at providing support for assessing and aggregating the information received through the MMR and BR2 reporting obligations of EU MS to improve methodological approaches for reporting climate finance and take stock of the developments in the field after Paris.

By providing an overview on certain aspects, comparing reporting submitted to different fora and testing alternative approaches, it shall help to get a clearer picture on the best approaches in this field.

Beyond the important methodological aspects described below, the results of this project should contribute to an accurate accounting of the EU's climate support to developing countries, thus strengthening the EU's position towards its negotiation counterparts.

2.2. Background / current system for MRV of support

For EU Member States, two reporting requirements exist to provide information on climate finance:

- their annual reports under Article 16 of Regulation No 525/2013 on a mechanism for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and for reporting other information at national and Union level relevant to climate change (MMR) in accordance with requirement under UNFCCC[4],
- and biennial reports (BR) including the provision of information on climate finance under the UNFCCC in accordance with UNFCCC decision 2/CP.171F5 and decision 19/CP.182F6.

UNFCCC decision 9/CP.21 on "methodologies for the reporting of financial information by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention" which was adopted in Paris includes a number of changes to the common tabular format (CTF) as part of the "UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties". These changes need to be incorporated in the reporting tables used under the MMR pursuant to Article 16, paragraph 1 of the MMR. Specific changes arising from this decision were integrated into the recommendations presented in this report in section 7.2**.**.

Furthermore, methodologies have been agreed under the OECD DAC for the reporting of official development aid (ODA) which also includes climate finance. However, they often do not correspond to the reporting requirements under the UNFCCC or the MMR. Also, not all EU MS are members of the OECD DAC[7].

Further recommendations to refine reporting methodologies on climate finance are included in the OECD/CPI report (OECD 2015a) and methodologies to account for mobilised private climate finance have been proposed by the Swiss Technical Working Group in their recommendations to the OECD/CPI report (Technical Working Group 2015).

2.3. Structure of this report

This report outlines progress made on all tasks of the work programme, describes key questions and challenges under each task and envisaged conclusions. Furthermore, it is structured according to the overall structure of the final report to be written for this project.

This report starts with an introduction (section 2). It then presents results from task 1 (section 3**.**) of the work programme of the commissioned project. Task 2a is presented in chapter 4 and task 2b in section 5. The text has been incorporated from the synthesis report in chapters 4 and 5 to avoid different messages and inconsistencies between the two versions of the report. Task 3, related to private finance, is presented in chapter 6 and has been amended in this final report based on the guidance provided by DG Climate Action. Task 4 has been added in chapter 7. It is followed by a bibliography (8) and an annex (9) with country-specific and overview tables of the analysed data and other documents. The quantitative data has been updated based on the feedback received

[4] OJ L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 13

[5] Decision 2/CP.17 on the Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention contained in FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1

[6] Decision 19/CP.18 on a Common tabular format for "UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties" contained in FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.3, p. 3

[7] Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania are not part of the OECD

from MS after the presentation of the synthesis report and incorporating second biennial reports from Greece and Slovenia in this report.

3. Task 1: Assessment of Member States information on climate finance reported under the MMR

3.1. Objectives and approach

In task 1 the project team has supported DG Climate Action in aggregating and synthesizing the information on financial and technology support provided to developing countries reported by Member States under Article 16 of the MMR via ReportNet by the end of September 2015.[8]

3.2. Timeliness of MMR reporting

In 2015 18 Member States provided their submissions under Article 16 of the MMR within the deadline of 30 September to the EIONET CDR ReportNet website where the data is stored. Seven Member States reported within one week of delay (BG, DK, IT, LU, LV, SI, SE), two Member States were less than two weeks delayed (FR and PL) and one Member State (DE) reported by 21.10.2015. A considerable number of clarifications were necessary from Member States to ensure a correct aggregation of total EU figures and some Member States provided revised submissions after clarifying questions were sent to them. Cyprus provided a submission, but did not report any climate finance in its report.

Table 3-1 Timeliness of reporting under Article 16 of the MMR in 2015

Reports available within deadline (30.9.)	Reports available within 1 week after deadline	Reports available within 2 weeks after deadline	Reports available within 3 weeks after deadline
18 MS	7 MS	2 MS	1 MS

While most Member States reported within the deadline or even before the deadline (e.g. BE, CY), **it is very important for a timely aggregation and reporting at EU level that all Member States provide their submissions within the due date of end of September.** The reported figures are used to produce aggregate numbers of EU climate finance provided to developing countries which is used by the Commission and EU heads at the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties. In 2016, COP 22 will start by 7 November and reporting delays as in 2015 would make it very difficult to present aggregate EU figures at the next COP.

In order to present aggregate figures and relevant details on EU finance in 2014, the project team collected the reports submitted by Member States and supported DG Climate Action in aggregating data on climate finance contained therein (task 1a). This task was concluded by the end of October 2015.

To approach this task, CION had prepared an overview of Member States' contributions on climate finance. The project team prepared a similar overview in order to check whether the aggregate

8 Available at http://cdr.eionet.europa.eu/ReportekEngine/searchdataflow

figures matched with the Commission's results. The final overview table including cross-checked figures is included below in Table 3-1.

The analysis was based on the data submitted by Member States in tabular format under the MMR which corresponds to tables 7, 7a and 7b of the Common Tabular Format (CTF) which are to be submitted together with developed countries' biennial reports under the UNFCCC. Several Member States submitted additional methodological notes explaining their approaches and methodologies. Further questions on methodologies underlying their data were raised by CION with Member States by email (e.g. why certain cells were not filled out; denominations of multilateral finance institutions; reporting of funds under the category "other"). The correspondences were forwarded to the project team.

Several Member States provided resubmissions of the tables (e.g. Portugal and Slovakia) as a result of the clarification questions raised.

3.3. Analysis of data

To generate aggregate figures for total climate finance, figures reported by Member States as 'climate-specific bilateral and multilateral public financial support' were copied from their MMR reports into an overview table (see Table 3-1), broken down into total figures for finance relevant for mitigation, adaptation, or cross-cutting issues. Such aggregate figures were produced for climate finance including (Table 3-1) imputed multilateral contributions as reported under the MMR as well as excluding those imputed multilateral shares (see Table 3-2) (see chapter 3.1.2.1).

The individual figures for mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting climate finance provided by the EU in 2014 do not add up to the overall total EU climate finance figure because the methodology for marking finance as relevant for mitigation, adaptation or cross-cutting used by the EU differs from the methodologies used by Member States. The EU reports finance relevant for both mitigation and adaptation under both categories, but only once in the total figure.[9]

[9] The EU has adopted the following approach to using the Rio markers: if an activity is marked as principal for mitigation or adaptation, 100% of the support is considered and reported as climate finance. If an aid activity is marked as significant for mitigation or adaptation, then only 40% of the support is considered and reported as climate finance. To avoid double counting, any activity can only count as 100%, 40% or 0%. If an activity is marked for both mitigation and adaptation, it will count towards total mitigation and total adaptation finance. However, only the highest marking will count when calculating the total climate relevant financial contributing of the activity (EU 2016). As a result, total mitigation support plus total adaptation support is greater than total support. There is no separate category to mark projects which are relevant to both mitigation and adaptation as "cross-cutting".

Table 3-2: Member States' climate finance in 2014 in million € including imputed multilateral contributions as reported under the MMR

	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	TOTAL
AT	72.07	6.88	22.12	0	101.07
BE	8.58	32.05	54.77	0	95.4
BG	0.06	0	0.01	0	0.07
HR	0.03	0	0	0	0.03
CY	0	0	0	0	0
CZ	1.15	2.8	3.71	0	7.66
DK	45.83	0	155.15	3.76	204.74
EE	0	0.32	0.26	0	0.58
FI	30.86	24.26	61.05	0	116.17
FR	2232.15	279.14	255.9	0	2767.19
DE	2,886.74	814.63	1,434.01	0	5,135.38
EL	0.04	0	0	0	0.04
HU	1.57	1.08	0.06	0	2.71
IE	1.53	22.87	9.57	0	33.97
IT	14.96	4.55	35.15	0	54.66
LV	0.05	0	0.35	0.02	0.42
LT	0.26	0	0	0	0.26
LU	6.1	7.35	25.25	0	38.7
MT	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.08
NL	71.95	133.84	165.49	0	371.28
PL	0.37	0.15	3.15	0	3.67
PT	8.36	0.86	0	0	9.22
RO	0	0.03	0	0	0.03
SK	0.2	0.76	0.15	0	1.11
SI	0.6	0.85	0.82	0	2.27
ES	423.18	18.67	21.29	0	463.14
SE	30.58	77.77	120.49	0	228.84
UK	260.46	246.13	524.31	167.02	1197.92
EU	486.58	442.37	0	0	677.01
EIB	2046.9	51.6	0	0	2098.5
Total	**8631.167**	**2168.983**	**2893.06**	**170.85**	**13612.12**

Source: MS reports submitted under the MMR in 2015

Table 3-3: Member States' climate finance in 2014 in million € excluding climate-specific imputed multilateral contributions under the MMR

	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	TOTAL
AT	71	6.88	21.87	0	99.75
BE	8.58	18.8	14.08	0	41.46
BG	0.06	0	0.01	0	0.07
HR	0.03	0	0	0	0.03
CY	0	0	0	0	0
CZ	1.15	2.8	3	0	6.95
DK	42.58	0	133.71	3.76	180.05
EE	0	0.33	0.2	0	0.53
FI	24.69	10.26	34.69	0	69.64
FR	2232.15	279.14	245.03	0	2756.32
DE	2878.74	716.63	1202.89	0	4798.26
EL	0.035	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.035
HU	1.57	1.08	0.06	0	2.71
IE	1.53	21.87	9.57	0.00	32.97
IT	14.96	4.55	24.49	0.00	44.00
LV	0.05	0	0.35	0.02	0.42
LT	0.26	0	0	0	0.26
LU	6.10	7.05	19.37	0.00	32.52
MT	0.01	0.023	0	0.05	0.08
NL	71.95	133.84	109.92	0.00	315.71
PL	0.37	0.15	1.90	0.00	2.42
PT	8.36	0.86	0.00	0.00	9.22
RO	0	0.03	0	0	0.03
SK	0	0.76	0.12	0	0.88
SI	0.60	0.85	0.16	0	1.61
ES	393.18	18.5	12.42	0	424.10
SE	26.32	76.12	119.06	0	221.50
UK	109.67	217.78	168.59	167.02	663.06
EU	486.58	442.37	0	0	677.01
EIB	2046.9	51.6	0	0	2098.5
Total	**8427.425**	**2012.273**	**2121.49**	**170.85**	**12480.098**

Source: MS reports submitted under the MMR in 2015
Notes: pink indicates rows with no changes compared to Table 3-1.

3.3.1. Imputed multilateral contributions (IMCs)

A central issue in the analysis of the data reported by MS under the MMR was the method used to allocate and estimate support provided to multilateral bodies. The OECD provided information on imputed multilateral contributions for several Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs).

These Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) provide estimates concerning the climate-related share within their portfolio and attribute this back to DAC members, based on a pro-rata share of their core multilateral ODA disbursements in a given year. These shares are referred to as 'imputed multilateral contributions in core/general finance'. However, Member States also have the option to report their national figures based on domestic calculations of imputed multilateral contributions. The methodologies of both approaches may differ though.

For the calculation of imputed multilateral contributions for 2014, CION had received from the OECD the preliminary table on imputed multilateral contributions for 2014, based on DAC Member States' reports on their core contributions. The total volume of such contributions according to OECD data was higher by Mio € 881.83 than the total volume of climate-specific multilateral funding reported under the MMR by Member States.

Thus, to produce an aggregate figure on imputed multilateral shares, a top-down approach was taken: The following OECD DAC list of MDB funds, funds and other institutions was taken as a basis (see also Table 3-3):

- MDB funds
    - African Development Fund
    - Asian Development Fund
    - International Development Association
    - Inter-American Development Bank, Fund for Special Operations
- Funds
    - Adaptation Fund (under the UNFCCC)
    - CIFS (Clean Technology Fund, Strategic Climate Fund (= Forest Investment Program, FIP; Pilot Program Climate Resilience, PPCR; and Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program, SREP))
    - Global Environment Facility and its two dedicated Funds (Least Developed Countries Fund and Special Climate Change Fund)
    - Global Environment Facility Trust Fund
    - Green Climate Fund
    - Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol
- Other institutions
    - United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
    - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

For members of the OECD DAC, the following approach was taken: If a Member State had reported climate-specific funding to any of the institutions on this list, this amount was filtered out when summing up multilateral contributions from the MMR reports. Thus, it was checked whether a Member State had reported funds as a **climate-specific** contribution to any of the institutions on the OECD DAC list in MMR table "contribution through multilateral channels" (corresponding to

CTF table 7a). If this was the case, the respective contribution(s) were deduced from the relevant total climate-specific figure (mitigation, adaptation or cross-cutting) in the summary table (CTF table 7) (see calculations in Table 3-2). After generating an aggregate figure for the EU without those imputed shares reported by the Member States and included in the OECD figure (see column I in Table 3-1), the relevant amount from the OECD was added to the aggregate figure without imputed multilateral contributions (see column K in Table 3-1). This approach aims at ensuring that multilateral contributions are not double counted.

For non-members of the OECD DAC, figures for imputed multilateral shares were included as reported under the MMR.

In this analysis, core/general contributions to multilateral channels as reported in MMR table "contribution through multilateral channels" (CTF table 7a) were not considered in this analysis, as it should include climate-specific finance only.

Challenges encountered

During the analysis of Member States' reports under the MMR finding a way to add Member States' imputed multilateral contributions to MDBs to the EU aggregate figure for climate finance was challenging. Several problems occurred with regard to the reporting of imputed multilateral contributions:

- DG CLIMA had to rely on preliminary data from the OECD DAC.
- OECD DAC data was not consistent with the data reported by the Member States. Climate-related development finance is broader than what is reported as climate finance in the BR. OECD DAC members when reporting to the UNFCCC often count only a share of what they reported to the OECD DAC.
- MDBs covered in the OECD DAC's reporting and those listed in the EU's CTF and MMR tables do not entirely overlap (see also Table 3-3). Even for the same multilateral institutions, the coverage of individual funds included under a specific financial institution varies between the OECD DAC list and the funds included in the CTF/MMR tables.
- The World Bank is mentioned as a single institution in the CTF/MMR tables while the World Bank Group includes several different organisations and it is not clear whether Member States' reported figures refer to the entire World Bank Group or specific branches (e.g. the OECD considers only contributions to the International Development Association (IDA) as relevant funds to the World Bank).
- In some MMR reports, there is no clear differentiation between core contributions (which are not necessarily climate relevant) and climate-specific contributions.
- There is no harmonized approach related to the reporting on imputed multilateral shares within the EU. Some MS report only core contributions to financial institutions, some report imputed multilateral contributions which are nationally calculated by a different methodology as the imputed contributions of the OECD DAC and some refer to the imputed shares established by the OECD DAC).
- It is not clear how Member States calculate imputed multilateral shares for certain MDBs.

For these reasons, recommendations for improving the aggregation of imputed multilateral contributions and Member States' reports on climate finance were developed during further analyses carried out in this project. They are described in chapter 5.14.

Table 3-4: List of multilateral funds and other multilateral institutions in OECD data and in the CTF/MMR tables for calculating imputed multilateral contributions

OECD	CTF/MMR tables	Differences between OECD and CTF
Only International Development Association	World Bank, International Finance Corporation	Only IDA.
African Development Fund Only concessional windows from bank[10]	African Development Bank	Only concessional windows from bank in OECD[11]
Asian Development Fund Only concessional windows from bank	Asian Development Bank	Only concessional windows from bank in OECD
Inter-American Development Bank, Fund for Special Operations	Inter-American Development Bank	Only fund for Special Operations in OECD
Global Environment Facility Trust Fund	Global Environment Facility[12]	Global Environment Facility Trust Fund
Adaptation Fund	Adaptation Fund	Same
Global Environment Facility - Least Developed Countries Fund	Least Developed Countries Fund	Same
Global Environment Facility - Special Climate Change Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Same
Clean Technology Fund		CIF
Strategic Climate Fund		CIF. 3 windows: FIP, PPCR, SREP
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change	UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities	UNFCCC under OECD covers Trust Fund and other contributions to UNFCCC, CTF is limited to Trust Fund
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol		Not mentioned in CTF
Green Climate Fund	Green Climate Fund	Same
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change		Not mentioned in CTF

[10] The African Development Fund (ADF) is the concessional window of the African Development Bank (AfDB) Group.

[11] The African Development Fund (ADF) is the concessional window of the African Development Bank (AfDB) Group.

[12] The GEF administers different trust funds: Global Environment Facility Trust Fund (GEF); Least Developed Countries Trust Fund (LDCF); Special Climate Change Trust Fund (SCCF); Nagoya Protocol Implementation Fund (NPIF). The GEF also provides secretariat services, on an interim basis, for the Adaptation Fund.

3.3.2. Calculating EU total climate finance

For calculating an aggregate figure for total EU climate finance as the sum of contributions provided by the Member States, three possible options were discussed within CION which are described below. Firstly, they include different possibilities for how to include funds reported in the category 'other' as there is no harmonised approach which funds to include in this category and how to define them as climate-relevant. This is particularly relevant for Germany's MMR report because Germany had originally reported about € 3.3 billion of its total climate-specific finance under this category. An approach for reporting these funds under the categories mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting was agreed with the German reporting experts subsequent to Germany's submission of their MMR report. Secondly, the three options differ with regard on how to include imputed multilateral contributions in the aggregate figure for total EU climate finance (use figures reported by the OECD DAC or figures reported by the Member States in their MMR reports). Table 3-5 presents the results of calculating total climate finance according to the different options.

Option 1: Including MMR figures for bilateral and multilateral, excluding funds reported in the category 'other', excluding OECD DAC imputed multilateral contributions

- Add up figures reported as total bilateral and multilateral climate-specific finance in the categories mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting by Member States in their MMR report;
- Exclude funds reported by Member States in the category 'other';
- Include multilateral funding on the basis of imputed multilateral contributions reported in the MMR (not taking into account imputed multilateral contributions calculated by the OECD).

For climate finance provided in 2014, this approach would have resulted in the exclusion of 3.3 billion EUR climate finance provided by Germany (reported in the category 'other') and about 0.9 billion EUR imputed multilateral shares which are included in the OECD's report but not in Member States' reporting (together roughly 30% of all EU climate finance).

Option 2: As option 1, but including funds reported in the category "other" by Germany, excluding the OECD DAC imputed multilateral contributions

- Include funds reported by Germany in the category 'other' but distribute them to mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting according to the breakdown provided by the German reporting experts subsequent to the MMR submission.
- Include multilateral funding on the basis of imputed multilateral contributions reported in the MMR (not taking into account imputed multilateral contributions reported by the OECD).

Option 3: Including funds reported in the category "other" by Germany, including imputed multilateral contributions based on OECD figures and subtracting figures reported in the MMR for these funds (to avoid double counting), including multilateral contributions from MMR reports when these funds are not part of the OECD imputed multilateral contributions.

- Include funds reported by Germany in the category 'other' but distribute them to mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting according to the breakdown provided by the German reporting experts subsequent to the MMR report;
- Exclude imputed multilateral contributions reported in the MMR for those funds which are also included in the OECD's reporting; Include figures reported by the OECD on imputed

multilateral contributions added to the EU's aggregate finance as 'cross-cutting' climate finance.

The third approach was chosen for the presentation of contributions for mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting climate finance for 2014 at aggregate EU level (see EU 2015). This is one of the areas where the methodology under the MMR should be further clarified to achieve a transparent approach for the aggregate EU figures for reporting imputed multilateral contributions in future years.

Table 3-5: Calculation of total EU climate finance for 2014 in Million €, with and without MMR-reported imputed multilateral contributions and with imputed multilateral contributions as calculated by OECD

Definition of EU total	Amount in Mio. €
A: EU total **with** imputed multilateral contributions as reported in MMR	13,612.12
B. EU total **without** imputed multilateral contributions as reported in MMR	12,480.10
C. Total imputed multilateral contributions **included in MMR reporting**	**1,132.03**
D. Total imputed multilateral contributions **as calculated by OECD**	**2,013.85**
E. EU total **with IMC as calculated by OECD**, **without IMC as reported in MMR (B+D)**	**14,493.95**

Note: The figure for E. in the last line was the one used in the Council Conclusions on climate finance published on 10.11.2015. The figures do not include amounts reported under 'other' by Germany.

3.3.3. Further methodological issues

Additional challenges arose from the MMR report provided by Germany. Firstly, Germany reported € 2.8 billion as "mobilised public finance" through national finance institutions (KfW and DEG) which was not included in the MMR table directly, but described in a qualitative section on Germany's methodological approach. This support was not further specified in terms of its relevance for mitigation or adaptation. This amount was included in the country's total climate finance figures under the category 'cross-cutting'. However, other Member State did not report on "mobilised public climate finance". Given the fact that also the Paris Agreement refers to finance provided and mobilized, further guidance should be developed related to a consistent reporting of 'mobilized finance' by Member States under the MMR.

Secondly, Germany reported a considerable amount of climate finance under the category 'other'. It thus needed to be clarified which parts of this amount are to be included in the EU's aggregate

figures for mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting. Guidance should be provided to Member States on how to treat the category 'other' in the future.

Furthermore, several methodological differences in the approaches used by Member States to produce their climate finance figures became obvious during the analysis of MMR data. These differences include (see also the summaries in chapters 4.3 and 4.4):

- the way OECD DAC markers to estimate financial flows have been implemented/which method has been applied to categorise flows as relevant for mitigation, adaptation or cross-cutting;
- different coefficients for Rio Markers (counting of 100%, 20%, 40% or 50% of funding if a project is marked as "significant"; which coefficient) are used if a project is marked as principal/significant for more than one category);
- different use of the category 'other';
- different underlying definitions (e.g. mobilised public finance, funding sources included (ODA, OOF, other), point of measurement (provided, committed, disbursed);
- which financial instruments are included in the climate finance figures (e.g. grants and (concessional) loans, including whether the new or the old approach to concessional loans agreed under the OECD has been used[13], guarantees, equity investments; funds channelled through multilateral development banks including the EIB;
- how Member States have differentiated between core contributions to the core budget of multilateral institutions which cannot be specified as climate-specific ("core/general") and climate-specific contributions to multilateral climate funds and dedicated programmes managed by multilateral institutions;
- methodologies to calculate imputed multilateral contributions;
- which funds/organisations are reported together under multilateral development banks (e.g. which organisations/ funds are considered to be part of the World Bank Group);
- which exchange rates have been used to estimate climate finance figures;
- which sector definitions have been used (OECD DAC definitions or others);
- accounting methods for private climate finance, including definition, the accounting of leveraging effects and ways to measure the extent of mobilization;
- which countries were included as recipient countries (non-Annex I countries, countries eligible for ODA under OECD DAC or any other definition of recipient countries,;
- whether repayments are deduced from climate finance disbursed;
- the approach taken to report on climate finance relevant to technology transfer or capacity building.

[13] As of 2018, new guidelines to assess the concessionality of loans apply for OECD countries, which imply i.a. that only loans with a grant element of at least 45% will be reportable as ODA (OECD DAC 2014). In their 2014 reports under the MMR, several Member States have already applied these new reporting guidelines.

Yet, these issues have not been analysed in greater depth in the first step of the analysis of the MMR reports. They will be dealt with in chapter 4 which describes the detailed analyses of Member States' MMR reports and their 2nd Biennial Reports. The extent to which the issues listed above are addressed in chapter 4 reflects the priorities for analysis determined at the kick-off meeting in November 2015.

4. Task 2a: Comparison of the climate finance reporting under the MMR with Biennial Reports under the UNFCCC

This chapter presents a qualitative and quantitative comparison of the Member States reports provided under Article 16 of the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (Regulation 525/2013) in September/ October 2015 with the information on climate finance provided in the second biennial reports submitted in January 2016 to the UNFCCC. Article 16, paragraph 1 of the MMR specifies that reporting under the MMR should be "in accordance with the relevant provisions under the UNFCCC, as applicable, including any common reporting format agreed under the UNFCCC". The reporting tables provided in Excel under the MMR therefore require the same information and data as the CTF tables agreed under the UNFCCC as part of decision 19/CP.18 (apart from few differences, e.g. no reporting in US$ under the MMR, extension of summary table with information on funding sources and financial instruments under the MMR).

In addition, Greece and Slovenia provided their 2nd biennial report to the UNFCCC in March hence these two countries were added to the comparative analysis of reports presented in this report. After the presentation of this comparison in a separate synthesis report at an ECCWG-EGI Workshop on 11 March 2016 further clarifications were received from Member States which are reflected in this chapter.

4.1. Data basis used

The data basis used concerning MMR reports is the same as described in section 3.2.

All Member States had provided the submissions of their 2nd biennial reports to the UNFCCC. Bulgaria and Cyprus did not report any climate finance in their second biennial reports. New Member States (BG, CY, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LV, LT, MT, SI, SK, PL, RO) are not part of the list of countries in Annex II of the Framework Convention on Climate Change which have the specific requirements to provide financial resources to developing countries under Article 4 of the Convention.

14 Member States (AT, BE, CZ, DE, ES, FI, FR, GR, LU, MT, NE, PL, SE, UK) and the OECD commented on the Synthesis Report, as sent to Member States and the OECD on 8 March 2016 and the according presentation as given on 11 March 2016 respectively. Those comments were a further information source for this report.

4.2. Comparison of quantitative information provided for the year 2014 in reports under the MMR and in second biennial reports

Given the fact that the reporting tables under the MMR and in the biennial reports require the same information for the year 2014 and that the due date between the two reports only had a difference of three months (taking into account the period of clarification of the submitted data the difference

was only two months), it had been expected that the amounts of climate finance reported are identical or very similar. However this expectation was not met.

Aggregated for all Member States, the second biennial reports (BR2) include around 1.9% or € 311 Mio. less **total climate finance contributions** (core/general and ´climate-specific´ finance) than the reports under the MMR. For **total climate-specific finance**, the difference is smaller and Member States reported 0.7% or € 59 Mio. more climate-specific contributions in BR2 than in MMR reports (see also Table 4-1).

Table 4-1 also shows that the deviations are different for multilateral climate finance and for bilateral climate finance. For **multilateral finance** the aggregate amount in BR2 is 2.3% or € 206 Mio. higher than the amount reported in the MMR for core/general and climate-specific finance. If only climate-specific finance is considered, the BR2 is 4.8% or € 77 Mio. higher. Only nine Member States reported consistent figures for multilateral climate finance in BR2 and MMR reports. This indicates that the reporting of multilateral finance is generally more complex and difficult.

The aggregate total **bilateral** climate finance reported in BR2 (core/ general and climate-specific) is 6.9% or € 517 Mio. lower than in the MMR reports while the climate-specific bilateral finance is rather similar (BR2 reports 0.3% or 18 € Mio. lower than MMR reports). The large difference for core/ general bilateral finance is mainly due to the reporting of large amount of core/ general bilateral finance in the MMR reports by Finland. In its comments to the draft synthesis report, Finland indicated that the UNFCCC CTF reporting software does not allow reporting of bilateral core/general data in table 7b and only climate-specific data can be entered. In the Finnish data bilateral core/ general data is added to table 7 and therefore reflected in the MMR reporting. Thus, according to the Finnish explanations, the BR reporting seems to miss some amounts that are reported under the MMR due to data entry problems. 16 Member States reported the same figures for bilateral climate finance in both reports.

Table 4-1 is based on the summary tables in Annex IV (section 9.4). In annex III (section 9.3) the underlying tables for each country are provided.

Table 4-1: Quantitative differences for total EU climate finance (as sum of all 28 EU Member States) based on aggregation of MMR reporting and BR2 for the year 2014

	Climate-specific and core/general	Climate-specific
Total (multilateral and bilateral)		
Total EU aggregate figure (Council conclusions 10.11.2015) (incl. EIB)[14](Council of the EU 2015)	€ 14,493,945,000	€ 14,493,945,000
Total MMR	€ 16,629,686,781	€ 8,631,696,892
Total BR2	€ 16,318,365,343	€ 8,690,635,762
Difference in % (BR2/MMR)	**-1.9%**	**0.7%**
Difference in € (BR2-MMR)	**€ -311,321,438**	**€ 58,938,870**
Multilateral		
Total MMR	€ 9,109,478,719	€ 1,610,595,669
Total BR2	€ 9,315,148,512	€ 1,687,454,495
Difference in % (BR2/MMR)	**2.3%**	**4.8%**
Difference in € (BR2-MMR)	**€ 205,669,793**	**€ 76,858,826**
Bilateral		
Total MMR	€ 7,520,208,062	€ 7,021,101,223
Total BR2	€ 7,003,216,831	€ 7,003,181,266
Difference in % (BR2/MMR)	**-6.9%**	**-0.3%**
Difference in € (BR2-MMR)	**€ -516,991,231**	**€ -17,919,956**

Note: Some Member States obviously reported incorrect units in the BR2 reports. In very obvious cases the reported figures were corrected for the aggregation in this table. Clarifications received from Member States after a presentation of a former version of this synthesis report were included in this table.

The Netherlands reported the same amount of bilateral core/ general finance as climate-specific finance in the 2nd biennial report which is not included in the MMR reporting and it was assumed that the repetition of this figure under core/ general in the BR2 is a mistake which was corrected in the aggregate figures.

[14] The figure published as EU climate finance for 2014 in the Council conclusions on climate finance in November 2015 was added as a reference to this table. However, neither the column 'core + climate-specific' nor the column 'climate-specific' are methodologically consistent with the aggregation from MMR reports and BR2 because of the different calculation of imputed multilateral contributions for the figure in the Council conclusions.

Table 4-2 indicates relative differences for each Member State and the EU between climate finance reported in BR2 relative to the amounts reported under the MMR. In some cases, consistent figures at total level still include some inconsistencies in reporting within the respective category, e.g. between the amounts provided for adaptation, mitigation and cross-cutting support.

Table 4-2 **Percentage differences between reported amounts of climate finance in BR2 and MMR reports for Member States (values > 100% = BR2 has higher figures, values < 100% MMR report has higher figures)**

Percentages of sum, multilateral and bilateral of total contributions by country						
	sum		multilateral		bilateral	
Country	% based on climate-specific and core / general (BR/MMR)	% based on climate specific (BR/MMR)	% based on climate-specific and core / general (BR/MMR)	% based on climate specific (BR/MMR)	% based on climate-specific and core / general (BR/MMR)	% based on climate specific (BR/MMR)
AT	125.26%	139.73%	318.97%	3133.73%	100.00%	100.00%
BE	100.48%	102.38%	100.52%	104.14%	100.00%	100.00%
BG			0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
CR	100.00%		100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
CY			0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
CZ	105.86%	100.00%	108.68%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
DE	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
DK	98.98%	97.94%	102.56%	126.74%	94.49%	94.49%
EE	104.33%	97.43%	26.32%	10.38%	597.39%	597.39%
ES	103.48%	100.00%	140.52%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
FI	54.91%	100.00%	97.75%	100.00%	8.17%	100.00%
FR	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
GR	100.00%		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
HU	99.94%	99.78%	100.00%	100.00%	99.47%	99.47%
IE	99.73%	99.12%	99.61%	85.28%	100.00%	100.00%
IT	60.93%	89.61%	48.64%	111.54%	77.06%	77.06%
LT	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
LU	108.26%	106.00%	141.31%	129.29%	100.62%	100.62%
LV	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
MT	100.00%	38.06%	70.94%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
NL	126.46%	107.00%	146.99%	133.78%	100.00%	100.00%
PL	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
PT	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	0.00%	100.00%	100.00%
RO	200.00%	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
SE	101.41%	100.00%	102.15%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
SI	94.27%	94.27%	80.41%	80.41%	100.00%	100.00%
SK	100.00%	103.65%	100.00%	111.51%	100.00%	100.00%
UK	100.01%	100.00%	100.02%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
			0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
total	98.13%	100.68%	102.26%	104.77%	93.13%	99.74%

Note: Green values indicate that figures are equal between MMR and BR2
Black values indicate difference of ±5%
Red values indicate difference of > 5%.

A former version of this synthesis report was sent and presented to Member States and their subsequent comments and corrections were used to update the reported data. Those clarifications from Member States and the biennial reports handed in by Greece and Slovenia in the meantime have reduced the differences. However, clear inconsistencies remain.

It is recommended that Member States improve the consistency of the information and data reported under the MMR reports and in their BRs. There is a risk related to the credibility of EU finance data if figures for national climate finance differ between two reports provided in a short time span of a few months.

4.3. Summary of qualitative comparison of Member States reports

Table 4-3 presents a factual account of inconsistencies identified between Member States´ reports under the MMR and the second biennial reports in the reporting on multilateral finance grouped into thematic areas.

Table 4-3: Qualitative comparison of MS reporting under the MMR and in second biennial reports for multilateral finance

Information	Comments (examples of inconsistency)
Coverage of core/general contributions and climate-specific finance	24 Member States report core contributions (all countries which have submitted their MMR or BR report except Latvia and Slovenia). Yet, of those Member States which have submitted MMR and BR2 reports, five Member States either include information on core contributions only in their second BR or in their MMR (AT, ES, IT, LU, SE). While a total of 21 Member States report on core contributions under the MMR, 19 do so in their BR2. Croatia, Greece and Portugal only report core contributions but no climate-specific contributions. The MMR template defines climate change funds listed in the reporting template as climate specific, apart from the GEF to which also core/general funding can be reported. Such a distinction is not made in the BR reporting. Two MS (DK, NL) report also core/ general contributions to climate-change funds. For other climate change funds which MS have to specify it is less clear whether all amounts should be considered as climate-finance. 11 MS consider the finance reported for ‘other multilateral funds’ as climate-specific (BE, BG, CZ, DE, EE, ES, GR, HU, IT, SE, UK). However NL and DK report ‘other multilateral climate change funds under core/ general. Croatia, Greece and Portugal only report core contributions but no climate-specific contributions. On the other hand, Latvia and Slovenia only report climate-specific contributions but no core contributions. Austria reports core contributions in the MMR report but not in the BR and Italy and Luxembourg in its BR but not in its MMR report.
Reporting related to the World Bank	The World Bank comprises a number of specific dedicated programmes and funds that are reported separately by some MS and jointly under the heading of the World Bank by other MS. (13 MS: AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, FI, HU, IE, LT, PL, PT, SE, UK) report core contributions to the World Bank while 6 MS (AT, DE, DK, FI, LU, SI) report climate-specific contributions to the World Bank (with

Information	Comments (examples of inconsistency)
	divergences between the BRs and MMR reports). The Netherlands is the only country which separately lists its contributions to International Development Association (IDA) under 'other multilateral financial institutions'. Denmark, Finland and Poland explain that they report contributions to IDA as part of the funds provided to the World Bank. For the other countries that report contributions to the World Bank (AT, BE, CZ, DE, HU, IE, LT, PL, PT, SE for core contributions and AT, DE, LU, SL for climate-specific contributions), it is not clear whether contributions to IDA are included in the figures provided or not. This holds true for other funds that belong to the World Bank Group as well. Germany lists climate-specific contributions to several World Bank administered funds under 'other multilateral financial institutions' (Pilot Auction Facility for Methane and Climate Change Mitigation; BioCarbon Fund Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes; Forest Carbon Partnership Facility) separately to a core contribution to the World Bank. Ireland separately reports core contributions to the World Bank and core contributions to the World Bank CGIAR Fund. Finland reports core contributions and climate-specific contributions to the World Bank and to the CGIAR.
Type of multilateral funds reported	There is a lack of clarity which funds are relevant for international reporting on climate finance. For example, 3 Member States (HR, HU, PT) report core contributions to the UNFCCC and 6 Member States (AT, BG, DE, EE, PL, SK) report climate-specific contributions to the UNFCCC (with discrepancies between their MMR and BR reports) and 1 Member State (HR) reports core contributions to the Kyoto Protocol and 4 Member States (AT, BG, IT, SK) climate-specific contributions to the Kyoto Protocol. 1 Member State (AT) reports climate-specific contributions to the International Transaction Log (ITL). However, all Member States provide contributions to the UNFCCC's budget or in the form of fees to the ITL to the UNFCCC; yet the majority of Member States excludes these flows from their reporting on climate finance. Only the UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities is listed under multilateral climate change funds in the CTF reporting template while contributions for other purposes to the UNFCCC need to be reported under 'other'. Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Italy and Slovakia categorise such contributions as other multilateral climate change funds, while Austria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Portugal list them as contributions to other UN specialized bodies. Additionally, Member States list a great variety of different funds and institutions under the categories 'other' of multilateral climate change funds, multilateral financial institutions and specialised UN bodies.
Imputed multilateral contributions	Only 7 MS explicitly explain their methodological approach towards providing multilateral climate-related shares. 2 MS (AT and DK) use the shares provided by the OECD DAC to determine their imputed multilateral contributions. Finland uses a similar approach as done by the OECD when calculating imputed multilateral contributions, but uses nationally determined figures. Germany explains in its MMR report that it uses the weighted average 2013-2014 of

Information	Comments (examples of inconsistency)
	imputed climate relevant shares as the basis for calculating the imputed multilateral contributions from core contributions to multilateral development banks. The shares used by Germany in its MMR report resemble but do not exactly correspond to the final shares published by the OECD. Four MS use their own methodology to calculate imputed multilateral contributions but two of them refer to the data used by the OECD: France only reports one multilateral climate-specific contribution to the GEF in its MMR report and BR and uses a different percentage rate for climate-relevant finance than the OECD. The Netherlands applies the percentages for climate-relevant shares of financial disbursements of multilateral development banks as established by the OECD DAC if available. Otherwise, these percentages are determined nationally in close cooperation with the organisations concerned and range between 5% and 20%. Sweden reports nationally determined imputed multilateral contributions without specifying the climate-relevant shares. The UK explained that it has reported provisional core contributions in its MMR report but that the final data will be provided to the OECD. All other MS do not explain their approach towards reporting climate-specific multilateral finance. As an additional challenge, final OECD data was not available on time and the OECD does not cover all funds and institutions in their reporting which MS report on. Thus, for a number of institutions, climate-relevant shares have to be taken from other sources than from the OECD.
Coverage of instruments reported	24 MS report grants provided through multilateral channels in their reports. Four MS (CZ, HR, SK, UK) additionally indicate the disbursement of funds through ‘other’ financial instruments. Croatia reports its membership fees to the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol as ‘other’ instruments. The Czech Republic reports core contributions to the World Bank as “other (grant/equity)” in its BR, but does not provide further information on this contribution. Slovakia reports membership fees to the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund, the Montreal Protocol Trust Fund, the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol under UNFCCC, CITES Multilateral Treaty, to the WMO and to UNEP as ‘other’ financial instruments. Contributions to UNCCD, FAO and EPPO are reported as “other (capital subscription)”. Yet, this is not further explained. The UK reports contributions to the Climate Investment Funds as “other (capital)” without further explanation. Bulgaria is the only country which reports all multilateral contributions as ‘other’ instruments in its MMR report. Yet, it does not further specify the type of instrument used. Definitions for the financial instruments included in reporting are not provided by any Member State.
Status/point of measurement	All MS have reported disbursed/provided contributions. Luxembourg additionally includes funds that have been committed.

Information	Comments (examples of inconsistency)
Funding source	All MS which have submitted MMR reports or BRs have included money disbursed as ODA in their reporting except for Croatia which has not provided information on this issue. 4 MS (BG, EE, IT, LU) have also included funds disbursed through OOF in their reports and 3 MS (BE, IE, LV) have included other flows. Belgium has reported separate contributions through ODA and through OOF to the Adaptation Fund and to the GCF in its MMR report. In its BR, only one contribution to the Adaptation Fund is reported as “other (ODA/OOF)” while the contribution to the GCF is reported as finance relevant for ODA. Estonia has specified that its contributions to the UNFCCC are partially ODA (61%) and partially OOF (39%) and that its contributions to the WMO are partially ODA (4%) and partially OOF (96%). Ireland has reported its contribution to the CTCN as stemming from other funding sources than ODA and OOF in its CTF table. In its BR, it is specified that this sum promotes the accelerated transfer of environmentally sound technologies for low carbon and climate resilient development at the request of developing countries, but the funding source is not further specified. Italy reports its contribution to the Regional Environmental Centre as OOF funds in its MMR report. Latvia reports its contribution to the GCF under ‘other funding sources’ in its MMR report and BR. This is not further explained. Luxembourg reports its contribution to the GCF as OOF in its MMR report and in its BR.
Sector information	19 MS (BE, DK, EE, FI, FR, GR, HU, IE, IT, LV, LT, LU, MT, NL, PL, SE, SI, SK, UK) report sector information for their multilateral contributions, but as these are mostly aggregate and not project-specific figures, most countries indicate “cross-cutting”, “general environmental protection” or “other multisector” in this column.

Difficulties in comparability of information reported by Member States also reduce accuracy and increase uncertainty within each report. The following table provides an assessment of the comparability of the information provided by Member States in reporting on multilateral climate finance. Some aspects for which inconsistencies in the reporting have been assessed in the previous table, do not appear in this summary if such inconsistencies are not very relevant for the comparability of data for the EU aggregation.

Table 4-4: Summary of issues identified that limited comparability related to the reporting of multilateral climate finance

Information	Comment on shortcomings
Coverage of core contributions and climate-specific finance	There are shortcomings in terms of identification of climate-relevant shares based on percentage ratios. Explications of differentiation between core and climate-specific are frequently missing. For those funds whose projects are not 100% climate relevant but where the share of climate-relevant expenditures needs to be determined, it is unclear how the reported figures were determined and specific methodological information is missing.
Coverage of multilateral funds or development banks	It is unclear whether some MS listed contributions to more funds than other MS and whether other MS also contributed to those funds but did not report on them because they did not consider them to be relevant. It is not completely comparable which multilateral funds and financial institutions of UN bodies are relevant for the reporting under the MMR and in biennial reports (e.g. related to finance provided to the UNFCCC).There are shortcomings how contributions to specific climate-related funds of multilateral institutions are reported and on how projects were treated which are not 100% climate-specific.
Imputed multilateral contributions	All but seven MS fall short on explicitly explaining their methodological approach to the calculation of imputed multilateral contributions and therefore the comparability of approaches chosen is limited. Methodological problems arise due to (1) national determination of climate-relevant shares (lack of specification and description of methodology), (2) timely OECD DAC data availability (available only after MMR submission date), (3) only partial overlap among multilateral institutions covered in the OECD DAC's reporting with those included in MMR and BR reporting (so some data have to be taken from other sources), (4) imperfect match of multilateral fund denotations between MMR, BR and OECD DAC.
Coverage of instruments reported	There seems to be no guidance which types of payments should be accounted for as a multilateral contribution; i.e. whether only grants should be considered, what kind of other payments should be reported and how membership fees to multilateral institutions should be treated.
Funding source	It is not clear what types of sources are included when other funding sources in addition to ODA and OOF are reported; this also reduces comparability.

Table 4-5 presents a factual account of inconsistencies identified between Member States´ reports under the MMR and the second biennial reports in the reporting on bilateral finance grouped into thematic areas.

Table 4-5: Qualitative comparison of MS reporting under the MMR and in second biennial reports for bilateral finance

Information	**Inconsistency found?** Yes/ No	**Comments (examples of inconsistency)**
Coverage of funding sources	Yes	Austria refers to OOF in the textual part of the MMR, but does not include it in the table nor in the BR; Italy refers to "Other" in the MMR, but not in BR; Germany refers to OOF in MMR, but not in BR.
Definition of funding sources	No	Only France and Belgium include definitions. Belgium does so only in the BR.
Point of measurement	Yes	Belgium refers to commitments in the textual part, but only includes provided in the table; France refers to disbursements in the BR, but not in the MMR. Germany refers that only commitments are reported, but includes some "as provided" in the tables (e.g. when funds are channelled via a regional fund); Spain does not refer to commitments in the MMR, but does so in the BR (in relation to export credits).
Definition of point of measurement	No	Only France, Spain and Sweden included such definitions. The later only in the BR, not in the MMR.
Coverage of instruments reported	Yes	Austria refers to several instruments in the BR, but only to grants in the MMR. Finland refers to (concessional) loan in the MMR and to other (interest subsidy) in the BR.
Definition of instrument	Yes	Only Finland provided definitions for all instruments, but only in the MMR. Spain provided definitions of export credits only in its BR.
Identification of adaptation/mitigation activities	No	All MS, except the UK, used OECD DAC guidance. France and Belgium have some additional national (or regional) approaches, which tend to complement in a compatible manner the OECD DAC Rio Markers. While the UK refers to the Rio Markers in the BR, the approached used is the national methodology described in the MMR report.
Recipient Definition	No	Only Austria, France, Ireland and Sweden define recipients. Consistently in both reports.
Quantification of climate-specific	No	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden describe their respective methodology to quantify climate support, through the definition

Information	**Inconsistency found?** Yes/ No	Comments (examples of inconsistency)
		of coefficients applied to the Rio Markers. While there are no inconsistencies between MS reports, the approaches used by the different MS vary quite significantly. The remaining MS do not describe their respective approach to quantifying climate support.
Valorisation of instrument	No	Only Austria and Germany make a reference to valorisation of instrument and only in the MMR.
Currency exchange rates	No	At least one MS does not present figures in US$. The reporting on the exchange rate used is consistent in the MMR and the BR.
Format of data	No	All MS present data at activity level; yet Luxembourg presents parts of its data in an aggregated way according to types of recipient countries and groups, yet providing details on the different projects included in their BR.
Report on Technology Transfer (TT)	Yes	There are several inconsistencies. Most MS report on TT in the BR, but not in the MMR. MS who report on TT in the BR but not in the MMR: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Poland, and Portugal. MS who report on TT in the MMR but not in the BR: Czech Republic, Luxembourg.
Report on Capacity Building (CB)	Yes	There are several inconsistencies. Most MS report on CB in the BR, but not in the MMR. MS who report on CB in the BR but not in the MMR: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy and Portugal. MS who report on CB in the MMR but not in the BR: Czech Republic, Luxemburg,
Report on private climate finance	No	Finland reports on private finance in the BR, but not in the MMR.

The following table provides an assessment of the comparability of the information provided by Member States in reporting on bilateral climate finance.

Table 4-6: Summary table of issues identified related to the reporting of bilateral climate finance that limit comparability of climate finance information

Information type	Issues identified
Point of measurement	Most MS report either commitment or disbursement; some, a combination of both. Most MS report that, except in cases of *force majeure* commitments will be equal to disbursements. The only difference between the two is the moment in which the recipient country benefits from the support. As long as MS who report both commitments and disbursements do not report the same amount as a commitment and later on as disbursement, there should be no problem in relation to comparability of data.
Coverage of instruments reported	Some MS report on loans, without distinguishing between concessional and non-concessional. Mostly no explanations or definitions are provided for other instruments reported apart from grants and loans.
Identification of adaptation/mitigation activities	While all MS use the same method, the OECD DAC Rio Markers, the discretion in its application is a major source of uncertainty in the support reported.
Recipient Definition	Member States use different definitions for recipient countries: • OECD DAC list of ODA recipients (this list includes some Annex I countries (Turkey, Ukraine, Belarus) and does not include all non-Annex I countries) • Non-Annex I countries (includes all countries for which the reporting guidelines requests support provided be reported on; includes some countries which are not eligible to receive ODA as per the OECD DAC list of ODA recipients) Some MS use the OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries and exclude Annex I Parties that are included in this list.
Quantification of climate-specific	As for the case of identification of climate support using the Rio Markers, the use of coefficients to quantify such support brings great uncertainty into the figures reported. In addition to the discretion in determining the coefficient to apply, MS are actually using many different coefficients to quantify the same thing (in particular to quantify activities marked as significant). Furthermore, the different approaches (including lack thereof) to avoid double counting exacerbate such problems.
Currency exchange rates	The use of different exchange rates can hinder comparability of data; sometimes the exchange rate is not clearly indicated.
Report on TT Report on CB	The report on TT and CB is rather qualitative and the information is collected mostly on a case study basis. No MS quantified the TT and CB support.
Report on private climate finance	As for TT and CB, there is very little information on private climate finance being reported and MS that do so, do it on an exploratory, preliminary

Information type	Issues identified
	basis. However, the different instruments that can be used to mobilize private finance and the many different approaches that can be used to estimate the amount of private finance actually mobilized (leveraged) will certainly become an issue when in the future more information is available.

4.4. Summary of quantitative comparison of Member States´ reports

This section summarizes the findings related to the quantitative comparison of the data provided in the MMR reports and the second biennial reports. Data from the analysis are presented in Annex III, IV and V (sections 9.3, 9.4 and 9.5). Comments and clarifications received from Member States after presenting and sharing the results of a former version of this synthesis report are incorporated in this analysis.

- Only four Member States reported completely consistent data in both reports (Croatia, Greece, Lithuania, Portugal)
- For 13 Member States data is largely consistent, but they reported changes in individual categories or aspects (Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and UK)
- For six Member States many data categories are different in both reports, however the impact on the total reported climate finance is relatively small (Denmark, Estonia, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Sweden)
- For four Member States many data categories are different in both reports and the total reported climate finance is substantially different (Austria, Czech Republic, Italy, Netherlands).
- Bulgaria and Cyprus could not be compared as one of the reports was missing or contained empty tables.

In particular for those Member States with many differences it is recommended to clarify the reasons for the changes. For Italy the figures reported in the second biennial report are very unclear (e.g. due to the reporting of amounts in € and in US$ which do not match with currency conversion rates).

Differences in financial values reported by all other Member States largely depend on one or more of the points below:

- Figures are largely consistent but countries swapped the reported figures within ´climate-specific´ subcategories but the total amounts remain the same (e.g. Poland, Belgium, France and Latvia);
- Bilateral contributions are consistent but multilateral contributions are inconsistent (e.g. Austria);
- Different reporting of ´core/general´ (e.g. Austria, Finland);
- Currency conversion rate is used for values but not for sums (e.g. Sweden)

- Rounding issues (e.g. Netherlands, Denmark);
- Reporting mistakes or errors in e.g.
  - In biennial reports there are errors in the reported units for several Member States and the reported figures are too low and a factor of thousand or a million has to be applied to achieve the correct order of magnitude compared to the MMR report or the previous biennial report (e.g. Denmark, Italy, United Kingdom). This may also arise from the CTF reporter software where countries should be able to change the unit reported.
  - Figures were not transferred from table 7a to summary table 7 (e.g. Sweden);
  - Summation mistakes when disaggregate categories are summed up (e.g. Portugal and Hungary have summation mistakes in 7a);
  - Mistakes in filling in currency or currency conversion (e.g. Italy reports different values in € than in US$);
  - Reporting the same value twice or forgetting it once) (e.g. Ireland and Romania report the same number twice in one report and one time in the other).

The aggregate comparison of the quantitative information is presented in Table 4-1. Detailed comparisons of the data in both reports are provided in section 9.5 (Annex V).

5. Task 2b: Recommendations for the improvement of technical guidance under the MMR

This chapter focuses on recommendations for the improvement of the "*Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR)*" (June 2015) (European Commission 2015). This technical guidance document has been slightly updated in order to incorporate the recent changes to the reporting tables adopted at COP 21 in Paris updated for 2016. Further improvements could be incorporated in a revised technical guidance document to be used for the reporting in 2017. The recommendations in this chapter have been developed based on the analysis of Member States' reports provided under Article 16 of the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation[15] due by 30 September 2015 and the second biennial reports (BR2) under the UNFCCC due by 1st January 2016 (in particular CTF Tables 7, 7a and 7b[16]) as well as studies and analysis undertaken by other organisations and authors, in particular the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The suggested improvements should also strengthen the consistency, comparability and accuracy of the aggregate EU figures on climate finance provided by DG Climate Action on the basis of MS' reports which supports the EU's position towards its counterparts in the negotiations under the UNFCCC.

The recommendations of a first draft of a separate synthesis report were discussed at a Workshop of ECCWG-EGI on 11 March 2016 and Member States also provided written feedback to the report. Comments from Member States and OECD on the draft synthesis report were included in this section, in particular when agreement or disagreement was expressed in relation to certain proposals. Other suggestions (e.g. for clarification) were directly incorporated in the text.

Some Member States expressed more general concerns related to the reporting under the MMR: Finland, the Netherlands and Austria generally expressed the point of view that the UNFCCC and OECD reporting are the 'leading' tasks and the MMR should not go beyond the requirements under the UNFCCC or the OECD. The Netherlands proposed that climate finance data should not be reported separately at the EU level or only after final OECD/UNFCCC data is available. Several Member States expressed concerns related to the reporting deadline of 30 September under MMR. Finland proposed that any further development of the EU reporting under the MMR should only take place after the UNFCCC reporting under the Paris Agreement is finally developed.

The Netherlands made a specific proposal related to aspects which were not part of the draft synthesis report. The Netherlands noted that the technical guidance under the MMR should also address

- how to ensure that double counting is avoided in relation to climate relevant support committed through the EU budget instruments and the European Development Fund and
- how the Commission will inform MS on an annual basis about the climate relevant support committed through the EU budget instruments and the European Development Fund for Member States' national reporting purposes.

[15] OJ, L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 13: Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on a mechanism for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and for reporting other information at national and Union level relevant to climate change and repealing Decision No 280/2004/EC.

[16] Table 7: Provision of public financial support: summary information; Table 7(a): Provision of public financial support: contribution through multilateral channels; Table 7 (b): Provision of public financial support: contribution through bilateral, regional and other channels;

5.1. Format of Member States replies

The technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) requests Member States to use the UNFCCC Common Tabular Formats (CTF) as the template for the MMR reporting. It is also strongly recommended to submit the tables in Excel format.

Decision 9/CP.21 on “Methodologies for the reporting of financial information by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention” (FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.2) agreed at COP 21 in Paris implements a number of changes to the UNFCCC CTF. These changes include:

(a) Creating reporting fields for the provision of information on definitions or methodologies used for reporting information in the following reporting parameters: “climate-specific” or “core/general”, “status”, “funding source”, “activity”, “financial instrument”, “type of support” and “sector”;

(b) extending the number of input rows in the Microsoft Excel file for tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b);

(c) Aligning the categorization in the reporting parameter “status” of support (“pledged”, “committed” and “provided”) in tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b) of the common tabular format with the categorization used in other existing international methodologies (“committed” and “disbursed”);

Proposal for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

The same changes as agreed in decision 9/CP.21 for the CTF should be applied to the reporting tables used for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR.

Seven Member States (AT, BE, DE, FI, PL, SE, UK) commented on this proposal, and all Member States agreed with it.

5.2. Template for methodological information

The technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) requests a descriptive section, preferably in a separate document. It should provide the technical description of the data, including key definitions and methodology. Narratives, such as justifications for climate finance should be avoided.

The addition of a reporting field for methodological information to the Excel tables as part of the UNFCCC (decision 9/CP.21) requires some modification of this guidance as some additional methodological explanations should be provided as part of the Excel table for the specific parameters “climate-specific” or “core/general”, “status”, “funding source”, “activity”, “financial instrument”, “type of support” and “sector”.

The current reporting of methodological information is rather inconsistent and incomplete. This also impacts comparability because it is sometimes unclear which approaches were used by Member States. A more systematic reporting of methodological information by all Member States would improve the comparability of the information.

Proposal for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

Option 1:

It is proposed to develop a template for the methodological information to be integrated in the technical guidance under the MMR (covering e.g. explanations how imputed multilateral climate-specific contributions were determined). This would facilitate a more complete reporting of methodological information. The template could include specific categories for approaches available and used by MS which can be selected. This could make the reporting more efficient and complete at the same time.

Option 2:

An alternative option for a template for methodological information would be that MS provide the template developed by the OECD joint ENVIRONET-WP-STAT Task Team on the methodological approaches for reporting also to the European Commission as part of the MMR reporting. This option would avoid filling another template. However, the template is rather detailed and requires a larger amount of descriptions than the approach suggested under option 1.

Eight Member States (AT, BE, DE, MT, NE, PL, SE, UK) commented on this proposal. Four Member States (DE, MT, NE, UK) agreed with option 1. One Member State (PL) supported option 1 by stating an “additional template aligned with OECD and not beyond BR requirements”. Two Member States (AT, SE) agreed with option 2. One Member State (BE) suggested that further discussion is needed on a template for methodological information.

5.3. Coverage of core contributions and climate-specific finance for multilateral climate finance

The technical guidance under the MMR already specifies that if core/general contributions are reported, core/general and climate-specific data should be mutually exclusive and that funds should be reported in only one of the categories. This is however not always implemented.

In exceptional cases, it might be necessary to report core/general and climate-specific contributions to the same bank or fund because the climate-specific contributions are made to specific sub-funds or dedicated programmes of the overarching institutions. In this case, it should be explained how core and climate-specific contributions have been differentiated. It should also be clearly indicated to which sub-funds or programmes the climate-specific contributions are paid to. This specific situation could be added to the technical guidance.

Contributions to those MDBs and multilateral institutions whose financial disbursements are not 100% climate relevant should be reported as core contributions. Climate-relevant shares of those payments will then be determined in a consistent manner for all Member States by the Commission using the imputed multilateral contributions provided by OECD in order to produce a figure for aggregate EU climate finance.

If core contributions are reported in the columns ‘other’ multilateral funds/multilateral financial institutions/specialised UN bodies, it should be specified to which funds beyond those indicated in the template these payments are made.

If core and climate-specific contributions are reported for the same institution, it should be explained how the figures have been determined (i.e. whether they relate to payments that are considered to be 100% climate relevant or whether they represent imputed multilateral contributions and how the imputed share has been determined, see chapter3.3.1) and how the

different categories of multilateral climate-specific finance (i.e. mitigation, adaptation, cross-cutting, other) have been determined. These options could be integrated in the methodological template proposed in section 0.

For OECD DAC members, it should be explained for contributions to banks or institutions not covered by OECD reporting how the climate-relevant share of these institutions' financial disbursements have been determined. For other countries, it is recommended to explain the calculation of climate-relevant shares in the methodological description for all funds reported.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

Add the following elements to the guidance related to core/ general vs climate-specific multilateral channels (text in bold is added):

1. If core/general contributions are reported, core/general and climate-specific data should be mutually exclusive **except in such cases where climate-specific contributions are made to specific sub-funds or dedicated programmes of the overarching institutions to which also core funding is provided. In this case, the core funding should be reported as well as climate specific funding and it should be explained how core and climate-specific contributions have been differentiated. It should also be clearly indicated to which sub-funds or programmes the climate-specific contributions are paid to.**

2. Climate specific concerns contributions to multilateral climate funds and dedicated programmes managed by multilateral institutions. Please report contributions to such funds and programmes (LDCF, SCCF, AF, GCF, UNFCCC, CIFs, FCPF, etc.) as climate specific only. **This also applies to those contributions reported under 'other multilateral climate change funds'.**

3. Any multilateral fund, financial institution or UN body reported under 'other' should be clearly indicated with its name.

4. If Member States use OECD imputed multilateral contributions to derive climate-specific finance for multilateral financial institutions or banks, this should be indicated in the methodological information provided (add in template suggested under 0).

5. Member States should only report climate-specific finance through bilateral, regional and other channels, and should not report core/ general bilateral or regional finance.

Proposal for revised recommendation for item 5:

5. Member States should only report climate-specific finance through bilateral, regional and other channels, if the recipient organisation is not listed on the DAC list of ODA eligible organisations.

Eight Member States (AT, BE, DE, FR, NE, PL, SE, UK) and the OECD commented on this proposal. Six Member States (AT, BE, DE, FR, PL, UK) agree with the recommendations. Poland agreed except with the 5th recommendation. The OECD explained that in the DAC statistics a "core" contribution is reportable as "bilateral" if the recipient organisation is not listed on the DAC list of ODA eligible organisations. Therefore the 5th recommendation would not be consistent with the DAC reporting system. This information was not available to the project team before and we believe that it is important to maintain consistency with the OECD DAC system and therefore the recommendation for item 5 was revised. Sweden did not support this proposal because Sweden

believes that countries should move towards developing systems where core support can be included – as all donors should work more towards aid effectiveness (Paris/Accra principles) and the reporting should not dis-incentivize core support. However, this disagreement may also be particularly related to the 5th recommendation.

5.4. Coverage of multilateral funds or development banks

Contributions to the World Bank should be reported as core contributions. It is recommended to specify contributions to the IBRD and to IDA as well as to other sub-funds or World Bank programmes separately as the climate-relevant share of each institution's funding will be different.

For other multilateral institutions, contributions to sub-funds should also be reported separately where possible (e.g. to the African Development Bank and to the African Development Fund). Otherwise, it should be explained in the methodological description which funds and programmes are included in an aggregated contribution.

Membership fees to UN institutions like the UNFCCC should neither be reported as climate-specific nor as core finance because they are not disbursed as climate finance to developing countries. This also includes the payments related to the operation use of the international transaction log for which it is difficult to justify that this is finance provided to developing countries. The UNFCCC reporting guidelines include only the UNFCCC trust fund for supplementary activities in the CTF template and this limitation seems justified. The trust fund mostly covers the participation of developing country experts in workshops and meetings scheduled as part of the UNFCCC work programme and to some extent also training and capacity building activities programmes for developing country Parties.

Similar considerations apply to the financial flows paid to the Montreal Protocol where general contributions to the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund or to the Montreal Protocol Trust Fund are reported. It should be discussed which of the Montreal Protocol flows can be regarded as climate finance provided to developing countries and whether these flows are reported under climate change funds or UN bodies.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

1. Related to the funds and programmes whose contributions are considered as climate-specific in the technical guidance, the provision of finance to the UNFCCC should be clarified and **only contributions to the UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities should be reported as climate-specific**.

2. It should be discussed which financial flows provided related to the Montreal Protocol (Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund and the Montreal Protocol Trust Fund / Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol) qualify for the reporting under the MMR and in biennial reports and amend the reporting tables under the MMR based on this discussion. It should also be discussed and decided whether financial flows to the Montreal Protocol should be reported under climate change funds or UN bodies.

3. From the list of other multilateral climate change funds, multilateral institutions and other specialized UN bodies reported by MS, the most frequent ones that are reported by more than three MS should be added as additional rows in the reporting template. This proposal would add the following funds / institutions / UN Bodies and it should be discussed whether these belong to multilateral funds, institutions or UN bodies:

FAO, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), UNCCD, UNICEF, WFP (United Nations World Food Programme), UN REDD (United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation)

Seven Member States (AT, BE, DE, FR, PL, SE, UK) and the OECD commented on this proposal. Three Member States (DE, SE, UK) generally agree with the proposals, one of these (UK) with a comment. Two Member States (BE, DE) agree and two (AT, PL) disagree with the first proposal. Four Member States (AT, BE, FR, PL) disagree with the second proposal and one of these (BE) states that discussion would be needed on this proposal. Four Member States (AT, BE, DE, PL) agree with the 3rd proposal. One Member State (FR) disagrees with reporting Montreal Protocol finance flows but indicates that future HFC amendment will contain elements on if/how to count part of the flows as climate finance.

The OECD commented that it is important to have clarity on which contributions are reported as bilateral to avoid double counting, and also ensure comparability across countries' reporting. The distinction between earmarked and non-earmarked is important. In DAC statistics, there is a clear demarcation between organizations considered “multilateral” and listed on the DAC list of ODA-eligible organizations and others not listed for which core contributions are classified as bilateral (e.g. Trust Funds such as WB Forest Carbon Partnership). If there is no such a demarcation in the reporting system, some countries may report a core contribution to an organization as bilateral and some countries as multilateral. If the distinction between bilateral and multilateral is not clear, there can be double-counting between countries' bilateral reporting and multilateral organizations' reporting on their outflows.

This leads to the conclusion that the technical guidance under the MMR should refer more specifically to the OECD DAC list of ODA-eligible organizations and how organization on this list and not on this list should be treated in the reporting.

5.5. Reporting on financial instruments

The technical guidance already requests an explanation of the methodology used when loans or other financial instruments are reported and to specify what is included in the ‘other’ category. Thus, the guidance already addresses shortcomings identified.

Two Member States (BE, PL) commented and both agreed with this proposal.

5.6. Definition of recipient countries

MS should be required to report on the definition of recipient countries and state whether this definition includes countries which are included in Annex I. In such a case, MS should be required to report whether support provided to Annex I Parties is included in the totals.

The MMR technical guidance could include key options for the definitions of recipient countries. The options currently used are:

1. OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries
2. OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries excluding Annex I Parties from this list.
3. Non-Annex I Parties

As explained in OECD 2015a the OECD DAC eligible recipients include nine countries which are not part of Non-Annex I Parties. These are Belarus, Kosovo, Montserrat, Saint Helena, Tokelau, Turkey, Ukraine, Wallis and Futuna and West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In contrast, Non-Annex I Parties include some relatively wealthy countries, such as Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, United Arab Emirates and some small countries.

While few information was provided about the recipient countries in the methodological information under the MMR or as part of second BRs, according to OECD (2015b) a larger number of Member States define their recipient countries based on the OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries (AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, GR, IE, IT, LU, NE, PL, PT, SK, SI, UK).

Thus the technical guidance document under the MMR could also be amended by recommending using the OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries as this seems to be the common approach deducting at least those countries that are Annex I countries (Ukraine, Belarus, Turkey) for the reporting under the UNFCCC.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

Recommending using the OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries as the basis for recipient countries for bilateral support and deduct those countries that are Annex I countries (Ukraine, Belarus, Turkey) for the reporting under the UNFCCC.

Six Member States (AT, BE, DE, FR, PL, SE) commented on this proposal, three of them (BE, FR, SE) agreed with it and two (AT, PL) disagreed. Those that disagreed suggested to align it with the OECD DAC eligibility list and to not deduct Annex-I countries. One Member State (DE) highlighted that the deduction of Annex I parties at UNFCCC would make MMR and BR reports different in this respect.

5.7. Point of measurement

The point of measurement has been adopted for the UNFCCC CTF in the recent decision 9/CP.21 by revising the categories which include only ‘committed’ and ‘disbursed’ – consistent with the international OECD DAC methodology and the categories ‘pledged’ and ‘provided’ were deleted. This revised guidance should also be applied under the MMR.

MS who report both on commitment and disbursement should explain how they ensure that there is no double counting (that the same support is not reported as a commitment and, later on, as disbursement).

While in general, there are no substantial problems with the point of measurement, it may be useful to define or explain the use of committed and disbursed related to specific instruments, such as loans, export credits or guarantees. For grants, the difference between commitment and disbursement is normally small, but for countries reporting multi-year loans, there can be considerable differences between the amount committed and disbursed in a specific year. A big difference between committed and disbursed can also occur for export credits or guarantees which may actually never be disbursed.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

Discuss whether further guidance for the use of 'committed' and 'disbursed' for loans, export credits or guarantees should be provided as part of the MMR technical guidance document. It could be that the ongoing discussions in OECD DAC already clarify this aspect without the need for additional guidance under the MMR.

Seven Member States (AT, BE, DE, FR, PL, SE, UK) commented on this proposal, four of them (AT, FR, PL, UK) agreed, some with further comments. AT expressed that no further guidance is needed. Germany mentioned that they measure at commitment level for both and that this is different in ODA reporting. UK added that the OECD DAC high level meeting in February 2016 agreed proposals on the treatment of private sector instruments that could have relevance to MMR reporting. However, much of the technical detail on the new ODA rules is yet to be finalised. France and Sweden confirmed that they use OECD definitions. Belgium generally supported the proposal, but also expressed the need for further discussion.

5.8. Coverage of funding sources

All MS have reported on ODA and only some have reported OOF (Other Official Flows which are generally defined as official sector transactions that do not meet official ODA criteria). MS should be encouraged to enhance coverage of funding sources and asked to explain when a funding source is not included, e.g. MS should explain whether not reporting on OOF is due to no climate support having been provided via OOF or whether it's due to the fact that a MS has not tracked climate relevant OOF.

MS should be required to provide a definition for OOF and should be strictly required to do so if "Other" source of funding is reported. This is currently not yet required in the technical guidance under the MMR.

The technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation could propose definitions of the funding sources that MS could directly use. If the proposed definition differs from the definition used by the MS, it should then provide its national definition or any additional details to the proposed definition.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

Add the following to the technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation:

1. Member States should use the definitions for OOF as provided by the OECD DAC (OECD 2016a). If the national definition used differs from the OECD DAC definition, additional explanations should be provided as part of the methodological information.[17]

2. If OOF flows are reported, MS shall explain as part of the methodological information which flows are covered under OOF.

[17] OOF include grants to developing countries for representational or essentially commercial purposes; official bilateral transactions intended to promote development, but having a grant element of less than 25%; and, official bilateral transactions, whatever their grant element, that are primarily export-facilitating in purpose. This category includes official direct export credits; the net acquisition by governments and central monetary institutions of securities issued by multilateral development banks at market terms; subsidies (grants) to the private sector to soften its credits to developing countries; and, funds in support of private investment (OECD 2016a)

3. If no OOF are reported, MS should indicate in the methodological template whether OOF flows do not occur (tick notation key 'not occurring' or whether OOF flows were not tracked and estimated, but do occur (tick notation key 'not estimated').

Six Member States (AT, BE, DE, PL, SE, UK) commented on this proposal. All but one (DE) agreed. The disagreeing Member State (DE) suggests that no change is required.

5.9. Coverage of instruments reported

Taking into account decision 9/CP.21, MS are now required to provide definitions of the instruments used. The technical guidance under the MMR could include default definitions for the instruments that MS could use directly in their reporting. If the definition used by the MS differs from these default definitions, the MS should be required to provide national definitions.

The technical guidance under the MMR requests Member States to explain which instruments are reported under 'other instruments' (e.g. export credits, guarantees). In addition, MS could be encouraged to explain whether not reporting on a given type of instrument (from the list included in the UNFCCC guidelines / CTF tables) is due to the fact that no climate relevant support has been provided through such instruments or because the MS is not tracking it.

All MS including loans (concessional or non-concessional) should be required to report whether repayments upon maturity of such loans are tracked and are part of the reporting.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

The technical guidance document under the MMR should be amended in the following way:

1. Include references to OECD DAC definitions for financial instruments including a list of instruments that could be reported under 'other'. In a methodological template MS under the MMR could tick off when OECD DAC definitions are used. Additional explanations should be required when different definitions are used.

2. If 'other instruments' are reported, MS shall explain as part of the methodological information which instruments are covered.

3. If no 'other instruments' are reported, MS should indicate in the methodological template whether such instruments do not occur (tick notation key 'not occurring') or whether 'other instruments' were not tracked and estimated, but do occur (tick notation key 'not estimated').

Six Member States (AT, BE, DE, PL, SE, UK) and the OECD commented and all agreed with this proposal. The OECD added that "a new taxonomy of financial instruments has been introduced in DAC statistics starting with 2016 data".

5.10. Currency conversion rate

The technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) requests that the default should be to report in EUR and the national currency. MS should indicate clearly if a different approach has been used and explain the reasons. When applicable, the source of the exchange rate and the exchange rate itself should be explicitly indicated. UNFCCC reporting tables do not include a clear reporting field for the exchange rates. It is recommended to insert a numeric field in the Excel

tables used under the MMR where the exchange rate should be provided. This assists the reporting and aggregation and is simpler than extracting the conversion rates from any supplementary methodological document.

As most MS use the OECD yearly average exchange rate, a link to this source could be included in the technical guidance document under the MMR.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

The technical guidance document under the MMR should be amended in the following way:

1. Add a specific field in the MMR table template for the reporting of the currency conversion rate used.

2. Add a recommendation to use the OECD yearly average exchange rate and provide a link to this source.

Seven Member States (AT, BE, DE, FR, PL, SE, UK) commented and all agreed with this proposal.

5.11. Financial resources mobilized through public interventions

Paragraph 57 of the Agreement adopted in Paris (decision 1/CP.21) requests the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to develop modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Agreement for consideration by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fourth session (November 2018). The current reporting only refers to financial resources provided, not to financial resources mobilized through public interventions. However, some Member States already provide information on financial resources mobilized in their second biennial reports under the UNFCCC and also provide methodological information related to finance mobilized.

It is proposed to add a reporting field for financial resources mobilized through public interventions as well as a field for explanations on the methodologies applied for the reporting under the MMR starting from 2016 in order to gain experiences with this new requirement at EU level to support the development of an international reporting requirement until the end of 2018 under the UNFCCC. After the adoption of any revised reporting guidance under the UNFCCC, the reporting tables under the MMR should be adapted to ensure consistency between the EU format and the UNFCCC format.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

The technical guidance document under the MMR should be amended in the following way:

1. Add a field for numerical data in the reporting tables where MS can report financial resources mobilized through public interventions.

2. Add a requirement that MS who report such figures should provide methodological information how mobilized resources were estimated.

Seven Member States (AT, BE, DE, FR, PL, SE, UK) and the OECD commented on this proposal. One Member State (BE) stated that a discussion would be needed on this point, all others agree with the proposal. The OECD added that it would be important to obtain methodological

information from those MS reporting on mobilized resources and that one of the key aspects of DAC methods to measure mobilisation is related to the "attribution" of amounts mobilised to avoid double-counting: The attribution is determined based on common rules that all reporters follow for the sake of comparability."

5.12. Coverage of cross-cutting and other climate-specific finance

It should be further discussed how the **category 'cross-cutting' climate-specific finance** should be used. In the CTF for the biennial reports it is explained that cross-cutting should be used for 'funding for activities which are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation'. However, with the Rio Marker system, some countries assign a certain quantitative contribution to both adaptation and mitigation and hence allocate activities that have mitigation and adaptation components under the individual categories. As explained above, some Member States apply their own definitions to the category 'cross-cutting'. The share of total climate-specific finance which is reported as cross-cutting varies largely across Member States. This complicates the data aggregation at EU level.

Some Member States use the category **'other'** for the reporting of activities related to REDD+ / forestry activities. The category 'other' is generally not very frequently used and it is recommended that the guidance is amended in a way, that Member States could report forestry related activities under 'other', if they intend to report these activities separately. Given the high importance of REDD+ project activities for some countries, it may be useful to enable a separate reporting which captures these activities in a transparent way apart from the sectoral classification requested in the reporting tables.

Member States should be encouraged to report whether activities marked as "other" refer only to activities relevant to climate change and one or more of the other Rio Conventions (and in that case any of the steps proposed above would provide clarity on how these activities are addressed) or whether activities marked as "other" refer to any other situation. In this case, the MS should be encouraged to explain what the situation is and how the quantification of the support has been estimated. If the volume of support provided marked as "other" is significant, the proposal above should become a requirement.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

Option 1a: Keep the current guidance: cross-cutting multilateral finance should be used for 'funding for activities which are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation'.

Option 1b: cross-cutting should be used for 'funding for activities which are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation' **only if countries cannot assign a contribution to adaptation and mitigation through the use of Rio markers.**

Option 2: Add the following element to the technical guidance note: **Countries who like to separate finance flows provided to REDD+ activities or forestry activities should report such flows under 'other climate-specific finance'.**

Seven Member States (AT, BE, DE, NE, PL, SE, UK) and the OECD commented on this proposal. Two Member States (PL, SE) agree with all three options. Option 1a was additionally supported by one Member State (AT) and opposed by two Member States (NE, UK). Option 1b was additionally supported by one Member State (NE) and opposed by one Member State (UK); this Member State (UK) could agree with an amended option 1b "cross-cutting should be used for 'funding for activities which are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation' only if countries cannot assign a contribution to adaptation and mitigation through the use of Rio markers or a transparent national methodology”. Option 2 is additionally supported by two Member States (NE, UK).

The OECD comments that it is “important to understand if the cross-cutting amounts are to be added or subtracted from the mitigation and adaptation amounts”.

5.13. Identification of mitigation/adaptation activities and use of OECD DAC indicators

Most Member States use OECD DAC Rio Markers for the identification of mitigation and adaptation activities. The few MS that use a national approach should be encouraged to transition to the OECD DAC Rio Markers in order to enhance transparency and comparability.

The technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support under the MMR already requires Member States to specify and explain any difference from the OECD DAC or the Commission methodology. This recommendation may be emphasised and Member States should be required to provide a detailed description of the national methodology used and, ideally, an explanation of how it more accurately tracks climate relevant support provided to developing countries.

Given the level of development of the OECD DAC Rio Markers (including its recent proposed revision), no further recommendations with regards to the development of the marking methodologies are made in this report as this is subject to more detailed discussion in the respective working group under the OECD DAC. The OECD DAC is currently updating its Rio Markers guidance, taking into account inputs received form DAC members. Once such revised guidance is adopted, it should be reflected in the MMR technical guidance and Member States should be encouraged to use it as soon as practicable.

The use of coefficients for the quantification of climate support based on the Rio Markers should build on a common understanding, given the many approaches used and, on top of that, the level of discretion in their application. The only guidance so far on this topic is the description of the approach used at EU level which uses the coefficient of 0.4 (40%) in activities marked as significant. A more coordinated approach may be feasible given the fact that the reported approaches by MS are not extremely different. A transition period for the implementation of such a coordinated approach could be considered.

Furthermore, different MS use different approaches to address overlap or double counting of support provided in one activity marked with more than one marker (either just climate or with climate and any of the other Rio Conventions). While the approach above addresses double counting of support provided for adaptation and mitigation, it does not address overlap with markings related to other Rio Conventions. In that case and/or in the absence of a common approach in the application of coefficients, several steps can be considered to enhance accuracy and comparability of figures reported by MS:

1. MS to be required to describe the methodology used to address overlapping /double counting between Rio Conventions

2. MS to select methodology to address overlap / double counting between Rio Conventions from a list of methodologies in the MMR technical guidance

3. MS to be required to use on single methodology to address overlap / double counting between Rio Conventions included in the technical guidance (e.g. the sum of the coefficients for the three Rio Conventions never exceeds 100 %)

The third option would provide for higher accuracy and comparability of figures.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

Discuss whether it is possible to develop a common approach or at least apply some elements of the marking system in a consistent way.

As expected, Member States had quite different views related to further guidance that ensure a consistent use of the OECD marker system.

Three Member States (DE, FR, SE) and the OECD have commented on this proposal. Germany highlighted that the OECD indicative table, which provides further guidance could potentially be useful under the MMR as well. UK also expressed general concerns related to a common approach on coefficients and explained that the UK's national approach related to its dedicated climate finance fund ICF allows programmes that do not have climate as a 'principal' focus but do have 'significant' climate objectives to justifiably count a percentage of the programme as climate finance. This requires programmes to estimate, based on actual costs and evidence, the funds required to deliver climate results. UK considers this approach as a more robust way of counting climate finance.

In relation to **the use of coefficients for the determination of Rio Markers**, it is recommended that the level of comparability of MS is enhanced. It is recommended to discuss whether a common approach could be used with the aim to limit the discretion in the marking process and the resulting lack of comparability. The following options are proposed:

- An activity marked as principal: 100%
    - Option1: An activity marked as principal for adaptation and mitigation: each activity accounts with 50%
    - Option 2: An activity can only be marked as principal for either adaptation or mitigation.

Three Member States (DE, NE, SE) commented on this proposal, two of them (NE, SE) agreed with option 1 and disagreed with option 2. Germany describes their approach and explained that option 1 would not be allowed in the German approach implemented.

- An activity marked as significant:
    - Option 1: the activity counts with 40%
    - Option 2: the activity counts with 50%
- An activity marked as significant for adaptation and mitigation:
    - Option 1: If significant = 40%, the activity counts with 20% for adaptation and with 20% for mitigation
- Option 2: If significant = 50%, the activity counts with 25% for adaptation and with 20% for mitigation

Three Member States (DE, NE, SE) commented on this proposal, two of them (NE, SE) agreed with option 1, for Sweden option 2 would also be acceptable. The Netherlands disagreed with option 2. One Member State (DE) opposed the proposal and described the German approach chosen.

- To avoid double counting, the sum of coefficients for each marker should never exceed 100%. Any activity can only count as 100%, 40% (option 1), 50% (option 2) or 0%.
- In case of option 1 (40%): If an activity is marked for both mitigation and adaptation, only the highest marking will count when calculating the total climate relevant financial contributing of the activity.

France mentioned that they are not in favor of using coefficients imposed on Member States, but rather that each Member State should be encouraged and able to be as precise as possible and therefore able to apply the percentage rate it deems appropriate, while remaining transparent on how it chooses the percentage rate.

One Member State (PL) suggests that a more specific approach must first be agreed under the OECD DAC.

The OECD added that "In OECD DAC, the possibility to identify, through Rio markers, activities addressing both mitigation and adaptation is considered a strength, and attributing the related amounts to either mitigation or adaptation, using fixed percentages seems artificial. OECD suggested considering the overlap as a category on its own. The total for climate-related finance is then the sum of "mitigation (only)", "adaptation (only)" and the "overlap (both mitigation and adaptation)". The same approach could be applied to activities overlapping several Rio Conventions.

As the implementation of the Rio Markers are not reported by all MS, it is difficult to judge the administrative burden and changes in the reported financial flows from the options proposed above. The main changes would arise if common guidance would be adopted for the 'significant' marking.

In relation to **double counting between Rio Conventions** in the application of Rio Markers, the technical guidance document could be amended by the following options:

Option 1: MS should be required to describe the methodology used to address overlapping / double counting between Rio Conventions.

Option 2: MS should select methodology to address overlap / double counting between Rio Conventions from a list of methodologies in the MMR technical guidance.

Option 3: MS should be required to use one single methodology to address overlap / double counting between Rio Conventions included in the technical guidance (e.g. the sum of the coefficients for the three Rio Conventions never exceeds 100%).

The third option would provide for higher accuracy and comparability of figures, but may require changes of existing approaches used for some MS and higher administrative burden and will lead to differences in the reported figures for some MS.

Option 2 may be the approach with lowest administrative burden for MS and higher comparability in the description of the methodological approach compared to option 1.

On double counting across Rio Conventions, four Member States (BE, DE, FR, SE) commented on this proposal. Two Member States (DE, SE) agreed with option 1 and 2 and disagreed with option 3, arguing that double counting should not be avoided but transparently communicated.

One Member State (AT) is of the view that the discussion of coefficients and double-counting between Rio Conventions belong to OECD DAC and this discussion should not be preempted by technical guidance under MMR.

5.14. Calculating EU total climate finance/ imputed multilateral contributions

It is crucial to ensure transparency in reporting on imputed multilateral contributions to MDBs. The current technical guidance document proposes the following approach:

> *"Several MDBs provide estimates concerning the climate-related share within their portfolio, and attribute this back to DAC members, based on a pro-rata share of their core multilateral ODA disbursements in a given year. The European Commission will, if available on time, obtain the figures from OECD on imputed multilateral contributions in core/general finance, and add these values to the amount reported under the MMR. If the figures are not available on time before the ECOFIN Council Conclusions, they will not be included in this year's report. Notwithstanding, Member States still have the option to report their national figures; in the absence of a common approach as described above, these figures may be used in the aggregate EU report subject to methodological feasibility".*

This approach turned out to be difficult because final data from the OECD DAC was not available on time in order to use them to aggregate Member States' contributions to an aggregate figure on total EU climate finance. Moreover, the MDBs covered in the OECD DAC's reporting and those listed in the EU's CTF and MMR tables do not entirely overlap. The following options for reporting imputed multilateral contributions and including them into aggregate EU climate finance figures are available:

Option 1: Base reporting on climate-related projects identified in <u>outflows</u> from MDBs. Outflows refer to those financial resources financed out of MDB own resources[18] which are actually disbursed to recipient countries.

Climate-related development finance data is reported by MDBs as part of their overall reporting into the OECD-CRS or in a stand-alone file only listing climate projects. Such an approach would entail new methodological challenges as MDBs do not all report in the same way on projects that target both mitigation and adaptation (i.e. their approaches to using the Rio Markers and determining the "overlap" between mitigation and adaptation-relevant finance differs). Additionally, the point of measurement (commitment or board approval) also varies among institutions. MDB reporting also includes in some instances the reporting of guarantees which are at present excluded from the regular data collection of the DAC (OECD 2015c). Yet, basing reporting on outflows from MDBs could help to enhance comparability in reporting among Member States.

The OECD DAC recommends a methodology developed by the Technical Working Group of 19 bilateral climate finance providers to attribute multilateral outflows to developed countries in its

[18] Besides contributions from developed and developing countries, additional financing is mobilised by the MDBs drawing in on retained earnings and leveraging money from global capital markets on the basis of their capital, which is typically composed of „paid-in", and „callable" capital as well as „reserves" built up over the years (OECD 2015c).

latest report (OECD 2015a). To attribute outflows to specific developed countries, this methodology differentiates between contributions to concessional and non-concessional windows.

Concessional climate finance disbursed by MDBs can be differentiated into those resources coming from new contributions made during the most recent replenishment process by providing countries and from retained earnings (reflows from loans and other instruments, transfers from sister organisations and interests on investments).

The part reflecting resources from new contributions is multiplied by the share of a developed country's contributions in the most recent replenishment cycle. The part reflecting retained earnings is multiplied by a developed country's share in historical replenishment rounds (i.e. all replenishments except the most recent ones). The two terms are then added together and the resulting fraction represents the developed country's share of total climate finance flows from that window or entity for the relevant year. According to OECD DAC analysis, the weighted average for the share of *all* developed countries of total MDB outflows from concessional windows is estimated at 95%.

This results in the following formula:

$$\left[\left[x\left(\frac{Developed\ \ country\ \ contribution}{All\ \ contributions}\right)^{Current}\right]+\left[y\left(\frac{Developed\ \ country\ \ contribution}{All\ \ contributions}\right)^{Historical}\right]\right]\times\ Annual\ \ climate\ \ finance\ \ flows$$

where x is the portion of climate finance from the concessional window or fund that derives from recent contributions, and y is the portion that comes from retained earnings.

For non-concessional finance, the proposed methodology takes into account both paid-in capital[19] of the MDB and its callable capital[20] where the sovereign credit rating of the country providing it is above a certain threshold.[21] The share of flows attributable to a developed country is then determined by calculating the value of paid-in capital plus a fraction of eligible callable capital.

The value of paid-in capital is calculated for a developed country that is a shareholder of that MDB and then subsequently for all shareholders. The ratio of these two quantities provides an estimate of the share of non-concessional MDB finance that can be attributed to the developed country in question.

For the estimates reported by the MDBs, OECD DAC assumes that a fraction of 10% of the callable capital can be attributed to countries with a sovereign credit rating of A or above. This share varies, depending on the fraction of callable capital considered and the credit rating that is applied as a threshold. According to OECD DAC analysis, the weighted average of *all* eligible developed countries' share of total MDB outflows from non-concessional windows is estimated at 78%.

[19] Paid-in capital is the amount of capital actually paid by shareholders (ODI 2015).

[20] Callable capital are the contributions due to the MDB, subject to payment as and when required to meet the bank's obligations on borrowing of funds for inclusion in its ordinary capital resources, or guarantees chargeable to such resources. This functions as protection for holders of bonds and guarantees issued by the Bank in the unlikely event that it is not able to meet its financial obligations (ODI 2015).

[21] It is assumed that only callable capital from countries that are highly rated (i.e. A or above) is effective in strengthening an MDB's stand-alone financial strength.

This results in the following formula:

$$\left[\frac{Paid\text{-}in\ capital^{developed\ country} + (highly\text{-}rated\ callable\ capital^{developed\ country} \times 0.1)}{Paid\text{-}in\ capital^{all\ countries} + (highly\text{-}rated\ callable\ capital^{all\ countries} \times 0.1}\right] \times Annual\ climate\ finance\ flows$$

The factor 0.1 represents the discount rate to be applied to the callable-capital fraction of resources in order to recognise that paid-in capital has substantially more value than callable capital. The Technical Working Group of 19 climate finance providers proposes to set this discount rate at 10% (Technical Working Group 2015).

The following graph summarises the components for calculating a country's share in the outflows from MDBs:

Figure 5-1: Attributing outflows from MDBs to individual donor countries



Furthermore, OECD DAC adjusts the total multilateral climate finance outflows as recorded in DAC statistics to reflect the exclusion of coal-related finance and the inclusion of UNFCCC non-Annex II party recipients. These statistics reflect OECD DAC analysis based on data reported by MDBs and other international organisations (the Adaptation Fund, the CIFs, the GEF and the Nordic Development Fund).

However, it would need to be clarified with the OECD DAC whether data on outflows would be available each year on time in order to use this data as input to determine an EU aggregate climate finance figure. Additionally, it would need to be clarified whether data on individual countries' contributions to concessional resources as well as on individual countries' contributions to paid-in

capital and to callable capital which is used for non-concessional outflows could be obtained in time from the OECD DAC.

The outflows from MDBs have so far not been used for the reporting of aggregate EU figures and total figures could of course be different and inconsistent with previous years' reporting. This may result in difficulties in justification of the reported figures, in particular as the methodological approach to calculate the outflows is not very easy to understand.

If an approach to base contributions to multilateral institutions on outflows was chosen, this would have to be combined with a methodology based on inflows for those funds that do not report on their climate-related outflows to the OECD DAC. This is due to the fact that OECD DAC data is limited to key funds and MDBs. Thus, for those funds data as reported by Member States in their MMR reports would be the basis.

Option 2: Continue to base reporting on imputed multilateral contributions on inflows to MDBs[22]. This approach does not take public financed mobilised by the MDBs into account. There are several sub-options how this approach can be implemented. These options are also presented in Figure 5-2**:**

a. **Option 2a: Member States report on climate-specific funding by using (preliminary) imputed multilateral shares as provided by OECD**. For funds not covered by OECD reporting and for Member States which are not members of the OECD DAC, national figures on imputed multilateral contributions are used. If Member States provide nationally determined imputed multilateral shares for certain funds/institutions, it is recommended to indicate the climate-relevant percentage shares for each fund/institution in the methodological description and to explain how this share has been determined. **EU aggregate climate finance is calculated based on data reported in MS reports under the MMRs only**.

b. **Option 2b: MS report only core contributions** to multilateral funds included in OECD reporting and the Commission calculates imputed multilateral contributions based on (preliminary) imputed multilateral shares as provided by the OECD. For funds not covered by OECD reporting and for Member States which are not members of the OECD DAC, national figures on imputed multilateral contributions are used. If Member States provide nationally determined imputed multilateral shares for certain funds/institutions, it is recommended to indicate the climate-relevant percentage shares for each fund/institution in the methodological description and to explain how this share has been determined. **EU aggregate climate finance is calculated based on OECD DAC data for OECD DAC member states and funds/ institutions for which OECD imputed multilateral contributions are available and MMR reports for EU MS and for those funds not covered by OECD DAC reporting.**

c. **Option 2c: MS only report climate-specific contributions to multilateral funds not included in OECD reporting unless they are not OECD DAC Member States** and explain their approach for determining climate-specific shares for these funds. **EU aggregate climate finance is calculated based on OECD DAC data**

22 See http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/oecdmethodologyforcalculatingimputedmultilateraloda.htm for an explanation of the OECD's methodology for calculating imputed multilateral ODA.

for OECD DAC member states and MMR reports for other EU MS and for those funds not covered by OECD DAC reporting.

d. **Option 2d: MS report climate-specific contributions based on imputed multilateral shares provided by OECD or on the basis of national methodologies** and explain their approach. **EU aggregate climate finance is calculated based on data reported in MMRs only**.

e. **Option 2e:** MS report climate-specific contributions based on imputed multilateral shares provided by the OECD DAC or on the basis of national methodologies and explain their approach. EU aggregate climate finance is calculated based on OECD data for OECD DAC member states. For **other EU MS and those funds not covered by OECD DAC reporting**, **a consistent percentage rate for the climate-relevant share of contributions to these funds is developed** and applied to MS' reported figures by the Commission.

In 2015 only preliminary OECD DAC data on imputed multilateral contributions were available in October/November 2015 in order to calculate an aggregate EU climate finance figure. It is unclear whether such data might be available earlier in future years. This needs to be clarified with the OECD DAC.

The following graph summarises the options available to have a common reporting on imputed multilateral contributions:

Figure 5-2: Options for a common reporting on imputed multilateral contributions



Figure 5-2 presents different options for reporting on imputed multilateral contributions and adding reported data into an aggregate figure for EU climate finance. The options to be chosen depend on the availability of OECD DAC data. If data on MDB reporting on outflows to the OECD and individual country data on contributions to those MDBs cannot be made available to the Commission or is not available on time, reporting needs to be continued on the basis of inflows.

If reporting is done on the basis of inflows, it needs to be clarified as well whether OECD DAC data on imputed multilateral contributions would be available on time. Moreover, discrepancies have been identified between Member States' reporting to the OECD DAC on their multilateral and bilateral climate finance and the data that is reported in MMR reports and BRs. If Member States can agree to calculate an aggregate EU figure for climate finance on the basis of OECD DAC data and if this data is available on time, it could be used as a basis for reporting on contributions to a number of key funds and institutions that are covered by OECD DAC reporting.

For other funds, reporting would be based on the information provided in Member States' MMR reports. For this purpose, Member States should report further details on their approach towards calculating the climate-specific portion of contributions to these funds. On the basis of such information, it could then be evaluated whether a joint approach towards reporting on these funds could be developed by the Commission.

For those funds which are only reported by a few Member States, it is recommended to base reporting on nationally determined figures instead of developing a joint EU approach.

Table 5-1: Calculation of total EU climate finance for 2014 in Million €, with and without MMR-reported imputed multilateral contributions and with imputed multilateral contributions as calculated by OECD

Definition of EU total	Amount in Mio. €
A: EU total **with** imputed multilateral contributions as reported in MMR	13,612.12
B. EU total **without** imputed multilateral contributions as reported in MMR	12,480.10
C. Total imputed multilateral contributions **included in MMR reporting**	**1,132.03**
D. Total imputed multilateral contributions **as calculated by OECD**	**2,013.85**
E. EU total **with IMC as calculated by OECD**, **without IMC as reported in MMR (B+D)**	**14,493.95**

Note: the Figure for E. in the last line was the one used in the Council Conclusions on climate finance published on 10.11.2015

6. Task 3: Assessment of key aspects in reporting private climate finance in the EU and the broader UNFCCC context

6.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the key methodological developments in terms of tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions.

While several public and private, national and international entities are making efforts into developing methodologies for and actually tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions, the Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance (further referred to as OECD Research Collaborative) has developed a methodological proposal which compiles state of the art approaches proposed by such entities.

After such a collaborative effort by all key relevant organizations, it was deemed extemporary to analyse the individual methodologies developed by each entity, given that such effort has been made in the scope of the collaborative research and such individual methodologies have been fully taken into account in the framework proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative. In this context, and having been considered state of the art, this chapter focuses on the methodological framework proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative and in selected applications of this framework.

In addition, the chapter also notes parallel but convergent work being done by the MDBs and other development banks and institutions. Their work, however, goes beyond tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions, as it includes all co-finance, public or private, mobilized by the intervention of the MDBs and development banks. While not specific on mobilized private climate finance, the approach to tracking mobilized co-finance is relevant for the scope of this task. MDBs and other development banks and institutions have also been involved in the OECD Research Collaborative.

This chapter does not focus or include figures on private finance mobilized by public interventions, as it focuses exclusively on methodologies to that end. Private finance mobilized as reported by Member States has been included in the analysis of the previous chapters.

6.2. State of play of methodological work and discussions on private climate finance

There are several tracks of work on methodological approaches to track private climate finance, but they seem to be converging towards two greater initiatives: the OECD Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance and the Multilateral Development Bank's Joint Working Group on Tracking Climate Co-finance[23]. While the first is developing a methodology applicable to all, but focused on national public entities, the second is focused on multilateral development banks which are now outreaching to other (including national) development finance entities.

The OECD Research Collaborative, in particular, represents an important effort to identify and bring together all knowledge and experience in the field. Several studies and reports made available in the recent years have been produced as an input, a contribution to this collaborative effort. Among many others, the reports "Estimating mobilized private climate finance for developing

[23] This initiative tracks all co-financing additional to finance provided by the MDBs, public and private.

countries – a Norwegian pilot study"(Torvanger et al (2015)); "Estimating Private Climate Finance mobilise by France's Climate Interventions (Abeille et al (2015)); Pilot study of private finance mobilised by Denmark for climate action in developing countries" (Mostert, et al (2015) and the CPI report "Estimating mobilized private finance for adaptation: exploring data and methods" (Brown et al (2015)) are examples of such inputs. The three first reports describe the pilot implementation of the methodological framework proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative.

Given the magnitude of the effort ahead and the intrinsically complex and interconnected nature of private climate finance, despite the different on-going initiatives and studies, it seems apparent that there is a great coordination and sharing of effort among the promoters of such initiatives, to avoid both duplication of work and gaps.

From the literature, it is possible to identify collaborative work among the following key actors:

- OECD DAC
- OECD Research Collaborative
- MDBs
- UN Agencies and Organizations (such as the UNDP and the UNFCCC)
- other development finance banks and institutions, including national and subnational, namely via the International Development Finance Club (IDFC)
- Research institutions, think tanks and consultancy firms.

The initiative "Proposal of a methodology for tracking publicly mobilized private climate finance," coordinated by KFW involving nearly 20 Development Banks and Development Finance Institutions, pilots the application of the methodology proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative.

With regards to the UNFCCC negotiations, SBSTA initiated (UNFCCC, 2016) its consideration of the development of modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Paris Agreement, and invited Parties and observer organizations to submit views on the matter by August, 29th. Resources mobilized through public interventions include private finance. This work follows up the previous SBSTA agenda item on the matter that concluded at COP21 with slight adjustments of the Common Tabular Formats (UNFCCC, 2015).

6.2.1. OECD – Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance

The OECD Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance is an initiative led by the OECD aimed at contributing to *the development of more comprehensive methodologies for identifying private finance for climate action in developing counties, and more specifically for estimating publicly-mobilised private climate finance. The project is focused on technical issues in terms of identifying, developing, testing and evaluating possible methodological options as input to political discussions. Decisions and choices on key definitional issues and acceptable measurement and reporting methodologies (in particular for accounting purposes under the United*

Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) are out of scope as these need to take place at the political level[24]*.*

This initiative includes 18 organizations that contribute to research work and 7 financial institutions that act as technical input providers and reviewers[25]. 17 governmental partners, including the European Commission are also involved in the initiative. Government partners *are increasingly becoming actors of the collaborative research process by conducting or commissioning pilot studies, thereby testing data availability and the applicability of measurement and estimation methodologies at a national level* [26].

The OECD Research Collaborative consists both of new research proposed, funded and conducted via itself, as well as relevant pre-existing and on-going activities. It has been established in 2013 and it is expected that its final conclusions are published in 2017.

In the first phase, the focus was on the identification and assessment of methods to estimate private climate finance, as well as on exploring the availability of the required information. Based on this, a *four-stage framework of decision points and methodological options* has been developed. The on-going and future work under the OECD Research Collaborative until 2017 is to further develop and test the estimation methods based on the mentioned framework[27].

An actual account of the key conclusions and proposal by the OECD Research Collaborative will be made in sections below.

6.2.2. Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)

The MDB's Technical Working Group (MDB TWG or MDBs) has developed the "joint MDB approach for climate finance tracking and reporting". The MDB TWG is composed of 6 MDBs: African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the International Finance Corporate (IFC) and World Bank (WB).

The joint approach, consisting of a set of common key definitions (such as what is climate finance, what is mitigation finance, what is adaptation finance) serves as a tool for the MDBs to consistently measure their financial contribution to climate change in a transparent and harmonized manner.

The first "Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks' Climate Finance" has been published for 2011 and the last one for 2014. This chapter compiles data from the participating MDBs, collected using the common approach developed. Such reports do not cover public or private capital mobilized by MDB climate finance.

As a follow up to this effort, the MDBs have published in December 2015, a briefing paper "Tracking Climate Co-Finance: Approach proposed by MDBs," which seeks to expand the MDB climate finance tracking to also estimate financial resources invested alongside MDBs by external parties. This paper, on top of the common definitions agreed on the joint approach, includes a set of additional definitions relevant to determine climate co-finance, such as the actual definition of co-financing, causality and double counting (attribution).

[24] https://www.oecd.org/env/researchcollaborative/aim-and-objectives.htm

[25] https://www.oecd.org/env/researchcollaborative/researchers-group.htm

[26] https://www.oecd.org/env/researchcollaborative/government-partners.htm

[27] https://www.oecd.org/env/researchcollaborative/on-going-activities.htm

Recently, the MDBs have worked closely with the International Development Finance Club (IDFC), a group of 22 leading development finance institutions and regional banks around the world, to more closely align their approaches on mitigation finance tracking, having jointly published the MDBs-IDFC Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking and the Common Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Finance Tracking. This document consists of a set of common definitions and guidelines, including the list of activities for tracking mitigation and adaptation finance.

Box 1 Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking adopted by MDBs-IDFC

Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking

Introduction

The purpose of these Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking (or the Principles) is to set out agreed climate change mitigation finance tracking principles for development finance. […]The principles consist of a set of common Definitions and Guidelines including the list of activities […]

Purpose

The MDBs and the IDFC commit to the Principles in their respective, group-based climate mitigation finance reporting. MDBs and IDFC invite other institutions to adopt the Principles and therewith further increase transparency and credibility of mitigation finance reporting […]

Definitions

- An activity will be classified as related to climate change mitigation if it promotes “efforts to reduce or limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or enhance GHG sequestration”

- Reporting according to the Principles does not imply evidence of climate change impacts and any inclusion of climate change impacts is not a substitute for project-specific theoretical and/or quantitative evidence of GHG emission mitigation; projects seeking to demonstrate climate change impacts should do so through project-specific data.

6.2.3. International Development Finance Club (IDFC)

The IDFC is composed of 23 leading international, national and sub regional development banks from across the world, both from OECD and non-OECD countries[28].

The Green Finance Mapping is one of IDFC’s most important and renowned projects. With the aim of identifying and categorizing financial flows of IDFC Members to projects in the fields of green energy, adaptation and mitigation of climate change and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, the Green Finance Mapping Report offers a transparent view on the activities of IDFC Members.

The Green Finance Mapping provides consistent information on green finance flows from a major group of national, sub regional and international development banks based in OECD and non OECD countries, including domestic flows[29].

[28] http://www.idfc.org/Who-We-Are/members.aspx

The IDFC Green Finance Mapping for 2014, prepared by World Resources Institute together with the energy and climate consultancy Ecofys, used the MDBs-IDFC Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking.

The key definitions proposed by both the MDBs and the DFIs and their joint approach are reflected in a comparative analysis below in this chapter.

6.3. Methodologies: The OECD Research Collaborative Framework for Estimating Private Finance Mobilisation

As mentioned before, the effort led by the OECD in the scope of the research collaborative represents state of the art knowledge about practices, challenges and methodologies for tracking private climate finance. In this regard, it seems unwarranted to perform an analysis of any other methodological proposal given that the OECD Research Collaborative has done so and all relevant actors (including the European Commission) have contributed to the results and are converging towards the outcome of that collective effort.

The framework for estimating mobilised private climate finance is not considered to be a methodology to that effect, but rather a tool to support the development of a methodology or methodologies and is stepping stone towards the potential proposal of such a methodology by the OECD Research Collaborative. The framework identifies a series of steps in which key definitions and decisions need to be made along the process of estimating private climate finance mobilized by public interventions. The set of such definitions and decisions would constitute a methodology.

The current framework acknowledges that for each step a range of definitions or decisions can be made, thus recognizing that specific (national) circumstances need to be taken into account in the process. The framework now provides flexibility in the methodological approach towards estimating private finance mobilized by public interventions that should not be lost in further refinements of the proposal.

The framework for estimating private climate finance "structures methodological choices and options into four sequential but interrelated stages. The choice at any given point will influence the availability and feasibility of choices at other stages at other stages of the framework." (Jachnik et al (2015)).

Figure 1 represents the 4 sequential stages proposed by the framework and the respective definitions and decisions that need to be made at each of those stages.

Similar to the IPCC tier approach for the estimation of GHG emissions, the different choices will result in different accuracy, completeness and, as a consequence, different quality of the estimations of private finance mobilized. In addition to actual differing specific circumstances, the availability of quality information and the resources required for the application of a given definition or decision will greatly determine the choices made.

[29] http://www.idfc.org/Our-Program/green-finance-mapping.aspx

Figure 6-1 Stages that define key choices and options as part of the framework for estimating mobilised private climate finance

Stage 1. Define core concepts

- Definition of climate change activities
- Definition of public and private finance
- Classification of developed and developing countries
- Determination of geographical origin of finance

Stage 2. Identify public interventions and instruments that can be credited for mobilising private climate finance

- Types of public interventions
- Specific instruments used for the interventions

Stage 3. Value public interventions and account for total private finance involved

- Choice and conversion of currency
- Choice of point of measurement
- Valuation of different public interventions
- Boundaries and estimation of private finance involved
- Availability of climate-specific private finance data or proxies

Stage 4. Estimate mobilised private climate finance

- Assessment of causality between public interventions and private finance
- Attribution of mobilised private climate finance to public interventions and instruments

Source: Jachnik et al (2015)

6.3.1. Way forward

The steps proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative framework are well sequenced. In order to facilitate getting a closer idea of the potential for mobilized private finance and while noting that fully implementing the framework might take longer, MS could be requested to, shortly, perform stages 1 and 2. In doing so, each MS would have a clear mapping of all the organizations deploying public instruments to mobilize private climate finance.

After such exercise, MS could start collecting data, eventually giving priority to those entities and/or instruments which may have a greater potential for mobilizing private climate finance or, alternatively, to those which pose lesser challenges in data collection and handling.

This would constitute a stepwise approach, which would progressively bring MS to the same level of preparedness. Those ready to move faster should be encouraged to do so.

6.4. Definitions proposed and decisions made in the pilot application of the framework

As described above, the OECD Research Collaborative does not propose a unified methodology, rather it provides a framework, an approach that practitioners may use in their efforts to track private climate finance mobilized by public interventions.

In their application of that framework, practitioners are required to make a set of decisions, namely in relation the definitions applicable to the different steps. The OECD Research Collaborative approach provides a step by step guidance on how to track private climate finance mobilized by public interventions, without imposing strict requirements on what and when is to be included. The framework provides an opportunity for practitioners to reflect their specific circumstances in the actual methodological approach resulting from the application of the framework.

In that sense, while there has been an effort to streamline definitions (building upon the efforts being made to track general public climate finance), there has not been an effort to make a uniform methodology (a single track, without options) and it seems that it should not be desirable to go down that avenue (at least not before practitioners gain more experience in using a more flexible approach).

The key concepts and definitions relevant to tracking of private climate finance mobilized by public interventions included in the framework are (details on these concepts are provided below as an introduction to the comparative analysis):

- Climate change activities, otherwise referred to also as low carbon and resilient (LCR) activities
    - Mitigation Activities
    - Adaptation Activities
- Public finance
- Private finance
- Mobilization of private finance by public initiatives
    - Causality
    - Attribution
    - Boundaries
- Definition of developed and developing country
    - In relation to the origin of financing and/or of policy
    - In relation to the recipient of the finance
- Types of public interventions that mobilize private finance
- Specific instruments to mobilize private finance
- Point of measurement and exchange rates

Nonetheless, while all these concepts and definitions are relevant to tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions (either policy or financial), only a few are specific to mobilized private climate finance, while the others are relevant to overall tracking of public climate finance. The concepts specific to mobilized private climate finance are:

- Definition of public and private finance
- The causality between a public intervention and private finance
- The attribution of private finance to a given public intervention
- The types of policies and of specific instruments used in public interventions to mobilize private finance.

While covering all relevant concepts and definitions below, we provide greater focus to those specific to tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions.

In the sections below, a description of the key concepts is offered, based on Jachnik et al (2015). In addition, the tables in each section include the definitions and decisions proposed by these authors (as short-term options, that can be understood as potential preferred options to start with, subject to revision in the future based on experience), and the definitions and decisions made by the KfW (with several other development finance institutions), and by Denmark, France and Norway in the pilot application of the OECD Research Collaborative framework.

When applicable, the relevant definitions of the MDBs and the International Development Finance Club and other entities are also provided in the overview table to enhance completeness and comparability.

6.4.1. Climate change activities

As pointed out by Jachnik, et al (2015), while there are no agreed definitions, there certainly is a number of proposed and operational definitions of low carbon and resilient (LCR) activities, namely those proposed by the OECD DAC Rio Markers and those by the MDBs and IDFC. He also notes that, given the extensive collaboration among the relevant actors, there are many points of contact and convergence among these definitions, as they build upon each other.

The table below provides a brief overview of the definitions proposed and/or use by key relevant actors.

Table 6-1: Definition of Low Carbon Resilient (LCR) Activities

Author of the definition / approach	Mitigation	Adaptation
OECD Research Collaborative	Defining LCR activities: Provide transparency on definitions used e.g. provide an explicit list; refer to existing approaches such as the OECD DAC Rio markers, joint-MDB positive list for mitigation activities.	
OECD DAC Rio Markers	An activity should be classified as climate-change-mitigation related if it contributes to the objective of stabilisation of greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system by promoting efforts to reduce or limit GHG emissions or to enhance GHG sequestration.	An activity should be classified as adaptation-related if it intends to reduce the vulnerability of human or natural systems to the impacts of climate variability and change, by maintaining or increasing adaptive capacity and resilience, and/or reducing exposure to climate variability and change.
MDBs	(Replaced by the definition proposed under the MDBs-IDFC Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking described below)	Three steps to the definition: <u>Context of vulnerability to climate variability and change:</u> for a project to be considered as one that contributes to adaptation, the context of climate vulnerability must be set

Author of the definition / approach	Mitigation	Adaptation
		out clearly using a robust evidence base. This could take a variety of forms, including use of material from existing analyses and reports, or original, bespoke climate vulnerability assessment analysis carried out as part of the preparation of a project. <u>Statement of purpose or intent:</u> The project should set out how it intends to address the context- and location-specific climate change vulnerabilities, as set out in existing analyses, reports or the project's climate vulnerability assessment. <u>Clear and direct link between climate vulnerability and project activities:</u> in line with the principles of the overall MDB climate finance tracking methodology, only specific project activities that explicitly address climate vulnerabilities identified in the project documentation are reported as climate finance.
IDFC[30]	Broad criteria and positive list based on OECD DAC Rio Markers.	Broad criteria and positive list based on OECD DAC Rio Markers.
MDBs-IDFC Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking Common Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Finance Tracking	An activity will be classified as related to climate change mitigation if it promotes "efforts to reduce or limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or enhance GHG sequestration". Reporting according to the Principles does not imply evidence of climate change impacts and any inclusion of climate change impacts is not a substitute for project-specific theoretical and/or quantitative evidence of GHG emission mitigation; projects seeking to demonstrate climate change impacts should do so through project-specific data.	*Adaptation finance tracking relates to tracking the finance for activities that address current and expected effects of climate change, where such effects are material for the context of those activities*[31].

[30] Where relevant, these definitions have now been replaces by the MDBs-IDFC Common Principles

[31] This is a preliminary definition, used to frame the work between the MDBs and IDFC. It will be further refined as the work on this subject is concluded.

Author of the definition / approach	Mitigation	Adaptation
KfW	Same as IDFC (see above)	
France	*Different approaches across the French administration. The MDBs/IDFC and the Rio Markers are quoted as being used or as source of inspiration.*	
Denmark	OECD DAC Rio Markers	
Norway	OECD DAC Rio Markers	

While there still is no absolutely consistent definition of climate relevant activities and while the actual application of these definitions is subject to an important degree of discretion, there is a clear convergence to the definition proposed by the OECD DAC Rio Markers and the key concepts behind it.

6.4.1.1. Way forward

In order to enhance transparency and comparability of data collection, MS should be required to use only the OECD DAC Rio Markers definition of climate change mitigation and adaptation activities. For most MS that is already the case, only a few MS divert (either fully or partially from this approach). In this regard, a strict mandatory rule on this topic may on the one hand bring little actual improvements compared to the current situation, but could also be met easily and enhance greatly the perceived transparency of EU and MS reporting on mobilized private climate finance.

6.4.2. Public finance and private finance

While the definition of public and private finance should seem clear cut, the fact that corporate ownership is a complex matter (namely for those with public and private shareholders or with complex control schemes), allows for some discretion in classifying a given entity as public or private.

It may be accepted that the most relevant instruments, including financial instruments, used to mobilize private climate finance come from clearly public entities (such as development agencies and banks), but in several cases, public service is being carried out by private entities and, on the other hand, public entities act as private market players. There is no clear black and white solution for these grey areas and it seems that it will be up to each country to decide, case by case, whether a given instrument is to be considered public for the purpose of tracking private climate finance mobilized by it. The volume of financing involved in these grey areas is not determined, but is deemed to not to account for a great share.

As can be seen from the definitions described in the table below, the most commonly used definition to public finance is that being committed by an entity that is at least owned or controlled 50% by a public shareholder / entity.

In relation to linking private finance to the public intervention, some require that an explicit link between the two is made, that it can be demonstrated that the public intervention had the aim and the capacity to mobilize the private finance and that the private finance would actually not happen if it were not for the public intervention. Not all authors in the table below address this link, while others (namely the OECD-CPI study) propose a rather complex and rigorous approach.

Table 6-2: Definition of public and private finance

Author of the definition / approach	Public finance	Private finance	Mobilized private finance
OECD Research Collaborative	Large institutions/transactions: analyse the public/private nature of finance provided. Small institutions/transactions or joint ventures: take a practical approach (e.g. based on majority ownership); consider existing definitions in that process e.g. OECD DAC, Eurostat.		
KfW	Finance committed by an institution which is at least 50% owned by one or several governments or government controlled institution.	Private climate finance is defined as limited to financing of assets that are in majority private ownership (i.e. “private investment” corresponding to equity) or established or purchased with third party financing originating directly from the private sector (i.e. “private capital” corresponding typically to debt.	Direct private co-financing at the level of the activity, credit line or structured fund. There needs to be a demonstrated supporting (mobilizing) link to a financial activity by a public sector actor. This public sector financial activity must be suitable to support a positive decision in favour of the specific investment.
OECD – CPI (on private adaptation finance)			Publicly-mobilized private finance for adaptation is the private finance invested as a result of adaptation-related public interventions, which can typically take the form of finance or policies. For the purposes of this study, the focus is on developed countries’ public finance interventions to mobilize private finance for climate adaptation in developing countries. Estimating private finance mobilization requires demonstrating or making plausible assumptions about the causal link between public

Author of the definition / approach	Public finance	Private finance	Mobilized private finance
			interventions and the amount of private finance claimed to have been mobilized as a result of such interventions. Direct private finance mobilization is defined as private finance that is co-financed alongside public finance into the same project, program or fund and which is invested as a direct result of the provision of public finance (or guarantee) to that same project, program or fund. Intermediated-direct private finance mobilization is defined as private finance that is invested alongside public finance and as a direct result of that public finance, but where the public finance is initially provided one step upstream of the private investment, and is intermediated via a fund, a fund of funds, or a bank account (e.g., a credit line). Indirect private finance mobilization is defined as private finance that is invested as a result of a public finance intervention, but where the public finance intervention supports enabling outputs that occur one or more steps upstream of the private investment.
MDBs	Public and private sources: Climate Co-Finance is segmented into public and private sources, based primarily on the shareholding structure of the external institution providing the co-financing [no further details].		
France	At least 50% of the capital is owned by public shareholders. Some French publicly owned companies operate in the competitive market. Their financing is not		(see causality below)

Author of the definition / approach	Public finance	Private finance	Mobilized private finance
	considered public.		
Denmark	If more than 50% of the shareholders are public, the entity is considered public.	Public companies operating according to commercial principles are considered private.	
Norway	At least a 50 % public ownership and operating under a mandate of subsidiarity (The subsidiarity principle implies a mission to build the private sector and that public money is used to 'crowd in' or mobilize private development finance).	Some public companies not acting under a subsidiarity mandate have been included in the private sector.	

6.4.2.1. Way forward

The definitions proposed to define public and private finance are mostly similar and point to the same overall general understanding. Some nuances and flexibility in definitions might be important to maintain in order to take specific circumstances into account (namely the definition of public / private finance for other non-climate related purposes – such as corporate governance matters).

Nonetheless, a strong recommendation should be made in relation to those entities that, despite having a public shareholder, act in a fully competitive market and are not fulfilling a public mandate. Financing originating from such entities should not be considered public.

6.4.3. Definition of countries and origin of private finance

The definition of countries as developed and developing or between Annex I and non-Annex I (as per the UNFCCC reporting guidelines), creates some challenges, as the lists are not a perfect match. This definition is important to determine whether fluxes are between Annex I and non-Annex I countries or between developed and developing countries. In this regard, there does not seem to be a more preeminent option either way (even when mobilization of private climate finance is not at stake, only provision of public resources). Given the current language of the Paris Agreement, it is expectable that there will be a tendency for more actors to choose developed/developing rather than Annex I / Non-Annex I, but currently that is still not discernible.

Private climate finance can be mobilised from developed *and* developing countries. If it is sometimes already complex to determine whether an entity is public or private, in many circumstances it is even harder to determine the country to which it belongs to. How to determine an entities nationality? Is it where it is headquartered (what about companies with independent branches?)? Is it in relation to the nationality of its key shareholders? Can all shareholders be tracked, even reference ones? How far should we track the shareholders of shareholders?

In this sense, many argue that, tracking private climate finance should include all private finance mobilized, identifying, when possible, whether the origin of such private finance is from a developed or a developing country entity.

Table 6-3: Definition of geographical origin

Author of the definition / approach	Definition of countries	Origin of (private) finance
OECD Research Collaborative	There are several different dynamic and static lists available that could be used to classify countries as developed or developing.	*Assigning a geographical origin to finance:* Use the headquarter location of the ultimate (if information available) or intermediate parent of the entity providing funds. Known cases of multiple country ownership/funding (e.g. MDBs) need to be considered separately *Handling multiple country ownership/funding:* Either do not assign a country of origin or take a pro-rata approach (based on shareholdings or amounts of funds provided) on a case-by-case basis depending on information availability *Which geographical source of private finance to include:* If/where assigning a country of origin is technically feasible and meaningful, run two scenarios in order to provide a range: one including aggregate private finance mobilised from all origins; one including only private finance assigned to developed country entities.
KfW	Official development assistance recipient country list maintained by the OECD DAC. A country included in this list eligible to receive ODA is categorized as developing by the methodology proposed by KfW. By opposition, all others are developed.	All sources of private co-finance irrespective of origin in order to be neutral in respect to the type of players (domestic or international) involved in a developing country
France	Developed Countries = Annex I Countries Developing Countries = Non Annex I Countries	Total private finance includes private finance from Annex I Countries and private finance from non-Annex I countries

Author of the definition / approach	Definition of countries	Origin of (private) finance
Denmark	Developed Countries = Annex I Countries Developing Countries = Non Annex I Countries	Total private finance includes private finance from Annex I Countries and private finance from non-Annex I countries
Norway	n.a.	n.a.

6.4.3.1. Way forward

In order to have a full picture of the mobilization potential of any public instrument, MS should be required to track all private finance mobilized by their public instruments, irrespective of its origin.

6.4.4. Types of public policy and public finance interventions used to mobilise private finance

Different types of public interventions and of public financial instruments can be said to have the capacity to mobilize private climate finance.

According to Jachnik et al (2015):

- Public finance interventions are those in which a public entity provides direct financial support to a project, programme, fund or enterprise.
- Public policy interventions consist of a broad set of interventions that can help to indirectly support low carbon resilient projects and activities as well as shape country and markets to achieve LCR goals.

In this context, actors can choose to account for private climate finance mobilized by one, the other or both types of public interventions.

As for public policy information, the following have been identified by Jachnik et al (2015):

- Regulatory policy
    - Laws and policies
    - Plans and targets
    - Standards
    - Quotas
- Fiscal policy
    - Taxes

  - Subsidies and tax reliefs/credits
  - Market support
- Information and innovation policy
  - Research and development
  - Licenses and patents
  - Technology transfer
  - Education and awareness
  - Data and statistics.

In relation to financial instruments potentially used in public interventions to mobilize private climate finance, Jachnik et al (2015) list the following:

- Grants
- Debt
  - Loans
  - Credit lines
  - Bonds
  - Debt funds
  - Subordinated debt (mezzanine finance)
- Equity
  - Direct equity investments
  - Shares in equity funds
  - Preferred equity
- De-risking
  - Insurances
  - Guarantees
  - Derivatives

Denmark identifies different types of instruments for different types of interventions:

- Policy and regulatory support is mainly provided through Technical Assistance financed by grants,
- Project preparation support is also mostly support by grants,
- Project implementation is commonly supported by non-grant instruments.

The different types of public interventions pose different challenges in determining the causality link and, in consequence, the attribution of private climate finance to a given public intervention. While a grant to support the development of a plan may pave the way for several private investments for several years, the clear causality link might be difficult to establish and in particular avoiding double counting with other more specific financial interventions used in that context would be extremely difficult.

Table 6-4: Definition of public interventions and financial instruments

Author of the definition / approach	Public Interventions	Financial Instruments
OECD Research Collaborative	Focus on public finance interventions for which data is available or can be collected in the short term (e.g. grants, loans, equity investments). This is likely to disregard the impact of public policies in mobilising private climate finance.	
KfW		Loans, equity positions, guarantees, grants, revolving use of credit lines or green funds.
France	All public interventions leading to mobilising private climate finance in accordance with the EU's common understanding of mobilised private climate finance which specifies that these financial flows are: 1) mobilised by public finance, or by a public intervention, including in the sphere of policy and regulatory reform, and 2) climate relevant in accordance with criteria used by relevant international organisations such as the OECD and Multilateral Development Banks (cf. ECOFIN Council Conclusions, November 2014). However only public finance for project implementation can be estimated.	Respectively, for the three categories, three types of instruments are typically used: 1) technical assistance and grants 2) technical assistance and grants 3) all possible financial instruments (grants, equity, loans, guarantees…) – capital expenditures for the most part, also called project finance.
Denmark	All public interventions in three categories[32]:	Respectively, for the three categories, three types of instruments are typically used:

[32] Denmark considers it to be very difficult to track private finance mobilised by policy and regulatory support and by project preparation support.

	1) policy and regulatory support 2) project preparation support 3) project implementation and project finance	1) technical assistance and grants 2) grants 3) non-grant instruments

6.4.4.1. Way forward

Given the complexity, in particular, of the financial instruments with the potential to mobilize private finance, there seem to be little merit in arguing for an agreed definition of such instruments in this context. For the most part, these instruments are clearly defined under financial regulations and through the financial market.

6.4.5. Point of measurement, exchange rates and valuation of the intervention

The two first topics: point of measurement and exchange rates are straightforward. In relation to the point of measurement, the options are at commitment or at disbursement. Most entities track finance (including private finance mobilized) at commitment (board approval), even though some recognize that the value disbursed may be different (usually lower) than the value committed. For that reason, some measure at disbursement.

With regards to exchange rates, climate finance should be reported in USD. Reporting countries should make a transparent (and consistent) choice of exchange rates.

Valuing the instrument is a more complex issue, resulting from a 2014 OECD decision[33], support provided to developing countries is valued taking into account the risk associated with the instrument used. In that sense, the grant is considered the instrument with the highest value (risk), because there will be no return to the investment. In that sense, a concessional loan should have a greater value than a non-concessional loan, because less of the first will be reimbursed than of the second. Take the case for a guarantee – it may actually never be used, it may never be disbursed (even though it performed its task of mobilizing private climate finance). Should it be valued by its face value (a guarantee of USD 1 Million has a USD 1 Million face value) or its *grant equivalent value* (to be determined in accordance to methodology proposed by the OECD), thus reflecting the fact that, while risky, it may never actually be disbursed? Given the fact that face value is the simpler, more straightforward approach, it is the most commonly used.

Table 6-5: Definitions of point of measurement, exchange rates and valuation of the instrument

Author of the definition / approach	Point of measurement	Exchange rates	Valuation of the instrument
OECD	Measure finance at the point of	Build upon/make use of available	Build upon/make

[33] DAC High Level Meeting Final Communiqué, December 16 2014

Author of the definition / approach	Point of measurement	Exchange rates	Valuation of the instrument
Research Collaborative	commitment; cross-check with disbursement data, where available	international statistical standards to report in either the currency in which the finance was committed, or an international currency along with information on the exchange rate used and date of conversion.	use of approaches used or being developed by the development finance community e.g. OECD DAC
KfW	At commitment	Conversion to USD using exchange rate from local currency on July 1st for past commitments. For planned interventions the exchange rate used is of the 1st working day of the ongoing year.	Face value
France	According to each institution´s method. Most institutions choose to estimate mobilised private finance at board approval (when a project is presented for decision including all other – public and private – co-finance).	OECD annual exchange rates	Face value
Denmark	At disbursement is more accurate then at commitment. However, private sector is wary of report on disbursements. So, measurement at commitment, applying a discount rate to take into account declining ratio from commitment to disbursements (private finance declining ratio (discount rate) from commitment to disbursement is used by checking the public finance disbursement in comparison to the commitment).	OECD annual exchange rates	Core / Default scenario: face value Sensitivity scenario: grant equivalent

6.4.5.1. Way forward

It seems only reasonable to ask for harmonization in relation to the exchange rate (use the OECD yearly average exchange rate). With regards to point of measurement, MS should report at the

point where data can be collected with more confidence (for most is at commitment). With regards to valuation of the instrument, it is becoming good practice to value it at grant equivalent. However, only few countries have developed capacity to do so and in that regard, most report at face value.

6.4.6. Mobilization of private climate finance

Closely linked to the discussion on definition of “mobilized private finance” above, is the definition of causality: can it be determined that a given private climate financing took place due to a public intervention? If so, to what extent? Fully? Partially?

When more than one public entity intervenes in the mobilization of private climate finance, it is necessary to attribute portions of the amounts mobilized to the specific public interventions. Several options exist, the simplest one being a pro-rata approach. Other, more complex approaches take into account the risk and the relative importance of each public intervention in attributing a portion of the private climate finance mobilized.

Finally, a third variable that may be taken into account are the boundaries to the causality and consequent attribution of mobilized private finance to a given public intervention, namely in relation to time (will only private finance mobilized at the time of the public intervention be attributed or will it be attributed throughout the project life-time?) and to the reach of the instrument used.

Table 6-6: Definitions of causality, attribution and boundaries

Author of the definition / approach	Causality	Attribution	Boundaries
OECD Research Collaborative	Take a differentiated approach by assuming blanket causality where there is a clear argument for doing so, e.g. absence of any relevant public interventions and weak enabling environment. Assign partial causality using default mobilization factors for relevant public policies where the relationship between public	*When blanket causality assumed:* either no-attribution to individual entities/interventions (aggregate estimate and collective reporting of mobilisation) or attributing based on readily available information, such as taking a pro rata approach based on the volume of funding and type of finance provided. *When causality is assessed:* - *Assessing causality for public finance*: If a risk-based approach is selected, use simple rules based on the relative risk positions of public and private finance. - *Temporal issues*: Consider private finance only within the direct scope of the activity	*For syndicated loans involving a public actor*: Account for all the private finance associated with the loan syndicate *For public investments in equity funds*: Only account for private finance at the direct fund-level. *For public guarantees*: Account for the total private finance instrument (loan, equity) to which the public guarantee applies.

Author of the definition / approach	Causality	Attribution	Boundaries
	interventions and private finance is particularly complex.	supported by the public intervention. This can include private finance invested before or after public finance was committed where appropriate (apply declining mobilization rate/tapering factor). - *Adjusting for the effects of LCR-specific public policies and/or broader country and market conditions*: Where possible, use transparent assumptions (e.g. a default factor to attribute mobilization to a policy intervention); report qualitatively on the presence/absence of indirect public interventions and policies otherwise.	
KfW	Volume based blanket causality. A clear supporting ("mobilizing") link between the financial activity by a public sector actor and the private finance must be determined.	Volume based pro rata	The following list specifies the boundaries of publicly mobilized private finance foreseen in the methodology: Loans by private sector actors mobilized by DFI loans Loans by private sector actors mobilized by DFI equity positions Loans by private sector actor mobilized by DFI guarantees Equity from private sector mobilized by DFI loans Equity from the private sector actor mobilized by DFI equity positions Loans by private sector actor mobilized by DFI grants for financing (e. g., to cover costs of a renewable energy feed-in law or premium or emission reduction credits from the Clean Development Mechanism) Equity from private sector actor

Author of the definition / approach	Causality	Attribution	Boundaries
			mobilized by DFI grants (e. g., to cover costs of a renewable energy feed-in law or premium or emission reduction credits from the Clean Development Mechanism) Loans to the private sector generated by the revolving use of credit lines or green funds (subtract original loan to avoid double counting)
France	100% causal relationship between the public intervention and private finance	Volume based attribution	Time dimension: private co-finance at the moment of the public intervention.
Denmark	100% causality	Core / Default scenario: volume-based pro rata Sensitivity scenario 1: concessionality-based pro rata Sensitivity scenario 1	Syndicated loans: account for all private project finance. The bank in charge of syndication usually provides the majority of the project (debt) finance. We therefore argue that the lead bank has mobilised all project finance. Equity participation: account for all private project finance. This includes: the percentage of private finance at the fund level and private co-finance at project level. For instance: the GCPF has one private investor at fund level, which accounts for 9% of the total fund. If GCPF finances 10 million to a climate project, 9% is counted as mobilised private finance. If a private co-financer invests 2 million to the climate project, this is counted as mobilised private finance as well. Total mobilised private climate finance: 2.9 million. Public guarantees: total face value of the private finance instrument to which it applies. This is in line with the OECD DAC.

Author of the definition / approach	Causality	Attribution	Boundaries
			Time dimension: Only private co-finance at the moment of the public intervention.
Norway		Volume-based pro rata	

6.4.6.1. Way forward

In relation to causality, there does not seem to be enough confidence and knowledge at the time to opt for something different to blanket causality.

In relation to attribution, in order to avoid gaps or overlaps, there should be an effort to harmonize approaches, but only in relation to the participants involved in the same instrument. As it happens, that is usually the case already (more often than note, an MDB is part of such instruments and it facilitates such an agreement among participants).

With regards to boundaries, there is an interest in allowing for different approaches to be tested in order to gain more experience and develop stronger methodological guidance on the matter.

6.5. Challenges in data collection

Data for private climate finance mobilized by public interventions is not readily available and is a rather complex venture. At the very simplest form of data unavailability, these data is simply not collected in a systematic fashion and, in cases, current approaches to financing or project planning and documentation may not even be able to provide the necessary information. It seems apparent that no entity has currently established a system which allows for the regular collection of data.

There are (more or less robust) systems to collect information on developed countries public climate interventions (policy and financial) in developing countries and databases which compile and store such information. Reporting by OECD members to the OECD DAC CRS (Creditor Reporting System) is the most preeminent exercise. Current reporting by annex I countries to the UNFCCC within the context of Biennial Reports is also promoting the establishment of a system and has already allowed for the collection of data for four years (2011 to 2014).

On the other hand, while there are some (mostly commercial) databases on private climate finance, they are mostly non-transparent (in relation to some key parameters required for the purpose of estimating mobilized private finance, for example in relation to the origin of financing and in relation to the (causal) link with a public intervention) and considered to be extremely incomplete or non-exhaustive. Some of the best databases cover large mitigation projects, namely on renewable energy but for anything smaller and adaptation projects there seems to be a large gap of information.

Annex VI (section 9.6) includes figures (Jachnik et.al. 2015) providing a detailed picture of the existing databases including information on public interventions and private finance for low carbon and resilient activities.

Given the approach proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative framework, however (in which tracking private climate finance starts by identifying those public interventions that have the potential to mobilize private finance), it seems likely that centralized databases will actually not need to play a central role in this process (further on this below).

Centralized databases might, nonetheless, play an important role in the following circumstances:

- If attribution to a specific country is not a requirement (in case of collective reporting),
- For those public policy interventions with a broad policy scope (e.g. aimed at enhancing overall enabling environments or designing relevant national strategies or programmes), for which direct causality may be harder to establish and in which circumstances, the country of origin of the public intervention might not have full access to activities in the recipient country (that is particularly relevant when private finance is mobilized by a public intervention that took place long time before),
- For reporting on private finance (not only on private finance mobilized by public interventions).

Namely in the scope of the OECD Research Collaborative, in estimating private climate finance mobilized by public intervention, have analysed their respective data collection system and data availability. Generally, it can be said that, after their experiences, data on mobilized private finance is for the most part not readily available, that the most pragmatic approach is to start collecting by the public entities mobilizing private finance and that centralized data bases and the use of leverage factors are incomplete and too uncertain respectively.

Denmark noted *that there were only few programmes that could provide data on private finance that was detailed and accurate enough to include in the quantification exercise. A major part of the public climate finance could thus not be linked to private finance mobilised.[…] 63% of the Danish public finance that was deemed of relevance for this study could not deliver any data on private finance.* It noted also that *those who did deliver data did not (not always) have the correct data readily available in their systems. They had to go back to original project documents in their files (very labour intensive process) to collect the requested information. Looking back without a well-established MRV system in place is not only time consuming but also prone for inaccuracies.*

Benn et al (2016) stated that *data on amounts mobilised are often available in project documentation. However, some data are more available than others. Data on the face value of the loan guaranteed by the institution, on the total amount of private investments in syndications, and on private investments in investment funds are often available. On the contrary, data on the amount mobilised by equity or mezzanine investments are more difficult to obtain. Data on the total project cost seem also to be available, however many DFIs highlighted the low quality of these data. They mentioned that data on the total project cost were often a supplementary field in their systems, subject to the project manager interpretation of the project boundaries*.

Brown et al (2015) also noted that, specifically on mobilized private finance for adaptation activities: *given the significant limitations in using existing databases to estimate mobilized private finance for adaptation highlighted here, a practical starting point for improving data lies with the public finance providers and working to more systematically monitor private co-finance.*

Jachnik and Raynaud (2015) argue that priority efforts need to be put on improving *primary data collection […] by public finance institutions on private co-financing*. Without this improvement on primary data collection, information contained on commercial databases (such as the Bloomberg New Energy Finance) and leverage ratios (to be used as proxy in case of data gaps) will be too uncertain to be used.

Given the state of the art experience described above, it seems important to highlight that entities involved or promoting public interventions with the potential to mobilize private finance will hold the key to data collection. In order to do so, they should establish systems that are capable of regularly, consistently, transparently and exhaustively doing so.

Abbeile et al (2015) noted that, despite deficiencies, the collection of data for France's pilot testing of the OECD Research Collaborative framework was not too difficult due to the dedication of the institutions involved, but in particular due to the fact that the number of institutions managing public interventions capable of mobilizing private climate finance are only four. It may be expected that in other countries the number of relevant entities is not much larger than that in France, thus making it somewhat simple to set up a system.

In this context where it is of paramount importance for national institutions to start collecting data on mobilized private climate finance, the following steps should be implemented:

- Identify the entities that manage public interventions with the potential to mobilize private climate finance,
- Interview these entities to identify and analyse the types of public intervention instruments (policy and/or financial) and to assess accessibility of data (namely historical data),
- Train the entities on methodological issues related to tracking mobilized private climate finance,
- Establish a formal data collection system (or include data on mobilized private finance in arrangements on collection of public climate finance already in place), including the definition of data collection needs.

The table below describes the questionnaire used by France (Abbeile et al 2015) for the collection of data at project level that can be used as a basis for the definition of data collection needs. This questionnaire was used for an isolated data collection. When this information is collected together with the regular data on provision of public climate support (for the OECD DAC, for example), the relevant items below would be integrated in such collection procedures.

Table 6-7: Questionnaire for data collection on mobilized private finance

Project Information	**Information on public finance**	**Information on private finance mobilized**
Project ID	Amount committed by the entity	Co-financier 1 - Name - Country - Amount committed - Instrument
Name of the project	Amount of relevant climate finance commitment	Co-financier 2 …

Project Information	Information on public finance	Information on private finance mobilized
Country	Amount disbursed	
Date of board approval	Amount reimbursed	
Date of contracting	Financial instrument	
Total costs of project	Mitigation amount	
	Adaptation amount	
	Other public finance from other Annex I countries	
	Other public finance from non-I countries	

Source: Abeille et al (2015)

6.6. Other initiatives to track private finance / investments

Tracking private finance is no simple endeavour. But there are several organizations that do it from different perspectives, using different methodologies and with different scopes and purposes. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) have the most extensive and reputed exercise in this regards. But there are others, namely some carried out by private entities, such as the Financial Times.

The three exercises described below were chosen due to their perceived comprehensiveness and credibility and also as a representation of different approaches and scopes. Their inclusion in this report is a mere illustration of specific efforts to collect data on foreign direct investments and do not constitute a proposal to use them for collection of data on climate relevant foreign direct investment mobilized by public interventions.

The World Investment Report is a yearly exercise by the UNCTAD and is arguably the most comprehensive one. In addition to the data collection on FDI, each year the UNCTAD selects a theme over which it makes an in-depth analysis. For 2014, the theme was the sustainable development goals.

The IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey is an interesting exercise, as it tracks the origin and the recipient country of the FDI, which can be a valuable experience in relation to attribution to developed countries of climate relevant private finance in developing countries.

Finally, the Financial Times FDI report is interesting as it captures only greenfield investments (new investments in the real economy, which climate relevant investments would be expected to be) and already tracks specific investments in the renewable energy sector.

While these exercises are interesting, they are far from being directly useful for the purpose of collecting data on climate relevant private finance mobilized by public instruments. Firstly, because they lack the tools to identify the relevant public instruments and to establish the causality between such instruments and the private finance mobilized. And secondly, because these exercises do not have the tools to mark the investments as climate relevant in accordance with the relevant methodologies. Current approaches to the attribution of investments to a specific economy sector

fall very short of providing a clear signal of climate relevance. If this is very true for mitigation, it is even very much more so for adaptation.

6.6.1. The UNCTAD's World Investment Report

The 2014 UNCTAD's World Investment Report (WIR) was dedicated to investments in areas relevant to the (at the time still under negotiation) Sustainable Development Goals.

The WIR provides figures of in- and out-flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), showing which countries lead providing and which lead receiving FDI (in both cases, the US, with China second on in flows and Japan second on outflows, followed by China in third). Among other analytical results, the WIR presented FDI by private equity firms (PEF), by sovereign wealth funds (SWF) and by state owned enterprises (SOE). This indicates that the approach used can easily identify private investments (noting that many countries opt to consider as private finance the climate relevant investments made by it largest SOE).

The WIR classifies FDI by sector/industry but on a very aggregate manner, not being possible to identify through currently available information whether or not the investment in the designated sectors are climate relevant.

The following are the sectors / industry classification used by WIR[34]:

- Primary
    - Agriculture, forestry and fishing
    - Mining, quarrying and petroleum
- Manufacturing
    - Food, beverages and tobacco
    - Textiles, clothing and leather
    - Wood and wood products
    - Paper and paper products
    - Publishing and printing
    - Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel
    - Chemicals and chemical products
    - Pharmaceuticals
    - Rubber and plastic products
    - Metals and metal products
    - Electrical and electronic equipment
    - Motor vehicles and other transport equipment
    - Non-metallic mineral products
    - Machinery and equipment
    - Manufacture of furniture
    - Other manufacturing
- Services
    - Electricity, gas and water
    - Construction

[34] http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Annex-Tables.aspx [visited on July, 14 2016]

- Trade
- Accommodation and food service activities
- Transportation and storage
- Information and communication
- Finance
- Business services
- Public administration and defense
- Education
- Health and social services
- Arts, entertainment and recreation
- Other service activities

So, despite the fact that the WIR was dedicated to investing in the SDG, the methodological approach used by UNCTAD is not detailed enough to be directly relevant for the identification of climate relevant investment flows.

With regards to the methodological approach, the WIR's FDI statistics are based on a large set of information sources, namely:

- National (or, when applicable, Regional) Central Banks (in respect of the country itself and in respect of other countries)
- OECD
- IMF
- National relevant ministries (in few cases)
- National statistics offices and other related offices (in few cases)

6.6.2. The IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey[35]

The IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) is particularly interesting, because it supports the objective of developing from-whom-to-whom cross border data, complementing the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), and contributes to a better understanding of financial interconnectedness. While, this survey does not include all countries (only about 100), it allows to determine the country of origin and the recipient country of investments, show casing, at least, the net relative position of a country in relation to another. This may be of interest in case of attribution of climate relevant investments to the country of origin.

Table 6-8 below shows the CDIS Top 10 From-Whom-to-Whom 2013 Inward Direct Investment

[35] http://data.imf.org/?sk=40313609-F037-48C1-84B1-E1F1CE54D6D5&sId=1390030109571

Table 6-8: CDIS Top 10 From-Whom-to-Whom 2013 Inward Direct Investment

Counterpart Economy (Investment from):	Reporting Economy (Investment in):											
	Netherlands	Luxembourg	United States	China, P.R.: Mainland	United Kingdom	China, P.R.: Hong Kong	Germany	France	Switzerland	Singapore	All Other Economies	Total Investment
United States	997,712	774,723		76,465	389,608	42,871	94,001	86,260	98,323	97,417	1,239,719	3,897,098
Netherlands		322,325	273,884	27,721	C	78,515	207,655	123,090	213,181	69,052	1,391,157	2,706,581
United Kingdom	455,896	540,818	518,643	20,989		20,054	62,154	75,802	23,892	40,501	633,031	2,391,780
Luxembourg	693,715		201,603	4,940	C	C	161,530	133,495	161,760	19,479	717,608	2,094,131
China, P.R.: Hong Kong	15,744	23,931	5,860	1,112,242	C		642	2,243	C	25,239	66,195	1,252,096
Germany	246,134	104,871	208,841	53,450	C	5,301		85,446	28,704	15,792	429,677	1,178,217
France	166,579	72,443	226,131	20,748	C	6,981	53,584		43,124	12,129	514,441	1,116,159
Japan	64,357	3,200	342,327	147,594	80,357	25,936	21,875	14,488	3,546	55,433	350,764	1,109,877
Switzerland	234,314	123,912	209,397	11,705	62,748	8,249	59,991	81,829		29,308	251,905	1,073,357
Virgin Islands, British	40,508	C		330,624	13,680	447,918	3,241	757	C	57,611	80,432	974,772
All Other Economies	1,427,401	1,285,283	777,270	524,759	1,061,577	559,475	261,860	180,300	197,797	328,118	3,505,381	10,109,220
Total Investment	4,342,358	3,251,506	2,763,956	2,331,238	1,607,970	1,195,301	926,532	783,712	770,327	750,078	9,180,310	27,903,288

Source:

Participating countries are required to fill in two questionnaires, one identifying the inflows and the out flows from and to each specific country and the other on methodological choices and assumptions, thus allowing for an assessment of data quality and comparability.

Given the complexity of organizational arrangements that different entities can have, this survey proposes approaches to these more complex arrangements, such as branches, multi-territory enterprises and joint ventures.

Finally, with regards to sector or industry classification, CDIS used the International Standard Industry Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC). Like for WIR above, this classification is not sufficient to assess the climate relevance of the FDI.

The survey is conducted at national level by one single entity (it varies from country to country: in some cases it's the central bank, in others the statistics office or other entity). This entity will then have to decide which companies to include in the survey. That can be done by performing a census (sending the questionnaire to everybody – which is advisable to do only once or only at long regular intervals), an exploratory survey (to identify the relevant companies to which to send the actual survey) or by focusing on the largest firms. The size of the universe is not only relevant in terms of the number of companies included, but also in terms of the value of the transactions they are involved in.

Draft surveys are provided by CDIS Guide and can be adapted to meet local circumstances.

6.6.3. The Financial Times FDI Report 2016

The FDI Report 2016 has some interesting aspects:

- It covers only *greenfield* investments, i.e. it covers only new investment projects in the real economy (which is something to be expected of a climate relevant investment)
- It has a sector / industry classification which speaks closer to the needs related to climate relevant investments as it tracks FDI for renewable energies, distinguishing between different technologies (regrettably, that is the only sector for which good information is already available)
- It identifies the top five (corporate) foreign direct investors in renewable energy

The methodological note included in the report provides interesting insights on the value of the data produced.

"The report is based on the fDi Markets database of The Financial Times Ltd, which tracks greenfield investment projects. It does not include mergers and acquisitions or other equity-based or non-equity investments. Only new investment projects and significant expansions of existing projects are included. fDi Markets is the most authoritative source of intelligence on real investment in the global economy, and the only source of greenfield investment data that covers all countries and industries worldwide. Retail projects have been excluded from this analysis but are tracked by fDi Markets.

The data presented includes FDI projects that have either been announced or opened by a company. As companies can raise capital locally, phase their investment over a period of time, and can channel their investment through different countries for tax efficiency, the data used in this report is different to the official data on FDI flows. The data from fDi Markets is more accurate and

a real-time indicator of the real investment companies are making in their overseas subsidiaries" (FDI Intelligence, 2016).

6.7. MRV of incentives to and enabling environments for private climate finance

6.7.1. MRV of incentives

This chapter addresses current MRV of incentives to and enabling environments for private climate finance. For incentives to private climate finance, it is understood that the public policy and financial interventions by developed countries mobilize private climate finance. Enabling environments are the set of circumstances that should be found in a developing country in order to become an attractive destination for private climate finance.

The previous chapter already addresses the topic of incentives, i.e. public interventions to mobilize private climate finance. It is widely recognised that public policy interventions as well as public financial interventions play an equally important, although distinct, role in mobilizing private climate finance. The OECD Research Collaborative framework provides scope for the definition of a methodology that tracks private finance mobilized by both types of interventions.

It's noted, however that, while public policy interventions[36] have the potential to mobilize a larger array of private investments, it is much harder to track private climate finance mobilized by such policy interventions, than to track the private finance mobilized by specific public finance interventions. While the causality between the public finance intervention and the private climate finance it mobilizes can be directly and more easily established, the causality between a public policy intervention and private climate finance may be harder to establish. The reason for this is that the causality may be of an indirect nature and the mobilization may actually occur several years down the line, when effective mechanisms to assess such causality may no longer be established.

While there has been a great effort to that end, it has not yet been possible to determine with any level of accuracy the relative effectiveness of one public instrument compared to the other. This relative effectiveness could be assessed, for example, by means of estimating leveraging ratios (the amount of private finance a certain type of public intervention mobilizes) and comparing them. However, the information currently available in the estimation of such leveraging ratios is not transparent. It is also incomplete to the point that it is not recommended to be used as a proxy to estimate mobilized private finance because of a lack of actual information for a specific public intervention.

The regular use of the OECD Research Collaborative framework will overcome this problem, by allowing for the collection of actual data on each specific relevant public intervention. The compilation of such higher quality information will, in turn, allow for the estimation of higher quality leverage ratios for each type of public intervention, which can finally be used with more confidence as proxy data to fill data gaps.

[36] those that address the barriers and that promote the enabling environments

Box 2: Leverage ratios

Leverage ratios are of particular use when no actual data is available to estimate private climate finance mobilized by each specific public intervention. Given the low quality of overall data collected so far, which can be used to estimate leverage ratios or leverage factors, these are also very uncertain, not representing a viable alternative to the actual data collection. Jachnik et al (2015), argues: Where no suitable data is available, alternative options to derive approximations include conducting bottom-up estimates of private co-financing based on historical average co-financing ratios (A10.1) or a top-down apportionment of aggregated finance data (e.g. FDI) using climate-relevant coefficients (e.g. emissions or energy intensity) (A10.2). The accuracy of such approaches depends on the exact methods used, such as the quality and specificity of leverage ratios (e.g. whether they are available by country, technology, project size) or the relevance of environmental proxies. Thus, the most appropriate option is likely to vary based on what is feasible and likely to produce the most accurate estimates in the short term. However, neither of these approaches is currently developed enough for producing robust estimates.

In addition, in order to provide the right signals in terms of the effectiveness of public interventions by unit of finance (e.g. per 1 Euro or 1 USD), the OECD is recommending that donor countries estimate and report the grant equivalent value of its public financing, in addition to reporting the actual face value of the interventions. Simply put, the OECD recommends that the value of a 1USD grant is considered higher than the value of a concessional loan of 1USD and that the value of a 1USD non-concessional loan is lower than the two previous ones. While the grant equivalent value of a grant is 1, the grant equivalent value of a concessional loan is less than 1 and the grant equivalent value of a non-concessional loan is even lower. The same applies to other public finance instruments taking into account the respective inherent risk.

By estimating and reporting the grant equivalent value of its public finance interventions and by linking each such intervention to the respective private climate finance, the leverage ratio will provide a clearer picture of the actual effort put into mobilizing private climate finance, than the leverage ratio that would be calculated using face value of public interventions. In this context, the signal, the incentive to use one or the other public intervention will be more accurate.

Taking this into consideration, one may argue that the methodological framework proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative provides the grounds for MRV of incentives to private climate finance (otherwise referred to as public interventions), as well as it creates the conditions to provide public entities with the correct signals, the correct incentives, to promote one type of public intervention over the other, taking into account its respective mobilization potential, usually referred to as leveraging ratio. However, while the OECD Research Collaborative provides grounds for this, it is still in its early stages of pilot application. It will take time until the framework is widely used by developed countries and their respective public entities promoting public interventions capable of mobilizing private climate finance.

6.7.2. MRV of climate investment enabling environments

With regards to MRV of enabling environments for attracting private climate finance, the situation is somewhat different to that of MRV of incentives for (mobilizing) private climate finance described above.

The topic of enabling environments is addressed at the UNFCCC level, in particular the item of technology development and transfer.

One of the Technology Transfer Framework's pillars is Enabling Environments, which it defines as *government actions, such as fair trade policies, removal of technical, legal and administrative barriers to technology transfer, sound economic policy, regulatory frameworks and transparency, all of which create an environment conducive to private and public sector technology transfer. The purpose of the enabling environments component of the framework is to improve the effectiveness of the transfer of environmentally sound technologies by identifying and analysing ways of facilitating the transfer of environmentally sound technologies, including the identification and removal of barriers at each stage of the process*[37]*.*

In this context, promoting enabling environments equates to removing barriers to technology development and transfer, which for the greater part (if not in its entirety) correspond to the barriers to private climate finance.

It can then be said that there are several barriers to private climate finance, more generally to the introduction of climate friendly technologies or more broadly even, to financing of sustainable development.

Amin (2013) lists such key barriers:

- Policy and Regulatory Barriers
    - Policy uncertainty and complexity
    - Transaction costs (complying with policy/licensing/reporting…)
    - Land allocation, access and security of ownership
    - Enforcement of policy and pricing incentives
    - Existing subsidies and policy support for high carbon alternatives
- Market and Technology Barriers
    - Relatively high upfront cost of technology
    - Human and operational risks (lack of trained people)
    - Limitations of support infrastructure (e.g. grid infrastructure)
    - Immature supply-chain and limited capacity of project developers
    - Long term viability of many state utilities under question
    - Lack of track record of particular technology/project
- Financial Barriers
    - Country risk: defaults or other factors leading to non-return of invested capital including inflation
    - Currency risk: Exchange rate fluctuations making returns volatile.
    - Deal flow: insufficient volume commercially attractive deals for diversified investment portfolios
    - Complexity risks: difficulty evaluating multiple and overlapping risks

The 2015 European Report on Development notes that these barriers are even more acute in low income countries, where development financing needs are even more important. It notes, however, that appropriate actions can effectively overcome these challenges by addressing market, coordination and governance failures.

Under this task, four broad principles for mobilization of finance for sustainable development, which obviously apply to private climate finance, are proposed:

[37] http://unfccc.int/ttclear/templates/ttclear/templates/render_cms_page?s=TTF_ene

- Finance can promote enablers (e.g. local governance, human capital, infrastructure, green energy technology and trade), which in turn can also attract more public and private finance. This creates a virtuous circle between the enablers and finance: examples include mobile phone technology for mobile banking services, and human capital for FDI.
- An appropriate regulatory framework is of critical importance in order to attract private finance. For example, clear property rights or land titles help to mobilise private domestic finance by providing a collateral, and an improved and more transparent and efficient investment climate can unleash more finance. Enhanced competition in transport services and benchmarks in contract provision promote finance for and investment in infrastructure. Rules that create incentives for institutional investors to finance infrastructure in developing countries or green technology, rather than in liquid assets, help to channel international private finance to sustainable development purposes.
- Development of financial-sector instruments and the capacity to apply them can mobilise private resources. Blending instruments or public-sector guarantees, for instance, can enhance credit availability, which in turn leverages more private-sector finance.
- A conducive international policy environment can be critical in setting the right conditions, e.g. transparent global financial rules and standards for global finance, appropriate trade policies for investment in agriculture in developing countries (abolishing harmful trade distortionary subsidies), tax regulations for tax havens, or appropriate climate mitigation deals to set a carbon price that will mobilise climate finance.

Additionally, Amin (2013) proposes the following elements of “effective enabling environments and policy frameworks for climate finance:”

- Government leadership for creating enabling environments for scaled-up investments,
- Appropriate institutional arrangements to facilitate effective cross-Ministerial coordination,
- A clear, long term and coherent policy and regulatory framework underpinned by rule of law – aim to align investment timescales and policy timescales,
- Aligning price signals to incentivise deployment of low carbon resilient investments (may require reform of existing subsidies),
- Need to foster and establish markets to capture benefits of green growth,
- Capacity for designing, developing and implementing strategies, policies, regulatory frameworks and public financial incentives (including climate finance),
- Tracking of climate finance to enable directing finance to greatest potential impact or needs, and the transparency and accountability increases confidence of investors.

Developing countries are required by the guidelines for national communications to report on *any constraints and gaps, and related financial, technical and capacity needs, as well as proposed and/or implemented activities for overcoming the gaps and constraints*. This means that developing countries are required to report on barriers, but also on efforts made to enhance enabling environments related to financing, technology and capacity needs for the implementation of the convention. A requirement to update this information provided in the national communications is included in the guidelines for Biennial Update Reports.

An analysis of a short random set of submitted biennial update reports (Ghana, Singapore, South Africa, Vietnam) shows that there is no relevant information being submitted by developing countries on their efforts to creating enabling environments for private climate finance.

Summary reports of the technical analysis of the BURs also fail to highlight this issue as an area where capacity building in countries is required.

It can thus be said that even under the UNFCCC there is a wide array of work done on enabling environments, including the requirement by developing countries to report on the efforts to promote them. Nonetheless, the quality of the information put forward on the matter is rather low and the information is actually non-existent for most cases.

6.7.3. MRV of general (private) investment enabling environments

Establishing enabling environments for private climate relevant investments comes second to establishing environments for general private investments. If a country is generally perceived to have a difficult and complex context for private investments, this will surely not be different for climate relevant private investments. On the other hand having an overall private investment friendly environment does not automatically qualify to a friendly climate relevant private investment environment.

In these circumstances, it does not make sense to assess a country's friendliness, its enabling environment to climate relevant investments isolated from its friendliness to investments in any other non-climate relevant sector.

As should be expected, there are several exercises assessing the business environment of world economies, such as The Economist Intelligence Unit's Business Environment Rankings[38] and Forbes' Best Countries for Business[39].

The most comprehensive and reputable exercise, however, is done by the World Bank Group, namely the Doing Business Report, which is quoted and used as a basis for other exercises, including the OECD, in its Policy Framework for Investment[40].

Below, there's a short description of the World Bank's Doing Business report, namely on the indicators it measures and on the data collection process.

In addition, there's a description of the World Bank's Business Environment Snapshots, which provide a one-stop shop for accessing business environment assessments performed by different entities, from different perspectives.

Finally, in the sections below, there is an additional reference to a World Bank initiative: the Readiness for Investment in Sustainable Energy, which provides an example one step closer of how MRV of enabling environments for climate relevant investments could be set up.

Box 3: Green Bonds

Green bonds are increasing year by year. The "Bonds and Climate Change: the state of market in 2016" report indicates that there are currently USD694 billion in green bonds, an increase of USD96 billion from the 2015 report.

A green bond, like any other bond, is a fixed-income financial instrument for raising capital through the debt capital market. In its simplest form, the bond issuer raises a fixed amount of capital from investors over a set period of time, repaying the capital when the bond matures and paying an

[38] http://pages.eiu.com/rs/eiu2/images/BER_2014.pdf [visited on July 14, 2016]

[39] http://www.forbes.com/best-countries-for-business/ [visited on July 14, 2016]

[40] http://www.oecd.org/investment/toolkit/measuringprogress/ [visited on July, 14 2016]

agreed amount of interest (coupons) along the way (KPMG, 2015). A green bond is issued when the issuer (borrower) declares that the capital raised will be used in a “green” investment. While there are several guidelines on labelling a bond as a green bond, there is no authoritative source for that purpose, nor is there any verification of the green claim.

The Climate Bonds Initiative is an international, investor-focused not-for-profit organisation focusing on mobilizing the $100 trillion bond market for climate change solutions (funded by public and private organizations). The Initiative has developed a methodology to track green bonds – those with use of proceeds defined and labelled as green. In addition to these bonds issued with a green tag, the Initiative is also tracking bonds financing climate aligned bonds, which have not been issued as green. Together, these bonds are called “climate-aligned” bonds. The value mentioned in the first paragraph of this box refers to the total of climate-aligned bonds (Climate Bonds Initiative, 2015).

To track unlabelled green bonds, the Initiative “screened Bloomberg issuer data and reviewed over 1700 issuers to identify those with at least 95% of revenue derived from climate-aligned assets, based on the Climate Bonds Standard[41]. While these standards and the principles behind them provide an indicative relationship between the use of the revenues and green / low carbon / resilient investments, the definitions used are not aligned with the most commonly used definitions for climate finance proposed by the OECD DAC Rio Markers, thus making the figures on green bonds difficult to reconcile with other climate finance data gathered using more mainstream approaches such as the mentioned OECD DAC Rio Markers.

Interesting to note, in terms of the outcomes of this exercise is that the labelled green bonds account for only 17% of the total climate aligned bonds, meaning that 83% of green bonds were not labelled as such by the issuer. From this, it can be inferable that an important part of potentially climate relevant financing is taking place without any labelling or marking as such. At least climate financing which is not mobilized by a specific public intervention.

6.7.3.1. World Bank Doing Business Report

The World Bank’s yearly Doing Business Report (13th edition for 2016) measures *“the regulations that enhance business activity and those that constrain it. Doing Business presents quantitative indicators on business regulations and the protection of property rights that can be compared across 189 economies—from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe—and over time[42].”*

The 2016 report looks at 10 indicators relevant to assess a country’s business friendliness, namely: ***starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency**[43].*

[41] The Climate Bonds Standard and Certification against that Standard is an easy-to-use tool that allows investors and intermediaries to assess the environmental integrity of bonds. It consists of a certification process, pre-issuance requirements, post-issuance requirements and a suite of sector-specific eligibility & guidance documents. For more information see https://www.climatebonds.net/standards/about. To view the Green Bond Principles behind the standard, please see http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/green-bonds/green-bond-principles./

[42] http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2016 [visited on July, 13 2016]

[43] Market regulations have not been assessed in the 2016 edition.

To estimate these macro-indicators, 109 sub-indicators are measured for each country, which results in over 110 000 data points.

Even though the methodology is deemed to be “inexpensive and easily replicable,” the process to collect data to measure these indicators is rather time intensive. It is fundamentally based on a network of over 11 000 contributors[44] that respond to a questionnaire[45] which is elaborated every year for the purpose of compiling the report. Such contributors include lawyers, accountants, judges, engineers, architects, businesspeople and public officials.

The data is collected through several rounds of interaction with the respondents. In addition to the questionnaires, written conversations, conference calls and visits by the Doing Business team are also used to collect information. The visits serve mainly the purpose of verifying data (for the 2016 report, 33 visits were made). The Doing Business team verifies all the answers provided by the respondents and therefore, the results included in the report are checked for accuracy.

The figure below illustrates the data collection process for the Doing Business Report.

Table 6-9: Data collection process for the World Bank's Doing Business Report



Source: Doing Business 2016

[44] http://www.doingbusiness.org/contributors/doing-business

[45] http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology

6.7.3.2. World Bank Business Environment Snapshots (BES)

The Business Environment Snapshots presents measurable indicators across a wide range of business environment issues and over time. This web-enabled tool compiles disparate data, indicators, and project information on the business environment for each country in an easily accessible, consistent and usable format. The BE Snapshots help development practitioners and policymakers obtain a comprehensive picture of the business environment in a particular country.

The Business Environment Snapshot is a composite of several other rankings and similar exercises, including the Doing Business Report described above:

- Economic Freedom Index (The Heritage Foundation)
- Political Risk Rating of ICRG Index (International Country Risk Guide – PRS)
- Country Credit Rating (Institutional Investor)
- Business Environment Index (EIU Global Outlook Report)
- Regulatory Quality Indicator (World Bank Group Governance Indicators)
- Control of Corruption Indicator (World Bank Group Governance Indicators)
- Quality of National BE Ranking (WEF Global Competitiveness Report)
- Doing Business Rank (World Bank Group Doing Business Report)

In this regards, the Business Environment Snapshot does not rely on the collection of primary data, rather it is a tool, a one-stop shop, to access to different ranking, measurement and analytical exercises.

6.7.3.3. World Bank Readiness for Investment in Sustainable Energy (RISE)

This new World Bank exercise is closer to the aim of MRVing enabling environments for climate relevant investments, as it provides indicators that compare the investment climate of countries across the three focus areas of the Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) initiative: energy access, energy efficiency and renewable energy[46].

RISE originates from a previous World Bank Group initiative, the Climate Investment Readiness Index, which evaluated the environment for private investment in climate mitigation and low-carbon technologies in South Asian countries—Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—compared with other emerging economies and developed regions. The index focused on renewable energy (particularly solar photovoltaic (PV), onshore wind, small hydro, and biomass) and energy efficiency (particularly lighting, appliances, and building codes).

RISE comprises 28 indicators and 85 sub-indicators encompassing the three pillars of energy access, renewable energy, and energy efficiency as well as cross-cutting indicators for topics relevant to all three SE4ALL pillars. All indicators are classified into four broad categories: planning, policies and regulations, pricing and subsidies, and procedural efficiency.

[46] http://rise.worldbank.org/

Figure 6-2: RISE Indicators



Source: World Bank[47]

[47] http://rise.worldbank.org/methodology

As an illustration, for Policies and Regulations on Renewable Energy, (sub)indicators such as incentives to grid-connected renewable energy, network usage pricing and fiscal incentives are collected. Figure 6-2 lists all the indicators collected for RISE.

As for the Doing Business Report, the information is collected via questionnaire sent to national stakeholders. All the indicators are weighted equally. A traffic light system applicable to each indicator, category and pillar to indicate distance to frontier[48] has been designed. The "frontier" being 100 points:

- A green light is reported for countries with a score of 75 or more, which are considered close to good practice on a certain indicator or a pillar.
- A yellow light shows countries that are in between green and red.
- A red light indicates that a country scores 25 or less and has a lot to improve to achieve good practice on what RISE measures.

A country receiving a green light on a pillar (energy access, renewable energy, and energy efficiency) gives evidence to the investor about the commitment and credibility of government policymaking to create an attractive enabling environment.

6.7.3.4. Way forward

There is ample experience is assessing a given country's friendliness to investment, in particular to private investment. This experience has already been expanded to assess, in a pilot phase only in 17 countries, the enabling environments (friendliness) to investments on sustainable energy (RISE).

When this has been done, it seems reasonable to expect that it should be feasible to identify a set of indicators to characterize the relevant enabling environment for climate relevant investments, both in terms of mitigation as well as of adaptation. Plenty of work on that front has already been done, including at the UNFCCC level.

Given that readiness for climate relevant investments cannot be considered in isolation from overall investment friendliness, it seems advisable that any such assessment would take into account the overall investment environment in a given country. In this regard, the climate relevant investment readiness assessment should be a subset, a spin-off of a larger investments environment assessment, such as the Doing Business Report described above, and build upon already existing relevant initiatives such as RISE.

Macro-indicators to be measured in such a specific climate relevant investments friendliness assessment could include:

- The existence of an officially approved Nationally Determined Contribution
- The inclusion of a mitigation component within the NDC
- The inclusion of an adaptation component within the NDC

[48] The "frontier" is the best case identified and is set at 100.

- The adoption of a low emissions development plan, including detailed mitigation action (with estimated emissions reduction potential)
- The adoption of a national adaptation plan with detailed adaptation measures
- Institutional capacity for implementation of climate policy is established
- Appropriate industry conditions, such as engineering expertise and the enabling infrastructure are present
- A stable financial sector with capacity to support low carbon (development) is present
- Economic instruments that translate policy targets into price incentives that make low carbon technologies more attractive are present[49]

While the collection of the data required to assess climate relevant investment enabling environments could be done via biennial reports to the UNFCCC, it does not seem feasible to adopt guidance on such collection with the required level of detail. Therefore, it is apparently more effective to undertake such an endeavour close but outside the formal UNFCCC process.

6.8. MRV of private climate finance by UNFCCC Parties

MRV of mobilized private climate finance is not yet a strict requirement in the UNFCCC reporting guidelines, and therefore only few countries are doing so. The approaches taken by those few countries that have included references to mobilized private finance in their second Biennial Report are greatly distinct and no consistency or comparability among approaches and figures can be identified from the analysis of the reported information.

In fact, most countries have been making efforts to estimate private climate finance mobilized by public interventions on pilot studies or case studies, not committing to the completeness or accuracy of the figures reported. For that reason, countries opt to not include mobilized private climate finance figures in the climate finance totals reported.

The following sections provided an account of reporting on mobilized private finance by UNFCCC parties: Member States, other selected Annex I Parties (US, Japan, Australia) and non-Annex I Parties. As can be seen, the level of sophistication and completeness of the estimation of private climate finance mobilized by Member State´s public interventions is low and the figures derived from these rather limited exercises by few MS do not allow any sort of extrapolation to an overall figure.

6.8.1. Member States

No MS has included mobilized private finance in the totals (i.e. in the tables[50]). Most are silent about mobilizing private finance, some mention that it is not yet possible to include such figures, others refer to on-going initiatives aimed at tracking and reporting mobilized private finance (either national or international such as the OECD Research Collaborative). A very small number of MS

[49] The last 4 items are from Polycarp et al (2013)

[50] Except for Spain which includes inclusion of USD 5 +14 million in table 7b, but it is not clear whether that is actually included in the totals

(ES, FI, FR, SE, UK) report a description of the public initiatives aimed at mobilizing private finance. In some of such descriptions, the amount of public finance involved is reporting and in fewer, a description of the amount of private finance leveraged is also identified.

6.8.1.1. Finland (2nd BUR)

As there are no appropriate data collection systems in place and due to confidentiality clauses related to some private sector data at the moment Finland does not estimate nor report regularly climate related private finance mobilized. Finland focuses instead at the moment to following and actively participating, when possible, to the multilateral discussions on the subject. However, in 2013 a very rough estimation was made, based on which Finland could mobilize yearly about USD 0.5–1.8 billion private climate finance to developing countries. This estimation was made using the analyses by Stadelmann and Michaelowa (2011)[51] *and should be taken only as a very initial estimation, which may not be comparable to other estimations.*

The Finnish Fund for Industrial Cooperation Ltd (Finnfund) is a state-owned company that finances private projects in developing countries by providing long-term risk capital for profitable projects. The funding modalities include ***equity investments, loans and/or guarantees****.*

During the reporting period, Finnfund provided approximately in total EUR 28 million, which can be included in Finnish public climate funding, and Finnpartnership provided approximately EUR 0.2 million. According to rough estimates, the public funding through Finnfund's climate-related projects ***leverages private funding at a level at about two to three times*** *that of Finnfund's funding for the investment, and the ratio can even be higher.*

Other climate finance and technology transfer activities […], such as the Energy and Environment Partnership (EEP), have also leveraged private finance. In the case of the EEP it has leveraged private finance at about 50% co-financing share.

6.8.1.2. France (2nd BR)

For the first time, France has estimated private climate finance mobilised through its public funding and projects in developing countries, for the years 2013 and 2014.

Total estimated private finance mobilised stood at approximately €596 million (US$791 million) in 2013 and €681 million (US$904 million) in 2014.

Key methodological choices by France to estimate the figures above include:

- *Categorization of actors based on >50% public ownership according to OECD DAC definition, with a filter extracting out French state-owned enterprises acting as "prudent investors"*
- *All private climate finance flows count (incl. domestic), but distinguish that originating from Annex I countries* (when possible)
- *Impact of TA or grants for policy support of project preparation is not included in the numbers. Guarantees not included either.*
- Point of measurement: mix of commitment (board approval) and disbursement

[51] Accounting of Private Climate Finance Types of Finance, Data Gaps and the 100 Billion Dollar Question

- Data is collected at project level, while proxies are used for credit lines
- Causality: all private finance identified (co-financing) is assumed to have been mobilised by the public intervention. When other public donors involved it is attributed pro-rata based on the share of the French public finance in the total amount of public finance for the project.

6.8.1.3. Spain (2nd BR)

Spain manages a set of public financial instruments with the potential to mobilize private climate finance:

- Fondo para la Internacionalización de la Empresa: provides direct financing to exporting Spanish companies. A single operation has been identified which mobilized USD 5 million in 2014.
- It has not been possible to estimate mobilization of private climate financing through interventions of Spain’s export credit agency.
- COFIDES is Spain’s development bank, providing direct support to the internationalization of Spanish companies, has mobilized an estimated USD 14 million.

6.8.1.4. Sweden (2nd BR)

Sweden has established public risk sharing mechanisms to promote climate private financing Instruments used including loans and guarantees. Sweden lists an indicative list of projects where private climate finance has been mobilized (indicating also when other public interventions have been involved). It mentions that the *leveraging is calculated for each project, following OECD DAC methodology* without providing further explanations. It stresses that the figures on private climate finance mobilized for these indicative projects are not included in the totals.

6.8.1.5. UK (2nd BR)

The UK has identified a number of instruments which are aimed at mobilizing private climate finance. It reports on the public financing involved and for one in specific, the UK Green Investment Bank, it reported on the estimated mobilized (leveraged) private finance: £200 million public financing, leveraging £360 million of private investment.

The UK is not clear on how this leveraging potential has been determined and does not mention if this figure is included in the totals.

6.8.2. Other Annex I Parties

Australia, Canada, Norway and the US do not include estimates of private climate finance mobilized by public interventions.

Some of the countries above, in particular the US, provide some brief information about the public instruments capable of mobilizing private finance, but do not provide figures for these instruments nor estimates of its leveraging potential.

6.8.3. Non-Annex I Parties

No non-Annex I Parties identify private finance mobilized by developed countries public policies.

7. Task 4: Assessment of additional thematic fields

It had been foreseen that the work to be carried out under task 4 would be discussed with DG Climate unit A2 and decided at a phone call after the workshop in February. Due to changes in the responsibilities, this was not yet discussed and determined. Therefore this task could not yet be elaborated for this draft final report. The following sections outline two tasks that are proposed under task 4.

7.1. Submission on accounting of financial resources

Article 9, paragraph 7 of the Paris Agreement includes a mandate to develop modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions. SBSTA 44 discussed this issue and invited Parties and observer organizations to provide submissions on this topic by 29 August 2016. The submissions should consider several questions outlined in the SBSTA conclusions:

(a) What are the existing modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions, and what are the challenges and information gaps with respect to these existing modalities;

(b) What accounting modalities need to be developed to serve the Paris Agreement, in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Agreement, and what are the challenges to the development of these accounting modalities and how can these be addressed;

(c) How to ensure that accounting modalities are developed in time to be integrated into the transparency framework established under the Paris Agreement.

The secretariat will compile the submissions into a miscellaneous document. In addition an in-session workshop will take place on this matter in conjunction with SBSTA 45 in November 2016. The secretariat will produce a technical paper prior to SBSTA 46 in May 2017, summarizing information from the in-session workshop and the submissions.

It was agreed that the work under task 4 should provide a contribution to this submission on modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions which could then be forwarded as an input from the Commission in the work process under EGI.

The input to the EU submission is structured in accordance with the questions outlined in the SBSTA conclusions in document FCCC/SBSTA/2016/L.5 (UNFCCC 2016) in the following sections.

7.1.1. What are the existing modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions, and what are the challenges and information gaps with respect to these existing modalities

7.1.1.1. Existing modalities

The current reporting of financial resources provided are based on the UNFCCC guidance for biennial reports as provided in decision 2/CP.17 which significantly improved the previous reporting of support through the national communications and the CTF format as updated by decision

9/CP.21. The following paragraphs describe key features of the current accounting framework applied by the EU and its Member States underpinning the reporting to the UNFCCC.

The EU support and follows the operational definition for reporting climate finance as provided by the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) in its “2014 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows Reported” which is *“Climate finance aims at reducing emissions, and enhancing sinks of greenhouse gases and aims at reducing vulnerability of, and maintaining and increasing the resilience of, human and ecological systems to negative climate change impacts*”. (UNFCCC SCF, 2014)

In line with the joint statement of ministers on Tracking Progress Towards the $100 billion Goal from September 2015 in Paris (Joint Statement 2015), the EU considers mobilized climate finance to include:

- Public finance provided by governments through a variety of institutions including through the operating entities of the financial mechanism of the Convention, bilateral aid agencies, development finance institutions, export credit agencies (ECAs) and multilateral entities;
- Climate finance provided through a multitude of instrument such as concessional and non-concessional, including grants, loans, equity, and de-risking instruments, where such finance is identified as climate relevant using criteria in line with those agreed within relevant international organizations such as the OECD, IPCC, and MDBs.
- Private finance for climate-relevant activities that has been mobilized by public finance or by a public policy intervention, including technical assistance to enable policy and regulatory reform.

The accounting framework is characterized by the following principles:

- Where multiple actors are involved, the resulting finance is only counted once in tracking progress.
- Recognising the role that developing countries play in mobilizing private finance, the method only includes the share of private finance mobilized by developed countries, excluding the share of private finance that developing countries’ public finance has mobilized.
- The assessment of the amount of private finance mobilized is done on an activity-by-activity basis and the reporting on mobilized private finance is associated with public activities where there is a clear causal link between a public intervention and private finance and where the activity would not have moved forward, or moved forward at scale, in the absence of the public intervention.
- The reporting framework should encourage and incentivise the most effective use of climate finance.

Other relevant aspects of the current methodologies are:

- The EU’s reporting on climate finance for adaptation, mitigation and cross-cutting activities is drawing on existing definitions and eligibility criteria from relevant international organisations (e.g. the OECD DAC Rio markers, Joint MDB Typology of Mitigation Activities, and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)).

- Definitions and classifications outlined in the OECD DAC Statistical Reporting Directives underpin a consistent, comparable and transparent data collection across Member States and the European Commission. These include inter alia reporting rules and requirements for commitments, disbursements, financial instruments, exchange rates, sector codes and points of measurement.[52] The following specific definitions and approaches are particularly relevant in this context:
    - Definition of climate change mitigation: An activity should be classified as climate-change mitigation related (score Principal or Significant) if: it contributes to the objective of stabilisation of greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system by promoting efforts to reduce or limit GHG emissions or to enhance GHG sequestration
    - Definition of climate change adaptation: An activity should be classified as adaptation-related (score Principal or Significant) if: it intends to reduce the vulnerability of human or natural systems to the impacts of climate change and climate-related risks, by maintaining or increasing adaptive capacity and resilience. This encompasses a range of activities from information and knowledge generation, to capacity development, planning and the implementation of climate change adaptation actions.
    - The DAC monitors development finance through its Creditor Reporting System (CRS) using the “Rio markers”. Markers indicate donors’ policy objectives in relation to each activity, where every development co-operation activity reported to the CRS should be screened and marked as either (i) targeting the Conventions as a ”principal” objective or a ”significant” objective, or (ii) not targeting the objective. Activities marked as having a “principal” climate objective would not have been funded but for that objective; activities marked “significant” have other prime objectives but have been formulated or adjusted to help meet climate change concerns.
    - The definition to determine whether financial flow are public are those undertaken by central, state or local government agencies at their own risk and responsibility, regardless of whether these agencies have raised the funds through taxation or through borrowing from the private sector (OECD DAC, 2016).
    - The EU and its Member States use of OECD DAC definitions for financial instruments as characterised in detail by OECD DAC (2016).
    - The EU and its Member States use OECD DAC definitions for Other official flows (OOF) as provided by the OECD DAC (OECD 2016).
    - Financial instruments are usually accounted for at cash face value.

The existing modalities for the accounting and reporting of financial resources of the EU, in particular the aggregate financial resources provided and mobilized at EU level are based on

[52] OECD DAC (2016), “Converged Statistical Reporting Directives for the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and the Annual DAC Questionnaire”, 8. April 2016, Document No DCD/DAC(2016)3/FINAL Available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/DCDDAC%282016%293FINAL.pdf

Article 16 of the EU Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) [53]. This Article requires annual reporting on support provided to developing countries by 30 September of Member States in the same format as used under the UNFCCC for the biennial reports to the Commission. With regard to accounting methodologies paragraph 2 of Article 16 specifies that Member States shall endeavour to provide information on financial flows based on the so-called 'Rio markers' for climate change mitigation-related support and climate change adaptation-related support introduced by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Member States are also requested to provide methodological information concerning the implementation of the climate change Rio markers methodology. Thus, the EU and many Member States are largely building on the OECD's longstanding experience in measuring and monitoring development finance and in tracking climate-related development finance through the OECD DAC Statistical Framework.

Paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the MMR requires Member States to report information on the definitions and methodologies used to determine any figures on private financial flows mobilised. As the reporting on private finance mobilized is currently under further development to enable countries to provide clear and transparent information, the EU and its Member States are also cooperating closely with the more recently established and OECD-hosted "Research Collaborative for Tracking Private Climate Finance" an open network, co-ordinated and hosted by the OECD, of governments, research institutions and international finance institutions with the objective to advance policy-relevant research related to methodologies to estimate mobilised private climate finance, collaborating across the DAC, Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), countries and expert organisations.

At EU level, for aggregate EU-28 figures on climate finance reported in 2015, OECD DAC statistics on 'imputed multilateral contributions' based on inflow data to multilateral funds and multilateral financial institutions have been used where figures are collected through the OECD DAC system based on detailed activity-level data within the statistical framework to ensure no double counting. However, such imputed multilateral contributions are not available for all climate funds, MDBs and relevant organizations. In addition, it does not include finance mobilized by the MDBs. Thus, work in the future should aim to broaden the availability of such data for more fund and institutions.

7.1.1.2. Challenges and gaps

General challenges

Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development and assessing the impacts and effectiveness of climate finance

As outlined in the 2014 Biennial Assessment report of the SCF an important area of future work is the assessment whether climate finance is helping to achieve the overarching goal of the Convention of keeping climate change within 2 degrees. It is key that not only our understanding of the financial flows related to climate activities from developed to developing countries improves, but to understand the mitigation and adaptation impacts of these financial flows. It will not contribute to achieve global climate objectives if the finance is not used effectively and efficiently. The objective expressed in Article 2, paragraph 1 (c) of the Paris agreement to make finance flows

[53] OJ, L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 13: Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on a mechanism for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and for reporting other information at national and Union level relevant to climate change and repealing Decision No 280/2004/EC..

consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development requires that the impacts on GHG emissions and climate-resilient development are tracked. Thus the main challenge for the development of accounting modalities for climate finance is that climate finance providers start assessing the impacts of mitigation finance on emissions. In addition there is a need to develop methodologies for assessing impacts of adaptation finance on resilience and effective adaptation which are much less developed and considerable further work is needed in this area. At the same time, the right enabling environments are fundamental to promote shifting finance to climate related areas, i.e. to mainstream climate finance. In this regards, MRV, including accounting of climate finance should contribute to promoting enabling environments aiming at incentivizing and facilitating climate investments.

Mainstreaming and co-benefits

In past years development assistance focused on working towards mainstreaming climate change into development planning and the related implementation of development plans and increased support to budgetary approaches compared to specific individual project activities. Such comprehensive and more holistic approach creates challenges for the monitoring of climate finance for mitigation and adaptation as it is more complicated to identify the climate-specific contributions if the support is addressing development priorities in a coherent and cross-cutting way. It is important that any accounting modalities for climate finance discussed under the UNFCCC do not disincentivise such mainstreaming activities.

Developing countries as well as developed countries have identified considerable co-benefits between activities targeting adaptation and mitigation simultaneously. Other co-benefits exist between adaptation and mitigation as well as forestry activities as recently identified in 2015 forum of the SCF. Thus there is a considerable potential for multiple co-benefits from jointly addressing several climate-related objectives into support activities and programmes. This also poses challenges for Parties in the reporting on climate finance, in particular for the separation of climate finance into mitigation and adaptation. It is important that methodologies for tracking climate finance reflect such multiple co-benefits in an appropriate way that creates incentives to enhance and use such co-benefits.

In its 2014 biennial assessment the SCF concluded that “Activities improving climate-resilience are rarely stand-alone but are mostly integrated into mainstream development interventions and business activities, for example, in the agricultural or water sectors. Due to this integration, support provided and investments in climate resilience are difficult to classify as such and therefore rarely reported as adaptation finance. Further work is therefore needed how monitoring of adaptation finance can be improved as the concepts of “adaptation” and “climate resilience” are well understood in the UNFCCC context, but not widely used in the development assistance contexts that implement activities that contribute to climate resilience.

Mobilization of climate finance

Article 9, paragraph 3 and 7 address particularly that the reporting is not only about climate finance provided, but also finance mobilized. The extent to which mobilisation of private finance happens depends on many factors, including the enabling conditions and sector-specific policies in the recipient country, the institution providing the finance, the type of instrument, and the purpose for which public finance is being made available. The measurement and reporting of mobilised private finance has only been initiated and needs to be further developed The range of actors and complexity of interactions associated with mobilising private climate finance makes it challenging to isolate the specific mobilisation effect of each public finance intervention. Thus further

methodological work is clearly required to improve monitoring and reporting of mobilisation at the international level. More work is needed to more accurately assess and make plausible assumptions about the causal relationship between public finance interventions and the private finance they mobilize directly and indirectly. Another area of work is the attribution of finance mobilized to countries or organizations. In this context it is also essential better understanding of how to account for policy-related public interventions, as domestic policy frameworks and wider enabling environments for investment are critical drivers of investments. Also at technical level in terms of reporting formats, improvements have to be implemented to address climate finance mobilized because currently there is no table or field for reporting numerical data in the reporting tables where Parties can report financial resources mobilized through public interventions.

Specific challenges and gaps

Improved terminology

The information provided in the section on existing modalities shows that a wide range of technical definitions are already available. In its reports the SCF also provided useful proposals for consistent use of terminology for climate finance in many areas. The use and reference to terminology, definitions and approaches already available and used could further improve the existing reporting guidelines for climate finance. Similar to the reporting on GHG emissions, where most of the terminology, approaches and methodologies are outlined in IPCC guidelines, it does not seem necessary to replicate such definitions or approaches as part of guidance under the UNFCCC, but references to available scientific work and guidance could further enhance the current guidance in an efficient way.

Structure of methodological information

In Paris in decision 9/CP.21 important changes to the current reporting framework have been agreed by creating specific reporting fields for the provision of information on definitions or methodologies used for reporting information in the following reporting parameters: “climate-specific” or “core/general”, “status”, “funding source”, “activity”, “financial instrument”, “type of support” and “sector”. This change will be implemented for the reporting in the biennial reports in 2018. The resulting information should be carefully assessed to what extent it led to improved transparency on the methodologies used by Parties. Based on such assessment, it could be useful to further improve the reporting of methodological information related to the monitoring of climate finance. The reporting template could be further developed through specifying the approaches available and used by Parties which could then be selected by countries in the reporting templates. Such further development of the reporting template could also include references to OECD DAC definitions for some of the reporting categories (e.g. financial instruments) as these definitions seem to be widely used by reporting Parties. Additional explanations should be required when different definitions are used. Such approach could make the reporting more efficient and complete at the same time.

Classification of “developing country” recipients:

Under the UNFCCC reporting there is a gap in the definition of recipients for climate finance. Under the UNFCCC it could be all Non-Annex I Parties, under the OECD DAC there is a different list of ODA eligible recipients and additional concepts may be used in bilateral public development assistance. From the perspective of accounting modalities, it would be useful to clarify the list of recipients as part of the guidance under the UNFCCC.

Forest finance flows

The 2015 Forum of the SCF discussed financing of forests and participants noted that there are gaps in data and information on forest finance flows. Currently, there is no commonly agreed definition of forest finance and what qualifies as forest finance. Information on private finance for forests is largely unavailable due to the difficulty in tracking. Participants mentioned that this poses challenges to governments and investors alike, in acquiring necessary information for designing policies or making investment decisions. The current reporting guidance or reporting template does not address forest finance apart from the choice of sector in the reporting table for bilateral support and Parties do not have an opportunity to provide separate information on finance provided related to forest activities. Forest finance could either be part of mitigation, adaptation or cross-cutting climate finance. Some countries also report forest finance under other in order to be able to separately report on forest finance. There is also no clear link between coordination of support for the implementation of the activities under the Warsaw framework for REDD-plus referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70 and the work on the improvement of the transparency of climate finance. Given the importance of REDD-plus finance and other support related to forests in the context of the UNFCCC, this link should be further discussed and the EU hopes that the 2016 Biennial Report of the SCF will provide further insights in this matter.

7.1.2. What accounting modalities need to be developed to serve the Paris Agreement, in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Agreement, and what are the challenges to the development of these accounting modalities and how can these be addressed

The further development of modalities and guidelines related to climate finance should address the challenges and gaps outlined in the previous section of this submission.

Accounting modalities go beyond a transparent presentation of information because they ensure that specific principles established as part of the Paris Agreement guide the implementation of the reporting. Therefore it is crucial for the development of accounting modalities to gain a common understanding of what these principles are.

The EU believes that transparency, completeness, consistency, comparability and accuracy are the key principles that should guide accounting of both support and for mitigation action. The SCF already provided more specific guidance how some these principles apply to climate finance and this work should be further developed.

Accuracy related to GHG emissions is defined that estimates should be accurate in the sense that they are systematically neither over nor under true values, as far as can be judged, and that uncertainties are reduced as far as practicable. Thus, the concept of uncertainties plays a significant role in the assessment of the accuracy of GHG emissions. The concept of uncertainties could also be applied to finance flows provided and mobilized as different types of flows will be connected with quite different levels of uncertainties. An approach that provides uncertainties for the aggregation of information could also be further discussed related to climate finance as an methodological approach that allows an aggregation of estimates that are sometimes related to significant uncertainties without the possibility to gather more robust data by making the implicit uncertainties transparent. The identification of uncertainties also helps to prioritize data collection and efforts to improve data.

In addition to the TACCC principles, paragraph 92 of decision 17CP.21 established several additional principles relevant under the Paris agreement:

1. The importance of facilitating improved reporting and transparency over time;
2. The need to avoid duplication as well as undue burden on Parties and the secretariat;
3. The need to ensure that Parties maintain at least the frequency and quality of reporting in accordance with their respective obligations under the Convention;
4. The need to ensure that double counting is avoided;
5. The need to ensure environmental integrity

In the context of climate finance, these principles have to be further discussed and the EU therefore provides some initial thoughts on how these principles apply in the context of climate finance:

Given the considerable challenges outlined above for the tracking of climate finance, Parties will need to follow a stepwise and ongoing improvement process in the future and it is important to implement the principle of “improved reporting and transparency over time” in this context. It is important to acknowledge that additional development of accounting modalities, refined definitions or methodologies need considerable time until they are systematically implemented in the data collection systems and before data can be consistently collected as part of the routine statistical procedures. Thus, it may take several years until changes come fully into effect, in particular as for climate finance, such improvements need to be implemented across a range of countries, organisations and international financial institutions.

The need to avoid duplication in the context of climate finance needs to be considered not only from the perspective of Parties and the secretariat, but also including international finance institutions, funds as well as private stakeholders. Therefore accounting modalities should carefully assess at which level (Parties, international finance organizations) additional guidance should apply and how reporting from different entities and institutions can be brought together in the most efficient and effective way for a transparent overview of global finance provided.

Given the large number of stakeholders involved in the provision of climate finance, it is important to ensure that double counting across donors is avoided. The way this is currently implemented was already outlined related to the first question in this submission.

The need to ensure environmental integrity implies that accounting modalities take into account the impacts and the effectiveness of climate finance, and its contribution to keeping climate change within two degrees centigrade as further outlined under gaps and challenges.

In the development of methodologies, definitions and accounting modalities for mitigation, e.g. for the land-use sector, SBSTA considerably draw on scientific work conducted by the IPCC. The EU believes that also further work on methodologies and accounting modalities for climate finance require further scientific input and the work under SBSTA will strongly depend on scientific work conducted by other organizations. Consistent and coherent accounting requires consistent methodologies over a wide range of actors which can only achieved if all actors are involved in the further development of the scientific approach for tracking of climate finance. Therefore the EU believes that the successful implementation of the task under SBSTA will depend to a large extent how Parties will manage to involve important actors that provided scientific research and

developed methodologies in the past such as OECD DAC, the OECD research collaborative on tracking private climate finance, Multilateral Development Banks, the International Development Finance Club or regional development banks will be involved in this work.

7.1.3. How to ensure that accounting modalities are developed in time to be integrated into the transparency framework established under the Paris Agreement

In accordance with Article 13, paragraph 6 the purpose of the framework for transparency of support is to provide clarity on support provided and received by relevant individual Parties in the context of climate change actions under Articles 4, 7, 9, 10 and 11, and, to the extent possible, to provide a full overview of aggregate financial support provided, to inform the global stocktake under Article 14. Specific reporting requirements related to climate finance include that developed country Parties shall, and other Parties that provide support should, provide information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support provided to developing country Parties under Articles 9, 10 and 11 (Article 13, paragraph 9) and that developing country Parties should provide information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support needed and received under Articles 9, 10 and 11 (Article 13, paragraph 10). The relevant Articles to the provision of support under Article 9 are paragraphs 1, 2 and 7.

As already outlined in the previous section, it is important that the work on accounting modalities for financial resources addresses the principles outlined in paragraph 92 of decision 1/CP.1 as these are guiding the elaboration of modalities, procedures and guidelines for the enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement.

Paragraph 96 of decision 1/CP.21 requests the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) to conclude the work on the modalities, procedures and guidelines for the enhanced transparency framework under Article 13 no later than 2018. This means that any outcome of the work process under SBSTA elaborated and finalized prior to the end of 2018 can be integrated into the revised common guidelines, modalities and procedures under Article 13. As no more detailed work programme has been elaborated related to the work under Article 13 under APA so far, nor any discussion took place related to the expected outputs in terms of guidelines, modalities or procedures, it cannot yet be specified in a more detailed way how the work under SBSTA could be undertaken in a way that creates most synergies with the work under Article 13. The EU expects that the work under Article 13 will elaborate reporting guidelines, guidelines for the technical expert review under Article 13, paragraph 11 as well as modalities for a facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress. Any specific outcomes in terms of reporting requirements or reporting tables under the SBSTA work programme would feed into the work on reporting guidelines under APA.

The purpose of the framework for transparency of support also includes the provision a full overview of aggregate financial support provided, to inform the global stocktake under Article 14. In this respect the accounting modalities may also address how the reported information from a wide range of actors can be made accessible to Parties and stakeholders in a searchable way and in a way that allows transparent aggregation. The addition of information from various sources and stakeholders may imply additional accounting decisions beyond any guidance provided to Parties which should be discussed in a transparent way if such aggregate information is informing the global stocktake.

7.2. Specific proposals for the revision of the “Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the MMR”

Table 7-1 provides conclusions related to the proposals and options given as recommendations under task 2 based on the comments received from Member States on these recommendations. The table provides an indication whether and how these recommendations should be implemented in the “Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the MMR”. The colour in the column conclusions follows a traffic light approach indicating in green which recommendations where supported by practically all Member States, in yellow those recommendations or proposals that were largely supported, but for which few Member States expressed concerns and using red for those proposals that were not supported by many Member States or where opposing views were expressed.

Table 7-1 Overview of recommendations related to the “Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support under the MMR”

Issue	Proposal or Options	Conclusions
1. Format of Member States replies	The same changes as agreed in decision 9/CP.21 for the CTF should be applied to the reporting tables used for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR.	ü Proposal implemented in technical guidance (2016)
2. Template for methodological information	**Option 1:** integrate a specific new template (covering e.g. explanations how imputed multilateral climate-specific contributions were determined). **Option 2:** integrate the template developed by the OECD joint ENVIRONET-WP-STAT Task Team on the methodological approaches for reporting.	ð Option 1 is preferred by more MS than option 2 ð With some discussion, it is assumed, that one of these options could be implemented in the 2017 technical guidance
3. Coverage of core contributions and climate-specific finance for multilateral climate finance	**1.** If reported, core/general and climate-specific data should be mutually exclusive except where climate-specific contributions are made to specific sub-funds or dedicated programmes of the overarching institutions to which also core funding is provided. **2.** Include a list of funds and programmes as climate specific only. **3.** Indicate any multilateral fund, financial institution or UN body reported under ‘other’ with its name. **4.** Indicate if Member States use OECD imputed multilateral contributions (add in template suggested under 2).	ð With some discussion this proposal could be implemented in the 2017 technical guidance
4. Coverage of multilateral funds or development	**1.** Contributions to the UNFCCC should be clarified. **2.** Amend the reporting tables related to contributions to the Montreal Protocol	ð With some discussion this proposal could be implemented in the 2017

Issue	Proposal or Options	Conclusions
banks	**3.** Include additional rows in the reporting template for most frequently reported other multilateral climate change funds, multilateral institutions and other specialized UN bodies	technical guidance ð Option 3 appears to be less controversial than options 1 and 2
5. Reporting on financial instruments	Request an explanation of the methodology used when loans or other financial instruments are reported	ð With some discussion this proposal could be implemented in the 2017 technical guidance
6. Definition of recipient countries	**Proposal [new option 1]** Use the OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries and deduct Annex I countries (Ukraine, Belarus, Turkey) **[new option 2]** Use the OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries. **[new option 3]** Keep the difference between technical guidance and BR guidance.	× Views are opposing on the three options × Unclear if a solution can be found to implement this in the 2017 technical guidance
7. Point of measurement	Include further guidance for the use of 'committed' and 'disbursed' for loans, export credits or guarantees, including the discussions in OECD DAC	ð With little discussion this proposal could be implemented in the 2017 technical guidance
8. Coverage of funding sources	**1.** Member States should use the definitions for OOF as provided by the OECD DAC, or provide additional explanations. **2.** If OOF flows are reported, MS shall explain as part of the methodological information which flows are covered under OOF. **3.** If no OOF are reported, MS should indicate whether OOF flows do or do not occur. **[new option]** no change required	ð There is wide agreement for the three points made under this proposal; however, a new option was introduced. ð With little discussion this proposal could be implemented in the 2017 technical guidance
9. Coverage of instruments reported	**1.** Include references to OECD DAC definitions for financial instruments including a list of instruments that could be reported under 'other **2.** If 'other instruments' are reported, MS shall explain which instruments are covered. **3.** If no 'other instruments' are reported, indicate whether such instruments do or do not occur.	ü Proposal can be implemented in technical guidance (2017) ü The OECD adds "a new taxonomy of financial instruments has been introduced in DAC statistics (starting with 2016 data)".
10. Currency conversion rate	**1.** Add a specific field in the MMR table template for the reporting of the currency conversion rate used. **2.** Recommendation using the OECD yearly average exchange rate and link it to the source.	ü Proposal can be implemented in technical guidance (2017)
11. Financial resources mobilized through public interventions	**1.** Add a field for numerical data in the reporting tables for financial resources mobilized through public interventions. **2.** Add a requirement that MS who report such figures should provide methodological information how mobilized resources were estimated.	ð There is wide agreement for the two points; however, one member state expresses need for further discussion.
12. Coverage of	**Option 1a:** Keep the current guidance.	ð With some discussion

Issue	Proposal or Options	Conclusions
cross-cutting and other climate-specific finance	**Option 1b:** cross-cutting should be used for ‘funding for activities which are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation’ only if countries cannot assign a contribution to adaptation and mitigation through the use of Rio markers. **[New Option 1b amended:]** Add at the end of 1b “or a transparent national methodology”. **Option 2:** Add the following element to the technical guidance note: Countries who like to separate finance flows provided to REDD+ activities or forestry activities should report such flows under ‘other climate-specific finance’.	this proposal could be implemented in the 2017 technical guidance ð Option 1b (amended) and 2 appear to be less controversial than option 1a ð According to the OECD it is “important to understand if the cross-cutting amounts are to be added or subtracted from the mitigation and adaptation amounts”.
13. Identification of mitigation/adaptation activities and use of OECD DAC indicators	Discuss whether it is possible to develop a common approach or at least apply some elements of the marking system in a consistent way	× Views are opposing on this proposal × Unclear if a solution can be found to implement this in the 2017 technical guidance

7.2.1. Revision of the “Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the MMR”

On the basis of the evaluation in Table 7-1, the recommendations and proposals related to the technical guidance that were supported by all Member States (green) and most of those supported by many countries (yellow) have been implemented in the revised technical guidance proposed in Annex VII (section 9.7). This revised version is based on the 6 June 2016 version and the respective template provided as Annex I. As the proposed technical guidance would apply to the year 2017, it was updated accordingly. The changes in the technical guidance document include the following elements:

- The section on DAC reporting on development finance was moved to the section on “definition of financial instruments”.
- A specific field for the OECD currency conversion rate was included in the template and referenced in the technical guidance.
- OECD definitions for commitments and disbursements have been added in a tablular format.
- For coverage of cross-cutting and other climate-specific finance, a new option is presented where Member States should use ‘funding for activities which are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation’ only if they cannot assign a contribution to adaptation and mitigation through the use of Rio markers or a transparent national methodology.
- The joint paragraph of financing source and financial instruments under section “definition” was divided into two separate paragraphs. In terms of coverage of funding sources, additional guidance for Other Official Flows (OOF) was included. This additional guidance requests Member States that they should use the definitions for OOF as provided by the

OECD DAC (OECD 2016a). If they use a national definition different from the OECD DAC definition, additional explanations should be provided by Member States as part of the methodological information. If OOF flows are reported, Member States shall explain as part of the methodological information which flows are covered under OOF. If no OOF are reported, Member States should indicate in the methodological template whether OOF flows do or do not occur.

- Concerning the use of the category “other” in the coverage of instruments reported, an explanation and specification of what is included is requested. It is also requested to indicate whether such instruments do or do not occur.
- An exception to the rule that core/general and climate-specific data should be mutually exclusive was added to core/general and climate-specific contributions through multilateral channels. In such cases where climate-specific contributions are made to specific sub-funds or dedicated programmes of the overarching institutions to which also core funding is provided, an exemption can be made. In this case, the core funding should be reported as well as climate specific funding and it should be explained how core and climate-specific contributions have been differentiated. It should also be clearly indicated to which sub-funds or programmes the climate-specific contributions are contributing.
- It is furthermore added that any multilateral fund, financial institution or UN body reported under “other” should be clearly indicated with its name.
- The numerical reporting field for private climate finance mobilized, which was added to the template, is referenced in the technical guidance and Member States should describe this in the methodological report.

Changes in the template, Annex I to the technical guidance

Annex I to the “Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the MMR” provides the proposed and revised 2017 template. Changes have been made in table 7, summary information, and table 7(a), contributions through multilateral channels. Changes to the 2016 version are indicated with grey background. Two fields and three footnotes were added to the summary information table. The changes introduced can be summarised as follows:

A currency conversion rate field was included which is linked to the OECD yearly average conversion rate. An additional field was added to indicate financial resources mobilized through public interventions. This field is non-mandatory but if filled in, Member States are encouraged to provide methodological information how those mobilized resources were estimated. For the reporting of OOF, a footnote was added asking Member States to either write “not occurring” or “not estimated”, if no value is reported.

Six United Nation bodies as well as two footnotes were added to table 7(a), contributions through multilateral channels. Climate-specific fields were blocked for the World Bank. As recitals 1-7 were indicated without the according footnotes, these were copied from the summary information table and added as a footnote. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN REDD), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) were added under Specialized United

Nation bodies. Member States are asked to indicate each fund, institution or specialized United Nation body reported under "other" with its name.

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9. Annex

9.1. Annex I: Detailed comparison of methodologies for multilateral finance

The following tables were the basis for the analysis of different methodologies used to report on multilateral climate finance (chapter 4.2.1). The information provided in Tables 7 and 7a from each Member State´s second biennial report (BR2/UNFCCC) and Article 16 of the MMR were analysed and compared. Additionally, qualitative information on methodologies provided in BRs and methodological notes submitted together with MMR reports were taken into account.

Table 9-1: Comparison of methodologies for reporting on multilateral climate finance in BRs/MMR

	core/ general	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	committed / pledged	Disbursed /Provided	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Other	Sector information provided	Sector definition based on OECD DAC	Other sector definition	ODA	OOF	other
	Coverage of core /climate-specific finance					Point of Measurement/ Status		Coverage of instruments reported					Coverage of sectors	Definition of sectors		Funding source		
Austria MMR	x	x	-	x	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x		
Austria BR	-	-	-	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-
Belgium MMR	x	x	x	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	x	x	-	x	x	-
Belgium BR	x	x	x	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	x	x	-	x	-	x
Bulgaria MMR	x	x	-	x	-		x	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-

	Coverage of core /climate-specific finance					Point of Measurement/ Status		Coverage of instruments reported					Coverage of sectors	Definition of sectors		Funding source		
	core/ general	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	committed / pledged	Disbursed /Provided	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Other	Sector information provided	Sector definition based on OECD DAC	Other sector definition	ODA	OOF	other
Bulgaria BR	no climate finance reported																	
Croatia MMR	x	-	-	-	-													
Croatia BR	x	-	-	-	-							x						
Cyprus MMR	no climate finance reported																	
Cyprus BR	no BR2 submitted yet (20.02.2016)																	
Czech Republic MMR	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	x					-	-	-	x		
Czech Republic BR	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-
Denmark MMR	x	x	-	x	x	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	x	x	-	x	-	-
Denmark BR	x	x	x	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	x			x	-	-

	core/ general	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	committed / pledged	Disbursed /Provided	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Other	Sector information provided	Sector definition based on OECD DAC	Other sector definition	ODA	OOF	other
	Coverage of core /climate-specific finance					Point of Measurement/ Status		Coverage of instruments reported					Coverage of sectors	Definition of sectors		Funding source		
Estonia MMR	x	-	x	x	-	-	x	x					(x)			x	x	-
Estonia BR	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	x					-	-	-	x	x	-
Finland MMR	x	x	x	x	-	-	x	x					x	x		x		
Finland BR	x	x	x	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	-						
France MMR	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	x					x	x		x		
France BR	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	x					x	x		x		
Germany MMR	x	x	x	x	x	-	x	x					-	-	-	x		
Germany BR	x	x	x	x	x	-	x	x					-	-	-	x		
Greece MMR	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	x					x			x		
Greece BR	no BR submitted (20.02.2016)																	
Hungary MMR	x	x	x	x				x					x	x		x		
Hungary BR	x	x					x	x					x			x		
Ireland MMR	x	x	x	x			x	x					x		x	x		
Ireland BR	x	x	x	x	x		x	x					x		x	x		x

	Coverage of core /climate-specific finance					Point of Measurement/ Status		Coverage of instruments reported					Covera ge of sectors	Definition of sectors		Funding source		
	core/ general	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	committed / pledged	Disbursed /Provided	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Other	Sector information provided	Sector definition based on OECD DAC	Other sector definition	ODA	OOF	other
Italy MMR	x	x	x	x			x	x					x			x	x	
Italy BR		x		x			x	x					x			x		
Latvia MMR	-	x		x	x	x	x	x					x			x		x
Latvia BR		x			x	x	x	x					x			x		x
Lithuania MMR	x	x		x			x	x					x			x		
Lithuania BR	x	x		x			x	x					x			x		
Luxembourg MMR			x	x		x	x	x					-			x	x	
Luxembourg BR	x	x	x	x		x	x	x					x			x	x	
Malta MMR	x	x	x		x	x		x					x	x		x		
Malta BR	x																	
Netherlands MMR	x	x		x			x	x					x		x	x		
Netherlands BR	x	x		x			x	x					x			x		
Poland MMR	x			x			x	x					x	x		x		

	Coverage of core /climate-specific finance					Point of Measurement/ Status		Coverage of instruments reported					Coverage of sectors	Definition of sectors		Funding source		
	core/ general	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	committed / pledged	Disbursed /Provided	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Other	Sector information provided	Sector definition based on OECD DAC	Other sector definition	ODA	OOF	other
Poland BR	x			x			x	x					x			x		
Portugal MMR	x						x	x					-			x		
Portugal BR	x						x	x								x		
Romania MMR	no multilateral contributions																	
Romania BR	no multilateral contributions																	
Slovakia MMR	x	x	x	x			x	x				x	x			x		
Slovakia BR	x	x	x	x	x		x	x				x	x			x		
Slovenia MMR				x			x	x					x			x		
Slovenia BR	no BR submitted (20.02.2016)																	
Spain MMR		x	x	x			x	x					-			x		
Spain BR	x	x	x	x			x	x					-			x		
Sweden MMR		x	x	x			x	x					x	x		x		

	core/ general	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	committed / pledged	Disbursed /Provided	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Other	Sector information provided	Sector definition based on OECD DAC	Other sector definition	ODA	OOF	other
	Coverage of core /climate-specific finance					**Point of Measurement/ Status**		**Coverage of instruments reported**					**Covera ge of sectors**	**Definition of sectors**		**Funding source**		
Sweden BR	x	x	x	x			x	x					x	x		x		
UK MMR	x	x	x	x			x	x				x	x			x		
UK BR	x		x	x			x	x					-					

Table 9-2: Coverage of multilateral institutions in reporting on core/general support

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - core/general							Coverage of financial institutions - core/general							Specialized UN bodies - core/general						
Austria MMR	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	x	-	x	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	
Austria BR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Belgium MMR	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	-	x	-	-	x	x	-	x	-	-	x
Belgium BR	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	x
Bulgaria MMR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	x
Bulgaria BR																					
Croatia MMR																			x	x	
Croatia BR																			x	x	
Cyprus MMR																					
Cyprus BR																					
Czech Republic MMR	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-
Czech Republic BR	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - core/general							**Coverage of financial institutions - core/general**							**Specialized UN bodies - core/general**						
Denmark MMR	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	x
Denmark BR	x	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-
Estonia MMR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	x
Estonia BR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	x
Finland MMR	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	x	-	x		x	x	-	x	-	-	x
Finland BR	x	x	x	x	-	x	x	-	x	x	x	-	x	-	x	x	-	x	-	-	x
France MMR	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
France BR	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany MMR	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany BR	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Greece MMR																		x			
Greece BR																					
Hungary MMR							x									x		x	x		x
Hungary BR							x											x	x		x
Ireland MMR	x						x			x						x		x			x

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - core/general							Coverage of financial institutions - core/general							Specialized UN bodies - core/general						
Ireland BR	x						x			x						x		x			x
Italy MMR	x																				x
Italy BR									x	x					x						
Latvia MMR																					
Latvia BR																					
Lithuania MMR							x											x			
Lithuania BR							x											x			
Luxembourg MMR																					
Luxembourg BR	x																				
Malta MMR																x					
Malta BR																x					x
Netherlands MMR									x						x	x		x			x
Netherlands BR	x							x	x	x				x	x	x	x	x			x

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - core/general							Coverage of financial institutions - core/general							Specialized UN bodies - core/general						
Poland MMR							x								x						
Poland BR							x								x						
Portugal MMR							x		x	x			x			x					x
Portugal BR							x		x	x			x			x			x		
Romania MMR																					
Romania BR																					
Slovakia MMR																		x			x
Slovakia BR																					x
Slovenia MMR																					
Slovenia BR																					
Spain MMR																					
Spain BR	x																				
Sweden MMR							x		x	x			x			x		x			x

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - core/general							Coverage of financial institutions - core/general								Specialized UN bodies - core/general					
Sweden BR							x		x	x			x			x		x			x
UK MMR									x	x			x	x	x						
UK BR							x		x	x			x								

Table 9-3: Coverage of multilateral institutions in reporting on climate-specific support

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	Clean Technology Fund	Strategic Climate Fund	IPCC	other	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	ITL	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - climate-specific										Coverage of financial institutions - climate-specific									Specialized UN bodies - climate-specific						
Austria MMR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-		x		-
Austria BR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	x	x	-	-	-
Belgium MMR	-	x	-	x	x	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	x
Belgium BR	-	x	x	x	x	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	x
Bulgaria MMR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	x	-
Bulgaria BR																										
Croatia MMR																										
Croatia BR																										
Cyprus MMR																										
Cyprus BR																										

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	Clean Technology Fund	Strategic Climate Fund	IPCC	other	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	ITL	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - climate-specific										**Coverage of financial institutions - climate-specific**									**Specialized UN bodies - climate-specific**						
Czech Republic MMR	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Czech Republic BR	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Denmark MMR	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	x	x	x	x	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	-
Denmark BR	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	x	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	-
Estonia MMR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	x	-	-	-
Estonia BR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-
Finland MMR	x	x	x	x	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	x	-	x	-	x	x	-	x	-	-	-	x
Finland BR	x	x	x	x	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	x	-	x	-	x	x	-	x	-	-	-	x
France MMR	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	Clean Technology Fund	Strategic Climate Fund	IPCC	other	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	ITL	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - climate-specific										**Coverage of financial institutions - climate-specific**									**Specialized UN bodies - climate-specific**						
France BR	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany MMR	-	x	x	x	x	-	-	-	x	x	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	x	x	-	-	-	x
Germany BR	-	x	x	x	x	-	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	x	x	x	x			x
Greece MMR										x																
Greece BR																										
Hungary MMR										x											x					
Hungary BR										x																
Ireland MMR		x				x																x				x
Ireland BR		x				x																x				x
Italy MMR	x				x					x					x				x	x		x		x		x
Italy BR	x				x								x	x			x		x	x		x				x
Latvia					x										x											

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	Clean Technology Fund	Strategic Climate Fund	IPCC	other	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	ITL	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - climate-specific										**Coverage of financial institutions - climate-specific**									**Specialized UN bodies - climate-specific**						
MMR																										
Latvia BR					x										x		x									
Lithuania MMR															x	x										
Lithuania BR															x	x										
Luxembourg MMR	x				x						x								x			x				x
Luxembourg BR					x						x								x	x		x				x
Malta MMR																										x
Malta BR																										
Netherlands MMR	x									x			x						x	x		x				x
Netherlands BR	x											x	x	x				x	x	x		x				x
Poland					x																x	x	x			x

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	Clean Technology Fund	Strategic Climate Fund	IPCC	other	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	ITL	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - climate-specific										**Coverage of financial institutions - climate-specific**									**Specialized UN bodies - climate-specific**						
MMR																										
Poland BR					x															x	x	x				x
Portugal MMR																										
Portugal BR																										
Romania MMR																										
Romania BR																										
Slovakia MMR										x					x						x		x	x		
Slovakia BR										x					x						x	x	x	x		
Slovenia MMR	x										x								x							x
Slovenia BR																										
Spain MMR							x															x				x
Spain BR	x			x			x															x				x

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	Clean Technology Fund	Strategic Climate Fund	IPCC	other	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	ITL	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - climate-specific										Coverage of financial institutions - climate-specific									Specialized UN bodies - climate-specific						
Sweden MMR	x	x			x	x				x																
Sweden BR	x	x			x	x				x																
UK MMR	x				x		x			x																
UK BR	x				x					x																

9.2. Annex II: Detailed comparison of methodologies for bilateral finance

The following tables were the basis for the analysis of different methodologies used to report on bilateral climate finance (chapter 4.3.3). The information provided in Tables 7b from each Member State´s second biennial report (BR2/UNFCCC) and Article 16 of the MMR were analysed and compared. Additionally, qualitative information on methodologies provided in BRs and methodological notes submitted together with MMR reports were taken into account.

Table 9-4: Comparison of methodologies to report on bilateral climate finance (funding sources, point of measurement, coverage of instruments reported)

	Coverage of funding sources			Definition provided for funding source			Point of Measurement/ Status				Definition used for point of measurement/ status				Coverage of instruments reported							Definition provided for instrument						
	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	committed	Disbursed /Provided	Calendar Year	Fiscal Year	Definition from DAC Statistical Reporting Directives	UNFCCC terminology	national definition	definition not indicated	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other
Austria MMR	x	x					x	x							x													
Austria BR	x						x	x							x		x	x	x	x								
Belgium MMR	x	x						x					x		x	x												
Belgium BR	x	x		x				x							x	x												
Bulgaria MMR																												
Bulgaria BR																												
Croatia MMR																												
Croatia BR																												
Cyprus MMR																												

	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	committed	Disbursed /Provided	Calendar Year	Fiscal Year	Definition from DAC Statistical Reporting Directives	UNFCCC terminology	national definition	definition not indicated	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other
	Coverage of funding sources			**Definition provided for funding source**			**Point of Measurement/ Status**				**Definition used for point of measurement/ status**				**Coverage of instruments reported**							**Definition provided for instrument**						
Cyprus BR																												
Czech Republic MMR	x							x							x													
Czech Republic BR	x							x							x													
Denmark MMR	x						x								x													
Denmark BR	x														x													
Estonia MMR	x							x							x													
Estonia BR	x							x							x													
Finland MMR	x							x							x			x				x			x	x	x	x
Finland BR	x							x							x			x			x							
France	x	x		x	x		x				x		x		x	x	x											

	Coverage of funding sources			Definition provided for funding source			Point of Measurement/ Status				Definition used for point of measurement/ status				Coverage of instruments reported							Definition provided for instrument						
	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	committed	Disbursed /Provided	Calendar Year	Fiscal Year	Definition from DAC Statistical Reporting Directives	UNFCCC terminology	national definition	definition not indicated	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other
MMR																												
France BR	x	x		x	x		x	x			x		x		x	x	x											
Germany MMR	x	x					x	x							x	x												
Germany BR	x						x	x							x	x												
Greece MMR																												
Greece BR																												
Hungary MMR																												
Hungary BR	x							x							x													
Ireland MMR	x							x							x													
Ireland BR	x							x							x													
Italy MMR	x	x	x				x	x							x	x												

	Coverage of funding sources			Definition provided for funding source			Point of Measurement/ Status				Definition used for point of measurement/ status				Coverage of instruments reported							Definition provided for instrument						
	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	committed	Disbursed /Provided	Calendar Year	Fiscal Year	Definition from DAC Statistical Reporting Directives	UNFCCC terminology	national definition	definition not indicated	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other
Italy BR	x	x					x	x							x	x												
Latvia MMR	x							x													x							
Latvia BR																												
Lithuania MMR	x							x							x													
Lithuania BR	x						x	x							x													
Luxembourg MMR	x														x													
Luxembourg BR	x							x							x													
Malta MMR	x						x								x													
Malta BR	x						x	x							x													
Netherlands MMR	x							x							x													
Netherlands BR	x							x							x													

	Coverage of funding sources			Definition provided for funding source			Point of Measurement/ Status				Definition used for point of measurement/ status				Coverage of instruments reported							Definition provided for instrument						
	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	committed	Disbursed /Provided	Calendar Year	Fiscal Year	Definition from DAC Statistical Reporting Directives	UNFCCC terminology	national definition	definition not indicated	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other
Poland MMR	x							x							x													
Poland BR	x							x							x													
Portugal MMR	x							x							x	x												
Portugal BR	X							x							x	x												
Romania MMR	x														x													
Romania BR	x							x							x													
Slovakia MMR	x							x							x						x							
Slovakia BR	x							x							x						x							
Slovenia MMR	x							x							x													
Slovenia BR																												
Spain MMR	x	x						x							x	x	x	x	x		x							

	Coverage of funding sources			Definition provided for funding source			Point of Measurement/ Status				Definition used for point of measurement/ status				Coverage of instruments reported							Definition provided for instrument						
	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	committed	Disbursed /Provided	Calendar Year	Fiscal Year	Definition from DAC Statistical Reporting Directives	UNFCCC terminology	national definition	definition not indicated	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other
Spain BR	x	x					x	x					x		x	x	x	x	x							x		
Sweden MMR	x							x							x													
Sweden BR	x							x			x				x													
United Kingdom MMR	x							x							x			x										
United Kingdom BR	x							x							x			x										

Table 9-5: Comparison of methodologies for reporting on bilateral climate finance (identification of mitigation/adaptation activities, recipient definition, quantification of climate-specific, valorisation of instrument, currency exchange rates, level of aggregation, reporting on technology transfer and capacity building)

	OECD DAC Rio Markers	MDB Adaptation 3-step appraoch	MDB Mitigation Positive list/ IDFC Common Principles	National Definition	ODA Eligible Countries (OECD DAC list)	UNFCCC Non-Annex I Parties	Activity-level component approach	Percentage at sectoral basis	Coefficient on "Principal"	Coefficient on "Significantl"	Approach for treating overlaps	Accounting (deduction) of reflows	Cash Value	Grant Equivalent	National currency	Euro	OECD exchange rates	Other exchange rates	Activity level	aggregate or semi-aggregates	Reporting on Technology Transfer yes/no	Reporting on Capacity building yes/no
	Identification of mitigation / adaptation activities				Recipient Definition		Quantification of climate-specific						Valorisation of Instrument		Currency reporting, exchange rates				Format of data			
Austria MMR	x				x				x	x			x									
Austria BR	x				x				100%	40%	x					x	x		x		Y	Y
Belgium MMR	x					x		x	x	x	x						x		x		Y	Y
Belgium BR	x					x		x	x	x	x						x		x		Y	Y
Bulgaria MMR																						
Bulgaria BR																						
Croatia MMR																						
Croatia BR																						
Cyprus MMR																						
Cyprus BR																						
Czech Republic MMR	x														x			x	x		Y	Y
Czech Republic BR	x														x			x	x		N	N

	OECD DAC Rio Markers	MDB Adaptation 3-step appraoch	MDB Mitigation Positive list/ IDFC Common Principles	National Definition	ODA Eligible Countries (OECD DAC list)	UNFCCC Non-Annex I Parties	Activity-level component approach	Percentage at sectoral basis	Coefficient on "Principal"	Coefficient on "Significantl"	Approach for treating overlaps	Accounting (deduction) of reflows	Cash Value	Grant Equivalent	National currency	Euro	OECD exchange rates	Other exchange rates	Activity level	aggregate or semi-aggregates	Reporting on Technology Transfer yes/no	Reporting on Capacity building yes/no
	Identification of mitigation / adaptation activities				**Recipient Definition**		**Quantification of climate-specific**						**Valorisation of Instrument**		**Currency reporting, exchange rates**				**Format of data**			
Denmark MMR	x								100%	50%					x				x		N	N
Denmark BR	x								100%	50%									x		Y	Y
Estonia MMR	x				x																	
Estonia BR																						
Finland MMR	x								varies	varies	x								x		Y	Y
Finland BR	x								varies	varies	x								x		Y	Y
France MMR	x			x	x		x		100%	40%	x					x	x		x	x	Y	Y
France BR	x			x	x		x		100%	40%	x					x	x		x	x	Y	Y
Germany MMR	x								100%	50%	x		x	x					x			
Germany BR	x								100%	50%	x					x			x		Y	Y
Greece MMR																					N	Y
Greece BR																						
Hungary MMR																						
Hungary BR																			x		N	N

	OECD DAC Rio Markers	MDB Adaptation 3-step appraoch	MDB Mitigation Positive list/ IDFC Common Principles	National Definition	ODA Eligible Countries (OECD DAC list)	UNFCCC Non-Annex I Parties	Activity-level component approach	Percentage at sectoral basis	Coefficient on "Principal"	Coefficient on "Significantl"	Approach for treating overlaps	Accounting (deduction) of reflows	Cash Value	Grant Equivalent	National currency	Euro	OECD exchange rates	Other exchange rates	Activity level	aggregate or semi-aggregates	Reporting on Technology Transfer yes/no	Reporting on Capacity building yes/no
	Identification of mitigation / adaptation activities				**Recipient Definition**		**Quantification of climate-specific**						**Valorisa tion of Instrum ent**		**Currency reporting, exchange rates**				**Format of data**			
Ireland MMR	x								100%	50%									x			
Ireland BR	x						x		100%	50%	x							x	x		Y	Y
Italy MMR									100%	40%									x		Y	N
Italy BR																			x		Y	Y
Latvia MMR																					N	N
Latvia BR																		x				
Lithuania MMR																					N	N
Lithuania BR																						
Luxembourg MMR	x																				Y	Y
Luxembo urg BR																				x	N	N
Malta MMR																						
Malta BR																			x		N	N
Netherlands MMR	x								100%	40%	x								x		Y	Y
Netherlands BR	x					x			100%	40%	x							x	x		Y	Y
Poland MMR	x														x			x	x		N	N

	OECD DAC Rio Markers	MDB Adaptation 3-step appraoch	MDB Mitigation Positive list/ IDFC Common Principles	National Definition	ODA Eligible Countries (OECD DAC list)	UNFCCC Non-Annex I Parties	Activity-level component approach	Percentage at sectoral basis	Coefficient on "Principal"	Coefficient on "Significantl"	Approach for treating overlaps	Accounting (deduction) of reflows	Cash Value	Grant Equivalent	National currency	Euro	OECD exchange rates	Other exchange rates	Activity level	aggregate or semi-aggregates	Reporting on Technology Transfer yes/no	Reporting on Capacity building yes/no
	Identification of mitigation / adaptation activities				**Recipient Definition**		**Quantification of climate-specific**						**Valorisation of Instrument**		**Currency reporting, exchange rates**				**Format of data**			
Poland BR															x			x	x		Y	N
Portugal MMR	x																		x			
Portugal BR	x																		x		Y	Y
Romania MMR																						
Romania BR															x							
Slovakia MMR	x																				Y	Y
Slovakia BR	x																	x			Y	Y
Slovenia MMR																						
Slovenia BR																						
Spain MMR																					Y	Y
Spain BR	x								100%	20%	x						x		x		Y	Y
Sweden MMR	x					x			100%	40%					x		x		x		Y	Y
Sweden BR	x					x			100%	40%					x		x		x		Y	Y
United Kingdom MMR				x											x			x	x		Y	Y
United Kingdom BR	x?														x				x		Y	Y

9.3. Annex III: Detailed quantitative comparison of finance data reported for the year 2014 in the MMR reporting and the second biennial reports

The following tables were the basis for the quantitative analysis (section 9.5). Tables 7 and 7a from each Member State´s second biennial report (BR2/UNFCCC) and Article 16 of the MMR were compiled into one table. Values are compared in national currency. Czech Republic has resubmitted the BR2 tables on 14 March 2016; those are considered here. There is no table for Cyprus, as Cyprus reports empty tables only. MMR data are presented with yellow and BR2 data with blue background. Values in red script are not equal between MMR and BR2. For some Member States, corrections had to be done, such as multiplying values by 1,000 or 1,000,000. Such corrections are described in the specific country chapter in section 9.5.

Table 9-6: Austria – Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Austria 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core / general	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**11,682,354**	**1,071,198**	**0**	**252,640**	**0**	**13,006,192**	**1,323,838**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**41,485,477**	**0**	**41,485,477**	**41,485,477**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds						0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	**9,702,354**			**0**		**9,702,354**	**0**
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	**0**			**40,331,412**		**40,331,412**	**40,331,412**
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	**1,980,000**	**1,071,198**		**252,640**		**3,303,838**	**1,323,838**
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	**0**	**0**		**1,154,065**		**1,154,065**	**1,154,065**
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**71,002,910**	**6,882,195**	**21,868,146**		**99,753,251**	**99,753,251**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**71,002,910**	**6,882,195**	**21,868,146**		**99,753,251**	**99,753,251**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**11,682,354**	**72,074,108**	6,882,195	**22,120,786**	0	**112,759,443**	**101,077,089**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**0**	**71,002,910**	6,882,195	**63,353,623**	0	**141,238,728**	**141,238,728**

Table 9-7: Austria – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	9,702,354	40,331,412	0
1. World Bank	0	4,898,927	26,135,980	0
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank	0	1,693,034	12,195,433	0
4. Asian Development Bank	0	1,769,290	2,000,000	0
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	0	860,000		
6. Inter-American Development Bank	0	481,103		
7. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies (sum of figures below)	0	1,980,000	1,154,065	1,323,838
1. United Nations Development Programme	0	1,580,000		
2. United Nations Environment Programme	0	400,000		
Montreal Protocol			1,071,198	1,071,198
3. Other				
UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and ITL			82,867	252,640
Total contributions through multilateral channels	*0*	*11,682,354*	*41,485,477*	*1,323,838*

Table 9-8: Belgium - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Belgium 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	**Allocation channels**	**Core / general**	**Climate-specific: Mitigation**	**Climate-specific: Adaptation**	**Climate-specific: Cross-cutting**	**Climate-specific: Other**	**Total (climate-specific and core / general)**	**Total climate-specific**
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**376,108,466**	**22,040**	**12,813,595**	**41,494,353**		**430,438,454**	**54,329,988**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**376,108,466**	**22,040**	**15,063,594**	**41,494,353**		**432,688,453**	**56,579,987**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	18,600,000	22,040	**12,000,000**	40,683,549		71,305,589	52,705,589
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	18,600,000	22,040	**14,250,000**	40,683,549		73,555,589	54,955,589
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds		22,040	1,000,000			1,022,040	1,022,040
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds		22,040	1,000,000			1,022,040	1,022,040
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	305,832,100					305,832,100	
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	305,832,100					305,832,100	
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	**43,676,366**		813,595	810,804			
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	**51,676,366**		813,594	810,804			
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**8,557,943**	**18,240,097**	**13,273,725**		**40,071,765**	**40,071,765**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**8,557,943.23**	**18,240,097.40**	**13,273,724.60**		**40,071,765**	**40,071,765**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	376,108,466	8,579,983.00	**31,053,691.95**	54,768,078.32	0	**470,510,220**	**94,401,753**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	376,108,466	8,579,983.23	**33,303,691.40**	54,768,077.60	0	**472,760,218**	**96,651,752**
MMR	*Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research*	**8,000,000**						

Table 9-9: Belgium – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)
Multilateral climate change funds	18,600,000			
1. Global Environment Facility	18,600,000	18,600,000		
2. Least Developed Countries Fund			12,000,000	12,000,000
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund			1,250,000	1,000,000
				250,000
5. Green Climate Fund			40,600,000	40,000,000
				600,000
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities			83,549	83,549
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
7.1 International Partnership on Mitigation and MRV			22,040	22,040
7.2 IFAD: budget support for the "Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme"			1,000,000	1,000,000
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	*305,832,100*			
1. World Bank	148,747,082	148,747,082		
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank	33,987,573	33,987,573		
4. Asian Development Bank	7,933,541	7,933,541		
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other	*115,163,904*			
7.1 European Investment Bank - EIB	4,146,560	4,146,560		
7.2 Europees ontwikkelingsfonds (EOF/EDF/FED)	111,017,344	111,017,344		
Specialized United Nations bodies	*51,676,366*			
1. United Nations Development Programme	19,000,000	19,000,000		
1.1 UNDP: Strengthen capacity to incorporate climate change adaptation and resilience planning into National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) through the NBSAP Forum			35,000	35,000
2. United Nations Environment Programme	4,000,000	4,000,000		
3. Other	*28,676,366*			
3.1 Food and Agricultural Organization	5,426,366	5,426,366		
3.2 International Fund for Agricultural Development	8,000,000	8,000,000		
3.2 World Food Programme - Immediate Response Account	7,250,000	7,250,000		
3.3 UNESCO: Framework for Research, Education and Training in the Water Sector Phase III (FET -Water III)			105,002	105,002
3.4 UNESCO: Southeast Pacific data and Information Networking support to integrated Coastal Area Management' (SPINCAM-II)			82,940	82,940
3.5 UNESCO: Addressing Water Security: Climate impacts and adaptation responses in Africa, Asia and LAC			130,517	130,517
3.6 UNESCO: Climate Change Adaptation for African Natural World Heritage Sites			37,700	37,700
3.7 UNESCO: Enhancing Natural Hazards Resilience in South America (ENHANS)			188,500	188,500
3.8 UNESCO: Biosphere reserves as a tool for coastal and island management in the South-East Pacific region (BRESEP)			75,339	75,339
3.9 UNESCO: Caribbean Marine Atlas, phase 2			95,547	95,547
3.10 UNESCO: Ecosystem-based marine spatial planning for conservation of World Heritage Marine Sites			63,049	63,049
3.11 ICRAF: support to the world congress on agroforestry			50,804	50,804
3.12 ICRAF: Extending the Agroforestry Food Security Programme (AFSP) in Kasungu and Mzimba districts			160,000	160,000
3.13 ICRAF: Building a larger Evergreen Agriculture Network for Southern Africa			600,000	600,000
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research	8,000,000	8,000,000		
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***376,108,466***	***376,108,466***		***55,329,988***

Table 9-10: Bulgaria- Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Bulgaria 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core / general	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**25,236**	**0**	**0**	**8,975**	**0**	**34,211**	**8,975**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	**8,975**	0	**8,975**	**8,975**
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds						**0**	**0**
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	**62,184**	0	**8,975**	0	**71,159**	**71,159**
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds		**0**		**0**		**0**	**0**
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks						0	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	**25,236**	0	0	0	0	**25,236**	**0**
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	**0**					**0**	**0**
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**						**0**	**0**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**25,236**	**0**	**0**	**8,975**	**0**	**34,211**	**8,975**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**

Table 9-11: Bulgaria – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	***MMR (EUR)***	***UNFCCC (EUR)***	***MMR (EUR)***
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
7.1. UNFCCC			0	8,001.00
7.2 Kyoto Protocol under UNFCCC			0	4,315.00
7.3 International Transaction Log (ITL)			0	974.00
7.4 Montreal Protocol			0	57,868.61
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies				
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme	0	15,220.10		
3. Other				
3.1 The United Nations Convention to Combat Desesrtification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa	0	3,381.00		
3.2 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES)	0	2,600.85		
3.3 International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)	0	4,033.92		
Total contributions through multilateral channels	*0*	*25,235.87*	*0*	*71,158.61*

Table 9-12: Croatia - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Croatia 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core / general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Climate-specific: Adaptation	Climate-specific: Cross-cutting	Climate-specific: Other	Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds						0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds						0.00	0.00
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds						0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0.00	0.00
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks						0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks						0.00	0.00
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	33,018.00					33,018.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	33,018.00					33,018.00	0.00
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**						**0.00**	**0.00**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**						**0.00**	**0.00**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**

Table 9-13: Croatia – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies	33,018.00	33,018.00		
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme				
3. Other				
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***33,018.00***	***33,018.00***		

Table 9-14: Czech Republic – Table 7 Summary information for 2014[54]

Czech Republic 2014, Table 7		National currency CZK (MMR) / National currency CZK (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core / general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Climate-specific: Adaptation	Climate-specific: Cross-cutting	Climate-specific: Other	Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	172,470,000	**0**	**0**	59,521,559	**0**	231,991,559	**59,521,559**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	192,610,621	**0**	**0**	59,521,559	**0**	252,132,180	**59,521,559**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	59,521,559	0	59,521,559	59,521,559
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	20,140,621			19,521,559		39,662,180	19,521,559
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	40,000,000	0	40,000,000	40,000,000
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds				0	0	0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	163,470,000	0	0	0	0	163,470,000	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	163,470,000			40,000,000		203,470,000	40,000,000
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	9,000,000	0	0	0	0	9,000,000	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	9,000,000					9,000,000	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	0	31,637,691	77,080,054	2,700,000	**0**	111,417,745	111,417,745
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		31,637,691	77,080,054	2,700,000		111,417,745	111,417,745
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**172,470,000**	**31,637,691**	**77,080,054**	**62,221,559**	**0**	**343,409,304**	**170,939,304**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**192,610,621**	**31,637,691**	**77,080,054**	**62,221,559**	**0**	**363,549,925**	**170,939,304**

[54] The corrected BR2 tables submitted on 14 March 2016 are considered here

Table 9-15: Czech Republic – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014[55]

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (CZK)	*MMR (CZK)*	*UNFCCC (CZK)*	*MMR (CZK)*
Multilateral climate change funds	20140621	20,140,621	**19,521,559**	**59,521,559**
1. Global Environment Facility	20140621	20,140,621	9,521,559	9,521,559
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund			10,000,000	10,000,000
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds			**0**	**40,000,000**
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	163,470,000	163,470,000	**40,000,000**	
1. World Bank	163,470,000	163,470,000		
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development		0		
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other			**40,000,000**	
Specialized United Nations bodies	9,000,000	9,000,000		
1. United Nations Development Programme	8,000,000	8,000,000		
2. United Nations Environment Programme	1,000,000	1,000,000		
3. Other				
Total contributions through multilateral channels	*192,610,621*	*192,610,621*	*59,521,559*	*59,521,559*

[55] The corrected BR2 tables submitted on 14 March 2016 are considered here

Table 9-16: Denmark - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Denmark 2014, Table 7		National currency DKK = 134,1413 EUR (MMR)							
		National currency DKK							
Source	Allocation channels	Core / general	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	1,284,523,000	28,918,500	0	120,701,000	128,000,000	1,562,142,500	149,619,500
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	1,412,523,000	52,175,500	40,000,000	97,455,500	0	1,602,154,000	189,631,000
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	135,000,000	0	0	0	128,000,000	263,000,000	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	263,000,000	0	0	11,500	0	263,011,500	11,500
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds	163,000,000	0	0	11,500	0	163,011,500	11,500
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	524,729,000	28,918,500	0	59,820,000	0	613,467,500	88,738,500
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	524,729,000	37,925,500	40,000,000	50,813,000	0	653,467,500	128,738,500
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	624,794,000	0	0	60,881,000	0	685,675,000	60,881,000
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	624,794,000	14,250,000	0	46,631,000	0	685,675,000	60,881,000
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	0	312,704,000	0	935,913,000	0	1,248,617,000	1,248,617,000
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	0	303,127,500	110,223,000	766,454,500	0	1,179,805,000	1,179,805,000
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	1,284,523,000	341,622,500	0	1,056,614,000	128,000,000	2,810,759,500	1,398,236,500
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	1,412,523,000	355,303,000	150,223,000	863,910,000	0	2,781,959,000	1,369,436,000

Table 9-17: Denmark – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCCC (1000 DKK)	MMR (1000 DKK)	UNFCCC (1000 DKK)	MMR (1000 DKK)
Multilateral climate change funds	**263,000.00**	**135,000.00**	**11.50**	**128,000.00**
1. Global Environment Facility - 47044	135,000.00	135,000.00	11.50	0.00
2. Least Developed Countries Fund - 47129	0.00		0.00	
3. Special Climate Change Fund - 47130	0.00		0.00	
4. Adaptation Fund - 47111	0.00		0.00	
5. Green Climate Fund - 41317	100,000.00		0.00	100,000.00
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities - 41316	0.00		0.00	
7. Other multilateral climate change funds - (GGGI) 47136	28,000.00		0.00	28,000.00
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	**524,728.90**	**524,729.00**	**128,738.00**	**88,738.50**
1. World Bank (IBRD & IDA?) - 44001+44002	436,320.00	436,320.00	43,538.00	52,545.00
			40,000.00	0.00
			9,007.00	0.00
2. International Finance Corporation - 44004	0.00		7,275.00	7,275.00
3. African Development Bank (&AfDF?) - 46002+46003	55,101.00	55,101.00	93.00	93.00
4. Asian Development Bank (&AsDF?) - 46004+46005	33,307.90	33,308.00	24,075.00	24,075.50
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development - 46015	0.00		4,750.00	4,750.00
6. Inter-American Development Bank - 46012+46013	0.00			
7. Other - ?				
Specialized United Nations bodies	**624,794.00**	**624,794.00**	**60,881.00**	**60,881.00**
1. United Nations Development Programme - 41114	346,478.00	346,478.00	20,881.00	20,881.00
2. United Nations Environment Programme - 41116	30,000.00	30,000.00	40,000.00	40,000.00
3. Other - (IFAD, ISDR, UNIDO, WFP) 41108+41315+41123+41140	248,316.00	248,316.00	0.00	
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***1,412,522.90***	***1,284,523.00***	***189,630.50***	***277,619.50***

Table 9-18: Estonia - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Estonia 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core / general	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	58,883.73	0.00	323,000.00	262,806.21	0.00	644,689.94	585,806.21
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	108,883.73	0.00	0.00	60,806.21	0.00	169,689.94	60,806.21
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	151,007.21	0.00	151,007.21	151,007.21
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds				49,007.21		49,007.21	49,007.21
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds				49,007.21		49,007.21	49,007.21
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0.00	0.00	0.00	100,000.00	0.00	100,000.00	100,000.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				0.00		0.00	0.00
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	58,883.73	0.00	323,000.00	11,799.00	0.00	393,682.73	334,799.00
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	108,883.73		0.00	11,799.00		120,682.73	11,799.00
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	0.00	0.00	0.00	102,000.00	0.00	102,000.00	102,000.00
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		74,134.00		535,204.00		609,338.00	609,338.00
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	58,883.73	0.00	323,000.00	364,806.21	0.00	746,689.94	687,806.21
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	108,883.73	74,134.00	0.00	596,010.21	0.00	779,027.94	670,144.21

Table 9-19: Estonia – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds			49,007.21	
7.1 Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol			49,007.21	49,007.21
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other: International Telecommunications Union			**0.00**	**100,000.00**
Specialized United Nations bodies	108,883.73		11,799.00	
1. United Nations Development Programme	**50,000.00**	**0.00**		
2. United Nations Environment Programme	5,000.00	5,000.00	**0.00**	**323,000.00**
3. Other		0.00	11,799.00	
3.1 UNCCD	2,877.00	2,877.00		
3.2 UNFCCC			11,799.00	11,799.00
3.3 WMO	21,335.73	21,335.73		
3.4 IAEA-TCF	29,671.00	29,671.00		
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***108,883.73***	***58,883.73***	***60,806.21***	***483,806.21***

Table 9-20: Finland - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Finland 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core / general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Climate-specific: Adaptation	Climate-specific: Cross-cutting	Climate-specific: Other	Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**521,277,548.61**	**6,837,000.00**	**14,000,000.00**	**50,907,921.70**	**0.00**	**593,022,470.31**	**71,744,921.70**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**507,945,143.59**	**6,837,000.00**	**14,000,000.00**	**50,907,921.69**	**0.00**	**579,690,065.28**	**71,744,921.69**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	**0.00**	6,167,000.00	14,000,000.00	0.00	0.00	**20,167,000.00**	20,167,000.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	**36,025,000.00**	6,167,000.00	14,000,000.00			**56,192,000.00**	20,167,000.00
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0.00	0.00
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	197,735,059.59	670,000.00	0.00	29,834,694.62	0.00	228,239,754.21	30,504,694.62
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	197,735,059.59	670,000.00		29,834,694.61		228,239,754.20	30,504,694.61
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	**323,542,489.02**	0.00	0.00	21,073,227.08	0.00	**344,615,716.10**	21,073,227.08
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	**274,185,084.00**			21,073,227.08		**295,258,311.08**	21,073,227.08
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**499,106,839.20**	**24,020,057.81**	**10,260,341.15**	**10,146,203.91**	**0.00**	**543,533,442.06**	**44,426,602.87**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0.00**	**24,020,057.81**	**10,260,341.14**	**10,146,203.91**		**44,426,602.86**	**44,426,602.86**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**1,020,384,387.81**	30,857,057.81	24,260,341.15	61,054,125.60	0.00	**1,136,555,912.37**	116,171,524.56
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**507,945,143.59**	30,857,057.81	24,260,341.14	61,054,125.60	0.00	**624,116,668.14**	116,171,524.55

Table 9-21: Finland – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)
Multilateral climate change funds	**36,025,000.00**		20,167,000.00	
1. Global Environment Facility	**22,025,000.00**		6,167,000.00	6,167,000.00
2. Least Developed Countries Fund	**6,000,000.00**		6,000,000.00	6,000,000.00
3. Special Climate Change Fund	**2,900,000.00**		2,900,000.00	2,900,000.00
4. Adaptation Fund	**5,000,000.00**		5,000,000.00	5,000,000.00
5. Green Climate Fund				0.00
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities	**100,000.00**		100,000.00	100,000.00
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				0.00
Subtotal				**20,167,000.00**
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development bar	197,735,059.59		30,504,694.61	
1. World Bank (WB, IBRD, IDA, IDA-HIPC, MIGA, AMCs)	116,815,254.14	116,815,254.14	13,976,020.09	13,976,020.09
2. International Finance Corporation		0.00		0.00
3. African Development Bank (Afr.DB, Afr.DF)	63,109,638.38	63,109,638.38	10,598,255.50	10,598,255.50
4. Asian Development Bank (AsDB, AsDF)	10,151,465.46	10,151,465.46	1,566,863.78	1,566,263.78
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, -TFs ODA, -TFs all, -ETC, -WBJTF)	2,700,000.00	2,700,000.00	670,000.00	670,000.00
6. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB, IDB Sp.F.)	1,487,701.61	1,487,701.61	223,155.24	223,155.24
7. Other	3,471,000.00		3,471,000.00	
Nordic Development Fund	3,471,000.00	3,471,000.00	3,471,000.00	3,471,000.00
Subtotal		**197,735,059.59**		**30,504,694.62**
Specialized United Nations bodies	274,185,084.00		21,073,227.08	
1. United Nations Development Programme (specific programmes)	43,704,171.43	43,704,171.43	3,127,500.00	3,127,500.00
2. United Nations Environment Programme (specific programmes)	6,724,427.00	6,724,427.00	1,200,000.00	1,200,000.00
United Nations Children's Fund		**49,357,405.02**		0.00
Food and Agricultural Organisation	5,014,586.22	5,014,586.22	1,337,500.00	1,337,500.00
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research	9,750,000.00	9,750,000.00	4,400,000.00	4,400,000.00
Other multilateral	208,991,899.35	208,991,899.35	11,008,227.08	11,008,227.08
Subtotal		**323,542,489.02**		**21,073,227.08**
Total		***557,337,125.85***		***71,744,921.70***

Table 9-22: France - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

France 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core / general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**33,985,000**	**0**	**0**	**10,875,200**	**0**	**44,860,200**	**10,875,200**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**33,985,000**			**10,875,200**		**44,860,200**	**10,875,200**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	33,985,000	0	0	10,875,200	0	44,860,200	10,875,200
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	33,985,000			10,875,200		44,860,200	10,875,200
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks						0	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies						0	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**2,232,149,678**	**279,138,362**	**245,032,419**	**0**	**2,756,320,459**	**2,756,320,459**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**2,233,874,678**	**279,138,362**	**243,307,419**		**2,756,320,459**	**2,756,320,459**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	33,985,000	**2,232,149,678**	279,138,362	**255,907,619**	0	2,801,180,659	2,767,195,659
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	33,985,000	**2,233,874,678**	279,138,362	**254,182,619**	0	2,801,180,659	2,767,195,659

Table 9-23: France – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor Funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)	UNFCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)
Multilateral climate change funds				
Global Environment Facility	33,985,000	33,985,000	10,875,200	10,875,200
Total contribution through multilateral channels	***33,985,000***	***33,985,000***	***10,875,200***	***10,875,200***

Table 9-24: Germany - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Germany 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core / general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**866,596,094**	**27,006,778**	**98,000,000**	**20,619,520**	**92,000,000**	**1,104,222,391**	**237,626,298**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**866,596,094**	**27,006,778**	**98,000,000**	**20,619,520**	**92,000,000**	**1,104,222,391**	**237,626,298**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	80,607,261	8,006,778	98,000,000	**1,000,000**		187,614,039	107,006,778
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	80,607,261	8,006,778	98,000,000	**7,392,792**		194,006,831	113,399,570
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds		8,006,778		6,392,792		14,399,570	14,399,570
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds		8,006,778		6,392,792		14,399,570	14,399,570
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	785,988,833	19,000,000			82,000,000	886,988,833	101,000,000
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	785,988,833	19,000,000			82,000,000	886,988,833	101,000,000
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies				13,226,728	10,000,000	23,226,728	23,226,728
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies				13,226,728	10,000,000	23,226,728	23,226,728
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**695,266,782**	**583,414,566**	**209,453,825**	**394,172,574**	**1,882,307,747**	**1,882,307,747**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**583,414,566**	**695,266,782**	**209,453,825**	**394,172,574**	**1,882,307,747**	**1,882,307,747**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**866,596,094**	**722,273,560**	**681,414,566**	**230,073,345**	**486,172,574**	**2,986,530,139**	**2,119,934,045**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**866,596,094**	**610,421,344**	**793,266,782**	**230,073,345**	**486,172,573**	**2,986,530,138**	**2,119,934,044**

Table 9-25: Germany – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds	**80,607,261**	**80,607,261**	**113,399,570**	**113,399,570**
1. Global Environment Facility	80,607,261	80,607,261		
2. Least Developed Countries Fund			30,000,000	30,000,000
3. Special Climate Change Fund			18,000,000	18,000,000
4. Adaptation Fund			50,000,000	50,000,000
5. Green Climate Fund			1,000,000	1,000,000
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
7.1 Montreal Protocol			8,006,778	8,006,778
7.2 IPCC			294,000	294,000
7.3 UNFCCC			6,098,792	6,098,792
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	**785,988,833**	**785,988,833**	**101,000,000**	**101,000,000**
1. World Bank	526,688,833	526,688,833		
1.1 Pilot Auction Facility for Methane and Climate Change Mitigation			15,000,000	15,000,000
1.2 BioCarbon Fund Initiative for Sustainable Forest			35,000,000	35,000,000
1.3 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility			47,000,000	47,000,000
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank	181,200,000	181,200,000		
4. Asian Development Bank	78,100,000	78,100,000		
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development			**4,000,000**	
5.1 Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership Fund - Armenia Window				**1,000,000**
5.2 Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership Fund - Georgia Window				**1,000,000**
5.3 Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership Fund - Moldova Window				**1,000,000**
5.4 Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership Fund				**1,000,000**
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
1.1 Clean Technology Fund				
Specialized United Nations bodies			**23,226,728**	**23,226,728**
1. United Nations Development Programme			10,000,000	10,000,000
1.1 Biodiversity Finance Initiative			10,000,000	10,000,000
2. United Nations Environment Programme			400,000	400,000
2.1 UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate and Sustainable Energy Finance			400,000	400,000
3. Other (UNHCR, UN-Habitat, UNODC, Worldbank, WFP, WRI, UNF, GGI)			12,826,728	12,826,728
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***866,596,094***	***866,596,094***	***237,626,298***	***237,626,298***

Table 9-26: Greece - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Greece 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core / general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**501,442**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**501,442**	**0**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**501,442**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**501,442**	**0**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	35,011	0	0	0	0	35,011	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	35,011					35,011	0
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds		0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds	35,011					35,011	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks						0	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	466,431	0	0	0	0	466,431	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	466,431					466,431	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**						**0**	**0**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	501,442	0	0	0	0	501,442	0
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	501,442	0	0	0	0	501,442	0

Table 9-27: Greece – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)
Multilateral climate change funds	35,011			
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds	35,011			35,011
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies				
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme	466,431	466,431		
3. Other				
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***501,442***	***466,431***		***35,011***

Table 9-28: Hungary - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Hungary 2014, Table 7		National currency - HUF (MMR) / National currency - HUF (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core / general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Climate-specific: Adaptation	Climate-specific: Cross-cutting	Climate-specific: Other	Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**2,228,716,810**	**485,417,240**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**2,714,134,050**	**485,417,240**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**2,228,716,910**	**485,417,240**				**2,714,134,150**	**485,417,240**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds		485,417,240				485,417,240	485,417,240
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	485,417,240	0	0	0	485,417,240	485,417,240
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds		485,417,240				485,417,240	485,417,240
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	1,876,400,000	0	0	0	0	1,876,400,000	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	1,876,400,000					1,876,400,000	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	**352,316,810**	0	0	0	0	**352,316,810**	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	**352,316,910**					**352,316,910**	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**740,000**	**334,307,051**	**17,049,256**	**0**	**352,096,307**	**352,096,307**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**740,000**	**334,307,051**	**15,181,636**		**350,228,687**	**350,228,687**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	2,228,716,810	486,157,240	334,307,051	**17,049,256**	0	**3,066,230,357**	**837,513,547**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	2,228,716,910	486,157,240	334,307,051	**15,181,636**	0	**3,064,362,837**	**835,645,927**

Table 9-29: Hungary – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (HUF)	*MMR (HUF)*	*UNFCCC (HUF)*	*MMR (HUF)*
Multilateral climate change funds	**2,228,716,910**		**485,417,240**	**485,417,240.00**
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds			485,417,240	485,417,240
7.1. Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol payments for 2014				70,053,298
7.2. Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol payments for 2015				415,363,942
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	**1,876,400,000**	**1,876,400,000**		
1. World Bank	1,876,400,000	1,876,400,000		
Participation in the General Capital Increase of the IBRD		1,876,400,000		
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies	**352,316,910**	**352,316,810**		
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme	2,236,700	2,236,700		
UNEP payments for 2014	2,236,700	2,236,700		
3. Other	350,080,110	350,080,110		
UNFCCC Membership contribution	4,658,125	4,658,125		
UNCCD (Convention to Combat Desertification) payments for 2014	5,867,517	5,867,517		
UNCCD (Convention to Combat Desertification) payments for 2015	7,071,492	7,071,492		
Food and Agricultural Organization payments for 2014	158,066,691	79,349,328		
Food and Agricultural Organization payments for 2014		78,717,363		
Food and Agricultural Organization payments for 2015	172,878,135	81,610,759		
Food and Agricultural Organization payments for 2015		91,267,375		
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe	1,538,150	1,538,150		
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***2,228,716,910***	***2,228,716,810***	***485,417,240***	***485,417,240***

Table 9-30: Ireland - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Ireland 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core / general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**75,431,805**	**37,600**	**1,900,000**	**100,000**	**0**	**77,469,405**	**2,037,600**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**75,431,800**	**37,600**	**1,300,000**	**100,000**	**300,000**	**77,169,400**	**1,737,600**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	1,469,000	0	1,000,000	0	0	2,469,000	1,000,000
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	1,469,000		1,000,000			2,469,000	1,000,000
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	32,085,000	0	0	0	0	32,085,000	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	32,085,000					32,085,000	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	41,877,805	37,600	**900,000**	100,000	0	42,915,405	1,037,600
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	41,877,800	37,600	**300,000**	100,000	300,000	42,615,400	737,600
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**1,490,000**	**20,974,000**	**9,472,500**	**0**	**31,936,500**	**31,936,500**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**1,490,000**	**20,974,000**	**9,472,500**		**31,936,500**	**31,936,500**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	75,431,805	1,527,600	22,874,000	9,572,500	**0**	**109,405,905**	**33,974,100**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	75,431,800	1,527,600	22,274,000	9,572,500	**300,000**	**109,105,900**	**33,674,100**

Table 9-31: Ireland – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds	1,469,000	0	1,000,000	0
1. Global Environment Facility	1,469,000	1,469,000		0
2. Least Developed Countries Fund		0	900,000	900,000
3. Special Climate Change Fund		0		0
4. Adaptation Fund		0		0
5. Green Climate Fund		0		0
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities -LEG		0	100,000	100,000
7. Other multilateral climate change funds		0		0
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	32,085,000	0		0
1. World Bank	25,385,000	25,385,000		0
1.1 World Bank CGIAR Fund - Support to pro-poor agriculture	4,200,000	4,200,000		0
2. International Finance Corporation		0		0
3. African Development Bank		0		0
4. Asian Development Bank	2,500,000	2,500,000		0
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development		0		0
6. Inter-American Development Bank		0		0
Specialized United Nations bodies	41,877,800	0	**737,600**	**1,037,600**
1. United Nations Development Programme	8,500,000	8,500,000		0
2. United Nations Environment Programme	357,800	357,805	**300,000**	**0**
2.1 UNEP - Clean Technology Centre and Network		0	100,000	100,000
2.2 UNEP - GEMS/Water		0		**600,000**
3. United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction		0	300,000	300,000
4. Other	33,020,000	0	437,600	
World Food Programme	10,000,000	10,000,000		0
FAO - LEAP		0	37,600	37,600
FAO - Emergency Section	240,000	240,000		0
UN Women	1,500,000	1,500,000		0
UNAIDS	2,950,000	2,950,000		0
UN Convention to Combat Desertification	30,000	30,000		0
UNDOCO	50,000	50,000		0
UNHCR	6,100,000	6,100,000		0
UNICEF	7,900,000	7,900,000		0
UNFPA	3,100,000	3,100,000		0
WHO	1,150,000	1,150,000		0
Sub Total		41,877,805		0
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***75,431,800***	***75,431,805***	***1,737,600***	***2,037,600***

Table 9-32: Italy - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Italy 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core / general	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	24,530,000.00	1,244,749.60	466,880.00	17,259,821.14	**0.00**	43,501,450.74	18,971,450.74
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	0.00	200,000.00	0.00	20,960,000.00	**0.00**	21,160,000.00	21,160,000.00
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	24,110,000.00	0.00	0.00	8,456,300.00	0.00	32,566,300.00	8,456,300.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0.00	-	-	2,553,374.42	0.00	2,553,374.42	2,553,374.42
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0.00	1,035,949.60	466,880.00	1,085,214.40	0.00	2,588,044.00	2,588,044.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	420,000.00	208,800.00	0.00	7,718,306.74	0.00	8,347,106.74	7,927,106.74
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	0.00	200,000.00	0.00	20,960,000.00	0.00	21,160,000.00	21,160,000.00
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0.00**	13,716,579.34	4,087,181.44	15,337,737.86	**0.00**	33,141,498.64	33,141,498.64
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0.00**	12,550,000.00	1,910,000.00	11,080,000.00	**0.00**	25,540,000.00	25,540,000.00
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	24,530,000.00	14,961,328.94	4,554,061.44	32,597,559.00	0.00	76,642,949.38	52,112,949.38
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	0.00	12,750,000.00	1,910,000.00	32,040,000.00	0.00	46,700,000.00	46,700,000.00

Table 9-33: Italy – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility		24,110,000.00		7,956,300.00
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				500,000.00
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
UNFCCC-Kyoto protocol				2,207,228.89
Support to the UN Secretary General's Climate Change Strategy				346,145.53
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				20,000.00
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
7.1 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development				800,000.00
7.2 IEF International Energy Forum				41,214.40
7.3 IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency				224,000.00
7.4 IILA ISTITUTO ITALO LATINO AMERICAN ISTITUTO ITALO LATINO AMERICANO				240,000.00
7.5 International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean				315,949.60
7.6 International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean				466,880.00
7.7 Bioversity International				480,000.00
Specialized United Nations bodies			21,160,000.00	
1. United Nations Development Programme			260,000.00	204,800.00
2. United Nations Environment Programme			18,000,000.00	3,025,815.22
3. Other			2,900,000.00	
3.1 Food and Agricolture Organization			0.00	2,350,931.51
3.2 United Nations Idustrial Development Organization			550,000.00	675,532.92
3.3 Regional Environmetal Centre		420,000.00	0.00	
3.4 UNESCO			0.00	1,160,003.09
3.5 International Fund for Agricultural Development			0.00	301,224.00
3.6 World Food Programme			200,000.00	208,800.00
3.7 FAO			2,150,000.00	
Total contributions through multilateral channels			21,160,000.00	21,524,825.16

Table 9-34: Lithuania - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Lithuania 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	**Allocation channels**	**Core / general**	**Climate-specific**				**Total (climate-specific and core / general)**	**Total climate-specific**
			Mitigation	**Adaptation**	**Cross-cutting**	**Other**		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**788,053**	**105,360**	**0**	**50,000**	**0**	**943,413**	**155,360**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**788,053**	**105,360**	**0**	**50,000**	**0**	**943,413**	**155,360**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0		0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	770,000	105,360	0	50,000	0	925,360	155,360
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	770,000	105,360		50,000		925,360	155,360
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	18,053	0	0	0	0	18,053	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	18,053					18,053	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**151,636**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**151,636**	**151,636**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**151,636**				**151,636**	**151,636**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	788,053	256,996	0	50,000	0	1,095,049	306,996
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	788,053	256,996	0	50,000	0	1,095,049	306,996

Table 9-35: Lithuania – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	770,000		155,360	
1. World Bank (*International Development Association*)	770,000	770,000		-
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development *(E5P fund)*		-	105,360	105,360
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other (*European Investment Bank*)		-	50,000	50,000
Specialized United Nations bodies	18,053			
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme	18,053	18,053		-
3. Other				
Total contributions through multilateral channels	**788,053**	**788,053**	**155,360**	**155,360**

Table 9-36: Luxembourg - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Luxembourg 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core / general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Climate-specific: Adaptation	Climate-specific: Cross-cutting	Climate-specific: Other	Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	0.00	0.00	1,389,078.00	5,872,700.00	0.00	7,261,778.00	7,261,778.00
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	872,700.00	3,000,000.00	1,389,078.00	5,000,000.00	0.00	10,261,778.00	9,389,078.00
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	5,872,700.00	0.00	5,872,700.00	5,872,700.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	872,700.00			5,000,000.00		5,872,700.00	5,000,000.00
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0.00	0.00
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0.00	0.00	1,141,170.00	0.00	0.00	1,141,170.00	1,141,170.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks		1,000,000.00	1,141,170.00			2,141,170.00	2,141,170.00
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0.00	0.00	247,908.00	0.00	0.00	247,908.00	247,908.00
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies		2,000,000.00	247,908.00			2,247,908.00	2,247,908.00
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	0.00	6,104,635.18	5,963,395.00	19,373,506.00	0.00	31,441,536.18	31,441,536.18
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		6,041,386.00	6,375,771.00	19,220,143.00		31,637,300.00	31,637,300.00
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	0.00	6,104,635.18	7,352,473.00	25,246,206.00	0.00	38,703,314.18	38,703,314.18
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	872,700.00	9,041,386.00	7,764,849.00	24,220,143.00	0.00	41,899,078.00	41,026,378.00

Table 9-37: Luxembourg – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds	**872,700.00**		**5,000,000.00**	**5,872,700.00**
1. Global Environment Facility	**872,700.00**			**872,700.00**
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund			5,000,000.00	5,000,000.00
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks			**2,141,170.00**	**1,141,170.00**
1. World Bank			300,000.00	300,000.00
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other *International Commitee of the Red Cross, Mekong River Commission*			**1,841,170.00**	**841,170.00**
Specialized United Nations bodies			**2,247,908.00**	**247,908.00**
1. United Nations Development Programme			247,908.00	
2. United Nations Environment Programme			**2,000,000.00**	
3. Other *UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women)*				**247,908.00**
Total contributions through multilateral channels			***9,389,078.00***	***7,261,778.00***

Table 9-38: Latvia - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Latvia 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	**Allocation channels**	**Core / general**	**Climate-specific**				**Total (climate-specific and core / general)**	**Total climate-specific**
			Mitigation	**Adaptation**	**Cross-cutting**	**Other**		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**0**	**45,000**	**0**	**350,000**	**0**	**395,000**	**395,000**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**0**	**45,000**	**0**	**0**	**350,000**	**395,000**	**395,000**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	**350,000**	**0**	350,000	350,000
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds					**350,000**	350,000	350,000
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0		0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	45,000	0	0	0	45,000	45,000
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks		45,000				45,000	45,000
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies						0	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**24,985**	**24,985**	**24,985**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**					**24,985**	**24,985**	**24,985**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	0	45,000	0	**350,000**	**24,985**	419,985	419,985
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	0	45,000	0	**0**	**374,985**	419,985	419,985

Table 9-39: Latvia – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds			350,000	
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund			350,000	350,000
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks			45,000	
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (pt1)			35,000	35,000
6. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (pt2)				10,000
7. Inter-American Development Bank			10,000	
8. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies				
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme				
3. Other				
Total contributions through multilateral channels			***395,000***	***395,000***

Table 9-40: Malta - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Malta 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core / general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	25,000	7,020	23,705	0	50,000	105,725	80,725
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	75,000	0	0	0	0	75,000	0
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	50,000	50,000	50,000
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0		0	0	50,000	50,000	50,000
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	7,020	23,705	0	0	30,725	30,725
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks		0	0			0	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	25,000	0	0	0	0	25,000	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	75,000					75,000	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		7,020	23,705			30,725	30,725
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	25,000	7,020	23,705	0	50,000	105,725	80,725
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	75,000	7,020	23,705	0	0	105,725	30,725

Table 9-41: Malta – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. other				
Specialized United Nations bodies				
1. United Nations Development Programme	25,000	25,000		
2. United Nations Environment Programme				
3. UNICEF	**50,000**	**0**	**0**	**50,000**
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***75,000***	***25,000***	***0***	***50,000***

Table 9-42: Netherlands - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Nethlerlands 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Climate-specific: Adaptation	Climate-specific: Cross-cutting	Climate-specific: Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	300,495,000.00	0.00	0.00	76,410,000.00	0.00	376,905,000.00	76,410,000.00
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	451,782,578.00	12,060,766.00	0.00	90,157,228.45	0.00	554,000,572.45	102,217,994.45
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	20,725,000.00	0.00	0.00	11,400,000.00	0.00	32,125,000.00	11,400,000.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	23,122,972.00	2,397,972.00		11,440,200.00		36,961,144.00	13,838,172.00
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	2,400,000.00	2,400,000.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4,800,000.00	2,400,000.00
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds	2,397,972.00	2,397,972.00				4,795,944.00	2,397,972.00
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	240,400,000.00	0.00	0.00	61,840,000.00	0.00	302,240,000.00	61,840,000.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	190,417,137.00			71,055,842.45		261,472,979.45	71,055,842.45
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	39,370,000.00	0.00	0.00	3,170,000.00	0.00	42,540,000.00	3,170,000.00
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	238,242,469.00	9,662,794.00		7,661,186.00		255,566,449.00	17,323,980.00
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	0.00	69,545,466.93	133,843,872.66	89,074,963.48	0.00	292,464,303.06	292,464,303.06
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		71,403,956.00	134,351,471.00	86,711,871.00		292,467,298.00	292,467,298.00
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	300,495,000.00	69,545,466.93	133,843,872.66	165,484,963.48	0.00	669,369,303.06	368,874,303.06
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	451,782,578.00	83,464,722.00	134,351,471.00	176,869,099.45	0.00	846,467,870.45	394,685,292.45

Table 9-43: Netherlands – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds	23,122,972	0	13,838,172	13,800,000
1. Global Environment Facility	20,725,000	0	11,440,200	11,400,000
2. Least Developed Countries Fund		0		0
3. Special Climate Change Fund		0		0
4. Adaptation Fund		0		0
5. Green Climate Fund		0		0
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities		0		0
7. Other multilateral climate change funds	2,397,972	0	2,397,972	2,400,000
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	190,417,137	0	71,055,842	61,840,000
1. World Bank		0		0
2. International Finance Corporation	7,508,800	0	9,962,676	0
3. African Development Bank	3,256,000	129,900,000	677,248	44,170,000
4. Asian Development Bank	2,242,000	0	405,802	0
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development		0		0
6. Inter-American Development Bank		0		0
7. Other	177,410,337	110,500,000	60,010,117	17,670,000
Specialized United Nations bodies	238,242,469	0	17,323,980	3,170,000
1. United Nations Development Programme	135,269,394	29,730,000	1,486,340	1,490,000
2. United Nations Environment Programme	7,124,228	7,140,000	1,424,846	1,430,000
3. Other	95,848,847	2,500,000	14,412,794	250,000
Total contributions through multilateral channels	*451,782,578*	*279,770,000*	*102,217,994*	*78,810,000*

Table 9-44: Poland – Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Poland 2014, Table 7		National currency PLN (MMR) / National currency PLN (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core / general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**9,342,872.61**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**9,139,127.84**	**0.00**	**18,482,000.45**	**9,139,127.84**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**9,342,872.61**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**9,139,127.84**	**0.00**	**18,482,000.45**	**9,139,127.84**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	350,000.00		350,000.00	350,000.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds				350,000.00		350,000.00	350,000.00
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0.00	0.00
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	9,342,872.61	0.00	0.00	0.00		9,342,872.61	0.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	9,342,872.61					9,342,872.61	0.00
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0.00	0.00	0.00	8,789,127.84		8,789,127.84	8,789,127.84
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies				8,789,127.84		8,789,127.84	8,789,127.84
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0.00**	**1,542,883.41**	**639,376.68**	**4,059,006.36**		**6,241,266.45**	**6,241,266.45**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**1,124,361.28**	**639,376.68**	**4,477,528.49**		**6,241,266.45**	**6,241,266.45**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	9,342,872.61	**1,542,883.41**	639,376.68	**13,198,134.20**	0.00	24,723,266.90	15,380,394.29
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	9,342,872.61	**1,124,361.28**	639,376.68	**13,616,656.33**	0.00	24,723,266.90	15,380,394.29

Table 9-45: Poland – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Poland Table 7a	*Total amount*			
Donor funding	*Core/general*		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (PLN)	*MMR (PLN)*	*UNFCCC (PLN)*	*MMR (PLN)*
Multilateral climate change funds			350,000.00	350,000.00
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund			350,000.00	350,000.00
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	9,342,872.61	9,342,872.61		
1. World Bank - IDA	9,208,118.00	9,208,118.00		
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other: Council of Europe Development Bank	134,754.61	134,754.61		
Specialized United Nations bodies			8,789,127.84	8,789,127.84
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme			473,145.00	473,145.00
UNCCD			218,873.72	218,873.72
UNFCCC			426,812.81	426,812.81
WMO			160,062.63	160,062.63
IAEA-TCF			2,569,630.80	2,569,630.80
3. Other:				
EPPO			295,299.73	295,299.73
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol			4,442,423.19	4,442,423.19
CITES			202,879.96	202,879.96
Total contributions through multilateral channels		***9,342,872.61***	***9,139,127.84***	***9,139,127.84***

Table 9-46: Portugal - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Portugal 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	**Allocation channels**	**Core / general**	**Climate-specific** Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	**Total (climate-specific and core / general)**	**Total climate-specific**
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**3,469,923**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**3,469,923**	**0**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**3,469,923**					**3,469,923**	**0**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	3,387,387	0	0	0	0	3,387,387	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	3,387,387					3,387,387	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	82,536	0	0	0	0	82,536	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	82,536					82,536	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**8,359,311**	**855,005**	**0**	**0**	**9,214,316**	**9,214,316**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**8,359,311**	**855,005**			**9,214,316**	**9,214,316**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	3,469,923	8,359,311	855,005	0	0	12,684,239	9,214,316
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	3,469,923	8,359,311	855,005	0	0	12,684,239	9,214,316

Table 9-47: Portugal – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds		-	-	-
1. Global Environment Facility		-	-	-
2. Least Developed Countries Fund			-	-
3. Special Climate Change Fund			-	-
4. Adaptation Fund			-	-
5. Green Climate Fund			-	-
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities			-	-
7. Other multilateral climate change funds			-	-
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	**3,469,923.00**	**3,387,387.00**	-	-
1. World Bank	1,490,000.00	1,490,000.00	-	-
2. International Finance Corporation		0.00	-	-
3. African Development Bank	1,478,108.00	1,478,108.00	-	-
4. Asian Development Bank	250,000.00	250,000.00	-	-
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development		0.00	-	-
6. Inter-American Development Bank	169,279.00	169,279.00	-	-
7. Other		0.00	-	-
Specialized United Nations bodies	82,536.00	82,536.00	-	-
1. United Nations Development Programme	39,872.00	39,872.00	-	-
2. United Nations Environment Programme		0.00	-	-
3. Other	42,664.00	42,664.00	-	-
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***3,469,923.00***	***3,469,923.00***	**-**	**-**

Table 9-48: Romania - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Romania 2014, Table 7		National currency RON (MMR) / National currency RON (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core / general	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**0**	**0**	**140,000**	**0**	**0**	**140,000**	**140,000**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**						**0**	**0**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks						0	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	140,000	0	0	140,000	140,000
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies			0			0	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**140,000**		**140,000**			**280,000**	**140,000**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	0	0	140,000	0	0	140,000	140,000
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	140,000	0	140,000	0	0	280,000	140,000

Table 9-49: Romania – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (RON)	*MMR (RON)*	*UNFCCC (RON)*	*MMR (RON)*
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies				
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme				
3. Other				
Total contributions through multilateral channels				

Table 9-50: Sweden - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Sweden 2014, Table 7		National currency SEK (MMR) / National currency SEK (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core / general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**3,572,108,526**	**45,050,000**	**15,000,000**	**74,500,000**	**0**	**3,706,658,526**	**134,550,000**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**3,651,927,334**	**45,050,000**	**15,000,000**	**74,500,000**	**0**	**3,786,477,334**	**134,550,000**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds[e]	0	38,700,000	15,000,000	11,500,000	0	65,200,000	65,200,000
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds		45,050,000	15,000,000	74,500,000		134,550,000	134,550,000
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds[f]	0	6,350,000	0	63,000,000	0	69,350,000	69,350,000
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds[f]		6,350,000		63,000,000		69,350,000	69,350,000
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	2,876,464,054	0	0	0	0	2,876,464,054	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	2,956,282,862					2,956,282,862	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	695,644,472	0	0	0	0	695,644,472	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	695,644,472					695,644,472	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**232,789,666**	**691,537,060**	**1,020,900,805**	**0**	**1,945,227,531**	**1,945,227,531**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**232,789,666**	**691,537,060**	**1,020,900,805**		**1,945,227,531**	**1,945,227,531**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**3,572,108,526**	277,839,666	706,537,060	1,095,400,805	0	**5,651,886,057**	2,079,777,531
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**3,651,927,334**	277,839,666	706,537,060	1,095,400,805	0	**5,731,704,865**	2,079,777,531

Table 9-51: Sweden – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCCC (SEK)	MMR (SEK)	UNFCCC (SEK)	MMR (SEK)
Multilateral climate change funds			134,550,000	
1. Global Environment Facility			38,700,000	38,700,000
2. Least Developed Countries Fund			15,000,000	15,000,000
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund			10,000,000	10,000,000
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities			1,500,000	1,500,000
7. Other multilateral climate finance			69,350,000	
7a) Climate and Clean Air Coallition (CCAC)			3,350,000	3,350,000
7b) Nordic Development Fund			60,000,000	60,000,000
7c) UNFCCC- Trust Fund for Participation			1,500,000	1,500,000
7e) New Climate Economy			1,000,000	1,000,000
7f) IISD/GSI Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform			2,000,000	2,000,000
7h) Other climate finance from Ministry of Environment			1,500,000	1,500,000
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	2,956,282,862.00	2,876,464,054		
1. World Bank	2,209,538,113	2,029,848,113		TBC
3. African Development Bank	609,673,785	709,544,977		TBC
4. Asian Development Bank	124,791,230	124,791,230		TBC
6. Inter-American Development Bank	12,279,734	12,279,734		TBC
7. Other				TBC
Specialized United Nations bodies	695,644,472			
1. United Nations Development Programme	510,000,000	510,000,000		TBC
2. United Nations Environment Programme	32,124,512	32,124,512		TBC
3. IFAD	153,519,960	153,519,960		TBC
3. Other	153,519,960			
Total contributions through multilateral channels	*3,651,927,334*	*3,572,108,526*	*134,550,000*	*134,550,000*

Table 9-52: Slovenia - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Slovenia 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	**Allocation channels**	**Core / general**	**Climate-specific**				**Total (climate-specific and core / general)**	**Total climate-specific**
			Mitigation	**Adaptation**	**Cross-cutting**	**Other**		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**663,490**	**0**	**663,490**	**663,490**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**533,510**	**0**	**533,510**	**533,510**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	376,200	0	376,200	376,200
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds				376,200		376,200	376,200
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	0	0	157,310	0	157,310	157,310
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				157,310		157,310	157,310
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	0	**129,980**	0	129,980	129,980
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	0	**0**		0	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**596,460**	**850,710**	**156,180**	**0**	**1,603,350**	**1,603,350**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**804,000**	**180,730**	**618,620**		**1,603,350**	**1,603,350**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	0	**596,460**	**850,710**	**819,670**	0	**2,266,840**	**2,266,840**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	0	**804,000**	**180,730**	**1,152,130**	0	**2,136,860**	**2,136,860**

Table 9-53: Slovenia – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)
Total contributions through multilateral channels			533,510	663,490
Multilateral climate change funds			376,200	376,200
1. Global Environment Facility			376,200	376,200
GEF - part for mitigation				
GEF - part for adaptation				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks			157,310	157,310
1. World Bank			154,440	154,440
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other			2,870	2,870
Specialized United Nations bodies			**0**	**129,980**
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme				
3. Other			**0**	**129,980**
			0	**660,620**

Table 9-54: Slovakia - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Slovakia 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core / general	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**305,224.72**	**198,996.50**	**3,676.36**	**150,468.73**	**0.00**	**658,366.31**	**353,141.59**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**264,580.32**	**198,996.50**	**3,676.36**	**150,468.73**	**40,644.40**	**658,366.31**	**393,785.99**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0.00	198,996.50	3,676.36	25,493.73	0.00	228,166.59	228,166.59
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds		198,996.50	3,676.36	25,493.73		228,166.59	228,166.59
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds		198,996.50	3,676.36	25,493.73		228,166.59	228,166.59
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0.00	0.00	0.00	124,975.00	0.00	124,975.00	124,975.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				124,975.00		124,975.00	124,975.00
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	**305,224.72**	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.00**	305,224.72	0.00
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	**264,580.32**				**40,644.40**	305,224.72	40,644.40
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**760,370.96**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**760,370.96**	**760,370.96**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**			**760,370.96**			**760,370.96**	**760,370.96**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	305,224.72	198,996.50	764,047.32	150,468.73	0.00	1,418,737.27	1,113,512.55
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	264,580.32	198,996.50	764,047.32	150,468.73	40,644.40	1,418,737.27	1,154,156.95

Table 9-55: Slovakia – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Slovakia Table 7a	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
Donor funding	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds			228,166.59	228,166.59
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund			173,975.00	173,975.00
8. Montreal Protocol Trust Fund			5,370.96	5,370.96
9. UNFCCC			25,493.73	25,493.73
10. Kyoto Protocol under UNFCCC			19,650.54	19,650.54
12. World Meteorological Organisation (WMO)			3,676.36	3,676.36
13. Other multilateral climate change funds			228,166.59	228,166.59
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks			124,975.00	124,975.00
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. SK-EBRD Technical Co-operation Fund; Projects: Kyrgyz Republic, Capacity enhancement of the Kyrgyz Civil Society Organisation Camp Alatoo regarding residential energy efficiency (II)			**0.00**	**74,975.00**
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development as a manager *Contribution to the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership Regional Fund - Moldova window*			**0.00**	**50,000.00**
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies	264,580.32	264,580.32	**40,644.40**	**0.00**
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme	**0.00**	**40,644.40**	**40,644.40**	**0.00**
3. Other: CITES Multilateral Treaty	8,969.61	8,969.61		
4. Other: The UNCCD in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa	12,833.00	12,833.00		
5. Other: The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	217,287.71	217,287.71		
6. Other: European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization (EPPO)	25,490.00	25,490.00		
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***264,580.32***	***305,224.72***	***393,785.99***	***581,308.18***

Table 9-56: Spain - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Spain 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core / general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**0**	**30,000,000**	**165,411**	**9,616,000**		**39,781,411**	**39,781,411**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**16,120,000**	**30,000,000**	**165,411**	**9,616,000**		**55,901,411**	**39,781,411**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	**0**	30,000,000	165,411	8,866,000		39,031,411	39,031,411
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	**16,120,000**	30,000,000	165,411	8,866,000		55,151,411	39,031,411
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0		0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds		30,000,000				30,000,000	30,000,000
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	0	0	0		0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks						0	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	0	750,000		750,000	750,000
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies				750,000		750,000	750,000
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**393,176,306**	**18,496,555**	**12,424,800**		**424,097,661**	**424,097,661**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**393,176,306**	**18,495,157**	**12,426,197**		**424,097,660**	**424,097,660**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**0**	423,176,306	**18,661,966**	**22,040,800**		463,879,072	463,879,072
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**16,120,000**	423,176,306	**18,660,568**	**22,042,197**		479,999,071	463,879,071

Table 9-57: Spain – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)
Multilateral climate change funds	16,120,000		39,031,411	
1. Global Environmental Facility	16,120,000	16,120,000	8,866,000	8,866,000
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund			165,411	165,411
5. Green Climate Change Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds			30,000,000	
Clean Technology Fund (Climate Investment Funds)			30,000,000	30,000,000
Subtotal				
Multilateral financial Institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank GROUP				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction				
6. Interamerican Development Bank				
7. Other				
Subtotal	**0**	**0**		
Specialized United Nations bodies			750,000	750,000
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme(REGATTA Project)			250,000	250,000
3. Other			500,000	500,000
FAO				
UN HABITAT				
UNREDD				500,000
Subtotal	**0**	**0**		
Total	***0***	***0***	***39,781,411***	***39,781,411***

Table 9-58: United Kingdom – Table 7 Summary information for 2014

United Kingdom 2014, Table 7		National currency £ (MMR) / National currency £ (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core / general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**1,825,600,000**	**111,690,000**	**21,000,000**	**284,610,000**	**0**	2,242,900,000	**417,300,000**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**1,826,000,000**	**0**	**2,500,000**	**414,800,000**	**0**	2,243,300,000	**922,790,000**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	**21,000,000**	**2,500,000**	0	**23,500,000**	**23,500,000**
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	**2,500,000**	**414,800,000**	0	**417,300,000**	**417,300,000**
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	**111,690,000**	0	**282,110,000**	0	393,800,000	393,800,000
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	**0**	0	**393,800,000**	0	393,800,000	393,800,000
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	1,825,600,000	0	0	0	0	1,825,600,000	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	1,826,000,000	0	0	0	0	1,826,000,000	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**81,240,000**	**161,320,000**	**103,770,000**	**123,720,000**	**470,050,000**	**470,050,000**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**81,240,000**	**161,520,000**	**103,770,000**	**123,520,000**	**470,050,000**	**470,050,000**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**1,825,600,000**	**192,930,000**	**182,320,000**	**388,380,000**	**123,720,000**	**2,712,950,000**	**887,350,000**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**1,826,000,000**	**81,240,000**	**164,020,000**	**518,570,000**	**123,520,000**	**2,713,350,000**	**887,350,000**

Table 9-59: United Kingdom – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (£)	*MMR (£)*	*UNFCCC (£)*	*MMR (£)*
Multilateral climate change funds				**417,300,000**
1. Global Environment Facility			21,000,000	21,000,000
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund			2,500,000	2,500,000
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Climate Investment Funds			372,690,000	261,000,000
Climate Investment Funds - Clean Technology Fund				111,690,000
Climate Development Knowledge Network				**21,110,000**
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks		**1,825,600,000**		
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank		**207,800,000**		
4. Asian Development Bank		**50,000,000**		
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank		**2,500,000**		
7. Other		**1,565,300,000**		
Specialized United Nations bodies				
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme				
3. Other				
Total contributions through multilateral channels		***1,825,600,000***		***417,300,000***

9.4. Annex IV: Overview of 28 Member States quantitative comparison of finance data reported for the year 2014 in the MMR reporting and the second biennial reports

The following tables are extracted from the data given in Annex III. Three tables are compiled presenting bilateral, multilateral and both contributions for all 28 EU Member States[56] and as a total.

Comments and clarifications received from Member States after presenting and sharing the results of a former version of this synthesis report are incorporated in this analysis.

[56] Croatia is abbreviated as CR

Table 9-60: Total multilateral and bilateral contributions for all 28 Member States

Sum of total contributions by country (bilateral and multilateral)								
			EURO					
			Climate-specific					
Country	Report	Exchange rate to €	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
AT	MMR	1.00	72,074,108	6,882,195	22,120,786	0	112,759,443	101,077,089
AT	BR2	1.00	71,002,910	6,882,195	63,353,623	0	141,238,728	141,238,728
BE	MMR	1.00	8,579,983	31,053,692	54,768,078	0	470,510,220	94,401,753
BE	BR2	1.00	8,579,983	33,303,691	54,768,078	0	472,760,218	96,651,752
BG	MMR	1.00	0	0	8,975	0	34,211	8,975
BG	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CR	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	33,018	0
CR	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	33,018	0
CY	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CY	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CZ	MMR	0.04	1,149,083	2,799,552	2,259,890	0	12,472,644	6,208,524
CZ	BR2	0.04	1,149,083	2,799,552	2,259,890	0	13,204,152	6,208,524
DE	MMR	1.00	722,273,560	681,414,566	230,073,345	486,172,574	2,986,530,139	2,119,934,045
DE	BR2	1.00	610,421,344	793,266,782	230,073,345	486,172,573	2,986,530,138	2,119,934,044
DK	MMR	0.13	45,789,402	0	141,623,350	17,156,491	376,740,396	187,412,752
DK	BR2	0.13	47,623,069	20,135,153	115,794,253	0	372,880,119	183,552,474
EE	MMR	1.00	0	323,000	364,806	0	746,690	687,806
EE	BR2	1.00	74,134	0	596,010	0	779,028	670,144
ES	MMR	1.00	423,176,306	18,661,966	22,040,800	0	463,879,072	463,879,072
ES	BR2	1.00	423,176,306	18,660,568	22,042,197	0	479,999,071	463,879,071
FI	MMR	1.00	30,857,058	24,260,341	61,054,126	0	1,136,555,912	116,171,525
FI	BR2	1.00	30,857,058	24,260,341	61,054,126	0	624,116,668	116,171,525
FR	MMR	1.00	2,232,149,678	279,138,362	255,907,619	0	2,801,180,659	2,767,195,659
FR	BR2	1.00	2,233,874,678	279,138,362	254,182,619	0	2,801,180,659	2,767,195,659
GR	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	501,442	0
GR	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	501,442	0
HU	MMR	1.00	486,157,240	334,307,051	17,049,256	0	3,066,230,357	837,513,547
HU	BR2	1.00	486,157,240	334,307,051	15,181,636	0	3,064,362,837	835,645,927
IE	MMR	1.00	1,527,600	22,874,000	9,572,500	0	109,405,905	33,974,100
IE	BR2	1.00	1,527,600	22,274,000	9,572,500	300,000	109,105,900	33,674,100
IT	MMR	1.00	14,961,329	4,554,061	32,597,559	0	76,642,949	52,112,949
IT	BR2	1.00	12,750,000	1,910,000	32,040,000	0	46,700,000	46,700,000
LT	MMR	1.00	256,996	0	50,000	0	1,095,049	306,996
LT	BR2	1.00	256,996	0	50,000	0	1,095,049	306,996
LU	MMR	1.00	6,104,635	7,352,473	25,246,206	0	38,703,314	38,703,314
LU	BR2	1.00	9,041,386	7,764,849	24,220,143	0	41,899,078	41,026,378
LV	MMR	1.00	45,000	0	350,000	24,985	419,985	419,985
LV	BR2	1.00	45,000	0	0	374,985	419,985	419,985

Sum of total contributions by country (bilateral and multilateral)									
			EURO						
Country	Report	Exchange rate to €	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MT	MMR	1.00	7,020	23,705	0	50,000	105,725	80,725
MT	BR2	1.00	7,020	23,705	0	0	105,725	30,725
NL	MMR	1.00	69,545,467	133,843,873	165,484,963	0	669,369,303	368,874,303
NL	BR2	1.00	83,464,722	134,351,471	176,869,099	0	846,467,870	394,685,292
PL	MMR	0.24	368,661	152,775	3,153,601	0	5,907,449	3,675,036
PL	BR2	0.24	268,658	152,775	3,253,604	0	5,907,449	3,675,036
PT	MMR	1.00	8,359,311	855,005	0	0	12,684,239	9,214,316
PT	BR2	1.00	8,359,311	855,005	0	0	12,684,239	9,214,316
RO	MMR	0.25	0	35,565	0	0	35,565	35,565
RO	BR2	0.25	0	35,565	0	0	71,129	35,565
SE	MMR	0.11	30,526,357	77,627,514	120,352,132	0	620,975,017	228,506,002
SE	BR2	0.11	30,526,357	77,627,514	120,352,132	0	629,744,742	228,506,002
SI	MMR	1.00	596,460	850,710	819,670	0	2,266,840	2,266,840
SI	BR2	1.00	804,000	180,730	1,152,130	0	2,136,860	2,136,860
SK	MMR	1.00	198,997	764,047	150,469	0	1,418,737	1,113,513
SK	BR2	1.00	198,997	764,047	150,469	40,644	1,418,737	1,154,157
UK	MMR	1.35	260,455,500	246,132,000	524,313,000	167,022,000	3,662,482,500	1,197,922,500
UK	BR2	1.35	109,674,000	221,427,000	700,069,500	166,752,000	3,663,022,500	1,197,922,500
Total MMR							16,629,686,781	8,631,696,892
Total BR2							16,318,365,343	8,690,635,762

Table 9-61: Total multilateral contributions for all 28 Member States

Sum of total multilateral contributions by country								
Country	Report	Exchange rate to €	EURO					
			Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
AT	MMR	1.00	1,071,198	0	252,640	0	13,006,192	1,323,838
AT	BR2	1.00	0	0	41,485,477	0	41,485,477	41,485,477
BE	MMR	1.00	22,040	12,813,595	41,494,353	0	430,438,454	54,329,988
BE	BR2	1.00	22,040	15,063,594	41,494,353	0	432,688,453	56,579,987
BG	MMR	1.00	0	0	8,975	0	34,211	8,975
BG	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CR	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	33,018	0
CR	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	33,018	0
CY	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CY	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CZ	MMR	0.04	0	0	2,161,826	0	8,425,946	2,161,826
CZ	BR2	0.04	0	0	2,161,826	0	9,157,454	2,161,826
DE	MMR	1.00	27,006,778	98,000,000	20,619,520	92,000,000	1,104,222,391	237,626,298
DE	BR2	1.00	27,006,778	98,000,000	20,619,520	92,000,000	1,104,222,391	237,626,297
DK	MMR	0.13	3,876,094	0	16,178,169	17,156,491	209,381,907	20,054,263
DK	BR2	0.13	6,993,348	5,361,404	13,062,456	0	214,744,852	25,417,208
EE	MMR	1.00	0	323,000	262,806	0	644,690	585,806
EE	BR2	1.00	0	0	60,806	0	169,690	60,806
ES	MMR	1.00	30,000,000	165,411	9,616,000	0	39,781,411	39,781,411
ES	BR2	1.00	30,000,000	165,411	9,616,000	0	55,901,411	39,781,411
FI	MMR	1.00	6,837,000	14,000,000	50,907,922	0	593,022,470	71,744,922
FI	BR2	1.00	6,837,000	14,000,000	50,907,922	0	579,690,065	71,744,922
FR	MMR	1.00	0	0	10,875,200	0	44,860,200	10,875,200
FR	BR2	1.00	0	0	10,875,200	0	44,860,200	10,875,200
GR	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	501,442	0
GR	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	501,442	0
HU	MMR	1.00	485,417,240	0	0	0	2,714,134,050	485,417,240
HU	BR2	1.00	485,417,240	0	0	0	2,714,134,150	485,417,240
IE	MMR	1.00	37,600	1,900,000	100,000	0	77,469,405	2,037,600
IE	BR2	1.00	37,600	1,300,000	100,000	300,000	77,169,400	1,737,600
IT	MMR	1.00	1,244,750	466,880	17,259,821	0	43,501,451	18,971,451
IT	BR2	1.00	200,000	0	20,960,000	0	21,160,000	21,160,000
LT	MMR	1.00	105,360	0	50,000	0	943,413	155,360
LT	BR2	1.00	105,360	0	50,000	0	943,413	155,360
LU	MMR	1.00	0	1,389,078	5,872,700	0	7,261,778	7,261,778
LU	BR2	1.00	3,000,000	1,389,078	5,000,000	0	10,261,778	9,389,078
LV	MMR	1.00	45,000	0	350,000	0	395,000	395,000
LV	BR2	1.00	45,000	0	0	350,000	395,000	395,000

Sum of total multilateral contributions by country									
Country	Report	Exchange rate to €	EURO						
			Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MT	MMR	1.00	7,020	23,705	0	50,000	105,725	80,725
MT	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	75,000	0
NL	MMR	1.00	0	0	76,410,000	0	376,905,000	76,410,000
NL	BR2	1.00	12,060,766	0	90,157,228	0	554,000,572	102,217,994
PL	MMR	0.24	0	0	2,183,730	0	4,416,143	2,183,730
PL	BR2	0.24	0	0	2,183,730	0	4,416,143	2,183,730
PT	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	3,469,923	0
PT	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	3,469,923	0
RO	MMR	0.25	0	35,565	0	0	35,565	35,565
RO	BR2	0.25	0	0	0	0	0	0
SE	MMR	0.11	4,949,662	1,648,056	8,185,345	0	407,252,078	14,783,063
SE	BR2	0.11	4,949,662	1,648,056	8,185,345	0	416,021,803	14,783,063
SI	MMR	1.00	0	0	663,490	0	663,490	663,490
SI	BR2	1.00	0	0	533,510	0	533,510	533,510
SK	MMR	1.00	198,997	3,676	150,469	0	658,366	353,142
SK	BR2	1.00	198,997	3,676	150,469	40,644	658,366	393,786
UK	MMR	1.35	150,781,500	28,350,000	384,223,500	0	3,027,915,000	563,355,000
UK	BR2	1.35	0	3,375,000	559,980,000	0	3,028,455,000	563,355,000
Total MMR							9,109,478,719	1,610,595,669
Total BR2							9,315,148,512	1,687,454,495

Table 9-62: Total bilateral contributions for all 28 Member States

Sum of total bilateral contributions by country								
Country	Report	Exchange rate to €	EURO					
			Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
AT	MMR	1.00	71,002,910	6,882,195	21,868,146	0	99,753,251	99,753,251
AT	BR2	1.00	71,002,910	6,882,195	21,868,146	0	99,753,251	99,753,251
BE	MMR	1.00	8,557,943	18,240,097	13,273,725	0	40,071,765	40,071,765
BE	BR2	1.00	8,557,943	18,240,097	13,273,725	0	40,071,765	40,071,765
BG	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
BG	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CR	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CR	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CY	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CY	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CZ	MMR	0.04	1,149,083	2,799,552	98,064	0	4,046,698	4,046,698
CZ	BR2	0.04	1,149,083	2,799,552	98,064	0	4,046,698	4,046,698
DE	MMR	1.00	**695,266,782**	**583,414,566**	209,453,825	394,172,574	1,882,307,747	1,882,307,747
DE	BR2	1	**583,414,566**	**695,266,782**	209,453,825	394,172,574	1,882,307,747	1,882,307,747
DK	MMR	0.13	**41,913,308**	**0**	**125,445,181**	0	**167,358,489**	**167,358,489**
DK	BR2	0.13	**40,629,721**	**14,773,749**	**102,731,796**	0	**158,135,267**	**158,135,267**
EE	MMR	1.00	**0**	0	**102,000**	0	**102,000**	**102,000**
EE	BR2	1.00	**74,134**	0	**535,204**	0	**609,338**	**609,338**
ES	MMR	1.00	393,176,306	**18,496,555**	**12,424,800**	0	424,097,661	424,097,661
ES	BR2	1.00	393,176,306	**18,495,157**	**12,426,197**	0	424,097,660	424,097,660
FI	MMR	1.00	24,020,058	10,260,341	10,146,204	0	**543,533,442**	44,426,603
FI	BR2	1.00	24,020,058	10,260,341	10,146,204	0	**44,426,603**	44,426,603
FR	MMR	1.00	**2,232,149,678**	279,138,362	**245,032,419**	0	2,756,320,459	2,756,320,459
FR	BR2	1.00	**2,233,874,678**	279,138,362	**243,307,419**	0	2,756,320,459	2,756,320,459
GR	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
GR	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
HU	MMR	1.00	740,000	334,307,051	**17,049,256**	0	**352,096,307**	**352,096,307**
HU	BR2	1.00	740,000	334,307,051	**15,181,636**	0	**350,228,687**	**350,228,687**
IE	MMR	1.00	1,490,000	20,974,000	9,472,500	0	31,936,500	31,936,500
IE	BR2	1.00	1,490,000	20,974,000	9,472,500	0	31,936,500	31,936,500
IT	MMR	1.00	**13,716,579**	**4,087,181**	**15,337,738**	0	**33,141,499**	**33,141,499**
IT	BR2	1.00	**12,550,000**	**1,910,000**	**11,080,000**	0	**25,540,000**	**25,540,000**
LT	MMR	1.00	151,636	0	0	0	151,636	151,636
LT	BR2	1.00	151,636	0	0	0	151,636	151,636
LU	MMR	1.00	**6,104,635**	**5,963,395**	**19,373,506**	0	**31,441,536**	**31,441,536**
LU	BR2	1.00	**6,041,386**	**6,375,771**	**19,220,143**	0	**31,637,300**	**31,637,300**
LV	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	24,985	24,985	24,985
LV	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	24,985	24,985	24,985

Sum of total bilateral contributions by country								
Country	Report	Exchange rate to €	EURO					
			Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core / general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MT	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
MT	BR2	1.00	7,020	23,705	0	0	30,725	30,725
NL	MMR	1.00	69,545,467	133,843,873	89,074,963	0	292,464,303	292,464,303
NL	BR2	1.00	71,403,956	134,351,471	86,711,871	0	292,467,298	292,467,298
PL	MMR	0.24	368,661	152,775	969,871	0	1,491,306	1,491,306
PL	BR2	0.24	268,658	152,775	1,069,874	0	1,491,306	1,491,306
PT	MMR	1.00	8,359,311	855,005	0	0	9,214,316	9,214,316
PT	BR2	1.00	8,359,311	855,005	0	0	9,214,316	9,214,316
RO	MMR	0.25	0	0	0	0	0	0
RO	BR2	0.25	0	35,565	0	0	71,129	35,565
SE	MMR	0.11	25,576,695	75,979,458	112,166,786	0	213,722,939	213,722,939
SE	BR2	0.11	25,576,695	75,979,458	112,166,786	0	213,722,939	213,722,939
SI	MMR	1.00	596,460	850,710	156,180	0	1,603,350	1,603,350
SI	BR2	1.00	804,000	180,730	618,620	0	1,603,350	1,603,350
SK	MMR	1.00	0	760,371	0	0	760,371	760,371
SK	BR2	1.00	0	760,371	0	0	760,371	760,371
UK	MMR	1.35	109,674,000	217,782,000	140,089,500	167,022,000	634,567,500	634,567,500
UK	BR2	1.35	109,674,000	218,052,000	140,089,500	166,752,000	634,567,500	634,567,500
Total MMR							7,520,208,062	7,021,101,223
Total BR2							7,003,216,831	7,003,181,266

9.5. Annex V: Key results of quantitative analysis of finance data reported under the MMR and in second biennial reports (multilateral and bilateral)

This chapter summarizes results from the quantitative data analysis. The tables compare the financial contributions to developing countries for the reporting year 2014 as reported in tables 7 and 7a under the MMR Article 16 at the end of October 2015 and in the second biennial report which was due by 1 January 2016 for each Member State. Annex III provides detailed comparison tables for each Member State and Annex IV shows a summary of the detailed comparison as well as the effects at aggregated EU level.

Comments and clarifications received from Member States after presenting and sharing the results of a former version of this synthesis report are incorporated in this analysis.

9.5.1. General reporting issues

- In table 7 it differs between countries and reports if the value of ´other´ is included in ´multilateral climate change funds´ or directly in ´total contributions through multilateral channels´.

9.5.2. Austria

- Reported amounts for multilateral support for 2014 in BR2 reports and in MMR reporting table are inconsistent while amounts for bilateral and regional support are consistent;
- Austria did not report any ´core/ general´ financial support in BR2 while ´core/ general´ support was included in MMR reporting. Thus the amount of € 11,682,354 of ´core/ general´ support is missing in the BR2 tables which was reported as ´core/ general´ in the MMR reporting for 2014;
- Amounts provided to Montreal Protocol are consistent between MMR reporting and BR2;
- Austria does not report any support provided to multilateral climate change funds;
- Support provided to multilateral financial institutions:
    - The support provided to the World Bank in 2014 is € 4.9 Mio in MMR reporting which is reported under ´core/ general´ whereas in the BR2 € 26.1 Mio are reported as cross-cutting climate-specific support to the World Bank. Thus, the climate-specific amount in BR2 is much higher than the core amount included in the MMR reporting;
    - The support provided to the African Development Bank in 2014 is € 1.8 Mio in MMR reporting which is reported under ´core/ general´ whereas in the BR2 € 2 Mio are reported as ´cross-cutting´ ´climate-specific´ support to the African Development Bank. Thus, the ´climate-specific´ amount in BR2 is slightly higher than the core amount included in the MMR reporting;
    - The support provided to the Asian Development Bank in 2014 is € 1.7 Mio in MMR reporting which is reported under ´core/ general´ whereas in the BR2 € 12.2 Mio are reported as ´cross-cutting´ ´climate-specific´ support to the African Development Bank. Thus, the ´climate-specific´ amount in BR2 is much higher than the core amount included in the MMR reporting;
    - ´Core/ general´ support to the EBRD and the Inter-American Development Bank is reported in the MMR tables, but not in the BR2 tables;

- ´Core/ general´ support to UNEP and UNDP is included in the MMR tables, but no amounts are indicated in BR2 tables;
- Support to UNFCCC is indicated with € 82,867 in BR2 whereas in the MMR tables a much higher amount of € 252,640 is provided for "UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and ITL";
- No sectoral information is provided for multilateral support;
- Financial instrument (grant) is provided in BR2 reporting, but not in MMR reporting.
- Austria commented that a key problem for consistency between MMR and BR reports that is not mentioned in the report is the early annual deadline of 30 September under MMR. The "imputed multilateral shares" that OECD publishes for OECD members are not available by that date. Yet these figures are the only genuinely comparable figures available. Austria therefore refrains from reporting "climate-specific" core contributions (below 100%) under MMR. We have thus treated MMR reports as preliminary reports to be updated and corrected in the relevant BRs. In this understanding consistency of data on multilateral support between MMR reports and BRs was neither anticipated nor indeed intended. We are however open to resubmitting MMR reports annually after the 30 September deadline once harmonised OECD data is available. This would ensure consistency between MMR and BR reports from Austria in the future."

9.5.3. Belgium

- Bilateral contributions are consistent between BR2 and MMR;
- Multilateral contributions are consistent apart from a subcategory for ´Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research´ in the MMR; in the BR this value is placed within ´specialized UN bodies´;
- The adaptation values differ for multilateral climate change funds;
- In MMR, value in multilateral climate change funds in 7 is different from 7a; only € 12 Mio from one fund are reported. The sum differs from the one in the BR;
- 7a is consistent. Only in the GCF, the BR2 reports one value, whereas it is split up in the MMR as € 40 Mio for ´cross-cutting´ multisectoral and € 600,000 for ´cross-cutting´. The Adaptation Fund value has also been split up under the MMR; the reason remains unclear.

9.5.4. Bulgaria

- Bulgaria reported empty tables on financial support in BR2 reporting under the UNFCCC, but reported support under the MMR. As Bulgaria is not included in Annex II to the Convention, it is not obliged to fulfil obligations pursuant to Articles 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 of the UNFCCC;
- The reported amounts of multilateral support in the MMR include contributions to the UNFCCC and the Montreal Protocol, core contributions to UNEP and other Conventions (desertification, CITES) as well as support to IUCN (which is reported under UN bodies; however IUCN is not an UN body.

9.5.5. Croatia

- The amount reported by Croatia is consistent. It includes only the UNFCCC core budget, which is reported under ´Specialized UN bodies´.

9.5.6. Czech Republic

- Reported amounts for climate-specific multilateral support for 2014 in BR2 reports and in MMR reporting table are consistent apart from 40,000,000 CZK reported as ´multilateral financial institutions including regional development banks´ - ´other´ in the BR and as ´other multilateral climate change funds´ in the MMR;
- Reported amounts for core/general multilateral support for 2014 in BR2 reports and in MMR reporting table are consistent apart from an additional 20,140,621 CZK reported in BR2 for ´multilateral climate change funds´;
- Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels are consistent;

9.5.7. Cyprus

- Cyprus reports empty tables under MMR and BR2.

9.5.8. Denmark

- Reported amounts in BR2 reports and in MMR reporting table are not fully consistent;
- Under the MMR Denmark reported finance data in 1000 DKK and in the BR CTF format DKK are reported. There is a factor of 1000 in the units indicated, however the order of magnitude of the numbers reported is the same or sometimes also the amounts are the same. This means that units are wrong in one of the reported set of tables. Comparison with BR1 reporting indicates that the units reported in BR2 tables are wrong and are indicated in 1000 DKK whereas the unit is DKK. This is corrected in the tables in Annex III;
- ´Multilateral climate change funds´: amount for GCF and ´other multilateral climate change funds´ are reported as ´core/ general´ in BR2 and as ´climate-specific´ in MMR template;
- Multilateral financial institutions: higher amount for World Bank provided in BR2 (DKK 40 Mio higher in BR2) which is also split to ´adaptation´/ ´mitigation´ / ´cross-cutting´ which was not the case for the amounts in the MMR template;
- ´Bilateral, regional and other channels´: higher amount reported in BR2, mostly due to adaptation projects included which were not included in MMR report, total amounts for ´mitigation´ and ´cross-cutting´ slightly lower in BR2 reporting than in MMR reporting;
- ´Bilateral, regional and other channels´: status reported as provided in BR2 and as committed in MMR template;
- In 7a of BR2 Denmark reports DKK 100 Mio and DKK 28 Mio under ´core/general´ ´multilateral climate change funds´ which are reported as ´climate-specific´ in the MMR;
- Values of the Asian Development Bank in 7a ´climate-specific´ are rounded in BR2;
- DKK 11,500 are reported in BR2 to the GEF which do not appear in the MMR and might be missing a factor 1000. This was not corrected.

9.5.9. Estonia

- In the MMR report, total bilateral contribution reported in summary table 7 is not the same number as the bilateral support reported in table 7b. The figure in table 7 was corrected according to table 7b;
- Estonia reports € 50,000 ´core/general´ to UNDP in BR2 that are not reported in the MMR;

- Under the MMR € 100,000 are reported as ´climate-specific´ to the International Telecommunications Union as ´other´ in ´Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks´ and € 323,000 to UNDP under ´specialized UN bodies´ which are not reported in BR2;
- In BR2 Estonia reports ´climate-specific´ bilateral contributions of € 74,134 (mitigation) and € 535,204 (cross-cutting) and only € 120,000 of the latter are reported to the MMR (in table 7b);
- In BR2 Estonia reports € 49,007.21 under ´cross-cutting´ and ´other multilateral climate change funds´ whereas in the MMR € 151,007.21 is reported under ´cross-cutting´ and ´multilateral climate change funds´;
- In total € 32,338 (´climate-specific´ and ´core/general´) are reported less in BR2 and € 17,662 more in BR2 (´climate-specific´).

9.5.10. Finland

- ´Climate-specific´ values are consistent between MMR and BR2 reporting;
- Differences in ´core/general´ can be observed for ´multilateral climate change funds´, ´specialized UN bodies´ and bilateral contributions;
- More than twice the amount is reported under the MMR as compared to BR2. This is largely due to the fact that no core/ general bilateral contributions are reported in BR2, but about 500 Mio € in the MMR report.
- Finland comments: "the UNFCCC reporting system does not allow to include bilateral core/general information in table 7b; it only has a column for climate specific. Our own computerized system includes this information in aggregate table 7. We do not see this difference as a problem, because the relevant information is always reported in the climate specific column."

9.5.11. France

- For ´core/general´ France reports € 33,985,000 in BR2 which France did not report in the MMR table 7, but this amount was reported in MMR table 7a. Therefore table 7 was corrected to include this amount consistent with table 7a.
- € 1,725,000 of bilateral contributions is reported as mitigation in BR2 and as cross-cutting under the MMR;
- Apart from this swapping, totals are consistent.

9.5.12. Germany

- In general, amounts reported in BR2 and in MMR template are consistent;
- The amounts for ´total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels´ for ´mitigation´ and ´adaptation´ are exchanged in the BR2 report, the amount reported for ´mitigation´ is the same as reported for ´adaptation´ in the MMR reporting and the other way round for ´mitigation´; Germany confirms this confusion of values in the comment;
- Under Cross-cutting in table 7, Germany reports ´other multilateral climate change funds´ as a subcategory under the UNFCCC and as a separate category under the MMR. Values are equal;

- In table 7, Germany reports a joint value to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to the UNFCCC and four separate values under the MMR. The sum is equal;
- Germany stated in its comment that changes between MMR and BR might depend on coal activities reported in the MMR September version, which have been corrected in an updated MMR version.

9.5.13. Greece

- All values are consistent.

9.5.14. Hungary

- Multilateral contributions are consistent apart from a HUF 100 difference under specialized UN bodies, which are probably a summation or typing mistake;
- Under the MMR, almost HUF 2,000,000 more are reported in bilateral ´cross-cutting´ than in BR2.

9.5.15. Ireland

- There is likely a reporting mistake of € 300,000 provided to UNEP in either the MMR or BR2 for ´climate-specific´. MMR reports € 300,000 more than BR2. This was not corrected;
- The two reports are largely consistent but in the MMR Ireland reports € 1.9 Mio under ´adaptation´ and nothing under ´other´ whereas in the BR they report € 1.3 Mio for ´adaptation´ and € 300,000 for ´other´;
- The ´UN International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction´ is reported directly under ´specialized UN bodies´ in the MMR and only as a subcategory of ´other´ in BR2. This happens with other subcategories too.

9.5.16. Italy

- Completely different values and categories are reported for € and US$ in BR2. It seems that Italy has reported some finance flows in € and other flows in $ as that the $ column is not a conversion of the amounts indicated in € in the other column as for other countries. Adding up € and US$ values for Italy in BR2 leads to values significantly higher than in the MMR, which makes this option unrealistic. Further clarification would be needed from Italy to be able to correct the data and make them comparable to other countries;
- BR2 data were corrected with a factor 1,000,000 because the reported units were obviously incorrect;
- No ´core/general´ is reported in BR2;
- In ´climate-specific´ all values differ between BR2 and MMR;
- The overall magnitude of difference is almost € 30 Mio for ´climate-specific and core/general´ and € 5 Mio for ´climate-specific´.

9.5.17. Lithuania

- All values are consistent.

9.5.18. Latvia

- € 350,000 was reported under ´cross-cutting´ in the MMR and under ´other´ in the BR. Both as ´multilateral climate change funds´;
- Totals and all other values are consistent.

9.5.19. Luxembourg

- No ´core/general´ is reported under the MMR; the value reported as ´core/general´ in BR2 is reported as ´climate-specific, cross-cutting´;
  - Luxembourg clarified "the value reported as ´core/general´ in BR2 is reported as ´climate-specific, cross-cutting´: we noticed that Belgium recorded the GEF finance under "Core/general" in its BR2 and not under "cross-cutting" as we did for the MMR reporting. We therefore moved the GEF financing to the "Core/general" category.
- Multilateral ´adaptation´ values are consistent between MMR and BR2;
- Bilateral contributions are slightly inconsistent, as there were changes between September and December as project data became available; some "cross-cutting" actions were reallocated to "adaptation";
- No multilateral ´mitigation´ contributions are reported under the MMR:
  - Luxembourg clarified that the multilateral contributions under BR2 are amounts which are committed but only reported in italics in the MMR (1 million for SIDS + 2 millions for REDD+).

9.5.20. Malta

- Malta reports the same totals but in different categories. € 50,000 out of € 75,000 which are reported under ´core/general´ ´specialized UN bodies´ in BR2 are reported as ´climate-specific´ or ´other´ ´other multilateral climate change funds´ under the MMR whereas € 25,000 are reported in the same category;
- These € 50,000 were committed to UNICEF, in BR2 as ´core/general´ and under MMR as ´climate-specific´;
- Amounts in mitigation and adaptation are equal but reported under ´total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels´ in BR2 and as ´multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks´ under the MMR.

9.5.21. Netherlands

- Several amounts are rounded in the MMR whereas the exact value is given in BR2.
- All non-rounded values are inconsistent between MMR and BR2;
- In BR2 ´other´ is reported in subcategories whereas in the MMR everything is in a joint ´other´ category;
- There is a reporting mistake of € 292,467,298 in BR2 bilateral ´core/general´ that was corrected;
- Netherlands comment
  - final data are only available in October.

- o In the MMR we used the 2012 and 2013 OECD/DAC percentages for the calculation of the climate share of our core contributions to MDBs and climate funds, while we used the 2013-2014 OECD/DAC averages for our 2014 report to UNFCCC.
- o We noted a mistake in our IFC climate specific finance reported to UNFCCC. This should not have been 9,962,676 but 20.4% of EUR 7,508,800. We included no figure in the MMR for IFC as OECD/DAC had not yet provided a percentage indicating the climate relevance of IFC.
- o Climate-specific and core/general cannot be added up.
- o In the MMR, we furthermore combined our contributions to the African Development Bank (AfDB) and Fund (AfDF) in one figure and applied the OECD/DAC percentage for the AfDF as 'a best estimate' given that no separate OECD/DAC percentage for the AfDB was available at the time. We used the same methodology for the Asian Development Bank and Fund. However, at the time of the UNFCCC report we applied the different percentages that OECD/DAC had by then provided for AfDB, AfDF, AsDB and AsDF.
- o Both in the MMR and in the figures reported to UNFCCC we have, where possible, reported both our (total) core contribution to the multilateral organization (as registered in our financial system) as well as the climate-specific part of this core contribution (as registered in our financial system). In our view this approach is in line with the tabular format provided by UNFCCC and provides optimal transparency. We have difficulty understanding the rationale and meaning of the EU's technical guidance for the MMR in this respect, in particular: the recommendation that we should preferably report core/general contributions while we are reporting on climate finance and the notion that core/general and climate-specific data for multilateral channels should be mutually exclusive while in reality climate-specific contributions are a part of the core contribution.

9.5.22. Poland

- Some bilateral contributions in BR2 and MMR are swapped between mitigation and cross-cutting but the totals are consistent.

9.5.23. Portugal

- All values in table 7 are consistent
- In table 7a the values for multilateral financial institutions differ between the MMR report and BR2 reports, however this is a simple summation mistake in the BR2.

9.5.24. Romania

- An amount of RON 140,000 provided is reported as ´specialized UN bodies´ under ´adaptation´ and in the MMR as ´bilateral´ under ´core/general´ and as ´bilateral adaptation´ in BR2. The amount of RON 140,000 is reported twice in BR2. This is probably a reporting mistake and would need to be clarified with Romania;
- Nothing is reported in table 7a.

9.5.25. Spain

- In ´bilateral, regional and other channels´ a small share (€ 1,398) of the totals for ´adaptation´ and ´cross-cutting´ is inverted.
  - o Spain´s clarification: The divergence between the overall sum recorded in MMR and in BR2 is due to the following factual mistake: an ODA grant aimed at Paraguay amounting to 1,402€ is classified as cross-cutting in the BR2 report (see page 98 of the BR2 report). This program should have been classified as mitigation, in the same way as in the MMR report (you can find this program in row 376 of tab "tabla 7b 2014 BI y REGIONAL" of the attached Excel file).
  - o The remaining €4 are due to rounding errors: bilateral and regional data of the MMR report is recorded with two decimals, while data in the BR2 report is recorded rounded.
  - o Spain clarified that they do not report core contributions to other multilateral financial institutions than the GEF, since the split devoted to core purposes is calculated and reported to the UNFCCC by these institutions to avoid double counting. Sweden
- Values for ´other multilateral climate change funds´ are included in the sum of ´multilateral climate change funds´ in BR2 but excluded under the MMR. Totals are equal;
- In the MMR, ´core/general´ was not transferred from table 7a to table 7. This was corrected;
- The value given to the African Development Bank differs by about SEK 100,000 between BR2 and MMR data;
- A currency conversion rate is given in the MMR and used for the values filled in; the sums are calculated separately in each currency, so that sums do not exchange with the same currency exchange rate indicated.

9.5.26. Slovenia

- € 129,980 are reported under multilateral ´cross-cutting, specialised UN bodies´ in the MMR which are not reported in the BR 2;
- Sums for bilateral contributions equal but values are distributed differently across ´mitigation´, ´adaptation´ and ´cross-cutting´.

9.5.27. Slovakia

- Values are consistent apart from a share of € 40,644 from ´core/general´ ´specialised UN bodies´ that is reported as ´climate-specific´ ´other´ in BR2;
- In table 7a in the MMR the value of ´multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks´ is split up whereas it is reported as a joint number in BR2;
- The BR2 total in table 7a for 'climate-specific' for 'multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks' is split into two subcategories in the MMR reporting.

9.5.28. United Kingdom

- Reported amounts in BR2 reports and in the MMR reporting table are largely consistent, however the allocation to institutions has changed in some cases in table 7a for the multilateral support as explained below;
- Some values differ due to rounding but sums equal;

- Under the MMR finance data are reported in Million British Pounds and in the BR CTF format British Pounds are reported. There is a factor of 1,000,000 in the units indicated, however the reported amounts, e.g. for bilateral support are the same. This means units are wrong in one of the reported set of tables. The comparison with the information in the BR2 report text where UK refers to billion £ provided indicates that the units reported in BR2 tables are wrong and are indicated in million British Pounds and not British Pounds as shown in the column headings;
- The amount reported under 'Multilateral financial institutions´ 'other' in the MMR template is reported as amount provided to the 'World Bank' in the BR2 template;
- In table 7a in the MMR template under 'Other Multilateral Climate Change Funds', three funds are differentiated 1. 'Climate Investment Funds', 2. 'Climate Investment Funds - Clean Technology Fund' and 3. 'Climate Development Knowledge Network'. In the BR2 tables, the differentiation is only to 1. 'Climate Investment Funds' and 2. 'Climate Development Knowledge Network';
- In table 7a, no support provided to ´specialized UN bodies´ is reported;
- In table 7a, the allocation of ´climate-specific´ support has changed for the same amounts reported in some cases:
  - Support provided to GEF is indicated as cross-cutting in BR2 table and adaptation in MMR table;
  - Support provided to GCF is indicated as adaptation in BR2 table and as cross-cutting in MMR table;
  - In BR2 table all support reported under 'Other multilateral climate change funds' are indicated as ´cross-cutting´ whereas in the MMR template the disaggregated amount to the 'Clean Technology Fund' is indicated as mitigation;
- The differences of the amounts indicated in table 7 arise from the differences in allocation of some amounts as explained above;
- In the MMR template the status is not always provided in table 7a, in the BR2 template it is always indicated as provided;

In the BR2 template no sector information is provided and the notation key 'not applicable' is used whereas some sector information is provided in the MMR template for 'other multilateral climate change funds'.

9.6. Annex VI: Information sources related to private finance

Figure 9-1: Information sources on public interventions for Low Carbon Resilient (LCR) activities

	Instruments and Interventions	Example datasets
Public finance	Grants	- BNEF for renewable energy projects - OECD-DAC for LCR activities - joint-MDBs* for LCR activities - IDFC* for LCR activities
	Debt	- OECD-DAC for LCR activities - joint-MDBs* for LCR activities - IDFC* for LCR activities
	Equity	- OECD-DAC for LCR activities - joint-MDBs* for LCR activities - IDFC* for LCR activities
	De-risking	- OECD DAC pilot survey +ADD DETAIL ON FUTURE DETAIL COLLECTION PROPOSAL
Public policy interventions	Regulatory Policy	- IEA *Polices and Measures Databases*: – Energy Efficiency Databases – IEA/IRENA Global Renewable Energy Policies and Measures - UNFCCC CDM/JI Database
	Fiscal Policy	- OECD/IEA Fossil fuels subsidies datasets
	Information and Innovation Policy	- IEA Energy Technology R&D Statistics - OECD Green Patent statistics

*Note: * aggregate data not reported by activity level or instrument*
Sources: Xxxx, Xxxx

Relative data availability	+	←→	-

Source: Jachnik et.al. 2015, p. 54

Figure 9-2: Information sources on private finance for low carbon and resilient (LCR) activities (sectoral approach)

Sector	Coverage of example activities		Example sources
Renewable energy	Wind		BNEF, 2014
	Solar		
	Geothermal		
	Small hydro; marine		
	Biomass and waste		
	Solar water heating		Mauthner and Weiss, 2012*
	Smart grids		Navigant Research, 2013*
Low-carbon transportation	Mass transit systems		Commercial databases
	Non-motorized		
	Air, rail, and maritime		
	On-road		BNEF, 2014
Energy efficiency	Supply-side		IEA, 2012 and 2014*; BNEF, 2014
	Demand-side residential		
	Demand-side commercial		
Agriculture, forestry, and land use	Reforestation		
	Lands, crop and livestock management.		
	Biofuels		BNEF, 2014
Water and Waste	Solid waste management		
	Wastewater		
Industry and infrastructure	Process technologies		
	Carbon capture and storage		BNEF, 2014
	Climate resilient infrastructure		
Other	Health		
	Capacity building		
	Education		
	Communication		

* = denotes proxy estimates.

Relative data availability: + ←→ -

Source : Jachnik et al. 2015, p. 55

Figure 9-3: Information sources on private finance for low carbon and resilient (LCR) activities (by type of financial instrument)

Private finance instruments	Examples	Example sources
Grants	Project and programme level grants	BNEF, OECD DAC (using US Foundations Center data)
Debt	Syndicated loans	BNEF, Bloomberg, Dealogic, FactSet, ThomsonOne, OECD (FDI)*
	Project loans	BNEF, Dealogic, ThomsonOne, Preqin Infrastructure
	Bonds (project and corporate)	Bloomberg, BNEF, Dealogic, Eikon, FactSet
	Other, e.g. microfinance, informal loans	No systematic data
Equity	Publicly traded	Not considered in this study
	Corporate-level private equity	Bloomberg, BNEF, FactSet, ThomsonOne, Preqin PE/VC, OECD (FDI)*
	Project-level private equity	BNEF, Dealogic, ThomsonOne, Preqin Infrastructure
	Other, e.g. microfinance, household investment, informal investment, enterprise reinvested earnings	No systematic data
De-risking	Insurance	No systematic data
	Guarantees	
	Derivatives	

* OECD (FDI) data is reported in aggregate as 'debt' or 'equity'.
Note: UNEP Risø CDM and World Bank PPI data on total investment is not disaggregated by instrument.

Relative data availability: + ←→ -

Source : Jachnik et al. 2015, p. 56

9.7. Annex VII: Proposal for revised 2017 "Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the MMR"

Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR)

1. Background and scope of the technical guidance

As already announced during discussions in the EGI and ECCWG, the European Commission has proposed to use the revised technical guidance, sent to Member States (MS) by the European Commission on ~~6 June 2015~~[DATE], for this year's reporting exercise, including a slightly revised common tabular format for the "UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties".

In order to facilitate the transition to the new rules on concessional loans in DAC statistics by 2018 it is recommended to report both on the old and new rules concerning concessional loans for reporting 2016 and 2017 data.

Please note that the reporting deadline for this year's exercise is advanced to 15 September, in order to allow for the aggregation of data in time for the Climate Change Conference (COP ~~22~~23), organized in November 2017, one month earlier than usually. The timely provision of data, at the latest by the reporting deadline and sooner if possible, will be of essence.

2. DAC reporting on development finance

The "good practice table for reporting", Annex I of the technical guidance, has been updated in 2016 to reflect the changes to the common tabular format for the "UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties" (tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b)) in accordance with Decision 9/CP.21 on Methodologies for the reporting of financial information by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention:

- Creating reporting fields for the provision of information on definitions or methodologies used for reporting information in the following reporting parameters: "climate-specific" or "core/general", "status", "funding source", "activity", "financial instrument", "type of support" and "sector";

- Aligning the categorization in the reporting parameter "status" of support ("pledged", "committed" and "provided") in tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b) of the common tabular format with the categorization used in other existing international methodologies ("committed" and "disbursed")

These changes reflect the need to enhance a common understanding on key terminology for reporting financial information under the Convention to facilitate transparency and comparability of information and data on support over time and across Parties.

This year ~~and in 2017~~, it is proposed to keep a descriptive separate document on the methodology used (point 3.2 below) and to populate the new reporting fields in the good practice table.

~~3. DAC reporting on development finance~~

~~In December 2014, members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) agreed on modernising the reporting on concessional loans in DAC statistics, which will become standard from 2018.1 In particular, the 2014 HLM agreed to modernise the reporting of concessional loans by assessing concessionality based on discount rates differentiated by income group and introducing a grant equivalent system for the purpose of calculating ODA figures2. During the transition period between current and new rules, it is recommended to use the same approach as the OECD and to report in 2016 and 2017 using both the new grant equivalent system and the current (2013) flow-based system.~~

4. Consolidated recommendations for MMR reporting in 2017~~6~~

1) **Format of Member States replies:** Member States are requested to use the new UNFCCC Common Tabular Formats (CTF), in accordance to Decision 9/CP.21, as the template for the MMR reporting. Annex I provides a good practice example, based on the best practices of MS in 2014 in which some additional improvements were introduced. It is strongly recommended to submit the tables in Excel format (avoid conversion to jpg, pdf etc.).

2) **Methodology:** A descriptive section, preferably in a separate document, should be added to the tables. It should provide the technical description of the data, including key definitions and methodology. Narratives, such as justifications for climate finance should be avoided. General methodological information at aggregate level or definitions should also be provided in the Excel reporting table. The information already provided in the Excel template does not need to be duplicated in the methodological report.

3) **Total data:** MS are strongly encouraged to provide totals on specific climate finance, funding type, financial instruments and sources (see Table 7). This additional information will facilitate the summing up of data at the EU level. It also reduces the risk of calculation errors.

4) **Currency:** The default should be to report in EUR and the national currency. Please indicate clearly if a different approach has been used and explain the reasons. When applicable, the exchange rate should be ~~explicitly~~ indicated in the specific field in the good practice table for reporting, Annex I. It is recommended to use the OECD yearly average exchange rate, which is also linked in the specific field.

5) **Level of detail:** MS should report as detailed as possible, preferably at programme/project level in table 7b of the UNFCCC template.

6) **Definitions:**

   a) **~~Provided /~~ committed / disbursed ~~pledged~~:** ~~In the context of the MMR, the term "provided" equals "disbursed".~~ Member States are requested to report committed funds for bilateral climate finance flows and disbursed ~~("provided")~~ funds for multilateral climate finance flows in line with OECD DAC definitions. Please indicate clearly if a different approach has been used and explain the reasons.

OECD DAC Definitions[57]

Commitment

"127. A commitment is a **firm written obligation** by a government or official agency, backed by the appropriation or availability of the necessary funds, to provide resources of a specified amount under specified financial terms and conditions and for specified purposes for the benefit of a recipient country or a multilateral agency. Donors unable to comply with this definition should explain the definition that they use.

128. Commitments are considered to be made at the **date** a loan or grant agreement is signed or the obligation is otherwise **made known to the recipient** (e.g. in the case of budgetary allocations to overseas territories, the final vote of the budget should be taken as the date of commitment). […]

129. **Bilateral** commitments comprise new commitments and additions to earlier commitments. The recording in the year reported on of cancellations on earlier years' commitments is allowed, but only in the form of an aggregate ("bilateral, unspecified"/"sector, unspecified") to avoid interpretation issues posed by negative commitment figures in analyses. […]

130. For **multilateral** contributions, commitments show the total amounts of multi-year agreements with multilateral institutions. For capital subscriptions in the form of notes encashable at sight, enter the total expected amount of deposits of such notes as the amount committed."

Disbursement

"131. A disbursement is the placement of resources at the **disposal of a recipient country** or agency, or in the case of internal development-related expenditures, the outlay of funds by the official sector. Disbursement may be measured in various ways at different stages of the transfer process.

132. For financial **loans and grants**, subject to the availability of the necessary records, preference should be given to the stage closest to balance of payments treatment, e.g.

i. the payment by the source agency for goods to be shipped (or other payments to a third party on behalf of the recipient);

ii. in the case of contributions to multilateral agencies in the form of a note or similar instrument encashable unconditionally at sight at the discretion of the recipient, on issue or deposit of the note;

iii. the placement of funds at the recipient's disposal in an account in the donor country, in the recipient country or in a third country;

iv. the withdrawal of funds by the recipient or use on his instructions of funds in an account in the donor country, in the recipient country or in a third country.

133. However, where funds are transferred to an **account in the recipient country** but held by the donor for release to the recipient on production of relevant documents, the balance of payments effective transaction is the conversion of foreign exchange, and this should be recorded as a disbursement.

[57] https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/DCDDAC%282016%293FINAL.pdf

[…]

b) **Sectors:** The OECD DAC definitions are the basis for filling in information in this field. Indicate clearly if different definitions or approaches have been used and explain the reasons for which the OECD one has not been applied. The OECD DAC purpose codes (xls, Dec. 2014) are available at: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/DAC-CRS-Code-List.xls. ~~http://www.oecd.org/investment/stats/dacandcrscodelists.htm.~~

c) Option a: **Mitigation, adaptation, crosscutting, other:** To present a transparent picture, these categories should be mutually exclusive if possible. In case of overlaps, please explain your method and rationale. Mitigation and adaptation support are defined in MMR in line with the OECD DAC definitions[58]. Crosscutting activities are those that involve both mitigation and adaptation components.

   If "other" activities are reported, please provide specification. For more information on the OECD DAC definitions, see http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/48785310.pdf

   Option b: **Mitigation, adaptation, crosscutting, other:** To present a transparent picture, these categories should be mutually exclusive if possible. In case of overlaps, please explain your method and rationale. Mitigation and adaptation support are defined in MMR in line with the OECD DAC definitions[58]. Cross-cutting should be used for 'funding for activities which are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation' only if countries cannot assign a contribution to adaptation and mitigation through the use of Rio markers or a transparent national methodology.

   If "other" activities are reported, please provide specification. For more information on the OECD DAC definitions, see http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/48785310.pdf

d) **"Financing source" (ODA, OOF, other):** ~~and~~. If the "other" category is used, please specify what it includes. The OECD DAC definitions are available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/38429349.pdf

   1. Member States should use the definitions for OOF as provided by the OECD DAC (OECD 2016a). If the national definition used differs from the OECD DAC definition, additional explanations should be provided as part of the methodological information.

   2. If OOF flows are reported, MS shall explain as part of the methodological information which flows are covered under OOF.

   3. If no OOF are reported, MS should indicate whether OOF flows do not occur' or whether OOF flows were not tracked and estimated, but do occur.

[58] 'Climate change mitigation-related support' means support for activities in developing countries that contribute to the objective of stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system; 'climate change adaptation-related support' means support for activities in developing countries that are intended to reduce the vulnerability of human or natural systems to the impact of climate change and climate-related risks, by maintaining or increasing developing countries' adaptive capacity and resilience (MMR definitions)

e) **"Financial instrument" (grant, concessional loan, non-concessional loan, other):** Member States that only provide grant financing may simply refer to OECD DAC definitions. Member States that provide loans or other financial instruments are requested to explain the methodology used (e.g. gross flows, net flows, grant equivalent, etc.) If the "other" category is used, please explain which instruments are covered and specify what ~~i~~they include~~s~~ (e.g. export credit, private, etc.). If no 'other instruments' are reported, indicate whether such instruments do or do not occur. The OECD DAC definitions are available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/38429349.pdf

In December 2014, members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) agreed on modernising the reporting on concessional loans in DAC statistics, which will become standard from 2018. In particular, the 2014 HLM agreed to modernise the reporting of concessional loans by assessing concessionality based on discount rates differentiated by income group and introducing a grant equivalent system for the purpose of calculating ODA figures. During the transition period between current and new rules, it is recommended to use the same approach as the OECD and to report in 2017 using both the new grant equivalent system and the current (2013) flow-based system.

7) Core/general vs Climate-specific (only **contributions through multilateral channels):**

a) **"Core/general"** refers to core contributions to the core budget of multilateral institutions "that Parties cannot specify as climate specific". In the CTF tables, Member States currently have the option to report full core contributions to MDBs and UN organisations: it is recommended to report this data.

If core/general contributions are reported, core/general and climate-specific data should be mutually exclusive, except in such cases where climate-specific contributions are made to specific sub-funds or dedicated programmes of the overarching institutions to which also core funding is provided. In this case, the core funding should be reported as well as climate specific funding and it should be explained how core and climate-specific contributions have been differentiated. It should also be clearly indicated to which sub-funds or programmes the climate-specific contributions are paid to.

b) **Climate specific** concerns contributions to multilateral climate funds and dedicated programmes managed by multilateral institutions. Please report contributions to such funds and programmes (LDCF, SCCF, AF, GCF, UNFCCC, CIFs, FCPF, etc.) as climate specific only. Core/general and climate-specific data should be mutually exclusive: funds should only be reported in one of the categories with the exception outlined under a).

c) **Other:** Any multilateral fund, financial institution or UN body reported under 'other' should be clearly indicated with its name.

d) **Contributions to the Global Environment Facility** may be reported as either core contribution or climate specific as the climate relevant part is communicated by GEF to contributing parties (exception from the above general rule).

e) **Imputed multilateral contributions in core/general finance:** Several MDBs provide estimates concerning the climate-related share within their portfolio, and attribute this back to DAC members, based on a pro-rata share of their core multilateral ODA disbursements in a given year. The European Commission will, if available on time, obtain the figures from OECD, and add these values to the amount reported under the MMR. If the figures are not

available on time before the ECOFIN Council Conclusions, they will not be included in this year's report.

Notwithstanding, Member States still have the option to report their national figures; in the absence of a common approach as described above, these figures may be used in the aggregate EU report subject to methodological feasibility.

f) **Rio Markers:** Many Member States are reporting based on Rio marked OECD DAC data, but using different methodologies and coefficients for quantifying the climate relevant part of the Rio marked activities. For the Commission's approach, please see Annex II.

In your descriptive section, please specify whether you are using Rio markers and provide information on the approach to identifying mitigation and adaptation markers and on the coefficients used. Please specify and explain any difference from the OECD DAC or the Commission methodology.

Further information on the Rio markers available here: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/48785310.pdf.

8) **Technology transfer and capacity building:** In order to get a better picture of the support for capacity building and technology transfer MS are asked to include a minimum of 10 examples (if available) for each type of support. It is recommended to give this information in a separate, easily identifiable chapter/section.

9) **Private climate finance:** ~~In order to provide a more accurate picture of climate finance flows,~~ MS are strongly encouraged to include data on mobilized private climate finance in the respective field in the template. If numerical data is reported, MS should describe the ~~along with the~~ methodology and definition used to compile such data in the methodological report.

10) **Timeliness:** For this year's exercise, given that the Marrakech Climate Change Conference (COP 23~~2~~) will be organized in November, one month earlier than usually, the reporting deadline is 15 September. This arrangement leaves very little time for the Commission to analyze and synthetize the information received in time for the Council conclusions and the COP. ~~On previous occasions, a number of Member States were late with the reporting.~~ Given the importance of this topic for the international negotiations and the timing challenge ~~presented to us this year~~ it is strongly recommended to provide your input as early as possible and at the latest by 15 September October 2016.

Annex I: Good practice template (additionally provided in xls)

Annex II: Climate action tracking (Rio markers) methodology

Annex I: Good practice template (additionally provided in xls)

Table 7: Provision of public financial support: summary information in 2016

Allocation channels	Year									
	European euro - EUR					National currency [a]				
	Core/ general [b, 1]	Climate-specific ²				Core/ general	Climate-specific ²			
		Mitigation [c]	Adaptation [c]	Cross-cutting [c]	Other [cd]		Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other
Total contributions through multilateral channels:										
Multilateral climate change funds[e]										
Other multilateral climate change funds[f]										
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks										
Specialized United Nations bodies										
Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels										
Total climate specific by funding type (total for mitigation, adaptation, crosscutting, other)										
Total climate specific finance		0					0			

Currency conversion rate: OECD yearly average [a]	
Financial resources mobilized through public interventions - EUR [g]	

Total climate specific by funding source (EUR)		Total climate specific by financial instrument (EUR)	
ODA		Grant	
OOF [h]		Concessional loan	
Other		Non-concessional loan	
		Equity	
		Other	

1-7 Please provide information on definitions or methodologies used for reporting in the Documentation box

a https://data.oecd.org/conversion/exchange-rates.htm; please change if other currency conversion rate is used

b This refers to support to multilateral institutions that Parties cannot specify as climate-specific

c These categories should be mutually exclusive

d Please specify

e Multilateral climate change funds: Global Environment Facility, Least Developed Countries Fund, Special Climate Change Fund, Adaptation Fund, Green Climate Fund and the Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities (paragraph 17(a) of the "UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties" in 2/CP.17)

f Not listed under e)

g This is not mandatory; if you fill in this field, you are encouraged to provide methodological information how mobilized resources were estimated

h If no value is reported under OOF, please indicate either "not occurring" with NO or "not estimated" with NE

Table 7(a)

Provision of public financial support: contribution through multilateral channels in 2016[a]

Donor funding	Total amount				Status: disbursed, committed [b, 3]	Funding source: ODA, OOF, Other [4]	Financial instrument: grant, concessional loan, non-concessional loan, equity, other [5]	Type of support: Mitigation, adaptation, crosscutting, other [c,6]	Sector [d, 7]
	Core/general [a, 1]		Climate-specific [2]						
	European euro - EUR	National currency	European euro - EUR	National currrency					
Multilateral climate change funds									
1. Global Environment Facility									
2. Least Developed Countries Fund									
3. Special Climate Change Fund									
4. Adaptation Fund									
5. Green Climate Fund									
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities									
8. Other [e] multilateral climate change funds									
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks									
1. World Bank									
2. International Finance Corporation									
3. African Development Bank									
4. Asian Development Bank									
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development									
6. Inter-American Development Bank									
7. Other [e]									
Specialized United Nations bodies									
1. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)									
2. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)									
3. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)									
4. United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)									
5. United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)									
6. United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)									
7. United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN REDD)									
8. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)									
9. Other [e]									
Total contributions through multilateral channels									

Abbreviations: ODA = official development assistance, OOF = other official flows.

1-7 Please provide information on definitions or methodologies used for reporting in the documentation box

a This refers to support to multilateral institutions that Parties cannot specify as climate-specific.

b In the context of the MMR, the term "provided" equals "disbursed".

c These categories should be mutually exclusive

d See the OECD purpose codes at http://www.oecd.org/investment/stats/dacandcrscodelists.htm. Codes include energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry, water and sanitation etc.

e Please indicate each fund, institution or specialized UN body reported under "other" with its name

Annex II: Climate action tracking (Rio markers) methodology

The approach used by the EU to track its provision of climate finance is based on the OECD DAC system of Rio markers.

The OECD has developed a comprehensive system for measuring aid in support of climate-related objectives. It is based on detailed project level reporting against carefully defined policy markers. A Rio marker for mitigation was introduced 1998 and in 2010 an additional marker for adaptation was introduced. There are specific guidelines from OECD DAC agreed by DAC members for scoring projects and programmes against these markers. For each Rio marker, projects and programmes are placed in three categories: a) Principal objective, b) significant objective or c) not targeting.

According to the Rio marker methodology an activity is classified as climate change mitigation-related (either marked as ‘Principal’ or ‘Significant’) if it “contributes to the objective of stabilisation of greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system by promoting efforts to reduce or limit GHG emissions or to enhance GHG sequestration.”

As regards adaptation, an aid activity is marked as relevant if it “intends to reduce the vulnerability of human or natural systems to the impacts of climate change and climate-related risks, by maintaining or increasing adaptive capacity and resilience. This encompasses a range of activities from information and knowledge generation, to capacity development, planning and the implementation of climate change adaptation actions.”

The Rio markers are policy makers, and were originally not intended for accurate quantification of flows to support policy goals. Therefore, an activity can have more than one principal or significant policy objective (i.e. it can be marked for several Rio markers; mitigation, adaptation and other Rio conventions such as Biodiversity and Desertification).

The Commission uses the following approach to “translate” the Rio marked data into estimated climate finance flows for the EU budget:

- If an activity is marked as principal for mitigation or adaptation, 100% of the support is considered and reported as climate finance;
- If an aid activity is marked as significant for mitigation or adaptation, then only 40% of the support is considered and reported as climate finance.
- To avoid double counting, any activity can only count as 100%, 40% or 0%. If an activity is marked for both mitigation and adaptation, only the highest marking will count when calculating the total climate relevant financial contributing of the activity.

Further information on the Rio markers available here: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/48785310.pdf

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Institute for Applied Ecology

Study on climate finance reporting, including methodological issues, producing overview information and assessing emerging requirements

Final report

Reference° CLIMA.A.2/ETU/2015/0011

Berlin, 24.08.2016

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Acknowledgements:

The project team thanks the European Commission for providing a large amount of materials and documents to the project team as well as explanations and clarifications which strongly facilitated the assessment conducted in this report.

Disclaimer:

The content of this report does not necessarily reflect the official opinions of the European Commission or other institutions of the European Union, but solely represents the findings of the project team that was tasked with the project.

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List of Abbreviations

BR	Biennial Report
BR2	Second Biennial Report
CB	Capacity Building
CCAC	Climate and Clean Air Coalition
CDR	Central Data Repository (of Eionet)
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CION	European Commission
COP	Conference of the Parties
CITES	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
CTCN	Climate Technology Centre & Network
CTF	Common Tabular Format
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DEG	Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft
DFI	Development Finance Institution
DG	Directorate General
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EDF	European Development Fund
EIB	European Investment Bank
EPPO	European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
LEAP	Livestock Environmental Assessment and Performance Partnership (under the FAO)
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GHG	Greenhouse gas
IAEA-TCF	International Atomic Energy Agency – Technical Cooperation Fund
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

ICESDF	Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing
ICRAF	International Council for Research in Agroforestry (now: World Agroforestry Centre)
IDA	International Development Association
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IISD-GSI	International Institute for Sustainable Development – Global Subsidies Initiative
IMC	Imputed Multilateral Contribution
IRENA	International Renewable Energy Agency
ITL	International Transaction Log
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
LCR	Low Carbon Resilient
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MMR	Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on a mechanism for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and for reporting other information at national and Union level relevant to climate change and repealing Decision No 280/2004/EC)
MRV	Measurement, Reporting and Verification or Monitoring, Reporting and Verification – the abbreviation is used in both contexts under the UNFCCC
MS	Member State (of the European Union)
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OOF	Other Official Flows
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
TT	Technology Transfer
UN	United Nations
UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNDOCO	United Nations Development Operations Coordination Office
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNF	United Nations Foundation

UNFCCC	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund / today: United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UN-REDD	United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
WFP	United Nations World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

Abstract

The analysis of Member States' reports on provision of financial, technological and capacity building support to developing countries under Article 16 of the EU Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) due by 30 September 2015 and their second biennial reports (BR2) under the UNFCCC due by 1 January 2016 revealed significant differences in the reported finance figures for many countries and showed that there are still considerable inconsistencies in the methodologies used despite past progress in improving monitoring and reporting of climate finance. This also impacts the quality of the aggregation of data at EU level.

A considerable number of improvements have been identified that may enhance transparency without putting additional reporting burden on Member States, with an particular focus on the technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support under the MMR.

The status quo of the current research related to reporting of private climate finance in the UNFCC context was undertaken with the objective to identify approaches that can be incorporated in the methodological guidance and subsequent steps to further advance the tracking of private finance.

In addition, based on the analytical findings in this report and the literature assessed, an input to an EU submission on accounting of finance resources provided and mobilized under the UNFCCC was prepared.

1. Executive Summary

DG Climate Action commissioned Öko-Institut e.V. with this "Study on climate finance reporting, including methodological issues, producing overview information and assessing emerging requirements" for assessing and aggregating the information on climate finance received through the various reporting obligations, improving methodological approaches for reporting climate finance and taking stock of the developments in the field after COP 21 in Paris. The study should assist the EU and its Member States (MS) in improving climate finance reporting in terms of consistency, comparability and accuracy as part of the reporting obligations under Article 16 of the EU Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR)[1] and as part of biennial reports under the UNFCCC[2]. The analysis should also contribute to improving consistency, comparability and accuracy of the aggregate reporting of support conducted by DG Climate Action on the basis of MS' reports.

The analysis of Member States' reports on provision of financial, technological and capacity building support to developing countries under Article 16 of the EU Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) due by 30 September 2015[3] and in their second biennial reports (BR2) under the UNFCCC due by 1 January 2016 shows that there are still considerable inconsistencies in the

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[1] OJ, L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 13: Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on a mechanism for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and for reporting other information at national and Union level relevant to climate change and repealing Decision No 280/2004/EC.

[2] Reporting obligations for support provided to developing countries are part of UNFCCC decision 2/CP:17, in particular its Annex I (UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties), UNFCCC decision 19/CP.18 (Common tabular format for "UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties") and UNFCCC decision 9/CP.21 (Methodologies for the reporting of financial information by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention)

[3] The due date for reporting under the MMR is by 30 September (Article 16, paragraph 1 of the MMR), however many Member States' provided the reports only by around mid-October in 2015.

methodologies used by Member States despite past progress in improving monitoring and reporting of climate finance. This also impacts the aggregation of data at EU level.

The quantitative analysis of finance reported under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation and as part of the second biennial reports under the UNFCCC revealed significant differences in the reported finance figures for many countries. It is recommended that Member States improve the consistency of the information and data reported under the MMR reports and in their BRs. There is a risk related to the credibility of EU finance data if figures for national climate finance differ between two reports provided in a short time span of several weeks.

While transparency has already been improved in recent years, the analysis shows that there is scope for further improvements and harmonization of definitions, approaches and categorization. A considerable number of improvements have been identified that may enhance transparency without putting additional reporting burden on Member States. Convergence towards common definitions, methodologies and approaches would also improve consistency and comparability and facilitate the aggregation of finance data at EU level.

The reporting of imputed multilateral contributions for the estimation of climate-specific multilateral finance is complex and needs further discussion in the EU. In this area, the report does not provide a single specific recommendation, but decision trees that can guide further decision-making related the approach to be implemented in the EU.

It is important that further improvements and changes are implemented in a coordinated way in the EU, as part of the ongoing work under the OECD DAC and in the negotiations under the UNFCCC. This report tried to take into account recent improvements decided under the UNFCCC as well as methodological work conducted in the OECD DAC. In the section on recommendations, the report provides a complete overview of potential recommendations and proposals related to finance reporting without differentiating whether such improvements are more appropriate to be implemented as part of EU guidance or OECD guidance.

The findings and recommendations presented in this report were also compiled in a synthesis report “Recommendations related to the technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation Synthesis Report”. The recommendations of a first draft of this synthesis report were discussed at a Workshop of ECCWG-EGI on 11 March 2016 and Member States also provided written feedback to the report. This version of the report the comments received from Member States and from OECD were incorporated. In addition, Greece and Slovenia provided their 2nd biennial report to the UNFCCC in March; hence these two countries were added to the comparative analysis presented in this report. The document “Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support under the MMR” as well as the related reporting tables were adapted to reflect those proposals for improvements on which Member States generally agreed in their feedback to the proposals in the synthesis report.

Task 3 of this study focuses on the key methodological developments in terms of tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions and provides a state of ply of methodological work and discussions on private climate finance.

While several public and private, national and international entities are making efforts into developing methodologies for and actually tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions, the Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance (further referred to

as OECD Research Collaborative) has developed a methodological proposal which compiles state of the art approaches proposed by such entities.

In addition, the chapter also notes parallel but convergent work being done by the MDBs and other development banks and institutions. Their work, however, goes beyond tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions, as it includes all co-finance, public or private, mobilized by the intervention of the MDBs and development banks. While not specific on mobilized private climate finance, the approach to tracking mobilized co-finance is relevant for the scope of this task. MDBs and other development banks and institutions have also been involved in the OECD Research Collaborative.

This chapter does not focus or include figures on private finance mobilized by public interventions, as it focuses exclusively on methodologies to that end.

The steps proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative C framework are considered to be well sequenced. In order to facilitate getting a better idea of the potential for mobilized private finance and while noting that fully implementing the framework might take longer, MS could be requested to, shortly, perform stages 1 and 2. In doing so, each MS would have a clear mapping of all the organizations deploying public instruments to mobilize private climate finance. After such exercise, MS could start collecting data, eventually giving priority to those entities and/or instruments which may have a greater potential for mobilizing private climate finance or, alternatively, to those which pose lesser challenges in data collection and handling. This would constitute a stepwise approach, which would progressively bring MS to the same level of preparedness. Those ready to move faster should be encouraged to do so. The work available on definitions related to private finance seems mature related to the definition of public and private finance. Related to the monitoring of the finance mobilized by public interventions, the causality between the public intervention and the finance mobilized is difficult to assess and there does not seem to be enough confidence and knowledge at the time to opt for something different to blanket causality. Related to attribution of finance mobilized to the specific public interventions, in order to avoid gaps or overlaps, there should be an effort to harmonize approaches, but only in relation to the participants involved in the same instrument. With regards to boundaries to the causality and consequent attribution of mobilized private finance to a given public intervention (e.g. related to time), there is an interest in allowing for different approaches to be tested in order to gain more experience and develop stronger methodological guidance on the matter.

Tracking private finance is no simple endeavour. But there are several organizations that do it from different perspectives, using different methodologies and with different scopes and purposes. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)(through the Coordinated Direct Investment Survey) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (in the annual World Investment Report) have the most extensive and reputed exercise in this regards. But there are others, namely some carried out by private entities, such as the Financial Times with the Financial Times FDI report which captures greenfield investments (new investments in the real economy, which climate relevant investments would be expected to be) and already tracks specific investments in the renewable energy sector. These three approaches were chosen due to their perceived comprehensiveness and credibility and also as a representation of different approaches and scopes. Their inclusion in this report is a mere illustration of specific efforts to collect data on foreign direct investments and do not constitute a proposal to use them for collection of data on climate relevant foreign direct investment mobilized by public interventions. While these exercises are interesting, they are far from being directly useful for the purpose of collecting data on climate relevant private finance mobilized by public instruments. Firstly, because they lack the tools to

identify the relevant public instruments and to establish the causality between such instruments and the private finance mobilized. And secondly, because these exercises do not have the tools to mark the investments as climate relevant in accordance with the relevant methodologies. Current approaches to the attribution of investments to a specific economy sector fall very short of providing a clear signal of climate relevance. If this is very true for mitigation, it is even very much more so for adaptation.

Task 3 also looked at MRV of incentives to and enabling environments for private climate finance. There is ample experience is assessing a given country's friendliness to investment, in particular to private investment. This experience has already been expanded to assess, in a pilot phase only in 17 countries, the enabling environments (friendliness) to investments on sustainable energy (RISE). When this has been done, it seems reasonable to expect that it should be feasible to identify a set of indicators to characterize the relevant enabling environment for climate relevant investments, both in terms of mitigation as well as of adaptation. Plenty of work on that front has already been done, including at the UNFCCC level.

Given that readiness for climate relevant investments cannot be considered in isolation from overall investment friendliness, it seems advisable that any such assessment would take into account the overall investment environment in a given country. In this regard, the climate relevant investment readiness assessment should be a subset, a spin-off of a larger investments environment assessment, such as the Doing Business Report described above, and build upon already existing relevant initiatives such as RISE.

Macro-indicators to be measured in such a specific climate relevant investments friendliness assessment could include:

- The existence of an officially approved Nationally Determined Contribution
- The inclusion of a mitigation component within the NDC
- The inclusion of an adaptation component within the NDC
- The adoption of a low emissions development plan, including detailed mitigation action (with estimated emissions reduction potential)
- The adoption of a national adaptation plan with detailed adaptation measures
- Institutional capacity for implementation of climate policy is established
- Appropriate industry conditions, such as engineering expertise and the enabling infrastructure are present
- A stable financial sector with capacity to support low carbon (development) is present
- Economic instruments that translate policy targets into price incentives that make low carbon technologies more attractive are present

While the collection of the data required to assess climate relevant investment enabling environments could be done via biennial reports to the UNFCCC, it does not seem feasible to adopt guidance on such collection with the required level of detail. Therefore, it is apparently more effective to undertake such an endeavour close but outside the formal UNFCCC process.

In task 4 it had been agreed with DG Climate Action that the study should provide an input for the EU submission on accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions for which a mandate was provided at the 44th session of SBSTA. The submission is due by 29 August 2016 should consider several questions outlined in the SBSTA conclusions:

(a) What are the existing modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions, and what are the challenges and information gaps with respect to these existing modalities;

(b) What accounting modalities need to be developed to serve the Paris Agreement, in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Agreement, and what are the challenges to the development of these accounting modalities and how can these be addressed;

(c) How to ensure that accounting modalities are developed in time to be integrated into the transparency framework established under the Paris Agreement.

In the input under task 4, the existing modalities and definitions used as part of the OECD DAC framework were described as well as the arrangements and methodologies agreed as part of the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR in the EU. Challenges and gaps of the current reporting are summarized taken up some of the findings of this study, but also addressing more general challenges such as the need to not only track global climate finance flows, but also the effectiveness of the use of these flows to achieve the purposes of the Paris agreement. Related to the question what accounting modalities need to be developed to serve the Paris agreement, the principles defined as part of the Paris agreement have been assessed in general terms how they are applicable to the reporting on climate finance.

2. Introduction and background

2.1. Objectives of the project

The study should help the EU and its Member States to improve climate finance reporting. This project aims at providing support for assessing and aggregating the information received through the MMR and BR2 reporting obligations of EU MS to improve methodological approaches for reporting climate finance and take stock of the developments in the field after Paris.

By providing an overview on certain aspects, comparing reporting submitted to different fora and testing alternative approaches, it shall help to get a clearer picture on the best approaches in this field.

Beyond the important methodological aspects described below, the results of this project should contribute to an accurate accounting of the EU's climate support to developing countries, thus strengthening the EU's position towards its negotiation counterparts.

2.2. Background / current system for MRV of support

For EU Member States, two reporting requirements exist to provide information on climate finance:

- their annual reports under Article 16 of Regulation No 525/2013 on a mechanism for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and for reporting other information at national and Union level relevant to climate change (MMR) in accordance with requirement under UNFCCC[4],
- and biennial reports (BR) including the provision of information on climate finance under the UNFCCC in accordance with UNFCCC decision 2/CP.171F5 and decision 19/CP.182F6.

UNFCCC decision 9/CP.21 on “methodologies for the reporting of financial information by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention” which was adopted in Paris includes a number of changes to the common tabular format (CTF) as part of the “UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties”. These changes need to be incorporated in the reporting tables used under the MMR pursuant to Article 16, paragraph 1 of the MMR. Specific changes arising from this decision were integrated into the recommendations presented in this report in section 7.2..

Furthermore, methodologies have been agreed under the OECD DAC for the reporting of official development aid (ODA) which also includes climate finance. However, they often do not correspond to the reporting requirements under the UNFCCC or the MMR. Also, not all EU MS are members of the OECD DAC[7].

Further recommendations to refine reporting methodologies on climate finance are included in the OECD/CPI report (OECD 2015a) and methodologies to account for mobilised private climate finance have been proposed by the Swiss Technical Working Group in their recommendations to the OECD/CPI report (Technical Working Group 2015).

2.3. Structure of this report

This report outlines progress made on all tasks of the work programme, describes key questions and challenges under each task and envisaged conclusions. Furthermore, it is structured according to the overall structure of the final report to be written for this project.

This report starts with an introduction (section 2). It then presents results from task 1 (section 3.) of the work programme of the commissioned project. Task 2a is presented in chapter 4 and task 2b in section 5. The text has been incorporated from the synthesis report in chapters 4 and 5 to avoid different messages and inconsistencies between the two versions of the report. Task 3, related to private finance, is presented in chapter 6 and has been amended in this final report based on the guidance provided by DG Climate Action. Task 4 has been added in chapter 7. It is followed by a bibliography (8) and an annex (9) with country-specific and overview tables of the analysed data and other documents. The quantitative data has been updated based on the feedback received

[4] OJ L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 13

[5] Decision 2/CP.17 on the Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention contained in FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1

[6] Decision 19/CP.18 on a Common tabular format for “UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties” contained in FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.3, p. 3

[7] Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania are not part of the OECD

from MS after the presentation of the synthesis report and incorporating second biennial reports from Greece and Slovenia in this report.

3. Task 1: Assessment of Member States information on climate finance reported under the MMR

3.1. Objectives and approach

In task 1 the project team has supported DG Climate Action in aggregating and synthesizing the information on financial and technology support provided to developing countries reported by Member States under Article 16 of the MMR via ReportNet by the end of September 2015.[8]

3.2. Timeliness of MMR reporting

In 2015 18 Member States provided their submissions under Article 16 of the MMR within the deadline of 30 September to the EIONET CDR ReportNet website where the data is stored. Seven Member States reported within one week of delay (BG, DK, IT, LU, LV, SI, SE), two Member States were less than two weeks delayed (FR and PL) and one Member State (DE) reported by 21.10.2015. A considerable number of clarifications were necessary from Member States to ensure a correct aggregation of total EU figures and some Member States provided revised submissions after clarifying questions were sent to them. Cyprus provided a submission, but did not report any climate finance in its report.

Table 3-1 Timeliness of reporting under Article 16 of the MMR in 2015

Reports available within deadline (30.9.)	Reports available within 1 week after deadline	Reports available within 2 weeks after deadline	Reports available within 3 weeks after deadline
18 MS	7 MS	2 MS	1 MS

While most Member States reported within the deadline or even before the deadline (e.g. BE, CY), **it is very important for a timely aggregation and reporting at EU level that all Member States provide their submissions within the due date of end of September.** The reported figures are used to produce aggregate numbers of EU climate finance provided to developing countries which is used by the Commission and EU heads at the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties. In 2016, COP 22 will start by 7 November and reporting delays as in 2015 would make it very difficult to present aggregate EU figures at the next COP.

In order to present aggregate figures and relevant details on EU finance in 2014, the project team collected the reports submitted by Member States and supported DG Climate Action in aggregating data on climate finance contained therein (task 1a). This task was concluded by the end of October 2015.

To approach this task, CION had prepared an overview of Member States' contributions on climate finance. The project team prepared a similar overview in order to check whether the aggregate

[8] Available at http://cdr.eionet.europa.eu/ReportekEngine/searchdataflow

figures matched with the Commission's results. The final overview table including cross-checked figures is included below in Table 3-1.

The analysis was based on the data submitted by Member States in tabular format under the MMR which corresponds to tables 7, 7a and 7b of the Common Tabular Format (CTF) which are to be submitted together with developed countries' biennial reports under the UNFCCC. Several Member States submitted additional methodological notes explaining their approaches and methodologies. Further questions on methodologies underlying their data were raised by CION with Member States by email (e.g. why certain cells were not filled out; denominations of multilateral finance institutions; reporting of funds under the category "other"). The correspondences were forwarded to the project team.

Several Member States provided resubmissions of the tables (e.g. Portugal and Slovakia) as a result of the clarification questions raised.

3.3. Analysis of data

To generate aggregate figures for total climate finance, figures reported by Member States as 'climate-specific bilateral and multilateral public financial support' were copied from their MMR reports into an overview table (see Table 3-1), broken down into total figures for finance relevant for mitigation, adaptation, or cross-cutting issues. Such aggregate figures were produced for climate finance including (Table 3-1) imputed multilateral contributions as reported under the MMR as well as excluding those imputed multilateral shares (see Table 3-2) (see chapter 3.1.2.1).

The individual figures for mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting climate finance provided by the EU in 2014 do not add up to the overall total EU climate finance figure because the methodology for marking finance as relevant for mitigation, adaptation or cross-cutting used by the EU differs from the methodologies used by Member States. The EU reports finance relevant for both mitigation and adaptation under both categories, but only once in the total figure.[9]

[9] The EU has adopted the following approach to using the Rio markers: if an activity is marked as principal for mitigation or adaptation, 100% of the support is considered and reported as climate finance. If an aid activity is marked as significant for mitigation or adaptation, then only 40% of the support is considered and reported as climate finance. To avoid double counting, any activity can only count as 100%, 40% or 0%. If an activity is marked for both mitigation and adaptation, it will count towards total mitigation and total adaptation finance. However, only the highest marking will count when calculating the total climate relevant financial contributing of the activity (EU 2016). As a result, total mitigation support plus total adaptation support is greater than total support. There is no separate category to mark projects which are relevant to both mitigation and adaptation as "cross-cutting".

Table 3-2: Member States' climate finance in 2014 in million € including imputed multilateral contributions as reported under the MMR

	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	TOTAL
AT	72.07	6.88	22.12	0	101.07
BE	8.58	32.05	54.77	0	95.4
BG	0.06	0	0.01	0	0.07
HR	0.03	0	0	0	0.03
CY	0	0	0	0	0
CZ	1.15	2.8	3.71	0	7.66
DK	45.83	0	155.15	3.76	204.74
EE	0	0.32	0.26	0	0.58
FI	30.86	24.26	61.05	0	116.17
FR	2232.15	279.14	255.9	0	2767.19
DE	2,886.74	814.63	1,434.01	0	5,135.38
EL	0.04	0	0	0	0.04
HU	1.57	1.08	0.06	0	2.71
IE	1.53	22.87	9.57	0	33.97
IT	14.96	4.55	35.15	0	54.66
LV	0.05	0	0.35	0.02	0.42
LT	0.26	0	0	0	0.26
LU	6.1	7.35	25.25	0	38.7
MT	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.08
NL	71.95	133.84	165.49	0	371.28
PL	0.37	0.15	3.15	0	3.67
PT	8.36	0.86	0	0	9.22
RO	0	0.03	0	0	0.03
SK	0.2	0.76	0.15	0	1.11
SI	0.6	0.85	0.82	0	2.27
ES	423.18	18.67	21.29	0	463.14
SE	30.58	77.77	120.49	0	228.84
UK	260.46	246.13	524.31	167.02	1197.92
EU	486.58	442.37	0	0	677.01
EIB	2046.9	51.6	0	0	2098.5
Total	**8631.167**	**2168.983**	**2893.06**	**170.85**	**13612.12**

Source: MS reports submitted under the MMR in 2015

Table 3-3: Member States' climate finance in 2014 in million € excluding climate-specific imputed multilateral contributions under the MMR

	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	TOTAL
AT	71	6.88	21.87	0	99.75
BE	8.58	18.8	14.08	0	41.46
BG	0.06	0	0.01	0	0.07
HR	0.03	0	0	0	0.03
CY	0	0	0	0	0
CZ	1.15	2.8	3	0	6.95
DK	42.58	0	133.71	3.76	180.05
EE	0	0.33	0.2	0	0.53
FI	24.69	10.26	34.69	0	69.64
FR	2232.15	279.14	245.03	0	2756.32
DE	2878.74	716.63	1202.89	0	4798.26
EL	0.035	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.035
HU	1.57	1.08	0.06	0	2.71
IE	1.53	21.87	9.57	0.00	32.97
IT	14.96	4.55	24.49	0.00	44.00
LV	0.05	0	0.35	0.02	0.42
LT	0.26	0	0	0	0.26
LU	6.10	7.05	19.37	0.00	32.52
MT	0.01	0.023	0	0.05	0.08
NL	71.95	133.84	109.92	0.00	315.71
PL	0.37	0.15	1.90	0.00	2.42
PT	8.36	0.86	0.00	0.00	9.22
RO	0	0.03	0	0	0.03
SK	0	0.76	0.12	0	0.88
SI	0.60	0.85	0.16	0	1.61
ES	393.18	18.5	12.42	0	424.10
SE	26.32	76.12	119.06	0	221.50
UK	109.67	217.78	168.59	167.02	663.06
EU	486.58	442.37	0	0	677.01
EIB	2046.9	51.6	0	0	2098.5
Total	**8427.425**	**2012.273**	**2121.49**	**170.85**	**12480.098**

Source: MS reports submitted under the MMR in 2015
Notes: pink indicates rows with no changes compared to Table 3-1.

3.3.1. Imputed multilateral contributions (IMCs)

A central issue in the analysis of the data reported by MS under the MMR was the method used to allocate and estimate support provided to multilateral bodies. The OECD provided information on imputed multilateral contributions for several Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs).

These Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) provide estimates concerning the climate-related share within their portfolio and attribute this back to DAC members, based on a pro-rata share of their core multilateral ODA disbursements in a given year. These shares are referred to as 'imputed multilateral contributions in core/general finance'. However, Member States also have the option to report their national figures based on domestic calculations of imputed multilateral contributions. The methodologies of both approaches may differ though.

For the calculation of imputed multilateral contributions for 2014, CION had received from the OECD the preliminary table on imputed multilateral contributions for 2014, based on DAC Member States' reports on their core contributions. The total volume of such contributions according to OECD data was higher by Mio € 881.83 than the total volume of climate-specific multilateral funding reported under the MMR by Member States.

Thus, to produce an aggregate figure on imputed multilateral shares, a top-down approach was taken: The following OECD DAC list of MDB funds, funds and other institutions was taken as a basis (see also Table 3-3):

- MDB funds
    - African Development Fund
    - Asian Development Fund
    - International Development Association
    - Inter-American Development Bank, Fund for Special Operations
- Funds
    - Adaptation Fund (under the UNFCCC)
    - CIFS (Clean Technology Fund, Strategic Climate Fund (= Forest Investment Program, FIP; Pilot Program Climate Resilience, PPCR; and Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program, SREP))
    - Global Environment Facility and its two dedicated Funds (Least Developed Countries Fund and Special Climate Change Fund)
    - Global Environment Facility Trust Fund
    - Green Climate Fund
    - Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol
- Other institutions
    - United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
    - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

For members of the OECD DAC, the following approach was taken: If a Member State had reported climate-specific funding to any of the institutions on this list, this amount was filtered out when summing up multilateral contributions from the MMR reports. Thus, it was checked whether a Member State had reported funds as a **climate-specific** contribution to any of the institutions on the OECD DAC list in MMR table "contribution through multilateral channels" (corresponding to

CTF table 7a). If this was the case, the respective contribution(s) were deduced from the relevant total climate-specific figure (mitigation, adaptation or cross-cutting) in the summary table (CTF table 7) (see calculations in Table 3-2). After generating an aggregate figure for the EU without those imputed shares reported by the Member States and included in the OECD figure (see column I in Table 3-1), the relevant amount from the OECD was added to the aggregate figure without imputed multilateral contributions (see column K in Table 3-1). This approach aims at ensuring that multilateral contributions are not double counted.

For non-members of the OECD DAC, figures for imputed multilateral shares were included as reported under the MMR.

In this analysis, core/general contributions to multilateral channels as reported in MMR table “contribution through multilateral channels” (CTF table 7a) were not considered in this analysis, as it should include climate-specific finance only.

Challenges encountered

During the analysis of Member States’ reports under the MMR finding a way to add Member States’ imputed multilateral contributions to MDBs to the EU aggregate figure for climate finance was challenging. Several problems occurred with regard to the reporting of imputed multilateral contributions:

- DG CLIMA had to rely on preliminary data from the OECD DAC.
- OECD DAC data was not consistent with the data reported by the Member States. Climate-related development finance is broader than what is reported as climate finance in the BR. OECD DAC members when reporting to the UNFCCC often count only a share of what they reported to the OECD DAC.
- MDBs covered in the OECD DAC’s reporting and those listed in the EU’s CTF and MMR tables do not entirely overlap (see also Table 3-3). Even for the same multilateral institutions, the coverage of individual funds included under a specific financial institution varies between the OECD DAC list and the funds included in the CTF/MMR tables.
- The World Bank is mentioned as a single institution in the CTF/MMR tables while the World Bank Group includes several different organisations and it is not clear whether Member States’ reported figures refer to the entire World Bank Group or specific branches (e.g. the OECD considers only contributions to the International Development Association (IDA) as relevant funds to the World Bank).
- In some MMR reports, there is no clear differentiation between core contributions (which are not necessarily climate relevant) and climate-specific contributions.
- There is no harmonized approach related to the reporting on imputed multilateral shares within the EU. Some MS report only core contributions to financial institutions, some report imputed multilateral contributions which are nationally calculated by a different methodology as the imputed contributions of the OECD DAC and some refer to the imputed shares established by the OECD DAC).
- It is not clear how Member States calculate imputed multilateral shares for certain MDBs.

For these reasons, recommendations for improving the aggregation of imputed multilateral contributions and Member States' reports on climate finance were developed during further analyses carried out in this project. They are described in chapter 5.14.

Table 3-4: List of multilateral funds and other multilateral institutions in OECD data and in the CTF/MMR tables for calculating imputed multilateral contributions

OECD	CTF/MMR tables	Differences between OECD and CTF
Only International Development Association	World Bank, International Finance Corporation	Only IDA.
African Development Fund Only concessional windows from bank[10]	African Development Bank	Only concessional windows from bank in OECD[11]
Asian Development Fund Only concessional windows from bank	Asian Development Bank	Only concessional windows from bank in OECD
Inter-American Development Bank, Fund for Special Operations	Inter-American Development Bank	Only fund for Special Operations in OECD
Global Environment Facility Trust Fund	Global Environment Facility[12]	Global Environment Facility Trust Fund
Adaptation Fund	Adaptation Fund	Same
Global Environment Facility - Least Developed Countries Fund	Least Developed Countries Fund	Same
Global Environment Facility - Special Climate Change Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Same
Clean Technology Fund		CIF
Strategic Climate Fund		CIF. 3 windows: FIP, PPCR, SREP
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change	UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities	UNFCCC under OECD covers Trust Fund and other contributions to UNFCCC, CTF is limited to Trust Fund
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol		Not mentioned in CTF
Green Climate Fund	Green Climate Fund	Same
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change		Not mentioned in CTF

[10] The African Development Fund (ADF) is the concessional window of the African Development Bank (AfDB) Group.

[11] The African Development Fund (ADF) is the concessional window of the African Development Bank (AfDB) Group.

[12] The GEF administers different trust funds: Global Environment Facility Trust Fund (GEF); Least Developed Countries Trust Fund (LDCF); Special Climate Change Trust Fund (SCCF); Nagoya Protocol Implementation Fund (NPIF). The GEF also provides secretariat services, on an interim basis, for the Adaptation Fund.

3.3.2. Calculating EU total climate finance

For calculating an aggregate figure for total EU climate finance as the sum of contributions provided by the Member States, three possible options were discussed within CION which are described below. Firstly, they include different possibilities for how to include funds reported in the category ‘other’ as there is no harmonised approach which funds to include in this category and how to define them as climate-relevant. This is particularly relevant for Germany’s MMR report because Germany had originally reported about € 3.3 billion of its total climate-specific finance under this category. An approach for reporting these funds under the categories mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting was agreed with the German reporting experts subsequent to Germany’s submission of their MMR report. Secondly, the three options differ with regard on how to include imputed multilateral contributions in the aggregate figure for total EU climate finance (use figures reported by the OECD DAC or figures reported by the Member States in their MMR reports). Table 3-5 presents the results of calculating total climate finance according to the different options.

Option 1: Including MMR figures for bilateral and multilateral, excluding funds reported in the category ’other’, excluding OECD DAC imputed multilateral contributions

- Add up figures reported as total bilateral and multilateral climate-specific finance in the categories mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting by Member States in their MMR report;
- Exclude funds reported by Member States in the category ’other’;
- Include multilateral funding on the basis of imputed multilateral contributions reported in the MMR (not taking into account imputed multilateral contributions calculated by the OECD).

For climate finance provided in 2014, this approach would have resulted in the exclusion of 3.3 billion EUR climate finance provided by Germany (reported in the category ‘other’) and about 0.9 billion EUR imputed multilateral shares which are included in the OECD’s report but not in Member States’ reporting (together roughly 30% of all EU climate finance).

Option 2: As option 1, but including funds reported in the category “other” by Germany, excluding the OECD DAC imputed multilateral contributions

- Include funds reported by Germany in the category ’other’ but distribute them to mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting according to the breakdown provided by the German reporting experts subsequent to the MMR submission.
- Include multilateral funding on the basis of imputed multilateral contributions reported in the MMR (not taking into account imputed multilateral contributions reported by the OECD).

Option 3: Including funds reported in the category “other” by Germany, including imputed multilateral contributions based on OECD figures and subtracting figures reported in the MMR for these funds (to avoid double counting), including multilateral contributions from MMR reports when these funds are not part of the OECD imputed multilateral contributions.

- Include funds reported by Germany in the category ‘other’ but distribute them to mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting according to the breakdown provided by the German reporting experts subsequent to the MMR report;
- Exclude imputed multilateral contributions reported in the MMR for those funds which are also included in the OECD’s reporting; Include figures reported by the OECD on imputed

multilateral contributions added to the EU's aggregate finance as 'cross-cutting' climate finance.

The third approach was chosen for the presentation of contributions for mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting climate finance for 2014 at aggregate EU level (see EU 2015). This is one of the areas where the methodology under the MMR should be further clarified to achieve a transparent approach for the aggregate EU figures for reporting imputed multilateral contributions in future years.

Table 3-5: Calculation of total EU climate finance for 2014 in Million €, with and without MMR-reported imputed multilateral contributions and with imputed multilateral contributions as calculated by OECD

Definition of EU total	Amount in Mio. €
A: EU total **with** imputed multilateral contributions as reported in MMR	13,612.12
B. EU total **without** imputed multilateral contributions as reported in MMR	12,480.10
C. Total imputed multilateral contributions **included in MMR reporting**	**1,132.03**
D. Total imputed multilateral contributions **as calculated by OECD**	**2,013.85**
E. EU total **with IMC as calculated by OECD**, **without IMC as reported in MMR (B+D)**	**14,493.95**

Note: The figure for E. in the last line was the one used in the Council Conclusions on climate finance published on 10.11.2015. The figures do not include amounts reported under 'other' by Germany.

3.3.3. Further methodological issues

Additional challenges arose from the MMR report provided by Germany. Firstly, Germany reported € 2.8 billion as "mobilised public finance" through national finance institutions (KfW and DEG) which was not included in the MMR table directly, but described in a qualitative section on Germany's methodological approach. This support was not further specified in terms of its relevance for mitigation or adaptation. This amount was included in the country's total climate finance figures under the category 'cross-cutting'. However, other Member State did not report on "mobilised public climate finance". Given the fact that also the Paris Agreement refers to finance provided and mobilized, further guidance should be developed related to a consistent reporting of 'mobilized finance' by Member States under the MMR.

Secondly, Germany reported a considerable amount of climate finance under the category 'other'. It thus needed to be clarified which parts of this amount are to be included in the EU's aggregate

figures for mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting. Guidance should be provided to Member States on how to treat the category ’other’ in the future.

Furthermore, several methodological differences in the approaches used by Member States to produce their climate finance figures became obvious during the analysis of MMR data. These differences include (see also the summaries in chapters 4.3 and 4.4):

- the way OECD DAC markers to estimate financial flows have been implemented/which method has been applied to categorise flows as relevant for mitigation, adaptation or cross-cutting;
- different coefficients for Rio Markers (counting of 100%, 20%, 40% or 50% of funding if a project is marked as “significant”; which coefficient) are used if a project is marked as principal/significant for more than one category);
- different use of the category ’other’;
- different underlying definitions (e.g. mobilised public finance, funding sources included (ODA, OOF, other), point of measurement (provided, committed, disbursed);
- which financial instruments are included in the climate finance figures (e.g. grants and (concessional) loans, including whether the new or the old approach to concessional loans agreed under the OECD has been used[13], guarantees, equity investments; funds channelled through multilateral development banks including the EIB;
- how Member States have differentiated between core contributions to the core budget of multilateral institutions which cannot be specified as climate-specific (“core/general”) and climate-specific contributions to multilateral climate funds and dedicated programmes managed by multilateral institutions;
- methodologies to calculate imputed multilateral contributions;
- which funds/organisations are reported together under multilateral development banks (e.g. which organisations/ funds are considered to be part of the World Bank Group);
- which exchange rates have been used to estimate climate finance figures;
- which sector definitions have been used (OECD DAC definitions or others);
- accounting methods for private climate finance, including definition, the accounting of leveraging effects and ways to measure the extent of mobilization;
- which countries were included as recipient countries (non-Annex I countries, countries eligible for ODA under OECD DAC or any other definition of recipient countries,;
- whether repayments are deduced from climate finance disbursed;
- the approach taken to report on climate finance relevant to technology transfer or capacity building.

[13] As of 2018, new guidelines to assess the concessionality of loans apply for OECD countries, which imply i.a. that only loans with a grant element of at least 45% will be reportable as ODA (OECD DAC 2014). In their 2014 reports under the MMR, several Member States have already applied these new reporting guidelines.

Yet, these issues have not been analysed in greater depth in the first step of the analysis of the MMR reports. They will be dealt with in chapter 4 which describes the detailed analyses of Member States' MMR reports and their 2nd Biennial Reports. The extent to which the issues listed above are addressed in chapter 4 reflects the priorities for analysis determined at the kick-off meeting in November 2015.

4. Task 2a: Comparison of the climate finance reporting under the MMR with Biennial Reports under the UNFCCC

This chapter presents a qualitative and quantitative comparison of the Member States reports provided under Article 16 of the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (Regulation 525/2013) in September/ October 2015 with the information on climate finance provided in the second biennial reports submitted in January 2016 to the UNFCCC. Article 16, paragraph 1 of the MMR specifies that reporting under the MMR should be "in accordance with the relevant provisions under the UNFCCC, as applicable, including any common reporting format agreed under the UNFCCC". The reporting tables provided in Excel under the MMR therefore require the same information and data as the CTF tables agreed under the UNFCCC as part of decision 19/CP.18 (apart from few differences, e.g. no reporting in US$ under the MMR, extension of summary table with information on funding sources and financial instruments under the MMR).

In addition, Greece and Slovenia provided their 2nd biennial report to the UNFCCC in March hence these two countries were added to the comparative analysis of reports presented in this report. After the presentation of this comparison in a separate synthesis report at an ECCWG-EGI Workshop on 11 March 2016 further clarifications were received from Member States which are reflected in this chapter.

4.1. Data basis used

The data basis used concerning MMR reports is the same as described in section 3.2.

All Member States had provided the submissions of their 2nd biennial reports to the UNFCCC. Bulgaria and Cyprus did not report any climate finance in their second biennial reports. New Member States (BG, CY, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LV, LT, MT, SI, SK, PL, RO) are not part of the list of countries in Annex II of the Framework Convention on Climate Change which have the specific requirements to provide financial resources to developing countries under Article 4 of the Convention.

14 Member States (AT, BE, CZ, DE, ES, FI, FR, GR, LU, MT, NE, PL, SE, UK) and the OECD commented on the Synthesis Report, as sent to Member States and the OECD on 8 March 2016 and the according presentation as given on 11 March 2016 respectively. Those comments were a further information source for this report.

4.2. Comparison of quantitative information provided for the year 2014 in reports under the MMR and in second biennial reports

Given the fact that the reporting tables under the MMR and in the biennial reports require the same information for the year 2014 and that the due date between the two reports only had a difference of three months (taking into account the period of clarification of the submitted data the difference

was only two months), it had been expected that the amounts of climate finance reported are identical or very similar. However this expectation was not met.

Aggregated for all Member States, the second biennial reports (BR2) include around 1.9% or € 311 Mio. less **total climate finance contributions** (core/general and ´climate-specific´ finance) than the reports under the MMR. For **total climate-specific finance**, the difference is smaller and Member States reported 0.7% or € 59 Mio. more climate-specific contributions in BR2 than in MMR reports (see also Table 4-1).

Table 4-1 also shows that the deviations are different for multilateral climate finance and for bilateral climate finance. For **multilateral finance** the aggregate amount in BR2 is 2.3% or € 206 Mio. higher than the amount reported in the MMR for core/general and climate-specific finance. If only climate-specific finance is considered, the BR2 is 4.8% or € 77 Mio. higher. Only nine Member States reported consistent figures for multilateral climate finance in BR2 and MMR reports. This indicates that the reporting of multilateral finance is generally more complex and difficult.

The aggregate total **bilateral** climate finance reported in BR2 (core/ general and climate-specific) is 6.9% or € 517 Mio. lower than in the MMR reports while the climate-specific bilateral finance is rather similar (BR2 reports 0.3% or 18 € Mio. lower than MMR reports). The large difference for core/ general bilateral finance is mainly due to the reporting of large amount of core/ general bilateral finance in the MMR reports by Finland. In its comments to the draft synthesis report, Finland indicated that the UNFCCC CTF reporting software does not allow reporting of bilateral core/general data in table 7b and only climate-specific data can be entered. In the Finnish data bilateral core/ general data is added to table 7 and therefore reflected in the MMR reporting. Thus, according to the Finnish explanations, the BR reporting seems to miss some amounts that are reported under the MMR due to data entry problems. 16 Member States reported the same figures for bilateral climate finance in both reports.

Table 4-1 is based on the summary tables in Annex IV (section 9.4). In annex III (section 9.3) the underlying tables for each country are provided.

Table 4-1: Quantitative differences for total EU climate finance (as sum of all 28 EU Member States) based on aggregation of MMR reporting and BR2 for the year 2014

	Climate-specific and core/general	Climate-specific
Total (multilateral and bilateral)		
Total EU aggregate figure (Council conclusions 10.11.2015) (incl. EIB)[14](Council of the EU 2015)	€ 14,493,945,000	€ 14,493,945,000
Total MMR	€ 16,629,686,781	€ 8,631,696,892
Total BR2	€ 16,318,365,343	€ 8,690,635,762
Difference in % (BR2/MMR)	**-1.9%**	**0.7%**
Difference in € (BR2-MMR)	**€ -311,321,438**	**€ 58,938,870**
Multilateral		
Total MMR	€ 9,109,478,719	€ 1,610,595,669
Total BR2	€ 9,315,148,512	€ 1,687,454,495
Difference in % (BR2/MMR)	**2.3%**	**4.8%**
Difference in € (BR2-MMR)	**€ 205,669,793**	**€ 76,858,826**
Bilateral		
Total MMR	€ 7,520,208,062	€ 7,021,101,223
Total BR2	€ 7,003,216,831	€ 7,003,181,266
Difference in % (BR2/MMR)	**-6.9%**	**-0.3%**
Difference in € (BR2-MMR)	**€ -516,991,231**	**€ -17,919,956**

Note: Some Member States obviously reported incorrect units in the BR2 reports. In very obvious cases the reported figures were corrected for the aggregation in this table. Clarifications received from Member States after a presentation of a former version of this synthesis report were included in this table.

The Netherlands reported the same amount of bilateral core/ general finance as climate-specific finance in the 2nd biennial report which is not included in the MMR reporting and it was assumed that the repetition of this figure under core/ general in the BR2 is a mistake which was corrected in the aggregate figures.

[14] The figure published as EU climate finance for 2014 in the Council conclusions on climate finance in November 2015 was added as a reference to this table. However, neither the column 'core + climate-specific' nor the column 'climate-specific' are methodologically consistent with the aggregation from MMR reports and BR2 because of the different calculation of imputed multilateral contributions for the figure in the Council conclusions.

Table 4-2 indicates relative differences for each Member State and the EU between climate finance reported in BR2 relative to the amounts reported under the MMR. In some cases, consistent figures at total level still include some inconsistencies in reporting within the respective category, e.g. between the amounts provided for adaptation, mitigation and cross-cutting support.

Table 4-2 Percentage differences between reported amounts of climate finance in BR2 and MMR reports for Member States (values > 100% = BR2 has higher figures, values < 100% MMR report has higher figures)

Percentages of sum, multilateral and bilateral of total contributions by country						
	sum		multilateral		bilateral	
Country	% based on climate-specific and core/ general (BR/MMR)	% based on climate specific (BR/MMR)	% based on climate-specific and core/ general (BR/MMR)	% based on climate specific (BR/MMR)	% based on climate-specific and core/ general (BR/MMR)	% based on climate specific (BR/MMR)
AT	125.26%	139.73%	318.97%	3133.73%	100.00%	100.00%
BE	100.48%	102.38%	100.52%	104.14%	100.00%	100.00%
BG			0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
CR	100.00%		100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
CY			0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
CZ	105.86%	100.00%	108.68%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
DE	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
DK	98.98%	97.94%	102.56%	126.74%	94.49%	94.49%
EE	104.33%	97.43%	26.32%	10.38%	597.39%	597.39%
ES	103.48%	100.00%	140.52%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
FI	54.91%	100.00%	97.75%	100.00%	8.17%	100.00%
FR	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
GR	100.00%		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
HU	99.94%	99.78%	100.00%	100.00%	99.47%	99.47%
IE	99.73%	99.12%	99.61%	85.28%	100.00%	100.00%
IT	60.93%	89.61%	48.64%	111.54%	77.06%	77.06%
LT	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
LU	108.26%	106.00%	141.31%	129.29%	100.62%	100.62%
LV	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
MT	100.00%	38.06%	70.94%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
NL	126.46%	107.00%	146.99%	133.78%	100.00%	100.00%
PL	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
PT	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	0.00%	100.00%	100.00%
RO	200.00%	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
SE	101.41%	100.00%	102.15%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
SI	94.27%	94.27%	80.41%	80.41%	100.00%	100.00%
SK	100.00%	103.65%	100.00%	111.51%	100.00%	100.00%
UK	100.01%	100.00%	100.02%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
			0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
total	**98.13%**	**100.68%**	**102.26%**	**104.77%**	**93.13%**	**99.74%**

Note: Green values indicate that figures are equal between MMR and BR2
Black values indicate difference of ±5%
Red values indicate difference of > 5%.

A former version of this synthesis report was sent and presented to Member States and their subsequent comments and corrections were used to update the reported data. Those clarifications from Member States and the biennial reports handed in by Greece and Slovenia in the meantime have reduced the differences. However, clear inconsistencies remain.

It is recommended that Member States improve the consistency of the information and data reported under the MMR reports and in their BRs. There is a risk related to the credibility of EU finance data if figures for national climate finance differ between two reports provided in a short time span of a few months.

4.3. Summary of qualitative comparison of Member States reports

Table 4-3 presents a factual account of inconsistencies identified between Member States´ reports under the MMR and the second biennial reports in the reporting on multilateral finance grouped into thematic areas.

Table 4-3: Qualitative comparison of MS reporting under the MMR and in second biennial reports for multilateral finance

Information	Comments (examples of inconsistency)
Coverage of core/general contributions and climate-specific finance	24 Member States report core contributions (all countries which have submitted their MMR or BR report except Latvia and Slovenia). Yet, of those Member States which have submitted MMR and BR2 reports, five Member States either include information on core contributions only in their second BR or in their MMR (AT, ES, IT, LU, SE). While a total of 21 Member States report on core contributions under the MMR, 19 do so in their BR2. Croatia, Greece and Portugal only report core contributions but no climate-specific contributions. The MMR template defines climate change funds listed in the reporting template as climate specific, apart from the GEF to which also core/general funding can be reported. Such a distinction is not made in the BR reporting. Two MS (DK, NL) report also core/ general contributions to climate-change funds. For other climate change funds which MS have to specify it is less clear whether all amounts should be considered as climate-finance. 11 MS consider the finance reported for ‘other multilateral funds’ as climate-specific (BE, BG, CZ, DE, EE, ES, GR, HU, IT, SE, UK). However NL and DK report ‘other multilateral climate change funds under core/ general. Croatia, Greece and Portugal only report core contributions but no climate-specific contributions. On the other hand, Latvia and Slovenia only report climate-specific contributions but no core contributions. Austria reports core contributions in the MMR report but not in the BR and Italy and Luxembourg in its BR but not in its MMR report.
Reporting related to the World Bank	The World Bank comprises a number of specific dedicated programmes and funds that are reported separately by some MS and jointly under the heading of the World Bank by other MS. (13 MS: AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, FI, HU, IE, LT, PL, PT, SE, UK) report core contributions to the World Bank while 6 MS (AT, DE, DK, FI, LU, SI) report climate-specific contributions to the World Bank (with

Information	Comments (examples of inconsistency)
	divergences between the BRs and MMR reports). The Netherlands is the only country which separately lists its contributions to International Development Association (IDA) under 'other multilateral financial institutions'. Denmark, Finland and Poland explain that they report contributions to IDA as part of the funds provided to the World Bank. For the other countries that report contributions to the World Bank (AT, BE, CZ, DE, HU, IE, LT, PL, PT, SE for core contributions and AT, DE, LU, SL for climate-specific contributions), it is not clear whether contributions to IDA are included in the figures provided or not. This holds true for other funds that belong to the World Bank Group as well. Germany lists climate-specific contributions to several World Bank administered funds under 'other multilateral financial institutions' (Pilot Auction Facility for Methane and Climate Change Mitigation; BioCarbon Fund Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes; Forest Carbon Partnership Facility) separately to a core contribution to the World Bank. Ireland separately reports core contributions to the World Bank and core contributions to the World Bank CGIAR Fund. Finland reports core contributions and climate-specific contributions to the World Bank and to the CGIAR.
Type of multilateral funds reported	There is a lack of clarity which funds are relevant for international reporting on climate finance. For example, 3 Member States (HR, HU, PT) report core contributions to the UNFCCC and 6 Member States (AT, BG, DE, EE, PL, SK) report climate-specific contributions to the UNFCCC (with discrepancies between their MMR and BR reports) and 1 Member State (HR) reports core contributions to the Kyoto Protocol and 4 Member States (AT, BG, IT, SK) climate-specific contributions to the Kyoto Protocol. 1 Member State (AT) reports climate-specific contributions to the International Transaction Log (ITL). However, all Member States provide contributions to the UNFCCC's budget or in the form of fees to the ITL to the UNFCCC; yet the majority of Member States excludes these flows from their reporting on climate finance. Only the UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities is listed under multilateral climate change funds in the CTF reporting template while contributions for other purposes to the UNFCCC need to be reported under 'other'. Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Italy and Slovakia categorise such contributions as other multilateral climate change funds, while Austria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Portugal list them as contributions to other UN specialized bodies. Additionally, Member States list a great variety of different funds and institutions under the categories 'other' of multilateral climate change funds, multilateral financial institutions and specialised UN bodies.
Imputed multilateral contributions	Only 7 MS explicitly explain their methodological approach towards providing multilateral climate-related shares. 2 MS (AT and DK) use the shares provided by the OECD DAC to determine their imputed multilateral contributions. Finland uses a similar approach as done by the OECD when calculating imputed multilateral contributions, but uses nationally determined figures. Germany explains in its MMR report that it uses the weighted average 2013-2014 of

Information	Comments (examples of inconsistency)
	imputed climate relevant shares as the basis for calculating the imputed multilateral contributions from core contributions to multilateral development banks. The shares used by Germany in its MMR report resemble but do not exactly correspond to the final shares published by the OECD. Four MS use their own methodology to calculate imputed multilateral contributions but two of them refer to the data used by the OECD: France only reports one multilateral climate-specific contribution to the GEF in its MMR report and BR and uses a different percentage rate for climate-relevant finance than the OECD. The Netherlands applies the percentages for climate-relevant shares of financial disbursements of multilateral development banks as established by the OECD DAC if available. Otherwise, these percentages are determined nationally in close cooperation with the organisations concerned and range between 5% and 20%. Sweden reports nationally determined imputed multilateral contributions without specifying the climate-relevant shares. The UK explained that it has reported provisional core contributions in its MMR report but that the final data will be provided to the OECD. All other MS do not explain their approach towards reporting climate-specific multilateral finance. As an additional challenge, final OECD data was not available on time and the OECD does not cover all funds and institutions in their reporting which MS report on. Thus, for a number of institutions, climate-relevant shares have to be taken from other sources than from the OECD.
Coverage of instruments reported	24 MS report grants provided through multilateral channels in their reports. Four MS (CZ, HR, SK, UK) additionally indicate the disbursement of funds through ‘other’ financial instruments. Croatia reports its membership fees to the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol as ‘other’ instruments. The Czech Republic reports core contributions to the World Bank as “other (grant/equity)” in its BR, but does not provide further information on this contribution. Slovakia reports membership fees to the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund, the Montreal Protocol Trust Fund, the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol under UNFCCC, CITES Multilateral Treaty, to the WMO and to UNEP as ‘other’ financial instruments. Contributions to UNCCD, FAO and EPPO are reported as “other (capital subscription)”. Yet, this is not further explained. The UK reports contributions to the Climate Investment Funds as “other (capital)” without further explanation. Bulgaria is the only country which reports all multilateral contributions as ‘other’ instruments in its MMR report. Yet, it does not further specify the type of instrument used. Definitions for the financial instruments included in reporting are not provided by any Member State.
Status/point of measurement	All MS have reported disbursed/provided contributions. Luxembourg additionally includes funds that have been committed.

Information	Comments (examples of inconsistency)
Funding source	All MS which have submitted MMR reports or BRs have included money disbursed as ODA in their reporting except for Croatia which has not provided information on this issue. 4 MS (BG, EE, IT, LU) have also included funds disbursed through OOF in their reports and 3 MS (BE, IE, LV) have included other flows. Belgium has reported separate contributions through ODA and through OOF to the Adaptation Fund and to the GCF in its MMR report. In its BR, only one contribution to the Adaptation Fund is reported as “other (ODA/OOF)” while the contribution to the GCF is reported as finance relevant for ODA. Estonia has specified that its contributions to the UNFCCC are partially ODA (61%) and partially OOF (39%) and that its contributions to the WMO are partially ODA (4%) and partially OOF (96%). Ireland has reported its contribution to the CTCN as stemming from other funding sources than ODA and OOF in its CTF table. In its BR, it is specified that this sum promotes the accelerated transfer of environmentally sound technologies for low carbon and climate resilient development at the request of developing countries, but the funding source is not further specified. Italy reports its contribution to the Regional Environmental Centre as OOF funds in its MMR report. Latvia reports its contribution to the GCF under ‘other funding sources’ in its MMR report and BR. This is not further explained. Luxembourg reports its contribution to the GCF as OOF in its MMR report and in its BR.
Sector information	19 MS (BE, DK, EE, FI, FR, GR, HU, IE, IT, LV, LT, LU, MT, NL, PL, SE, SI, SK, UK) report sector information for their multilateral contributions, but as these are mostly aggregate and not project-specific figures, most countries indicate “cross-cutting”, “general environmental protection” or “other multisector” in this column.

Difficulties in comparability of information reported by Member States also reduce accuracy and increase uncertainty within each report. The following table provides an assessment of the comparability of the information provided by Member States in reporting on multilateral climate finance. Some aspects for which inconsistencies in the reporting have been assessed in the previous table, do not appear in this summary if such inconsistencies are not very relevant for the comparability of data for the EU aggregation.

Table 4-4: Summary of issues identified that limited comparability related to the reporting of multilateral climate finance

Information	Comment on shortcomings
Coverage of core contributions and climate-specific finance	There are shortcomings in terms of identification of climate-relevant shares based on percentage ratios. Explications of differentiation between core and climate-specific are frequently missing. For those funds whose projects are not 100% climate relevant but where the share of climate-relevant expenditures needs to be determined, it is unclear how the reported figures were determined and specific methodological information is missing.
Coverage of multilateral funds or development banks	It is unclear whether some MS listed contributions to more funds than other MS and whether other MS also contributed to those funds but did not report on them because they did not consider them to be relevant. It is not completely comparable which multilateral funds and financial institutions of UN bodies are relevant for the reporting under the MMR and in biennial reports (e.g. related to finance provided to the UNFCCC).There are shortcomings how contributions to specific climate-related funds of multilateral institutions are reported and on how projects were treated which are not 100% climate-specific.
Imputed multilateral contributions	All but seven MS fall short on explicitly explaining their methodological approach to the calculation of imputed multilateral contributions and therefore the comparability of approaches chosen is limited. Methodological problems arise due to (1) national determination of climate-relevant shares (lack of specification and description of methodology), (2) timely OECD DAC data availability (available only after MMR submission date), (3) only partial overlap among multilateral institutions covered in the OECD DAC's reporting with those included in MMR and BR reporting (so some data have to be taken from other sources), (4) imperfect match of multilateral fund denotations between MMR, BR and OECD DAC.
Coverage of instruments reported	There seems to be no guidance which types of payments should be accounted for as a multilateral contribution; i.e. whether only grants should be considered, what kind of other payments should be reported and how membership fees to multilateral institutions should be treated.
Funding source	It is not clear what types of sources are included when other funding sources in addition to ODA and OOF are reported; this also reduces comparability.

Table 4-5 presents a factual account of inconsistencies identified between Member States´ reports under the MMR and the second biennial reports in the reporting on bilateral finance grouped into thematic areas.

Table 4-5: Qualitative comparison of MS reporting under the MMR and in second biennial reports for bilateral finance

Information	**Inconsistency found?** Yes/ No	**Comments (examples of inconsistency)**
Coverage of funding sources	Yes	Austria refers to OOF in the textual part of the MMR, but does not include it in the table nor in the BR; Italy refers to "Other" in the MMR, but not in BR; Germany refers to OOF in MMR, but not in BR.
Definition of funding sources	No	Only France and Belgium include definitions. Belgium does so only in the BR.
Point of measurement	Yes	Belgium refers to commitments in the textual part, but only includes provided in the table; France refers to disbursements in the BR, but not in the MMR. Germany refers that only commitments are reported, but includes some "as provided" in the tables (e.g. when funds are channelled via a regional fund); Spain does not refer to commitments in the MMR, but does so in the BR (in relation to export credits).
Definition of point of measurement	No	Only France, Spain and Sweden included such definitions. The later only in the BR, not in the MMR.
Coverage of instruments reported	Yes	Austria refers to several instruments in the BR, but only to grants in the MMR. Finland refers to (concessional) loan in the MMR and to other (interest subsidy) in the BR.
Definition of instrument	Yes	Only Finland provided definitions for all instruments, but only in the MMR. Spain provided definitions of export credits only in its BR.
Identification of adaptation/mitigation activities	No	All MS, except the UK, used OECD DAC guidance. France and Belgium have some additional national (or regional) approaches, which tend to complement in a compatible manner the OECD DAC Rio Markers. While the UK refers to the Rio Markers in the BR, the approached used is the national methodology described in the MMR report.
Recipient Definition	No	Only Austria, France, Ireland and Sweden define recipients. Consistently in both reports.
Quantification of climate-specific	No	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden describe their respective methodology to quantify climate support, through the definition

Information	**Inconsistency found?** Yes/ No	Comments (examples of inconsistency)
		of coefficients applied to the Rio Markers. While there are no inconsistencies between MS reports, the approaches used by the different MS vary quite significantly. The remaining MS do not describe their respective approach to quantifying climate support.
Valorisation of instrument	No	Only Austria and Germany make a reference to valorisation of instrument and only in the MMR.
Currency exchange rates	No	At least one MS does not present figures in US$. The reporting on the exchange rate used is consistent in the MMR and the BR.
Format of data	No	All MS present data at activity level; yet Luxembourg presents parts of its data in an aggregated way according to types of recipient countries and groups, yet providing details on the different projects included in their BR.
Report on Technology Transfer (TT)	Yes	There are several inconsistencies. Most MS report on TT in the BR, but not in the MMR. MS who report on TT in the BR but not in the MMR: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Poland, and Portugal. MS who report on TT in the MMR but not in the BR: Czech Republic, Luxembourg.
Report on Capacity Building (CB)	Yes	There are several inconsistencies. Most MS report on CB in the BR, but not in the MMR. MS who report on CB in the BR but not in the MMR: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy and Portugal. MS who report on CB in the MMR but not in the BR: Czech Republic, Luxemburg,
Report on private climate finance	No	Finland reports on private finance in the BR, but not in the MMR.

The following table provides an assessment of the comparability of the information provided by Member States in reporting on bilateral climate finance.

Table 4-6: Summary table of issues identified related to the reporting of bilateral climate finance that limit comparability of climate finance information

Information type	Issues identified
Point of measurement	Most MS report either commitment or disbursement; some, a combination of both. Most MS report that, except in cases of *force majeure* commitments will be equal to disbursements. The only difference between the two is the moment in which the recipient country benefits from the support. As long as MS who report both commitments and disbursements do not report the same amount as a commitment and later on as disbursement, there should be no problem in relation to comparability of data.
Coverage of instruments reported	Some MS report on loans, without distinguishing between concessional and non-concessional. Mostly no explanations or definitions are provided for other instruments reported apart from grants and loans.
Identification of adaptation/mitigation activities	While all MS use the same method, the OECD DAC Rio Markers, the discretion in its application is a major source of uncertainty in the support reported.
Recipient Definition	Member States use different definitions for recipient countries: • OECD DAC list of ODA recipients (this list includes some Annex I countries (Turkey, Ukraine, Belarus) and does not include all non-Annex I countries) • Non-Annex I countries (includes all countries for which the reporting guidelines requests support provided be reported on; includes some countries which are not eligible to receive ODA as per the OECD DAC list of ODA recipients) Some MS use the OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries and exclude Annex I Parties that are included in this list.
Quantification of climate-specific	As for the case of identification of climate support using the Rio Markers, the use of coefficients to quantify such support brings great uncertainty into the figures reported. In addition to the discretion in determining the coefficient to apply, MS are actually using many different coefficients to quantify the same thing (in particular to quantify activities marked as significant). Furthermore, the different approaches (including lack thereof) to avoid double counting exacerbate such problems.
Currency exchange rates	The use of different exchange rates can hinder comparability of data; sometimes the exchange rate is not clearly indicated.
Report on TT Report on CB	The report on TT and CB is rather qualitative and the information is collected mostly on a case study basis. No MS quantified the TT and CB support.
Report on private climate finance	As for TT and CB, there is very little information on private climate finance being reported and MS that do so, do it on an exploratory, preliminary

Information type	Issues identified
	basis. However, the different instruments that can be used to mobilize private finance and the many different approaches that can be used to estimate the amount of private finance actually mobilized (leveraged) will certainly become an issue when in the future more information is available.

4.4. Summary of quantitative comparison of Member States´ reports

This section summarizes the findings related to the quantitative comparison of the data provided in the MMR reports and the second biennial reports. Data from the analysis are presented in Annex III, IV and V (sections 9.3, 9.4 and 9.5). Comments and clarifications received from Member States after presenting and sharing the results of a former version of this synthesis report are incorporated in this analysis.

- Only four Member States reported completely consistent data in both reports (Croatia, Greece, Lithuania, Portugal)
- For 13 Member States data is largely consistent, but they reported changes in individual categories or aspects (Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and UK)
- For six Member States many data categories are different in both reports, however the impact on the total reported climate finance is relatively small (Denmark, Estonia, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Sweden)
- For four Member States many data categories are different in both reports and the total reported climate finance is substantially different (Austria, Czech Republic, Italy, Netherlands).
- Bulgaria and Cyprus could not be compared as one of the reports was missing or contained empty tables.

In particular for those Member States with many differences it is recommended to clarify the reasons for the changes. For Italy the figures reported in the second biennial report are very unclear (e.g. due to the reporting of amounts in € and in US$ which do not match with currency conversion rates).

Differences in financial values reported by all other Member States largely depend on one or more of the points below:

- Figures are largely consistent but countries swapped the reported figures within ´climate-specific´ subcategories but the total amounts remain the same (e.g. Poland, Belgium, France and Latvia);
- Bilateral contributions are consistent but multilateral contributions are inconsistent (e.g. Austria);
- Different reporting of ´core/general´ (e.g. Austria, Finland);
- Currency conversion rate is used for values but not for sums (e.g. Sweden)

- Rounding issues (e.g. Netherlands, Denmark);
- Reporting mistakes or errors in e.g.
  - In biennial reports there are errors in the reported units for several Member States and the reported figures are too low and a factor of thousand or a million has to be applied to achieve the correct order of magnitude compared to the MMR report or the previous biennial report (e.g. Denmark, Italy, United Kingdom). This may also arise from the CTF reporter software where countries should be able to change the unit reported.
  - Figures were not transferred from table 7a to summary table 7 (e.g. Sweden);
  - Summation mistakes when disaggregate categories are summed up (e.g. Portugal and Hungary have summation mistakes in 7a);
  - Mistakes in filling in currency or currency conversion (e.g. Italy reports different values in € than in US$);
  - Reporting the same value twice or forgetting it once) (e.g. Ireland and Romania report the same number twice in one report and one time in the other).

The aggregate comparison of the quantitative information is presented in Table 4-1. Detailed comparisons of the data in both reports are provided in section 9.5 (Annex V).

5. Task 2b: Recommendations for the improvement of technical guidance under the MMR

This chapter focuses on recommendations for the improvement of the "*Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR)*" (June 2015) (European Commission 2015). This technical guidance document has been slightly updated in order to incorporate the recent changes to the reporting tables adopted at COP 21 in Paris updated for 2016. Further improvements could be incorporated in a revised technical guidance document to be used for the reporting in 2017. The recommendations in this chapter have been developed based on the analysis of Member States' reports provided under Article 16 of the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation[15] due by 30 September 2015 and the second biennial reports (BR2) under the UNFCCC due by 1st January 2016 (in particular CTF Tables 7, 7a and 7b[16]) as well as studies and analysis undertaken by other organisations and authors, in particular the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The suggested improvements should also strengthen the consistency, comparability and accuracy of the aggregate EU figures on climate finance provided by DG Climate Action on the basis of MS' reports which supports the EU's position towards its counterparts in the negotiations under the UNFCCC.

The recommendations of a first draft of a separate synthesis report were discussed at a Workshop of ECCWG-EGI on 11 March 2016 and Member States also provided written feedback to the report. Comments from Member States and OECD on the draft synthesis report were included in this section, in particular when agreement or disagreement was expressed in relation to certain proposals. Other suggestions (e.g. for clarification) were directly incorporated in the text.

Some Member States expressed more general concerns related to the reporting under the MMR: Finland, the Netherlands and Austria generally expressed the point of view that the UNFCCC and OECD reporting are the 'leading' tasks and the MMR should not go beyond the requirements under the UNFCCC or the OECD. The Netherlands proposed that climate finance data should not be reported separately at the EU level or only after final OECD/UNFCCC data is available. Several Member States expressed concerns related to the reporting deadline of 30 September under MMR. Finland proposed that any further development of the EU reporting under the MMR should only take place after the UNFCCC reporting under the Paris Agreement is finally developed.

The Netherlands made a specific proposal related to aspects which were not part of the draft synthesis report. The Netherlands noted that the technical guidance under the MMR should also address

- how to ensure that double counting is avoided in relation to climate relevant support committed through the EU budget instruments and the European Development Fund and
- how the Commission will inform MS on an annual basis about the climate relevant support committed through the EU budget instruments and the European Development Fund for Member States' national reporting purposes.

[15] OJ, L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 13: Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on a mechanism for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and for reporting other information at national and Union level relevant to climate change and repealing Decision No 280/2004/EC.

[16] Table 7: Provision of public financial support: summary information; Table 7(a): Provision of public financial support: contribution through multilateral channels; Table 7 (b): Provision of public financial support: contribution through bilateral, regional and other channels;

5.1. Format of Member States replies

The technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) requests Member States to use the UNFCCC Common Tabular Formats (CTF) as the template for the MMR reporting. It is also strongly recommended to submit the tables in Excel format.

Decision 9/CP.21 on "Methodologies for the reporting of financial information by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention" (FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.2) agreed at COP 21 in Paris implements a number of changes to the UNFCCC CTF. These changes include:

(a) Creating reporting fields for the provision of information on definitions or methodologies used for reporting information in the following reporting parameters: "climate-specific" or "core/general", "status", "funding source", "activity", "financial instrument", "type of support" and "sector";

(b) extending the number of input rows in the Microsoft Excel file for tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b);

(c) Aligning the categorization in the reporting parameter "status" of support ("pledged", "committed" and "provided") in tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b) of the common tabular format with the categorization used in other existing international methodologies ("committed" and "disbursed");

Proposal for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

The same changes as agreed in decision 9/CP.21 for the CTF should be applied to the reporting tables used for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR.

Seven Member States (AT, BE, DE, FI, PL, SE, UK) commented on this proposal, and all Member States agreed with it.

5.2. Template for methodological information

The technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) requests a descriptive section, preferably in a separate document. It should provide the technical description of the data, including key definitions and methodology. Narratives, such as justifications for climate finance should be avoided.

The addition of a reporting field for methodological information to the Excel tables as part of the UNFCCC (decision 9/CP.21) requires some modification of this guidance as some additional methodological explanations should be provided as part of the Excel table for the specific parameters "climate-specific" or "core/general", "status", "funding source", "activity", "financial instrument", "type of support" and "sector".

The current reporting of methodological information is rather inconsistent and incomplete. This also impacts comparability because it is sometimes unclear which approaches were used by Member States. A more systematic reporting of methodological information by all Member States would improve the comparability of the information.

Proposal for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

Option 1:

It is proposed to develop a template for the methodological information to be integrated in the technical guidance under the MMR (covering e.g. explanations how imputed multilateral climate-specific contributions were determined). This would facilitate a more complete reporting of methodological information. The template could include specific categories for approaches available and used by MS which can be selected. This could make the reporting more efficient and complete at the same time.

Option 2:

An alternative option for a template for methodological information would be that MS provide the template developed by the OECD joint ENVIRONET-WP-STAT Task Team on the methodological approaches for reporting also to the European Commission as part of the MMR reporting. This option would avoid filling another template. However, the template is rather detailed and requires a larger amount of descriptions than the approach suggested under option 1.

Eight Member States (AT, BE, DE, MT, NE, PL, SE, UK) commented on this proposal. Four Member States (DE, MT, NE, UK) agreed with option 1. One Member State (PL) supported option 1 by stating an “additional template aligned with OECD and not beyond BR requirements”. Two Member States (AT, SE) agreed with option 2. One Member State (BE) suggested that further discussion is needed on a template for methodological information.

5.3. Coverage of core contributions and climate-specific finance for multilateral climate finance

The technical guidance under the MMR already specifies that if core/general contributions are reported, core/general and climate-specific data should be mutually exclusive and that funds should be reported in only one of the categories. This is however not always implemented.

In exceptional cases, it might be necessary to report core/general and climate-specific contributions to the same bank or fund because the climate-specific contributions are made to specific sub-funds or dedicated programmes of the overarching institutions. In this case, it should be explained how core and climate-specific contributions have been differentiated. It should also be clearly indicated to which sub-funds or programmes the climate-specific contributions are paid to. This specific situation could be added to the technical guidance.

Contributions to those MDBs and multilateral institutions whose financial disbursements are not 100% climate relevant should be reported as core contributions. Climate-relevant shares of those payments will then be determined in a consistent manner for all Member States by the Commission using the imputed multilateral contributions provided by OECD in order to produce a figure for aggregate EU climate finance.

If core contributions are reported in the columns ‘other’ multilateral funds/multilateral financial institutions/specialised UN bodies, it should be specified to which funds beyond those indicated in the template these payments are made.

If core and climate-specific contributions are reported for the same institution, it should be explained how the figures have been determined (i.e. whether they relate to payments that are considered to be 100% climate relevant or whether they represent imputed multilateral contributions and how the imputed share has been determined, see chapter3.3.1) and how the

different categories of multilateral climate-specific finance (i.e. mitigation, adaptation, cross-cutting, other) have been determined. These options could be integrated in the methodological template proposed in section 0.

For OECD DAC members, it should be explained for contributions to banks or institutions not covered by OECD reporting how the climate-relevant share of these institutions' financial disbursements have been determined. For other countries, it is recommended to explain the calculation of climate-relevant shares in the methodological description for all funds reported.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

Add the following elements to the guidance related to core/ general vs climate-specific multilateral channels (text in bold is added):

1. If core/general contributions are reported, core/general and climate-specific data should be mutually exclusive **except in such cases where climate-specific contributions are made to specific sub-funds or dedicated programmes of the overarching institutions to which also core funding is provided. In this case, the core funding should be reported as well as climate specific funding and it should be explained how core and climate-specific contributions have been differentiated. It should also be clearly indicated to which sub-funds or programmes the climate-specific contributions are paid to.**

2. Climate specific concerns contributions to multilateral climate funds and dedicated programmes managed by multilateral institutions. Please report contributions to such funds and programmes (LDCF, SCCF, AF, GCF, UNFCCC, CIFs, FCPF, etc.) as climate specific only. **This also applies to those contributions reported under 'other multilateral climate change funds'.**

3. Any multilateral fund, financial institution or UN body reported under 'other' should be clearly indicated with its name.

4. If Member States use OECD imputed multilateral contributions to derive climate-specific finance for multilateral financial institutions or banks, this should be indicated in the methodological information provided (add in template suggested under 0).

5. Member States should only report climate-specific finance through bilateral, regional and other channels, and should not report core/ general bilateral or regional finance.

Proposal for revised recommendation for item 5:

5. Member States should only report climate-specific finance through bilateral, regional and other channels, if the recipient organisation is not listed on the DAC list of ODA eligible organisations.

Eight Member States (AT, BE, DE, FR, NE, PL, SE, UK) and the OECD commented on this proposal. Six Member States (AT, BE, DE, FR, PL, UK) agree with the recommendations. Poland agreed except with the 5th recommendation. The OECD explained that in the DAC statistics a "core" contribution is reportable as "bilateral" if the recipient organisation is not listed on the DAC list of ODA eligible organisations. Therefore the 5th recommendation would not be consistent with the DAC reporting system. This information was not available to the project team before and we believe that it is important to maintain consistency with the OECD DAC system and therefore the recommendation for item 5 was revised. Sweden did not support this proposal because Sweden

believes that countries should move towards developing systems where core support can be included – as all donors should work more towards aid effectiveness (Paris/Accra principles) and the reporting should not dis-incentivize core support. However, this disagreement may also be particularly related to the 5th recommendation.

5.4. Coverage of multilateral funds or development banks

Contributions to the World Bank should be reported as core contributions. It is recommended to specify contributions to the IBRD and to IDA as well as to other sub-funds or World Bank programmes separately as the climate-relevant share of each institution's funding will be different.

For other multilateral institutions, contributions to sub-funds should also be reported separately where possible (e.g. to the African Development Bank and to the African Development Fund). Otherwise, it should be explained in the methodological description which funds and programmes are included in an aggregated contribution.

Membership fees to UN institutions like the UNFCCC should neither be reported as climate-specific nor as core finance because they are not disbursed as climate finance to developing countries. This also includes the payments related to the operation use of the international transaction log for which it is difficult to justify that this is finance provided to developing countries. The UNFCCC reporting guidelines include only the UNFCCC trust fund for supplementary activities in the CTF template and this limitation seems justified. The trust fund mostly covers the participation of developing country experts in workshops and meetings scheduled as part of the UNFCCC work programme and to some extent also training and capacity building activities programmes for developing country Parties.

Similar considerations apply to the financial flows paid to the Montreal Protocol where general contributions to the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund or to the Montreal Protocol Trust Fund are reported. It should be discussed which of the Montreal Protocol flows can be regarded as climate finance provided to developing countries and whether these flows are reported under climate change funds or UN bodies.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

1. Related to the funds and programmes whose contributions are considered as climate-specific in the technical guidance, the provision of finance to the UNFCCC should be clarified and **only contributions to the UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities should be reported as climate-specific**.

2. It should be discussed which financial flows provided related to the Montreal Protocol (Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund and the Montreal Protocol Trust Fund / Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol) qualify for the reporting under the MMR and in biennial reports and amend the reporting tables under the MMR based on this discussion. It should also be discussed and decided whether financial flows to the Montreal Protocol should be reported under climate change funds or UN bodies.

3. From the list of other multilateral climate change funds, multilateral institutions and other specialized UN bodies reported by MS, the most frequent ones that are reported by more than three MS should be added as additional rows in the reporting template. This proposal would add the following funds / institutions / UN Bodies and it should be discussed whether these belong to multilateral funds, institutions or UN bodies:

FAO, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), UNCCD, UNICEF, WFP (United Nations World Food Programme), UN REDD (United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation)

Seven Member States (AT, BE, DE, FR, PL, SE, UK) and the OECD commented on this proposal. Three Member States (DE, SE, UK) generally agree with the proposals, one of these (UK) with a comment. Two Member States (BE, DE) agree and two (AT, PL) disagree with the first proposal. Four Member States (AT, BE, FR, PL) disagree with the second proposal and one of these (BE) states that discussion would be needed on this proposal. Four Member States (AT, BE, DE, PL) agree with the 3rd proposal. One Member State (FR) disagrees with reporting Montreal Protocol finance flows but indicates that future HFC amendment will contain elements on if/how to count part of the flows as climate finance.

The OECD commented that it is important to have clarity on which contributions are reported as bilateral to avoid double counting, and also ensure comparability across countries' reporting. The distinction between earmarked and non-earmarked is important. In DAC statistics, there is a clear demarcation between organizations considered "multilateral" and listed on the DAC list of ODA-eligible organizations and others not listed for which core contributions are classified as bilateral (e.g. Trust Funds such as WB Forest Carbon Partnership). If there is no such a demarcation in the reporting system, some countries may report a core contribution to an organization as bilateral and some countries as multilateral. If the distinction between bilateral and multilateral is not clear, there can be double-counting between countries' bilateral reporting and multilateral organizations' reporting on their outflows.

This leads to the conclusion that the technical guidance under the MMR should refer more specifically to the OECD DAC list of ODA-eligible organizations and how organization on this list and not on this list should be treated in the reporting.

5.5. Reporting on financial instruments

The technical guidance already requests an explanation of the methodology used when loans or other financial instruments are reported and to specify what is included in the 'other' category. Thus, the guidance already addresses shortcomings identified.

Two Member States (BE, PL) commented and both agreed with this proposal.

5.6. Definition of recipient countries

MS should be required to report on the definition of recipient countries and state whether this definition includes countries which are included in Annex I. In such a case, MS should be required to report whether support provided to Annex I Parties is included in the totals.

The MMR technical guidance could include key options for the definitions of recipient countries. The options currently used are:

1. OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries
2. OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries excluding Annex I Parties from this list.
3. Non-Annex I Parties

As explained in OECD 2015a the OECD DAC eligible recipients include nine countries which are not part of Non-Annex I Parties. These are Belarus, Kosovo, Montserrat, Saint Helena, Tokelau, Turkey, Ukraine, Wallis and Futuna and West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In contrast, Non-Annex I Parties include some relatively wealthy countries, such as Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, United Arab Emirates and some small countries.

While few information was provided about the recipient countries in the methodological information under the MMR or as part of second BRs, according to OECD (2015b) a larger number of Member States define their recipient countries based on the OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries (AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, GR, IE, IT, LU, NE, PL, PT, SK, SI, UK).

Thus the technical guidance document under the MMR could also be amended by recommending using the OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries as this seems to be the common approach deducting at least those countries that are Annex I countries (Ukraine, Belarus, Turkey) for the reporting under the UNFCCC.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

Recommending using the OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries as the basis for recipient countries for bilateral support and deduct those countries that are Annex I countries (Ukraine, Belarus, Turkey) for the reporting under the UNFCCC.

Six Member States (AT, BE, DE, FR, PL, SE) commented on this proposal, three of them (BE, FR, SE) agreed with it and two (AT, PL) disagreed. Those that disagreed suggested to align it with the OECD DAC eligibility list and to not deduct Annex-I countries. One Member State (DE) highlighted that the deduction of Annex I parties at UNFCCC would make MMR and BR reports different in this respect.

5.7. Point of measurement

The point of measurement has been adopted for the UNFCCC CTF in the recent decision 9/CP.21 by revising the categories which include only ‘committed’ and ‘disbursed’ – consistent with the international OECD DAC methodology and the categories ‘pledged’ and ‘provided’ were deleted. This revised guidance should also be applied under the MMR.

MS who report both on commitment and disbursement should explain how they ensure that there is no double counting (that the same support is not reported as a commitment and, later on, as disbursement).

While in general, there are no substantial problems with the point of measurement, it may be useful to define or explain the use of committed and disbursed related to specific instruments, such as loans, export credits or guarantees. For grants, the difference between commitment and disbursement is normally small, but for countries reporting multi-year loans, there can be considerable differences between the amount committed and disbursed in a specific year. A big difference between committed and disbursed can also occur for export credits or guarantees which may actually never be disbursed.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

Discuss whether further guidance for the use of 'committed' and 'disbursed' for loans, export credits or guarantees should be provided as part of the MMR technical guidance document. It could be that the ongoing discussions in OECD DAC already clarify this aspect without the need for additional guidance under the MMR.

Seven Member States (AT, BE, DE, FR, PL, SE, UK) commented on this proposal, four of them (AT, FR, PL, UK) agreed, some with further comments. AT expressed that no further guidance is needed. Germany mentioned that they measure at commitment level for both and that this is different in ODA reporting. UK added that the OECD DAC high level meeting in February 2016 agreed proposals on the treatment of private sector instruments that could have relevance to MMR reporting. However, much of the technical detail on the new ODA rules is yet to be finalised. France and Sweden confirmed that they use OECD definitions. Belgium generally supported the proposal, but also expressed the need for further discussion.

5.8. Coverage of funding sources

All MS have reported on ODA and only some have reported OOF (Other Official Flows which are generally defined as official sector transactions that do not meet official ODA criteria). MS should be encouraged to enhance coverage of funding sources and asked to explain when a funding source is not included, e.g. MS should explain whether not reporting on OOF is due to no climate support having been provided via OOF or whether it's due to the fact that a MS has not tracked climate relevant OOF.

MS should be required to provide a definition for OOF and should be strictly required to do so if "Other" source of funding is reported. This is currently not yet required in the technical guidance under the MMR.

The technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation could propose definitions of the funding sources that MS could directly use. If the proposed definition differs from the definition used by the MS, it should then provide its national definition or any additional details to the proposed definition.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

Add the following to the technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation:

1. Member States should use the definitions for OOF as provided by the OECD DAC (OECD 2016a). If the national definition used differs from the OECD DAC definition, additional explanations should be provided as part of the methodological information.[17]

2. If OOF flows are reported, MS shall explain as part of the methodological information which flows are covered under OOF.

[17] OOF include grants to developing countries for representational or essentially commercial purposes; official bilateral transactions intended to promote development, but having a grant element of less than 25%; and, official bilateral transactions, whatever their grant element, that are primarily export-facilitating in purpose. This category includes official direct export credits; the net acquisition by governments and central monetary institutions of securities issued by multilateral development banks at market terms; subsidies (grants) to the private sector to soften its credits to developing countries; and, funds in support of private investment (OECD 2016a)

3. If no OOF are reported, MS should indicate in the methodological template whether OOF flows do not occur (tick notation key 'not occurring' or whether OOF flows were not tracked and estimated, but do occur (tick notation key 'not estimated').

Six Member States (AT, BE, DE, PL, SE, UK) commented on this proposal. All but one (DE) agreed. The disagreeing Member State (DE) suggests that no change is required.

5.9. Coverage of instruments reported

Taking into account decision 9/CP.21, MS are now required to provide definitions of the instruments used. The technical guidance under the MMR could include default definitions for the instruments that MS could use directly in their reporting. If the definition used by the MS differs from these default definitions, the MS should be required to provide national definitions.

The technical guidance under the MMR requests Member States to explain which instruments are reported under 'other instruments' (e.g. export credits, guarantees). In addition, MS could be encouraged to explain whether not reporting on a given type of instrument (from the list included in the UNFCCC guidelines / CTF tables) is due to the fact that no climate relevant support has been provided through such instruments or because the MS is not tracking it.

All MS including loans (concessional or non-concessional) should be required to report whether repayments upon maturity of such loans are tracked and are part of the reporting.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

The technical guidance document under the MMR should be amended in the following way:

1. Include references to OECD DAC definitions for financial instruments including a list of instruments that could be reported under 'other'. In a methodological template MS under the MMR could tick off when OECD DAC definitions are used. Additional explanations should be required when different definitions are used.

2. If 'other instruments' are reported, MS shall explain as part of the methodological information which instruments are covered.

3. If no 'other instruments' are reported, MS should indicate in the methodological template whether such instruments do not occur (tick notation key 'not occurring') or whether 'other instruments' were not tracked and estimated, but do occur (tick notation key 'not estimated').

Six Member States (AT, BE, DE, PL, SE, UK) and the OECD commented and all agreed with this proposal. The OECD added that "a new taxonomy of financial instruments has been introduced in DAC statistics starting with 2016 data".

5.10. Currency conversion rate

The technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) requests that the default should be to report in EUR and the national currency. MS should indicate clearly if a different approach has been used and explain the reasons. When applicable, the source of the exchange rate and the exchange rate itself should be explicitly indicated. UNFCCC reporting tables do not include a clear reporting field for the exchange rates. It is recommended to insert a numeric field in the Excel

tables used under the MMR where the exchange rate should be provided. This assists the reporting and aggregation and is simpler than extracting the conversion rates from any supplementary methodological document.

As most MS use the OECD yearly average exchange rate, a link to this source could be included in the technical guidance document under the MMR.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

The technical guidance document under the MMR should be amended in the following way:

1. Add a specific field in the MMR table template for the reporting of the currency conversion rate used.

2. Add a recommendation to use the OECD yearly average exchange rate and provide a link to this source.

Seven Member States (AT, BE, DE, FR, PL, SE, UK) commented and all agreed with this proposal.

5.11. Financial resources mobilized through public interventions

Paragraph 57 of the Agreement adopted in Paris (decision 1/CP.21) requests the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to develop modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Agreement for consideration by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fourth session (November 2018). The current reporting only refers to financial resources provided, not to financial resources mobilized through public interventions. However, some Member States already provide information on financial resources mobilized in their second biennial reports under the UNFCCC and also provide methodological information related to finance mobilized.

It is proposed to add a reporting field for financial resources mobilized through public interventions as well as a field for explanations on the methodologies applied for the reporting under the MMR starting from 2016 in order to gain experiences with this new requirement at EU level to support the development of an international reporting requirement until the end of 2018 under the UNFCCC. After the adoption of any revised reporting guidance under the UNFCCC, the reporting tables under the MMR should be adapted to ensure consistency between the EU format and the UNFCCC format.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

The technical guidance document under the MMR should be amended in the following way:

1. Add a field for numerical data in the reporting tables where MS can report financial resources mobilized through public interventions.

2. Add a requirement that MS who report such figures should provide methodological information how mobilized resources were estimated.

Seven Member States (AT, BE, DE, FR, PL, SE, UK) and the OECD commented on this proposal. One Member State (BE) stated that a discussion would be needed on this point, all others agree with the proposal. The OECD added that it would be important to obtain methodological

information from those MS reporting on mobilized resources and that one of the key aspects of DAC methods to measure mobilisation is related to the “attribution” of amounts mobilised to avoid double-counting: The attribution is determined based on common rules that all reporters follow for the sake of comparability.”

5.12. Coverage of cross-cutting and other climate-specific finance

It should be further discussed how the **category ‘cross-cutting’ climate-specific finance** should be used. In the CTF for the biennial reports it is explained that cross-cutting should be used for ‘funding for activities which are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation’. However, with the Rio Marker system, some countries assign a certain quantitative contribution to both adaptation and mitigation and hence allocate activities that have mitigation and adaptation components under the individual categories. As explained above, some Member States apply their own definitions to the category ‘cross-cutting’. The share of total climate-specific finance which is reported as cross-cutting varies largely across Member States. This complicates the data aggregation at EU level.

Some Member States use the category **‘other’** for the reporting of activities related to REDD+ / forestry activities. The category ‘other’ is generally not very frequently used and it is recommended that the guidance is amended in a way, that Member States could report forestry related activities under ‘other’, if they intend to report these activities separately. Given the high importance of REDD+ project activities for some countries, it may be useful to enable a separate reporting which captures these activities in a transparent way apart from the sectoral classification requested in the reporting tables.

Member States should be encouraged to report whether activities marked as “other” refer only to activities relevant to climate change and one or more of the other Rio Conventions (and in that case any of the steps proposed above would provide clarity on how these activities are addressed) or whether activities marked as “other” refer to any other situation. In this case, the MS should be encouraged to explain what the situation is and how the quantification of the support has been estimated. If the volume of support provided marked as “other” is significant, the proposal above should become a requirement.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

Option 1a: Keep the current guidance: cross-cutting multilateral finance should be used for ‘funding for activities which are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation’.

Option 1b: cross-cutting should be used for ‘funding for activities which are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation’ **only if countries cannot assign a contribution to adaptation and mitigation through the use of Rio markers.**

Option 2: Add the following element to the technical guidance note: **Countries who like to separate finance flows provided to REDD+ activities or forestry activities should report such flows under ‘other climate-specific finance’.**

Seven Member States (AT, BE, DE, NE, PL, SE, UK) and the OECD commented on this proposal. Two Member States (PL, SE) agree with all three options. Option 1a was additionally supported by one Member State (AT) and opposed by two Member States (NE, UK). Option 1b was additionally supported by one Member State (NE) and opposed by one Member State (UK); this Member State (UK) could agree with an amended option 1b “cross-cutting should be used for ‘funding for activities which are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation’ only if countries cannot assign a contribution to adaptation and mitigation through the use of Rio markers or a transparent national methodology". Option 2 is additionally supported by two Member States (NE, UK).

The OECD comments that it is "important to understand if the cross-cutting amounts are to be added or subtracted from the mitigation and adaptation amounts".

5.13. Identification of mitigation/adaptation activities and use of OECD DAC indicators

Most Member States use OECD DAC Rio Markers for the identification of mitigation and adaptation activities. The few MS that use a national approach should be encouraged to transition to the OECD DAC Rio Markers in order to enhance transparency and comparability.

The technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support under the MMR already requires Member States to specify and explain any difference from the OECD DAC or the Commission methodology. This recommendation may be emphasised and Member States should be required to provide a detailed description of the national methodology used and, ideally, an explanation of how it more accurately tracks climate relevant support provided to developing countries.

Given the level of development of the OECD DAC Rio Markers (including its recent proposed revision), no further recommendations with regards to the development of the marking methodologies are made in this report as this is subject to more detailed discussion in the respective working group under the OECD DAC. The OECD DAC is currently updating its Rio Markers guidance, taking into account inputs received form DAC members. Once such revised guidance is adopted, it should be reflected in the MMR technical guidance and Member States should be encouraged to use it as soon as practicable.

The use of coefficients for the quantification of climate support based on the Rio Markers should build on a common understanding, given the many approaches used and, on top of that, the level of discretion in their application. The only guidance so far on this topic is the description of the approach used at EU level which uses the coefficient of 0.4 (40%) in activities marked as significant. A more coordinated approach may be feasible given the fact that the reported approaches by MS are not extremely different. A transition period for the implementation of such a coordinated approach could be considered.

Furthermore, different MS use different approaches to address overlap or double counting of support provided in one activity marked with more than one marker (either just climate or with climate and any of the other Rio Conventions). While the approach above addresses double counting of support provided for adaptation and mitigation, it does not address overlap with markings related to other Rio Conventions. In that case and/or in the absence of a common approach in the application of coefficients, several steps can be considered to enhance accuracy and comparability of figures reported by MS:

1. MS to be required to describe the methodology used to address overlapping /double counting between Rio Conventions
2. MS to select methodology to address overlap / double counting between Rio Conventions from a list of methodologies in the MMR technical guidance

3. MS to be required to use on single methodology to address overlap / double counting between Rio Conventions included in the technical guidance (e.g. the sum of the coefficients for the three Rio Conventions never exceeds 100 %)

The third option would provide for higher accuracy and comparability of figures.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

Discuss whether it is possible to develop a common approach or at least apply some elements of the marking system in a consistent way.

As expected, Member States had quite different views related to further guidance that ensure a consistent use of the OECD marker system.

Three Member States (DE, FR, SE) and the OECD have commented on this proposal. Germany highlighted that the OECD indicative table, which provides further guidance could potentially be useful under the MMR as well. UK also expressed general concerns related to a common approach on coefficients and explained that the UK's national approach related to its dedicated climate finance fund ICF allows programmes that do not have climate as a 'principal' focus but do have 'significant' climate objectives to justifiably count a percentage of the programme as climate finance. This requires programmes to estimate, based on actual costs and evidence, the funds required to deliver climate results. UK considers this approach as a more robust way of counting climate finance.

In relation to **the use of coefficients for the determination of Rio Markers**, it is recommended that the level of comparability of MS is enhanced. It is recommended to discuss whether a common approach could be used with the aim to limit the discretion in the marking process and the resulting lack of comparability. The following options are proposed:

- An activity marked as principal: 100%
    - Option1: An activity marked as principal for adaptation and mitigation: each activity accounts with 50%
    - Option 2: An activity can only be marked as principal for either adaptation or mitigation.

Three Member States (DE, NE, SE) commented on this proposal, two of them (NE, SE) agreed with option 1 and disagreed with option 2. Germany describes their approach and explained that option 1 would not be allowed in the German approach implemented.

- An activity marked as significant:
    - Option 1: the activity counts with 40%
    - Option 2: the activity counts with 50%
- An activity marked as significant for adaptation and mitigation:
    - Option 1: If significant = 40%, the activity counts with 20% for adaptation and with 20% for mitigation
- Option 2: If significant = 50%, the activity counts with 25% for adaptation and with 20% for mitigation

Three Member States (DE, NE, SE) commented on this proposal, two of them (NE, SE) agreed with option 1, for Sweden option 2 would also be acceptable. The Netherlands disagreed with option 2. One Member State (DE) opposed the proposal and described the German approach chosen.

- To avoid double counting, the sum of coefficients for each marker should never exceed 100%. Any activity can only count as 100%, 40% (option 1), 50% (option 2) or 0%.
- In case of option 1 (40%): If an activity is marked for both mitigation and adaptation, only the highest marking will count when calculating the total climate relevant financial contributing of the activity.

France mentioned that they are not in favor of using coefficients imposed on Member States, but rather that each Member State should be encouraged and able to be as precise as possible and therefore able to apply the percentage rate it deems appropriate, while remaining transparent on how it chooses the percentage rate.

One Member State (PL) suggests that a more specific approach must first be agreed under the OECD DAC.

The OECD added that "In OECD DAC, the possibility to identify, through Rio markers, activities addressing both mitigation and adaptation is considered a strength, and attributing the related amounts to either mitigation or adaptation, using fixed percentages seems artificial. OECD suggested considering the overlap as a category on its own. The total for climate-related finance is then the sum of "mitigation (only)", "adaptation (only)" and the "overlap (both mitigation and adaptation)". The same approach could be applied to activities overlapping several Rio Conventions.

As the implementation of the Rio Markers are not reported by all MS, it is difficult to judge the administrative burden and changes in the reported financial flows from the options proposed above. The main changes would arise if common guidance would be adopted for the 'significant' marking.

In relation to **double counting between Rio Conventions** in the application of Rio Markers, the technical guidance document could be amended by the following options:

Option 1: MS should be required to describe the methodology used to address overlapping / double counting between Rio Conventions.

Option 2: MS should select methodology to address overlap / double counting between Rio Conventions from a list of methodologies in the MMR technical guidance.

Option 3: MS should be required to use one single methodology to address overlap / double counting between Rio Conventions included in the technical guidance (e.g. the sum of the coefficients for the three Rio Conventions never exceeds 100%).

The third option would provide for higher accuracy and comparability of figures, but may require changes of existing approaches used for some MS and higher administrative burden and will lead to differences in the reported figures for some MS.

Option 2 may be the approach with lowest administrative burden for MS and higher comparability in the description of the methodological approach compared to option 1.

On double counting across Rio Conventions, four Member States (BE, DE, FR, SE) commented on this proposal. Two Member States (DE, SE) agreed with option 1 and 2 and disagreed with option 3, arguing that double counting should not be avoided but transparently communicated.

One Member State (AT) is of the view that the discussion of coefficients and double-counting between Rio Conventions belong to OECD DAC and this discussion should not be preempted by technical guidance under MMR.

5.14. Calculating EU total climate finance/ imputed multilateral contributions

It is crucial to ensure transparency in reporting on imputed multilateral contributions to MDBs. The current technical guidance document proposes the following approach:

> *"Several MDBs provide estimates concerning the climate-related share within their portfolio, and attribute this back to DAC members, based on a pro-rata share of their core multilateral ODA disbursements in a given year. The European Commission will, if available on time, obtain the figures from OECD on imputed multilateral contributions in core/general finance, and add these values to the amount reported under the MMR. If the figures are not available on time before the ECOFIN Council Conclusions, they will not be included in this year's report. Notwithstanding, Member States still have the option to report their national figures; in the absence of a common approach as described above, these figures may be used in the aggregate EU report subject to methodological feasibility".*

This approach turned out to be difficult because final data from the OECD DAC was not available on time in order to use them to aggregate Member States' contributions to an aggregate figure on total EU climate finance. Moreover, the MDBs covered in the OECD DAC's reporting and those listed in the EU's CTF and MMR tables do not entirely overlap. The following options for reporting imputed multilateral contributions and including them into aggregate EU climate finance figures are available:

Option 1: Base reporting on climate-related projects identified in outflows from MDBs. Outflows refer to those financial resources financed out of MDB own resources[18] which are actually disbursed to recipient countries.

Climate-related development finance data is reported by MDBs as part of their overall reporting into the OECD-CRS or in a stand-alone file only listing climate projects. Such an approach would entail new methodological challenges as MDBs do not all report in the same way on projects that target both mitigation and adaptation (i.e. their approaches to using the Rio Markers and determining the "overlap" between mitigation and adaptation-relevant finance differs). Additionally, the point of measurement (commitment or board approval) also varies among institutions. MDB reporting also includes in some instances the reporting of guarantees which are at present excluded from the regular data collection of the DAC (OECD 2015c). Yet, basing reporting on outflows from MDBs could help to enhance comparability in reporting among Member States.

The OECD DAC recommends a methodology developed by the Technical Working Group of 19 bilateral climate finance providers to attribute multilateral outflows to developed countries in its

[18] Besides contributions from developed and developing countries, additional financing is mobilised by the MDBs drawing in on retained earnings and leveraging money from global capital markets on the basis of their capital, which is typically composed of „paid-in", and „callable" capital as well as „reserves" built up over the years (OECD 2015c).

latest report (OECD 2015a). To attribute outflows to specific developed countries, this methodology differentiates between contributions to concessional and non-concessional windows.

Concessional climate finance disbursed by MDBs can be differentiated into those resources coming from new contributions made during the most recent replenishment process by providing countries and from retained earnings (reflows from loans and other instruments, transfers from sister organisations and interests on investments).

The part reflecting resources from new contributions is multiplied by the share of a developed country's contributions in the most recent replenishment cycle. The part reflecting retained earnings is multiplied by a developed country's share in historical replenishment rounds (i.e. all replenishments except the most recent ones). The two terms are then added together and the resulting fraction represents the developed country's share of total climate finance flows from that window or entity for the relevant year. According to OECD DAC analysis, the weighted average for the share of *all* developed countries of total MDB outflows from concessional windows is estimated at 95%.

This results in the following formula:

$$\left[\left[x\left(\frac{Developed\ \ country\ \ contribution}{All\ \ contributions}\right)^{Current}\right]+\left[y\left(\frac{Developed\ \ country\ \ contribution}{All\ \ contributions}\right)^{Historical}\right]\right]\times Annual\ \ climate\ \ finance\ \ flows$$

where x is the portion of climate finance from the concessional window or fund that derives from recent contributions, and y is the portion that comes from retained earnings.

For non-concessional finance, the proposed methodology takes into account both paid-in capital[19] of the MDB and its callable capital[20] where the sovereign credit rating of the country providing it is above a certain threshold.[21] The share of flows attributable to a developed country is then determined by calculating the value of paid-in capital plus a fraction of eligible callable capital.

The value of paid-in capital is calculated for a developed country that is a shareholder of that MDB and then subsequently for all shareholders. The ratio of these two quantities provides an estimate of the share of non-concessional MDB finance that can be attributed to the developed country in question.

For the estimates reported by the MDBs, OECD DAC assumes that a fraction of 10% of the callable capital can be attributed to countries with a sovereign credit rating of A or above. This share varies, depending on the fraction of callable capital considered and the credit rating that is applied as a threshold. According to OECD DAC analysis, the weighted average of *all* eligible developed countries' share of total MDB outflows from non-concessional windows is estimated at 78%.

[19] Paid-in capital is the amount of capital actually paid by shareholders (ODI 2015).

[20] Callable capital are the contributions due to the MDB, subject to payment as and when required to meet the bank's obligations on borrowing of funds for inclusion in its ordinary capital resources, or guarantees chargeable to such resources. This functions as protection for holders of bonds and guarantees issued by the Bank in the unlikely event that it is not able to meet its financial obligations (ODI 2015).

[21] It is assumed that only callable capital from countries that are highly rated (i.e. A or above) is effective in strengthening an MDB's stand-alone financial strength.

This results in the following formula:

$$\left[\frac{Paid\text{-}in\ capital^{developed\ country} + (highly\text{-}rated\ callable\ capital^{developed\ country} \times 0.1)}{Paid\text{-}in\ capital^{all\ countries} + (highly\text{-}rated\ callable\ capital^{all\ countries} \times 0.1}\right] \times Annual\ climate\ finance\ flows$$

The factor 0.1 represents the discount rate to be applied to the callable-capital fraction of resources in order to recognise that paid-in capital has substantially more value than callable capital. The Technical Working Group of 19 climate finance providers proposes to set this discount rate at 10% (Technical Working Group 2015).

The following graph summarises the components for calculating a country's share in the outflows from MDBs:

Figure 5-1: Attributing outflows from MDBs to individual donor countries



Furthermore, OECD DAC adjusts the total multilateral climate finance outflows as recorded in DAC statistics to reflect the exclusion of coal-related finance and the inclusion of UNFCCC non-Annex II party recipients. These statistics reflect OECD DAC analysis based on data reported by MDBs and other international organisations (the Adaptation Fund, the CIFs, the GEF and the Nordic Development Fund).

However, it would need to be clarified with the OECD DAC whether data on outflows would be available each year on time in order to use this data as input to determine an EU aggregate climate finance figure. Additionally, it would need to be clarified whether data on individual countries' contributions to concessional resources as well as on individual countries' contributions to paid-in

capital and to callable capital which is used for non-concessional outflows could be obtained in time from the OECD DAC.

The outflows from MDBs have so far not been used for the reporting of aggregate EU figures and total figures could of course be different and inconsistent with previous years' reporting. This may result in difficulties in justification of the reported figures, in particular as the methodological approach to calculate the outflows is not very easy to understand.

If an approach to base contributions to multilateral institutions on outflows was chosen, this would have to be combined with a methodology based on inflows for those funds that do not report on their climate-related outflows to the OECD DAC. This is due to the fact that OECD DAC data is limited to key funds and MDBs. Thus, for those funds data as reported by Member States in their MMR reports would be the basis.

Option 2: Continue to base reporting on <u>imputed multilateral contributions on inflows</u> to MDBs[22]. This approach does not take public financed mobilised by the MDBs into account. There are several sub-options how this approach can be implemented. These options are also presented in Figure 5-2**:**

a. **Option 2a: Member States report on climate-specific funding by using (preliminary) imputed multilateral shares as provided by OECD**. For funds not covered by OECD reporting and for Member States which are not members of the OECD DAC, national figures on imputed multilateral contributions are used. If Member States provide nationally determined imputed multilateral shares for certain funds/institutions, it is recommended to indicate the climate-relevant percentage shares for each fund/institution in the methodological description and to explain how this share has been determined. **EU aggregate climate finance is calculated based on data reported in MS reports under the MMRs only**.

b. **Option 2b: MS report only core contributions** to multilateral funds included in OECD reporting and the Commission calculates imputed multilateral contributions based on (preliminary) imputed multilateral shares as provided by the OECD. For funds not covered by OECD reporting and for Member States which are not members of the OECD DAC, national figures on imputed multilateral contributions are used. If Member States provide nationally determined imputed multilateral shares for certain funds/institutions, it is recommended to indicate the climate-relevant percentage shares for each fund/institution in the methodological description and to explain how this share has been determined. **EU aggregate climate finance is calculated based on OECD DAC data for OECD DAC member states and funds/ institutions for which OECD imputed multilateral contributions are available and MMR reports for EU MS and for those funds not covered by OECD DAC reporting.**

c. **Option 2c: MS only report climate-specific contributions to multilateral funds not included in OECD reporting unless they are not OECD DAC Member States** and explain their approach for determining climate-specific shares for these funds. **EU aggregate climate finance is calculated based on OECD DAC data**

[22] See http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/oecdmethodologyforcalculatingimputedmultilateraloda.htm for an explanation of the OECD's methodology for calculating imputed multilateral ODA.

for OECD DAC member states and MMR reports for other EU MS and for those funds not covered by OECD DAC reporting.

d. **Option 2d: MS report climate-specific contributions based on imputed multilateral shares provided by OECD or on the basis of national methodologies** and explain their approach. **EU aggregate climate finance is calculated based on data reported in MMRs only**.

e. **Option 2e:** MS report climate-specific contributions based on imputed multilateral shares provided by the OECD DAC or on the basis of national methodologies and explain their approach. EU aggregate climate finance is calculated based on OECD data for OECD DAC member states. For **other EU MS and those funds not covered by OECD DAC reporting**, **a consistent percentage rate for the climate-relevant share of contributions to these funds is developed** and applied to MS' reported figures by the Commission.

In 2015 only preliminary OECD DAC data on imputed multilateral contributions were available in October/November 2015 in order to calculate an aggregate EU climate finance figure. It is unclear whether such data might be available earlier in future years. This needs to be clarified with the OECD DAC.

The following graph summarises the options available to have a common reporting on imputed multilateral contributions:

Figure 5-2: Options for a common reporting on imputed multilateral contributions



Figure 5-2 presents different options for reporting on imputed multilateral contributions and adding reported data into an aggregate figure for EU climate finance. The options to be chosen depend on the availability of OECD DAC data. If data on MDB reporting on outflows to the OECD and individual country data on contributions to those MDBs cannot be made available to the Commission or is not available on time, reporting needs to be continued on the basis of inflows.

If reporting is done on the basis of inflows, it needs to be clarified as well whether OECD DAC data on imputed multilateral contributions would be available on time. Moreover, discrepancies have been identified between Member States' reporting to the OECD DAC on their multilateral and bilateral climate finance and the data that is reported in MMR reports and BRs. If Member States can agree to calculate an aggregate EU figure for climate finance on the basis of OECD DAC data and if this data is available on time, it could be used as a basis for reporting on contributions to a number of key funds and institutions that are covered by OECD DAC reporting.

For other funds, reporting would be based on the information provided in Member States' MMR reports. For this purpose, Member States should report further details on their approach towards calculating the climate-specific portion of contributions to these funds. On the basis of such information, it could then be evaluated whether a joint approach towards reporting on these funds could be developed by the Commission.

For those funds which are only reported by a few Member States, it is recommended to base reporting on nationally determined figures instead of developing a joint EU approach.

Table 5-1: Calculation of total EU climate finance for 2014 in Million €, with and without MMR-reported imputed multilateral contributions and with imputed multilateral contributions as calculated by OECD

Definition of EU total	Amount in Mio. €
A: EU total **with** imputed multilateral contributions as reported in MMR	13,612.12
B. EU total **without** imputed multilateral contributions as reported in MMR	12,480.10
C. Total imputed multilateral contributions **included in MMR reporting**	**1,132.03**
D. Total imputed multilateral contributions **as calculated by OECD**	**2,013.85**
E. EU total **with IMC as calculated by OECD**, **without IMC as reported in MMR (B+D)**	**14,493.95**

Note: the Figure for E. in the last line was the one used in the Council Conclusions on climate finance published on 10.11.2015

6. Task 3: Assessment of key aspects in reporting private climate finance in the EU and the broader UNFCCC context

6.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the key methodological developments in terms of tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions.

While several public and private, national and international entities are making efforts into developing methodologies for and actually tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions, the Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance (further referred to as OECD Research Collaborative) has developed a methodological proposal which compiles state of the art approaches proposed by such entities.

After such a collaborative effort by all key relevant organizations, it was deemed extemporary to analyse the individual methodologies developed by each entity, given that such effort has been made in the scope of the collaborative research and such individual methodologies have been fully taken into account in the framework proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative. In this context, and having been considered state of the art, this chapter focuses on the methodological framework proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative and in selected applications of this framework.

In addition, the chapter also notes parallel but convergent work being done by the MDBs and other development banks and institutions. Their work, however, goes beyond tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions, as it includes all co-finance, public or private, mobilized by the intervention of the MDBs and development banks. While not specific on mobilized private climate finance, the approach to tracking mobilized co-finance is relevant for the scope of this task. MDBs and other development banks and institutions have also been involved in the OECD Research Collaborative.

This chapter does not focus or include figures on private finance mobilized by public interventions, as it focuses exclusively on methodologies to that end. Private finance mobilized as reported by Member States has been included in the analysis of the previous chapters.

6.2. State of play of methodological work and discussions on private climate finance

There are several tracks of work on methodological approaches to track private climate finance, but they seem to be converging towards two greater initiatives: the OECD Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance and the Multilateral Development Bank's Joint Working Group on Tracking Climate Co-finance[23]. While the first is developing a methodology applicable to all, but focused on national public entities, the second is focused on multilateral development banks which are now outreaching to other (including national) development finance entities.

The OECD Research Collaborative, in particular, represents an important effort to identify and bring together all knowledge and experience in the field. Several studies and reports made available in the recent years have been produced as an input, a contribution to this collaborative effort. Among many others, the reports "Estimating mobilized private climate finance for developing

[23] This initiative tracks all co-financing additional to finance provided by the MDBs, public and private.

countries – a Norwegian pilot study"(Torvanger et al (2015)); "Estimating Private Climate Finance mobilise by France's Climate Interventions (Abeille et al (2015)); Pilot study of private finance mobilised by Denmark for climate action in developing countries" (Mostert, et al (2015) and the CPI report "Estimating mobilized private finance for adaptation: exploring data and methods" (Brown et al (2015)) are examples of such inputs. The three first reports describe the pilot implementation of the methodological framework proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative.

Given the magnitude of the effort ahead and the intrinsically complex and interconnected nature of private climate finance, despite the different on-going initiatives and studies, it seems apparent that there is a great coordination and sharing of effort among the promoters of such initiatives, to avoid both duplication of work and gaps.

From the literature, it is possible to identify collaborative work among the following key actors:

- OECD DAC
- OECD Research Collaborative
- MDBs
- UN Agencies and Organizations (such as the UNDP and the UNFCCC)
- other development finance banks and institutions, including national and subnational, namely via the International Development Finance Club (IDFC)
- Research institutions, think tanks and consultancy firms.

The initiative "Proposal of a methodology for tracking publicly mobilized private climate finance," coordinated by KFW involving nearly 20 Development Banks and Development Finance Institutions, pilots the application of the methodology proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative.

With regards to the UNFCCC negotiations, SBSTA initiated (UNFCCC, 2016) its consideration of the development of modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Paris Agreement, and invited Parties and observer organizations to submit views on the matter by August, 29th. Resources mobilized through public interventions include private finance. This work follows up the previous SBSTA agenda item on the matter that concluded at COP21 with slight adjustments of the Common Tabular Formats (UNFCCC, 2015).

6.2.1. OECD – Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance

The OECD Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance is an initiative led by the OECD aimed at contributing to *the development of more comprehensive methodologies for identifying private finance for climate action in developing counties, and more specifically for estimating publicly-mobilised private climate finance. The project is focused on technical issues in terms of identifying, developing, testing and evaluating possible methodological options as input to political discussions. Decisions and choices on key definitional issues and acceptable measurement and reporting methodologies (in particular for accounting purposes under the United*

Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) are out of scope as these need to take place at the political level[24]*.*

This initiative includes 18 organizations that contribute to research work and 7 financial institutions that act as technical input providers and reviewers[25]. 17 governmental partners, including the European Commission are also involved in the initiative. Government partners *are increasingly becoming actors of the collaborative research process by conducting or commissioning pilot studies, thereby testing data availability and the applicability of measurement and estimation methodologies at a national level* [26].

The OECD Research Collaborative consists both of new research proposed, funded and conducted via itself, as well as relevant pre-existing and on-going activities. It has been established in 2013 and it is expected that its final conclusions are published in 2017.

In the first phase, the focus was on the identification and assessment of methods to estimate private climate finance, as well as on exploring the availability of the required information. Based on this, a *four-stage framework of decision points and methodological options* has been developed. The on-going and future work under the OECD Research Collaborative until 2017 is to further develop and test the estimation methods based on the mentioned framework[27].

An actual account of the key conclusions and proposal by the OECD Research Collaborative will be made in sections below.

6.2.2. Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)

The MDB's Technical Working Group (MDB TWG or MDBs) has developed the "joint MDB approach for climate finance tracking and reporting". The MDB TWG is composed of 6 MDBs: African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the International Finance Corporate (IFC) and World Bank (WB).

The joint approach, consisting of a set of common key definitions (such as what is climate finance, what is mitigation finance, what is adaptation finance) serves as a tool for the MDBs to consistently measure their financial contribution to climate change in a transparent and harmonized manner.

The first "Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks' Climate Finance" has been published for 2011 and the last one for 2014. This chapter compiles data from the participating MDBs, collected using the common approach developed. Such reports do not cover public or private capital mobilized by MDB climate finance.

As a follow up to this effort, the MDBs have published in December 2015, a briefing paper "Tracking Climate Co-Finance: Approach proposed by MDBs," which seeks to expand the MDB climate finance tracking to also estimate financial resources invested alongside MDBs by external parties. This paper, on top of the common definitions agreed on the joint approach, includes a set of additional definitions relevant to determine climate co-finance, such as the actual definition of co-financing, causality and double counting (attribution).

[24] https://www.oecd.org/env/researchcollaborative/aim-and-objectives.htm

[25] https://www.oecd.org/env/researchcollaborative/researchers-group.htm

[26] https://www.oecd.org/env/researchcollaborative/government-partners.htm

[27] https://www.oecd.org/env/researchcollaborative/on-going-activities.htm

Recently, the MDBs have worked closely with the International Development Finance Club (IDFC), a group of 22 leading development finance institutions and regional banks around the world, to more closely align their approaches on mitigation finance tracking, having jointly published the MDBs-IDFC Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking and the Common Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Finance Tracking. This document consists of a set of common definitions and guidelines, including the list of activities for tracking mitigation and adaptation finance.

Box 1 Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking adopted by MDBs-IDFC

Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking

Introduction

The purpose of these Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking (or the Principles) is to set out agreed climate change mitigation finance tracking principles for development finance. […]The principles consist of a set of common Definitions and Guidelines including the list of activities […]

Purpose

The MDBs and the IDFC commit to the Principles in their respective, group-based climate mitigation finance reporting. MDBs and IDFC invite other institutions to adopt the Principles and therewith further increase transparency and credibility of mitigation finance reporting […]

Definitions

- An activity will be classified as related to climate change mitigation if it promotes "efforts to reduce or limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or enhance GHG sequestration"

- Reporting according to the Principles does not imply evidence of climate change impacts and any inclusion of climate change impacts is not a substitute for project-specific theoretical and/or quantitative evidence of GHG emission mitigation; projects seeking to demonstrate climate change impacts should do so through project-specific data.

6.2.3. International Development Finance Club (IDFC)

The IDFC is composed of 23 leading international, national and sub regional development banks from across the world, both from OECD and non-OECD countries[28].

The Green Finance Mapping is one of IDFC's most important and renowned projects. With the aim of identifying and categorizing financial flows of IDFC Members to projects in the fields of green energy, adaptation and mitigation of climate change and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, the Green Finance Mapping Report offers a transparent view on the activities of IDFC Members.

The Green Finance Mapping provides consistent information on green finance flows from a major group of national, sub regional and international development banks based in OECD and non OECD countries, including domestic flows[29].

[28] http://www.idfc.org/Who-We-Are/members.aspx

The IDFC Green Finance Mapping for 2014, prepared by World Resources Institute together with the energy and climate consultancy Ecofys, used the MDBs-IDFC Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking.

The key definitions proposed by both the MDBs and the DFIs and their joint approach are reflected in a comparative analysis below in this chapter.

6.3. Methodologies: The OECD Research Collaborative Framework for Estimating Private Finance Mobilisation

As mentioned before, the effort led by the OECD in the scope of the research collaborative represents state of the art knowledge about practices, challenges and methodologies for tracking private climate finance. In this regard, it seems unwarranted to perform an analysis of any other methodological proposal given that the OECD Research Collaborative has done so and all relevant actors (including the European Commission) have contributed to the results and are converging towards the outcome of that collective effort.

The framework for estimating mobilised private climate finance is not considered to be a methodology to that effect, but rather a tool to support the development of a methodology or methodologies and is stepping stone towards the potential proposal of such a methodology by the OECD Research Collaborative. The framework identifies a series of steps in which key definitions and decisions need to be made along the process of estimating private climate finance mobilized by public interventions. The set of such definitions and decisions would constitute a methodology.

The current framework acknowledges that for each step a range of definitions or decisions can be made, thus recognizing that specific (national) circumstances need to be taken into account in the process. The framework now provides flexibility in the methodological approach towards estimating private finance mobilized by public interventions that should not be lost in further refinements of the proposal.

The framework for estimating private climate finance "structures methodological choices and options into four sequential but interrelated stages. The choice at any given point will influence the availability and feasibility of choices at other stages at other stages of the framework." (Jachnik et al (2015)).

Figure 1 represents the 4 sequential stages proposed by the framework and the respective definitions and decisions that need to be made at each of those stages.

Similar to the IPCC tier approach for the estimation of GHG emissions, the different choices will result in different accuracy, completeness and, as a consequence, different quality of the estimations of private finance mobilized. In addition to actual differing specific circumstances, the availability of quality information and the resources required for the application of a given definition or decision will greatly determine the choices made.

[29] http://www.idfc.org/Our-Program/green-finance-mapping.aspx

Figure 6-1 Stages that define key choices and options as part of the framework for estimating mobilised private climate finance

Stage 1. Define core concepts

- Definition of climate change activities
- Definition of public and private finance
- Classification of developed and developing countries
- Determination of geographical origin of finance

Stage 2. Identify public interventions and instruments that can be credited for mobilising private climate finance

- Types of public interventions
- Specific instruments used for the interventions

Stage 3. Value public interventions and account for total private finance involved

- Choice and conversion of currency
- Choice of point of measurement
- Valuation of different public interventions
- Boundaries and estimation of private finance involved
- Availability of climate-specific private finance data or proxies

Stage 4. Estimate mobilised private climate finance

- Assessment of causality between public interventions and private finance
- Attribution of mobilised private climate finance to public interventions and instruments

Source: Jachnik et al (2015)

6.3.1. Way forward

The steps proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative framework are well sequenced. In order to facilitate getting a closer idea of the potential for mobilized private finance and while noting that fully implementing the framework might take longer, MS could be requested to, shortly, perform stages 1 and 2. In doing so, each MS would have a clear mapping of all the organizations deploying public instruments to mobilize private climate finance.

After such exercise, MS could start collecting data, eventually giving priority to those entities and/or instruments which may have a greater potential for mobilizing private climate finance or, alternatively, to those which pose lesser challenges in data collection and handling.

This would constitute a stepwise approach, which would progressively bring MS to the same level of preparedness. Those ready to move faster should be encouraged to do so.

6.4. Definitions proposed and decisions made in the pilot application of the framework

As described above, the OECD Research Collaborative does not propose a unified methodology, rather it provides a framework, an approach that practitioners may use in their efforts to track private climate finance mobilized by public interventions.

In their application of that framework, practitioners are required to make a set of decisions, namely in relation the definitions applicable to the different steps. The OECD Research Collaborative approach provides a step by step guidance on how to track private climate finance mobilized by public interventions, without imposing strict requirements on what and when is to be included. The framework provides an opportunity for practitioners to reflect their specific circumstances in the actual methodological approach resulting from the application of the framework.

In that sense, while there has been an effort to streamline definitions (building upon the efforts being made to track general public climate finance), there has not been an effort to make a uniform methodology (a single track, without options) and it seems that it should not be desirable to go down that avenue (at least not before practitioners gain more experience in using a more flexible approach).

The key concepts and definitions relevant to tracking of private climate finance mobilized by public interventions included in the framework are (details on these concepts are provided below as an introduction to the comparative analysis):

- Climate change activities, otherwise referred to also as low carbon and resilient (LCR) activities
    - Mitigation Activities
    - Adaptation Activities
- Public finance
- Private finance
- Mobilization of private finance by public initiatives
    - Causality
    - Attribution
    - Boundaries
- Definition of developed and developing country
    - In relation to the origin of financing and/or of policy
    - In relation to the recipient of the finance
- Types of public interventions that mobilize private finance
- Specific instruments to mobilize private finance
- Point of measurement and exchange rates

Nonetheless, while all these concepts and definitions are relevant to tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions (either policy or financial), only a few are specific to mobilized private climate finance, while the others are relevant to overall tracking of public climate finance. The concepts specific to mobilized private climate finance are:

- Definition of public and private finance
- The causality between a public intervention and private finance
- The attribution of private finance to a given public intervention
- The types of policies and of specific instruments used in public interventions to mobilize private finance.

While covering all relevant concepts and definitions below, we provide greater focus to those specific to tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions.

In the sections below, a description of the key concepts is offered, based on Jachnik et al (2015). In addition, the tables in each section include the definitions and decisions proposed by these authors (as short-term options, that can be understood as potential preferred options to start with, subject to revision in the future based on experience), and the definitions and decisions made by the KfW (with several other development finance institutions), and by Denmark, France and Norway in the pilot application of the OECD Research Collaborative framework.

When applicable, the relevant definitions of the MDBs and the International Development Finance Club and other entities are also provided in the overview table to enhance completeness and comparability.

6.4.1. Climate change activities

As pointed out by Jachnik, et al (2015), while there are no agreed definitions, there certainly is a number of proposed and operational definitions of low carbon and resilient (LCR) activities, namely those proposed by the OECD DAC Rio Markers and those by the MDBs and IDFC. He also notes that, given the extensive collaboration among the relevant actors, there are many points of contact and convergence among these definitions, as they build upon each other.

The table below provides a brief overview of the definitions proposed and/or use by key relevant actors.

Table 6-1: Definition of Low Carbon Resilient (LCR) Activities

Author of the definition / approach	Mitigation	Adaptation
OECD Research Collaborative	Defining LCR activities: Provide transparency on definitions used e.g. provide an explicit list; refer to existing approaches such as the OECD DAC Rio markers, joint-MDB positive list for mitigation activities.	
OECD DAC Rio Markers	An activity should be classified as climate-change-mitigation related if it contributes to the objective of stabilisation of greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system by promoting efforts to reduce or limit GHG emissions or to enhance GHG sequestration.	An activity should be classified as adaptation-related if it intends to reduce the vulnerability of human or natural systems to the impacts of climate variability and change, by maintaining or increasing adaptive capacity and resilience, and/or reducing exposure to climate variability and change.
MDBs	(Replaced by the definition proposed under the MDBs-IDFC Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking described below)	Three steps to the definition: <u>Context of vulnerability to climate variability and change:</u> for a project to be considered as one that contributes to adaptation, the context of climate vulnerability must be set

Author of the definition / approach	Mitigation	Adaptation
		out clearly using a robust evidence base. This could take a variety of forms, including use of material from existing analyses and reports, or original, bespoke climate vulnerability assessment analysis carried out as part of the preparation of a project. Statement of purpose or intent: The project should set out how it intends to address the context- and location-specific climate change vulnerabilities, as set out in existing analyses, reports or the project's climate vulnerability assessment. Clear and direct link between climate vulnerability and project activities: in line with the principles of the overall MDB climate finance tracking methodology, only specific project activities that explicitly address climate vulnerabilities identified in the project documentation are reported as climate finance.
IDFC[30]	Broad criteria and positive list based on OECD DAC Rio Markers.	Broad criteria and positive list based on OECD DAC Rio Markers.
MDBs-IDFC Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking Common Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Finance Tracking	An activity will be classified as related to climate change mitigation if it promotes "efforts to reduce or limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or enhance GHG sequestration". Reporting according to the Principles does not imply evidence of climate change impacts and any inclusion of climate change impacts is not a substitute for project-specific theoretical and/or quantitative evidence of GHG emission mitigation; projects seeking to demonstrate climate change impacts should do so through project-specific data.	*Adaptation finance tracking relates to tracking the finance for activities that address current and expected effects of climate change, where such effects are material for the context of those activities*[31].

[30] Where relevant, these definitions have now been replaces by the MDBs-IDFC Common Principles

[31] This is a preliminary definition, used to frame the work between the MDBs and IDFC. It will be further refined as the work on this subject is concluded.

Author of the definition / approach	Mitigation	Adaptation
KfW	Same as IDFC (see above)	
France	*Different approaches across the French administration. The MDBs/IDFC and the Rio Markers are quoted as being used or as source of inspiration.*	
Denmark	OECD DAC Rio Markers	
Norway	OECD DAC Rio Markers	

While there still is no absolutely consistent definition of climate relevant activities and while the actual application of these definitions is subject to an important degree of discretion, there is a clear convergence to the definition proposed by the OECD DAC Rio Markers and the key concepts behind it.

6.4.1.1. Way forward

In order to enhance transparency and comparability of data collection, MS should be required to use only the OECD DAC Rio Markers definition of climate change mitigation and adaptation activities. For most MS that is already the case, only a few MS divert (either fully or partially from this approach). In this regard, a strict mandatory rule on this topic may on the one hand bring little actual improvements compared to the current situation, but could also be met easily and enhance greatly the perceived transparency of EU and MS reporting on mobilized private climate finance.

6.4.2. Public finance and private finance

While the definition of public and private finance should seem clear cut, the fact that corporate ownership is a complex matter (namely for those with public and private shareholders or with complex control schemes), allows for some discretion in classifying a given entity as public or private.

It may be accepted that the most relevant instruments, including financial instruments, used to mobilize private climate finance come from clearly public entities (such as development agencies and banks), but in several cases, public service is being carried out by private entities and, on the other hand, public entities act as private market players. There is no clear black and white solution for these grey areas and it seems that it will be up to each country to decide, case by case, whether a given instrument is to be considered public for the purpose of tracking private climate finance mobilized by it. The volume of financing involved in these grey areas is not determined, but is deemed to not to account for a great share.

As can be seen from the definitions described in the table below, the most commonly used definition to public finance is that being committed by an entity that is at least owned or controlled 50% by a public shareholder / entity.

In relation to linking private finance to the public intervention, some require that an explicit link between the two is made, that it can be demonstrated that the public intervention had the aim and the capacity to mobilize the private finance and that the private finance would actually not happen if it were not for the public intervention. Not all authors in the table below address this link, while others (namely the OECD-CPI study) propose a rather complex and rigorous approach.

Table 6-2: Definition of public and private finance

Author of the definition / approach	Public finance	Private finance	Mobilized private finance
OECD Research Collaborative	Large institutions/transactions: analyse the public/private nature of finance provided. Small institutions/transactions or joint ventures: take a practical approach (e.g. based on majority ownership); consider existing definitions in that process e.g. OECD DAC, Eurostat.		
KfW	Finance committed by an institution which is at least 50% owned by one or several governments or government controlled institution.	Private climate finance is defined as limited to financing of assets that are in majority private ownership (i.e. “private investment” corresponding to equity) or established or purchased with third party financing originating directly from the private sector (i.e. “private capital” corresponding typically to debt.	Direct private co-financing at the level of the activity, credit line or structured fund. There needs to be a demonstrated supporting (mobilizing) link to a financial activity by a public sector actor. This public sector financial activity must be suitable to support a positive decision in favour of the specific investment.
OECD – CPI (on private adaptation finance)			Publicly-mobilized private finance for adaptation is the private finance invested as a result of adaptation-related public interventions, which can typically take the form of finance or policies. For the purposes of this study, the focus is on developed countries’ public finance interventions to mobilize private finance for climate adaptation in developing countries. Estimating private finance mobilization requires demonstrating or making plausible assumptions about the causal link between public

Author of the definition / approach	Public finance	Private finance	Mobilized private finance
			interventions and the amount of private finance claimed to have been mobilized as a result of such interventions. Direct private finance mobilization is defined as private finance that is co-financed alongside public finance into the same project, program or fund and which is invested as a direct result of the provision of public finance (or guarantee) to that same project, program or fund. Intermediated-direct private finance mobilization is defined as private finance that is invested alongside public finance and as a direct result of that public finance, but where the public finance is initially provided one step upstream of the private investment, and is intermediated via a fund, a fund of funds, or a bank account (e.g., a credit line). Indirect private finance mobilization is defined as private finance that is invested as a result of a public finance intervention, but where the public finance intervention supports enabling outputs that occur one or more steps upstream of the private investment.
MDBs	Public and private sources: Climate Co-Finance is segmented into public and private sources, based primarily on the shareholding structure of the external institution providing the co-financing [no further details].		
France	At least 50% of the capital is owned by public shareholders. Some French publicly owned companies operate in the competitive market. Their financing is not		(see causality below)

Author of the definition / approach	Public finance	Private finance	Mobilized private finance
	considered public.		
Denmark	If more than 50% of the shareholders are public, the entity is considered public.	Public companies operating according to commercial principles are considered private.	
Norway	At least a 50 % public ownership and operating under a mandate of subsidiarity (The subsidiarity principle implies a mission to build the private sector and that public money is used to ‘crowd in’ or mobilize private development finance).	Some public companies not acting under a subsidiarity mandate have been included in the private sector.	

6.4.2.1. Way forward

The definitions proposed to define public and private finance are mostly similar and point to the same overall general understanding. Some nuances and flexibility in definitions might be important to maintain in order to take specific circumstances into account (namely the definition of public / private finance for other non-climate related purposes – such as corporate governance matters).

Nonetheless, a strong recommendation should be made in relation to those entities that, despite having a public shareholder, act in a fully competitive market and are not fulfilling a public mandate. Financing originating from such entities should not be considered public.

6.4.3. Definition of countries and origin of private finance

The definition of countries as developed and developing or between Annex I and non-Annex I (as per the UNFCCC reporting guidelines), creates some challenges, as the lists are not a perfect match. This definition is important to determine whether fluxes are between Annex I and non-Annex I countries or between developed and developing countries. In this regard, there does not seem to be a more preeminent option either way (even when mobilization of private climate finance is not at stake, only provision of public resources). Given the current language of the Paris Agreement, it is expectable that there will be a tendency for more actors to choose developed/developing rather than Annex I / Non-Annex I, but currently that is still not discernible.

Private climate finance can be mobilised from developed *and* developing countries. If it is sometimes already complex to determine whether an entity is public or private, in many circumstances it is even harder to determine the country to which it belongs to. How to determine an entities nationality? Is it where it is headquartered (what about companies with independent branches?)? Is it in relation to the nationality of its key shareholders? Can all shareholders be tracked, even reference ones? How far should we track the shareholders of shareholders?

In this sense, many argue that, tracking private climate finance should include all private finance mobilized, identifying, when possible, whether the origin of such private finance is from a developed or a developing country entity.

Table 6-3: Definition of geographical origin

Author of the definition / approach	Definition of countries	Origin of (private) finance
OECD Research Collaborative	There are several different dynamic and static lists available that could be used to classify countries as developed or developing.	*Assigning a geographical origin to finance:* Use the headquarter location of the ultimate (if information available) or intermediate parent of the entity providing funds. Known cases of multiple country ownership/funding (e.g. MDBs) need to be considered separately *Handling multiple country ownership/funding:* Either do not assign a country of origin or take a pro-rata approach (based on shareholdings or amounts of funds provided) on a case-by-case basis depending on information availability *Which geographical source of private finance to include:* If/where assigning a country of origin is technically feasible and meaningful, run two scenarios in order to provide a range: one including aggregate private finance mobilised from all origins; one including only private finance assigned to developed country entities.
KfW	Official development assistance recipient country list maintained by the OECD DAC. A country included in this list eligible to receive ODA is categorized as developing by the methodology proposed by KfW. By opposition, all others are developed.	All sources of private co-finance irrespective of origin in order to be neutral in respect to the type of players (domestic or international) involved in a developing country
France	Developed Countries = Annex I Countries Developing Countries = Non Annex I Countries	Total private finance includes private finance from Annex I Countries and private finance from non-Annex I countries

Author of the definition / approach	Definition of countries	Origin of (private) finance
Denmark	Developed Countries = Annex I Countries Developing Countries = Non Annex I Countries	Total private finance includes private finance from Annex I Countries and private finance from non-Annex I countries
Norway	n.a.	n.a.

6.4.3.1. Way forward

In order to have a full picture of the mobilization potential of any public instrument, MS should be required to track all private finance mobilized by their public instruments, irrespective of its origin.

6.4.4. Types of public policy and public finance interventions used to mobilise private finance

Different types of public interventions and of public financial instruments can be said to have the capacity to mobilize private climate finance.

According to Jachnik et al (2015):

- Public finance interventions are those in which a public entity provides direct financial support to a project, programme, fund or enterprise.
- Public policy interventions consist of a broad set of interventions that can help to indirectly support low carbon resilient projects and activities as well as shape country and markets to achieve LCR goals.

In this context, actors can choose to account for private climate finance mobilized by one, the other or both types of public interventions.

As for public policy information, the following have been identified by Jachnik et al (2015):

- Regulatory policy
    - Laws and policies
    - Plans and targets
    - Standards
    - Quotas
- Fiscal policy
    - Taxes

    - Subsidies and tax reliefs/credits
    - Market support
- Information and innovation policy
    - Research and development
    - Licenses and patents
    - Technology transfer
    - Education and awareness
    - Data and statistics.

In relation to financial instruments potentially used in public interventions to mobilize private climate finance, Jachnik et al (2015) list the following:

- Grants
- Debt
    - Loans
    - Credit lines
    - Bonds
    - Debt funds
    - Subordinated debt (mezzanine finance)
- Equity
    - Direct equity investments
    - Shares in equity funds
    - Preferred equity
- De-risking
    - Insurances
    - Guarantees
    - Derivatives

Denmark identifies different types of instruments for different types of interventions:

- Policy and regulatory support is mainly provided through Technical Assistance financed by grants,
- Project preparation support is also mostly support by grants,
- Project implementation is commonly supported by non-grant instruments.

The different types of public interventions pose different challenges in determining the causality link and, in consequence, the attribution of private climate finance to a given public intervention. While a grant to support the development of a plan may pave the way for several private investments for several years, the clear causality link might be difficult to establish and in particular avoiding double counting with other more specific financial interventions used in that context would be extremely difficult.

Table 6-4: Definition of public interventions and financial instruments

Author of the definition / approach	Public Interventions	Financial Instruments
OECD Research Collaborative	Focus on public finance interventions for which data is available or can be collected in the short term (e.g. grants, loans, equity investments). This is likely to disregard the impact of public policies in mobilising private climate finance.	
KfW		Loans, equity positions, guarantees, grants, revolving use of credit lines or green funds.
France	All public interventions leading to mobilising private climate finance in accordance with the EU's common understanding of mobilised private climate finance which specifies that these financial flows are: 1) mobilised by public finance, or by a public intervention, including in the sphere of policy and regulatory reform, and 2) climate relevant in accordance with criteria used by relevant international organisations such as the OECD and Multilateral Development Banks (cf. ECOFIN Council Conclusions, November 2014). However only public finance for project implementation can be estimated.	Respectively, for the three categories, three types of instruments are typically used: 1) technical assistance and grants 2) technical assistance and grants 3) all possible financial instruments (grants, equity, loans, guarantees…) – capital expenditures for the most part, also called project finance.
Denmark	All public interventions in three categories[32]:	Respectively, for the three categories, three types of instruments are typically used:

[32] Denmark considers it to be very difficult to track private finance mobilised by policy and regulatory support and by project preparation support.

	1) policy and regulatory support 2) project preparation support 3) project implementation and project finance	1) technical assistance and grants 2) grants 3) non-grant instruments

6.4.4.1. Way forward

Given the complexity, in particular, of the financial instruments with the potential to mobilize private finance, there seem to be little merit in arguing for an agreed definition of such instruments in this context. For the most part, these instruments are clearly defined under financial regulations and through the financial market.

6.4.5. Point of measurement, exchange rates and valuation of the intervention

The two first topics: point of measurement and exchange rates are straightforward. In relation to the point of measurement, the options are at commitment or at disbursement. Most entities track finance (including private finance mobilized) at commitment (board approval), even though some recognize that the value disbursed may be different (usually lower) than the value committed. For that reason, some measure at disbursement.

With regards to exchange rates, climate finance should be reported in USD. Reporting countries should make a transparent (and consistent) choice of exchange rates.

Valuing the instrument is a more complex issue, resulting from a 2014 OECD decision[33], support provided to developing countries is valued taking into account the risk associated with the instrument used. In that sense, the grant is considered the instrument with the highest value (risk), because there will be no return to the investment. In that sense, a concessional loan should have a greater value than a non-concessional loan, because less of the first will be reimbursed than of the second. Take the case for a guarantee – it may actually never be used, it may never be disbursed (even though it performed its task of mobilizing private climate finance). Should it be valued by its face value (a guarantee of USD 1 Million has a USD 1 Million face value) or its *grant equivalent value* (to be determined in accordance to methodology proposed by the OECD), thus reflecting the fact that, while risky, it may never actually be disbursed? Given the fact that face value is the simpler, more straightforward approach, it is the most commonly used.

Table 6-5: Definitions of point of measurement, exchange rates and valuation of the instrument

Author of the definition / approach	Point of measurement	Exchange rates	Valuation of the instrument
OECD	Measure finance at the point of	Build upon/make use of available	Build upon/make

[33] DAC High Level Meeting Final Communiqué, December 16 2014

Author of the definition / approach	Point of measurement	Exchange rates	Valuation of the instrument
Research Collaborative	commitment; cross-check with disbursement data, where available	international statistical standards to report in either the currency in which the finance was committed, or an international currency along with information on the exchange rate used and date of conversion.	use of approaches used or being developed by the development finance community e.g. OECD DAC
KfW	At commitment	Conversion to USD using exchange rate from local currency on July 1st for past commitments. For planned interventions the exchange rate used is of the 1st working day of the ongoing year.	Face value
France	According to each institution´s method. Most institutions choose to estimate mobilised private finance at board approval (when a project is presented for decision including all other – public and private – co-finance).	OECD annual exchange rates	Face value
Denmark	At disbursement is more accurate then at commitment. However, private sector is wary of report on disbursements. So, measurement at commitment, applying a discount rate to take into account declining ratio from commitment to disbursements (private finance declining ratio (discount rate) from commitment to disbursement is used by checking the public finance disbursement in comparison to the commitment).	OECD annual exchange rates	Core / Default scenario: face value Sensitivity scenario: grant equivalent

6.4.5.1. Way forward

It seems only reasonable to ask for harmonization in relation to the exchange rate (use the OECD yearly average exchange rate). With regards to point of measurement, MS should report at the

point where data can be collected with more confidence (for most is at commitment). With regards to valuation of the instrument, it is becoming good practice to value it at grant equivalent. However, only few countries have developed capacity to do so and in that regard, most report at face value.

6.4.6. Mobilization of private climate finance

Closely linked to the discussion on definition of "mobilized private finance" above, is the definition of causality: can it be determined that a given private climate financing took place due to a public intervention? If so, to what extent? Fully? Partially?

When more than one public entity intervenes in the mobilization of private climate finance, it is necessary to attribute portions of the amounts mobilized to the specific public interventions. Several options exist, the simplest one being a pro-rata approach. Other, more complex approaches take into account the risk and the relative importance of each public intervention in attributing a portion of the private climate finance mobilized.

Finally, a third variable that may be taken into account are the boundaries to the causality and consequent attribution of mobilized private finance to a given public intervention, namely in relation to time (will only private finance mobilized at the time of the public intervention be attributed or will it be attributed throughout the project life-time?) and to the reach of the instrument used.

Table 6-6: Definitions of causality, attribution and boundaries

Author of the definition / approach	Causality	Attribution	Boundaries
OECD Research Collaborative	Take a differentiated approach by assuming blanket causality where there is a clear argument for doing so, e.g. absence of any relevant public interventions and weak enabling environment. Assign partial causality using default mobilization factors for relevant public policies where the relationship between public	*When blanket causality assumed:* either no-attribution to individual entities/interventions (aggregate estimate and collective reporting of mobilisation) or attributing based on readily available information, such as taking a pro rata approach based on the volume of funding and type of finance provided. *When causality is assessed:* - *Assessing causality for public finance*: If a risk-based approach is selected, use simple rules based on the relative risk positions of public and private finance. - *Temporal issues*: Consider private finance only within the direct scope of the activity	*For syndicated loans involving a public actor*: Account for all the private finance associated with the loan syndicate *For public investments in equity funds*: Only account for private finance at the direct fund-level. *For public guarantees*: Account for the total private finance instrument (loan, equity) to which the public guarantee applies.

Author of the definition / approach	Causality	Attribution	Boundaries
	interventions and private finance is particularly complex.	supported by the public intervention. This can include private finance invested before or after public finance was committed where appropriate (apply declining mobilization rate/tapering factor). - *Adjusting for the effects of LCR-specific public policies and/or broader country and market conditions*: Where possible, use transparent assumptions (e.g. a default factor to attribute mobilization to a policy intervention); report qualitatively on the presence/absence of indirect public interventions and policies otherwise.	
KfW	Volume based blanket causality. A clear supporting ("mobilizing") link between the financial activity by a public sector actor and the private finance must be determined.	Volume based pro rata	The following list specifies the boundaries of publicly mobilized private finance foreseen in the methodology: Loans by private sector actors mobilized by DFI loans Loans by private sector actors mobilized by DFI equity positions Loans by private sector actor mobilized by DFI guarantees Equity from private sector mobilized by DFI loans Equity from the private sector actor mobilized by DFI equity positions Loans by private sector actor mobilized by DFI grants for financing (e. g., to cover costs of a renewable energy feed-in law or premium or emission reduction credits from the Clean Development Mechanism) Equity from private sector actor

Author of the definition / approach	Causality	Attribution	Boundaries
			mobilized by DFI grants (e. g., to cover costs of a renewable energy feed-in law or premium or emission reduction credits from the Clean Development Mechanism) Loans to the private sector generated by the revolving use of credit lines or green funds (subtract original loan to avoid double counting)
France	100% causal relationship between the public intervention and private finance	Volume based attribution	Time dimension: private co-finance at the moment of the public intervention.
Denmark	100% causality	Core / Default scenario: volume-based pro rata Sensitivity scenario 1: concessionality-based pro rata Sensitivity scenario 1	<u>Syndicated loans</u>: account for all private project finance. The bank in charge of syndication usually provides the majority of the project (debt) finance. We therefore argue that the lead bank has mobilised all project finance. <u>Equity participation</u>: account for all private project finance. This includes: the percentage of private finance at the fund level and private co-finance at project level. For instance: the GCPF has one private investor at fund level, which accounts for 9% of the total fund. If GCPF finances 10 million to a climate project, 9% is counted as mobilised private finance. If a private co-financer invests 2 million to the climate project, this is counted as mobilised private finance as well. Total mobilised private climate finance: 2.9 million. <u>Public guarantees</u>: total face value of the private finance instrument to which it applies. This is in line with the OECD DAC.

Author of the definition / approach	Causality	Attribution	Boundaries
			Time dimension: Only private co-finance at the moment of the public intervention.
Norway		Volume-based pro rata	

6.4.6.1. Way forward

In relation to causality, there does not seem to be enough confidence and knowledge at the time to opt for something different to blanket causality.

In relation to attribution, in order to avoid gaps or overlaps, there should be an effort to harmonize approaches, but only in relation to the participants involved in the same instrument. As it happens, that is usually the case already (more often than note, an MDB is part of such instruments and it facilitates such an agreement among participants).

With regards to boundaries, there is an interest in allowing for different approaches to be tested in order to gain more experience and develop stronger methodological guidance on the matter.

6.5. Challenges in data collection

Data for private climate finance mobilized by public interventions is not readily available and is a rather complex venture. At the very simplest form of data unavailability, these data is simply not collected in a systematic fashion and, in cases, current approaches to financing or project planning and documentation may not even be able to provide the necessary information. It seems apparent that no entity has currently established a system which allows for the regular collection of data.

There are (more or less robust) systems to collect information on developed countries public climate interventions (policy and financial) in developing countries and databases which compile and store such information. Reporting by OECD members to the OECD DAC CRS (Creditor Reporting System) is the most preeminent exercise. Current reporting by annex I countries to the UNFCCC within the context of Biennial Reports is also promoting the establishment of a system and has already allowed for the collection of data for four years (2011 to 2014).

On the other hand, while there are some (mostly commercial) databases on private climate finance, they are mostly non-transparent (in relation to some key parameters required for the purpose of estimating mobilized private finance, for example in relation to the origin of financing and in relation to the (causal) link with a public intervention) and considered to be extremely incomplete or non-exhaustive. Some of the best databases cover large mitigation projects, namely on renewable energy but for anything smaller and adaptation projects there seems to be a large gap of information.

Annex VI (section 9.6) includes figures (Jachnik et.al. 2015) providing a detailed picture of the existing databases including information on public interventions and private finance for low carbon and resilient activities.

Given the approach proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative framework, however (in which tracking private climate finance starts by identifying those public interventions that have the potential to mobilize private finance), it seems likely that centralized databases will actually not need to play a central role in this process (further on this below).

Centralized databases might, nonetheless, play an important role in the following circumstances:

- If attribution to a specific country is not a requirement (in case of collective reporting),
- For those public policy interventions with a broad policy scope (e.g. aimed at enhancing overall enabling environments or designing relevant national strategies or programmes), for which direct causality may be harder to establish and in which circumstances, the country of origin of the public intervention might not have full access to activities in the recipient country (that is particularly relevant when private finance is mobilized by a public intervention that took place long time before),
- For reporting on private finance (not only on private finance mobilized by public interventions).

Namely in the scope of the OECD Research Collaborative, in estimating private climate finance mobilized by public intervention, have analysed their respective data collection system and data availability. Generally, it can be said that, after their experiences, data on mobilized private finance is for the most part not readily available, that the most pragmatic approach is to start collecting by the public entities mobilizing private finance and that centralized data bases and the use of leverage factors are incomplete and too uncertain respectively.

Denmark noted *that there were only few programmes that could provide data on private finance that was detailed and accurate enough to include in the quantification exercise. A major part of the public climate finance could thus not be linked to private finance mobilised.[…] 63% of the Danish public finance that was deemed of relevance for this study could not deliver any data on private finance.* It noted also that *those who did deliver data did not (not always) have the correct data readily available in their systems. They had to go back to original project documents in their files (very labour intensive process) to collect the requested information. Looking back without a well-established MRV system in place is not only time consuming but also prone for inaccuracies.*

Benn et al (2016) stated that *data on amounts mobilised are often available in project documentation. However, some data are more available than others. Data on the face value of the loan guaranteed by the institution, on the total amount of private investments in syndications, and on private investments in investment funds are often available. On the contrary, data on the amount mobilised by equity or mezzanine investments are more difficult to obtain. Data on the total project cost seem also to be available, however many DFIs highlighted the low quality of these data. They mentioned that data on the total project cost were often a supplementary field in their systems, subject to the project manager interpretation of the project boundaries*.

Brown et al (2015) also noted that, specifically on mobilized private finance for adaptation activities: *given the significant limitations in using existing databases to estimate mobilized private finance for adaptation highlighted here, a practical starting point for improving data lies with the public finance providers and working to more systematically monitor private co-finance.*

Jachnik and Raynaud (2015) argue that priority efforts need to be put on improving *primary data collection […] by public finance institutions on private co-financing*. Without this improvement on primary data collection, information contained on commercial databases (such as the Bloomberg New Energy Finance) and leverage ratios (to be used as proxy in case of data gaps) will be too uncertain to be used.

Given the state of the art experience described above, it seems important to highlight that entities involved or promoting public interventions with the potential to mobilize private finance will hold the key to data collection. In order to do so, they should establish systems that are capable of regularly, consistently, transparently and exhaustively doing so.

Abbeile et al (2015) noted that, despite deficiencies, the collection of data for France's pilot testing of the OECD Research Collaborative framework was not too difficult due to the dedication of the institutions involved, but in particular due to the fact that the number of institutions managing public interventions capable of mobilizing private climate finance are only four. It may be expected that in other countries the number of relevant entities is not much larger than that in France, thus making it somewhat simple to set up a system.

In this context where it is of paramount importance for national institutions to start collecting data on mobilized private climate finance, the following steps should be implemented:

- Identify the entities that manage public interventions with the potential to mobilize private climate finance,
- Interview these entities to identify and analyse the types of public intervention instruments (policy and/or financial) and to assess accessibility of data (namely historical data),
- Train the entities on methodological issues related to tracking mobilized private climate finance,
- Establish a formal data collection system (or include data on mobilized private finance in arrangements on collection of public climate finance already in place), including the definition of data collection needs.

The table below describes the questionnaire used by France (Abbeile et al 2015) for the collection of data at project level that can be used as a basis for the definition of data collection needs. This questionnaire was used for an isolated data collection. When this information is collected together with the regular data on provision of public climate support (for the OECD DAC, for example), the relevant items below would be integrated in such collection procedures.

Table 6-7: Questionnaire for data collection on mobilized private finance

Project Information	**Information on public finance**	**Information on private finance mobilized**
Project ID	Amount committed by the entity	Co-financier 1 - Name - Country - Amount committed - Instrument
Name of the project	Amount of relevant climate finance commitment	Co-financier 2 …

Project Information	Information on public finance	Information on private finance mobilized
Country	Amount disbursed	
Date of board approval	Amount reimbursed	
Date of contracting	Financial instrument	
Total costs of project	Mitigation amount	
	Adaptation amount	
	Other public finance from other Annex I countries	
	Other public finance from non-I countries	

Source: Abeille et al (2015)

6.6. Other initiatives to track private finance / investments

Tracking private finance is no simple endeavour. But there are several organizations that do it from different perspectives, using different methodologies and with different scopes and purposes. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) have the most extensive and reputed exercise in this regards. But there are others, namely some carried out by private entities, such as the Financial Times.

The three exercises described below were chosen due to their perceived comprehensiveness and credibility and also as a representation of different approaches and scopes. Their inclusion in this report is a mere illustration of specific efforts to collect data on foreign direct investments and do not constitute a proposal to use them for collection of data on climate relevant foreign direct investment mobilized by public interventions.

The World Investment Report is a yearly exercise by the UNCTAD and is arguably the most comprehensive one. In addition to the data collection on FDI, each year the UNCTAD selects a theme over which it makes an in-depth analysis. For 2014, the theme was the sustainable development goals.

The IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey is an interesting exercise, as it tracks the origin and the recipient country of the FDI, which can be a valuable experience in relation to attribution to developed countries of climate relevant private finance in developing countries.

Finally, the Financial Times FDI report is interesting as it captures only greenfield investments (new investments in the real economy, which climate relevant investments would be expected to be) and already tracks specific investments in the renewable energy sector.

While these exercises are interesting, they are far from being directly useful for the purpose of collecting data on climate relevant private finance mobilized by public instruments. Firstly, because they lack the tools to identify the relevant public instruments and to establish the causality between such instruments and the private finance mobilized. And secondly, because these exercises do not have the tools to mark the investments as climate relevant in accordance with the relevant methodologies. Current approaches to the attribution of investments to a specific economy sector

fall very short of providing a clear signal of climate relevance. If this is very true for mitigation, it is even very much more so for adaptation.

6.6.1. The UNCTAD's World Investment Report

The 2014 UNCTAD's World Investment Report (WIR) was dedicated to investments in areas relevant to the (at the time still under negotiation) Sustainable Development Goals.

The WIR provides figures of in- and out-flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), showing which countries lead providing and which lead receiving FDI (in both cases, the US, with China second on in flows and Japan second on outflows, followed by China in third). Among other analytical results, the WIR presented FDI by private equity firms (PEF), by sovereign wealth funds (SWF) and by state owned enterprises (SOE). This indicates that the approach used can easily identify private investments (noting that many countries opt to consider as private finance the climate relevant investments made by it largest SOE).

The WIR classifies FDI by sector/industry but on a very aggregate manner, not being possible to identify through currently available information whether or not the investment in the designated sectors are climate relevant.

The following are the sectors / industry classification used by WIR[34]:

- Primary
    - Agriculture, forestry and fishing
    - Mining, quarrying and petroleum
- Manufacturing
    - Food, beverages and tobacco
    - Textiles, clothing and leather
    - Wood and wood products
    - Paper and paper products
    - Publishing and printing
    - Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel
    - Chemicals and chemical products
    - Pharmaceuticals
    - Rubber and plastic products
    - Metals and metal products
    - Electrical and electronic equipment
    - Motor vehicles and other transport equipment
    - Non-metallic mineral products
    - Machinery and equipment
    - Manufacture of furniture
    - Other manufacturing
- Services
    - Electricity, gas and water
    - Construction

[34] http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Annex-Tables.aspx [visited on July, 14 2016]

- Trade
- Accommodation and food service activities
- Transportation and storage
- Information and communication
- Finance
- Business services
- Public administration and defense
- Education
- Health and social services
- Arts, entertainment and recreation
- Other service activities

So, despite the fact that the WIR was dedicated to investing in the SDG, the methodological approach used by UNCTAD is not detailed enough to be directly relevant for the identification of climate relevant investment flows.

With regards to the methodological approach, the WIR's FDI statistics are based on a large set of information sources, namely:

- National (or, when applicable, Regional) Central Banks (in respect of the country itself and in respect of other countries)
- OECD
- IMF
- National relevant ministries (in few cases)
- National statistics offices and other related offices (in few cases)

6.6.2. The IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey[35]

The IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) is particularly interesting, because it supports the objective of developing from-whom-to-whom cross border data, complementing the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), and contributes to a better understanding of financial interconnectedness. While, this survey does not include all countries (only about 100), it allows to determine the country of origin and the recipient country of investments, show casing, at least, the net relative position of a country in relation to another. This may be of interest in case of attribution of climate relevant investments to the country of origin.

Table 6-8 below shows the CDIS Top 10 From-Whom-to-Whom 2013 Inward Direct Investment

[35] http://data.imf.org/?sk=40313609-F037-48C1-84B1-E1F1CE54D6D5&sId=1390030109571

Table 6-8: CDIS Top 10 From-Whom-to-Whom 2013 Inward Direct Investment

Counterpart Economy (Investment from):	Reporting Economy (Investment in):											
	Netherlands	Luxembourg	United States	China, P.R.: Mainland	United Kingdom	China, P.R.: Hong Kong	Germany	France	Switzerland	Singapore	All Other Economies	Total Investment
United States	997,712	774,723		76,465	389,608	42,871	94,001	86,260	98,323	97,417	1,239,719	3,897,098
Netherlands		322,325	273,884	27,721	C	78,515	207,655	123,090	213,181	69,052	1,391,157	2,706,581
United Kingdom	455,896	540,818	518,643	20,989		20,054	62,154	75,802	23,892	40,501	633,031	2,391,780
Luxembourg	693,715		201,603	4,940	C	C	161,530	133,495	161,76[illegible]	19,479	717,608	2,094,131
China, P.R.: Hong Kong	15,744	23,931	5,860	1,112,242	C		642	2,243	C	25,239	66,195	1,252,096
Germany	246,134	104,871	208,841	53,450	C	5,301		85,446	28,704	15,792	429,677	1,178,217
France	166,579	72,443	226,131	20,748	C	6,981	53,584		43,124	12,129	514,441	1,116,159
Japan	64,357	3,200	342,327	147,594	80,357	25,936	21,875	14,488	3,546	55,433	350,764	1,109,877
Switzerland	234,314	123,912	209,397	11,705	62,748	8,249	59,991	81,829		29,308	251,905	1,073,357
Virgin Islands, British	40,508	C		330,624	13,680	447,918	3,241	757	C	57,611	80,432	974,772
All Other Economies	1,427,401	1,285,283	777,270	524,759	1,061,577	559,475	261,860	180,300	197,797	328,118	3,505,381	10,109,220
Total Investment	4,342,358	3,251,506	2,763,956	2,331,238	1,607,970	1,195,301	926,532	783,712	770,327	750,078	9,180,310	27,903,288

Source:

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Participating countries are required to fill in two questionnaires, one identifying the inflows and the out flows from and to each specific country and the other on methodological choices and assumptions, thus allowing for an assessment of data quality and comparability.

Given the complexity of organizational arrangements that different entities can have, this survey proposes approaches to these more complex arrangements, such as branches, multi-territory enterprises and joint ventures.

Finally, with regards to sector or industry classification, CDIS used the International Standard Industry Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC). Like for WIR above, this classification is not sufficient to assess the climate relevance of the FDI.

The survey is conducted at national level by one single entity (it varies from country to country: in some cases it's the central bank, in others the statistics office or other entity). This entity will then have to decide which companies to include in the survey. That can be done by performing a census (sending the questionnaire to everybody – which is advisable to do only once or only at long regular intervals), an exploratory survey (to identify the relevant companies to which to send the actual survey) or by focusing on the largest firms. The size of the universe is not only relevant in terms of the number of companies included, but also in terms of the value of the transactions they are involved in.

Draft surveys are provided by CDIS Guide and can be adapted to meet local circumstances.

6.6.3. The Financial Times FDI Report 2016

The FDI Report 2016 has some interesting aspects:

- It covers only *greenfield* investments, i.e. it covers only new investment projects in the real economy (which is something to be expected of a climate relevant investment)
- It has a sector / industry classification which speaks closer to the needs related to climate relevant investments as it tracks FDI for renewable energies, distinguishing between different technologies (regrettably, that is the only sector for which good information is already available)
- It identifies the top five (corporate) foreign direct investors in renewable energy

The methodological note included in the report provides interesting insights on the value of the data produced.
"The report is based on the fDi Markets database of The Financial Times Ltd, which tracks greenfield investment projects. It does not include mergers and acquisitions or other equity-based or non-equity investments. Only new investment projects and significant expansions of existing projects are included. fDi Markets is the most authoritative source of intelligence on real investment in the global economy, and the only source of greenfield investment data that covers all countries and industries worldwide. Retail projects have been excluded from this analysis but are tracked by fDi Markets.

The data presented includes FDI projects that have either been announced or opened by a company. As companies can raise capital locally, phase their investment over a period of time, and can channel their investment through different countries for tax efficiency, the data used in this report is different to the official data on FDI flows. The data from fDi Markets is more accurate and

a real-time indicator of the real investment companies are making in their overseas subsidiaries" (FDI Intelligence, 2016).

6.7. MRV of incentives to and enabling environments for private climate finance

6.7.1. MRV of incentives

This chapter addresses current MRV of incentives to and enabling environments for private climate finance. For incentives to private climate finance, it is understood that the public policy and financial interventions by developed countries mobilize private climate finance. Enabling environments are the set of circumstances that should be found in a developing country in order to become an attractive destination for private climate finance.

The previous chapter already addresses the topic of incentives, i.e. public interventions to mobilize private climate finance. It is widely recognised that public policy interventions as well as public financial interventions play an equally important, although distinct, role in mobilizing private climate finance. The OECD Research Collaborative framework provides scope for the definition of a methodology that tracks private finance mobilized by both types of interventions.

It's noted, however that, while public policy interventions[36] have the potential to mobilize a larger array of private investments, it is much harder to track private climate finance mobilized by such policy interventions, than to track the private finance mobilized by specific public finance interventions. While the causality between the public finance intervention and the private climate finance it mobilizes can be directly and more easily established, the causality between a public policy intervention and private climate finance may be harder to establish. The reason for this is that the causality may be of an indirect nature and the mobilization may actually occur several years down the line, when effective mechanisms to assess such causality may no longer be established.

While there has been a great effort to that end, it has not yet been possible to determine with any level of accuracy the relative effectiveness of one public instrument compared to the other. This relative effectiveness could be assessed, for example, by means of estimating leveraging ratios (the amount of private finance a certain type of public intervention mobilizes) and comparing them. However, the information currently available in the estimation of such leveraging ratios is not transparent. It is also incomplete to the point that it is not recommended to be used as a proxy to estimate mobilized private finance because of a lack of actual information for a specific public intervention.

The regular use of the OECD Research Collaborative framework will overcome this problem, by allowing for the collection of actual data on each specific relevant public intervention. The compilation of such higher quality information will, in turn, allow for the estimation of higher quality leverage ratios for each type of public intervention, which can finally be used with more confidence as proxy data to fill data gaps.

[36] those that address the barriers and that promote the enabling environments

Box 2: Leverage ratios

Leverage ratios are of particular use when no actual data is available to estimate private climate finance mobilized by each specific public intervention. Given the low quality of overall data collected so far, which can be used to estimate leverage ratios or leverage factors, these are also very uncertain, not representing a viable alternative to the actual data collection. Jachnik et al (2015), argues: Where no suitable data is available, alternative options to derive approximations include conducting bottom-up estimates of private co-financing based on historical average co-financing ratios (A10.1) or a top-down apportionment of aggregated finance data (e.g. FDI) using climate-relevant coefficients (e.g. emissions or energy intensity) (A10.2). The accuracy of such approaches depends on the exact methods used, such as the quality and specificity of leverage ratios (e.g. whether they are available by country, technology, project size) or the relevance of environmental proxies. Thus, the most appropriate option is likely to vary based on what is feasible and likely to produce the most accurate estimates in the short term. However, neither of these approaches is currently developed enough for producing robust estimates.

In addition, in order to provide the right signals in terms of the effectiveness of public interventions by unit of finance (e.g. per 1 Euro or 1 USD), the OECD is recommending that donor countries estimate and report the grant equivalent value of its public financing, in addition to reporting the actual face value of the interventions. Simply put, the OECD recommends that the value of a 1USD grant is considered higher than the value of a concessional loan of 1USD and that the value of a 1USD non-concessional loan is lower than the two previous ones. While the grant equivalent value of a grant is 1, the grant equivalent value of a concessional loan is less than 1 and the grant equivalent value of a non-concessional loan is even lower. The same applies to other public finance instruments taking into account the respective inherent risk.

By estimating and reporting the grant equivalent value of its public finance interventions and by linking each such intervention to the respective private climate finance, the leverage ratio will provide a clearer picture of the actual effort put into mobilizing private climate finance, than the leverage ratio that would be calculated using face value of public interventions. In this context, the signal, the incentive to use one or the other public intervention will be more accurate.

Taking this into consideration, one may argue that the methodological framework proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative provides the grounds for MRV of incentives to private climate finance (otherwise referred to as public interventions), as well as it creates the conditions to provide public entities with the correct signals, the correct incentives, to promote one type of public intervention over the other, taking into account its respective mobilization potential, usually referred to as leveraging ratio. However, while the OECD Research Collaborative provides grounds for this, it is still in its early stages of pilot application. It will take time until the framework is widely used by developed countries and their respective public entities promoting public interventions capable of mobilizing private climate finance.

6.7.2. MRV of climate investment enabling environments

With regards to MRV of enabling environments for attracting private climate finance, the situation is somewhat different to that of MRV of incentives for (mobilizing) private climate finance described above.

The topic of enabling environments is addressed at the UNFCCC level, in particular the item of technology development and transfer.

One of the Technology Transfer Framework's pillars is Enabling Environments, which it defines as *government actions, such as fair trade policies, removal of technical, legal and administrative barriers to technology transfer, sound economic policy, regulatory frameworks and transparency, all of which create an environment conducive to private and public sector technology transfer. The purpose of the enabling environments component of the framework is to improve the effectiveness of the transfer of environmentally sound technologies by identifying and analysing ways of facilitating the transfer of environmentally sound technologies, including the identification and removal of barriers at each stage of the process*[37]*.*

In this context, promoting enabling environments equates to removing barriers to technology development and transfer, which for the greater part (if not in its entirety) correspond to the barriers to private climate finance.

It can then be said that there are several barriers to private climate finance, more generally to the introduction of climate friendly technologies or more broadly even, to financing of sustainable development.

Amin (2013) lists such key barriers:

- Policy and Regulatory Barriers
  - Policy uncertainty and complexity
  - Transaction costs (complying with policy/licensing/reporting…)
  - Land allocation, access and security of ownership
  - Enforcement of policy and pricing incentives
  - Existing subsidies and policy support for high carbon alternatives
- Market and Technology Barriers
  - Relatively high upfront cost of technology
  - Human and operational risks (lack of trained people)
  - Limitations of support infrastructure (e.g. grid infrastructure)
  - Immature supply-chain and limited capacity of project developers
  - Long term viability of many state utilities under question
  - Lack of track record of particular technology/project
- Financial Barriers
  - Country risk: defaults or other factors leading to non-return of invested capital including inflation
  - Currency risk: Exchange rate fluctuations making returns volatile.
  - Deal flow: insufficient volume commercially attractive deals for diversified investment portfolios
  - Complexity risks: difficulty evaluating multiple and overlapping risks

The 2015 European Report on Development notes that these barriers are even more acute in low income countries, where development financing needs are even more important. It notes, however, that appropriate actions can effectively overcome these challenges by addressing market, coordination and governance failures.

Under this task, four broad principles for mobilization of finance for sustainable development, which obviously apply to private climate finance, are proposed:

[37] http://unfccc.int/ttclear/templates/ttclear/templates/render_cms_page?s=TTF_ene

- Finance can promote enablers (e.g. local governance, human capital, infrastructure, green energy technology and trade), which in turn can also attract more public and private finance. This creates a virtuous circle between the enablers and finance: examples include mobile phone technology for mobile banking services, and human capital for FDI.
- An appropriate regulatory framework is of critical importance in order to attract private finance. For example, clear property rights or land titles help to mobilise private domestic finance by providing a collateral, and an improved and more transparent and efficient investment climate can unleash more finance. Enhanced competition in transport services and benchmarks in contract provision promote finance for and investment in infrastructure. Rules that create incentives for institutional investors to finance infrastructure in developing countries or green technology, rather than in liquid assets, help to channel international private finance to sustainable development purposes.
- Development of financial-sector instruments and the capacity to apply them can mobilise private resources. Blending instruments or public-sector guarantees, for instance, can enhance credit availability, which in turn leverages more private-sector finance.
- A conducive international policy environment can be critical in setting the right conditions, e.g. transparent global financial rules and standards for global finance, appropriate trade policies for investment in agriculture in developing countries (abolishing harmful trade distortionary subsidies), tax regulations for tax havens, or appropriate climate mitigation deals to set a carbon price that will mobilise climate finance.

Additionally, Amin (2013) proposes the following elements of “effective enabling environments and policy frameworks for climate finance:”

- Government leadership for creating enabling environments for scaled-up investments,
- Appropriate institutional arrangements to facilitate effective cross-Ministerial coordination,
- A clear, long term and coherent policy and regulatory framework underpinned by rule of law – aim to align investment timescales and policy timescales,
- Aligning price signals to incentivise deployment of low carbon resilient investments (may require reform of existing subsidies),
- Need to foster and establish markets to capture benefits of green growth,
- Capacity for designing, developing and implementing strategies, policies, regulatory frameworks and public financial incentives (including climate finance),
- Tracking of climate finance to enable directing finance to greatest potential impact or needs, and the transparency and accountability increases confidence of investors.

Developing countries are required by the guidelines for national communications to report on *any constraints and gaps, and related financial, technical and capacity needs, as well as proposed and/or implemented activities for overcoming the gaps and constraints*. This means that developing countries are required to report on barriers, but also on efforts made to enhance enabling environments related to financing, technology and capacity needs for the implementation of the convention. A requirement to update this information provided in the national communications is included in the guidelines for Biennial Update Reports.

An analysis of a short random set of submitted biennial update reports (Ghana, Singapore, South Africa, Vietnam) shows that there is no relevant information being submitted by developing countries on their efforts to creating enabling environments for private climate finance.

Summary reports of the technical analysis of the BURs also fail to highlight this issue as an area where capacity building in countries is required.

It can thus be said that even under the UNFCCC there is a wide array of work done on enabling environments, including the requirement by developing countries to report on the efforts to promote them. Nonetheless, the quality of the information put forward on the matter is rather low and the information is actually non-existent for most cases.

6.7.3. MRV of general (private) investment enabling environments

Establishing enabling environments for private climate relevant investments comes second to establishing environments for general private investments. If a country is generally perceived to have a difficult and complex context for private investments, this will surely not be different for climate relevant private investments. On the other hand having an overall private investment friendly environment does not automatically qualify to a friendly climate relevant private investment environment.

In these circumstances, it does not make sense to assess a country's friendliness, its enabling environment to climate relevant investments isolated from its friendliness to investments in any other non-climate relevant sector.

As should be expected, there are several exercises assessing the business environment of world economies, such as The Economist Intelligence Unit's Business Environment Rankings[38] and Forbes' Best Countries for Business[39].

The most comprehensive and reputable exercise, however, is done by the World Bank Group, namely the Doing Business Report, which is quoted and used as a basis for other exercises, including the OECD, in its Policy Framework for Investment[40].

Below, there's a short description of the World Bank's Doing Business report, namely on the indicators it measures and on the data collection process.

In addition, there's a description of the World Bank's Business Environment Snapshots, which provide a one-stop shop for accessing business environment assessments performed by different entities, from different perspectives.

Finally, in the sections below, there is an additional reference to a World Bank initiative: the Readiness for Investment in Sustainable Energy, which provides an example one step closer of how MRV of enabling environments for climate relevant investments could be set up.

Box 3: Green Bonds

Green bonds are increasing year by year. The "Bonds and Climate Change: the state of market in 2016" report indicates that there are currently USD694 billion in green bonds, an increase of USD96 billion from the 2015 report.

A green bond, like any other bond, is a fixed-income financial instrument for raising capital through the debt capital market. In its simplest form, the bond issuer raises a fixed amount of capital from investors over a set period of time, repaying the capital when the bond matures and paying an

[38] http://pages.eiu.com/rs/eiu2/images/BER_2014.pdf [visited on July 14, 2016]

[39] http://www.forbes.com/best-countries-for-business/ [visited on July 14, 2016]

[40] http://www.oecd.org/investment/toolkit/measuringprogress/ [visited on July, 14 2016]

agreed amount of interest (coupons) along the way (KPMG, 2015). A green bond is issued when the issuer (borrower) declares that the capital raised will be used in a "green" investment. While there are several guidelines on labelling a bond as a green bond, there is no authoritative source for that purpose, nor is there any verification of the green claim.

The Climate Bonds Initiative is an international, investor-focused not-for-profit organisation focusing on mobilizing the $100 trillion bond market for climate change solutions (funded by public and private organizations). The Initiative has developed a methodology to track green bonds – those with use of proceeds defined and labelled as green. In addition to these bonds issued with a green tag, the Initiative is also tracking bonds financing climate aligned bonds, which have not been issued as green. Together, these bonds are called "climate-aligned" bonds. The value mentioned in the first paragraph of this box refers to the total of climate-aligned bonds (Climate Bonds Initiative, 2015).

To track unlabelled green bonds, the Initiative "screened Bloomberg issuer data and reviewed over 1700 issuers to identify those with at least 95% of revenue derived from climate-aligned assets, based on the Climate Bonds Standard[41]. While these standards and the principles behind them provide an indicative relationship between the use of the revenues and green / low carbon / resilient investments, the definitions used are not aligned with the most commonly used definitions for climate finance proposed by the OECD DAC Rio Markers, thus making the figures on green bonds difficult to reconcile with other climate finance data gathered using more mainstream approaches such as the mentioned OECD DAC Rio Markers.

Interesting to note, in terms of the outcomes of this exercise is that the labelled green bonds account for only 17% of the total climate aligned bonds, meaning that 83% of green bonds were not labelled as such by the issuer. From this, it can be inferable that an important part of potentially climate relevant financing is taking place without any labelling or marking as such. At least climate financing which is not mobilized by a specific public intervention.

6.7.3.1. World Bank Doing Business Report

The World Bank's yearly Doing Business Report (13th edition for 2016) measures *"the regulations that enhance business activity and those that constrain it. Doing Business presents quantitative indicators on business regulations and the protection of property rights that can be compared across 189 economies—from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe—and over time[42]."*

The 2016 report looks at 10 indicators relevant to assess a country's business friendliness, namely: *starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency[43].*

[41] The Climate Bonds Standard and Certification against that Standard is an easy-to-use tool that allows investors and intermediaries to assess the environmental integrity of bonds. It consists of a certification process, pre-issuance requirements, post-issuance requirements and a suite of sector-specific eligibility & guidance documents. For more information see https://www.climatebonds.net/standards/about. To view the Green Bond Principles behind the standard, please see http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/green-bonds/green-bond-principles./

[42] http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2016 [visited on July, 13 2016]

[43] Market regulations have not been assessed in the 2016 edition.

To estimate these macro-indicators, 109 sub-indicators are measured for each country, which results in over 110 000 data points.

Even though the methodology is deemed to be "inexpensive and easily replicable," the process to collect data to measure these indicators is rather time intensive. It is fundamentally based on a network of over 11 000 contributors[44] that respond to a questionnaire[45] which is elaborated every year for the purpose of compiling the report. Such contributors include lawyers, accountants, judges, engineers, architects, businesspeople and public officials.

The data is collected through several rounds of interaction with the respondents. In addition to the questionnaires, written conversations, conference calls and visits by the Doing Business team are also used to collect information. The visits serve mainly the purpose of verifying data (for the 2016 report, 33 visits were made). The Doing Business team verifies all the answers provided by the respondents and therefore, the results included in the report are checked for accuracy.

The figure below illustrates the data collection process for the Doing Business Report.

Table 6-9: Data collection process for the World Bank's Doing Business Report



Source: Doing Business 2016

[44] http://www.doingbusiness.org/contributors/doing-business

[45] http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology

6.7.3.2. World Bank Business Environment Snapshots (BES)

The Business Environment Snapshots presents measurable indicators across a wide range of business environment issues and over time. This web-enabled tool compiles disparate data, indicators, and project information on the business environment for each country in an easily accessible, consistent and usable format. The BE Snapshots help development practitioners and policymakers obtain a comprehensive picture of the business environment in a particular country.

The Business Environment Snapshot is a composite of several other rankings and similar exercises, including the Doing Business Report described above:

- Economic Freedom Index (The Heritage Foundation)
- Political Risk Rating of ICRG Index (International Country Risk Guide – PRS)
- Country Credit Rating (Institutional Investor)
- Business Environment Index (EIU Global Outlook Report)
- Regulatory Quality Indicator (World Bank Group Governance Indicators)
- Control of Corruption Indicator (World Bank Group Governance Indicators)
- Quality of National BE Ranking (WEF Global Competitiveness Report)
- Doing Business Rank (World Bank Group Doing Business Report)

In this regards, the Business Environment Snapshot does not rely on the collection of primary data, rather it is a tool, a one-stop shop, to access to different ranking, measurement and analytical exercises.

6.7.3.3. World Bank Readiness for Investment in Sustainable Energy (RISE)

This new World Bank exercise is closer to the aim of MRVing enabling environments for climate relevant investments, as it provides indicators that compare the investment climate of countries across the three focus areas of the Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) initiative: energy access, energy efficiency and renewable energy[46].

RISE originates from a previous World Bank Group initiative, the Climate Investment Readiness Index, which evaluated the environment for private investment in climate mitigation and low-carbon technologies in South Asian countries—Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—compared with other emerging economies and developed regions. The index focused on renewable energy (particularly solar photovoltaic (PV), onshore wind, small hydro, and biomass) and energy efficiency (particularly lighting, appliances, and building codes).

RISE comprises 28 indicators and 85 sub-indicators encompassing the three pillars of energy access, renewable energy, and energy efficiency as well as cross-cutting indicators for topics relevant to all three SE4ALL pillars. All indicators are classified into four broad categories: planning, policies and regulations, pricing and subsidies, and procedural efficiency.

[46] http://rise.worldbank.org/

Figure 6-2: RISE Indicators

	Energy Access	Renewable Energy	Energy Efficiency
Planning	**Electrification plan** – National plan – Coverage of grid and off-grid – Regular update	**Planning for renewable energy expansion** – Renewable energy in expansion planning – Renewable energy in transmission planning – Target with an action plan – High quality resource mapping	**National plan for increasing energy efficiency** – National energy efficiency targets – Energy efficiency legislation/action plan – Sub-sectoral targets **Entities for energy efficiency policies, regulation and implementation** – Setting energy efficiency policy – Setting energy efficiency standards – Regulating energy efficiency activities of suppliers – Regulating energy efficiency activities of consumers – Equipment standards compliance – Building standards compliance
Policies and Regulations	**Enabling environment for renewable energy developers to invest in mini-grids** – Existence of regulations – Regulation attributes – Standards – Protection against expropriation – Subsidies or duty exemption **Enabling environment for standalone home systems** – National program – Standards – Subsidies or duty exemption	**Legal framework for renewable energy** **Regulatory policies** – Incentives to grid-connected renewable energy – Incentives to distributed renewable energy **Regulatory policies-policy design attributes** – Predictibility – Sustainability – Accessability – Remuneration efficiency **Network connection and pricing** – Connection cost allocation – Network usage pricing **Public financial support mechanisms** – Credit enhancement – Utility payments guarantee – Fiscal incentives – Public financing supports	**Quality of information provided to consumers** – Reports on electricity usage – Quality of information in report – Comparison with other users – Energy saving information **Incentives or mandates for energy supply utilities** – Mandates for utilities – Penalties for non-compliance – Measurement of savings – Third party validation – Cost recovery for utilities **Incentives or mandates for public entities** – Obligations for public buildings – Obligations for other public facilities – Public procurement of energy efficiency products – Multi-year contracts – Allowance to retain savings **Incentives or mandates for large-scale users** – Mandates for large-scale users – Penalties for non-compliance – Measurement of savings – Incentives for large-scale users **Minimum energy efficiency performance standards** – Appliances – Lighting – Electric motors – Industrial equipment – Regular update – Penalties for non-compliance **Energy labeling system** – Appliances – Lighting – Electric motors – Industrial equipment **Building energy codes** – Residential buildings – Commercial buildings – Compliance system – Renovated buildings – Building energy information
Pricing and Subsidies	**Funding support to electrification** – Dedicated funding – Subsidy to household connection – Subsidy to grid extension **Affordability of electricity** **Utility performance** – Reporting practice – Financial performance	**Fossil fuel subsidy** **Carbon pricing mechanism** – GHG emission reduction target – Carbon pricing mechanism **Utility performance** – Reporting practice – Financial performance	**Incentives from electricity pricing** – Electricity rate structure – Charges to large customers **Fossil fuel subsidy** **Carbon pricing mechanism** – GHG emission reduction target – Carbon pricing mechanism **Retail price of electricity**
Procedural Efficiency	**Establishing a new connection** **Permitting a mini-grid**	**Starting a new renewable energy project**	

● Indicators for a specific pillar ● Cross-cutting indicators

Source: World Bank[47]

[47] http://rise.worldbank.org/methodology

As an illustration, for Policies and Regulations on Renewable Energy, (sub)indicators such as incentives to grid-connected renewable energy, network usage pricing and fiscal incentives are collected. Figure 6-2 lists all the indicators collected for RISE.

As for the Doing Business Report, the information is collected via questionnaire sent to national stakeholders. All the indicators are weighted equally. A traffic light system applicable to each indicator, category and pillar to indicate distance to frontier[48] has been designed. The "frontier" being 100 points:

- A green light is reported for countries with a score of 75 or more, which are considered close to good practice on a certain indicator or a pillar.
- A yellow light shows countries that are in between green and red.
- A red light indicates that a country scores 25 or less and has a lot to improve to achieve good practice on what RISE measures.

A country receiving a green light on a pillar (energy access, renewable energy, and energy efficiency) gives evidence to the investor about the commitment and credibility of government policymaking to create an attractive enabling environment.

6.7.3.4. Way forward

There is ample experience is assessing a given country's friendliness to investment, in particular to private investment. This experience has already been expanded to assess, in a pilot phase only in 17 countries, the enabling environments (friendliness) to investments on sustainable energy (RISE).

When this has been done, it seems reasonable to expect that it should be feasible to identify a set of indicators to characterize the relevant enabling environment for climate relevant investments, both in terms of mitigation as well as of adaptation. Plenty of work on that front has already been done, including at the UNFCCC level.

Given that readiness for climate relevant investments cannot be considered in isolation from overall investment friendliness, it seems advisable that any such assessment would take into account the overall investment environment in a given country. In this regard, the climate relevant investment readiness assessment should be a subset, a spin-off of a larger investments environment assessment, such as the Doing Business Report described above, and build upon already existing relevant initiatives such as RISE.

Macro-indicators to be measured in such a specific climate relevant investments friendliness assessment could include:

- The existence of an officially approved Nationally Determined Contribution
- The inclusion of a mitigation component within the NDC
- The inclusion of an adaptation component within the NDC

[48] The "frontier" is the best case identified and is set at 100.

- The adoption of a low emissions development plan, including detailed mitigation action (with estimated emissions reduction potential)
- The adoption of a national adaptation plan with detailed adaptation measures
- Institutional capacity for implementation of climate policy is established
- Appropriate industry conditions, such as engineering expertise and the enabling infrastructure are present
- A stable financial sector with capacity to support low carbon (development) is present
- Economic instruments that translate policy targets into price incentives that make low carbon technologies more attractive are present[49]

While the collection of the data required to assess climate relevant investment enabling environments could be done via biennial reports to the UNFCCC, it does not seem feasible to adopt guidance on such collection with the required level of detail. Therefore, it is apparently more effective to undertake such an endeavour close but outside the formal UNFCCC process.

6.8. MRV of private climate finance by UNFCCC Parties

MRV of mobilized private climate finance is not yet a strict requirement in the UNFCCC reporting guidelines, and therefore only few countries are doing so. The approaches taken by those few countries that have included references to mobilized private finance in their second Biennial Report are greatly distinct and no consistency or comparability among approaches and figures can be identified from the analysis of the reported information.

In fact, most countries have been making efforts to estimate private climate finance mobilized by public interventions on pilot studies or case studies, not committing to the completeness or accuracy of the figures reported. For that reason, countries opt to not include mobilized private climate finance figures in the climate finance totals reported.

The following sections provided an account of reporting on mobilized private finance by UNFCCC parties: Member States, other selected Annex I Parties (US, Japan, Australia) and non-Annex I Parties. As can be seen, the level of sophistication and completeness of the estimation of private climate finance mobilized by Member State´s public interventions is low and the figures derived from these rather limited exercises by few MS do not allow any sort of extrapolation to an overall figure.

6.8.1. Member States

No MS has included mobilized private finance in the totals (i.e. in the tables[50]). Most are silent about mobilizing private finance, some mention that it is not yet possible to include such figures, others refer to on-going initiatives aimed at tracking and reporting mobilized private finance (either national or international such as the OECD Research Collaborative). A very small number of MS

[49] The last 4 items are from Polycarp et al (2013)

[50] Except for Spain which includes inclusion of USD 5 +14 million in table 7b, but it is not clear whether that is actually included in the totals

(ES, FI, FR, SE, UK) report a description of the public initiatives aimed at mobilizing private finance. In some of such descriptions, the amount of public finance involved is reporting and in fewer, a description of the amount of private finance leveraged is also identified.

6.8.1.1. Finland (2nd BUR)

As there are no appropriate data collection systems in place and due to confidentiality clauses related to some private sector data at the moment Finland does not estimate nor report regularly climate related private finance mobilized. Finland focuses instead at the moment to following and actively participating, when possible, to the multilateral discussions on the subject. However, in 2013 a very rough estimation was made, based on which Finland could mobilize yearly about USD 0.5–1.8 billion private climate finance to developing countries. This estimation was made using the analyses by Stadelmann and Michaelowa (2011)[51] and should be taken only as a very initial estimation, which may not be comparable to other estimations.

*The Finnish Fund for Industrial Cooperation Ltd (Finnfund) is a state-owned company that finances private projects in developing countries by providing long-term risk capital for profitable projects. The funding modalities include **equity investments, loans and/or guarantees**.*

*During the reporting period, Finnfund provided approximately in total EUR 28 million, which can be included in Finnish public climate funding, and Finnpartnership provided approximately EUR 0.2 million. According to rough estimates, the public funding through Finnfund's climate-related projects **leverages private funding at a level at about two to three times** that of Finnfund's funding for the investment, and the ratio can even be higher.*

Other climate finance and technology transfer activities […], such as the Energy and Environment Partnership (EEP), have also leveraged private finance. In the case of the EEP it has leveraged private finance at about 50% co-financing share.

6.8.1.2. France (2nd BR)

For the first time, France has estimated private climate finance mobilised through its public funding and projects in developing countries, for the years 2013 and 2014.

Total estimated private finance mobilised stood at approximately €596 million (US$791 million) in 2013 and €681 million (US$904 million) in 2014.

Key methodological choices by France to estimate the figures above include:

- *Categorization of actors based on >50% public ownership according to OECD DAC definition, with a filter extracting out French state-owned enterprises acting as "prudent investors"*
- *All private climate finance flows count (incl. domestic), but distinguish that originating from Annex I countries* (when possible)
- *Impact of TA or grants for policy support of project preparation is not included in the numbers. Guarantees not included either.*
- Point of measurement: mix of commitment (board approval) and disbursement

[51] Accounting of Private Climate Finance Types of Finance, Data Gaps and the 100 Billion Dollar Question

- Data is collected at project level, while proxies are used for credit lines
- Causality: all private finance identified (co-financing) is assumed to have been mobilised by the public intervention. When other public donors involved it is attributed pro-rata based on the share of the French public finance in the total amount of public finance for the project.

6.8.1.3. Spain (2nd BR)

Spain manages a set of public financial instruments with the potential to mobilize private climate finance:

- Fondo para la Internacionalización de la Empresa: provides direct financing to exporting Spanish companies. A single operation has been identified which mobilized USD 5 million in 2014.
- It has not been possible to estimate mobilization of private climate financing through interventions of Spain's export credit agency.
- COFIDES is Spain's development bank, providing direct support to the internationalization of Spanish companies, has mobilized an estimated USD 14 million.

6.8.1.4. Sweden (2nd BR)

Sweden has established public risk sharing mechanisms to promote climate private financing Instruments used including loans and guarantees. Sweden lists an indicative list of projects where private climate finance has been mobilized (indicating also when other public interventions have been involved). It mentions that the *leveraging is calculated for each project, following OECD DAC methodology* without providing further explanations. It stresses that the figures on private climate finance mobilized for these indicative projects are not included in the totals.

6.8.1.5. UK (2nd BR)

The UK has identified a number of instruments which are aimed at mobilizing private climate finance. It reports on the public financing involved and for one in specific, the UK Green Investment Bank, it reported on the estimated mobilized (leveraged) private finance: £200 million public financing, leveraging £360 million of private investment.

The UK is not clear on how this leveraging potential has been determined and does not mention if this figure is included in the totals.

6.8.2. Other Annex I Parties

Australia, Canada, Norway and the US do not include estimates of private climate finance mobilized by public interventions.

Some of the countries above, in particular the US, provide some brief information about the public instruments capable of mobilizing private finance, but do not provide figures for these instruments nor estimates of its leveraging potential.

6.8.3. Non-Annex I Parties

No non-Annex I Parties identify private finance mobilized by developed countries public policies.

7. Task 4: Assessment of additional thematic fields

It had been foreseen that the work to be carried out under task 4 would be discussed with DG Climate unit A2 and decided at a phone call after the workshop in February. Due to changes in the responsibilities, this was not yet discussed and determined. Therefore this task could not yet be elaborated for this draft final report. The following sections outline two tasks that are proposed under task 4.

7.1. Submission on accounting of financial resources

Article 9, paragraph 7 of the Paris Agreement includes a mandate to develop modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions. SBSTA 44 discussed this issue and invited Parties and observer organizations to provide submissions on this topic by 29 August 2016. The submissions should consider several questions outlined in the SBSTA conclusions:

(a) What are the existing modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions, and what are the challenges and information gaps with respect to these existing modalities;

(b) What accounting modalities need to be developed to serve the Paris Agreement, in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Agreement, and what are the challenges to the development of these accounting modalities and how can these be addressed;

(c) How to ensure that accounting modalities are developed in time to be integrated into the transparency framework established under the Paris Agreement.

The secretariat will compile the submissions into a miscellaneous document. In addition an in-session workshop will take place on this matter in conjunction with SBSTA 45 in November 2016. The secretariat will produce a technical paper prior to SBSTA 46 in May 2017, summarizing information from the in-session workshop and the submissions.

It was agreed that the work under task 4 should provide a contribution to this submission on modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions which could then be forwarded as an input from the Commission in the work process under EGI.

The input to the EU submission is structured in accordance with the questions outlined in the SBSTA conclusions in document FCCC/SBSTA/2016/L.5 (UNFCCC 2016) in the following sections.

7.1.1. What are the existing modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions, and what are the challenges and information gaps with respect to these existing modalities

7.1.1.1. Existing modalities

The current reporting of financial resources provided are based on the UNFCCC guidance for biennial reports as provided in decision 2/CP.17 which significantly improved the previous reporting of support through the national communications and the CTF format as updated by decision

9/CP.21. The following paragraphs describe key features of the current accounting framework applied by the EU and its Member States underpinning the reporting to the UNFCCC.

The EU support and follows the operational definition for reporting climate finance as provided by the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) in its "2014 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows Reported" which is *"Climate finance aims at reducing emissions, and enhancing sinks of greenhouse gases and aims at reducing vulnerability of, and maintaining and increasing the resilience of, human and ecological systems to negative climate change impacts*". (UNFCCC SCF, 2014)

In line with the joint statement of ministers on Tracking Progress Towards the $100 billion Goal from September 2015 in Paris (Joint Statement 2015), the EU considers mobilized climate finance to include:

- Public finance provided by governments through a variety of institutions including through the operating entities of the financial mechanism of the Convention, bilateral aid agencies, development finance institutions, export credit agencies (ECAs) and multilateral entities;
- Climate finance provided through a multitude of instrument such as concessional and non-concessional, including grants, loans, equity, and de-risking instruments, where such finance is identified as climate relevant using criteria in line with those agreed within relevant international organizations such as the OECD, IPCC, and MDBs.
- Private finance for climate-relevant activities that has been mobilized by public finance or by a public policy intervention, including technical assistance to enable policy and regulatory reform.

The accounting framework is characterized by the following principles:

- Where multiple actors are involved, the resulting finance is only counted once in tracking progress.
- Recognising the role that developing countries play in mobilizing private finance, the method only includes the share of private finance mobilized by developed countries, excluding the share of private finance that developing countries' public finance has mobilized.
- The assessment of the amount of private finance mobilized is done on an activity-by-activity basis and the reporting on mobilized private finance is associated with public activities where there is a clear causal link between a public intervention and private finance and where the activity would not have moved forward, or moved forward at scale, in the absence of the public intervention.
- The reporting framework should encourage and incentivise the most effective use of climate finance.

Other relevant aspects of the current methodologies are:

- The EU's reporting on climate finance for adaptation, mitigation and cross-cutting activities is drawing on existing definitions and eligibility criteria from relevant international organisations (e.g. the OECD DAC Rio markers, Joint MDB Typology of Mitigation Activities, and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)).

- Definitions and classifications outlined in the OECD DAC Statistical Reporting Directives underpin a consistent, comparable and transparent data collection across Member States and the European Commission. These include inter alia reporting rules and requirements for commitments, disbursements, financial instruments, exchange rates, sector codes and points of measurement.[52] The following specific definitions and approaches are particularly relevant in this context:
    - Definition of climate change mitigation: An activity should be classified as climate-change mitigation related (score Principal or Significant) if: it contributes to the objective of stabilisation of greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system by promoting efforts to reduce or limit GHG emissions or to enhance GHG sequestration
    - Definition of climate change adaptation: An activity should be classified as adaptation-related (score Principal or Significant) if: it intends to reduce the vulnerability of human or natural systems to the impacts of climate change and climate-related risks, by maintaining or increasing adaptive capacity and resilience. This encompasses a range of activities from information and knowledge generation, to capacity development, planning and the implementation of climate change adaptation actions.
    - The DAC monitors development finance through its Creditor Reporting System (CRS) using the "Rio markers". Markers indicate donors' policy objectives in relation to each activity, where every development co-operation activity reported to the CRS should be screened and marked as either (i) targeting the Conventions as a "principal" objective or a "significant" objective, or (ii) not targeting the objective. Activities marked as having a "principal" climate objective would not have been funded but for that objective; activities marked "significant" have other prime objectives but have been formulated or adjusted to help meet climate change concerns.
    - The definition to determine whether financial flow are public are those undertaken by central, state or local government agencies at their own risk and responsibility, regardless of whether these agencies have raised the funds through taxation or through borrowing from the private sector (OECD DAC, 2016).
    - The EU and its Member States use of OECD DAC definitions for financial instruments as characterised in detail by OECD DAC (2016).
    - The EU and its Member States use OECD DAC definitions for Other official flows (OOF) as provided by the OECD DAC (OECD 2016).
    - Financial instruments are usually accounted for at cash face value.

The existing modalities for the accounting and reporting of financial resources of the EU, in particular the aggregate financial resources provided and mobilized at EU level are based on

[52] OECD DAC (2016), "Converged Statistical Reporting Directives for the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and the Annual DAC Questionnaire", 8. April 2016, Document No DCD/DAC(2016)3/FINAL Available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/DCDDAC%282016%293FINAL.pdf

Article 16 of the EU Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) [53]. This Article requires annual reporting on support provided to developing countries by 30 September of Member States in the same format as used under the UNFCCC for the biennial reports to the Commission. With regard to accounting methodologies paragraph 2 of Article 16 specifies that Member States shall endeavour to provide information on financial flows based on the so-called 'Rio markers' for climate change mitigation-related support and climate change adaptation-related support introduced by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Member States are also requested to provide methodological information concerning the implementation of the climate change Rio markers methodology. Thus, the EU and many Member States are largely building on the OECD's longstanding experience in measuring and monitoring development finance and in tracking climate-related development finance through the OECD DAC Statistical Framework.

Paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the MMR requires Member States to report information on the definitions and methodologies used to determine any figures on private financial flows mobilised. As the reporting on private finance mobilized is currently under further development to enable countries to provide clear and transparent information, the EU and its Member States are also cooperating closely with the more recently established and OECD-hosted "Research Collaborative for Tracking Private Climate Finance" an open network, co-ordinated and hosted by the OECD, of governments, research institutions and international finance institutions with the objective to advance policy-relevant research related to methodologies to estimate mobilised private climate finance, collaborating across the DAC, Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), countries and expert organisations.

At EU level, for aggregate EU-28 figures on climate finance reported in 2015, OECD DAC statistics on 'imputed multilateral contributions' based on inflow data to multilateral funds and multilateral financial institutions have been used where figures are collected through the OECD DAC system based on detailed activity-level data within the statistical framework to ensure no double counting. However, such imputed multilateral contributions are not available for all climate funds, MDBs and relevant organizations. In addition, it does not include finance mobilized by the MDBs. Thus, work in the future should aim to broaden the availability of such data for more fund and institutions.

7.1.1.2. Challenges and gaps

General challenges

Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development and assessing the impacts and effectiveness of climate finance

As outlined in the 2014 Biennial Assessment report of the SCF an important area of future work is the assessment whether climate finance is helping to achieve the overarching goal of the Convention of keeping climate change within 2 degrees. It is key that not only our understanding of the financial flows related to climate activities from developed to developing countries improves, but to understand the mitigation and adaptation impacts of these financial flows. It will not contribute to achieve global climate objectives if the finance is not used effectively and efficiently. The objective expressed in Article 2, paragraph 1 (c) of the Paris agreement to make finance flows

[53] OJ, L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 13: Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on a mechanism for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and for reporting other information at national and Union level relevant to climate change and repealing Decision No 280/2004/EC..

consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development requires that the impacts on GHG emissions and climate-resilient development are tracked. Thus the main challenge for the development of accounting modalities for climate finance is that climate finance providers start assessing the impacts of mitigation finance on emissions. In addition there is a need to develop methodologies for assessing impacts of adaptation finance on resilience and effective adaptation which are much less developed and considerable further work is needed in this area. At the same time, the right enabling environments are fundamental to promote shifting finance to climate related areas, i.e. to mainstream climate finance. In this regards, MRV, including accounting of climate finance should contribute to promoting enabling environments aiming at incentivizing and facilitating climate investments.

Mainstreaming and co-benefits

In past years development assistance focused on working towards mainstreaming climate change into development planning and the related implementation of development plans and increased support to budgetary approaches compared to specific individual project activities. Such comprehensive and more holistic approach creates challenges for the monitoring of climate finance for mitigation and adaptation as it is more complicated to identify the climate-specific contributions if the support is addressing development priorities in a coherent and cross-cutting way. It is important that any accounting modalities for climate finance discussed under the UNFCCC do not disincentivise such mainstreaming activities.

Developing countries as well as developed countries have identified considerable co-benefits between activities targeting adaptation and mitigation simultaneously. Other co-benefits exist between adaptation and mitigation as well as forestry activities as recently identified in 2015 forum of the SCF. Thus there is a considerable potential for multiple co-benefits from jointly addressing several climate-related objectives into support activities and programmes. This also poses challenges for Parties in the reporting on climate finance, in particular for the separation of climate finance into mitigation and adaptation. It is important that methodologies for tracking climate finance reflect such multiple co-benefits in an appropriate way that creates incentives to enhance and use such co-benefits.

In its 2014 biennial assessment the SCF concluded that “Activities improving climate-resilience are rarely stand-alone but are mostly integrated into mainstream development interventions and business activities, for example, in the agricultural or water sectors. Due to this integration, support provided and investments in climate resilience are difficult to classify as such and therefore rarely reported as adaptation finance. Further work is therefore needed how monitoring of adaptation finance can be improved as the concepts of “adaptation” and “climate resilience” are well understood in the UNFCCC context, but not widely used in the development assistance contexts that implement activities that contribute to climate resilience.

Mobilization of climate finance

Article 9, paragraph 3 and 7 address particularly that the reporting is not only about climate finance provided, but also finance mobilized. The extent to which mobilisation of private finance happens depends on many factors, including the enabling conditions and sector-specific policies in the recipient country, the institution providing the finance, the type of instrument, and the purpose for which public finance is being made available. The measurement and reporting of mobilised private finance has only been initiated and needs to be further developed The range of actors and complexity of interactions associated with mobilising private climate finance makes it challenging to isolate the specific mobilisation effect of each public finance intervention. Thus further

methodological work is clearly required to improve monitoring and reporting of mobilisation at the international level. More work is needed to more accurately assess and make plausible assumptions about the causal relationship between public finance interventions and the private finance they mobilize directly and indirectly. Another area of work is the attribution of finance mobilized to countries or organizations. In this context it is also essential better understanding of how to account for policy-related public interventions, as domestic policy frameworks and wider enabling environments for investment are critical drivers of investments. Also at technical level in terms of reporting formats, improvements have to be implemented to address climate finance mobilized because currently there is no table or field for reporting numerical data in the reporting tables where Parties can report financial resources mobilized through public interventions.

Specific challenges and gaps

Improved terminology

The information provided in the section on existing modalities shows that a wide range of technical definitions are already available. In its reports the SCF also provided useful proposals for consistent use of terminology for climate finance in many areas. The use and reference to terminology, definitions and approaches already available and used could further improve the existing reporting guidelines for climate finance. Similar to the reporting on GHG emissions, where most of the terminology, approaches and methodologies are outlined in IPCC guidelines, it does not seem necessary to replicate such definitions or approaches as part of guidance under the UNFCCC, but references to available scientific work and guidance could further enhance the current guidance in an efficient way.

Structure of methodological information

In Paris in decision 9/CP.21 important changes to the current reporting framework have been agreed by creating specific reporting fields for the provision of information on definitions or methodologies used for reporting information in the following reporting parameters: “climate-specific” or “core/general”, “status”, “funding source”, “activity”, “financial instrument”, “type of support” and “sector”. This change will be implemented for the reporting in the biennial reports in 2018. The resulting information should be carefully assessed to what extent it led to improved transparency on the methodologies used by Parties. Based on such assessment, it could be useful to further improve the reporting of methodological information related to the monitoring of climate finance. The reporting template could be further developed through specifying the approaches available and used by Parties which could then be selected by countries in the reporting templates. Such further development of the reporting template could also include references to OECD DAC definitions for some of the reporting categories (e.g. financial instruments) as these definitions seem to be widely used by reporting Parties. Additional explanations should be required when different definitions are used. Such approach could make the reporting more efficient and complete at the same time.

Classification of “developing country” recipients:

Under the UNFCCC reporting there is a gap in the definition of recipients for climate finance. Under the UNFCCC it could be all Non-Annex I Parties, under the OECD DAC there is a different list of ODA eligible recipients and additional concepts may be used in bilateral public development assistance. From the perspective of accounting modalities, it would be useful to clarify the list of recipients as part of the guidance under the UNFCCC.

Forest finance flows

The 2015 Forum of the SCF discussed financing of forests and participants noted that there are gaps in data and information on forest finance flows. Currently, there is no commonly agreed definition of forest finance and what qualifies as forest finance. Information on private finance for forests is largely unavailable due to the difficulty in tracking. Participants mentioned that this poses challenges to governments and investors alike, in acquiring necessary information for designing policies or making investment decisions. The current reporting guidance or reporting template does not address forest finance apart from the choice of sector in the reporting table for bilateral support and Parties do not have an opportunity to provide separate information on finance provided related to forest activities. Forest finance could either be part of mitigation, adaptation or cross-cutting climate finance. Some countries also report forest finance under other in order to be able to separately report on forest finance. There is also no clear link between coordination of support for the implementation of the activities under the Warsaw framework for REDD-plus referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70 and the work on the improvement of the transparency of climate finance. Given the importance of REDD-plus finance and other support related to forests in the context of the UNFCCC, this link should be further discussed and the EU hopes that the 2016 Biennial Report of the SCF will provide further insights in this matter.

7.1.2. What accounting modalities need to be developed to serve the Paris Agreement, in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Agreement, and what are the challenges to the development of these accounting modalities and how can these be addressed

The further development of modalities and guidelines related to climate finance should address the challenges and gaps outlined in the previous section of this submission.

Accounting modalities go beyond a transparent presentation of information because they ensure that specific principles established as part of the Paris Agreement guide the implementation of the reporting. Therefore it is crucial for the development of accounting modalities to gain a common understanding of what these principles are.

The EU believes that transparency, completeness, consistency, comparability and accuracy are the key principles that should guide accounting of both support and for mitigation action. The SCF already provided more specific guidance how some these principles apply to climate finance and this work should be further developed.

Accuracy related to GHG emissions is defined that estimates should be accurate in the sense that they are systematically neither over nor under true values, as far as can be judged, and that uncertainties are reduced as far as practicable. Thus, the concept of uncertainties plays a significant role in the assessment of the accuracy of GHG emissions. The concept of uncertainties could also be applied to finance flows provided and mobilized as different types of flows will be connected with quite different levels of uncertainties. An approach that provides uncertainties for the aggregation of information could also be further discussed related to climate finance as an methodological approach that allows an aggregation of estimates that are sometimes related to significant uncertainties without the possibility to gather more robust data by making the implicit uncertainties transparent. The identification of uncertainties also helps to prioritize data collection and efforts to improve data.

In addition to the TACCC principles, paragraph 92 of decision 17CP.21 established several additional principles relevant under the Paris agreement:

1. The importance of facilitating improved reporting and transparency over time;
2. The need to avoid duplication as well as undue burden on Parties and the secretariat;
3. The need to ensure that Parties maintain at least the frequency and quality of reporting in accordance with their respective obligations under the Convention;
4. The need to ensure that double counting is avoided;
5. The need to ensure environmental integrity

In the context of climate finance, these principles have to be further discussed and the EU therefore provides some initial thoughts on how these principles apply in the context of climate finance:

Given the considerable challenges outlined above for the tracking of climate finance, Parties will need to follow a stepwise and ongoing improvement process in the future and it is important to implement the principle of “improved reporting and transparency over time” in this context. It is important to acknowledge that additional development of accounting modalities, refined definitions or methodologies need considerable time until they are systematically implemented in the data collection systems and before data can be consistently collected as part of the routine statistical procedures. Thus, it may take several years until changes come fully into effect, in particular as for climate finance, such improvements need to be implemented across a range of countries, organisations and international financial institutions.

The need to avoid duplication in the context of climate finance needs to be considered not only from the perspective of Parties and the secretariat, but also including international finance institutions, funds as well as private stakeholders. Therefore accounting modalities should carefully assess at which level (Parties, international finance organizations) additional guidance should apply and how reporting from different entities and institutions can be brought together in the most efficient and effective way for a transparent overview of global finance provided.

Given the large number of stakeholders involved in the provision of climate finance, it is important to ensure that double counting across donors is avoided. The way this is currently implemented was already outlined related to the first question in this submission.

The need to ensure environmental integrity implies that accounting modalities take into account the impacts and the effectiveness of climate finance, and its contribution to keeping climate change within two degrees centigrade as further outlined under gaps and challenges.

In the development of methodologies, definitions and accounting modalities for mitigation, e.g. for the land-use sector, SBSTA considerably draw on scientific work conducted by the IPCC. The EU believes that also further work on methodologies and accounting modalities for climate finance require further scientific input and the work under SBSTA will strongly depend on scientific work conducted by other organizations. Consistent and coherent accounting requires consistent methodologies over a wide range of actors which can only achieved if all actors are involved in the further development of the scientific approach for tracking of climate finance. Therefore the EU believes that the successful implementation of the task under SBSTA will depend to a large extent how Parties will manage to involve important actors that provided scientific research and

developed methodologies in the past such as OECD DAC, the OECD research collaborative on tracking private climate finance, Multilateral Development Banks, the International Development Finance Club or regional development banks will be involved in this work.

7.1.3. How to ensure that accounting modalities are developed in time to be integrated into the transparency framework established under the Paris Agreement

In accordance with Article 13, paragraph 6 the purpose of the framework for transparency of support is to provide clarity on support provided and received by relevant individual Parties in the context of climate change actions under Articles 4, 7, 9, 10 and 11, and, to the extent possible, to provide a full overview of aggregate financial support provided, to inform the global stocktake under Article 14. Specific reporting requirements related to climate finance include that developed country Parties shall, and other Parties that provide support should, provide information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support provided to developing country Parties under Articles 9, 10 and 11 (Article 13, paragraph 9) and that developing country Parties should provide information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support needed and received under Articles 9, 10 and 11 (Article 13, paragraph 10). The relevant Articles to the provision of support under Article 9 are paragraphs 1, 2 and 7.

As already outlined in the previous section, it is important that the work on accounting modalities for financial resources addresses the principles outlined in paragraph 92 of decision 1/CP.1 as these are guiding the elaboration of modalities, procedures and guidelines for the enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement.

Paragraph 96 of decision 1/CP.21 requests the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) to conclude the work on the modalities, procedures and guidelines for the enhanced transparency framework under Article 13 no later than 2018. This means that any outcome of the work process under SBSTA elaborated and finalized prior to the end of 2018 can be integrated into the revised common guidelines, modalities and procedures under Article 13. As no more detailed work programme has been elaborated related to the work under Article 13 under APA so far, nor any discussion took place related to the expected outputs in terms of guidelines, modalities or procedures, it cannot yet be specified in a more detailed way how the work under SBSTA could be undertaken in a way that creates most synergies with the work under Article 13. The EU expects that the work under Article 13 will elaborate reporting guidelines, guidelines for the technical expert review under Article 13, paragraph 11 as well as modalities for a facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress. Any specific outcomes in terms of reporting requirements or reporting tables under the SBSTA work programme would feed into the work on reporting guidelines under APA.

The purpose of the framework for transparency of support also includes the provision a full overview of aggregate financial support provided, to inform the global stocktake under Article 14. In this respect the accounting modalities may also address how the reported information from a wide range of actors can be made accessible to Parties and stakeholders in a searchable way and in a way that allows transparent aggregation. The addition of information from various sources and stakeholders may imply additional accounting decisions beyond any guidance provided to Parties which should be discussed in a transparent way if such aggregate information is informing the global stocktake.

7.2. Specific proposals for the revision of the "Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the MMR"

Table 7-1 provides conclusions related to the proposals and options given as recommendations under task 2 based on the comments received from Member States on these recommendations. The table provides an indication whether and how these recommendations should be implemented in the "Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the MMR". The colour in the column conclusions follows a traffic light approach indicating in green which recommendations where supported by practically all Member States, in yellow those recommendations or proposals that were largely supported, but for which few Member States expressed concerns and using red for those proposals that were not supported by many Member States or where opposing views were expressed.

Table 7-1 Overview of recommendations related to the "Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support under the MMR"

Issue	Proposal or Options	Conclusions
1. Format of Member States replies	The same changes as agreed in decision 9/CP.21 for the CTF should be applied to the reporting tables used for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR.	✓ Proposal implemented in technical guidance (2016)
2. Template for methodological information	**Option 1:** integrate a specific new template (covering e.g. explanations how imputed multilateral climate-specific contributions were determined). **Option 2:** integrate the template developed by the OECD joint ENVIRONET-WP-STAT Task Team on the methodological approaches for reporting.	⇨ Option 1 is preferred by more MS than option 2 ⇨ With some discussion, it is assumed, that one of these options could be implemented in the 2017 technical guidance
3. Coverage of core contributions and climate-specific finance for multilateral climate finance	**1.** If reported, core/general and climate-specific data should be mutually exclusive except where climate-specific contributions are made to specific sub-funds or dedicated programmes of the overarching institutions to which also core funding is provided. **2.** Include a list of funds and programmes as climate specific only. **3.** Indicate any multilateral fund, financial institution or UN body reported under 'other' with its name. **4.** Indicate if Member States use OECD imputed multilateral contributions (add in template suggested under 2).	⇨ With some discussion this proposal could be implemented in the 2017 technical guidance
4. Coverage of multilateral funds or development	**1.** Contributions to the UNFCCC should be clarified. **2.** Amend the reporting tables related to contributions to the Montreal Protocol	⇨ With some discussion this proposal could be implemented in the 2017

Issue	Proposal or Options	Conclusions
banks	**3.** Include additional rows in the reporting template for most frequently reported other multilateral climate change funds, multilateral institutions and other specialized UN bodies	technical guidance ⇨ Option 3 appears to be less controversial than options 1 and 2
5. Reporting on financial instruments	Request an explanation of the methodology used when loans or other financial instruments are reported	⇨ With some discussion this proposal could be implemented in the 2017 technical guidance
6. Definition of recipient countries	**Proposal [new option 1]** Use the OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries and deduct Annex I countries (Ukraine, Belarus, Turkey) **[new option 2]** Use the OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries. **[new option 3]** Keep the difference between technical guidance and BR guidance.	× Views are opposing on the three options × Unclear if a solution can be found to implement this in the 2017 technical guidance
7. Point of measurement	Include further guidance for the use of 'committed' and 'disbursed' for loans, export credits or guarantees, including the discussions in OECD DAC	⇨ With little discussion this proposal could be implemented in the 2017 technical guidance
8. Coverage of funding sources	**1.** Member States should use the definitions for OOF as provided by the OECD DAC, or provide additional explanations. **2.** If OOF flows are reported, MS shall explain as part of the methodological information which flows are covered under OOF. **3.** If no OOF are reported, MS should indicate whether OOF flows do or do not occur. **[new option]** no change required	⇨ There is wide agreement for the three points made under this proposal; however, a new option was introduced. ⇨ With little discussion this proposal could be implemented in the 2017 technical guidance
9. Coverage of instruments reported	**1.** Include references to OECD DAC definitions for financial instruments including a list of instruments that could be reported under 'other **2.** If 'other instruments' are reported, MS shall explain which instruments are covered. **3.** If no 'other instruments' are reported, indicate whether such instruments do or do not occur.	✓ Proposal can be implemented in technical guidance (2017) ✓ The OECD adds "a new taxonomy of financial instruments has been introduced in DAC statistics (starting with 2016 data)".
10. Currency conversion rate	**1.** Add a specific field in the MMR table template for the reporting of the currency conversion rate used. **2.** Recommendation using the OECD yearly average exchange rate and link it to the source.	✓ Proposal can be implemented in technical guidance (2017)
11. Financial resources mobilized through public interventions	**1.** Add a field for numerical data in the reporting tables for financial resources mobilized through public interventions. **2.** Add a requirement that MS who report such figures should provide methodological information how mobilized resources were estimated.	⇨ There is wide agreement for the two points; however, one member state expresses need for further discussion.
12. Coverage of	**Option 1a:** Keep the current guidance.	⇨ With some discussion

Issue	Proposal or Options	Conclusions
cross-cutting and other climate-specific finance	**Option 1b:** cross-cutting should be used for ‘funding for activities which are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation’ only if countries cannot assign a contribution to adaptation and mitigation through the use of Rio markers. **[New Option 1b amended:]** Add at the end of 1b “or a transparent national methodology”. **Option 2:** Add the following element to the technical guidance note: Countries who like to separate finance flows provided to REDD+ activities or forestry activities should report such flows under ‘other climate-specific finance’.	this proposal could be implemented in the 2017 technical guidance ⇨ Option 1b (amended) and 2 appear to be less controversial than option 1a ⇨ According to the OECD it is “important to understand if the cross-cutting amounts are to be added or subtracted from the mitigation and adaptation amounts”.
13. Identification of mitigation/adaptation activities and use of OECD DAC indicators	Discuss whether it is possible to develop a common approach or at least apply some elements of the marking system in a consistent way	× Views are opposing on this proposal × Unclear if a solution can be found to implement this in the 2017 technical guidance

7.2.1. Revision of the “Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the MMR”

On the basis of the evaluation in Table 7-1, the recommendations and proposals related to the technical guidance that were supported by all Member States (green) and most of those supported by many countries (yellow) have been implemented in the revised technical guidance proposed in Annex VII (section 9.7). This revised version is based on the 6 June 2016 version and the respective template provided as Annex I. As the proposed technical guidance would apply to the year 2017, it was updated accordingly. The changes in the technical guidance document include the following elements:

- The section on DAC reporting on development finance was moved to the section on “definition of financial instruments”.
- A specific field for the OECD currency conversion rate was included in the template and referenced in the technical guidance.
- OECD definitions for commitments and disbursements have been added in a tablular format.
- For coverage of cross-cutting and other climate-specific finance, a new option is presented where Member States should use ‘funding for activities which are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation’ only if they cannot assign a contribution to adaptation and mitigation through the use of Rio markers or a transparent national methodology.
- The joint paragraph of financing source and financial instruments under section “definition” was divided into two separate paragraphs. In terms of coverage of funding sources, additional guidance for Other Official Flows (OOF) was included. This additional guidance requests Member States that they should use the definitions for OOF as provided by the

OECD DAC (OECD 2016a). If they use a national definition different from the OECD DAC definition, additional explanations should be provided by Member States as part of the methodological information. If OOF flows are reported, Member States shall explain as part of the methodological information which flows are covered under OOF. If no OOF are reported, Member States should indicate in the methodological template whether OOF flows do or do not occur.

- Concerning the use of the category “other” in the coverage of instruments reported, an explanation and specification of what is included is requested. It is also requested to indicate whether such instruments do or do not occur.
- An exception to the rule that core/general and climate-specific data should be mutually exclusive was added to core/general and climate-specific contributions through multilateral channels. In such cases where climate-specific contributions are made to specific sub-funds or dedicated programmes of the overarching institutions to which also core funding is provided, an exemption can be made. In this case, the core funding should be reported as well as climate specific funding and it should be explained how core and climate-specific contributions have been differentiated. It should also be clearly indicated to which sub-funds or programmes the climate-specific contributions are contributing.
- It is furthermore added that any multilateral fund, financial institution or UN body reported under “other” should be clearly indicated with its name.
- The numerical reporting field for private climate finance mobilized, which was added to the template, is referenced in the technical guidance and Member States should describe this in the methodological report.

Changes in the template, Annex I to the technical guidance

Annex I to the “Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the MMR” provides the proposed and revised 2017 template. Changes have been made in table 7, summary information, and table 7(a), contributions through multilateral channels. Changes to the 2016 version are indicated with grey background. Two fields and three footnotes were added to the summary information table. The changes introduced can be summarised as follows:

A currency conversion rate field was included which is linked to the OECD yearly average conversion rate. An additional field was added to indicate financial resources mobilized through public interventions. This field is non-mandatory but if filled in, Member States are encouraged to provide methodological information how those mobilized resources were estimated. For the reporting of OOF, a footnote was added asking Member States to either write “not occurring” or “not estimated”, if no value is reported.

Six United Nation bodies as well as two footnotes were added to table 7(a), contributions through multilateral channels. Climate-specific fields were blocked for the World Bank. As recitals 1-7 were indicated without the according footnotes, these were copied from the summary information table and added as a footnote. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN REDD), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) were added under Specialized United

Nation bodies. Member States are asked to indicate each fund, institution or specialized United Nation body reported under “other” with its name.

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9. Annex

9.1. Annex I: Detailed comparison of methodologies for multilateral finance

The following tables were the basis for the analysis of different methodologies used to report on multilateral climate finance (chapter 4.2.1). The information provided in Tables 7 and 7a from each Member State´s second biennial report (BR2/UNFCCC) and Article 16 of the MMR were analysed and compared. Additionally, qualitative information on methodologies provided in BRs and methodological notes submitted together with MMR reports were taken into account.

Table 9-1: Comparison of methodologies for reporting on multilateral climate finance in BRs/MMR

	core/ general	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	committed / pledged	Disbursed /Provided	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Other	Sector information provided	Sector definition based on OECD DAC	Other sector definition	ODA	OOF	other
	Coverage of core /climate-specific finance					**Point of Measurement/ Status**		**Coverage of instruments reported**					**Coverage of sectors**	**Definition of sectors**		**Funding source**		
Austria MMR	x	x	-	x	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x		
Austria BR	-	-	-	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-
Belgium MMR	x	x	x	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	x	x	-	x	x	-
Belgium BR	x	x	x	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	x	x	-	x	-	x
Bulgaria MMR	x	x	-	x	-		x	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-

	core/ general	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	committed / pledged	Disbursed /Provided	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Other	Sector information provided	Sector definition based on OECD DAC	Other sector definition	ODA	OOF	other
	Coverage of core /climate-specific finance					Point of Measurement/ Status		Coverage of instruments reported					Coverage of sectors	Definition of sectors		Funding source		
Bulgaria BR	no climate finance reported																	
Croatia MMR	x	-	-	-	-													
Croatia BR	x	-	-	-	-							x						
Cyprus MMR	no climate finance reported																	
Cyprus BR	no BR2 submitted yet (20.02.2016)																	
Czech Republic MMR	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	x					-	-	-	x		
Czech Republic BR	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-
Denmark MMR	x	x	-	x	x	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	x	x	-	x	-	-
Denmark BR	x	x	x	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	x			x	-	-

	core/ general	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	committed / pledged	Disbursed /Provided	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Other	Sector information provided	Sector definition based on OECD DAC	Other sector definition	ODA	OOF	other
	Coverage of core /climate-specific finance					**Point of Measurement/ Status**		**Coverage of instruments reported**					**Coverage of sectors**	**Definition of sectors**		**Funding source**		
Estonia MMR	x	-	x	x	-	-	x	x					(x)			x	x	-
Estonia BR	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	x					-	-	-	x	x	-
Finland MMR	x	x	x	x	-	-	x	x					x	x		x		
Finland BR	x	x	x	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	-						
France MMR	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	x					x	x		x		
France BR	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	x					x	x		x		
Germany MMR	x	x	x	x	x	-	x	x					-	-	-	x		
Germany BR	x	x	x	x	x	-	x	x					-	-	-	x		
Greece MMR	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	x					x			x		
Greece BR	no BR submitted (20.02.2016)																	
Hungary MMR	x	x	x	x				x					x	x		x		
Hungary BR	x	x					x	x					x			x		
Ireland MMR	x	x	x	x			x	x					x		x	x		
Ireland BR	x	x	x	x	x		x	x					x		x	x		x

	core/ general	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	committed / pledged	Disbursed /Provided	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Other	Sector information provided	Sector definition based on OECD DAC	Other sector definition	ODA	OOF	other
	Coverage of core /climate-specific finance					Point of Measurement/ Status		Coverage of instruments reported					Coverage of sectors	Definition of sectors		Funding source		
Italy MMR	x	x	x	x			x	x					x			x	x	
Italy BR		x		x			x	x					x			x		
Latvia MMR	-	x		x	x	x	x	x					x			x		x
Latvia BR		x			x	x	x	x					x			x		x
Lithuania MMR	x	x		x			x	x					x			x		
Lithuania BR	x	x		x			x	x					x			x		
Luxembourg MMR			x	x		x	x	x					-			x	x	
Luxembourg BR	x	x	x	x		x	x	x					x			x	x	
Malta MMR	x	x	x		x	x		x					x	x		x		
Malta BR	x																	
Netherlands MMR	x	x		x			x	x					x		x	x		
Netherlands BR	x	x		x			x	x					x			x		
Poland MMR	x			x			x	x					x	x		x		

	core/ general	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	committed / pledged	Disbursed /Provided	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Other	Sector information provided	Sector definition based on OECD DAC	Other sector definition	ODA	OOF	other
	Coverage of core /climate-specific finance					Point of Measurement/ Status		Coverage of instruments reported					Coverage of sectors	Definition of sectors		Funding source		
Poland BR	x			x			x	x					x			x		
Portugal MMR	x						x	x					-			x		
Portugal BR	x						x	x								x		
Romania MMR	no multilateral contributions																	
Romania BR	no multilateral contributions																	
Slovakia MMR	x	x	x	x			x	x				x	x			x		
Slovakia BR	x	x	x	x	x		x	x				x	x			x		
Slovenia MMR				x			x	x					x			x		
Slovenia BR	no BR submitted (20.02.2016)																	
Spain MMR		x	x	x			x	x					-			x		
Spain BR	x	x	x	x			x	x					-			x		
Sweden MMR		x	x	x			x	x					x	x		x		

	core/ general	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	committed / pledged	Disbursed /Provided	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Other	Sector information provided	Sector definition based on OECD DAC	Other sector definition	ODA	OOF	other
	Coverage of core /climate-specific finance					**Point of Measurement/ Status**		**Coverage of instruments reported**					**Coverage of sectors**	**Definition of sectors**		**Funding source**		
Sweden BR	x	x	x	x			x	x					x	x		x		
UK MMR	x	x	x	x			x	x				x	x			x		
UK BR	x		x	x			x	x					-					

Table 9-2: Coverage of multilateral institutions in reporting on core/general support

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - core/general							**Coverage of financial institutions - core/general**							**Specialized UN bodies - core/general**						
Austria MMR	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	x	-	x	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	
Austria BR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Belgium MMR	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	-	x	-	-	x	x	-	x	-	-	x
Belgium BR	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	x
Bulgaria MMR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	x
Bulgaria BR																					
Croatia MMR																			x	x	
Croatia BR																			x	x	
Cyprus MMR																					
Cyprus BR																					
Czech Republic MMR	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-
Czech Republic BR	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - core/general							**Coverage of financial institutions - core/general**							**Specialized UN bodies - core/general**						
Denmark MMR	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	x
Denmark BR	x	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-
Estonia MMR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	x
Estonia BR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	x
Finland MMR	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	x	-	x		x	x	-	x	-	-	x
Finland BR	x	x	x	x	-	x	x	-	x	x	x	-	x	-	x	x	-	x	-	-	x
France MMR	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
France BR	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany MMR	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany BR	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Greece MMR																		x			
Greece BR																					
Hungary MMR							x									x		x	x		x
Hungary BR							x											x	x		x
Ireland MMR	x						x			x						x		x			x

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - core/general							Coverage of financial institutions - core/general							Specialized UN bodies - core/general						
Ireland BR	x						x			x						x		x			x
Italy MMR	x																				x
Italy BR									x	x					x						
Latvia MMR																					
Latvia BR																					
Lithuania MMR							x											x			
Lithuania BR							x											x			
Luxembourg MMR																					
Luxembourg BR	x																				
Malta MMR																x					
Malta BR																x					x
Netherlands MMR									x						x	x		x			x
Netherlands BR	x							x	x	x				x	x	x	x	x			x

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - core/general							Coverage of financial institutions - core/general							Specialized UN bodies - core/general						
Poland MMR							x								x						
Poland BR							x								x						
Portugal MMR							x		x	x			x			x					x
Portugal BR							x		x	x			x			x			x		
Romania MMR																					
Romania BR																					
Slovakia MMR																		x			x
Slovakia BR																					x
Slovenia MMR																					
Slovenia BR																					
Spain MMR																					
Spain BR	x																				
Sweden MMR							x		x	x			x			x		x			x

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - core/general							**Coverage of financial institutions - core/general**								**Specialized UN bodies - core/general**					
Sweden BR							x		x	x			x			x		x			x
UK MMR									x	x			x	x	x						
UK BR							x		x	x			x								

Table 9-3: Coverage of multilateral institutions in reporting on climate-specific support

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	Clean Technology Fund	Strategic Climate Fund	IPCC	other	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	ITL	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - climate-specific										Coverage of financial institutions - climate-specific									Specialized UN bodies - climate-specific						
Austria MMR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-		x		-
Austria BR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	x	x	-	-	-
Belgium MMR	-	x	-	x	x	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	x
Belgium BR	-	x	x	x	x	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	x
Bulgaria MMR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	x	-
Bulgaria BR																										
Croatia MMR																										
Croatia BR																										
Cyprus MMR																										
Cyprus BR																										

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	Clean Technology Fund	Strategic Climate Fund	IPCC	other	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	ITL	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - climate-specific										**Coverage of financial institutions - climate-specific**									**Specialized UN bodies - climate-specific**						
Czech Republic MMR	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Czech Republic BR	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Denmark MMR	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	x	x	x	x	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	-
Denmark BR	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	x	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	-
Estonia MMR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	x	-	-	-
Estonia BR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-
Finland MMR	x	x	x	x	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	x	-	x	-	x	x	-	x	-	-	-	x
Finland BR	x	x	x	x	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	x	-	x	-	x	x	-	x	-	-	-	x
France MMR	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	Clean Technology Fund	Strategic Climate Fund	IPCC	other	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	ITL	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - climate-specific										**Coverage of financial institutions - climate-specific**									**Specialized UN bodies - climate-specific**						
France BR	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany MMR	-	x	x	x	x	-	-	-	x	x	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	x	x	-	-	-	x
Germany BR	-	x	x	x	x	-	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	x	x	x	x			x
Greece MMR										x																
Greece BR																										
Hungary MMR										x											x					
Hungary BR										x																
Ireland MMR		x				x																x				x
Ireland BR		x				x																x				x
Italy MMR	x				x					x					x				x	x		x		x		x
Italy BR	x				x								x	x			x		x	x		x				x
Latvia					x										x											

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	Clean Technology Fund	Strategic Climate Fund	IPCC	other	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	ITL	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - climate-specific										**Coverage of financial institutions - climate-specific**									**Specialized UN bodies - climate-specific**						
MMR																										
Latvia BR					x										x		x									
Lithuania MMR															x	x										
Lithuania BR															x	x										
Luxembourg MMR	x				x						x								x			x				x
Luxembourg BR					x						x								x	x		x				x
Malta MMR																										x
Malta BR																										
Netherlands MMR	x									x			x						x	x		x				x
Netherlands BR	x											x	x	x				x	x	x		x				x
Poland					x																x	x	x			x

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	Clean Technology Fund	Strategic Climate Fund	IPCC	other	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	ITL	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - climate-specific										**Coverage of financial institutions - climate-specific**									**Specialized UN bodies - climate-specific**						
MMR																										
Poland BR					x															x	x	x				x
Portugal MMR																										
Portugal BR																										
Romania MMR																										
Romania BR																										
Slovakia MMR										x					x						x		x	x		
Slovakia BR										x					x						x	x	x	x		
Slovenia MMR	x										x								x							x
Slovenia BR																										
Spain MMR							x															x				x
Spain BR	x			x			x															x				x

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	Clean Technology Fund	Strategic Climate Fund	IPCC	other	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	ITL	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - climate-specific										**Coverage of financial institutions - climate-specific**									**Specialized UN bodies - climate-specific**						
Sweden MMR	x	x			x	x				x																
Sweden BR	x	x			x	x				x																
UK MMR	x				x		x			x																
UK BR	x				x					x																

9.2. Annex II: Detailed comparison of methodologies for bilateral finance

The following tables were the basis for the analysis of different methodologies used to report on bilateral climate finance (chapter 4.3.3). The information provided in Tables 7b from each Member State´s second biennial report (BR2/UNFCCC) and Article 16 of the MMR were analysed and compared. Additionally, qualitative information on methodologies provided in BRs and methodological notes submitted together with MMR reports were taken into account.

Table 9-4: Comparison of methodologies to report on bilateral climate finance (funding sources, point of measurement, coverage of instruments reported)

	Coverage of funding sources			Definition provided for funding source			Point of Measurement/ Status				Definition used for point of measurement/ status				Coverage of instruments reported							Definition provided for instrument						
	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	committed	Disbursed /Provided	Calendar Year	Fiscal Year	Definition from DAC Statistical Reporting Directives	UNFCCC terminology	national definition	definition not indicated	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other
Austria MMR	x	x					x	x							x													
Austria BR	x						x	x							x		x	x	x	x								
Belgium MMR	x	x						x					x		x	x												
Belgium BR	x	x		x				x							x	x												
Bulgaria MMR																												
Bulgaria BR																												
Croatia MMR																												
Croatia BR																												
Cyprus MMR																												

	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	committed	Disbursed /Provided	Calendar Year	Fiscal Year	Definition from DAC Statistical Reporting Directives	UNFCCC terminology	national definition	definition not indicated	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other
	Coverage of funding sources			**Definition provided for funding source**			**Point of Measurement/ Status**				**Definition used for point of measurement/ status**				**Coverage of instruments reported**							**Definition provided for instrument**						
Cyprus BR																												
Czech Republic MMR	x							x							x													
Czech Republic BR	x							x							x													
Denmark MMR	x						x								x													
Denmark BR	x														x													
Estonia MMR	x							x							x													
Estonia BR	x							x							x													
Finland MMR	x							x							x			x				x			x	x	x	x
Finland BR	x							x							x			x			x							
France	x	x		x	x		x				x		x		x	x	x											

	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	committed	Disbursed /Provided	Calendar Year	Fiscal Year	Definition from DAC Statistical Reporting Directives	UNFCCC terminology	national definition	definition not indicated	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other
	Coverage of funding sources			**Definition provided for funding source**			**Point of Measurement/ Status**				**Definition used for point of measurement/ status**				**Coverage of instruments reported**							**Definition provided for instrument**						
MMR																												
France BR	x	x		x	x		x	x			x		x		x	x	x											
Germany MMR	x	x					x	x							x	x												
Germany BR	x						x	x							x	x												
Greece MMR																												
Greece BR																												
Hungary MMR																												
Hungary BR	x							x							x													
Ireland MMR	x							x							x													
Ireland BR	x							x							x													
Italy MMR	x	x	x				x	x							x	x												

	Coverage of funding sources			Definition provided for funding source			Point of Measurement/ Status				Definition used for point of measurement/ status				Coverage of instruments reported							Definition provided for instrument						
	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	committed	Disbursed /Provided	Calendar Year	Fiscal Year	Definition from DAC Statistical Reporting Directives	UNFCCC terminology	national definition	definition not indicated	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other
Italy BR	x	x					x	x							x	x												
Latvia MMR	x							x													x							
Latvia BR																												
Lithuania MMR	x							x							x													
Lithuania BR	x						x	x							x													
Luxembourg MMR	x														x													
Luxembourg BR	x							x							x													
Malta MMR	x						x								x													
Malta BR	x						x	x							x													
Netherlands MMR	x							x							x													
Netherlands BR	x							x							x													

	Coverage of funding sources			Definition provided for funding source			Point of Measurement/ Status				Definition used for point of measurement/ status				Coverage of instruments reported							Definition provided for instrument						
	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	committed	Disbursed /Provided	Calendar Year	Fiscal Year	Definition from DAC Statistical Reporting Directives	UNFCCC terminology	national definition	definition not indicated	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other
Poland MMR	x							x							x													
Poland BR	x							x							x													
Portugal MMR	x							x							x	x												
Portugal BR	X							x							x	x												
Romania MMR	x														x													
Romania BR	x							x							x													
Slovakia MMR	x							x							x						x							
Slovakia BR	x							x							x						x							
Slovenia MMR	x							x							x													
Slovenia BR																												
Spain MMR	x	x						x							x	x	x	x	x		x							

	Coverage of funding sources			Definition provided for funding source			Point of Measurement/ Status				Definition used for point of measurement/ status				Coverage of instruments reported							Definition provided for instrument						
	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	committed	Disbursed /Provided	Calendar Year	Fiscal Year	Definition from DAC Statistical Reporting Directives	UNFCCC terminology	national definition	definition not indicated	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other
Spain BR	x	x					x	x					x		x	x	x	x	x							x		
Sweden MMR	x							x							x													
Sweden BR	x							x			x				x													
United Kingdom MMR	x							x							x			x										
United Kingdom BR	x							x							x			x										

Table 9-5: Comparison of methodologies for reporting on bilateral climate finance (identification of mitigation/adaptation activities, recipient definition, quantification of climate-specific, valorisation of instrument, currency exchange rates, level of aggregation, reporting on technology transfer and capacity building)

	OECD DAC Rio Markers	MDB Adaptation 3-step appraoch	MDB Mitigation Positive list/ IDFC Common Principles	National Definition	ODA Eligible Countries (OECD DAC list)	UNFCCC Non-Annex I Parties	Activity-level component approach	Percentage at sectoral basis	Coefficient on "Principal"	Coefficient on "Significantl"	Approach for treating overlaps	Accounting (deduction) of reflows	Cash Value	Grant Equivalent	National currency	Euro	OECD exchange rates	Other exchange rates	Activity level	aggregate or semi-aggregates	Reporting on Technology Transfer yes/no	Reporting on Capacity building yes/no
	Identification of mitigation / adaptation activities				**Recipient Definition**		**Quantification of climate-specific**						**Valorisation of Instrument**		**Currency reporting, exchange rates**				**Format of data**			
Austria MMR	x				x				x	x			x									
Austria BR	x				x				100%	40%	x					x	x		x		Y	Y
Belgium MMR	x					x		x	x	x	x						x		x		Y	Y
Belgium BR	x					x		x	x	x	x						x		x		Y	Y
Bulgaria MMR																						
Bulgaria BR																						
Croatia MMR																						
Croatia BR																						
Cyprus MMR																						
Cyprus BR																						
Czech Republic MMR	x														x			x	x		Y	Y
Czech Republic BR	x														x			x	x		N	N

	OECD DAC Rio Markers	MDB Adaptation 3-step appraoch	MDB Mitigation Positive list/ IDFC Common Principles	National Definition	ODA Eligible Countries (OECD DAC list)	UNFCCC Non-Annex I Parties	Activity-level component approach	Percentage at sectoral basis	Coefficient on "Principal"	Coefficient on "Significantl"	Approach for treating overlaps	Accounting (deduction) of reflows	Cash Value	Grant Equivalent	National currency	Euro	OECD exchange rates	Other exchange rates	Activity level	aggregate or semi-aggregates	Reporting on Technology Transfer yes/no	Reporting on Capacity building yes/no
	Identification of mitigation / adaptation activities				**Recipient Definition**		**Quantification of climate-specific**						**Valorisation of Instrument**		**Currency reporting, exchange rates**				**Format of data**			
Denmark MMR	x								100%	50%					x				x		N	N
Denmark BR	x								100%	50%									x		Y	Y
Estonia MMR	x				x																	
Estonia BR																						
Finland MMR	x								varies	vari es	x								x		Y	Y
Finland BR	x								varies	vari es	x								x		Y	Y
France MMR	x			x	x		x		100%	40%	x					x	x		x	x	Y	Y
France BR	x			x	x		x		100%	40%	x					x	x		x	x	Y	Y
Germany MMR	x								100%	50%	x		x	x					x			
Germany BR	x								100%	50%	x					x			x		Y	Y
Greece MMR																					N	Y
Greece BR																						
Hungary MMR																						
Hungary BR																			x		N	N

	OECD DAC Rio Markers	MDB Adaptation 3-step appraoch	MDB Mitigation Positive list/ IDFC Common Principles	National Definition	ODA Eligible Countries (OECD DAC list)	UNFCCC Non-Annex I Parties	Activity-level component approach	Percentage at sectoral basis	Coefficient on "Principal"	Coefficient on "Significantl"	Approach for treating overlaps	Accounting (deduction) of reflows	Cash Value	Grant Equivalent	National currency	Euro	OECD exchange rates	Other exchange rates	Activity level	aggregate or semi-aggregates	Reporting on Technology Transfer yes/no	Reporting on Capacity building yes/no
	Identification of mitigation / adaptation activities				Recipient Definition		Quantification of climate-specific						Valorisation of Instrument		Currency reporting, exchange rates				Format of data			
Ireland MMR	x								100%	50%									x			
Ireland BR	x						x		100%	50%	x							x	x		Y	Y
Italy MMR									100%	40%									x		Y	N
Italy BR																			x		Y	Y
Latvia MMR																					N	N
Latvia BR																		x				
Lithuania MMR																					N	N
Lithuania BR																						
Luxembourg MMR	x																				Y	Y
Luxembo urg BR																				x	N	N
Malta MMR																						
Malta BR																			x		N	N
Netherlands MMR	x								100%	40%	x								x		Y	Y
Netherlands BR	x					x			100%	40%	x							x	x		Y	Y
Poland MMR	x														x			x	x		N	N

	OECD DAC Rio Markers	MDB Adaptation 3-step appraoch	MDB Mitigation Positive list/ IDFC Common Principles	National Definition	ODA Eligible Countries (OECD DAC list)	UNFCCC Non-Annex I Parties	Activity-level component approach	Percentage at sectoral basis	Coefficient on "Principal"	Coefficient on "Significantl"	Approach for treating overlaps	Accounting (deduction) of reflows	Cash Value	Grant Equivalent	National currency	Euro	OECD exchange rates	Other exchange rates	Activity level	aggregate or semi-aggregates	Reporting on Technology Transfer yes/no	Reporting on Capacity building yes/no
	Identification of mitigation / adaptation activities				**Recipient Definition**		**Quantification of climate-specific**						**Valorisa tion of Instrum ent**		**Currency reporting, exchange rates**				**Format of data**			
Poland BR															x			x	x		Y	N
Portugal MMR	x																		x			
Portugal BR	x																		x		Y	Y
Romania MMR																						
Romania BR															x							
Slovakia MMR	x																				Y	Y
Slovakia BR	x																	x			Y	Y
Slovenia MMR																						
Slovenia BR																						
Spain MMR																					Y	Y
Spain BR	x								100%	20%	x						x		x		Y	Y
Sweden MMR	x					x			100%	40%					x		x		x		Y	Y
Sweden BR	x					x			100%	40%					x		x		x		Y	Y
United Kingdom MMR				x											x			x	x		Y	Y
United Kingdom BR	x?														x				x		Y	Y

9.3. Annex III: Detailed quantitative comparison of finance data reported for the year 2014 in the MMR reporting and the second biennial reports

The following tables were the basis for the quantitative analysis (section 9.5). Tables 7 and 7a from each Member State´s second biennial report (BR2/UNFCCC) and Article 16 of the MMR were compiled into one table. Values are compared in national currency. Czech Republic has resubmitted the BR2 tables on 14 March 2016; those are considered here. There is no table for Cyprus, as Cyprus reports empty tables only. MMR data are presented with yellow and BR2 data with blue background. Values in red script are not equal between MMR and BR2. For some Member States, corrections had to be done, such as multiplying values by 1,000 or 1,000,000. Such corrections are described in the specific country chapter in section 9.5.

Table 9-6: Austria – Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Austria 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	**Allocation channels**	**Core/ general**	**Climate-specific**				**Total (climate-specific and core/ general)**	**Total climate-specific**
			Mitigation	**Adaptation**	**Cross-cutting**	**Other**		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**11,682,354**	**1,071,198**	**0**	**252,640**	**0**	**13,006,192**	**1,323,838**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**41,485,477**	**0**	**41,485,477**	**41,485,477**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds						0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	**9,702,354**			**0**		**9,702,354**	**0**
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	**0**			**40,331,412**		**40,331,412**	**40,331,412**
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	**1,980,000**	**1,071,198**		**252,640**		**3,303,838**	**1,323,838**
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	**0**	**0**		**1,154,065**		**1,154,065**	**1,154,065**
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**71,002,910**	**6,882,195**	**21,868,146**		**99,753,251**	**99,753,251**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**71,002,910**	**6,882,195**	**21,868,146**		**99,753,251**	**99,753,251**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**11,682,354**	**72,074,108**	6,882,195	**22,120,786**	0	**112,759,443**	**101,077,089**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**0**	**71,002,910**	6,882,195	**63,353,623**	0	**141,238,728**	**141,238,728**

Table 9-7: Austria – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	9,702,354	40,331,412	0
1. World Bank	0	4,898,927	26,135,980	0
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank	0	1,693,034	12,195,433	0
4. Asian Development Bank	0	1,769,290	2,000,000	0
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	0	860,000		
6. Inter-American Development Bank	0	481,103		
7. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies (sum of figures below)	0	1,980,000	1,154,065	1,323,838
1. United Nations Development Programme	0	1,580,000		
2. United Nations Environment Programme	0	400,000		
Montreal Protocol			1,071,198	1,071,198
3. Other				
UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and ITL			82,867	252,640
Total contributions through multilateral channels	*0*	*11,682,354*	*41,485,477*	*1,323,838*

Table 9-8: Belgium - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Belgium 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	**Allocation channels**	**Core/ general**	**Climate-specific**				**Total (climate-specific and core/ general)**	**Total climate-specific**
			Mitigation	**Adaptation**	**Cross-cutting**	**Other**		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**376,108,466**	**22,040**	**12,813,595**	**41,494,353**		**430,438,454**	**54,329,988**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**376,108,466**	**22,040**	**15,063,594**	**41,494,353**		**432,688,453**	**56,579,987**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	18,600,000	22,040	**12,000,000**	40,683,549		71,305,589	52,705,589
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	18,600,000	22,040	**14,250,000**	40,683,549		73,555,589	54,955,589
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds		22,040	1,000,000			1,022,040	1,022,040
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds		22,040	1,000,000			1,022,040	1,022,040
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	305,832,100					305,832,100	
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	305,832,100					305,832,100	
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	**43,676,366**		813,595	810,804			
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	**51,676,366**		813,594	810,804			
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**8,557,943**	**18,240,097**	**13,273,725**		**40,071,765**	**40,071,765**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**8,557,943.23**	**18,240,097.40**	**13,273,724.60**		**40,071,765**	**40,071,765**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	376,108,466	8,579,983.00	**31,053,691.95**	54,768,078.32	0	**470,510,220**	**94,401,753**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	376,108,466	8,579,983.23	**33,303,691.40**	54,768,077.60	0	**472,760,218**	**96,651,752**
MMR	*Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research*	**8,000,000**						

Table 9-9: Belgium – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds	18,600,000			
1. Global Environment Facility	18,600,000	18,600,000		
2. Least Developed Countries Fund			12,000,000	12,000,000
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund			**1,250,000**	**1,000,000**
				250,000
5. Green Climate Fund			**40,600,000**	**40,000,000**
				600,000
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities			83,549	83,549
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
7.1 International Partnership on Mitigation and MRV			22,040	22,040
7.2 IFAD: budget support for the "Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme"			1,000,000	1,000,000
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	*305,832,100*			
1. World Bank	148,747,082	148,747,082		
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank	33,987,573	33,987,573		
4. Asian Development Bank	7,933,541	7,933,541		
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other	*115,163,904*			
7.1 European Investment Bank - EIB	4,146,560	4,146,560		
7.2 Europees ontwikkelingsfonds (EOF/EDF/FED)	111,017,344	111,017,344		
Specialized United Nations bodies	*51,676,366*			
1. United Nations Development Programme	19,000,000	19,000,000		
1.1 UNDP: Strengthen capacity to incorporate climate change adaptation and resilience planning into National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) through the NBSAP Forum			35,000	35,000
2. United Nations Environment Programme	4,000,000	4,000,000		
3. Other	*28,676,366*			
3.1 Food and Agricultural Organization	5,426,366	5,426,366		
3.2 International Fund for Agricultural Development	8,000,000	8,000,000		
3.2 World Food Programme - Immediate Response Account	7,250,000	7,250,000		
3.3 UNESCO: Framework for Research, Education and Training in the Water Sector Phase III (FET -Water III)			105,002	105,002
3.4 UNESCO: Southeast Pacific data and Information Networking support to integrated Coastal Area Management' (SPINCAM-II)			82,940	82,940
3.5 UNESCO: Addressing Water Security: Climate impacts and adaptation responses in Africa, Asia and LAC			130,517	130,517
3.6 UNESCO: Climate Change Adaptation for African Natural World Heritage Sites			37,700	37,700
3.7 UNESCO: Enhancing Natural Hazards Resilience in South America (ENHANS)			188,500	188,500
3.8 UNESCO: Biosphere reserves as a tool for coastal and island management in the South-East Pacific region (BRESEP)			75,339	75,339
3.9 UNESCO: Caribbean Marine Atlas, phase 2			95,547	95,547
3.10 UNESCO: Ecosystem-based marine spatial planning for conservation of World Heritage Marine Sites			63,049	63,049
3.11 ICRAF: support to the world congress on agroforestry			50,804	50,804
3.12 ICRAF: Extending the Agroforestry Food Security Programme (AFSP) in Kasungu and Mzimba districts			160,000	160,000
3.13 ICRAF: Building a larger Evergreen Agriculture Network for Southern Africa			600,000	600,000
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research	8,000,000	8,000,000		
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***376,108,466***	***376,108,466***		***55,329,988***

Table 9-10: Bulgaria- Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Bulgaria 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**25,236**	**0**	**0**	**8,975**	**0**	**34,211**	**8,975**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	**8,975**	0	**8,975**	**8,975**
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds						**0**	**0**
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	**62,184**	0	**8,975**	0	**71,159**	**71,159**
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds		**0**		**0**		**0**	**0**
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks						0	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	**25,236**	0	0	0	0	**25,236**	**0**
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	**0**					**0**	**0**
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**						**0**	**0**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**25,236**	**0**	**0**	**8,975**	**0**	**34,211**	**8,975**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**

Table 9-11: Bulgaria – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	***MMR (EUR)***	***UNFCCC (EUR)***	***MMR (EUR)***
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
7.1. UNFCCC			**0**	**8,001.00**
7.2 Kyoto Protocol under UNFCCC			**0**	**4,315.00**
7.3 International Transaction Log (ITL)			**0**	**974.00**
7.4 Montreal Protocol			**0**	**57,868.61**
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies				
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme	**0**	**15,220.10**		
3. Other				
3.1 The United Nations Convention to Combat Desesrtification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa	**0**	**3,381.00**		
3.2 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES)	**0**	**2,600.85**		
3.3 International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)	**0**	**4,033.92**		
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***0***	***25,235.87***	***0***	***71,158.61***

Table 9-12: Croatia - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Croatia 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds						0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds						0.00	0.00
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds						0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0.00	0.00
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks						0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks						0.00	0.00
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	33,018.00					33,018.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	33,018.00					33,018.00	0.00
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**						**0.00**	**0.00**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**						**0.00**	**0.00**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**

Table 9-13: Croatia – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies	33,018.00	33,018.00		
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme				
3. Other				
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***33,018.00***	***33,018.00***		

Table 9-14: Czech Republic – Table 7 Summary information for 2014[54]

Czech Republic 2014, Table 7		National currency CZK (MMR) / National currency CZK (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**172,470,000**	**0**	**0**	59,521,559	**0**	**231,991,559**	**59,521,559**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**192,610,621**	**0**	**0**	59,521,559	**0**	**252,132,180**	**59,521,559**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	**0**	0	0	**59,521,559**	0	**59,521,559**	**59,521,559**
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	**20,140,621**			**19,521,559**		**39,662,180**	**19,521,559**
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	**40,000,000**	0	**40,000,000**	**40,000,000**
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds				**0**	0	**0**	**0**
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	163,470,000	0	0	0	0	**163,470,000**	**0**
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	163,470,000			40,000,000		**203,470,000**	**40,000,000**
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	9,000,000	0	0	0	0	9,000,000	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	9,000,000					9,000,000	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	0	31,637,691	77,080,054	2,700,000	**0**	111,417,745	111,417,745
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		31,637,691	77,080,054	2,700,000		111,417,745	111,417,745
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**172,470,000**	**31,637,691**	**77,080,054**	**62,221,559**	**0**	**343,409,304**	**170,939,304**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**192,610,621**	**31,637,691**	**77,080,054**	**62,221,559**	**0**	**363,549,925**	**170,939,304**

[54] The corrected BR2 tables submitted on 14 March 2016 are considered here

Table 9-15: Czech Republic – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014[55]

Donor funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCCC (CZK)	MMR (CZK)	UNFCCC (CZK)	MMR (CZK)
Multilateral climate change funds	20140621	20,140,621	19,521,559	59,521,559
1. Global Environment Facility	20140621	20,140,621	9,521,559	9,521,559
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund			10,000,000	10,000,000
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds			0	40,000,000
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	163,470,000	163,470,000	40,000,000	
1. World Bank	163,470,000	163,470,000		
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development		0		
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other			40,000,000	
Specialized United Nations bodies	9,000,000	9,000,000		
1. United Nations Development Programme	8,000,000	8,000,000		
2. United Nations Environment Programme	1,000,000	1,000,000		
3. Other				
Total contributions through multilateral channels	*192,610,621*	*192,610,621*	*59,521,559*	*59,521,559*

[55] The corrected BR2 tables submitted on 14 March 2016 are considered here

Table 9-16: Denmark - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Denmark 2014, Table 7		National currency DKK = 134,1413 EUR (MMR)							
		National currency DKK							
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	1,284,523,000	28,918,500	0	120,701,000	128,000,000	1,562,142,500	149,619,500
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	1,412,523,000	52,175,500	40,000,000	97,455,500	0	1,602,154,000	189,631,000
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	135,000,000	0	0	0	128,000,000	263,000,000	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	263,000,000	0	0	11,500	0	263,011,500	11,500
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds	163,000,000	0	0	11,500	0	163,011,500	11,500
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	524,729,000	28,918,500	0	59,820,000	0	613,467,500	88,738,500
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	524,729,000	37,925,500	40,000,000	50,813,000	0	653,467,500	128,738,500
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	624,794,000	0	0	60,881,000	0	685,675,000	60,881,000
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	624,794,000	14,250,000	0	46,631,000	0	685,675,000	60,881,000
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	0	312,704,000	0	935,913,000	0	1,248,617,000	1,248,617,000
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	0	303,127,500	110,223,000	766,454,500	0	1,179,805,000	1,179,805,000
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	1,284,523,000	341,622,500	0	1,056,614,000	128,000,000	2,810,759,500	1,398,236,500
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	1,412,523,000	355,303,000	150,223,000	863,910,000	0	2,781,959,000	1,369,436,000

Table 9-17: Denmark – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (1000 DKK)	***MMR (1000 DKK)***	*UNFCCC (1000 DKK)*	*MMR (1000 DKK)*
Multilateral climate change funds	**263,000.00**	**135,000.00**	**11.50**	**128,000.00**
1. Global Environment Facility - 47044	135,000.00	135,000.00	**11.50**	**0.00**
2. Least Developed Countries Fund - 47129	0.00		0.00	
3. Special Climate Change Fund - 47130	0.00		0.00	
4. Adaptation Fund - 47111	0.00		0.00	
5. Green Climate Fund - 41317	**100,000.00**		**0.00**	**100,000.00**
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities - 41316	0.00		0.00	
7. Other multilateral climate change funds - (GGGI) 47136	**28,000.00**		**0.00**	**28,000.00**
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	**524,728.90**	**524,729.00**	**128,738.00**	**88,738.50**
1. World Bank (IBRD & IDA?) - 44001+44002	436,320.00	436,320.00	43,538.00	52,545.00
			40,000.00	**0.00**
			9,007.00	**0.00**
2. International Finance Corporation - 44004	0.00		7,275.00	7,275.00
3. African Development Bank (&AfDF?) - 46002+46003	55,101.00	55,101.00	93.00	93.00
4. Asian Development Bank (&AsDF?) - 46004+46005	33,307.90	33,308.00	**24,075.00**	**24,075.50**
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development - 46015	0.00		4,750.00	4,750.00
6. Inter-American Development Bank - 46012+46013	0.00			
7. Other - ?				
Specialized United Nations bodies	**624,794.00**	**624,794.00**	**60,881.00**	**60,881.00**
1. United Nations Development Programme - 41114	346,478.00	346,478.00	20,881.00	20,881.00
2. United Nations Environment Programme - 41116	30,000.00	30,000.00	40,000.00	40,000.00
3. Other - (IFAD, ISDR, UNIDO, WFP) 41108+41315+41123+41140	248,316.00	248,316.00	0.00	
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***1,412,522.90***	***1,284,523.00***	***189,630.50***	***277,619.50***

Table 9-18: Estonia - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Estonia 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	**Allocation channels**	**Core/ general**	**Climate-specific: Mitigation**	**Adaptation**	**Cross-cutting**	**Other**	**Total (climate-specific and core/ general)**	**Total climate-specific**
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	58,883.73	0.00	323,000.00	262,806.21	0.00	644,689.94	585,806.21
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	108,883.73	0.00	0.00	60,806.21	0.00	169,689.94	60,806.21
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	151,007.21	0.00	151,007.21	151,007.21
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds				49,007.21		49,007.21	49,007.21
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds				49,007.21		49,007.21	49,007.21
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0.00	0.00	0.00	100,000.00	0.00	100,000.00	100,000.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				0.00		0.00	0.00
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	58,883.73	0.00	323,000.00	11,799.00	0.00	393,682.73	334,799.00
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	108,883.73		0.00	11,799.00		120,682.73	11,799.00
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	0.00	0.00	0.00	102,000.00	0.00	102,000.00	102,000.00
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		74,134.00		535,204.00		609,338.00	609,338.00
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	58,883.73	0.00	323,000.00	364,806.21	0.00	746,689.94	687,806.21
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	108,883.73	74,134.00	0.00	596,010.21	0.00	779,027.94	670,144.21

Table 9-19: Estonia – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds			49,007.21	
7.1 Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol			49,007.21	49,007.21
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other: International Telecommunications Union			**0.00**	**100,000.00**
Specialized United Nations bodies	108,883.73		11,799.00	
1. United Nations Development Programme	**50,000.00**	**0.00**		
2. United Nations Environment Programme	5,000.00	5,000.00	**0.00**	**323,000.00**
3. Other		0.00	11,799.00	
3.1 UNCCD	2,877.00	2,877.00		
3.2 UNFCCC			11,799.00	11,799.00
3.3 WMO	21,335.73	21,335.73		
3.4 IAEA-TCF	29,671.00	29,671.00		
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***108,883.73***	***58,883.73***	***60,806.21***	***483,806.21***

Table 9-20: Finland - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Finland 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Climate-specific: Adaptation	Climate-specific: Cross-cutting	Climate-specific: Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**521,277,548.61**	**6,837,000.00**	**14,000,000.00**	**50,907,921.70**	**0.00**	**593,022,470.31**	**71,744,921.70**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**507,945,143.59**	**6,837,000.00**	**14,000,000.00**	**50,907,921.69**	**0.00**	**579,690,065.28**	**71,744,921.69**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	**0.00**	6,167,000.00	14,000,000.00	0.00	0.00	**20,167,000.00**	20,167,000.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	**36,025,000.00**	6,167,000.00	14,000,000.00			**56,192,000.00**	20,167,000.00
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0.00	0.00
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	197,735,059.59	670,000.00	0.00	29,834,694.62	0.00	228,239,754.21	30,504,694.62
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	197,735,059.59	670,000.00		29,834,694.61		228,239,754.20	30,504,694.61
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	**323,542,489.02**	0.00	0.00	21,073,227.08	0.00	**344,615,716.10**	21,073,227.08
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	**274,185,084.00**			21,073,227.08		**295,258,311.08**	21,073,227.08
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**499,106,839.20**	**24,020,057.81**	**10,260,341.15**	**10,146,203.91**	**0.00**	**543,533,442.06**	**44,426,602.87**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0.00**	**24,020,057.81**	**10,260,341.14**	**10,146,203.91**		**44,426,602.86**	**44,426,602.86**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**1,020,384,387.81**	30,857,057.81	24,260,341.15	61,054,125.60	0.00	**1,136,555,912.37**	116,171,524.56
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**507,945,143.59**	30,857,057.81	24,260,341.14	61,054,125.60	0.00	**624,116,668.14**	116,171,524.55

Table 9-21: Finland – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds	**36,025,000.00**		20,167,000.00	
1. Global Environment Facility	**22,025,000.00**		6,167,000.00	6,167,000.00
2. Least Developed Countries Fund	**6,000,000.00**		6,000,000.00	6,000,000.00
3. Special Climate Change Fund	**2,900,000.00**		2,900,000.00	2,900,000.00
4. Adaptation Fund	**5,000,000.00**		5,000,000.00	5,000,000.00
5. Green Climate Fund				0.00
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities	**100,000.00**		100,000.00	100,000.00
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				0.00
Subtotal				**20,167,000.00**
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development ban	197,735,059.59		30,504,694.61	
1. World Bank (WB, IBRD, IDA, IDA-HIPC, MIGA, AMCs)	116,815,254.14	116,815,254.14	13,976,020.09	13,976,020.09
2. International Finance Corporation		0.00		0.00
3. African Development Bank (Afr.DB, Afr.DF)	63,109,638.38	63,109,638.38	10,598,255.50	10,598,255.50
4. Asian Development Bank (AsDB, AsDF)	10,151,465.46	10,151,465.46	1,566,863.78	1,566,263.78
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, -TFs ODA, -TFs all, -ETC, -WBJTF)	2,700,000.00	2,700,000.00	670,000.00	670,000.00
6. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB, IDB Sp.F.)	1,487,701.61	1,487,701.61	223,155.24	223,155.24
7. Other	3,471,000.00		3,471,000.00	
Nordic Development Fund	3,471,000.00	3,471,000.00	3,471,000.00	3,471,000.00
Subtotal		**197,735,059.59**		**30,504,694.62**
Specialized United Nations bodies	274,185,084.00		21,073,227.08	
1. United Nations Development Programme (specific programmes)	43,704,171.43	43,704,171.43	3,127,500.00	3,127,500.00
2. United Nations Environment Programme (specific programmes)	6,724,427.00	6,724,427.00	1,200,000.00	1,200,000.00
United Nations Children's Fund		**49,357,405.02**		0.00
Food and Agricultural Organisation	5,014,586.22	5,014,586.22	1,337,500.00	1,337,500.00
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research	9,750,000.00	9,750,000.00	4,400,000.00	4,400,000.00
Other multilateral	208,991,899.35	208,991,899.35	11,008,227.08	11,008,227.08
Subtotal		**323,542,489.02**		**21,073,227.08**
Total		***557,337,125.85***		***71,744,921.70***

Table 9-22: France - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

France 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR)						
		National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**33,985,000**	**0**	**0**	**10,875,200**	**0**	**44,860,200**	**10,875,200**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**33,985,000**			**10,875,200**		**44,860,200**	**10,875,200**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	33,985,000	0	0	10,875,200	0	44,860,200	10,875,200
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	33,985,000			10,875,200		44,860,200	10,875,200
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks						0	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies						0	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**2,232,149,678**	**279,138,362**	**245,032,419**	**0**	**2,756,320,459**	**2,756,320,459**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**2,233,874,678**	**279,138,362**	**243,307,419**		**2,756,320,459**	**2,756,320,459**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	33,985,000	**2,232,149,678**	279,138,362	**255,907,619**	0	2,801,180,659	2,767,195,659
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	33,985,000	**2,233,874,678**	279,138,362	**254,182,619**	0	2,801,180,659	2,767,195,659

Table 9-23: France – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor Funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)	UNFCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)
Multilateral climate change funds				
Global Environment Facility	33,985,000	33,985,000	10,875,200	10,875,200
Total contribution through multilateral channels	***33,985,000***	***33,985,000***	***10,875,200***	***10,875,200***

Table 9-24: Germany - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Germany 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	**Allocation channels**	**Core/ general**	**Climate-specific: Mitigation**	**Adaptation**	**Cross-cutting**	**Other**	**Total (climate-specific and core/ general)**	**Total climate-specific**
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**866,596,094**	**27,006,778**	**98,000,000**	**20,619,520**	**92,000,000**	**1,104,222,391**	**237,626,298**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**866,596,094**	**27,006,778**	**98,000,000**	**20,619,520**	**92,000,000**	**1,104,222,391**	**237,626,298**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	80,607,261	8,006,778	98,000,000	1,000,000		187,614,039	107,006,778
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	80,607,261	8,006,778	98,000,000	7,392,792		194,006,831	113,399,570
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds		8,006,778		6,392,792		14,399,570	14,399,570
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds		8,006,778		6,392,792		14,399,570	14,399,570
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	785,988,833	19,000,000			82,000,000	886,988,833	101,000,000
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	785,988,833	19,000,000			82,000,000	886,988,833	101,000,000
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies				13,226,728	10,000,000	23,226,728	23,226,728
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies				13,226,728	10,000,000	23,226,728	23,226,728
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**695,266,782**	**583,414,566**	**209,453,825**	**394,172,574**	**1,882,307,747**	**1,882,307,747**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**583,414,566**	**695,266,782**	**209,453,825**	**394,172,574**	**1,882,307,747**	**1,882,307,747**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**866,596,094**	**722,273,560**	**681,414,566**	**230,073,345**	**486,172,574**	**2,986,530,139**	**2,119,934,045**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**866,596,094**	**610,421,344**	**793,266,782**	**230,073,345**	**486,172,573**	**2,986,530,138**	**2,119,934,044**

Table 9-25: Germany – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds	**80,607,261**	**80,607,261**	**113,399,570**	**113,399,570**
1. Global Environment Facility	80,607,261	80,607,261		
2. Least Developed Countries Fund			30,000,000	30,000,000
3. Special Climate Change Fund			18,000,000	18,000,000
4. Adaptation Fund			50,000,000	50,000,000
5. Green Climate Fund			1,000,000	1,000,000
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
7.1 Montreal Protocol			8,006,778	8,006,778
7.2 IPCC			294,000	294,000
7.3 UNFCCC			6,098,792	6,098,792
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	**785,988,833**	**785,988,833**	**101,000,000**	**101,000,000**
1. World Bank	526,688,833	526,688,833		
1.1 Pilot Auction Facility for Methane and Climate Change Mitigation			15,000,000	15,000,000
1.2 BioCarbon Fund Initiative for Sustainable Forest			35,000,000	35,000,000
1.3 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility			47,000,000	47,000,000
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank	181,200,000	181,200,000		
4. Asian Development Bank	78,100,000	78,100,000		
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development			**4,000,000**	
5.1 Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership Fund - Armenia Window				**1,000,000**
5.2 Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership Fund - Georgia Window				**1,000,000**
5.3 Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership Fund - Moldova Window				**1,000,000**
5.4 Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership Fund				**1,000,000**
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
1.1 Clean Technology Fund				
Specialized United Nations bodies			**23,226,728**	**23,226,728**
1. United Nations Development Programme			10,000,000	10,000,000
1.1 Biodiversity Finance Initiative			10,000,000	10,000,000
2. United Nations Environment Programme			400,000	400,000
2.1 UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate and Sustainable Energy Finance			400,000	400,000
3. Other (UNHCR, UN-Habitat, UNODC, Worldbank, WFP, WRI, UNF, GGI)			12,826,728	12,826,728
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***866,596,094***	***866,596,094***	***237,626,298***	***237,626,298***

Table 9-26: Greece - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Greece 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**501,442**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**501,442**	**0**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**501,442**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**501,442**	**0**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	35,011	0	0	0	0	35,011	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	35,011					35,011	0
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds		0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds	35,011					35,011	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks						0	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	466,431	0	0	0	0	466,431	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	466,431					466,431	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**						**0**	**0**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	501,442	0	0	0	0	501,442	0
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	501,442	0	0	0	0	501,442	0

Table 9-27: Greece – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds	35,011			
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds	35,011			35,011
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies				
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme	466,431	466,431		
3. Other				
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***501,442***	***466,431***		***35,011***

Table 9-28: Hungary - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Hungary 2014, Table 7		National currency - HUF (MMR) / National currency - HUF (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Climate-specific: Adaptation	Climate-specific: Cross-cutting	Climate-specific: Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**2,228,716,810**	**485,417,240**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**2,714,134,050**	**485,417,240**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**2,228,716,910**	**485,417,240**				**2,714,134,150**	**485,417,240**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds		485,417,240				485,417,240	485,417,240
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	485,417,240	0	0	0	485,417,240	485,417,240
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds		485,417,240				485,417,240	485,417,240
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	1,876,400,000	0	0	0	0	1,876,400,000	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	1,876,400,000					1,876,400,000	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	**352,316,810**	0	0	0	0	**352,316,810**	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	**352,316,910**					**352,316,910**	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**740,000**	**334,307,051**	**17,049,256**	**0**	**352,096,307**	**352,096,307**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**740,000**	**334,307,051**	**15,181,636**		**350,228,687**	**350,228,687**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	2,228,716,810	486,157,240	334,307,051	**17,049,256**	0	**3,066,230,357**	**837,513,547**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	2,228,716,910	486,157,240	334,307,051	**15,181,636**	0	**3,064,362,837**	**835,645,927**

Table 9-29: Hungary – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCCC (HUF)	MMR (HUF)	UNFCCC (HUF)	MMR (HUF)
Multilateral climate change funds	**2,228,716,910**		**485,417,240**	**485,417,240.00**
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds			485,417,240	485,417,240
7.1. Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol payments for 2014				70,053,298
7.2. Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol payments for 2015				415,363,942
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	**1,876,400,000**	**1,876,400,000**		
1. World Bank	1,876,400,000	1,876,400,000		
Participation in the General Capital Increase of the IBRD		1,876,400,000		
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies	**352,316,910**	**352,316,810**		
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme	2,236,700	2,236,700		
UNEP payments for 2014	2,236,700	2,236,700		
3. Other	350,080,110	350,080,110		
UNFCCC Membership contribution	4,658,125	4,658,125		
UNCCD (Convention to Combat Desertification) payments for 2014	5,867,517	5,867,517		
UNCCD (Convention to Combat Desertification) payments for 2015	7,071,492	7,071,492		
Food and Agricultural Organization payments for 2014	158,066,691	79,349,328		
Food and Agricultural Organization payments for 2014		78,717,363		
Food and Agricultural Organization payments for 2015	172,878,135	81,610,759		
Food and Agricultural Organization payments for 2015		91,267,375		
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe	1,538,150	1,538,150		
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***2,228,716,910***	***2,228,716,810***	***485,417,240***	***485,417,240***

Table 9-30: Ireland - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Ireland 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	**Allocation channels**	**Core/ general**	**Climate-specific: Mitigation**	**Adaptation**	**Cross-cutting**	**Other**	**Total (climate-specific and core/ general)**	**Total climate-specific**
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**75,431,805**	**37,600**	**1,900,000**	**100,000**	**0**	**77,469,405**	**2,037,600**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**75,431,800**	**37,600**	**1,300,000**	**100,000**	**300,000**	**77,169,400**	**1,737,600**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	1,469,000	0	1,000,000	0	0	2,469,000	1,000,000
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	1,469,000		1,000,000			2,469,000	1,000,000
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	32,085,000	0	0	0	0	32,085,000	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	32,085,000					32,085,000	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	41,877,805	37,600	**900,000**	100,000	0	42,915,405	1,037,600
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	41,877,800	37,600	**300,000**	100,000	300,000	42,615,400	737,600
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**1,490,000**	**20,974,000**	**9,472,500**	**0**	**31,936,500**	**31,936,500**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**1,490,000**	**20,974,000**	**9,472,500**		**31,936,500**	**31,936,500**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	75,431,805	1,527,600	22,874,000	9,572,500	0	109,405,905	33,974,100
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	75,431,800	1,527,600	22,274,000	9,572,500	300,000	109,105,900	33,674,100

Table 9-31: Ireland – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)
Multilateral climate change funds	1,469,000	0	1,000,000	0
1. Global Environment Facility	1,469,000	1,469,000		0
2. Least Developed Countries Fund		0	900,000	900,000
3. Special Climate Change Fund		0		0
4. Adaptation Fund		0		0
5. Green Climate Fund		0		0
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities -LEG		0	100,000	100,000
7. Other multilateral climate change funds		0		0
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	32,085,000	0		0
1. World Bank	25,385,000	25,385,000		0
1.1 World Bank CGIAR Fund - Support to pro-poor agriculture	4,200,000	4,200,000		0
2. International Finance Corporation		0		0
3. African Development Bank		0		0
4. Asian Development Bank	2,500,000	2,500,000		0
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development		0		0
6. Inter-American Development Bank		0		0
Specialized United Nations bodies	41,877,800	0	737,600	1,037,600
1. United Nations Development Programme	8,500,000	8,500,000		0
2. United Nations Environment Programme	357,800	357,805	300,000	0
2.1 UNEP - Clean Technology Centre and Network		0	100,000	100,000
2.2 UNEP - GEMS/Water		0		600,000
3. United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction		0	300,000	300,000
4. Other	33,020,000	0	437,600	
World Food Programme	10,000,000	10,000,000		0
FAO - LEAP		0	37,600	37,600
FAO - Emergency Section	240,000	240,000		0
UN Women	1,500,000	1,500,000		0
UNAIDS	2,950,000	2,950,000		0
UN Convention to Combat Desertification	30,000	30,000		0
UNDOCO	50,000	50,000		0
UNHCR	6,100,000	6,100,000		0
UNICEF	7,900,000	7,900,000		0
UNFPA	3,100,000	3,100,000		0
WHO	1,150,000	1,150,000		0
Sub Total		41,877,805		0
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***75,431,800***	***75,431,805***	***1,737,600***	***2,037,600***

Table 9-32: Italy - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Italy 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Climate-specific: Adaptation	Climate-specific: Cross-cutting	Climate-specific: Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	24,530,000.00	1,244,749.60	466,880.00	17,259,821.14	**0.00**	43,501,450.74	18,971,450.74
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	0.00	200,000.00	0.00	20,960,000.00	**0.00**	21,160,000.00	21,160,000.00
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	24,110,000.00	0.00	0.00	8,456,300.00	0.00	32,566,300.00	8,456,300.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0.00	-	-	2,553,374.42	0.00	2,553,374.42	2,553,374.42
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0.00	1,035,949.60	466,880.00	1,085,214.40	0.00	2,588,044.00	2,588,044.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	420,000.00	208,800.00	0.00	7,718,306.74	0.00	8,347,106.74	7,927,106.74
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	0.00	200,000.00	0.00	20,960,000.00	0.00	21,160,000.00	21,160,000.00
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0.00**	13,716,579.34	4,087,181.44	15,337,737.86	**0.00**	33,141,498.64	33,141,498.64
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0.00**	12,550,000.00	1,910,000.00	11,080,000.00	**0.00**	25,540,000.00	25,540,000.00
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	24,530,000.00	14,961,328.94	4,554,061.44	32,597,559.00	0.00	76,642,949.38	52,112,949.38
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	0.00	12,750,000.00	1,910,000.00	32,040,000.00	0.00	46,700,000.00	46,700,000.00

Table 9-33: Italy – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility		24,110,000.00		7,956,300.00
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				500,000.00
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
UNFCCC-Kyoto protocol				2,207,228.89
Support to the UN Secretary General's Climate Change Strategy				346,145.53
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				20,000.00
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
7.1 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development				800,000.00
7.2 IEF International Energy Forum				41,214.40
7.3 IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency				224,000.00
7.4 IILA ISTITUTO ITALO LATINO AMERICAN ISTITUTO ITALO LATINO AMERICANO				240,000.00
7.5 International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean				315,949.60
7.6 International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean				466,880.00
7.7 Bioversity International				480,000.00
Specialized United Nations bodies			21,160,000.00	
1. United Nations Development Programme			260,000.00	204,800.00
2. United Nations Environment Programme			18,000,000.00	3,025,815.22
3. Other			2,900,000.00	
3.1 Food and Agricolture Organization			0.00	2,350,931.51
3.2 United Nations Idustrial Development Organization			550,000.00	675,532.92
3.3 Regional Environmetal Centre		420,000.00	0.00	
3.4 UNESCO			0.00	1,160,003.09
3.5 International Fund for Agricultural Development			0.00	301,224.00
3.6 World Food Programme			200,000.00	208,800.00
3.7 FAO			2,150,000.00	
Total contributions through multilateral channels			21,160,000.00	21,524,825.16

Table 9-34: Lithuania - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Lithuania 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**788,053**	**105,360**	**0**	**50,000**	**0**	**943,413**	**155,360**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**788,053**	**105,360**	**0**	**50,000**	**0**	**943,413**	**155,360**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0		0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	770,000	105,360	0	50,000	0	925,360	155,360
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	770,000	105,360		50,000		925,360	155,360
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	18,053	0	0	0	0	18,053	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	18,053					18,053	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**151,636**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**151,636**	**151,636**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**151,636**				**151,636**	**151,636**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	788,053	256,996	0	50,000	0	1,095,049	306,996
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	788,053	256,996	0	50,000	0	1,095,049	306,996

Table 9-35: Lithuania – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	770,000		155,360	
1. World Bank (*International Development Association*)	770,000	770,000		-
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development *(E5P fund)*		-	105,360	105,360
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other (*European Investment Bank*)		-	50,000	50,000
Specialized United Nations bodies	18,053			
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme	18,053	18,053		-
3. Other				
Total contributions through multilateral channels	**788,053**	**788,053**	**155,360**	**155,360**

Table 9-36: Luxembourg - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Luxembourg 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Climate-specific: Adaptation	Climate-specific: Cross-cutting	Climate-specific: Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**1,389,078.00**	**5,872,700.00**	**0.00**	**7,261,778.00**	**7,261,778.00**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**872,700.00**	**3,000,000.00**	**1,389,078.00**	**5,000,000.00**	**0.00**	**10,261,778.00**	**9,389,078.00**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	**0.00**	0.00	0.00	**5,872,700.00**	0.00	5,872,700.00	**5,872,700.00**
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	**872,700.00**			**5,000,000.00**		5,872,700.00	**5,000,000.00**
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0.00	0.00
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0.00	**0.00**	1,141,170.00	0.00	0.00	**1,141,170.00**	**1,141,170.00**
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks		**1,000,000.00**	1,141,170.00			**2,141,170.00**	**2,141,170.00**
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0.00	**0.00**	247,908.00	0.00	0.00	**247,908.00**	**247,908.00**
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies		**2,000,000.00**	247,908.00			**2,247,908.00**	**2,247,908.00**
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0.00**	**6,104,635.18**	**5,963,395.00**	**19,373,506.00**	**0.00**	**31,441,536.18**	**31,441,536.18**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**6,041,386.00**	**6,375,771.00**	**19,220,143.00**		**31,637,300.00**	**31,637,300.00**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**0.00**	**6,104,635.18**	**7,352,473.00**	**25,246,206.00**	0.00	**38,703,314.18**	**38,703,314.18**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**872,700.00**	**9,041,386.00**	**7,764,849.00**	**24,220,143.00**	0.00	**41,899,078.00**	**41,026,378.00**

Table 9-37: Luxembourg – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds	872,700.00		5,000,000.00	5,872,700.00
1. Global Environment Facility	872,700.00			872,700.00
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund			5,000,000.00	5,000,000.00
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks			2,141,170.00	1,141,170.00
1. World Bank			300,000.00	300,000.00
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other *International Commitee of the Red Cross, Mekong River Commission*			1,841,170.00	841,170.00
Specialized United Nations bodies			2,247,908.00	247,908.00
1. United Nations Development Programme			247,908.00	
2. United Nations Environment Programme			2,000,000.00	
3. Other *UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women)*				247,908.00
Total contributions through multilateral channels			***9,389,078.00***	***7,261,778.00***

Table 9-38: Latvia - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Latvia 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	**Allocation channels**	**Core/ general**	**Climate-specific: Mitigation**	**Adaptation**	**Cross-cutting**	**Other**	**Total (climate-specific and core/ general)**	**Total climate-specific**
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**0**	**45,000**	**0**	**350,000**	**0**	**395,000**	**395,000**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**0**	**45,000**	**0**	**0**	**350,000**	**395,000**	**395,000**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	**350,000**	**0**	350,000	350,000
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds					**350,000**	350,000	350,000
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0		0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	45,000	0	0	0	45,000	45,000
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks		45,000				45,000	45,000
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies						0	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**24,985**	**24,985**	**24,985**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**					**24,985**	**24,985**	**24,985**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	0	45,000	0	**350,000**	**24,985**	419,985	419,985
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	0	45,000	0	**0**	**374,985**	419,985	419,985

Table 9-39: Latvia – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds			350,000	
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund			350,000	350,000
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks			45,000	
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (pt1)			35,000	35,000
6. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (pt2)				10,000
7. Inter-American Development Bank			10,000	
8. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies				
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme				
3. Other				
Total contributions through multilateral channels			***395,000***	***395,000***

Table 9-40: Malta - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Malta 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	**Allocation channels**	**Core/ general**	**Climate-specific**				**Total (climate-specific and core/ general)**	**Total climate-specific**
			Mitigation	**Adaptation**	**Cross-cutting**	**Other**		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	25,000	7,020	23,705	0	50,000	105,725	80,725
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	75,000	0	0	0	0	75,000	0
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	50,000	50,000	50,000
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0		0	0	50,000	50,000	50,000
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	7,020	23,705	0	0	30,725	30,725
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks		0	0			0	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	25,000	0	0	0	0	25,000	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	75,000					75,000	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		7,020	23,705			30,725	30,725
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	25,000	7,020	23,705	0	50,000	105,725	80,725
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	75,000	7,020	23,705	0	0	105,725	30,725

Table 9-41: Malta – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. other				
Specialized United Nations bodies				
1. United Nations Development Programme	25,000	25,000		
2. United Nations Environment Programme				
3. UNICEF	50,000	0	0	50,000
Total contributions through multilateral channels	*75,000*	*25,000*	*0*	*50,000*

Table 9-42: Netherlands - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Nethlerlands 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Climate-specific: Adaptation	Climate-specific: Cross-cutting	Climate-specific: Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	300,495,000.00	0.00	**0.00**	76,410,000.00	**0.00**	376,905,000.00	76,410,000.00
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	451,782,578.00	12,060,766.00	**0.00**	90,157,228.45	**0.00**	554,000,572.45	102,217,994.45
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	20,725,000.00	0.00	0.00	11,400,000.00	0.00	32,125,000.00	11,400,000.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	23,122,972.00	2,397,972.00		11,440,200.00		36,961,144.00	13,838,172.00
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	2,400,000.00	2,400,000.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4,800,000.00	2,400,000.00
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds	2,397,972.00	2,397,972.00				4,795,944.00	2,397,972.00
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	240,400,000.00	0.00	0.00	61,840,000.00	0.00	302,240,000.00	61,840,000.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	190,417,137.00			71,055,842.45		261,472,979.45	71,055,842.45
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	39,370,000.00	0.00	0.00	3,170,000.00	0.00	42,540,000.00	3,170,000.00
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	238,242,469.00	9,662,794.00		7,661,186.00		255,566,449.00	17,323,980.00
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	0.00	69,545,466.93	133,843,872.66	89,074,963.48	**0.00**	292,464,303.06	292,464,303.06
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		71,403,956.00	134,351,471.00	86,711,871.00		292,467,298.00	292,467,298.00
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	300,495,000.00	69,545,466.93	133,843,872.66	165,484,963.48	0.00	669,369,303.06	368,874,303.06
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	451,782,578.00	83,464,722.00	134,351,471.00	176,869,099.45	0.00	846,467,870.45	394,685,292.45

Table 9-43: Netherlands – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds	23,122,972	0	13,838,172	13,800,000
1. Global Environment Facility	20,725,000	0	11,440,200	11,400,000
2. Least Developed Countries Fund		0		0
3. Special Climate Change Fund		0		0
4. Adaptation Fund		0		0
5. Green Climate Fund		0		0
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities		0		0
7. Other multilateral climate change funds	2,397,972	0	2,397,972	2,400,000
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	190,417,137	0	71,055,842	61,840,000
1. World Bank		0		0
2. International Finance Corporation	7,508,800	0	9,962,676	0
3. African Development Bank	3,256,000	129,900,000	677,248	44,170,000
4. Asian Development Bank	2,242,000	0	405,802	0
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development		0		0
6. Inter-American Development Bank		0		0
7. Other	177,410,337	110,500,000	60,010,117	17,670,000
Specialized United Nations bodies	238,242,469	0	17,323,980	3,170,000
1. United Nations Development Programme	135,269,394	29,730,000	1,486,340	1,490,000
2. United Nations Environment Programme	7,124,228	7,140,000	1,424,846	1,430,000
3. Other	95,848,847	2,500,000	14,412,794	250,000
Total contributions through multilateral channels	*451,782,578*	*279,770,000*	*102,217,994*	*78,810,000*

Table 9-44: Poland – Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Poland 2014, Table 7		National currency PLN (MMR) / National currency PLN (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Climate-specific: Adaptation	Climate-specific: Cross-cutting	Climate-specific: Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**9,342,872.61**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**9,139,127.84**	**0.00**	**18,482,000.45**	**9,139,127.84**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**9,342,872.61**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**9,139,127.84**	**0.00**	**18,482,000.45**	**9,139,127.84**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	350,000.00		350,000.00	350,000.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds				350,000.00		350,000.00	350,000.00
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0.00	0.00
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	9,342,872.61	0.00	0.00	0.00		9,342,872.61	0.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	9,342,872.61					9,342,872.61	0.00
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0.00	0.00	0.00	8,789,127.84		8,789,127.84	8,789,127.84
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies				8,789,127.84		8,789,127.84	8,789,127.84
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0.00**	**1,542,883.41**	**639,376.68**	**4,059,006.36**		**6,241,266.45**	**6,241,266.45**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**1,124,361.28**	**639,376.68**	**4,477,528.49**		**6,241,266.45**	**6,241,266.45**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	9,342,872.61	**1,542,883.41**	639,376.68	**13,198,134.20**	0.00	24,723,266.90	15,380,394.29
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	9,342,872.61	**1,124,361.28**	639,376.68	**13,616,656.33**	0.00	24,723,266.90	15,380,394.29

Table 9-45: Poland – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Poland Table 7a	*Total amount*			
Donor funding	*Core/general*		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (PLN)	*MMR (PLN)*	*UNFCCC (PLN)*	*MMR (PLN)*
Multilateral climate change funds			350,000.00	350,000.00
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund			350,000.00	350,000.00
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	9,342,872.61	9,342,872.61		
1. World Bank - IDA	9,208,118.00	9,208,118.00		
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other: Council of Europe Development Bank	134,754.61	134,754.61		
Specialized United Nations bodies			8,789,127.84	8,789,127.84
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme			473,145.00	473,145.00
UNCCD			218,873.72	218,873.72
UNFCCC			426,812.81	426,812.81
WMO			160,062.63	160,062.63
IAEA-TCF			2,569,630.80	2,569,630.80
3. Other:				
EPPO			295,299.73	295,299.73
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol			4,442,423.19	4,442,423.19
CITES			202,879.96	202,879.96
Total contributions through multilateral channels		***9,342,872.61***	***9,139,127.84***	***9,139,127.84***

Table 9-46: Portugal - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Portugal 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	**Allocation channels**	**Core/ general**	**Climate-specific**				**Total (climate-specific and core/ general)**	**Total climate-specific**
			Mitigation	**Adaptation**	**Cross-cutting**	**Other**		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**3,469,923**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**3,469,923**	**0**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**3,469,923**					**3,469,923**	**0**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	3,387,387	0	0	0	0	3,387,387	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	3,387,387					3,387,387	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	82,536	0	0	0	0	82,536	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	82,536					82,536	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**8,359,311**	**855,005**	**0**	**0**	**9,214,316**	**9,214,316**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**8,359,311**	**855,005**			**9,214,316**	**9,214,316**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	3,469,923	8,359,311	855,005	0	0	12,684,239	9,214,316
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	3,469,923	8,359,311	855,005	0	0	12,684,239	9,214,316

Table 9-47: Portugal – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)
Multilateral climate change funds		-	-	-
1. Global Environment Facility		-	-	-
2. Least Developed Countries Fund			-	-
3. Special Climate Change Fund			-	-
4. Adaptation Fund			-	-
5. Green Climate Fund			-	-
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities			-	-
7. Other multilateral climate change funds			-	-
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	**3,469,923.00**	**3,387,387.00**	-	-
1. World Bank	1,490,000.00	1,490,000.00	-	-
2. International Finance Corporation		0.00	-	-
3. African Development Bank	1,478,108.00	1,478,108.00	-	-
4. Asian Development Bank	250,000.00	250,000.00	-	-
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development		0.00	-	-
6. Inter-American Development Bank	169,279.00	169,279.00	-	-
7. Other		0.00	-	-
Specialized United Nations bodies	82,536.00	82,536.00	-	-
1. United Nations Development Programme	39,872.00	39,872.00	-	-
2. United Nations Environment Programme		0.00	-	-
3. Other	42,664.00	42,664.00	-	-
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***3,469,923.00***	***3,469,923.00***	**-**	**-**

Table 9-48: Romania - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Romania 2014, Table 7		National currency RON (MMR) / National currency RON (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**0**	**0**	**140,000**	**0**	**0**	**140,000**	**140,000**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**						**0**	**0**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks						0	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	140,000	0	0	140,000	140,000
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies			0			0	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**140,000**		**140,000**			**280,000**	**140,000**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**0**	0	140,000	0	0	140,000	140,000
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**140,000**	0	140,000	0	0	280,000	140,000

Table 9-49: Romania – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (RON)	*MMR (RON)*	*UNFCCC (RON)*	*MMR (RON)*
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies				
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme				
3. Other				
Total contributions through multilateral channels				

Table 9-50: Sweden - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Sweden 2014, Table 7		National currency SEK (MMR) / National currency SEK (UNFCCC)						
Source	**Allocation channels**	**Core/ general**	**Climate-specific: Mitigation**	**Adaptation**	**Cross-cutting**	**Other**	**Total (climate-specific and core/ general)**	**Total climate-specific**
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**3,572,108,526**	**45,050,000**	**15,000,000**	**74,500,000**	**0**	**3,706,658,526**	**134,550,000**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**3,651,927,334**	**45,050,000**	**15,000,000**	**74,500,000**	**0**	**3,786,477,334**	**134,550,000**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds[e]	0	**38,700,000**	15,000,000	**11,500,000**	0	**65,200,000**	**65,200,000**
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds		**45,050,000**	15,000,000	**74,500,000**		**134,550,000**	**134,550,000**
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds[f]	0	6,350,000	0	63,000,000	0	69,350,000	69,350,000
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds[f]		6,350,000		63,000,000		69,350,000	69,350,000
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	**2,876,464,054**	0	0	0	0	**2,876,464,054**	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	**2,956,282,862**					**2,956,282,862**	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	**695,644,472**	0	0	0	0	**695,644,472**	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	**695,644,472**					**695,644,472**	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**232,789,666**	**691,537,060**	**1,020,900,805**	**0**	**1,945,227,531**	**1,945,227,531**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**232,789,666**	**691,537,060**	**1,020,900,805**		**1,945,227,531**	**1,945,227,531**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**3,572,108,526**	277,839,666	706,537,060	1,095,400,805	0	**5,651,886,057**	2,079,777,531
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**3,651,927,334**	277,839,666	706,537,060	1,095,400,805	0	**5,731,704,865**	2,079,777,531

Table 9-51: Sweden – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (SEK)	*MMR (SEK)*	*UNFCCC (SEK)*	*MMR (SEK)*
Multilateral climate change funds			134,550,000	
1. Global Environment Facility			38,700,000	38,700,000
2. Least Developed Countries Fund			15,000,000	15,000,000
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund			10,000,000	10,000,000
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities			1,500,000	1,500,000
7. Other multilateral climate finance			69,350,000	
7a) Climate and Clean Air Coallition (CCAC)			3,350,000	3,350,000
7b) Nordic Development Fund			60,000,000	60,000,000
7c) UNFCCC- Trust Fund for Participation			1,500,000	1,500,000
7e) New Climate Economy			1,000,000	1,000,000
7f) IISD/GSI Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform			2,000,000	2,000,000
7h) Other climate finance from Ministry of Environment			1,500,000	1,500,000
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	2,956,282,862.00	2,876,464,054		
1. World Bank	2,209,538,113	2,029,848,113		TBC
3. African Development Bank	609,673,785	709,544,977		TBC
4. Asian Development Bank	124,791,230	124,791,230		TBC
6. Inter-American Development Bank	12,279,734	12,279,734		TBC
7. Other				TBC
Specialized United Nations bodies	695,644,472			
1. United Nations Development Programme	510,000,000	510,000,000		TBC
2. United Nations Environment Programme	32,124,512	32,124,512		TBC
3. IFAD	153,519,960	153,519,960		TBC
3. Other	153,519,960			
Total contributions through multilateral channels	*3,651,927,334*	*3,572,108,526*	*134,550,000*	*134,550,000*

Table 9-52: Slovenia - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Slovenia 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**663,490**	**0**	**663,490**	**663,490**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**533,510**	**0**	**533,510**	**533,510**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	376,200	0	376,200	376,200
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds				376,200		376,200	376,200
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	0	0	157,310	0	157,310	157,310
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				157,310		157,310	157,310
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	0	**129,980**	0	129,980	129,980
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	0	**0**		0	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**596,460**	**850,710**	**156,180**	**0**	**1,603,350**	**1,603,350**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**804,000**	**180,730**	**618,620**		**1,603,350**	**1,603,350**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	0	**596,460**	**850,710**	**819,670**	0	**2,266,840**	**2,266,840**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	0	**804,000**	**180,730**	**1,152,130**	0	**2,136,860**	**2,136,860**

Table 9-53: Slovenia – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)
Total contributions through multilateral channels			533,510	663,490
Multilateral climate change funds			376,200	376,200
1. Global Environment Facility			376,200	376,200
GEF - part for mitigation				
GEF - part for adaptation				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks			157,310	157,310
1. World Bank			154,440	154,440
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other			2,870	2,870
Specialized United Nations bodies			**0**	**129,980**
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme				
3. Other			**0**	**129,980**
			0	**660,620**

Table 9-54: Slovakia - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Slovakia 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**305,224.72**	**198,996.50**	**3,676.36**	**150,468.73**	**0.00**	**658,366.31**	**353,141.59**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**264,580.32**	**198,996.50**	**3,676.36**	**150,468.73**	**40,644.40**	**658,366.31**	**393,785.99**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0.00	198,996.50	3,676.36	25,493.73	0.00	228,166.59	228,166.59
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds		198,996.50	3,676.36	25,493.73		228,166.59	228,166.59
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds		198,996.50	3,676.36	25,493.73		228,166.59	228,166.59
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0.00	0.00	0.00	124,975.00	0.00	124,975.00	124,975.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				124,975.00		124,975.00	124,975.00
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	**305,224.72**	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.00**	305,224.72	0.00
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	**264,580.32**				**40,644.40**	305,224.72	40,644.40
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**760,370.96**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**760,370.96**	**760,370.96**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**			**760,370.96**			**760,370.96**	**760,370.96**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	305,224.72	198,996.50	764,047.32	150,468.73	0.00	1,418,737.27	1,113,512.55
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	264,580.32	198,996.50	764,047.32	150,468.73	40,644.40	1,418,737.27	1,154,156.95

Table 9-55: Slovakia – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Slovakia Table 7a	*Total amount*			
Donor funding	*Core/general*		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds			228,166.59	228,166.59
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund			173,975.00	173,975.00
8. Montreal Protocol Trust Fund			5,370.96	5,370.96
9. UNFCCC			25,493.73	25,493.73
10. Kyoto Protocol under UNFCCC			19,650.54	19,650.54
12. World Meteorological Organisation (WMO)			3,676.36	3,676.36
13. Other multilateral climate change funds			228,166.59	228,166.59
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks			124,975.00	124,975.00
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. SK-EBRD Technical Co-operation Fund; Projects: Kyrgyz Republic, Capacity enhancement of the Kyrgyz Civil Society Organisation Camp Alatoo regarding residential energy efficiency (II)			**0.00**	**74,975.00**
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development as a manager *Contribution to the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership Regional Fund - Moldova window*			**0.00**	**50,000.00**
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies	264,580.32	264,580.32	**40,644.40**	**0.00**
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme	**0.00**	**40,644.40**	**40,644.40**	**0.00**
3. Other: CITES Multilateral Treaty	8,969.61	8,969.61		
4. Other: The UNCCD in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa	12,833.00	12,833.00		
5. Other: The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	217,287.71	217,287.71		
6. Other: European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization (EPPO)	25,490.00	25,490.00		
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***264,580.32***	***305,224.72***	***393,785.99***	***581,308.18***

Table 9-56: Spain - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Spain 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**0**	**30,000,000**	**165,411**	**9,616,000**		**39,781,411**	**39,781,411**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**16,120,000**	**30,000,000**	**165,411**	**9,616,000**		**55,901,411**	**39,781,411**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	30,000,000	165,411	8,866,000		39,031,411	39,031,411
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	16,120,000	30,000,000	165,411	8,866,000		55,151,411	39,031,411
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0		0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds		30,000,000				30,000,000	30,000,000
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	0	0	0		0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks						0	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	0	750,000		750,000	750,000
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies				750,000		750,000	750,000
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**393,176,306**	**18,496,555**	**12,424,800**		**424,097,661**	**424,097,661**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**393,176,306**	**18,495,157**	**12,426,197**		**424,097,660**	**424,097,660**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	0	423,176,306	**18,661,966**	**22,040,800**		463,879,072	463,879,072
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	16,120,000	423,176,306	**18,660,568**	**22,042,197**		479,999,071	463,879,071

Table 9-57: Spain – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)
Multilateral climate change funds	16,120,000		39,031,411	
1. Global Environmental Facility	16,120,000	16,120,000	8,866,000	8,866,000
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund			165,411	165,411
5. Green Climate Change Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds			30,000,000	
Clean Technology Fund (Climate Investment Funds)			30,000,000	30,000,000
Subtotal				
Multilateral financial Institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank GROUP				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction				
6. Interamerican Development Bank				
7. Other				
Subtotal	**0**	**0**		
Specialized United Nations bodies			750,000	750,000
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme(REGATTA Project)			250,000	250,000
3. Other			500,000	500,000
FAO				
UN HABITAT				
UNREDD				500,000
Subtotal	**0**	**0**		
Total	***0***	***0***	***39,781,411***	***39,781,411***

Table 9-58: United Kingdom – Table 7 Summary information for 2014

United Kingdom 2014, Table 7		National currency £ (MMR) / National currency £ (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**1,825,600,000**	**111,690,000**	**21,000,000**	**284,610,000**	**0**	2,242,900,000	**417,300,000**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**1,826,000,000**	**0**	**2,500,000**	**414,800,000**	**0**	2,243,300,000	**922,790,000**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	**21,000,000**	**2,500,000**	0	**23,500,000**	**23,500,000**
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	**2,500,000**	**414,800,000**	0	**417,300,000**	**417,300,000**
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	**111,690,000**	0	**282,110,000**	0	393,800,000	393,800,000
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	**0**	0	**393,800,000**	0	393,800,000	393,800,000
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	1,825,600,000	0	0	0	0	1,825,600,000	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	1,826,000,000	0	0	0	0	1,826,000,000	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**81,240,000**	**161,320,000**	**103,770,000**	**123,720,000**	**470,050,000**	**470,050,000**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**81,240,000**	**161,520,000**	**103,770,000**	**123,520,000**	**470,050,000**	**470,050,000**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**1,825,600,000**	**192,930,000**	**182,320,000**	**388,380,000**	**123,720,000**	**2,712,950,000**	**887,350,000**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**1,826,000,000**	**81,240,000**	**164,020,000**	**518,570,000**	**123,520,000**	**2,713,350,000**	**887,350,000**

Table 9-59: United Kingdom – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (£)	*MMR (£)*	*UNFCCC (£)*	*MMR (£)*
Multilateral climate change funds				**417,300,000**
1. Global Environment Facility			21,000,000	21,000,000
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund			2,500,000	2,500,000
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Climate Investment Funds			372,690,000	261,000,000
Climate Investment Funds - Clean Technology Fund				111,690,000
Climate Development Knowledge Network				**21,110,000**
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks		**1,825,600,000**		
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank		**207,800,000**		
4. Asian Development Bank		**50,000,000**		
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank		**2,500,000**		
7. Other		**1,565,300,000**		
Specialized United Nations bodies				
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme				
3. Other				
Total contributions through multilateral channels		***1,825,600,000***		***417,300,000***

9.4. Annex IV: Overview of 28 Member States quantitative comparison of finance data reported for the year 2014 in the MMR reporting and the second biennial reports

The following tables are extracted from the data given in Annex III. Three tables are compiled presenting bilateral, multilateral and both contributions for all 28 EU Member States[56] and as a total.

Comments and clarifications received from Member States after presenting and sharing the results of a former version of this synthesis report are incorporated in this analysis.

[56] Croatia is abbreviated as CR

Table 9-60: Total multilateral and bilateral contributions for all 28 Member States

Sum of total contributions by country (bilateral and multilateral)								
			EURO					
			Climate-specific					
Country	Report	Exchange rate to €	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
AT	MMR	1.00	72,074,108	6,882,195	22,120,786	0	112,759,443	101,077,089
AT	BR2	1.00	71,002,910	6,882,195	63,353,623	0	141,238,728	141,238,728
BE	MMR	1.00	8,579,983	31,053,692	54,768,078	0	470,510,220	94,401,753
BE	BR2	1.00	8,579,983	33,303,691	54,768,078	0	472,760,218	96,651,752
BG	MMR	1.00	0	0	8,975	0	34,211	8,975
BG	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CR	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	33,018	0
CR	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	33,018	0
CY	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CY	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CZ	MMR	0.04	1,149,083	2,799,552	2,259,890	0	12,472,644	6,208,524
CZ	BR2	0.04	1,149,083	2,799,552	2,259,890	0	13,204,152	6,208,524
DE	MMR	1.00	722,273,560	681,414,566	230,073,345	486,172,574	2,986,530,139	2,119,934,045
DE	BR2	1.00	610,421,344	793,266,782	230,073,345	486,172,573	2,986,530,138	2,119,934,044
DK	MMR	0.13	45,789,402	0	141,623,350	17,156,491	376,740,396	187,412,752
DK	BR2	0.13	47,623,069	20,135,153	115,794,253	0	372,880,119	183,552,474
EE	MMR	1.00	0	323,000	364,806	0	746,690	687,806
EE	BR2	1.00	74,134	0	596,010	0	779,028	670,144
ES	MMR	1.00	423,176,306	18,661,966	22,040,800	0	463,879,072	463,879,072
ES	BR2	1.00	423,176,306	18,660,568	22,042,197	0	479,999,071	463,879,071
FI	MMR	1.00	30,857,058	24,260,341	61,054,126	0	1,136,555,912	116,171,525
FI	BR2	1.00	30,857,058	24,260,341	61,054,126	0	624,116,668	116,171,525
FR	MMR	1.00	2,232,149,678	279,138,362	255,907,619	0	2,801,180,659	2,767,195,659
FR	BR2	1.00	2,233,874,678	279,138,362	254,182,619	0	2,801,180,659	2,767,195,659
GR	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	501,442	0
GR	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	501,442	0
HU	MMR	1.00	486,157,240	334,307,051	17,049,256	0	3,066,230,357	837,513,547
HU	BR2	1.00	486,157,240	334,307,051	15,181,636	0	3,064,362,837	835,645,927
IE	MMR	1.00	1,527,600	22,874,000	9,572,500	0	109,405,905	33,974,100
IE	BR2	1.00	1,527,600	22,274,000	9,572,500	300,000	109,105,900	33,674,100
IT	MMR	1.00	14,961,329	4,554,061	32,597,559	0	76,642,949	52,112,949
IT	BR2	1.00	12,750,000	1,910,000	32,040,000	0	46,700,000	46,700,000
LT	MMR	1.00	256,996	0	50,000	0	1,095,049	306,996
LT	BR2	1.00	256,996	0	50,000	0	1,095,049	306,996
LU	MMR	1.00	6,104,635	7,352,473	25,246,206	0	38,703,314	38,703,314
LU	BR2	1.00	9,041,386	7,764,849	24,220,143	0	41,899,078	41,026,378
LV	MMR	1.00	45,000	0	350,000	24,985	419,985	419,985
LV	BR2	1.00	45,000	0	0	374,985	419,985	419,985

Sum of total contributions by country (bilateral and multilateral)									
Country	Report	Exchange rate to €	EURO						
			Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MT	MMR	1.00	7,020	23,705	0	50,000	105,725	80,725
MT	BR2	1.00	7,020	23,705	0	0	105,725	30,725
NL	MMR	1.00	69,545,467	133,843,873	165,484,963	0	669,369,303	368,874,303
NL	BR2	1.00	83,464,722	134,351,471	176,869,099	0	846,467,870	394,685,292
PL	MMR	0.24	368,661	152,775	3,153,601	0	5,907,449	3,675,036
PL	BR2	0.24	268,658	152,775	3,253,604	0	5,907,449	3,675,036
PT	MMR	1.00	8,359,311	855,005	0	0	12,684,239	9,214,316
PT	BR2	1.00	8,359,311	855,005	0	0	12,684,239	9,214,316
RO	MMR	0.25	0	35,565	0	0	35,565	35,565
RO	BR2	0.25	0	35,565	0	0	71,129	35,565
SE	MMR	0.11	30,526,357	77,627,514	120,352,132	0	620,975,017	228,506,002
SE	BR2	0.11	30,526,357	77,627,514	120,352,132	0	629,744,742	228,506,002
SI	MMR	1.00	596,460	850,710	819,670	0	2,266,840	2,266,840
SI	BR2	1.00	804,000	180,730	1,152,130	0	2,136,860	2,136,860
SK	MMR	1.00	198,997	764,047	150,469	0	1,418,737	1,113,513
SK	BR2	1.00	198,997	764,047	150,469	40,644	1,418,737	1,154,157
UK	MMR	1.35	260,455,500	246,132,000	524,313,000	167,022,000	3,662,482,500	1,197,922,500
UK	BR2	1.35	109,674,000	221,427,000	700,069,500	166,752,000	3,663,022,500	1,197,922,500
Total MMR							16,629,686,781	8,631,696,892
Total BR2							16,318,365,343	8,690,635,762

Table 9-61: Total multilateral contributions for all 28 Member States

Sum of total multilateral contributions by country								
			EURO					
			Climate-specific					
Country	Report	Exchange rate to €	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
AT	MMR	1.00	1,071,198	0	252,640	0	13,006,192	1,323,838
AT	BR2	1.00	0	0	41,485,477	0	41,485,477	41,485,477
BE	MMR	1.00	22,040	12,813,595	41,494,353	0	430,438,454	54,329,988
BE	BR2	1.00	22,040	15,063,594	41,494,353	0	432,688,453	56,579,987
BG	MMR	1.00	0	0	8,975	0	34,211	8,975
BG	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CR	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	33,018	0
CR	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	33,018	0
CY	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CY	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CZ	MMR	0.04	0	0	2,161,826	0	8,425,946	2,161,826
CZ	BR2	0.04	0	0	2,161,826	0	9,157,454	2,161,826
DE	MMR	1.00	27,006,778	98,000,000	20,619,520	92,000,000	1,104,222,391	237,626,298
DE	BR2	1.00	27,006,778	98,000,000	20,619,520	92,000,000	1,104,222,391	237,626,297
DK	MMR	0.13	3,876,094	0	16,178,169	17,156,491	209,381,907	20,054,263
DK	BR2	0.13	6,993,348	5,361,404	13,062,456	0	214,744,852	25,417,208
EE	MMR	1.00	0	323,000	262,806	0	644,690	585,806
EE	BR2	1.00	0	0	60,806	0	169,690	60,806
ES	MMR	1.00	30,000,000	165,411	9,616,000	0	39,781,411	39,781,411
ES	BR2	1.00	30,000,000	165,411	9,616,000	0	55,901,411	39,781,411
FI	MMR	1.00	6,837,000	14,000,000	50,907,922	0	593,022,470	71,744,922
FI	BR2	1.00	6,837,000	14,000,000	50,907,922	0	579,690,065	71,744,922
FR	MMR	1.00	0	0	10,875,200	0	44,860,200	10,875,200
FR	BR2	1.00	0	0	10,875,200	0	44,860,200	10,875,200
GR	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	501,442	0
GR	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	501,442	0
HU	MMR	1.00	485,417,240	0	0	0	2,714,134,050	485,417,240
HU	BR2	1.00	485,417,240	0	0	0	2,714,134,150	485,417,240
IE	MMR	1.00	37,600	1,900,000	100,000	0	77,469,405	2,037,600
IE	BR2	1.00	37,600	1,300,000	100,000	300,000	77,169,400	1,737,600
IT	MMR	1.00	1,244,750	466,880	17,259,821	0	43,501,451	18,971,451
IT	BR2	1.00	200,000	0	20,960,000	0	21,160,000	21,160,000
LT	MMR	1.00	105,360	0	50,000	0	943,413	155,360
LT	BR2	1.00	105,360	0	50,000	0	943,413	155,360
LU	MMR	1.00	0	1,389,078	5,872,700	0	7,261,778	7,261,778
LU	BR2	1.00	3,000,000	1,389,078	5,000,000	0	10,261,778	9,389,078
LV	MMR	1.00	45,000	0	350,000	0	395,000	395,000
LV	BR2	1.00	45,000	0	0	350,000	395,000	395,000

Sum of total multilateral contributions by country									
Country	Report	Exchange rate to €	EURO						
			Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MT	MMR	1.00	7,020	23,705	0	50,000	105,725	80,725
MT	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	75,000	0
NL	MMR	1.00	0	0	76,410,000	0	376,905,000	76,410,000
NL	BR2	1.00	12,060,766	0	90,157,228	0	554,000,572	102,217,994
PL	MMR	0.24	0	0	2,183,730	0	4,416,143	2,183,730
PL	BR2	0.24	0	0	2,183,730	0	4,416,143	2,183,730
PT	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	3,469,923	0
PT	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	3,469,923	0
RO	MMR	0.25	0	35,565	0	0	35,565	35,565
RO	BR2	0.25	0	0	0	0	0	0
SE	MMR	0.11	4,949,662	1,648,056	8,185,345	0	407,252,078	14,783,063
SE	BR2	0.11	4,949,662	1,648,056	8,185,345	0	416,021,803	14,783,063
SI	MMR	1.00	0	0	663,490	0	663,490	663,490
SI	BR2	1.00	0	0	533,510	0	533,510	533,510
SK	MMR	1.00	198,997	3,676	150,469	0	658,366	353,142
SK	BR2	1.00	198,997	3,676	150,469	40,644	658,366	393,786
UK	MMR	1.35	150,781,500	28,350,000	384,223,500	0	3,027,915,000	563,355,000
UK	BR2	1.35	0	3,375,000	559,980,000	0	3,028,455,000	563,355,000
Total MMR							9,109,478,719	1,610,595,669
Total BR2							9,315,148,512	1,687,454,495

Table 9-62: Total bilateral contributions for all 28 Member States

Sum of total bilateral contributions by country								
			EURO					
			Climate-specific					
Country	Report	Exchange rate to €	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
AT	MMR	1.00	71,002,910	6,882,195	21,868,146	0	99,753,251	99,753,251
AT	BR2	1.00	71,002,910	6,882,195	21,868,146	0	99,753,251	99,753,251
BE	MMR	1.00	8,557,943	18,240,097	13,273,725	0	40,071,765	40,071,765
BE	BR2	1.00	8,557,943	18,240,097	13,273,725	0	40,071,765	40,071,765
BG	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
BG	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CR	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CR	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CY	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CY	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CZ	MMR	0.04	1,149,083	2,799,552	98,064	0	4,046,698	4,046,698
CZ	BR2	0.04	1,149,083	2,799,552	98,064	0	4,046,698	4,046,698
DE	MMR	1.00	**695,266,782**	**583,414,566**	209,453,825	394,172,574	1,882,307,747	1,882,307,747
DE	BR2	1	**583,414,566**	**695,266,782**	209,453,825	394,172,574	1,882,307,747	1,882,307,747
DK	MMR	0.13	**41,913,308**	**0**	**125,445,181**	0	**167,358,489**	**167,358,489**
DK	BR2	0.13	**40,629,721**	**14,773,749**	**102,731,796**	0	**158,135,267**	**158,135,267**
EE	MMR	1.00	**0**	0	**102,000**	0	**102,000**	**102,000**
EE	BR2	1.00	**74,134**	0	**535,204**	0	**609,338**	**609,338**
ES	MMR	1.00	393,176,306	**18,496,555**	**12,424,800**	0	424,097,661	424,097,661
ES	BR2	1.00	393,176,306	**18,495,157**	**12,426,197**	0	424,097,660	424,097,660
FI	MMR	1.00	24,020,058	10,260,341	10,146,204	0	**543,533,442**	44,426,603
FI	BR2	1.00	24,020,058	10,260,341	10,146,204	0	**44,426,603**	44,426,603
FR	MMR	1.00	**2,232,149,678**	279,138,362	**245,032,419**	0	2,756,320,459	2,756,320,459
FR	BR2	1.00	**2,233,874,678**	279,138,362	**243,307,419**	0	2,756,320,459	2,756,320,459
GR	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
GR	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
HU	MMR	1.00	740,000	334,307,051	**17,049,256**	0	**352,096,307**	**352,096,307**
HU	BR2	1.00	740,000	334,307,051	**15,181,636**	0	**350,228,687**	**350,228,687**
IE	MMR	1.00	1,490,000	20,974,000	9,472,500	0	31,936,500	31,936,500
IE	BR2	1.00	1,490,000	20,974,000	9,472,500	0	31,936,500	31,936,500
IT	MMR	1.00	**13,716,579**	**4,087,181**	**15,337,738**	0	**33,141,499**	**33,141,499**
IT	BR2	1.00	**12,550,000**	**1,910,000**	**11,080,000**	0	**25,540,000**	**25,540,000**
LT	MMR	1.00	151,636	0	0	0	151,636	151,636
LT	BR2	1.00	151,636	0	0	0	151,636	151,636
LU	MMR	1.00	**6,104,635**	**5,963,395**	**19,373,506**	0	**31,441,536**	**31,441,536**
LU	BR2	1.00	**6,041,386**	**6,375,771**	**19,220,143**	0	**31,637,300**	**31,637,300**
LV	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	24,985	24,985	24,985
LV	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	24,985	24,985	24,985

Sum of total bilateral contributions by country									
Country	Report	Exchange rate to €	EURO						
			Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MT	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
MT	BR2	1.00	7,020	23,705	0	0	30,725	30,725
NL	MMR	1.00	69,545,467	133,843,873	89,074,963	0	292,464,303	292,464,303
NL	BR2	1.00	71,403,956	134,351,471	86,711,871	0	292,467,298	292,467,298
PL	MMR	0.24	368,661	152,775	969,871	0	1,491,306	1,491,306
PL	BR2	0.24	268,658	152,775	1,069,874	0	1,491,306	1,491,306
PT	MMR	1.00	8,359,311	855,005	0	0	9,214,316	9,214,316
PT	BR2	1.00	8,359,311	855,005	0	0	9,214,316	9,214,316
RO	MMR	0.25	0	0	0	0	0	0
RO	BR2	0.25	0	35,565	0	0	71,129	35,565
SE	MMR	0.11	25,576,695	75,979,458	112,166,786	0	213,722,939	213,722,939
SE	BR2	0.11	25,576,695	75,979,458	112,166,786	0	213,722,939	213,722,939
SI	MMR	1.00	596,460	850,710	156,180	0	1,603,350	1,603,350
SI	BR2	1.00	804,000	180,730	618,620	0	1,603,350	1,603,350
SK	MMR	1.00	0	760,371	0	0	760,371	760,371
SK	BR2	1.00	0	760,371	0	0	760,371	760,371
UK	MMR	1.35	109,674,000	217,782,000	140,089,500	167,022,000	634,567,500	634,567,500
UK	BR2	1.35	109,674,000	218,052,000	140,089,500	166,752,000	634,567,500	634,567,500
Total MMR							7,520,208,062	7,021,101,223
Total BR2							7,003,216,831	7,003,181,266

9.5. Annex V: Key results of quantitative analysis of finance data reported under the MMR and in second biennial reports (multilateral and bilateral)

This chapter summarizes results from the quantitative data analysis. The tables compare the financial contributions to developing countries for the reporting year 2014 as reported in tables 7 and 7a under the MMR Article 16 at the end of October 2015 and in the second biennial report which was due by 1 January 2016 for each Member State. Annex III provides detailed comparison tables for each Member State and Annex IV shows a summary of the detailed comparison as well as the effects at aggregated EU level.

Comments and clarifications received from Member States after presenting and sharing the results of a former version of this synthesis report are incorporated in this analysis.

9.5.1. General reporting issues

- In table 7 it differs between countries and reports if the value of ´other´ is included in ´multilateral climate change funds´ or directly in ´total contributions through multilateral channels´.

9.5.2. Austria

- Reported amounts for multilateral support for 2014 in BR2 reports and in MMR reporting table are inconsistent while amounts for bilateral and regional support are consistent;
- Austria did not report any ´core/ general´ financial support in BR2 while ´core/ general´ support was included in MMR reporting. Thus the amount of € 11,682,354 of ´core/ general´ support is missing in the BR2 tables which was reported as ´core/ general´ in the MMR reporting for 2014;
- Amounts provided to Montreal Protocol are consistent between MMR reporting and BR2;
- Austria does not report any support provided to multilateral climate change funds;
- Support provided to multilateral financial institutions:
    - The support provided to the World Bank in 2014 is € 4.9 Mio in MMR reporting which is reported under ´core/ general´ whereas in the BR2 € 26.1 Mio are reported as cross-cutting climate-specific support to the World Bank. Thus, the climate-specific amount in BR2 is much higher than the core amount included in the MMR reporting;
    - The support provided to the African Development Bank in 2014 is € 1.8 Mio in MMR reporting which is reported under ´core/ general´ whereas in the BR2 € 2 Mio are reported as ´cross-cutting´ ´climate-specific´ support to the African Development Bank. Thus, the ´climate-specific´ amount in BR2 is slightly higher than the core amount included in the MMR reporting;
    - The support provided to the Asian Development Bank in 2014 is € 1.7 Mio in MMR reporting which is reported under ´core/ general´ whereas in the BR2 € 12.2 Mio are reported as ´cross-cutting´ ´climate-specific´ support to the African Development Bank. Thus, the ´climate-specific´ amount in BR2 is much higher than the core amount included in the MMR reporting;
    - ´Core/ general´ support to the EBRD and the Inter-American Development Bank is reported in the MMR tables, but not in the BR2 tables;

- ´Core/ general´ support to UNEP and UNDP is included in the MMR tables, but no amounts are indicated in BR2 tables;
- Support to UNFCCC is indicated with € 82,867 in BR2 whereas in the MMR tables a much higher amount of € 252,640 is provided for "UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and ITL";
- No sectoral information is provided for multilateral support;
- Financial instrument (grant) is provided in BR2 reporting, but not in MMR reporting.
- Austria commented that a key problem for consistency between MMR and BR reports that is not mentioned in the report is the early annual deadline of 30 September under MMR. The "imputed multilateral shares" that OECD publishes for OECD members are not available by that date. Yet these figures are the only genuinely comparable figures available. Austria therefore refrains from reporting "climate-specific" core contributions (below 100%) under MMR. We have thus treated MMR reports as preliminary reports to be updated and corrected in the relevant BRs. In this understanding consistency of data on multilateral support between MMR reports and BRs was neither anticipated nor indeed intended. We are however open to resubmitting MMR reports annually after the 30 September deadline once harmonised OECD data is available. This would ensure consistency between MMR and BR reports from Austria in the future."

9.5.3. Belgium

- Bilateral contributions are consistent between BR2 and MMR;
- Multilateral contributions are consistent apart from a subcategory for ´Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research´ in the MMR; in the BR this value is placed within ´specialized UN bodies´;
- The adaptation values differ for multilateral climate change funds;
- In MMR, value in multilateral climate change funds in 7 is different from 7a; only € 12 Mio from one fund are reported. The sum differs from the one in the BR;
- 7a is consistent. Only in the GCF, the BR2 reports one value, whereas it is split up in the MMR as € 40 Mio for ´cross-cutting´ multisectoral and € 600,000 for ´cross-cutting´. The Adaptation Fund value has also been split up under the MMR; the reason remains unclear.

9.5.4. Bulgaria

- Bulgaria reported empty tables on financial support in BR2 reporting under the UNFCCC, but reported support under the MMR. As Bulgaria is not included in Annex II to the Convention, it is not obliged to fulfil obligations pursuant to Articles 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 of the UNFCCC;
- The reported amounts of multilateral support in the MMR include contributions to the UNFCCC and the Montreal Protocol, core contributions to UNEP and other Conventions (desertification, CITES) as well as support to IUCN (which is reported under UN bodies; however IUCN is not an UN body.

9.5.5. Croatia

- The amount reported by Croatia is consistent. It includes only the UNFCCC core budget, which is reported under ´Specialized UN bodies´.

9.5.6. Czech Republic

- Reported amounts for climate-specific multilateral support for 2014 in BR2 reports and in MMR reporting table are consistent apart from 40,000,000 CZK reported as ´multilateral financial institutions including regional development banks´ - ´other´ in the BR and as ´other multilateral climate change funds´ in the MMR;
- Reported amounts for core/general multilateral support for 2014 in BR2 reports and in MMR reporting table are consistent apart from an additional 20,140,621 CZK reported in BR2 for ´multilateral climate change funds´;
- Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels are consistent;

9.5.7. Cyprus

- Cyprus reports empty tables under MMR and BR2.

9.5.8. Denmark

- Reported amounts in BR2 reports and in MMR reporting table are not fully consistent;
- Under the MMR Denmark reported finance data in 1000 DKK and in the BR CTF format DKK are reported. There is a factor of 1000 in the units indicated, however the order of magnitude of the numbers reported is the same or sometimes also the amounts are the same. This means that units are wrong in one of the reported set of tables. Comparison with BR1 reporting indicates that the units reported in BR2 tables are wrong and are indicated in 1000 DKK whereas the unit is DKK. This is corrected in the tables in Annex III;
- ´Multilateral climate change funds´: amount for GCF and ´other multilateral climate change funds´ are reported as ´core/ general´ in BR2 and as ´climate-specific´ in MMR template;
- Multilateral financial institutions: higher amount for World Bank provided in BR2 (DKK 40 Mio higher in BR2) which is also split to ´adaptation´/ ´mitigation´ / ´cross-cutting´ which was not the case for the amounts in the MMR template;
- ´Bilateral, regional and other channels´: higher amount reported in BR2, mostly due to adaptation projects included which were not included in MMR report, total amounts for ´mitigation´ and ´cross-cutting´ slightly lower in BR2 reporting than in MMR reporting;
- ´Bilateral, regional and other channels´: status reported as provided in BR2 and as committed in MMR template;
- In 7a of BR2 Denmark reports DKK 100 Mio and DKK 28 Mio under ´core/general´ ´multilateral climate change funds´ which are reported as ´climate-specific´ in the MMR;
- Values of the Asian Development Bank in 7a ´climate-specific´ are rounded in BR2;
- DKK 11,500 are reported in BR2 to the GEF which do not appear in the MMR and might be missing a factor 1000. This was not corrected.

9.5.9. Estonia

- In the MMR report, total bilateral contribution reported in summary table 7 is not the same number as the bilateral support reported in table 7b. The figure in table 7 was corrected according to table 7b;
- Estonia reports € 50,000 ´core/general´ to UNDP in BR2 that are not reported in the MMR;

- Under the MMR € 100,000 are reported as ´climate-specific´ to the International Telecommunications Union as ´other´ in ´Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks´ and € 323,000 to UNDP under ´specialized UN bodies´ which are not reported in BR2;
- In BR2 Estonia reports ´climate-specific´ bilateral contributions of € 74,134 (mitigation) and € 535,204 (cross-cutting) and only € 120,000 of the latter are reported to the MMR (in table 7b);
- In BR2 Estonia reports € 49,007.21 under ´cross-cutting´ and ´other multilateral climate change funds´ whereas in the MMR € 151,007.21 is reported under ´cross-cutting´ and ´multilateral climate change funds´;
- In total € 32,338 (´climate-specific´ and ´core/general´) are reported less in BR2 and € 17,662 more in BR2 (´climate-specific´).

9.5.10. Finland

- ´Climate-specific´ values are consistent between MMR and BR2 reporting;
- Differences in ´core/general´ can be observed for ´multilateral climate change funds´, ´specialized UN bodies´ and bilateral contributions;
- More than twice the amount is reported under the MMR as compared to BR2. This is largely due to the fact that no core/ general bilateral contributions are reported in BR2, but about 500 Mio € in the MMR report.
- Finland comments: "the UNFCCC reporting system does not allow to include bilateral core/general information in table 7b; it only has a column for climate specific. Our own computerized system includes this information in aggregate table 7. We do not see this difference as a problem, because the relevant information is always reported in the climate specific column."

9.5.11. France

- For ´core/general´ France reports € 33,985,000 in BR2 which France did not report in the MMR table 7, but this amount was reported in MMR table 7a. Therefore table 7 was corrected to include this amount consistent with table 7a.
- € 1,725,000 of bilateral contributions is reported as mitigation in BR2 and as cross-cutting under the MMR;
- Apart from this swapping, totals are consistent.

9.5.12. Germany

- In general, amounts reported in BR2 and in MMR template are consistent;
- The amounts for ´total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels´ for ´mitigation´ and ´adaptation´ are exchanged in the BR2 report, the amount reported for ´mitigation´ is the same as reported for ´adaptation´ in the MMR reporting and the other way round for ´mitigation´; Germany confirms this confusion of values in the comment;
- Under Cross-cutting in table 7, Germany reports ´other multilateral climate change funds´ as a subcategory under the UNFCCC and as a separate category under the MMR. Values are equal;

- In table 7, Germany reports a joint value to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to the UNFCCC and four separate values under the MMR. The sum is equal;
- Germany stated in its comment that changes between MMR and BR might depend on coal activities reported in the MMR September version, which have been corrected in an updated MMR version.

9.5.13. Greece

- All values are consistent.

9.5.14. Hungary

- Multilateral contributions are consistent apart from a HUF 100 difference under specialized UN bodies, which are probably a summation or typing mistake;
- Under the MMR, almost HUF 2,000,000 more are reported in bilateral ´cross-cutting´ than in BR2.

9.5.15. Ireland

- There is likely a reporting mistake of € 300,000 provided to UNEP in either the MMR or BR2 for ´climate-specific´. MMR reports € 300,000 more than BR2. This was not corrected;
- The two reports are largely consistent but in the MMR Ireland reports € 1.9 Mio under ´adaptation´ and nothing under ´other´ whereas in the BR they report € 1.3 Mio for ´adaptation´ and € 300,000 for ´other´;
- The ´UN International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction´ is reported directly under ´specialized UN bodies´ in the MMR and only as a subcategory of ´other´ in BR2. This happens with other subcategories too.

9.5.16. Italy

- Completely different values and categories are reported for € and US$ in BR2. It seems that Italy has reported some finance flows in € and other flows in $ as that the $ column is not a conversion of the amounts indicated in € in the other column as for other countries. Adding up € and US$ values for Italy in BR2 leads to values significantly higher than in the MMR, which makes this option unrealistic. Further clarification would be needed from Italy to be able to correct the data and make them comparable to other countries;
- BR2 data were corrected with a factor 1,000,000 because the reported units were obviously incorrect;
- No ´core/general´ is reported in BR2;
- In ´climate-specific´ all values differ between BR2 and MMR;
- The overall magnitude of difference is almost € 30 Mio for ´climate-specific and core/general´ and € 5 Mio for ´climate-specific´.

9.5.17. Lithuania

- All values are consistent.

9.5.18. Latvia

- € 350,000 was reported under ´cross-cutting´ in the MMR and under ´other´ in the BR. Both as ´multilateral climate change funds´;
- Totals and all other values are consistent.

9.5.19. Luxembourg

- No ´core/general´ is reported under the MMR; the value reported as ´core/general´ in BR2 is reported as ´climate-specific, cross-cutting´;
    - Luxembourg clarified "the value reported as ´core/general´ in BR2 is reported as ´climate-specific, cross-cutting´: we noticed that Belgium recorded the GEF finance under "Core/general" in its BR2 and not under "cross-cutting" as we did for the MMR reporting. We therefore moved the GEF financing to the "Core/general" category.
- Multilateral ´adaptation´ values are consistent between MMR and BR2;
- Bilateral contributions are slightly inconsistent, as there were changes between September and December as project data became available; some "cross-cutting" actions were reallocated to "adaptation";
- No multilateral ´mitigation´ contributions are reported under the MMR:
    - Luxembourg clarified that the multilateral contributions under BR2 are amounts which are committed but only reported in italics in the MMR (1 million for SIDS + 2 millions for REDD+).

9.5.20. Malta

- Malta reports the same totals but in different categories. € 50,000 out of € 75,000 which are reported under ´core/general´ ´specialized UN bodies´ in BR2 are reported as ´climate-specific´ or ´other´ ´other multilateral climate change funds´ under the MMR whereas € 25,000 are reported in the same category;
- These € 50,000 were committed to UNICEF, in BR2 as ´core/general´ and under MMR as ´climate-specific´;
- Amounts in mitigation and adaptation are equal but reported under ´total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels´ in BR2 and as ´multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks´ under the MMR.

9.5.21. Netherlands

- Several amounts are rounded in the MMR whereas the exact value is given in BR2.
- All non-rounded values are inconsistent between MMR and BR2;
- In BR2 ´other´ is reported in subcategories whereas in the MMR everything is in a joint ´other´ category;
- There is a reporting mistake of € 292,467,298 in BR2 bilateral ´core/general´ that was corrected;
- Netherlands comment
    - final data are only available in October.

- In the MMR we used the 2012 and 2013 OECD/DAC percentages for the calculation of the climate share of our core contributions to MDBs and climate funds, while we used the 2013-2014 OECD/DAC averages for our 2014 report to UNFCCC.
- We noted a mistake in our IFC climate specific finance reported to UNFCCC. This should not have been 9,962,676 but 20.4% of EUR 7,508,800. We included no figure in the MMR for IFC as OECD/DAC had not yet provided a percentage indicating the climate relevance of IFC.
- Climate-specific and core/general cannot be added up.
- In the MMR, we furthermore combined our contributions to the African Development Bank (AfDB) and Fund (AfDF) in one figure and applied the OECD/DAC percentage for the AfDF as 'a best estimate' given that no separate OECD/DAC percentage for the AfDB was available at the time. We used the same methodology for the Asian Development Bank and Fund. However, at the time of the UNFCCC report we applied the different percentages that OECD/DAC had by then provided for AfDB, AfDF, AsDB and AsDF.
- Both in the MMR and in the figures reported to UNFCCC we have, where possible, reported both our (total) core contribution to the multilateral organization (as registered in our financial system) as well as the climate-specific part of this core contribution (as registered in our financial system). In our view this approach is in line with the tabular format provided by UNFCCC and provides optimal transparency. We have difficulty understanding the rationale and meaning of the EU's technical guidance for the MMR in this respect, in particular: the recommendation that we should preferably report core/general contributions while we are reporting on climate finance and the notion that core/general and climate-specific data for multilateral channels should be mutually exclusive while in reality climate-specific contributions are a part of the core contribution.

9.5.22. Poland

- Some bilateral contributions in BR2 and MMR are swapped between mitigation and cross-cutting but the totals are consistent.

9.5.23. Portugal

- All values in table 7 are consistent
- In table 7a the values for multilateral financial institutions differ between the MMR report and BR2 reports, however this is a simple summation mistake in the BR2.

9.5.24. Romania

- An amount of RON 140,000 provided is reported as ´specialized UN bodies´ under ´adaptation´ and in the MMR as ´bilateral´ under ´core/general´ and as ´bilateral adaptation´ in BR2. The amount of RON 140,000 is reported twice in BR2. This is probably a reporting mistake and would need to be clarified with Romania;
- Nothing is reported in table 7a.

9.5.25. Spain

- In ´bilateral, regional and other channels´ a small share (€ 1,398) of the totals for ´adaptation´ and ´cross-cutting´ is inverted.
    - Spain´s clarification: The divergence between the overall sum recorded in MMR and in BR2 is due to the following factual mistake: an ODA grant aimed at Paraguay amounting to 1,402€ is classified as cross-cutting in the BR2 report (see page 98 of the BR2 report). This program should have been classified as mitigation, in the same way as in the MMR report (you can find this program in row 376 of tab "tabla 7b 2014 BI y REGIONAL" of the attached Excel file).
    - The remaining €4 are due to rounding errors: bilateral and regional data of the MMR report is recorded with two decimals, while data in the BR2 report is recorded rounded.
    - Spain clarified that they do not report core contributions to other multilateral financial institutions than the GEF, since the split devoted to core purposes is calculated and reported to the UNFCCC by these institutions to avoid double counting. Sweden
- Values for ´other multilateral climate change funds´ are included in the sum of ´multilateral climate change funds´ in BR2 but excluded under the MMR. Totals are equal;
- In the MMR, ´core/general´ was not transferred from table 7a to table 7. This was corrected;
- The value given to the African Development Bank differs by about SEK 100,000 between BR2 and MMR data;
- A currency conversion rate is given in the MMR and used for the values filled in; the sums are calculated separately in each currency, so that sums do not exchange with the same currency exchange rate indicated.

9.5.26. Slovenia

- € 129,980 are reported under multilateral ´cross-cutting, specialised UN bodies´ in the MMR which are not reported in the BR 2;
- Sums for bilateral contributions equal but values are distributed differently across ´mitigation´, ´adaptation´ and ´cross-cutting´.

9.5.27. Slovakia

- Values are consistent apart from a share of € 40,644 from ´core/general´ ´specialised UN bodies´ that is reported as ´climate-specific´ ´other´ in BR2;
- In table 7a in the MMR the value of ´multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks´ is split up whereas it is reported as a joint number in BR2;
- The BR2 total in table 7a for 'climate-specific' for 'multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks' is split into two subcategories in the MMR reporting.

9.5.28. United Kingdom

- Reported amounts in BR2 reports and in the MMR reporting table are largely consistent, however the allocation to institutions has changed in some cases in table 7a for the multilateral support as explained below;
- Some values differ due to rounding but sums equal;

- Under the MMR finance data are reported in Million British Pounds and in the BR CTF format British Pounds are reported. There is a factor of 1,000,000 in the units indicated, however the reported amounts, e.g. for bilateral support are the same. This means units are wrong in one of the reported set of tables. The comparison with the information in the BR2 report text where UK refers to billion £ provided indicates that the units reported in BR2 tables are wrong and are indicated in million British Pounds and not British Pounds as shown in the column headings;
- The amount reported under 'Multilateral financial institutions´ 'other' in the MMR template is reported as amount provided to the 'World Bank' in the BR2 template;
- In table 7a in the MMR template under 'Other Multilateral Climate Change Funds', three funds are differentiated 1. 'Climate Investment Funds', 2. 'Climate Investment Funds - Clean Technology Fund' and 3. 'Climate Development Knowledge Network'. In the BR2 tables, the differentiation is only to 1. 'Climate Investment Funds' and 2. 'Climate Development Knowledge Network';
- In table 7a, no support provided to ´specialized UN bodies´ is reported;
- In table 7a, the allocation of ´climate-specific´ support has changed for the same amounts reported in some cases:
    - Support provided to GEF is indicated as cross-cutting in BR2 table and adaptation in MMR table;
    - Support provided to GCF is indicated as adaptation in BR2 table and as cross-cutting in MMR table;
    - In BR2 table all support reported under 'Other multilateral climate change funds' are indicated as ´cross-cutting´ whereas in the MMR template the disaggregated amount to the 'Clean Technology Fund' is indicated as mitigation;
- The differences of the amounts indicated in table 7 arise from the differences in allocation of some amounts as explained above;
- In the MMR template the status is not always provided in table 7a, in the BR2 template it is always indicated as provided;

In the BR2 template no sector information is provided and the notation key 'not applicable' is used whereas some sector information is provided in the MMR template for 'other multilateral climate change funds'.

9.6. Annex VI: Information sources related to private finance

Figure 9-1: Information sources on public interventions for Low Carbon Resilient (LCR) activities

	Instruments and Interventions		Example datasets
Public finance	Grants		- BNEF for renewable energy projects - OECD-DAC for LCR activities - joint-MDBs* for LCR activities - IDFC* for LCR activities
	Debt		- OECD-DAC for LCR activities - joint-MDBs* for LCR activities - IDFC* for LCR activities
	Equity		- OECD-DAC for LCR activities - joint-MDBs* for LCR activities - IDFC* for LCR activities
	De-risking		- OECD DAC pilot survey +ADD DETAIL ON FUTURE DETAIL COLLECTION PROPOSAL
Public policy interventions	Regulatory Policy		- IEA *Polices and Measures Databases*: – Energy Efficiency Databases – IEA/IRENA Global Renewable Energy Policies and Measures - UNFCCC CDM/JI Database
	Fiscal Policy		- OECD/IEA Fossil fuels subsidies datasets
	Information and Innovation Policy		- IEA Energy Technology R&D Statistics - OECD Green Patent statistics

*Note: * aggregate data not reported by activity level or instrument*
Sources: Xxxx, Xxxx

Relative data availability			
	+	←→	-

Source: Jachnik et.al. 2015, p. 54

Figure 9-2: Information sources on private finance for low carbon and resilient (LCR) activities (sectoral approach)

Sector	Coverage of example activities	Example sources
Renewable energy	Wind	BNEF, 2014
	Solar	
	Geothermal	
	Small hydro; marine	
	Biomass and waste	
	Solar water heating	Mauthner and Weiss, 2012*
	Smart grids	Navigant Research, 2013*
Low-carbon transportation	Mass transit systems	Commercial databases
	Non-motorized	
	Air, rail, and maritime	
	On-road	BNEF, 2014
Energy efficiency	Supply-side	IEA, 2012 and 2014*; BNEF, 2014
	Demand-side residential	
	Demand-side commercial	
Agriculture, forestry, and land use	Reforestation	
	Lands, crop and livestock management.	
	Biofuels	BNEF, 2014
Water and Waste	Solid waste management	
	Wastewater	
Industry and infrastructure	Process technologies	
	Carbon capture and storage	BNEF, 2014
	Climate resilient infrastructure	
Other	Health	
	Capacity building	
	Education	
	Communication	

* = denotes proxy estimates.

Relative data availability + ←→ -

Source : Jachnik et al. 2015, p. 55

Figure 9-3: Information sources on private finance for low carbon and resilient (LCR) activities (by type of financial instrument)

Private finance instruments	Examples	Example sources
Grants	Project and programme level grants	BNEF, OECD DAC (using US Foundations Center data)
Debt	Syndicated loans	BNEF, Bloomberg, Dealogic, FactSet, ThomsonOne, OECD (FDI)*
	Project loans	BNEF, Dealogic, ThomsonOne, Preqin Infrastructure
	Bonds (project and corporate)	Bloomberg, BNEF, Dealogic, Eikon, FactSet
	Other, e.g. microfinance, informal loans	No systematic data
Equity	Publicly traded	Not considered in this study
	Corporate-level private equity	Bloomberg, BNEF, FactSet, ThomsonOne, Preqin PE/VC, OECD (FDI)*
	Project-level private equity	BNEF, Dealogic, ThomsonOne, Preqin Infrastructure
	Other, e.g. microfinance, household investment, informal investment, enterprise reinvested earnings	No systematic data
De-risking	Insurance	No systematic data
	Guarantees	
	Derivatives	

* OECD (FDI) data is reported in aggregate as 'debt' or 'equity'.
Note: UNEP Risø CDM and World Bank PPI data on total investment is not disaggregated by instrument.

Relative data availability: + ←→ -

Source : Jachnik et al. 2015, p. 56

9.7. Annex VII: Proposal for revised 2017 "Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the MMR"

Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR)

1. Background and scope of the technical guidance

As already announced during discussions in the EGI and ECCWG, the European Commission has proposed to use the revised technical guidance, sent to Member States (MS) by the European Commission on ~~6 June 2015~~[DATE], for this year's reporting exercise, including a slightly revised common tabular format for the "UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties".

In order to facilitate the transition to the new rules on concessional loans in DAC statistics by 2018 it is recommended to report both on the old and new rules concerning concessional loans for reporting 2016 and 2017 data.

Please note that the reporting deadline for this year's exercise is advanced to 15 September, in order to allow for the aggregation of data in time for the Climate Change Conference (COP ~~22~~23), organized in November 2017, one month earlier than usually. The timely provision of data, at the latest by the reporting deadline and sooner if possible, will be of essence.

2. DAC reporting on development finance

The "good practice table for reporting", Annex I of the technical guidance, has been updated in 2016 to reflect the changes to the common tabular format for the "UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties" (tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b)) in accordance with Decision 9/CP.21 on Methodologies for the reporting of financial information by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention:

- Creating reporting fields for the provision of information on definitions or methodologies used for reporting information in the following reporting parameters: "climate-specific" or "core/general", "status", "funding source", "activity", "financial instrument", "type of support" and "sector";

- Aligning the categorization in the reporting parameter "status" of support ("pledged", "committed" and "provided") in tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b) of the common tabular format with the categorization used in other existing international methodologies ("committed" and "disbursed")

These changes reflect the need to enhance a common understanding on key terminology for reporting financial information under the Convention to facilitate transparency and comparability of information and data on support over time and across Parties.

This year ~~and in 2017~~, it is proposed to keep a descriptive separate document on the methodology used (point 3.2 below) and to populate the new reporting fields in the good practice table.

~~3. DAC reporting on development finance~~

~~In December 2014, members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) agreed on modernising the reporting on concessional loans in DAC statistics, which will become standard from 2018.1 In particular, the 2014 HLM agreed to modernise the reporting of concessional loans by assessing concessionality based on discount rates differentiated by income group and introducing a grant equivalent system for the purpose of calculating ODA figures2. During the transition period between current and new rules, it is recommended to use the same approach as the OECD and to report in 2016 and 2017 using both the new grant equivalent system and the current (2013) flow-based system.~~

4. Consolidated recommendations for MMR reporting in 2017~~6~~

1) **Format of Member States replies:** Member States are requested to use the new UNFCCC Common Tabular Formats (CTF), in accordance to Decision 9/CP.21, as the template for the MMR reporting. Annex I provides a good practice example, based on the best practices of MS in 2014 in which some additional improvements were introduced. It is strongly recommended to submit the tables in Excel format (avoid conversion to jpg, pdf etc.).

2) **Methodology:** A descriptive section, preferably in a separate document, should be added to the tables. It should provide the technical description of the data, including key definitions and methodology. Narratives, such as justifications for climate finance should be avoided. General methodological information at aggregate level or definitions should also be provided in the Excel reporting table. The information already provided in the Excel template does not need to be duplicated in the methodological report.

3) **Total data:** MS are strongly encouraged to provide totals on specific climate finance, funding type, financial instruments and sources (see Table 7). This additional information will facilitate the summing up of data at the EU level. It also reduces the risk of calculation errors.

4) **Currency:** The default should be to report in EUR and the national currency. Please indicate clearly if a different approach has been used and explain the reasons. When applicable, the exchange rate should be ~~explicitly~~ indicated in the specific field in the good practice table for reporting, Annex I. It is recommended to use the OECD yearly average exchange rate, which is also linked in the specific field.

5) **Level of detail:** MS should report as detailed as possible, preferably at programme/project level in table 7b of the UNFCCC template.

6) **Definitions:**

   a) **~~Provided /~~ committed / disbursed ~~pledged~~:** ~~In the context of the MMR, the term "provided" equals "disbursed".~~ Member States are requested to report committed funds for bilateral climate finance flows and disbursed ~~("provided")~~ funds for multilateral climate finance flows in line with OECD DAC definitions. Please indicate clearly if a different approach has been used and explain the reasons.

OECD DAC Definitions[57]

Commitment

“127. A commitment is a **firm written obligation** by a government or official agency, backed by the appropriation or availability of the necessary funds, to provide resources of a specified amount under specified financial terms and conditions and for specified purposes for the benefit of a recipient country or a multilateral agency. Donors unable to comply with this definition should explain the definition that they use.

128. Commitments are considered to be made at the **date** a loan or grant agreement is signed or the obligation is otherwise **made known to the recipient** (e.g. in the case of budgetary allocations to overseas territories, the final vote of the budget should be taken as the date of commitment). […]

129. **Bilateral** commitments comprise new commitments and additions to earlier commitments. The recording in the year reported on of cancellations on earlier years’ commitments is allowed, but only in the form of an aggregate (“bilateral, unspecified”/“sector, unspecified”) to avoid interpretation issues posed by negative commitment figures in analyses. […]

130. For **multilateral** contributions, commitments show the total amounts of multi-year agreements with multilateral institutions. For capital subscriptions in the form of notes encashable at sight, enter the total expected amount of deposits of such notes as the amount committed.”

Disbursement

“131. A disbursement is the placement of resources at the **disposal of a recipient country** or agency, or in the case of internal development-related expenditures, the outlay of funds by the official sector. Disbursement may be measured in various ways at different stages of the transfer process.

132. For financial **loans and grants**, subject to the availability of the necessary records, preference should be given to the stage closest to balance of payments treatment, e.g.

i. the payment by the source agency for goods to be shipped (or other payments to a third party on behalf of the recipient);

ii. in the case of contributions to multilateral agencies in the form of a note or similar instrument encashable unconditionally at sight at the discretion of the recipient, on issue or deposit of the note;

iii. the placement of funds at the recipient’s disposal in an account in the donor country, in the recipient country or in a third country;

iv. the withdrawal of funds by the recipient or use on his instructions of funds in an account in the donor country, in the recipient country or in a third country.

133. However, where funds are transferred to an **account in the recipient country** but held by the donor for release to the recipient on production of relevant documents, the balance of payments effective transaction is the conversion of foreign exchange, and this should be recorded as a disbursement.

[57] https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/DCDDAC%282016%293FINAL.pdf

[…]

b) **Sectors:** The OECD DAC definitions are the basis for filling in information in this field. Indicate clearly if different definitions or approaches have been used and explain the reasons for which the OECD one has not been applied. The OECD DAC purpose codes (xls, Dec. 2014) are available at: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/DAC-CRS-Code-List.xls. ~~http://www.oecd.org/investment/stats/dacandcrscodelists.htm.~~

c) Option a: **Mitigation, adaptation, crosscutting, other:** To present a transparent picture, these categories should be mutually exclusive if possible. In case of overlaps, please explain your method and rationale. Mitigation and adaptation support are defined in MMR in line with the OECD DAC definitions[58]. Crosscutting activities are those that involve both mitigation and adaptation components.

If "other" activities are reported, please provide specification. For more information on the OECD DAC definitions, see http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/48785310.pdf

Option b: **Mitigation, adaptation, crosscutting, other:** To present a transparent picture, these categories should be mutually exclusive if possible. In case of overlaps, please explain your method and rationale. Mitigation and adaptation support are defined in MMR in line with the OECD DAC definitions[44]. Cross-cutting should be used for 'funding for activities which are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation' only if countries cannot assign a contribution to adaptation and mitigation through the use of Rio markers or a transparent national methodology.

If "other" activities are reported, please provide specification. For more information on the OECD DAC definitions, see http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/48785310.pdf

d) **"Financing source" (ODA, OOF, other):** ~~and~~. If the "other" category is used, please specify what it includes. The OECD DAC definitions are available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/38429349.pdf

1. Member States should use the definitions for OOF as provided by the OECD DAC (OECD 2016a). If the national definition used differs from the OECD DAC definition, additional explanations should be provided as part of the methodological information.

2. If OOF flows are reported, MS shall explain as part of the methodological information which flows are covered under OOF.

3. If no OOF are reported, MS should indicate whether OOF flows do not occur' or whether OOF flows were not tracked and estimated, but do occur.

[58] 'Climate change mitigation-related support' means support for activities in developing countries that contribute to the objective of stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system; 'climate change adaptation-related support' means support for activities in developing countries that are intended to reduce the vulnerability of human or natural systems to the impact of climate change and climate-related risks, by maintaining or increasing developing countries' adaptive capacity and resilience (MMR definitions)

e) **"Financial instrument" (grant, concessional loan, non-concessional loan, other):** Member States that only provide grant financing may simply refer to OECD DAC definitions. Member States that provide loans or other financial instruments are requested to explain the methodology used (e.g. gross flows, net flows, grant equivalent, etc.) If the "other" category is used, please explain which instruments are covered and specify what ~~i~~they include~~s~~ (e.g. export credit, private, etc.). If no 'other instruments' are reported, indicate whether such instruments do or do not occur. The OECD DAC definitions are available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/38429349.pdf

In December 2014, members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) agreed on modernising the reporting on concessional loans in DAC statistics, which will become standard from 2018. In particular, the 2014 HLM agreed to modernise the reporting of concessional loans by assessing concessionality based on discount rates differentiated by income group and introducing a grant equivalent system for the purpose of calculating ODA figures. During the transition period between current and new rules, it is recommended to use the same approach as the OECD and to report in 2017 using both the new grant equivalent system and the current (2013) flow-based system.

7) **Core/general vs Climate-specific (**only **contributions through multilateral channels):**

a) **"Core/general"** refers to core contributions to the core budget of multilateral institutions "that Parties cannot specify as climate specific". In the CTF tables, Member States currently have the option to report full core contributions to MDBs and UN organisations: it is recommended to report this data.

If core/general contributions are reported, core/general and climate-specific data should be mutually exclusive, except in such cases where climate-specific contributions are made to specific sub-funds or dedicated programmes of the overarching institutions to which also core funding is provided. In this case, the core funding should be reported as well as climate specific funding and it should be explained how core and climate-specific contributions have been differentiated. It should also be clearly indicated to which sub-funds or programmes the climate-specific contributions are paid to.

b) **Climate specific** concerns contributions to multilateral climate funds and dedicated programmes managed by multilateral institutions. Please report contributions to such funds and programmes (LDCF, SCCF, AF, GCF, UNFCCC, CIFs, FCPF, etc.) as climate specific only. Core/general and climate-specific data should be mutually exclusive: funds should only be reported in one of the categories with the exception outlined under a).

c) **Other:** Any multilateral fund, financial institution or UN body reported under 'other' should be clearly indicated with its name.

d) **Contributions to the Global Environment Facility** may be reported as either core contribution or climate specific as the climate relevant part is communicated by GEF to contributing parties (exception from the above general rule).

e) **Imputed multilateral contributions in core/general finance:** Several MDBs provide estimates concerning the climate-related share within their portfolio, and attribute this back to DAC members, based on a pro-rata share of their core multilateral ODA disbursements in a given year. The European Commission will, if available on time, obtain the figures from OECD, and add these values to the amount reported under the MMR. If the figures are not

available on time before the ECOFIN Council Conclusions, they will not be included in this year's report.

Notwithstanding, Member States still have the option to report their national figures; in the absence of a common approach as described above, these figures may be used in the aggregate EU report subject to methodological feasibility.

f) **Rio Markers:** Many Member States are reporting based on Rio marked OECD DAC data, but using different methodologies and coefficients for quantifying the climate relevant part of the Rio marked activities. For the Commission's approach, please see Annex II.

In your descriptive section, please specify whether you are using Rio markers and provide information on the approach to identifying mitigation and adaptation markers and on the coefficients used. Please specify and explain any difference from the OECD DAC or the Commission methodology.

Further information on the Rio markers available here: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/48785310.pdf.

8) **Technology transfer and capacity building:** In order to get a better picture of the support for capacity building and technology transfer MS are asked to include a minimum of 10 examples (if available) for each type of support. It is recommended to give this information in a separate, easily identifiable chapter/section.

9) **Private climate finance:** ~~In order to provide a more accurate picture of climate finance flows,~~ MS are strongly encouraged to include data on mobilized private climate finance in the respective field in the template. If numerical data is reported, MS should describe the ~~along with the~~ methodology and definition used to compile such data in the methodological report.

10) **Timeliness:** For this year's exercise, given that the Marrakech Climate Change Conference (COP 23~~2~~) will be organized in November, one month earlier than usually, the reporting deadline is 15 September. This arrangement leaves very little time for the Commission to analyze and synthetize the information received in time for the Council conclusions and the COP. ~~On previous occasions, a number of Member States were late with the reporting.~~ Given the importance of this topic for the international negotiations and the timing challenge ~~presented to us this year~~ it is strongly recommended to provide your input as early as possible and at the latest by 15 September October 2016.

Annex I: Good practice template (additionally provided in xls)

Annex II: Climate action tracking (Rio markers) methodology

Annex I: Good practice template (additionally provided in xls)

Table 7: Provision of public financial support: summary information in 2016

Allocation channels	*Year*									
	European euro - EUR					*National currency* [a]				
	Core/ general [b, 1]	*Climate-specific* [2]				*Core/ general*	*Climate-specific* [2]			
		Mitigation [c]	*Adaptation* [c]	*Cross-cutting* [c]	*Other* [cd]		*Mitigation*	*Adaptation*	*Cross-cutting*	*Other*
Total contributions through multilateral channels:										
Multilateral climate change funds[e]										
Other multilateral climate change funds[f]										
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks										
Specialized United Nations bodies										
Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels										
Total climate specific by funding type (total for mitigation, adaptation, crosscutting, other)										
Total climate specific finance		0					0			

Currency conversion rate: OECD yearly average [a]	
Financial resources mobilized through public interventions - EUR [g]	

Total climate specific by funding source (EUR)		**Total climate specific by financial instrument (EUR)**	
ODA		Grant	
OOF [h]		Concessional loan	
Other		Non-concessional loan	
		Equity	
		Other	

1-7 Please provide information on definitions or methodologies used for reporting in the Documentation box

a https://data.oecd.org/conversion/exchange-rates.htm; please change if other currency conversion rate is used

b This refers to support to multilateral institutions that Parties cannot specify as climate-specific

c These categories should be mutually exclusive

d Please specify

e Multilateral climate change funds: Global Environment Facility, Least Developed Countries Fund, Special Climate Change Fund, Adaptation Fund, Green Climate Fund and the Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities (paragraph 17(a) of the "UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties" in 2/CP.17)

f Not listed under e)

g This is not mandatory; if you fill in this field, you are encouraged to provide methodological information how mobilized resources were estimated

h If no value is reported under OOF, please indicate either "not occurring" with NO or "not estimated" with NE

Table 7(a)

Provision of public financial support: contribution through multilateral channels in 2016[a]

Donor funding	*Total amount*				*Status: disbursed, committed b, 3*	*Funding source: ODA, OOF, Other 4*	*Financial instrument: grant, concessional loan, non-concessional loan, equity, other 5*	*Type of support: Mitigation, adaptation, crosscutting, other c, 6*	*Sector d, 7*
	Core/general a, 1		*Climate-specific 2*						
	European euro - EUR	*National currency*	*European euro - EUR*	*National currrency*					
Multilateral climate change funds									
1. Global Environment Facility									
2. Least Developed Countries Fund									
3. Special Climate Change Fund									
4. Adaptation Fund									
5. Green Climate Fund									
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities									
8. Other [e] multilateral climate change funds									
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks									
1. World Bank									
2. International Finance Corporation									
3. African Development Bank									
4. Asian Development Bank									
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development									
6. Inter-American Development Bank									
7. Other [e]									
Specialized United Nations bodies									
1. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)									
2. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)									
3. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)									
4. United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)									
5. United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)									
6. United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)									
7. United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN REDD)									
8. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)									
9. Other [e]									
Total contributions through multilateral channels									

Abbreviations: ODA = official development assistance, OOF = other official flows.

1-7 Please provide information on definitions or methodologies used for reporting in the documentation box

a This refers to support to multilateral institutions that Parties cannot specify as climate-specific.

b In the context of the MMR, the term "provided" equals "disbursed".

c These categories should be mutually exclusive

d See the OECD purpose codes at http://www.oecd.org/investment/stats/dacandcrscodelists.htm. Codes include energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry, water and sanitation etc.

e Please indicate each fund, institution or specialized UN body reported under "other" with its name

Annex II: Climate action tracking (Rio markers) methodology

The approach used by the EU to track its provision of climate finance is based on the OECD DAC system of Rio markers.

The OECD has developed a comprehensive system for measuring aid in support of climate-related objectives. It is based on detailed project level reporting against carefully defined policy markers. A Rio marker for mitigation was introduced 1998 and in 2010 an additional marker for adaptation was introduced. There are specific guidelines from OECD DAC agreed by DAC members for scoring projects and programmes against these markers. For each Rio marker, projects and programmes are placed in three categories: a) Principal objective, b) significant objective or c) not targeting.

According to the Rio marker methodology an activity is classified as climate change mitigation-related (either marked as ‘Principal’ or ‘Significant’) if it “contributes to the objective of stabilisation of greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system by promoting efforts to reduce or limit GHG emissions or to enhance GHG sequestration.”

As regards adaptation, an aid activity is marked as relevant if it “intends to reduce the vulnerability of human or natural systems to the impacts of climate change and climate-related risks, by maintaining or increasing adaptive capacity and resilience. This encompasses a range of activities from information and knowledge generation, to capacity development, planning and the implementation of climate change adaptation actions.”

The Rio markers are policy makers, and were originally not intended for accurate quantification of flows to support policy goals. Therefore, an activity can have more than one principal or significant policy objective (i.e. it can be marked for several Rio markers; mitigation, adaptation and other Rio conventions such as Biodiversity and Desertification).

The Commission uses the following approach to “translate” the Rio marked data into estimated climate finance flows for the EU budget:

- If an activity is marked as principal for mitigation or adaptation, 100% of the support is considered and reported as climate finance;

- If an aid activity is marked as significant for mitigation or adaptation, then only 40% of the support is considered and reported as climate finance.

- To avoid double counting, any activity can only count as 100%, 40% or 0%. If an activity is marked for both mitigation and adaptation, only the highest marking will count when calculating the total climate relevant financial contributing of the activity.

Further information on the Rio markers available here: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/48785310.pdf

Ref. Ares(2016)4775443 - 25/08/2016

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Institute for Applied Ecology

Study on climate finance reporting, including methodological issues, producing overview information and assessing emerging requirements

Final report

Reference° CLIMA.A.2/ETU/2015/0011

Berlin, 24.08.2016

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Acknowledgements:

The project team thanks the European Commission for providing a large amount of materials and documents to the project team as well as explanations and clarifications which strongly facilitated the assessment conducted in this report.

Disclaimer:

The content of this report does not necessarily reflect the official opinions of the European Commission or other institutions of the European Union, but solely represents the findings of the project team that was tasked with the project.

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List of Abbreviations

BR	Biennial Report
BR2	Second Biennial Report
CB	Capacity Building
CCAC	Climate and Clean Air Coalition
CDR	Central Data Repository (of Eionet)
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CION	European Commission
COP	Conference of the Parties
CITES	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
CTCN	Climate Technology Centre & Network
CTF	Common Tabular Format
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DEG	Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft
DFI	Development Finance Institution
DG	Directorate General
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EDF	European Development Fund
EIB	European Investment Bank
EPPO	European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
LEAP	Livestock Environmental Assessment and Performance Partnership (under the FAO)
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GHG	Greenhouse gas
IAEA-TCF	International Atomic Energy Agency – Technical Cooperation Fund
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

ICESDF	Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing
ICRAF	International Council for Research in Agroforestry (now: World Agroforestry Centre)
IDA	International Development Association
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IISD-GSI	International Institute for Sustainable Development – Global Subsidies Initiative
IMC	Imputed Multilateral Contribution
IRENA	International Renewable Energy Agency
ITL	International Transaction Log
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
LCR	Low Carbon Resilient
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MMR	Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on a mechanism for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and for reporting other information at national and Union level relevant to climate change and repealing Decision No 280/2004/EC)
MRV	Measurement, Reporting and Verification or Monitoring, Reporting and Verification – the abbreviation is used in both contexts under the UNFCCC
MS	Member State (of the European Union)
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OOF	Other Official Flows
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
TT	Technology Transfer
UN	United Nations
UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNDOCO	United Nations Development Operations Coordination Office
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNF	United Nations Foundation

UNFCCC	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund / today: United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UN-REDD	United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
WFP	United Nations World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

Abstract

The analysis of Member States' reports on provision of financial, technological and capacity building support to developing countries under Article 16 of the EU Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) due by 30 September 2015 and their second biennial reports (BR2) under the UNFCCC due by 1 January 2016 revealed significant differences in the reported finance figures for many countries and showed that there are still considerable inconsistencies in the methodologies used despite past progress in improving monitoring and reporting of climate finance. This also impacts the quality of the aggregation of data at EU level.

A considerable number of improvements have been identified that may enhance transparency without putting additional reporting burden on Member States, with an particular focus on the technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support under the MMR.

The status quo of the current research related to reporting of private climate finance in the UNFCC context was undertaken with the objective to identify approaches that can be incorporated in the methodological guidance and subsequent steps to further advance the tracking of private finance.

In addition, based on the analytical findings in this report and the literature assessed, an input to an EU submission on accounting of finance resources provided and mobilized under the UNFCCC was prepared.

1. Executive Summary

DG Climate Action commissioned Öko-Institut e.V. with this "Study on climate finance reporting, including methodological issues, producing overview information and assessing emerging requirements" for assessing and aggregating the information on climate finance received through the various reporting obligations, improving methodological approaches for reporting climate finance and taking stock of the developments in the field after COP 21 in Paris. The study should assist the EU and its Member States (MS) in improving climate finance reporting in terms of consistency, comparability and accuracy as part of the reporting obligations under Article 16 of the EU Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR)[1] and as part of biennial reports under the UNFCCC[2]. The analysis should also contribute to improving consistency, comparability and accuracy of the aggregate reporting of support conducted by DG Climate Action on the basis of MS' reports.

The analysis of Member States' reports on provision of financial, technological and capacity building support to developing countries under Article 16 of the EU Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) due by 30 September 2015[3] and in their second biennial reports (BR2) under the UNFCCC due by 1 January 2016 shows that there are still considerable inconsistencies in the

[1] OJ, L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 13: Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on a mechanism for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and for reporting other information at national and Union level relevant to climate change and repealing Decision No 280/2004/EC.

[2] Reporting obligations for support provided to developing countries are part of UNFCCC decision 2/CP:17, in particular its Annex I (UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties), UNFCCC decision 19/CP.18 (Common tabular format for "UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties") and UNFCCC decision 9/CP.21 (Methodologies for the reporting of financial information by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention)

[3] The due date for reporting under the MMR is by 30 September (Article 16, paragraph 1 of the MMR), however many Member States' provided the reports only by around mid-October in 2015.

methodologies used by Member States despite past progress in improving monitoring and reporting of climate finance. This also impacts the aggregation of data at EU level.

The quantitative analysis of finance reported under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation and as part of the second biennial reports under the UNFCCC revealed significant differences in the reported finance figures for many countries. It is recommended that Member States improve the consistency of the information and data reported under the MMR reports and in their BRs. There is a risk related to the credibility of EU finance data if figures for national climate finance differ between two reports provided in a short time span of several weeks.

While transparency has already been improved in recent years, the analysis shows that there is scope for further improvements and harmonization of definitions, approaches and categorization. A considerable number of improvements have been identified that may enhance transparency without putting additional reporting burden on Member States. Convergence towards common definitions, methodologies and approaches would also improve consistency and comparability and facilitate the aggregation of finance data at EU level.

The reporting of imputed multilateral contributions for the estimation of climate-specific multilateral finance is complex and needs further discussion in the EU. In this area, the report does not provide a single specific recommendation, but decision trees that can guide further decision-making related the approach to be implemented in the EU.

It is important that further improvements and changes are implemented in a coordinated way in the EU, as part of the ongoing work under the OECD DAC and in the negotiations under the UNFCCC. This report tried to take into account recent improvements decided under the UNFCCC as well as methodological work conducted in the OECD DAC. In the section on recommendations, the report provides a complete overview of potential recommendations and proposals related to finance reporting without differentiating whether such improvements are more appropriate to be implemented as part of EU guidance or OECD guidance.

The findings and recommendations presented in this report were also compiled in a synthesis report "Recommendations related to the technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation Synthesis Report". The recommendations of a first draft of this synthesis report were discussed at a Workshop of ECCWG-EGI on 11 March 2016 and Member States also provided written feedback to the report. This version of the report the comments received from Member States and from OECD were incorporated. In addition, Greece and Slovenia provided their 2nd biennial report to the UNFCCC in March; hence these two countries were added to the comparative analysis presented in this report. The document "Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support under the MMR" as well as the related reporting tables were adapted to reflect those proposals for improvements on which Member States generally agreed in their feedback to the proposals in the synthesis report.

Task 3 of this study focuses on the key methodological developments in terms of tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions and provides a state of ply of methodological work and discussions on private climate finance.

While several public and private, national and international entities are making efforts into developing methodologies for and actually tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions, the Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance (further referred to

as OECD Research Collaborative) has developed a methodological proposal which compiles state of the art approaches proposed by such entities.

In addition, the chapter also notes parallel but convergent work being done by the MDBs and other development banks and institutions. Their work, however, goes beyond tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions, as it includes all co-finance, public or private, mobilized by the intervention of the MDBs and development banks. While not specific on mobilized private climate finance, the approach to tracking mobilized co-finance is relevant for the scope of this task. MDBs and other development banks and institutions have also been involved in the OECD Research Collaborative.

This chapter does not focus or include figures on private finance mobilized by public interventions, as it focuses exclusively on methodologies to that end.

The steps proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative C framework are considered to be well sequenced. In order to facilitate getting a better idea of the potential for mobilized private finance and while noting that fully implementing the framework might take longer, MS could be requested to, shortly, perform stages 1 and 2. In doing so, each MS would have a clear mapping of all the organizations deploying public instruments to mobilize private climate finance. After such exercise, MS could start collecting data, eventually giving priority to those entities and/or instruments which may have a greater potential for mobilizing private climate finance or, alternatively, to those which pose lesser challenges in data collection and handling. This would constitute a stepwise approach, which would progressively bring MS to the same level of preparedness. Those ready to move faster should be encouraged to do so. The work available on definitions related to private finance seems mature related to the definition of public and private finance. Related to the monitoring of the finance mobilized by public interventions, the causality between the public intervention and the finance mobilized is difficult to assess and there does not seem to be enough confidence and knowledge at the time to opt for something different to blanket causality. Related to attribution of finance mobilized to the specific public interventions, in order to avoid gaps or overlaps, there should be an effort to harmonize approaches, but only in relation to the participants involved in the same instrument. With regards to boundaries to the causality and consequent attribution of mobilized private finance to a given public intervention (e.g. related to time), there is an interest in allowing for different approaches to be tested in order to gain more experience and develop stronger methodological guidance on the matter.

Tracking private finance is no simple endeavour. But there are several organizations that do it from different perspectives, using different methodologies and with different scopes and purposes. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)(through the Coordinated Direct Investment Survey) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (in the annual World Investment Report) have the most extensive and reputed exercise in this regards. But there are others, namely some carried out by private entities, such as the Financial Times with the Financial Times FDI report which captures greenfield investments (new investments in the real economy, which climate relevant investments would be expected to be) and already tracks specific investments in the renewable energy sector. These three approaches were chosen due to their perceived comprehensiveness and credibility and also as a representation of different approaches and scopes. Their inclusion in this report is a mere illustration of specific efforts to collect data on foreign direct investments and do not constitute a proposal to use them for collection of data on climate relevant foreign direct investment mobilized by public interventions. While these exercises are interesting, they are far from being directly useful for the purpose of collecting data on climate relevant private finance mobilized by public instruments. Firstly, because they lack the tools to

identify the relevant public instruments and to establish the causality between such instruments and the private finance mobilized. And secondly, because these exercises do not have the tools to mark the investments as climate relevant in accordance with the relevant methodologies. Current approaches to the attribution of investments to a specific economy sector fall very short of providing a clear signal of climate relevance. If this is very true for mitigation, it is even very much more so for adaptation.

Task 3 also looked at MRV of incentives to and enabling environments for private climate finance. There is ample experience is assessing a given country's friendliness to investment, in particular to private investment. This experience has already been expanded to assess, in a pilot phase only in 17 countries, the enabling environments (friendliness) to investments on sustainable energy (RISE). When this has been done, it seems reasonable to expect that it should be feasible to identify a set of indicators to characterize the relevant enabling environment for climate relevant investments, both in terms of mitigation as well as of adaptation. Plenty of work on that front has already been done, including at the UNFCCC level.

Given that readiness for climate relevant investments cannot be considered in isolation from overall investment friendliness, it seems advisable that any such assessment would take into account the overall investment environment in a given country. In this regard, the climate relevant investment readiness assessment should be a subset, a spin-off of a larger investments environment assessment, such as the Doing Business Report described above, and build upon already existing relevant initiatives such as RISE.

Macro-indicators to be measured in such a specific climate relevant investments friendliness assessment could include:

- The existence of an officially approved Nationally Determined Contribution
- The inclusion of a mitigation component within the NDC
- The inclusion of an adaptation component within the NDC
- The adoption of a low emissions development plan, including detailed mitigation action (with estimated emissions reduction potential)
- The adoption of a national adaptation plan with detailed adaptation measures
- Institutional capacity for implementation of climate policy is established
- Appropriate industry conditions, such as engineering expertise and the enabling infrastructure are present
- A stable financial sector with capacity to support low carbon (development) is present
- Economic instruments that translate policy targets into price incentives that make low carbon technologies more attractive are present

While the collection of the data required to assess climate relevant investment enabling environments could be done via biennial reports to the UNFCCC, it does not seem feasible to adopt guidance on such collection with the required level of detail. Therefore, it is apparently more effective to undertake such an endeavour close but outside the formal UNFCCC process.

In task 4 it had been agreed with DG Climate Action that the study should provide an input for the EU submission on accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions for which a mandate was provided at the 44th session of SBSTA. The submission is due by 29 August 2016 should consider several questions outlined in the SBSTA conclusions:

(a) What are the existing modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions, and what are the challenges and information gaps with respect to these existing modalities;

(b) What accounting modalities need to be developed to serve the Paris Agreement, in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Agreement, and what are the challenges to the development of these accounting modalities and how can these be addressed;

(c) How to ensure that accounting modalities are developed in time to be integrated into the transparency framework established under the Paris Agreement.

In the input under task 4, the existing modalities and definitions used as part of the OECD DAC framework were described as well as the arrangements and methodologies agreed as part of the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR in the EU. Challenges and gaps of the current reporting are summarized taken up some of the findings of this study, but also addressing more general challenges such as the need to not only track global climate finance flows, but also the effectiveness of the use of these flows to achieve the purposes of the Paris agreement. Related to the question what accounting modalities need to be developed to serve the Paris agreement, the principles defined as part of the Paris agreement have been assessed in general terms how they are applicable to the reporting on climate finance.

2. Introduction and background

2.1. Objectives of the project

The study should help the EU and its Member States to improve climate finance reporting. This project aims at providing support for assessing and aggregating the information received through the MMR and BR2 reporting obligations of EU MS to improve methodological approaches for reporting climate finance and take stock of the developments in the field after Paris.

By providing an overview on certain aspects, comparing reporting submitted to different fora and testing alternative approaches, it shall help to get a clearer picture on the best approaches in this field.

Beyond the important methodological aspects described below, the results of this project should contribute to an accurate accounting of the EU's climate support to developing countries, thus strengthening the EU's position towards its negotiation counterparts.

2.2. Background / current system for MRV of support

For EU Member States, two reporting requirements exist to provide information on climate finance:

- their annual reports under Article 16 of Regulation No 525/2013 on a mechanism for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and for reporting other information at national and Union level relevant to climate change (MMR) in accordance with requirement under UNFCCC[4],
- and biennial reports (BR) including the provision of information on climate finance under the UNFCCC in accordance with UNFCCC decision 2/CP.171F5 and decision 19/CP.182F6.

UNFCCC decision 9/CP.21 on “methodologies for the reporting of financial information by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention” which was adopted in Paris includes a number of changes to the common tabular format (CTF) as part of the “UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties”. These changes need to be incorporated in the reporting tables used under the MMR pursuant to Article 16, paragraph 1 of the MMR. Specific changes arising from this decision were integrated into the recommendations presented in this report in section 7.2..

Furthermore, methodologies have been agreed under the OECD DAC for the reporting of official development aid (ODA) which also includes climate finance. However, they often do not correspond to the reporting requirements under the UNFCCC or the MMR. Also, not all EU MS are members of the OECD DAC[7].

Further recommendations to refine reporting methodologies on climate finance are included in the OECD/CPI report (OECD 2015a) and methodologies to account for mobilised private climate finance have been proposed by the Swiss Technical Working Group in their recommendations to the OECD/CPI report (Technical Working Group 2015).

2.3. Structure of this report

This report outlines progress made on all tasks of the work programme, describes key questions and challenges under each task and envisaged conclusions. Furthermore, it is structured according to the overall structure of the final report to be written for this project.

This report starts with an introduction (section 2). It then presents results from task 1 (section 3.) of the work programme of the commissioned project. Task 2a is presented in chapter 4 and task 2b in section 5. The text has been incorporated from the synthesis report in chapters 4 and 5 to avoid different messages and inconsistencies between the two versions of the report. Task 3, related to private finance, is presented in chapter 6 and has been amended in this final report based on the guidance provided by DG Climate Action. Task 4 has been added in chapter 7. It is followed by a bibliography (8) and an annex (9) with country-specific and overview tables of the analysed data and other documents. The quantitative data has been updated based on the feedback received

[4] OJ L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 13

[5] Decision 2/CP.17 on the Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention contained in FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1

[6] Decision 19/CP.18 on a Common tabular format for “UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties” contained in FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.3, p. 3

[7] Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania are not part of the OECD

from MS after the presentation of the synthesis report and incorporating second biennial reports from Greece and Slovenia in this report.

3. Task 1: Assessment of Member States information on climate finance reported under the MMR

3.1. Objectives and approach

In task 1 the project team has supported DG Climate Action in aggregating and synthesizing the information on financial and technology support provided to developing countries reported by Member States under Article 16 of the MMR via ReportNet by the end of September 2015.[8]

3.2. Timeliness of MMR reporting

In 2015 18 Member States provided their submissions under Article 16 of the MMR within the deadline of 30 September to the EIONET CDR ReportNet website where the data is stored. Seven Member States reported within one week of delay (BG, DK, IT, LU, LV, SI, SE), two Member States were less than two weeks delayed (FR and PL) and one Member State (DE) reported by 21.10.2015. A considerable number of clarifications were necessary from Member States to ensure a correct aggregation of total EU figures and some Member States provided revised submissions after clarifying questions were sent to them. Cyprus provided a submission, but did not report any climate finance in its report.

Table 3-1 Timeliness of reporting under Article 16 of the MMR in 2015

Reports available within deadline (30.9.)	Reports available within 1 week after deadline	Reports available within 2 weeks after deadline	Reports available within 3 weeks after deadline
18 MS	7 MS	2 MS	1 MS

While most Member States reported within the deadline or even before the deadline (e.g. BE, CY), **it is very important for a timely aggregation and reporting at EU level that all Member States provide their submissions within the due date of end of September.** The reported figures are used to produce aggregate numbers of EU climate finance provided to developing countries which is used by the Commission and EU heads at the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties. In 2016, COP 22 will start by 7 November and reporting delays as in 2015 would make it very difficult to present aggregate EU figures at the next COP.

In order to present aggregate figures and relevant details on EU finance in 2014, the project team collected the reports submitted by Member States and supported DG Climate Action in aggregating data on climate finance contained therein (task 1a). This task was concluded by the end of October 2015.

To approach this task, CION had prepared an overview of Member States' contributions on climate finance. The project team prepared a similar overview in order to check whether the aggregate

8 Available at http://cdr.eionet.europa.eu/ReportekEngine/searchdataflow

figures matched with the Commission's results. The final overview table including cross-checked figures is included below in Table 3-1.

The analysis was based on the data submitted by Member States in tabular format under the MMR which corresponds to tables 7, 7a and 7b of the Common Tabular Format (CTF) which are to be submitted together with developed countries' biennial reports under the UNFCCC. Several Member States submitted additional methodological notes explaining their approaches and methodologies. Further questions on methodologies underlying their data were raised by CION with Member States by email (e.g. why certain cells were not filled out; denominations of multilateral finance institutions; reporting of funds under the category "other"). The correspondences were forwarded to the project team.

Several Member States provided resubmissions of the tables (e.g. Portugal and Slovakia) as a result of the clarification questions raised.

3.3. Analysis of data

To generate aggregate figures for total climate finance, figures reported by Member States as 'climate-specific bilateral and multilateral public financial support' were copied from their MMR reports into an overview table (see Table 3-1), broken down into total figures for finance relevant for mitigation, adaptation, or cross-cutting issues. Such aggregate figures were produced for climate finance including (Table 3-1) imputed multilateral contributions as reported under the MMR as well as excluding those imputed multilateral shares (see Table 3-2) (see chapter 3.1.2.1).

The individual figures for mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting climate finance provided by the EU in 2014 do not add up to the overall total EU climate finance figure because the methodology for marking finance as relevant for mitigation, adaptation or cross-cutting used by the EU differs from the methodologies used by Member States. The EU reports finance relevant for both mitigation and adaptation under both categories, but only once in the total figure.[9]

[9] The EU has adopted the following approach to using the Rio markers: if an activity is marked as principal for mitigation or adaptation, 100% of the support is considered and reported as climate finance. If an aid activity is marked as significant for mitigation or adaptation, then only 40% of the support is considered and reported as climate finance. To avoid double counting, any activity can only count as 100%, 40% or 0%. If an activity is marked for both mitigation and adaptation, it will count towards total mitigation and total adaptation finance. However, only the highest marking will count when calculating the total climate relevant financial contributing of the activity (EU 2016). As a result, total mitigation support plus total adaptation support is greater than total support. There is no separate category to mark projects which are relevant to both mitigation and adaptation as "cross-cutting".

Table 3-2: Member States' climate finance in 2014 in million € including imputed multilateral contributions as reported under the MMR

	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	TOTAL
AT	72.07	6.88	22.12	0	101.07
BE	8.58	32.05	54.77	0	95.4
BG	0.06	0	0.01	0	0.07
HR	0.03	0	0	0	0.03
CY	0	0	0	0	0
CZ	1.15	2.8	3.71	0	7.66
DK	45.83	0	155.15	3.76	204.74
EE	0	0.32	0.26	0	0.58
FI	30.86	24.26	61.05	0	116.17
FR	2232.15	279.14	255.9	0	2767.19
DE	2,886.74	814.63	1,434.01	0	5,135.38
EL	0.04	0	0	0	0.04
HU	1.57	1.08	0.06	0	2.71
IE	1.53	22.87	9.57	0	33.97
IT	14.96	4.55	35.15	0	54.66
LV	0.05	0	0.35	0.02	0.42
LT	0.26	0	0	0	0.26
LU	6.1	7.35	25.25	0	38.7
MT	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.08
NL	71.95	133.84	165.49	0	371.28
PL	0.37	0.15	3.15	0	3.67
PT	8.36	0.86	0	0	9.22
RO	0	0.03	0	0	0.03
SK	0.2	0.76	0.15	0	1.11
SI	0.6	0.85	0.82	0	2.27
ES	423.18	18.67	21.29	0	463.14
SE	30.58	77.77	120.49	0	228.84
UK	260.46	246.13	524.31	167.02	1197.92
EU	486.58	442.37	0	0	677.01
EIB	2046.9	51.6	0	0	2098.5
Total	**8631.167**	**2168.983**	**2893.06**	**170.85**	**13612.12**

Source: MS reports submitted under the MMR in 2015

Table 3-3: Member States' climate finance in 2014 in million € excluding climate-specific imputed multilateral contributions under the MMR

	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	TOTAL
AT	71	6.88	21.87	0	99.75
BE	8.58	18.8	14.08	0	41.46
BG	0.06	0	0.01	0	0.07
HR	0.03	0	0	0	0.03
CY	0	0	0	0	0
CZ	1.15	2.8	3	0	6.95
DK	42.58	0	133.71	3.76	180.05
EE	0	0.33	0.2	0	0.53
FI	24.69	10.26	34.69	0	69.64
FR	2232.15	279.14	245.03	0	2756.32
DE	2878.74	716.63	1202.89	0	4798.26
EL	0.035	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.035
HU	1.57	1.08	0.06	0	2.71
IE	1.53	21.87	9.57	0.00	32.97
IT	14.96	4.55	24.49	0.00	44.00
LV	0.05	0	0.35	0.02	0.42
LT	0.26	0	0	0	0.26
LU	6.10	7.05	19.37	0.00	32.52
MT	0.01	0.023	0	0.05	0.08
NL	71.95	133.84	109.92	0.00	315.71
PL	0.37	0.15	1.90	0.00	2.42
PT	8.36	0.86	0.00	0.00	9.22
RO	0	0.03	0	0	0.03
SK	0	0.76	0.12	0	0.88
SI	0.60	0.85	0.16	0	1.61
ES	393.18	18.5	12.42	0	424.10
SE	26.32	76.12	119.06	0	221.50
UK	109.67	217.78	168.59	167.02	663.06
EU	486.58	442.37	0	0	677.01
EIB	2046.9	51.6	0	0	2098.5
Total	**8427.425**	**2012.273**	**2121.49**	**170.85**	**12480.098**

Source: MS reports submitted under the MMR in 2015
Notes: pink indicates rows with no changes compared to Table 3-1.

3.3.1. Imputed multilateral contributions (IMCs)

A central issue in the analysis of the data reported by MS under the MMR was the method used to allocate and estimate support provided to multilateral bodies. The OECD provided information on imputed multilateral contributions for several Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs).

These Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) provide estimates concerning the climate-related share within their portfolio and attribute this back to DAC members, based on a pro-rata share of their core multilateral ODA disbursements in a given year. These shares are referred to as 'imputed multilateral contributions in core/general finance'. However, Member States also have the option to report their national figures based on domestic calculations of imputed multilateral contributions. The methodologies of both approaches may differ though.

For the calculation of imputed multilateral contributions for 2014, CION had received from the OECD the preliminary table on imputed multilateral contributions for 2014, based on DAC Member States' reports on their core contributions. The total volume of such contributions according to OECD data was higher by Mio € 881.83 than the total volume of climate-specific multilateral funding reported under the MMR by Member States.

Thus, to produce an aggregate figure on imputed multilateral shares, a top-down approach was taken: The following OECD DAC list of MDB funds, funds and other institutions was taken as a basis (see also Table 3-3):

- MDB funds
    - African Development Fund
    - Asian Development Fund
    - International Development Association
    - Inter-American Development Bank, Fund for Special Operations
- Funds
    - Adaptation Fund (under the UNFCCC)
    - CIFS (Clean Technology Fund, Strategic Climate Fund (= Forest Investment Program, FIP; Pilot Program Climate Resilience, PPCR; and Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program, SREP))
    - Global Environment Facility and its two dedicated Funds (Least Developed Countries Fund and Special Climate Change Fund)
    - Global Environment Facility Trust Fund
    - Green Climate Fund
    - Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol
- Other institutions
    - United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
    - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

For members of the OECD DAC, the following approach was taken: If a Member State had reported climate-specific funding to any of the institutions on this list, this amount was filtered out when summing up multilateral contributions from the MMR reports. Thus, it was checked whether a Member State had reported funds as a **climate-specific** contribution to any of the institutions on the OECD DAC list in MMR table "contribution through multilateral channels" (corresponding to

CTF table 7a). If this was the case, the respective contribution(s) were deduced from the relevant total climate-specific figure (mitigation, adaptation or cross-cutting) in the summary table (CTF table 7) (see calculations in Table 3-2). After generating an aggregate figure for the EU without those imputed shares reported by the Member States and included in the OECD figure (see column I in Table 3-1), the relevant amount from the OECD was added to the aggregate figure without imputed multilateral contributions (see column K in Table 3-1). This approach aims at ensuring that multilateral contributions are not double counted.

For non-members of the OECD DAC, figures for imputed multilateral shares were included as reported under the MMR.

In this analysis, core/general contributions to multilateral channels as reported in MMR table "contribution through multilateral channels" (CTF table 7a) were not considered in this analysis, as it should include climate-specific finance only.

Challenges encountered

During the analysis of Member States' reports under the MMR finding a way to add Member States' imputed multilateral contributions to MDBs to the EU aggregate figure for climate finance was challenging. Several problems occurred with regard to the reporting of imputed multilateral contributions:

- DG CLIMA had to rely on preliminary data from the OECD DAC.
- OECD DAC data was not consistent with the data reported by the Member States. Climate-related development finance is broader than what is reported as climate finance in the BR. OECD DAC members when reporting to the UNFCCC often count only a share of what they reported to the OECD DAC.
- MDBs covered in the OECD DAC's reporting and those listed in the EU's CTF and MMR tables do not entirely overlap (see also Table 3-3). Even for the same multilateral institutions, the coverage of individual funds included under a specific financial institution varies between the OECD DAC list and the funds included in the CTF/MMR tables.
- The World Bank is mentioned as a single institution in the CTF/MMR tables while the World Bank Group includes several different organisations and it is not clear whether Member States' reported figures refer to the entire World Bank Group or specific branches (e.g. the OECD considers only contributions to the International Development Association (IDA) as relevant funds to the World Bank).
- In some MMR reports, there is no clear differentiation between core contributions (which are not necessarily climate relevant) and climate-specific contributions.
- There is no harmonized approach related to the reporting on imputed multilateral shares within the EU. Some MS report only core contributions to financial institutions, some report imputed multilateral contributions which are nationally calculated by a different methodology as the imputed contributions of the OECD DAC and some refer to the imputed shares established by the OECD DAC).
- It is not clear how Member States calculate imputed multilateral shares for certain MDBs.

For these reasons, recommendations for improving the aggregation of imputed multilateral contributions and Member States' reports on climate finance were developed during further analyses carried out in this project. They are described in chapter 5.14.

Table 3-4: List of multilateral funds and other multilateral institutions in OECD data and in the CTF/MMR tables for calculating imputed multilateral contributions

OECD	CTF/MMR tables	Differences between OECD and CTF
Only International Development Association	World Bank, International Finance Corporation	Only IDA.
African Development Fund Only concessional windows from bank[10]	African Development Bank	Only concessional windows from bank in OECD[11]
Asian Development Fund Only concessional windows from bank	Asian Development Bank	Only concessional windows from bank in OECD
Inter-American Development Bank, Fund for Special Operations	Inter-American Development Bank	Only fund for Special Operations in OECD
Global Environment Facility Trust Fund	Global Environment Facility[12]	Global Environment Facility Trust Fund
Adaptation Fund	Adaptation Fund	Same
Global Environment Facility - Least Developed Countries Fund	Least Developed Countries Fund	Same
Global Environment Facility - Special Climate Change Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Same
Clean Technology Fund		CIF
Strategic Climate Fund		CIF. 3 windows: FIP, PPCR, SREP
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change	UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities	UNFCCC under OECD covers Trust Fund and other contributions to UNFCCC, CTF is limited to Trust Fund
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol		Not mentioned in CTF
Green Climate Fund	Green Climate Fund	Same
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change		Not mentioned in CTF

[10] The African Development Fund (ADF) is the concessional window of the African Development Bank (AfDB) Group.

[11] The African Development Fund (ADF) is the concessional window of the African Development Bank (AfDB) Group.

[12] The GEF administers different trust funds: Global Environment Facility Trust Fund (GEF); Least Developed Countries Trust Fund (LDCF); Special Climate Change Trust Fund (SCCF); Nagoya Protocol Implementation Fund (NPIF). The GEF also provides secretariat services, on an interim basis, for the Adaptation Fund.

3.3.2. Calculating EU total climate finance

For calculating an aggregate figure for total EU climate finance as the sum of contributions provided by the Member States, three possible options were discussed within CION which are described below. Firstly, they include different possibilities for how to include funds reported in the category 'other' as there is no harmonised approach which funds to include in this category and how to define them as climate-relevant. This is particularly relevant for Germany's MMR report because Germany had originally reported about € 3.3 billion of its total climate-specific finance under this category. An approach for reporting these funds under the categories mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting was agreed with the German reporting experts subsequent to Germany's submission of their MMR report. Secondly, the three options differ with regard on how to include imputed multilateral contributions in the aggregate figure for total EU climate finance (use figures reported by the OECD DAC or figures reported by the Member States in their MMR reports). Table 3-5 presents the results of calculating total climate finance according to the different options.

Option 1: Including MMR figures for bilateral and multilateral, excluding funds reported in the category 'other', excluding OECD DAC imputed multilateral contributions

- Add up figures reported as total bilateral and multilateral climate-specific finance in the categories mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting by Member States in their MMR report;
- Exclude funds reported by Member States in the category 'other';
- Include multilateral funding on the basis of imputed multilateral contributions reported in the MMR (not taking into account imputed multilateral contributions calculated by the OECD).

For climate finance provided in 2014, this approach would have resulted in the exclusion of 3.3 billion EUR climate finance provided by Germany (reported in the category 'other') and about 0.9 billion EUR imputed multilateral shares which are included in the OECD's report but not in Member States' reporting (together roughly 30% of all EU climate finance).

Option 2: As option 1, but including funds reported in the category "other" by Germany, excluding the OECD DAC imputed multilateral contributions

- Include funds reported by Germany in the category 'other' but distribute them to mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting according to the breakdown provided by the German reporting experts subsequent to the MMR submission.
- Include multilateral funding on the basis of imputed multilateral contributions reported in the MMR (not taking into account imputed multilateral contributions reported by the OECD).

Option 3: Including funds reported in the category "other" by Germany, including imputed multilateral contributions based on OECD figures and subtracting figures reported in the MMR for these funds (to avoid double counting), including multilateral contributions from MMR reports when these funds are not part of the OECD imputed multilateral contributions.

- Include funds reported by Germany in the category 'other' but distribute them to mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting according to the breakdown provided by the German reporting experts subsequent to the MMR report;
- Exclude imputed multilateral contributions reported in the MMR for those funds which are also included in the OECD's reporting; Include figures reported by the OECD on imputed

multilateral contributions added to the EU's aggregate finance as 'cross-cutting' climate finance.

The third approach was chosen for the presentation of contributions for mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting climate finance for 2014 at aggregate EU level (see EU 2015). This is one of the areas where the methodology under the MMR should be further clarified to achieve a transparent approach for the aggregate EU figures for reporting imputed multilateral contributions in future years.

Table 3-5: Calculation of total EU climate finance for 2014 in Million €, with and without MMR-reported imputed multilateral contributions and with imputed multilateral contributions as calculated by OECD

Definition of EU total	Amount in Mio. €
A: EU total **with** imputed multilateral contributions as reported in MMR	13,612.12
B. EU total **without** imputed multilateral contributions as reported in MMR	12,480.10
C. Total imputed multilateral contributions **included in MMR reporting**	**1,132.03**
D. Total imputed multilateral contributions **as calculated by OECD**	**2,013.85**
E. EU total **with IMC as calculated by OECD**, **without IMC as reported in MMR (B+D)**	**14,493.95**

Note: The figure for E. in the last line was the one used in the Council Conclusions on climate finance published on 10.11.2015. The figures do not include amounts reported under 'other' by Germany.

3.3.3. Further methodological issues

Additional challenges arose from the MMR report provided by Germany. Firstly, Germany reported € 2.8 billion as "mobilised public finance" through national finance institutions (KfW and DEG) which was not included in the MMR table directly, but described in a qualitative section on Germany's methodological approach. This support was not further specified in terms of its relevance for mitigation or adaptation. This amount was included in the country's total climate finance figures under the category 'cross-cutting'. However, other Member State did not report on "mobilised public climate finance". Given the fact that also the Paris Agreement refers to finance provided and mobilized, further guidance should be developed related to a consistent reporting of 'mobilized finance' by Member States under the MMR.

Secondly, Germany reported a considerable amount of climate finance under the category 'other'. It thus needed to be clarified which parts of this amount are to be included in the EU's aggregate

figures for mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting. Guidance should be provided to Member States on how to treat the category ’other’ in the future.

Furthermore, several methodological differences in the approaches used by Member States to produce their climate finance figures became obvious during the analysis of MMR data. These differences include (see also the summaries in chapters 4.3 and 4.4):

- the way OECD DAC markers to estimate financial flows have been implemented/which method has been applied to categorise flows as relevant for mitigation, adaptation or cross-cutting;
- different coefficients for Rio Markers (counting of 100%, 20%, 40% or 50% of funding if a project is marked as “significant”; which coefficient) are used if a project is marked as principal/significant for more than one category);
- different use of the category ’other’;
- different underlying definitions (e.g. mobilised public finance, funding sources included (ODA, OOF, other), point of measurement (provided, committed, disbursed);
- which financial instruments are included in the climate finance figures (e.g. grants and (concessional) loans, including whether the new or the old approach to concessional loans agreed under the OECD has been used[13], guarantees, equity investments; funds channelled through multilateral development banks including the EIB;
- how Member States have differentiated between core contributions to the core budget of multilateral institutions which cannot be specified as climate-specific (“core/general”) and climate-specific contributions to multilateral climate funds and dedicated programmes managed by multilateral institutions;
- methodologies to calculate imputed multilateral contributions;
- which funds/organisations are reported together under multilateral development banks (e.g. which organisations/ funds are considered to be part of the World Bank Group);
- which exchange rates have been used to estimate climate finance figures;
- which sector definitions have been used (OECD DAC definitions or others);
- accounting methods for private climate finance, including definition, the accounting of leveraging effects and ways to measure the extent of mobilization;
- which countries were included as recipient countries (non-Annex I countries, countries eligible for ODA under OECD DAC or any other definition of recipient countries,;
- whether repayments are deduced from climate finance disbursed;
- the approach taken to report on climate finance relevant to technology transfer or capacity building.

[13] As of 2018, new guidelines to assess the concessionality of loans apply for OECD countries, which imply i.a. that only loans with a grant element of at least 45% will be reportable as ODA (OECD DAC 2014). In their 2014 reports under the MMR, several Member States have already applied these new reporting guidelines.

Yet, these issues have not been analysed in greater depth in the first step of the analysis of the MMR reports. They will be dealt with in chapter 4 which describes the detailed analyses of Member States' MMR reports and their 2nd Biennial Reports. The extent to which the issues listed above are addressed in chapter 4 reflects the priorities for analysis determined at the kick-off meeting in November 2015.

4. Task 2a: Comparison of the climate finance reporting under the MMR with Biennial Reports under the UNFCCC

This chapter presents a qualitative and quantitative comparison of the Member States reports provided under Article 16 of the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (Regulation 525/2013) in September/ October 2015 with the information on climate finance provided in the second biennial reports submitted in January 2016 to the UNFCCC. Article 16, paragraph 1 of the MMR specifies that reporting under the MMR should be "in accordance with the relevant provisions under the UNFCCC, as applicable, including any common reporting format agreed under the UNFCCC". The reporting tables provided in Excel under the MMR therefore require the same information and data as the CTF tables agreed under the UNFCCC as part of decision 19/CP.18 (apart from few differences, e.g. no reporting in US$ under the MMR, extension of summary table with information on funding sources and financial instruments under the MMR).

In addition, Greece and Slovenia provided their 2nd biennial report to the UNFCCC in March hence these two countries were added to the comparative analysis of reports presented in this report. After the presentation of this comparison in a separate synthesis report at an ECCWG-EGI Workshop on 11 March 2016 further clarifications were received from Member States which are reflected in this chapter.

4.1. Data basis used

The data basis used concerning MMR reports is the same as described in section 3.2.

All Member States had provided the submissions of their 2nd biennial reports to the UNFCCC. Bulgaria and Cyprus did not report any climate finance in their second biennial reports. New Member States (BG, CY, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LV, LT, MT, SI, SK, PL, RO) are not part of the list of countries in Annex II of the Framework Convention on Climate Change which have the specific requirements to provide financial resources to developing countries under Article 4 of the Convention.

14 Member States (AT, BE, CZ, DE, ES, FI, FR, GR, LU, MT, NE, PL, SE, UK) and the OECD commented on the Synthesis Report, as sent to Member States and the OECD on 8 March 2016 and the according presentation as given on 11 March 2016 respectively. Those comments were a further information source for this report.

4.2. Comparison of quantitative information provided for the year 2014 in reports under the MMR and in second biennial reports

Given the fact that the reporting tables under the MMR and in the biennial reports require the same information for the year 2014 and that the due date between the two reports only had a difference of three months (taking into account the period of clarification of the submitted data the difference

was only two months), it had been expected that the amounts of climate finance reported are identical or very similar. However this expectation was not met.

Aggregated for all Member States, the second biennial reports (BR2) include around 1.9% or € 311 Mio. less **total climate finance contributions** (core/general and ´climate-specific´ finance) than the reports under the MMR. For **total climate-specific finance**, the difference is smaller and Member States reported 0.7% or € 59 Mio. more climate-specific contributions in BR2 than in MMR reports (see also Table 4-1).

Table 4-1 also shows that the deviations are different for multilateral climate finance and for bilateral climate finance. For **multilateral finance** the aggregate amount in BR2 is 2.3% or € 206 Mio. higher than the amount reported in the MMR for core/general and climate-specific finance. If only climate-specific finance is considered, the BR2 is 4.8% or € 77 Mio. higher. Only nine Member States reported consistent figures for multilateral climate finance in BR2 and MMR reports. This indicates that the reporting of multilateral finance is generally more complex and difficult.

The aggregate total **bilateral** climate finance reported in BR2 (core/ general and climate-specific) is 6.9% or € 517 Mio. lower than in the MMR reports while the climate-specific bilateral finance is rather similar (BR2 reports 0.3% or 18 € Mio. lower than MMR reports). The large difference for core/ general bilateral finance is mainly due to the reporting of large amount of core/ general bilateral finance in the MMR reports by Finland. In its comments to the draft synthesis report, Finland indicated that the UNFCCC CTF reporting software does not allow reporting of bilateral core/general data in table 7b and only climate-specific data can be entered. In the Finnish data bilateral core/ general data is added to table 7 and therefore reflected in the MMR reporting. Thus, according to the Finnish explanations, the BR reporting seems to miss some amounts that are reported under the MMR due to data entry problems. 16 Member States reported the same figures for bilateral climate finance in both reports.

Table 4-1 is based on the summary tables in Annex IV (section 9.4). In annex III (section 9.3) the underlying tables for each country are provided.

Table 4-1: Quantitative differences for total EU climate finance (as sum of all 28 EU Member States) based on aggregation of MMR reporting and BR2 for the year 2014

	Climate-specific and core/general	Climate-specific
Total (multilateral and bilateral)		
Total EU aggregate figure (Council conclusions 10.11.2015) (incl. EIB)[14](Council of the EU 2015)	€ 14,493,945,000	€ 14,493,945,000
Total MMR	€ 16,629,686,781	€ 8,631,696,892
Total BR2	€ 16,318,365,343	€ 8,690,635,762
Difference in % (BR2/MMR)	**-1.9%**	**0.7%**
Difference in € (BR2-MMR)	**€ -311,321,438**	**€ 58,938,870**
Multilateral		
Total MMR	€ 9,109,478,719	€ 1,610,595,669
Total BR2	€ 9,315,148,512	€ 1,687,454,495
Difference in % (BR2/MMR)	**2.3%**	**4.8%**
Difference in € (BR2-MMR)	**€ 205,669,793**	**€ 76,858,826**
Bilateral		
Total MMR	€ 7,520,208,062	€ 7,021,101,223
Total BR2	€ 7,003,216,831	€ 7,003,181,266
Difference in % (BR2/MMR)	**-6.9%**	**-0.3%**
Difference in € (BR2-MMR)	**€ -516,991,231**	**€ -17,919,956**

Note: Some Member States obviously reported incorrect units in the BR2 reports. In very obvious cases the reported figures were corrected for the aggregation in this table. Clarifications received from Member States after a presentation of a former version of this synthesis report were included in this table.

The Netherlands reported the same amount of bilateral core/ general finance as climate-specific finance in the 2nd biennial report which is not included in the MMR reporting and it was assumed that the repetition of this figure under core/ general in the BR2 is a mistake which was corrected in the aggregate figures.

[14] The figure published as EU climate finance for 2014 in the Council conclusions on climate finance in November 2015 was added as a reference to this table. However, neither the column 'core + climate-specific' nor the column 'climate-specific' are methodologically consistent with the aggregation from MMR reports and BR2 because of the different calculation of imputed multilateral contributions for the figure in the Council conclusions.

Table 4-2 indicates relative differences for each Member State and the EU between climate finance reported in BR2 relative to the amounts reported under the MMR. In some cases, consistent figures at total level still include some inconsistencies in reporting within the respective category, e.g. between the amounts provided for adaptation, mitigation and cross-cutting support.

Table 4-2 Percentage differences between reported amounts of climate finance in BR2 and MMR reports for Member States (values > 100% = BR2 has higher figures, values < 100% MMR report has higher figures)

Percentages of sum, multilateral and bilateral of total contributions by country						
	sum		multilateral		bilateral	
Country	% based on climate-specific and core/ general (BR/MMR)	% based on climate specific (BR/MMR)	% based on climate-specific and core/ general (BR/MMR)	% based on climate specific (BR/MMR)	% based on climate-specific and core/ general (BR/MMR)	% based on climate specific (BR/MMR)
AT	125.26%	139.73%	318.97%	3133.73%	100.00%	100.00%
BE	100.48%	102.38%	100.52%	104.14%	100.00%	100.00%
BG			0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
CR	100.00%		100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
CY			0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
CZ	105.86%	100.00%	108.68%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
DE	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
DK	98.98%	97.94%	102.56%	126.74%	94.49%	94.49%
EE	104.33%	97.43%	26.32%	10.38%	597.39%	597.39%
ES	103.48%	100.00%	140.52%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
FI	54.91%	100.00%	97.75%	100.00%	8.17%	100.00%
FR	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
GR	100.00%		0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
HU	99.94%	99.78%	100.00%	100.00%	99.47%	99.47%
IE	99.73%	99.12%	99.61%	85.28%	100.00%	100.00%
IT	60.93%	89.61%	48.64%	111.54%	77.06%	77.06%
LT	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
LU	108.26%	106.00%	141.31%	129.29%	100.62%	100.62%
LV	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
MT	100.00%	38.06%	70.94%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
NL	126.46%	107.00%	146.99%	133.78%	100.00%	100.00%
PL	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
PT	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	0.00%	100.00%	100.00%
RO	200.00%	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
SE	101.41%	100.00%	102.15%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
SI	94.27%	94.27%	80.41%	80.41%	100.00%	100.00%
SK	100.00%	103.65%	100.00%	111.51%	100.00%	100.00%
UK	100.01%	100.00%	100.02%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
			0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
total	98.13%	100.68%	102.26%	104.77%	93.13%	99.74%

Note: Green values indicate that figures are equal between MMR and BR2
Black values indicate difference of ±5%
Red values indicate difference of > 5%.

A former version of this synthesis report was sent and presented to Member States and their subsequent comments and corrections were used to update the reported data. Those clarifications from Member States and the biennial reports handed in by Greece and Slovenia in the meantime have reduced the differences. However, clear inconsistencies remain.

It is recommended that Member States improve the consistency of the information and data reported under the MMR reports and in their BRs. There is a risk related to the credibility of EU finance data if figures for national climate finance differ between two reports provided in a short time span of a few months.

4.3. Summary of qualitative comparison of Member States reports

Table 4-3 presents a factual account of inconsistencies identified between Member States´ reports under the MMR and the second biennial reports in the reporting on multilateral finance grouped into thematic areas.

Table 4-3: Qualitative comparison of MS reporting under the MMR and in second biennial reports for multilateral finance

Information	Comments (examples of inconsistency)
Coverage of core/general contributions and climate-specific finance	24 Member States report core contributions (all countries which have submitted their MMR or BR report except Latvia and Slovenia). Yet, of those Member States which have submitted MMR and BR2 reports, five Member States either include information on core contributions only in their second BR or in their MMR (AT, ES, IT, LU, SE). While a total of 21 Member States report on core contributions under the MMR, 19 do so in their BR2. Croatia, Greece and Portugal only report core contributions but no climate-specific contributions. The MMR template defines climate change funds listed in the reporting template as climate specific, apart from the GEF to which also core/general funding can be reported. Such a distinction is not made in the BR reporting. Two MS (DK, NL) report also core/ general contributions to climate-change funds. For other climate change funds which MS have to specify it is less clear whether all amounts should be considered as climate-finance. 11 MS consider the finance reported for ‘other multilateral funds’ as climate-specific (BE, BG, CZ, DE, EE, ES, GR, HU, IT, SE, UK). However NL and DK report ‘other multilateral climate change funds under core/ general. Croatia, Greece and Portugal only report core contributions but no climate-specific contributions. On the other hand, Latvia and Slovenia only report climate-specific contributions but no core contributions. Austria reports core contributions in the MMR report but not in the BR and Italy and Luxembourg in its BR but not in its MMR report.
Reporting related to the World Bank	The World Bank comprises a number of specific dedicated programmes and funds that are reported separately by some MS and jointly under the heading of the World Bank by other MS. (13 MS: AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, FI, HU, IE, LT, PL, PT, SE, UK) report core contributions to the World Bank while 6 MS (AT, DE, DK, FI, LU, SI) report climate-specific contributions to the World Bank (with

Information	Comments (examples of inconsistency)
	divergences between the BRs and MMR reports). The Netherlands is the only country which separately lists its contributions to International Development Association (IDA) under 'other multilateral financial institutions'. Denmark, Finland and Poland explain that they report contributions to IDA as part of the funds provided to the World Bank. For the other countries that report contributions to the World Bank (AT, BE, CZ, DE, HU, IE, LT, PL, PT, SE for core contributions and AT, DE, LU, SL for climate-specific contributions), it is not clear whether contributions to IDA are included in the figures provided or not. This holds true for other funds that belong to the World Bank Group as well. Germany lists climate-specific contributions to several World Bank administered funds under 'other multilateral financial institutions' (Pilot Auction Facility for Methane and Climate Change Mitigation; BioCarbon Fund Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes; Forest Carbon Partnership Facility) separately to a core contribution to the World Bank. Ireland separately reports core contributions to the World Bank and core contributions to the World Bank CGIAR Fund. Finland reports core contributions and climate-specific contributions to the World Bank and to the CGIAR.
Type of multilateral funds reported	There is a lack of clarity which funds are relevant for international reporting on climate finance. For example, 3 Member States (HR, HU, PT) report core contributions to the UNFCCC and 6 Member States (AT, BG, DE, EE, PL, SK) report climate-specific contributions to the UNFCCC (with discrepancies between their MMR and BR reports) and 1 Member State (HR) reports core contributions to the Kyoto Protocol and 4 Member States (AT, BG, IT, SK) climate-specific contributions to the Kyoto Protocol. 1 Member State (AT) reports climate-specific contributions to the International Transaction Log (ITL). However, all Member States provide contributions to the UNFCCC's budget or in the form of fees to the ITL to the UNFCCC; yet the majority of Member States excludes these flows from their reporting on climate finance. Only the UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities is listed under multilateral climate change funds in the CTF reporting template while contributions for other purposes to the UNFCCC need to be reported under 'other'. Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Italy and Slovakia categorise such contributions as other multilateral climate change funds, while Austria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Portugal list them as contributions to other UN specialized bodies. Additionally, Member States list a great variety of different funds and institutions under the categories 'other' of multilateral climate change funds, multilateral financial institutions and specialised UN bodies.
Imputed multilateral contributions	Only 7 MS explicitly explain their methodological approach towards providing multilateral climate-related shares. 2 MS (AT and DK) use the shares provided by the OECD DAC to determine their imputed multilateral contributions. Finland uses a similar approach as done by the OECD when calculating imputed multilateral contributions, but uses nationally determined figures. Germany explains in its MMR report that it uses the weighted average 2013-2014 of

Information	Comments (examples of inconsistency)
	imputed climate relevant shares as the basis for calculating the imputed multilateral contributions from core contributions to multilateral development banks. The shares used by Germany in its MMR report resemble but do not exactly correspond to the final shares published by the OECD. Four MS use their own methodology to calculate imputed multilateral contributions but two of them refer to the data used by the OECD: France only reports one multilateral climate-specific contribution to the GEF in its MMR report and BR and uses a different percentage rate for climate-relevant finance than the OECD. The Netherlands applies the percentages for climate-relevant shares of financial disbursements of multilateral development banks as established by the OECD DAC if available. Otherwise, these percentages are determined nationally in close cooperation with the organisations concerned and range between 5% and 20%. Sweden reports nationally determined imputed multilateral contributions without specifying the climate-relevant shares. The UK explained that it has reported provisional core contributions in its MMR report but that the final data will be provided to the OECD. All other MS do not explain their approach towards reporting climate-specific multilateral finance. As an additional challenge, final OECD data was not available on time and the OECD does not cover all funds and institutions in their reporting which MS report on. Thus, for a number of institutions, climate-relevant shares have to be taken from other sources than from the OECD.
Coverage of instruments reported	24 MS report grants provided through multilateral channels in their reports. Four MS (CZ, HR, SK, UK) additionally indicate the disbursement of funds through 'other' financial instruments. Croatia reports its membership fees to the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol as 'other' instruments. The Czech Republic reports core contributions to the World Bank as "other (grant/equity)" in its BR, but does not provide further information on this contribution. Slovakia reports membership fees to the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund, the Montreal Protocol Trust Fund, the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol under UNFCCC, CITES Multilateral Treaty, to the WMO and to UNEP as 'other' financial instruments. Contributions to UNCCD, FAO and EPPO are reported as "other (capital subscription)". Yet, this is not further explained. The UK reports contributions to the Climate Investment Funds as "other (capital)" without further explanation. Bulgaria is the only country which reports all multilateral contributions as 'other' instruments in its MMR report. Yet, it does not further specify the type of instrument used. Definitions for the financial instruments included in reporting are not provided by any Member State.
Status/point of measurement	All MS have reported disbursed/provided contributions. Luxembourg additionally includes funds that have been committed.

Information	Comments (examples of inconsistency)
Funding source	All MS which have submitted MMR reports or BRs have included money disbursed as ODA in their reporting except for Croatia which has not provided information on this issue. 4 MS (BG, EE, IT, LU) have also included funds disbursed through OOF in their reports and 3 MS (BE, IE, LV) have included other flows. Belgium has reported separate contributions through ODA and through OOF to the Adaptation Fund and to the GCF in its MMR report. In its BR, only one contribution to the Adaptation Fund is reported as "other (ODA/OOF)" while the contribution to the GCF is reported as finance relevant for ODA. Estonia has specified that its contributions to the UNFCCC are partially ODA (61%) and partially OOF (39%) and that its contributions to the WMO are partially ODA (4%) and partially OOF (96%). Ireland has reported its contribution to the CTCN as stemming from other funding sources than ODA and OOF in its CTF table. In its BR, it is specified that this sum promotes the accelerated transfer of environmentally sound technologies for low carbon and climate resilient development at the request of developing countries, but the funding source is not further specified. Italy reports its contribution to the Regional Environmental Centre as OOF funds in its MMR report. Latvia reports its contribution to the GCF under 'other funding sources' in its MMR report and BR. This is not further explained. Luxembourg reports its contribution to the GCF as OOF in its MMR report and in its BR.
Sector information	19 MS (BE, DK, EE, FI, FR, GR, HU, IE, IT, LV, LT, LU, MT, NL, PL, SE, SI, SK, UK) report sector information for their multilateral contributions, but as these are mostly aggregate and not project-specific figures, most countries indicate "cross-cutting", "general environmental protection" or "other multisector" in this column.

Difficulties in comparability of information reported by Member States also reduce accuracy and increase uncertainty within each report. The following table provides an assessment of the comparability of the information provided by Member States in reporting on multilateral climate finance. Some aspects for which inconsistencies in the reporting have been assessed in the previous table, do not appear in this summary if such inconsistencies are not very relevant for the comparability of data for the EU aggregation.

Table 4-4: Summary of issues identified that limited comparability related to the reporting of multilateral climate finance

Information	Comment on shortcomings
Coverage of core contributions and climate-specific finance	There are shortcomings in terms of identification of climate-relevant shares based on percentage ratios. Explications of differentiation between core and climate-specific are frequently missing. For those funds whose projects are not 100% climate relevant but where the share of climate-relevant expenditures needs to be determined, it is unclear how the reported figures were determined and specific methodological information is missing.
Coverage of multilateral funds or development banks	It is unclear whether some MS listed contributions to more funds than other MS and whether other MS also contributed to those funds but did not report on them because they did not consider them to be relevant. It is not completely comparable which multilateral funds and financial institutions of UN bodies are relevant for the reporting under the MMR and in biennial reports (e.g. related to finance provided to the UNFCCC).There are shortcomings how contributions to specific climate-related funds of multilateral institutions are reported and on how projects were treated which are not 100% climate-specific.
Imputed multilateral contributions	All but seven MS fall short on explicitly explaining their methodological approach to the calculation of imputed multilateral contributions and therefore the comparability of approaches chosen is limited. Methodological problems arise due to (1) national determination of climate-relevant shares (lack of specification and description of methodology), (2) timely OECD DAC data availability (available only after MMR submission date), (3) only partial overlap among multilateral institutions covered in the OECD DAC's reporting with those included in MMR and BR reporting (so some data have to be taken from other sources), (4) imperfect match of multilateral fund denotations between MMR, BR and OECD DAC.
Coverage of instruments reported	There seems to be no guidance which types of payments should be accounted for as a multilateral contribution; i.e. whether only grants should be considered, what kind of other payments should be reported and how membership fees to multilateral institutions should be treated.
Funding source	It is not clear what types of sources are included when other funding sources in addition to ODA and OOF are reported; this also reduces comparability.

Table 4-5 presents a factual account of inconsistencies identified between Member States´ reports under the MMR and the second biennial reports in the reporting on bilateral finance grouped into thematic areas.

Table 4-5: Qualitative comparison of MS reporting under the MMR and in second biennial reports for bilateral finance

Information	**Inconsistency found?** Yes/ No	**Comments (examples of inconsistency)**
Coverage of funding sources	Yes	Austria refers to OOF in the textual part of the MMR, but does not include it in the table nor in the BR; Italy refers to "Other" in the MMR, but not in BR; Germany refers to OOF in MMR, but not in BR.
Definition of funding sources	No	Only France and Belgium include definitions. Belgium does so only in the BR.
Point of measurement	Yes	Belgium refers to commitments in the textual part, but only includes provided in the table; France refers to disbursements in the BR, but not in the MMR. Germany refers that only commitments are reported, but includes some "as provided" in the tables (e.g. when funds are channelled via a regional fund); Spain does not refer to commitments in the MMR, but does so in the BR (in relation to export credits).
Definition of point of measurement	No	Only France, Spain and Sweden included such definitions. The later only in the BR, not in the MMR.
Coverage of instruments reported	Yes	Austria refers to several instruments in the BR, but only to grants in the MMR. Finland refers to (concessional) loan in the MMR and to other (interest subsidy) in the BR.
Definition of instrument	Yes	Only Finland provided definitions for all instruments, but only in the MMR. Spain provided definitions of export credits only in its BR.
Identification of adaptation/mitigation activities	No	All MS, except the UK, used OECD DAC guidance. France and Belgium have some additional national (or regional) approaches, which tend to complement in a compatible manner the OECD DAC Rio Markers. While the UK refers to the Rio Markers in the BR, the approached used is the national methodology described in the MMR report.
Recipient Definition	No	Only Austria, France, Ireland and Sweden define recipients. Consistently in both reports.
Quantification of climate-specific	No	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden describe their respective methodology to quantify climate support, through the definition

Information	**Inconsistency found?** Yes/ No	Comments (examples of inconsistency)
		of coefficients applied to the Rio Markers. While there are no inconsistencies between MS reports, the approaches used by the different MS vary quite significantly. The remaining MS do not describe their respective approach to quantifying climate support.
Valorisation of instrument	No	Only Austria and Germany make a reference to valorisation of instrument and only in the MMR.
Currency exchange rates	No	At least one MS does not present figures in US$. The reporting on the exchange rate used is consistent in the MMR and the BR.
Format of data	No	All MS present data at activity level; yet Luxembourg presents parts of its data in an aggregated way according to types of recipient countries and groups, yet providing details on the different projects included in their BR.
Report on Technology Transfer (TT)	Yes	There are several inconsistencies. Most MS report on TT in the BR, but not in the MMR. MS who report on TT in the BR but not in the MMR: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Poland, and Portugal. MS who report on TT in the MMR but not in the BR: Czech Republic, Luxembourg.
Report on Capacity Building (CB)	Yes	There are several inconsistencies. Most MS report on CB in the BR, but not in the MMR. MS who report on CB in the BR but not in the MMR: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy and Portugal. MS who report on CB in the MMR but not in the BR: Czech Republic, Luxemburg,
Report on private climate finance	No	Finland reports on private finance in the BR, but not in the MMR.

The following table provides an assessment of the comparability of the information provided by Member States in reporting on bilateral climate finance.

Table 4-6: Summary table of issues identified related to the reporting of bilateral climate finance that limit comparability of climate finance information

Information type	Issues identified
Point of measurement	Most MS report either commitment or disbursement; some, a combination of both. Most MS report that, except in cases of *force majeure* commitments will be equal to disbursements. The only difference between the two is the moment in which the recipient country benefits from the support. As long as MS who report both commitments and disbursements do not report the same amount as a commitment and later on as disbursement, there should be no problem in relation to comparability of data.
Coverage of instruments reported	Some MS report on loans, without distinguishing between concessional and non-concessional. Mostly no explanations or definitions are provided for other instruments reported apart from grants and loans.
Identification of adaptation/mitigation activities	While all MS use the same method, the OECD DAC Rio Markers, the discretion in its application is a major source of uncertainty in the support reported.
Recipient Definition	Member States use different definitions for recipient countries: • OECD DAC list of ODA recipients (this list includes some Annex I countries (Turkey, Ukraine, Belarus) and does not include all non-Annex I countries) • Non-Annex I countries (includes all countries for which the reporting guidelines requests support provided be reported on; includes some countries which are not eligible to receive ODA as per the OECD DAC list of ODA recipients) Some MS use the OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries and exclude Annex I Parties that are included in this list.
Quantification of climate-specific	As for the case of identification of climate support using the Rio Markers, the use of coefficients to quantify such support brings great uncertainty into the figures reported. In addition to the discretion in determining the coefficient to apply, MS are actually using many different coefficients to quantify the same thing (in particular to quantify activities marked as significant). Furthermore, the different approaches (including lack thereof) to avoid double counting exacerbate such problems.
Currency exchange rates	The use of different exchange rates can hinder comparability of data; sometimes the exchange rate is not clearly indicated.
Report on TT Report on CB	The report on TT and CB is rather qualitative and the information is collected mostly on a case study basis. No MS quantified the TT and CB support.
Report on private climate finance	As for TT and CB, there is very little information on private climate finance being reported and MS that do so, do it on an exploratory, preliminary

Information type	Issues identified
	basis. However, the different instruments that can be used to mobilize private finance and the many different approaches that can be used to estimate the amount of private finance actually mobilized (leveraged) will certainly become an issue when in the future more information is available.

4.4. Summary of quantitative comparison of Member States´ reports

This section summarizes the findings related to the quantitative comparison of the data provided in the MMR reports and the second biennial reports. Data from the analysis are presented in Annex III, IV and V (sections 9.3, 9.4 and 9.5). Comments and clarifications received from Member States after presenting and sharing the results of a former version of this synthesis report are incorporated in this analysis.

- Only four Member States reported completely consistent data in both reports (Croatia, Greece, Lithuania, Portugal)
- For 13 Member States data is largely consistent, but they reported changes in individual categories or aspects (Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and UK)
- For six Member States many data categories are different in both reports, however the impact on the total reported climate finance is relatively small (Denmark, Estonia, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Sweden)
- For four Member States many data categories are different in both reports and the total reported climate finance is substantially different (Austria, Czech Republic, Italy, Netherlands).
- Bulgaria and Cyprus could not be compared as one of the reports was missing or contained empty tables.

In particular for those Member States with many differences it is recommended to clarify the reasons for the changes. For Italy the figures reported in the second biennial report are very unclear (e.g. due to the reporting of amounts in € and in US$ which do not match with currency conversion rates).

Differences in financial values reported by all other Member States largely depend on one or more of the points below:

- Figures are largely consistent but countries swapped the reported figures within ´climate-specific´ subcategories but the total amounts remain the same (e.g. Poland, Belgium, France and Latvia);
- Bilateral contributions are consistent but multilateral contributions are inconsistent (e.g. Austria);
- Different reporting of ´core/general´ (e.g. Austria, Finland);
- Currency conversion rate is used for values but not for sums (e.g. Sweden)

- Rounding issues (e.g. Netherlands, Denmark);
- Reporting mistakes or errors in e.g.
    - In biennial reports there are errors in the reported units for several Member States and the reported figures are too low and a factor of thousand or a million has to be applied to achieve the correct order of magnitude compared to the MMR report or the previous biennial report (e.g. Denmark, Italy, United Kingdom). This may also arise from the CTF reporter software where countries should be able to change the unit reported.
    - Figures were not transferred from table 7a to summary table 7 (e.g. Sweden);
    - Summation mistakes when disaggregate categories are summed up (e.g. Portugal and Hungary have summation mistakes in 7a);
    - Mistakes in filling in currency or currency conversion (e.g. Italy reports different values in € than in US$);
    - Reporting the same value twice or forgetting it once) (e.g. Ireland and Romania report the same number twice in one report and one time in the other).

The aggregate comparison of the quantitative information is presented in Table 4-1. Detailed comparisons of the data in both reports are provided in section 9.5 (Annex V).

5. Task 2b: Recommendations for the improvement of technical guidance under the MMR

This chapter focuses on recommendations for the improvement of the "*Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR)*" (June 2015) (European Commission 2015). This technical guidance document has been slightly updated in order to incorporate the recent changes to the reporting tables adopted at COP 21 in Paris updated for 2016. Further improvements could be incorporated in a revised technical guidance document to be used for the reporting in 2017. The recommendations in this chapter have been developed based on the analysis of Member States' reports provided under Article 16 of the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation[15] due by 30 September 2015 and the second biennial reports (BR2) under the UNFCCC due by 1st January 2016 (in particular CTF Tables 7, 7a and 7b[16]) as well as studies and analysis undertaken by other organisations and authors, in particular the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The suggested improvements should also strengthen the consistency, comparability and accuracy of the aggregate EU figures on climate finance provided by DG Climate Action on the basis of MS' reports which supports the EU's position towards its counterparts in the negotiations under the UNFCCC.

The recommendations of a first draft of a separate synthesis report were discussed at a Workshop of ECCWG-EGI on 11 March 2016 and Member States also provided written feedback to the report. Comments from Member States and OECD on the draft synthesis report were included in this section, in particular when agreement or disagreement was expressed in relation to certain proposals. Other suggestions (e.g. for clarification) were directly incorporated in the text.

Some Member States expressed more general concerns related to the reporting under the MMR: Finland, the Netherlands and Austria generally expressed the point of view that the UNFCCC and OECD reporting are the 'leading' tasks and the MMR should not go beyond the requirements under the UNFCCC or the OECD. The Netherlands proposed that climate finance data should not be reported separately at the EU level or only after final OECD/UNFCCC data is available. Several Member States expressed concerns related to the reporting deadline of 30 September under MMR. Finland proposed that any further development of the EU reporting under the MMR should only take place after the UNFCCC reporting under the Paris Agreement is finally developed.

The Netherlands made a specific proposal related to aspects which were not part of the draft synthesis report. The Netherlands noted that the technical guidance under the MMR should also address

- how to ensure that double counting is avoided in relation to climate relevant support committed through the EU budget instruments and the European Development Fund and
- how the Commission will inform MS on an annual basis about the climate relevant support committed through the EU budget instruments and the European Development Fund for Member States' national reporting purposes.

[15] OJ, L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 13: Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on a mechanism for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and for reporting other information at national and Union level relevant to climate change and repealing Decision No 280/2004/EC.

[16] Table 7: Provision of public financial support: summary information; Table 7(a): Provision of public financial support: contribution through multilateral channels; Table 7 (b): Provision of public financial support: contribution through bilateral, regional and other channels;

5.1. Format of Member States replies

The technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) requests Member States to use the UNFCCC Common Tabular Formats (CTF) as the template for the MMR reporting. It is also strongly recommended to submit the tables in Excel format.

Decision 9/CP.21 on "Methodologies for the reporting of financial information by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention" (FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.2) agreed at COP 21 in Paris implements a number of changes to the UNFCCC CTF. These changes include:

(a) Creating reporting fields for the provision of information on definitions or methodologies used for reporting information in the following reporting parameters: "climate-specific" or "core/general", "status", "funding source", "activity", "financial instrument", "type of support" and "sector";

(b) extending the number of input rows in the Microsoft Excel file for tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b);

(c) Aligning the categorization in the reporting parameter "status" of support ("pledged", "committed" and "provided") in tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b) of the common tabular format with the categorization used in other existing international methodologies ("committed" and "disbursed");

Proposal for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

The same changes as agreed in decision 9/CP.21 for the CTF should be applied to the reporting tables used for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR.

Seven Member States (AT, BE, DE, FI, PL, SE, UK) commented on this proposal, and all Member States agreed with it.

5.2. Template for methodological information

The technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) requests a descriptive section, preferably in a separate document. It should provide the technical description of the data, including key definitions and methodology. Narratives, such as justifications for climate finance should be avoided.

The addition of a reporting field for methodological information to the Excel tables as part of the UNFCCC (decision 9/CP.21) requires some modification of this guidance as some additional methodological explanations should be provided as part of the Excel table for the specific parameters "climate-specific" or "core/general", "status", "funding source", "activity", "financial instrument", "type of support" and "sector".

The current reporting of methodological information is rather inconsistent and incomplete. This also impacts comparability because it is sometimes unclear which approaches were used by Member States. A more systematic reporting of methodological information by all Member States would improve the comparability of the information.

Proposal for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

Option 1:

It is proposed to develop a template for the methodological information to be integrated in the technical guidance under the MMR (covering e.g. explanations how imputed multilateral climate-specific contributions were determined). This would facilitate a more complete reporting of methodological information. The template could include specific categories for approaches available and used by MS which can be selected. This could make the reporting more efficient and complete at the same time.

Option 2:

An alternative option for a template for methodological information would be that MS provide the template developed by the OECD joint ENVIRONET-WP-STAT Task Team on the methodological approaches for reporting also to the European Commission as part of the MMR reporting. This option would avoid filling another template. However, the template is rather detailed and requires a larger amount of descriptions than the approach suggested under option 1.

Eight Member States (AT, BE, DE, MT, NE, PL, SE, UK) commented on this proposal. Four Member States (DE, MT, NE, UK) agreed with option 1. One Member State (PL) supported option 1 by stating an “additional template aligned with OECD and not beyond BR requirements”. Two Member States (AT, SE) agreed with option 2. One Member State (BE) suggested that further discussion is needed on a template for methodological information.

5.3. Coverage of core contributions and climate-specific finance for multilateral climate finance

The technical guidance under the MMR already specifies that if core/general contributions are reported, core/general and climate-specific data should be mutually exclusive and that funds should be reported in only one of the categories. This is however not always implemented.

In exceptional cases, it might be necessary to report core/general and climate-specific contributions to the same bank or fund because the climate-specific contributions are made to specific sub-funds or dedicated programmes of the overarching institutions. In this case, it should be explained how core and climate-specific contributions have been differentiated. It should also be clearly indicated to which sub-funds or programmes the climate-specific contributions are paid to. This specific situation could be added to the technical guidance.

Contributions to those MDBs and multilateral institutions whose financial disbursements are not 100% climate relevant should be reported as core contributions. Climate-relevant shares of those payments will then be determined in a consistent manner for all Member States by the Commission using the imputed multilateral contributions provided by OECD in order to produce a figure for aggregate EU climate finance.

If core contributions are reported in the columns ‘other’ multilateral funds/multilateral financial institutions/specialised UN bodies, it should be specified to which funds beyond those indicated in the template these payments are made.

If core and climate-specific contributions are reported for the same institution, it should be explained how the figures have been determined (i.e. whether they relate to payments that are considered to be 100% climate relevant or whether they represent imputed multilateral contributions and how the imputed share has been determined, see chapter3.3.1) and how the

different categories of multilateral climate-specific finance (i.e. mitigation, adaptation, cross-cutting, other) have been determined. These options could be integrated in the methodological template proposed in section 0.

For OECD DAC members, it should be explained for contributions to banks or institutions not covered by OECD reporting how the climate-relevant share of these institutions' financial disbursements have been determined. For other countries, it is recommended to explain the calculation of climate-relevant shares in the methodological description for all funds reported.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

Add the following elements to the guidance related to core/ general vs climate-specific multilateral channels (text in bold is added):

1. If core/general contributions are reported, core/general and climate-specific data should be mutually exclusive **except in such cases where climate-specific contributions are made to specific sub-funds or dedicated programmes of the overarching institutions to which also core funding is provided. In this case, the core funding should be reported as well as climate specific funding and it should be explained how core and climate-specific contributions have been differentiated. It should also be clearly indicated to which sub-funds or programmes the climate-specific contributions are paid to.**

2. Climate specific concerns contributions to multilateral climate funds and dedicated programmes managed by multilateral institutions. Please report contributions to such funds and programmes (LDCF, SCCF, AF, GCF, UNFCCC, CIFs, FCPF, etc.) as climate specific only. **This also applies to those contributions reported under 'other multilateral climate change funds'.**

3. Any multilateral fund, financial institution or UN body reported under 'other' should be clearly indicated with its name.

4. If Member States use OECD imputed multilateral contributions to derive climate-specific finance for multilateral financial institutions or banks, this should be indicated in the methodological information provided (add in template suggested under 0).

5. Member States should only report climate-specific finance through bilateral, regional and other channels, and should not report core/ general bilateral or regional finance.

Proposal for revised recommendation for item 5:

5. Member States should only report climate-specific finance through bilateral, regional and other channels, if the recipient organisation is not listed on the DAC list of ODA eligible organisations.

Eight Member States (AT, BE, DE, FR, NE, PL, SE, UK) and the OECD commented on this proposal. Six Member States (AT, BE, DE, FR, PL, UK) agree with the recommendations. Poland agreed except with the 5th recommendation. The OECD explained that in the DAC statistics a "core" contribution is reportable as "bilateral" if the recipient organisation is not listed on the DAC list of ODA eligible organisations. Therefore the 5th recommendation would not be consistent with the DAC reporting system. This information was not available to the project team before and we believe that it is important to maintain consistency with the OECD DAC system and therefore the recommendation for item 5 was revised. Sweden did not support this proposal because Sweden

believes that countries should move towards developing systems where core support can be included – as all donors should work more towards aid effectiveness (Paris/Accra principles) and the reporting should not dis-incentivize core support. However, this disagreement may also be particularly related to the 5th recommendation.

5.4. Coverage of multilateral funds or development banks

Contributions to the World Bank should be reported as core contributions. It is recommended to specify contributions to the IBRD and to IDA as well as to other sub-funds or World Bank programmes separately as the climate-relevant share of each institution's funding will be different.

For other multilateral institutions, contributions to sub-funds should also be reported separately where possible (e.g. to the African Development Bank and to the African Development Fund). Otherwise, it should be explained in the methodological description which funds and programmes are included in an aggregated contribution.

Membership fees to UN institutions like the UNFCCC should neither be reported as climate-specific nor as core finance because they are not disbursed as climate finance to developing countries. This also includes the payments related to the operation use of the international transaction log for which it is difficult to justify that this is finance provided to developing countries. The UNFCCC reporting guidelines include only the UNFCCC trust fund for supplementary activities in the CTF template and this limitation seems justified. The trust fund mostly covers the participation of developing country experts in workshops and meetings scheduled as part of the UNFCCC work programme and to some extent also training and capacity building activities programmes for developing country Parties.

Similar considerations apply to the financial flows paid to the Montreal Protocol where general contributions to the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund or to the Montreal Protocol Trust Fund are reported. It should be discussed which of the Montreal Protocol flows can be regarded as climate finance provided to developing countries and whether these flows are reported under climate change funds or UN bodies.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

1. Related to the funds and programmes whose contributions are considered as climate-specific in the technical guidance, the provision of finance to the UNFCCC should be clarified and **only contributions to the UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities should be reported as climate-specific**.

2. It should be discussed which financial flows provided related to the Montreal Protocol (Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund and the Montreal Protocol Trust Fund / Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol) qualify for the reporting under the MMR and in biennial reports and amend the reporting tables under the MMR based on this discussion. It should also be discussed and decided whether financial flows to the Montreal Protocol should be reported under climate change funds or UN bodies.

3. From the list of other multilateral climate change funds, multilateral institutions and other specialized UN bodies reported by MS, the most frequent ones that are reported by more than three MS should be added as additional rows in the reporting template. This proposal would add the following funds / institutions / UN Bodies and it should be discussed whether these belong to multilateral funds, institutions or UN bodies:

FAO, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), UNCCD, UNICEF, WFP (United Nations World Food Programme), UN REDD (United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation)

Seven Member States (AT, BE, DE, FR, PL, SE, UK) and the OECD commented on this proposal. Three Member States (DE, SE, UK) generally agree with the proposals, one of these (UK) with a comment. Two Member States (BE, DE) agree and two (AT, PL) disagree with the first proposal. Four Member States (AT, BE, FR, PL) disagree with the second proposal and one of these (BE) states that discussion would be needed on this proposal. Four Member States (AT, BE, DE, PL) agree with the 3rd proposal. One Member State (FR) disagrees with reporting Montreal Protocol finance flows but indicates that future HFC amendment will contain elements on if/how to count part of the flows as climate finance.

The OECD commented that it is important to have clarity on which contributions are reported as bilateral to avoid double counting, and also ensure comparability across countries' reporting. The distinction between earmarked and non-earmarked is important. In DAC statistics, there is a clear demarcation between organizations considered "multilateral" and listed on the DAC list of ODA-eligible organizations and others not listed for which core contributions are classified as bilateral (e.g. Trust Funds such as WB Forest Carbon Partnership). If there is no such a demarcation in the reporting system, some countries may report a core contribution to an organization as bilateral and some countries as multilateral. If the distinction between bilateral and multilateral is not clear, there can be double-counting between countries' bilateral reporting and multilateral organizations' reporting on their outflows.

This leads to the conclusion that the technical guidance under the MMR should refer more specifically to the OECD DAC list of ODA-eligible organizations and how organization on this list and not on this list should be treated in the reporting.

5.5. Reporting on financial instruments

The technical guidance already requests an explanation of the methodology used when loans or other financial instruments are reported and to specify what is included in the 'other' category. Thus, the guidance already addresses shortcomings identified.

Two Member States (BE, PL) commented and both agreed with this proposal.

5.6. Definition of recipient countries

MS should be required to report on the definition of recipient countries and state whether this definition includes countries which are included in Annex I. In such a case, MS should be required to report whether support provided to Annex I Parties is included in the totals.

The MMR technical guidance could include key options for the definitions of recipient countries. The options currently used are:

1. OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries
2. OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries excluding Annex I Parties from this list.
3. Non-Annex I Parties

As explained in OECD 2015a the OECD DAC eligible recipients include nine countries which are not part of Non-Annex I Parties. These are Belarus, Kosovo, Montserrat, Saint Helena, Tokelau, Turkey, Ukraine, Wallis and Futuna and West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In contrast, Non-Annex I Parties include some relatively wealthy countries, such as Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, United Arab Emirates and some small countries.

While few information was provided about the recipient countries in the methodological information under the MMR or as part of second BRs, according to OECD (2015b) a larger number of Member States define their recipient countries based on the OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries (AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, GR, IE, IT, LU, NE, PL, PT, SK, SI, UK).

Thus the technical guidance document under the MMR could also be amended by recommending using the OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries as this seems to be the common approach deducting at least those countries that are Annex I countries (Ukraine, Belarus, Turkey) for the reporting under the UNFCCC.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

Recommending using the OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries as the basis for recipient countries for bilateral support and deduct those countries that are Annex I countries (Ukraine, Belarus, Turkey) for the reporting under the UNFCCC.

Six Member States (AT, BE, DE, FR, PL, SE) commented on this proposal, three of them (BE, FR, SE) agreed with it and two (AT, PL) disagreed. Those that disagreed suggested to align it with the OECD DAC eligibility list and to not deduct Annex-I countries. One Member State (DE) highlighted that the deduction of Annex I parties at UNFCCC would make MMR and BR reports different in this respect.

5.7. Point of measurement

The point of measurement has been adopted for the UNFCCC CTF in the recent decision 9/CP.21 by revising the categories which include only ‘committed’ and ‘disbursed’ – consistent with the international OECD DAC methodology and the categories ‘pledged’ and ‘provided’ were deleted. This revised guidance should also be applied under the MMR.

MS who report both on commitment and disbursement should explain how they ensure that there is no double counting (that the same support is not reported as a commitment and, later on, as disbursement).

While in general, there are no substantial problems with the point of measurement, it may be useful to define or explain the use of committed and disbursed related to specific instruments, such as loans, export credits or guarantees. For grants, the difference between commitment and disbursement is normally small, but for countries reporting multi-year loans, there can be considerable differences between the amount committed and disbursed in a specific year. A big difference between committed and disbursed can also occur for export credits or guarantees which may actually never be disbursed.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

Discuss whether further guidance for the use of 'committed' and 'disbursed' for loans, export credits or guarantees should be provided as part of the MMR technical guidance document. It could be that the ongoing discussions in OECD DAC already clarify this aspect without the need for additional guidance under the MMR.

Seven Member States (AT, BE, DE, FR, PL, SE, UK) commented on this proposal, four of them (AT, FR, PL, UK) agreed, some with further comments. AT expressed that no further guidance is needed. Germany mentioned that they measure at commitment level for both and that this is different in ODA reporting. UK added that the OECD DAC high level meeting in February 2016 agreed proposals on the treatment of private sector instruments that could have relevance to MMR reporting. However, much of the technical detail on the new ODA rules is yet to be finalised. France and Sweden confirmed that they use OECD definitions. Belgium generally supported the proposal, but also expressed the need for further discussion.

5.8. Coverage of funding sources

All MS have reported on ODA and only some have reported OOF (Other Official Flows which are generally defined as official sector transactions that do not meet official ODA criteria). MS should be encouraged to enhance coverage of funding sources and asked to explain when a funding source is not included, e.g. MS should explain whether not reporting on OOF is due to no climate support having been provided via OOF or whether it's due to the fact that a MS has not tracked climate relevant OOF.

MS should be required to provide a definition for OOF and should be strictly required to do so if "Other" source of funding is reported. This is currently not yet required in the technical guidance under the MMR.

The technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation could propose definitions of the funding sources that MS could directly use. If the proposed definition differs from the definition used by the MS, it should then provide its national definition or any additional details to the proposed definition.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

Add the following to the technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation:

1. Member States should use the definitions for OOF as provided by the OECD DAC (OECD 2016a). If the national definition used differs from the OECD DAC definition, additional explanations should be provided as part of the methodological information.[17]

2. If OOF flows are reported, MS shall explain as part of the methodological information which flows are covered under OOF.

[17] OOF include grants to developing countries for representational or essentially commercial purposes; official bilateral transactions intended to promote development, but having a grant element of less than 25%; and, official bilateral transactions, whatever their grant element, that are primarily export-facilitating in purpose. This category includes official direct export credits; the net acquisition by governments and central monetary institutions of securities issued by multilateral development banks at market terms; subsidies (grants) to the private sector to soften its credits to developing countries; and, funds in support of private investment (OECD 2016a)

3. If no OOF are reported, MS should indicate in the methodological template whether OOF flows do not occur (tick notation key 'not occurring' or whether OOF flows were not tracked and estimated, but do occur (tick notation key 'not estimated').

Six Member States (AT, BE, DE, PL, SE, UK) commented on this proposal. All but one (DE) agreed. The disagreeing Member State (DE) suggests that no change is required.

5.9. Coverage of instruments reported

Taking into account decision 9/CP.21, MS are now required to provide definitions of the instruments used. The technical guidance under the MMR could include default definitions for the instruments that MS could use directly in their reporting. If the definition used by the MS differs from these default definitions, the MS should be required to provide national definitions.

The technical guidance under the MMR requests Member States to explain which instruments are reported under 'other instruments' (e.g. export credits, guarantees). In addition, MS could be encouraged to explain whether not reporting on a given type of instrument (from the list included in the UNFCCC guidelines / CTF tables) is due to the fact that no climate relevant support has been provided through such instruments or because the MS is not tracking it.

All MS including loans (concessional or non-concessional) should be required to report whether repayments upon maturity of such loans are tracked and are part of the reporting.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

The technical guidance document under the MMR should be amended in the following way:

1. Include references to OECD DAC definitions for financial instruments including a list of instruments that could be reported under 'other'. In a methodological template MS under the MMR could tick off when OECD DAC definitions are used. Additional explanations should be required when different definitions are used.

2. If 'other instruments' are reported, MS shall explain as part of the methodological information which instruments are covered.

3. If no 'other instruments' are reported, MS should indicate in the methodological template whether such instruments do not occur (tick notation key 'not occurring') or whether 'other instruments' were not tracked and estimated, but do occur (tick notation key 'not estimated').

Six Member States (AT, BE, DE, PL, SE, UK) and the OECD commented and all agreed with this proposal. The OECD added that "a new taxonomy of financial instruments has been introduced in DAC statistics starting with 2016 data".

5.10. Currency conversion rate

The technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) requests that the default should be to report in EUR and the national currency. MS should indicate clearly if a different approach has been used and explain the reasons. When applicable, the source of the exchange rate and the exchange rate itself should be explicitly indicated. UNFCCC reporting tables do not include a clear reporting field for the exchange rates. It is recommended to insert a numeric field in the Excel

tables used under the MMR where the exchange rate should be provided. This assists the reporting and aggregation and is simpler than extracting the conversion rates from any supplementary methodological document.

As most MS use the OECD yearly average exchange rate, a link to this source could be included in the technical guidance document under the MMR.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

The technical guidance document under the MMR should be amended in the following way:

1. Add a specific field in the MMR table template for the reporting of the currency conversion rate used.

2. Add a recommendation to use the OECD yearly average exchange rate and provide a link to this source.

Seven Member States (AT, BE, DE, FR, PL, SE, UK) commented and all agreed with this proposal.

5.11. Financial resources mobilized through public interventions

Paragraph 57 of the Agreement adopted in Paris (decision 1/CP.21) requests the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to develop modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Agreement for consideration by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fourth session (November 2018). The current reporting only refers to financial resources provided, not to financial resources mobilized through public interventions. However, some Member States already provide information on financial resources mobilized in their second biennial reports under the UNFCCC and also provide methodological information related to finance mobilized.

It is proposed to add a reporting field for financial resources mobilized through public interventions as well as a field for explanations on the methodologies applied for the reporting under the MMR starting from 2016 in order to gain experiences with this new requirement at EU level to support the development of an international reporting requirement until the end of 2018 under the UNFCCC. After the adoption of any revised reporting guidance under the UNFCCC, the reporting tables under the MMR should be adapted to ensure consistency between the EU format and the UNFCCC format.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

The technical guidance document under the MMR should be amended in the following way:

1. Add a field for numerical data in the reporting tables where MS can report financial resources mobilized through public interventions.

2. Add a requirement that MS who report such figures should provide methodological information how mobilized resources were estimated.

Seven Member States (AT, BE, DE, FR, PL, SE, UK) and the OECD commented on this proposal. One Member State (BE) stated that a discussion would be needed on this point, all others agree with the proposal. The OECD added that it would be important to obtain methodological

information from those MS reporting on mobilized resources and that one of the key aspects of DAC methods to measure mobilisation is related to the “attribution” of amounts mobilised to avoid double-counting: The attribution is determined based on common rules that all reporters follow for the sake of comparability.”

5.12. Coverage of cross-cutting and other climate-specific finance

It should be further discussed how the **category ‘cross-cutting’ climate-specific finance** should be used. In the CTF for the biennial reports it is explained that cross-cutting should be used for ‘funding for activities which are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation’. However, with the Rio Marker system, some countries assign a certain quantitative contribution to both adaptation and mitigation and hence allocate activities that have mitigation and adaptation components under the individual categories. As explained above, some Member States apply their own definitions to the category ‘cross-cutting’. The share of total climate-specific finance which is reported as cross-cutting varies largely across Member States. This complicates the data aggregation at EU level.

Some Member States use the category **‘other’** for the reporting of activities related to REDD+ / forestry activities. The category ‘other’ is generally not very frequently used and it is recommended that the guidance is amended in a way, that Member States could report forestry related activities under ‘other’, if they intend to report these activities separately. Given the high importance of REDD+ project activities for some countries, it may be useful to enable a separate reporting which captures these activities in a transparent way apart from the sectoral classification requested in the reporting tables.

Member States should be encouraged to report whether activities marked as “other” refer only to activities relevant to climate change and one or more of the other Rio Conventions (and in that case any of the steps proposed above would provide clarity on how these activities are addressed) or whether activities marked as “other” refer to any other situation. In this case, the MS should be encouraged to explain what the situation is and how the quantification of the support has been estimated. If the volume of support provided marked as “other” is significant, the proposal above should become a requirement.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

Option 1a: Keep the current guidance: cross-cutting multilateral finance should be used for ‘funding for activities which are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation’.

Option 1b: cross-cutting should be used for ‘funding for activities which are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation’ **only if countries cannot assign a contribution to adaptation and mitigation through the use of Rio markers.**

Option 2: Add the following element to the technical guidance note: **Countries who like to separate finance flows provided to REDD+ activities or forestry activities should report such flows under ‘other climate-specific finance’.**

Seven Member States (AT, BE, DE, NE, PL, SE, UK) and the OECD commented on this proposal. Two Member States (PL, SE) agree with all three options. Option 1a was additionally supported by one Member State (AT) and opposed by two Member States (NE, UK). Option 1b was additionally supported by one Member State (NE) and opposed by one Member State (UK); this Member State (UK) could agree with an amended option 1b “cross-cutting should be used for ‘funding for activities which are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation’ only if countries cannot assign a contribution to adaptation and mitigation through the use of Rio markers or a transparent national methodology”. Option 2 is additionally supported by two Member States (NE, UK).

The OECD comments that it is “important to understand if the cross-cutting amounts are to be added or subtracted from the mitigation and adaptation amounts”.

5.13. Identification of mitigation/adaptation activities and use of OECD DAC indicators

Most Member States use OECD DAC Rio Markers for the identification of mitigation and adaptation activities. The few MS that use a national approach should be encouraged to transition to the OECD DAC Rio Markers in order to enhance transparency and comparability.

The technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support under the MMR already requires Member States to specify and explain any difference from the OECD DAC or the Commission methodology. This recommendation may be emphasised and Member States should be required to provide a detailed description of the national methodology used and, ideally, an explanation of how it more accurately tracks climate relevant support provided to developing countries.

Given the level of development of the OECD DAC Rio Markers (including its recent proposed revision), no further recommendations with regards to the development of the marking methodologies are made in this report as this is subject to more detailed discussion in the respective working group under the OECD DAC. The OECD DAC is currently updating its Rio Markers guidance, taking into account inputs received form DAC members. Once such revised guidance is adopted, it should be reflected in the MMR technical guidance and Member States should be encouraged to use it as soon as practicable.

The use of coefficients for the quantification of climate support based on the Rio Markers should build on a common understanding, given the many approaches used and, on top of that, the level of discretion in their application. The only guidance so far on this topic is the description of the approach used at EU level which uses the coefficient of 0.4 (40%) in activities marked as significant. A more coordinated approach may be feasible given the fact that the reported approaches by MS are not extremely different. A transition period for the implementation of such a coordinated approach could be considered.

Furthermore, different MS use different approaches to address overlap or double counting of support provided in one activity marked with more than one marker (either just climate or with climate and any of the other Rio Conventions). While the approach above addresses double counting of support provided for adaptation and mitigation, it does not address overlap with markings related to other Rio Conventions. In that case and/or in the absence of a common approach in the application of coefficients, several steps can be considered to enhance accuracy and comparability of figures reported by MS:

1. MS to be required to describe the methodology used to address overlapping /double counting between Rio Conventions
2. MS to select methodology to address overlap / double counting between Rio Conventions from a list of methodologies in the MMR technical guidance

3. MS to be required to use on single methodology to address overlap / double counting between Rio Conventions included in the technical guidance (e.g. the sum of the coefficients for the three Rio Conventions never exceeds 100 %)

The third option would provide for higher accuracy and comparability of figures.

Proposals for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR:

Discuss whether it is possible to develop a common approach or at least apply some elements of the marking system in a consistent way.

As expected, Member States had quite different views related to further guidance that ensure a consistent use of the OECD marker system.

Three Member States (DE, FR, SE) and the OECD have commented on this proposal. Germany highlighted that the OECD indicative table, which provides further guidance could potentially be useful under the MMR as well. UK also expressed general concerns related to a common approach on coefficients and explained that the UK's national approach related to its dedicated climate finance fund ICF allows programmes that do not have climate as a 'principal' focus but do have 'significant' climate objectives to justifiably count a percentage of the programme as climate finance. This requires programmes to estimate, based on actual costs and evidence, the funds required to deliver climate results. UK considers this approach as a more robust way of counting climate finance.

In relation to **the use of coefficients for the determination of Rio Markers**, it is recommended that the level of comparability of MS is enhanced. It is recommended to discuss whether a common approach could be used with the aim to limit the discretion in the marking process and the resulting lack of comparability. The following options are proposed:

- An activity marked as principal: 100%
    - Option1: An activity marked as principal for adaptation and mitigation: each activity accounts with 50%
    - Option 2: An activity can only be marked as principal for either adaptation or mitigation.

Three Member States (DE, NE, SE) commented on this proposal, two of them (NE, SE) agreed with option 1 and disagreed with option 2. Germany describes their approach and explained that option 1 would not be allowed in the German approach implemented.

- An activity marked as significant:
    - Option 1: the activity counts with 40%
    - Option 2: the activity counts with 50%
- An activity marked as significant for adaptation and mitigation:
    - Option 1: If significant = 40%, the activity counts with 20% for adaptation and with 20% for mitigation
- Option 2: If significant = 50%, the activity counts with 25% for adaptation and with 20% for mitigation

Three Member States (DE, NE, SE) commented on this proposal, two of them (NE, SE) agreed with option 1, for Sweden option 2 would also be acceptable. The Netherlands disagreed with option 2. One Member State (DE) opposed the proposal and described the German approach chosen.

- To avoid double counting, the sum of coefficients for each marker should never exceed 100%. Any activity can only count as 100%, 40% (option 1), 50% (option 2) or 0%.
- In case of option 1 (40%): If an activity is marked for both mitigation and adaptation, only the highest marking will count when calculating the total climate relevant financial contributing of the activity.

France mentioned that they are not in favor of using coefficients imposed on Member States, but rather that each Member State should be encouraged and able to be as precise as possible and therefore able to apply the percentage rate it deems appropriate, while remaining transparent on how it chooses the percentage rate.

One Member State (PL) suggests that a more specific approach must first be agreed under the OECD DAC.

The OECD added that "In OECD DAC, the possibility to identify, through Rio markers, activities addressing both mitigation and adaptation is considered a strength, and attributing the related amounts to either mitigation or adaptation, using fixed percentages seems artificial. OECD suggested considering the overlap as a category on its own. The total for climate-related finance is then the sum of "mitigation (only)", "adaptation (only)" and the "overlap (both mitigation and adaptation)". The same approach could be applied to activities overlapping several Rio Conventions.

As the implementation of the Rio Markers are not reported by all MS, it is difficult to judge the administrative burden and changes in the reported financial flows from the options proposed above. The main changes would arise if common guidance would be adopted for the 'significant' marking.

In relation to **double counting between Rio Conventions** in the application of Rio Markers, the technical guidance document could be amended by the following options:

Option 1: MS should be required to describe the methodology used to address overlapping / double counting between Rio Conventions.

Option 2: MS should select methodology to address overlap / double counting between Rio Conventions from a list of methodologies in the MMR technical guidance.

Option 3: MS should be required to use one single methodology to address overlap / double counting between Rio Conventions included in the technical guidance (e.g. the sum of the coefficients for the three Rio Conventions never exceeds 100%).

The third option would provide for higher accuracy and comparability of figures, but may require changes of existing approaches used for some MS and higher administrative burden and will lead to differences in the reported figures for some MS.

Option 2 may be the approach with lowest administrative burden for MS and higher comparability in the description of the methodological approach compared to option 1.

On double counting across Rio Conventions, four Member States (BE, DE, FR, SE) commented on this proposal. Two Member States (DE, SE) agreed with option 1 and 2 and disagreed with option 3, arguing that double counting should not be avoided but transparently communicated.

One Member State (AT) is of the view that the discussion of coefficients and double-counting between Rio Conventions belong to OECD DAC and this discussion should not be preempted by technical guidance under MMR.

5.14. Calculating EU total climate finance/ imputed multilateral contributions

It is crucial to ensure transparency in reporting on imputed multilateral contributions to MDBs. The current technical guidance document proposes the following approach:

> *"Several MDBs provide estimates concerning the climate-related share within their portfolio, and attribute this back to DAC members, based on a pro-rata share of their core multilateral ODA disbursements in a given year. The European Commission will, if available on time, obtain the figures from OECD on imputed multilateral contributions in core/general finance, and add these values to the amount reported under the MMR. If the figures are not available on time before the ECOFIN Council Conclusions, they will not be included in this year's report. Notwithstanding, Member States still have the option to report their national figures; in the absence of a common approach as described above, these figures may be used in the aggregate EU report subject to methodological feasibility".*

This approach turned out to be difficult because final data from the OECD DAC was not available on time in order to use them to aggregate Member States' contributions to an aggregate figure on total EU climate finance. Moreover, the MDBs covered in the OECD DAC's reporting and those listed in the EU's CTF and MMR tables do not entirely overlap. The following options for reporting imputed multilateral contributions and including them into aggregate EU climate finance figures are available:

Option 1: Base reporting on climate-related projects identified in outflows from MDBs. Outflows refer to those financial resources financed out of MDB own resources[18] which are actually disbursed to recipient countries.

Climate-related development finance data is reported by MDBs as part of their overall reporting into the OECD-CRS or in a stand-alone file only listing climate projects. Such an approach would entail new methodological challenges as MDBs do not all report in the same way on projects that target both mitigation and adaptation (i.e. their approaches to using the Rio Markers and determining the "overlap" between mitigation and adaptation-relevant finance differs). Additionally, the point of measurement (commitment or board approval) also varies among institutions. MDB reporting also includes in some instances the reporting of guarantees which are at present excluded from the regular data collection of the DAC (OECD 2015c). Yet, basing reporting on outflows from MDBs could help to enhance comparability in reporting among Member States.

The OECD DAC recommends a methodology developed by the Technical Working Group of 19 bilateral climate finance providers to attribute multilateral outflows to developed countries in its

[18] Besides contributions from developed and developing countries, additional financing is mobilised by the MDBs drawing in on retained earnings and leveraging money from global capital markets on the basis of their capital, which is typically composed of „paid-in", and „callable" capital as well as „reserves" built up over the years (OECD 2015c).

latest report (OECD 2015a). To attribute outflows to specific developed countries, this methodology differentiates between contributions to concessional and non-concessional windows.

Concessional climate finance disbursed by MDBs can be differentiated into those resources coming from new contributions made during the most recent replenishment process by providing countries and from retained earnings (reflows from loans and other instruments, transfers from sister organisations and interests on investments).

The part reflecting resources from new contributions is multiplied by the share of a developed country's contributions in the most recent replenishment cycle. The part reflecting retained earnings is multiplied by a developed country's share in historical replenishment rounds (i.e. all replenishments except the most recent ones). The two terms are then added together and the resulting fraction represents the developed country's share of total climate finance flows from that window or entity for the relevant year. According to OECD DAC analysis, the weighted average for the share of *all* developed countries of total MDB outflows from concessional windows is estimated at 95%.

This results in the following formula:

$$\left[\left[x\left(\frac{Developed\ \ country\ \ contribution}{All\ \ contributions}\right)^{Current}\right]+\left[y\left(\frac{Developed\ \ country\ \ contribution}{All\ \ contributions}\right)^{Historical}\right]\right]\times Annual\ \ climate\ \ finance\ \ flows$$

where x is the portion of climate finance from the concessional window or fund that derives from recent contributions, and y is the portion that comes from retained earnings.

For non-concessional finance, the proposed methodology takes into account both paid-in capital[19] of the MDB and its callable capital[20] where the sovereign credit rating of the country providing it is above a certain threshold.[21] The share of flows attributable to a developed country is then determined by calculating the value of paid-in capital plus a fraction of eligible callable capital.

The value of paid-in capital is calculated for a developed country that is a shareholder of that MDB and then subsequently for all shareholders. The ratio of these two quantities provides an estimate of the share of non-concessional MDB finance that can be attributed to the developed country in question.

For the estimates reported by the MDBs, OECD DAC assumes that a fraction of 10% of the callable capital can be attributed to countries with a sovereign credit rating of A or above. This share varies, depending on the fraction of callable capital considered and the credit rating that is applied as a threshold. According to OECD DAC analysis, the weighted average of *all* eligible developed countries' share of total MDB outflows from non-concessional windows is estimated at 78%.

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[19] Paid-in capital is the amount of capital actually paid by shareholders (ODI 2015).

[20] Callable capital are the contributions due to the MDB, subject to payment as and when required to meet the bank's obligations on borrowing of funds for inclusion in its ordinary capital resources, or guarantees chargeable to such resources. This functions as protection for holders of bonds and guarantees issued by the Bank in the unlikely event that it is not able to meet its financial obligations (ODI 2015).

[21] It is assumed that only callable capital from countries that are highly rated (i.e. A or above) is effective in strengthening an MDB's stand-alone financial strength.

This results in the following formula:

$$\left[\frac{Paid\text{-}in\ capital^{developed\ country} + (highly\text{-}rated\ callable\ capital^{developed\ country} \times 0.1)}{Paid\text{-}in\ capital^{all\ countries} + (highly\text{-}rated\ callable\ capital^{all\ countries} \times 0.1}\right] \times Annual\ climate\ finance\ flows$$

The factor 0.1 represents the discount rate to be applied to the callable-capital fraction of resources in order to recognise that paid-in capital has substantially more value than callable capital. The Technical Working Group of 19 climate finance providers proposes to set this discount rate at 10% (Technical Working Group 2015).

The following graph summarises the components for calculating a country's share in the outflows from MDBs:

Figure 5-1: Attributing outflows from MDBs to individual donor countries



Furthermore, OECD DAC adjusts the total multilateral climate finance outflows as recorded in DAC statistics to reflect the exclusion of coal-related finance and the inclusion of UNFCCC non-Annex II party recipients. These statistics reflect OECD DAC analysis based on data reported by MDBs and other international organisations (the Adaptation Fund, the CIFs, the GEF and the Nordic Development Fund).

However, it would need to be clarified with the OECD DAC whether data on outflows would be available each year on time in order to use this data as input to determine an EU aggregate climate finance figure. Additionally, it would need to be clarified whether data on individual countries' contributions to concessional resources as well as on individual countries' contributions to paid-in

capital and to callable capital which is used for non-concessional outflows could be obtained in time from the OECD DAC.

The outflows from MDBs have so far not been used for the reporting of aggregate EU figures and total figures could of course be different and inconsistent with previous years' reporting. This may result in difficulties in justification of the reported figures, in particular as the methodological approach to calculate the outflows is not very easy to understand.

If an approach to base contributions to multilateral institutions on outflows was chosen, this would have to be combined with a methodology based on inflows for those funds that do not report on their climate-related outflows to the OECD DAC. This is due to the fact that OECD DAC data is limited to key funds and MDBs. Thus, for those funds data as reported by Member States in their MMR reports would be the basis.

Option 2: Continue to base reporting on <u>imputed multilateral contributions on inflows</u> to MDBs[22]. This approach does not take public financed mobilised by the MDBs into account. There are several sub-options how this approach can be implemented. These options are also presented in Figure 5-2**:**

a. **Option 2a: Member States report on climate-specific funding by using (preliminary) imputed multilateral shares as provided by OECD**. For funds not covered by OECD reporting and for Member States which are not members of the OECD DAC, national figures on imputed multilateral contributions are used. If Member States provide nationally determined imputed multilateral shares for certain funds/institutions, it is recommended to indicate the climate-relevant percentage shares for each fund/institution in the methodological description and to explain how this share has been determined. **EU aggregate climate finance is calculated based on data reported in MS reports under the MMRs only**.

b. **Option 2b: MS report only core contributions** to multilateral funds included in OECD reporting and the Commission calculates imputed multilateral contributions based on (preliminary) imputed multilateral shares as provided by the OECD. For funds not covered by OECD reporting and for Member States which are not members of the OECD DAC, national figures on imputed multilateral contributions are used. If Member States provide nationally determined imputed multilateral shares for certain funds/institutions, it is recommended to indicate the climate-relevant percentage shares for each fund/institution in the methodological description and to explain how this share has been determined. **EU aggregate climate finance is calculated based on OECD DAC data for OECD DAC member states and funds/ institutions for which OECD imputed multilateral contributions are available and MMR reports for EU MS and for those funds not covered by OECD DAC reporting.**

c. **Option 2c: MS only report climate-specific contributions to multilateral funds not included in OECD reporting unless they are not OECD DAC Member States** and explain their approach for determining climate-specific shares for these funds. **EU aggregate climate finance is calculated based on OECD DAC data**

[22] See http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/oecdmethodologyforcalculatingimputedmultilateraloda.htm for an explanation of the OECD's methodology for calculating imputed multilateral ODA.

for OECD DAC member states and MMR reports for other EU MS and for those funds not covered by OECD DAC reporting.

d. **Option 2d: MS report climate-specific contributions based on imputed multilateral shares provided by OECD or on the basis of national methodologies** and explain their approach. **EU aggregate climate finance is calculated based on data reported in MMRs only**.

e. **Option 2e:** MS report climate-specific contributions based on imputed multilateral shares provided by the OECD DAC or on the basis of national methodologies and explain their approach. EU aggregate climate finance is calculated based on OECD data for OECD DAC member states. For **other EU MS and those funds not covered by OECD DAC reporting**, **a consistent percentage rate for the climate-relevant share of contributions to these funds is developed** and applied to MS' reported figures by the Commission.

In 2015 only preliminary OECD DAC data on imputed multilateral contributions were available in October/November 2015 in order to calculate an aggregate EU climate finance figure. It is unclear whether such data might be available earlier in future years. This needs to be clarified with the OECD DAC.

The following graph summarises the options available to have a common reporting on imputed multilateral contributions:

Figure 5-2: Options for a common reporting on imputed multilateral contributions



Figure 5-2 presents different options for reporting on imputed multilateral contributions and adding reported data into an aggregate figure for EU climate finance. The options to be chosen depend on the availability of OECD DAC data. If data on MDB reporting on outflows to the OECD and individual country data on contributions to those MDBs cannot be made available to the Commission or is not available on time, reporting needs to be continued on the basis of inflows.

If reporting is done on the basis of inflows, it needs to be clarified as well whether OECD DAC data on imputed multilateral contributions would be available on time. Moreover, discrepancies have been identified between Member States' reporting to the OECD DAC on their multilateral and bilateral climate finance and the data that is reported in MMR reports and BRs. If Member States can agree to calculate an aggregate EU figure for climate finance on the basis of OECD DAC data and if this data is available on time, it could be used as a basis for reporting on contributions to a number of key funds and institutions that are covered by OECD DAC reporting.

For other funds, reporting would be based on the information provided in Member States' MMR reports. For this purpose, Member States should report further details on their approach towards calculating the climate-specific portion of contributions to these funds. On the basis of such information, it could then be evaluated whether a joint approach towards reporting on these funds could be developed by the Commission.

For those funds which are only reported by a few Member States, it is recommended to base reporting on nationally determined figures instead of developing a joint EU approach.

Table 5-1: Calculation of total EU climate finance for 2014 in Million €, with and without MMR-reported imputed multilateral contributions and with imputed multilateral contributions as calculated by OECD

Definition of EU total	**Amount in Mio. €**
A: EU total **with** imputed multilateral contributions as reported in MMR	13,612.12
B. EU total **without** imputed multilateral contributions as reported in MMR	12,480.10
C. Total imputed multilateral contributions **included in MMR reporting**	**1,132.03**
D. Total imputed multilateral contributions **as calculated by OECD**	**2,013.85**
E. EU total **with IMC as calculated by OECD**, **without IMC as reported in MMR (B+D)**	**14,493.95**

Note: the Figure for E. in the last line was the one used in the Council Conclusions on climate finance published on 10.11.2015

6. Task 3: Assessment of key aspects in reporting private climate finance in the EU and the broader UNFCCC context

6.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the key methodological developments in terms of tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions.

While several public and private, national and international entities are making efforts into developing methodologies for and actually tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions, the Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance (further referred to as OECD Research Collaborative) has developed a methodological proposal which compiles state of the art approaches proposed by such entities.

After such a collaborative effort by all key relevant organizations, it was deemed extemporary to analyse the individual methodologies developed by each entity, given that such effort has been made in the scope of the collaborative research and such individual methodologies have been fully taken into account in the framework proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative. In this context, and having been considered state of the art, this chapter focuses on the methodological framework proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative and in selected applications of this framework.

In addition, the chapter also notes parallel but convergent work being done by the MDBs and other development banks and institutions. Their work, however, goes beyond tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions, as it includes all co-finance, public or private, mobilized by the intervention of the MDBs and development banks. While not specific on mobilized private climate finance, the approach to tracking mobilized co-finance is relevant for the scope of this task. MDBs and other development banks and institutions have also been involved in the OECD Research Collaborative.

This chapter does not focus or include figures on private finance mobilized by public interventions, as it focuses exclusively on methodologies to that end. Private finance mobilized as reported by Member States has been included in the analysis of the previous chapters.

6.2. State of play of methodological work and discussions on private climate finance

There are several tracks of work on methodological approaches to track private climate finance, but they seem to be converging towards two greater initiatives: the OECD Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance and the Multilateral Development Bank's Joint Working Group on Tracking Climate Co-finance[23]. While the first is developing a methodology applicable to all, but focused on national public entities, the second is focused on multilateral development banks which are now outreaching to other (including national) development finance entities.

The OECD Research Collaborative, in particular, represents an important effort to identify and bring together all knowledge and experience in the field. Several studies and reports made available in the recent years have been produced as an input, a contribution to this collaborative effort. Among many others, the reports "Estimating mobilized private climate finance for developing

[23] This initiative tracks all co-financing additional to finance provided by the MDBs, public and private.

countries – a Norwegian pilot study"(Torvanger et al (2015)); "Estimating Private Climate Finance mobilise by France's Climate Interventions (Abeille et al (2015)); Pilot study of private finance mobilised by Denmark for climate action in developing countries" (Mostert, et al (2015) and the CPI report "Estimating mobilized private finance for adaptation: exploring data and methods" (Brown et al (2015)) are examples of such inputs. The three first reports describe the pilot implementation of the methodological framework proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative.

Given the magnitude of the effort ahead and the intrinsically complex and interconnected nature of private climate finance, despite the different on-going initiatives and studies, it seems apparent that there is a great coordination and sharing of effort among the promoters of such initiatives, to avoid both duplication of work and gaps.

From the literature, it is possible to identify collaborative work among the following key actors:

- OECD DAC
- OECD Research Collaborative
- MDBs
- UN Agencies and Organizations (such as the UNDP and the UNFCCC)
- other development finance banks and institutions, including national and subnational, namely via the International Development Finance Club (IDFC)
- Research institutions, think tanks and consultancy firms.

The initiative "Proposal of a methodology for tracking publicly mobilized private climate finance," coordinated by KFW involving nearly 20 Development Banks and Development Finance Institutions, pilots the application of the methodology proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative.

With regards to the UNFCCC negotiations, SBSTA initiated (UNFCCC, 2016) its consideration of the development of modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Paris Agreement, and invited Parties and observer organizations to submit views on the matter by August, 29th. Resources mobilized through public interventions include private finance. This work follows up the previous SBSTA agenda item on the matter that concluded at COP21 with slight adjustments of the Common Tabular Formats (UNFCCC, 2015).

6.2.1. OECD – Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance

The OECD Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance is an initiative led by the OECD aimed at contributing to *the development of more comprehensive methodologies for identifying private finance for climate action in developing counties, and more specifically for estimating publicly-mobilised private climate finance. The project is focused on technical issues in terms of identifying, developing, testing and evaluating possible methodological options as input to political discussions. Decisions and choices on key definitional issues and acceptable measurement and reporting methodologies (in particular for accounting purposes under the United*

Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) are out of scope as these need to take place at the political level[24].

This initiative includes 18 organizations that contribute to research work and 7 financial institutions that act as technical input providers and reviewers[25]. 17 governmental partners, including the European Commission are also involved in the initiative. Government partners *are increasingly becoming actors of the collaborative research process by conducting or commissioning pilot studies, thereby testing data availability and the applicability of measurement and estimation methodologies at a national level* [26].

The OECD Research Collaborative consists both of new research proposed, funded and conducted via itself, as well as relevant pre-existing and on-going activities. It has been established in 2013 and it is expected that its final conclusions are published in 2017.

In the first phase, the focus was on the identification and assessment of methods to estimate private climate finance, as well as on exploring the availability of the required information. Based on this, a *four-stage framework of decision points and methodological options* has been developed. The on-going and future work under the OECD Research Collaborative until 2017 is to further develop and test the estimation methods based on the mentioned framework[27].

An actual account of the key conclusions and proposal by the OECD Research Collaborative will be made in sections below.

6.2.2. Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)

The MDB's Technical Working Group (MDB TWG or MDBs) has developed the "joint MDB approach for climate finance tracking and reporting". The MDB TWG is composed of 6 MDBs: African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the International Finance Corporate (IFC) and World Bank (WB).

The joint approach, consisting of a set of common key definitions (such as what is climate finance, what is mitigation finance, what is adaptation finance) serves as a tool for the MDBs to consistently measure their financial contribution to climate change in a transparent and harmonized manner.

The first "Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks' Climate Finance" has been published for 2011 and the last one for 2014. This chapter compiles data from the participating MDBs, collected using the common approach developed. Such reports do not cover public or private capital mobilized by MDB climate finance.

As a follow up to this effort, the MDBs have published in December 2015, a briefing paper "Tracking Climate Co-Finance: Approach proposed by MDBs," which seeks to expand the MDB climate finance tracking to also estimate financial resources invested alongside MDBs by external parties. This paper, on top of the common definitions agreed on the joint approach, includes a set of additional definitions relevant to determine climate co-finance, such as the actual definition of co-financing, causality and double counting (attribution).

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[24] https://www.oecd.org/env/researchcollaborative/aim-and-objectives.htm

[25] https://www.oecd.org/env/researchcollaborative/researchers-group.htm

[26] https://www.oecd.org/env/researchcollaborative/government-partners.htm

[27] https://www.oecd.org/env/researchcollaborative/on-going-activities.htm

Recently, the MDBs have worked closely with the International Development Finance Club (IDFC), a group of 22 leading development finance institutions and regional banks around the world, to more closely align their approaches on mitigation finance tracking, having jointly published the MDBs-IDFC Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking and the Common Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Finance Tracking. This document consists of a set of common definitions and guidelines, including the list of activities for tracking mitigation and adaptation finance.

Box 1 Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking adopted by MDBs-IDFC

Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking

Introduction

The purpose of these Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking (or the Principles) is to set out agreed climate change mitigation finance tracking principles for development finance. […]The principles consist of a set of common Definitions and Guidelines including the list of activities […]

Purpose

The MDBs and the IDFC commit to the Principles in their respective, group-based climate mitigation finance reporting. MDBs and IDFC invite other institutions to adopt the Principles and therewith further increase transparency and credibility of mitigation finance reporting […]

Definitions

- An activity will be classified as related to climate change mitigation if it promotes “efforts to reduce or limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or enhance GHG sequestration”

- Reporting according to the Principles does not imply evidence of climate change impacts and any inclusion of climate change impacts is not a substitute for project-specific theoretical and/or quantitative evidence of GHG emission mitigation; projects seeking to demonstrate climate change impacts should do so through project-specific data.

6.2.3. International Development Finance Club (IDFC)

The IDFC is composed of 23 leading international, national and sub regional development banks from across the world, both from OECD and non-OECD countries[28].

The Green Finance Mapping is one of IDFC’s most important and renowned projects. With the aim of identifying and categorizing financial flows of IDFC Members to projects in the fields of green energy, adaptation and mitigation of climate change and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, the Green Finance Mapping Report offers a transparent view on the activities of IDFC Members.

The Green Finance Mapping provides consistent information on green finance flows from a major group of national, sub regional and international development banks based in OECD and non OECD countries, including domestic flows[29].

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[28] http://www.idfc.org/Who-We-Are/members.aspx

The IDFC Green Finance Mapping for 2014, prepared by World Resources Institute together with the energy and climate consultancy Ecofys, used the MDBs-IDFC Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking.

The key definitions proposed by both the MDBs and the DFIs and their joint approach are reflected in a comparative analysis below in this chapter.

6.3. Methodologies: The OECD Research Collaborative Framework for Estimating Private Finance Mobilisation

As mentioned before, the effort led by the OECD in the scope of the research collaborative represents state of the art knowledge about practices, challenges and methodologies for tracking private climate finance. In this regard, it seems unwarranted to perform an analysis of any other methodological proposal given that the OECD Research Collaborative has done so and all relevant actors (including the European Commission) have contributed to the results and are converging towards the outcome of that collective effort.

The framework for estimating mobilised private climate finance is not considered to be a methodology to that effect, but rather a tool to support the development of a methodology or methodologies and is stepping stone towards the potential proposal of such a methodology by the OECD Research Collaborative. The framework identifies a series of steps in which key definitions and decisions need to be made along the process of estimating private climate finance mobilized by public interventions. The set of such definitions and decisions would constitute a methodology.

The current framework acknowledges that for each step a range of definitions or decisions can be made, thus recognizing that specific (national) circumstances need to be taken into account in the process. The framework now provides flexibility in the methodological approach towards estimating private finance mobilized by public interventions that should not be lost in further refinements of the proposal.

The framework for estimating private climate finance "structures methodological choices and options into four sequential but interrelated stages. The choice at any given point will influence the availability and feasibility of choices at other stages at other stages of the framework." (Jachnik et al (2015)).

Figure 1 represents the 4 sequential stages proposed by the framework and the respective definitions and decisions that need to be made at each of those stages.

Similar to the IPCC tier approach for the estimation of GHG emissions, the different choices will result in different accuracy, completeness and, as a consequence, different quality of the estimations of private finance mobilized. In addition to actual differing specific circumstances, the availability of quality information and the resources required for the application of a given definition or decision will greatly determine the choices made.

[29] http://www.idfc.org/Our-Program/green-finance-mapping.aspx

Figure 6-1 Stages that define key choices and options as part of the framework for estimating mobilised private climate finance

Stage 1. Define core concepts

- Definition of climate change activities
- Definition of public and private finance
- Classification of developed and developing countries
- Determination of geographical origin of finance

Stage 2. Identify public interventions and instruments that can be credited for mobilising private climate finance

- Types of public interventions
- Specific instruments used for the interventions

Stage 3. Value public interventions and account for total private finance involved

- Choice and conversion of currency
- Choice of point of measurement
- Valuation of different public interventions
- Boundaries and estimation of private finance involved
- Availability of climate-specific private finance data or proxies

Stage 4. Estimate mobilised private climate finance

- Assessment of causality between public interventions and private finance
- Attribution of mobilised private climate finance to public interventions and instruments

Source: Jachnik et al (2015)

6.3.1. Way forward

The steps proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative framework are well sequenced. In order to facilitate getting a closer idea of the potential for mobilized private finance and while noting that fully implementing the framework might take longer, MS could be requested to, shortly, perform stages 1 and 2. In doing so, each MS would have a clear mapping of all the organizations deploying public instruments to mobilize private climate finance.

After such exercise, MS could start collecting data, eventually giving priority to those entities and/or instruments which may have a greater potential for mobilizing private climate finance or, alternatively, to those which pose lesser challenges in data collection and handling.

This would constitute a stepwise approach, which would progressively bring MS to the same level of preparedness. Those ready to move faster should be encouraged to do so.

6.4. Definitions proposed and decisions made in the pilot application of the framework

As described above, the OECD Research Collaborative does not propose a unified methodology, rather it provides a framework, an approach that practitioners may use in their efforts to track private climate finance mobilized by public interventions.

In their application of that framework, practitioners are required to make a set of decisions, namely in relation the definitions applicable to the different steps. The OECD Research Collaborative approach provides a step by step guidance on how to track private climate finance mobilized by public interventions, without imposing strict requirements on what and when is to be included. The framework provides an opportunity for practitioners to reflect their specific circumstances in the actual methodological approach resulting from the application of the framework.

In that sense, while there has been an effort to streamline definitions (building upon the efforts being made to track general public climate finance), there has not been an effort to make a uniform methodology (a single track, without options) and it seems that it should not be desirable to go down that avenue (at least not before practitioners gain more experience in using a more flexible approach).

The key concepts and definitions relevant to tracking of private climate finance mobilized by public interventions included in the framework are (details on these concepts are provided below as an introduction to the comparative analysis):

- Climate change activities, otherwise referred to also as low carbon and resilient (LCR) activities
  - Mitigation Activities
  - Adaptation Activities
- Public finance
- Private finance
- Mobilization of private finance by public initiatives
  - Causality
  - Attribution
  - Boundaries
- Definition of developed and developing country
  - In relation to the origin of financing and/or of policy
  - In relation to the recipient of the finance
- Types of public interventions that mobilize private finance
- Specific instruments to mobilize private finance
- Point of measurement and exchange rates

Nonetheless, while all these concepts and definitions are relevant to tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions (either policy or financial), only a few are specific to mobilized private climate finance, while the others are relevant to overall tracking of public climate finance. The concepts specific to mobilized private climate finance are:

- Definition of public and private finance
- The causality between a public intervention and private finance
- The attribution of private finance to a given public intervention
- The types of policies and of specific instruments used in public interventions to mobilize private finance.

While covering all relevant concepts and definitions below, we provide greater focus to those specific to tracking private climate finance mobilized by public interventions.

In the sections below, a description of the key concepts is offered, based on Jachnik et al (2015). In addition, the tables in each section include the definitions and decisions proposed by these authors (as short-term options, that can be understood as potential preferred options to start with, subject to revision in the future based on experience), and the definitions and decisions made by the KfW (with several other development finance institutions), and by Denmark, France and Norway in the pilot application of the OECD Research Collaborative framework.

When applicable, the relevant definitions of the MDBs and the International Development Finance Club and other entities are also provided in the overview table to enhance completeness and comparability.

6.4.1. Climate change activities

As pointed out by Jachnik, et al (2015), while there are no agreed definitions, there certainly is a number of proposed and operational definitions of low carbon and resilient (LCR) activities, namely those proposed by the OECD DAC Rio Markers and those by the MDBs and IDFC. He also notes that, given the extensive collaboration among the relevant actors, there are many points of contact and convergence among these definitions, as they build upon each other.

The table below provides a brief overview of the definitions proposed and/or use by key relevant actors.

Table 6-1: Definition of Low Carbon Resilient (LCR) Activities

Author of the definition / approach	Mitigation	Adaptation
OECD Research Collaborative	Defining LCR activities: Provide transparency on definitions used e.g. provide an explicit list; refer to existing approaches such as the OECD DAC Rio markers, joint-MDB positive list for mitigation activities.	
OECD DAC Rio Markers	An activity should be classified as climate-change-mitigation related if it contributes to the objective of stabilisation of greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system by promoting efforts to reduce or limit GHG emissions or to enhance GHG sequestration.	An activity should be classified as adaptation-related if it intends to reduce the vulnerability of human or natural systems to the impacts of climate variability and change, by maintaining or increasing adaptive capacity and resilience, and/or reducing exposure to climate variability and change.
MDBs	(Replaced by the definition proposed under the MDBs-IDFC Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking described below)	Three steps to the definition: <u>Context of vulnerability to climate variability and change:</u> for a project to be considered as one that contributes to adaptation, the context of climate vulnerability must be set

Author of the definition / approach	Mitigation	Adaptation
		out clearly using a robust evidence base. This could take a variety of forms, including use of material from existing analyses and reports, or original, bespoke climate vulnerability assessment analysis carried out as part of the preparation of a project. Statement of purpose or intent: The project should set out how it intends to address the context- and location-specific climate change vulnerabilities, as set out in existing analyses, reports or the project's climate vulnerability assessment. Clear and direct link between climate vulnerability and project activities: in line with the principles of the overall MDB climate finance tracking methodology, only specific project activities that explicitly address climate vulnerabilities identified in the project documentation are reported as climate finance.
IDFC[30]	Broad criteria and positive list based on OECD DAC Rio Markers.	Broad criteria and positive list based on OECD DAC Rio Markers.
MDBs-IDFC Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking Common Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Finance Tracking	An activity will be classified as related to climate change mitigation if it promotes "efforts to reduce or limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or enhance GHG sequestration". Reporting according to the Principles does not imply evidence of climate change impacts and any inclusion of climate change impacts is not a substitute for project-specific theoretical and/or quantitative evidence of GHG emission mitigation; projects seeking to demonstrate climate change impacts should do so through project-specific data.	*Adaptation finance tracking relates to tracking the finance for activities that address current and expected effects of climate change, where such effects are material for the context of those activities*[31].

[30] Where relevant, these definitions have now been replaces by the MDBs-IDFC Common Principles

[31] This is a preliminary definition, used to frame the work between the MDBs and IDFC. It will be further refined as the work on this subject is concluded.

Author of the definition / approach	Mitigation	Adaptation
KfW	Same as IDFC (see above)	
France	*Different approaches across the French administration. The MDBs/IDFC and the Rio Markers are quoted as being used or as source of inspiration.*	
Denmark	OECD DAC Rio Markers	
Norway	OECD DAC Rio Markers	

While there still is no absolutely consistent definition of climate relevant activities and while the actual application of these definitions is subject to an important degree of discretion, there is a clear convergence to the definition proposed by the OECD DAC Rio Markers and the key concepts behind it.

6.4.1.1. Way forward

In order to enhance transparency and comparability of data collection, MS should be required to use only the OECD DAC Rio Markers definition of climate change mitigation and adaptation activities. For most MS that is already the case, only a few MS divert (either fully or partially from this approach). In this regard, a strict mandatory rule on this topic may on the one hand bring little actual improvements compared to the current situation, but could also be met easily and enhance greatly the perceived transparency of EU and MS reporting on mobilized private climate finance.

6.4.2. Public finance and private finance

While the definition of public and private finance should seem clear cut, the fact that corporate ownership is a complex matter (namely for those with public and private shareholders or with complex control schemes), allows for some discretion in classifying a given entity as public or private.

It may be accepted that the most relevant instruments, including financial instruments, used to mobilize private climate finance come from clearly public entities (such as development agencies and banks), but in several cases, public service is being carried out by private entities and, on the other hand, public entities act as private market players. There is no clear black and white solution for these grey areas and it seems that it will be up to each country to decide, case by case, whether a given instrument is to be considered public for the purpose of tracking private climate finance mobilized by it. The volume of financing involved in these grey areas is not determined, but is deemed to not to account for a great share.

As can be seen from the definitions described in the table below, the most commonly used definition to public finance is that being committed by an entity that is at least owned or controlled 50% by a public shareholder / entity.

In relation to linking private finance to the public intervention, some require that an explicit link between the two is made, that it can be demonstrated that the public intervention had the aim and the capacity to mobilize the private finance and that the private finance would actually not happen if it were not for the public intervention. Not all authors in the table below address this link, while others (namely the OECD-CPI study) propose a rather complex and rigorous approach.

Table 6-2: Definition of public and private finance

Author of the definition / approach	Public finance	Private finance	Mobilized private finance
OECD Research Collaborative	Large institutions/transactions: analyse the public/private nature of finance provided. Small institutions/transactions or joint ventures: take a practical approach (e.g. based on majority ownership); consider existing definitions in that process e.g. OECD DAC, Eurostat.		
KfW	Finance committed by an institution which is at least 50% owned by one or several governments or government controlled institution.	Private climate finance is defined as limited to financing of assets that are in majority private ownership (i.e. “private investment” corresponding to equity) or established or purchased with third party financing originating directly from the private sector (i.e. “private capital” corresponding typically to debt.	Direct private co-financing at the level of the activity, credit line or structured fund. There needs to be a demonstrated supporting (mobilizing) link to a financial activity by a public sector actor. This public sector financial activity must be suitable to support a positive decision in favour of the specific investment.
OECD – CPI (on private adaptation finance)			Publicly-mobilized private finance for adaptation is the private finance invested as a result of adaptation-related public interventions, which can typically take the form of finance or policies. For the purposes of this study, the focus is on developed countries’ public finance interventions to mobilize private finance for climate adaptation in developing countries. Estimating private finance mobilization requires demonstrating or making plausible assumptions about the causal link between public

Author of the definition / approach	**Public finance**	**Private finance**	**Mobilized private finance**
			interventions and the amount of private finance claimed to have been mobilized as a result of such interventions. Direct private finance mobilization is defined as private finance that is co-financed alongside public finance into the same project, program or fund and which is invested as a direct result of the provision of public finance (or guarantee) to that same project, program or fund. Intermediated-direct private finance mobilization is defined as private finance that is invested alongside public finance and as a direct result of that public finance, but where the public finance is initially provided one step upstream of the private investment, and is intermediated via a fund, a fund of funds, or a bank account (e.g., a credit line). Indirect private finance mobilization is defined as private finance that is invested as a result of a public finance intervention, but where the public finance intervention supports enabling outputs that occur one or more steps upstream of the private investment.
MDBs	Public and private sources: Climate Co-Finance is segmented into public and private sources, based primarily on the shareholding structure of the external institution providing the co-financing [no further details].		
France	At least 50% of the capital is owned by public shareholders. Some French publicly owned companies operate in the competitive market. Their financing is not		(see causality below)

Author of the definition / approach	Public finance	Private finance	Mobilized private finance
	considered public.		
Denmark	If more than 50% of the shareholders are public, the entity is considered public.	Public companies operating according to commercial principles are considered private.	
Norway	At least a 50 % public ownership and operating under a mandate of subsidiarity (The subsidiarity principle implies a mission to build the private sector and that public money is used to 'crowd in' or mobilize private development finance).	Some public companies not acting under a subsidiarity mandate have been included in the private sector.	

6.4.2.1. Way forward

The definitions proposed to define public and private finance are mostly similar and point to the same overall general understanding. Some nuances and flexibility in definitions might be important to maintain in order to take specific circumstances into account (namely the definition of public / private finance for other non-climate related purposes – such as corporate governance matters).

Nonetheless, a strong recommendation should be made in relation to those entities that, despite having a public shareholder, act in a fully competitive market and are not fulfilling a public mandate. Financing originating from such entities should not be considered public.

6.4.3. Definition of countries and origin of private finance

The definition of countries as developed and developing or between Annex I and non-Annex I (as per the UNFCCC reporting guidelines), creates some challenges, as the lists are not a perfect match. This definition is important to determine whether fluxes are between Annex I and non-Annex I countries or between developed and developing countries. In this regard, there does not seem to be a more preeminent option either way (even when mobilization of private climate finance is not at stake, only provision of public resources). Given the current language of the Paris Agreement, it is expectable that there will be a tendency for more actors to choose developed/developing rather than Annex I / Non-Annex I, but currently that is still not discernible.

Private climate finance can be mobilised from developed *and* developing countries. If it is sometimes already complex to determine whether an entity is public or private, in many circumstances it is even harder to determine the country to which it belongs to. How to determine an entities nationality? Is it where it is headquartered (what about companies with independent branches?)? Is it in relation to the nationality of its key shareholders? Can all shareholders be tracked, even reference ones? How far should we track the shareholders of shareholders?

In this sense, many argue that, tracking private climate finance should include all private finance mobilized, identifying, when possible, whether the origin of such private finance is from a developed or a developing country entity.

Table 6-3: Definition of geographical origin

Author of the definition / approach	Definition of countries	Origin of (private) finance
OECD Research Collaborative	There are several different dynamic and static lists available that could be used to classify countries as developed or developing.	*Assigning a geographical origin to finance:* Use the headquarter location of the ultimate (if information available) or intermediate parent of the entity providing funds. Known cases of multiple country ownership/funding (e.g. MDBs) need to be considered separately *Handling multiple country ownership/funding:* Either do not assign a country of origin or take a pro-rata approach (based on shareholdings or amounts of funds provided) on a case-by-case basis depending on information availability *Which geographical source of private finance to include:* If/where assigning a country of origin is technically feasible and meaningful, run two scenarios in order to provide a range: one including aggregate private finance mobilised from all origins; one including only private finance assigned to developed country entities.
KfW	Official development assistance recipient country list maintained by the OECD DAC. A country included in this list eligible to receive ODA is categorized as developing by the methodology proposed by KfW. By opposition, all others are developed.	All sources of private co-finance irrespective of origin in order to be neutral in respect to the type of players (domestic or international) involved in a developing country
France	Developed Countries = Annex I Countries Developing Countries = Non Annex I Countries	Total private finance includes private finance from Annex I Countries and private finance from non-Annex I countries

Author of the definition / approach	Definition of countries	Origin of (private) finance
Denmark	Developed Countries = Annex I Countries Developing Countries = Non Annex I Countries	Total private finance includes private finance from Annex I Countries and private finance from non-Annex I countries
Norway	n.a.	n.a.

6.4.3.1. Way forward

In order to have a full picture of the mobilization potential of any public instrument, MS should be required to track all private finance mobilized by their public instruments, irrespective of its origin.

6.4.4. Types of public policy and public finance interventions used to mobilise private finance

Different types of public interventions and of public financial instruments can be said to have the capacity to mobilize private climate finance.

According to Jachnik et al (2015):

- Public finance interventions are those in which a public entity provides direct financial support to a project, programme, fund or enterprise.
- Public policy interventions consist of a broad set of interventions that can help to indirectly support low carbon resilient projects and activities as well as shape country and markets to achieve LCR goals.

In this context, actors can choose to account for private climate finance mobilized by one, the other or both types of public interventions.

As for public policy information, the following have been identified by Jachnik et al (2015):

- Regulatory policy
    - Laws and policies
    - Plans and targets
    - Standards
    - Quotas
- Fiscal policy
    - Taxes

  - Subsidies and tax reliefs/credits
  - Market support
- Information and innovation policy
  - Research and development
  - Licenses and patents
  - Technology transfer
  - Education and awareness
  - Data and statistics.

In relation to financial instruments potentially used in public interventions to mobilize private climate finance, Jachnik et al (2015) list the following:

- Grants
- Debt
  - Loans
  - Credit lines
  - Bonds
  - Debt funds
  - Subordinated debt (mezzanine finance)
- Equity
  - Direct equity investments
  - Shares in equity funds
  - Preferred equity
- De-risking
  - Insurances
  - Guarantees
  - Derivatives

Denmark identifies different types of instruments for different types of interventions:

- Policy and regulatory support is mainly provided through Technical Assistance financed by grants,
- Project preparation support is also mostly support by grants,
- Project implementation is commonly supported by non-grant instruments.

The different types of public interventions pose different challenges in determining the causality link and, in consequence, the attribution of private climate finance to a given public intervention. While a grant to support the development of a plan may pave the way for several private investments for several years, the clear causality link might be difficult to establish and in particular avoiding double counting with other more specific financial interventions used in that context would be extremely difficult.

Table 6-4: Definition of public interventions and financial instruments

Author of the definition / approach	Public Interventions	Financial Instruments
OECD Research Collaborative	Focus on public finance interventions for which data is available or can be collected in the short term (e.g. grants, loans, equity investments). This is likely to disregard the impact of public policies in mobilising private climate finance.	
KfW		Loans, equity positions, guarantees, grants, revolving use of credit lines or green funds.
France	All public interventions leading to mobilising private climate finance in accordance with the EU's common understanding of mobilised private climate finance which specifies that these financial flows are: 1) mobilised by public finance, or by a public intervention, including in the sphere of policy and regulatory reform, and 2) climate relevant in accordance with criteria used by relevant international organisations such as the OECD and Multilateral Development Banks (cf. ECOFIN Council Conclusions, November 2014). However only public finance for project implementation can be estimated.	Respectively, for the three categories, three types of instruments are typically used: 1) technical assistance and grants 2) technical assistance and grants 3) all possible financial instruments (grants, equity, loans, guarantees…) – capital expenditures for the most part, also called project finance.
Denmark	All public interventions in three categories[32]:	Respectively, for the three categories, three types of instruments are typically used:

[32] Denmark considers it to be very difficult to track private finance mobilised by policy and regulatory support and by project preparation support.

	1) policy and regulatory support 2) project preparation support 3) project implementation and project finance	1) technical assistance and grants 2) grants 3) non-grant instruments

6.4.4.1. Way forward

Given the complexity, in particular, of the financial instruments with the potential to mobilize private finance, there seem to be little merit in arguing for an agreed definition of such instruments in this context. For the most part, these instruments are clearly defined under financial regulations and through the financial market.

6.4.5. Point of measurement, exchange rates and valuation of the intervention

The two first topics: point of measurement and exchange rates are straightforward. In relation to the point of measurement, the options are at commitment or at disbursement. Most entities track finance (including private finance mobilized) at commitment (board approval), even though some recognize that the value disbursed may be different (usually lower) than the value committed. For that reason, some measure at disbursement.

With regards to exchange rates, climate finance should be reported in USD. Reporting countries should make a transparent (and consistent) choice of exchange rates.

Valuing the instrument is a more complex issue, resulting from a 2014 OECD decision[33], support provided to developing countries is valued taking into account the risk associated with the instrument used. In that sense, the grant is considered the instrument with the highest value (risk), because there will be no return to the investment. In that sense, a concessional loan should have a greater value than a non-concessional loan, because less of the first will be reimbursed than of the second. Take the case for a guarantee – it may actually never be used, it may never be disbursed (even though it performed its task of mobilizing private climate finance). Should it be valued by its face value (a guarantee of USD 1 Million has a USD 1 Million face value) or its *grant equivalent value* (to be determined in accordance to methodology proposed by the OECD), thus reflecting the fact that, while risky, it may never actually be disbursed? Given the fact that face value is the simpler, more straightforward approach, it is the most commonly used.

Table 6-5: Definitions of point of measurement, exchange rates and valuation of the instrument

Author of the definition / approach	Point of measurement	Exchange rates	Valuation of the instrument
OECD	Measure finance at the point of	Build upon/make use of available	Build upon/make

[33] DAC High Level Meeting Final Communiqué, December 16 2014

Author of the definition / approach	Point of measurement	Exchange rates	Valuation of the instrument
Research Collaborative	commitment; cross-check with disbursement data, where available	international statistical standards to report in either the currency in which the finance was committed, or an international currency along with information on the exchange rate used and date of conversion.	use of approaches used or being developed by the development finance community e.g. OECD DAC
KfW	At commitment	Conversion to USD using exchange rate from local currency on July 1st for past commitments. For planned interventions the exchange rate used is of the 1st working day of the ongoing year.	Face value
France	According to each institution´s method. Most institutions choose to estimate mobilised private finance at board approval (when a project is presented for decision including all other – public and private – co-finance).	OECD annual exchange rates	Face value
Denmark	At disbursement is more accurate then at commitment. However, private sector is wary of report on disbursements. So, measurement at commitment, applying a discount rate to take into account declining ratio from commitment to disbursements (private finance declining ratio (discount rate) from commitment to disbursement is used by checking the public finance disbursement in comparison to the commitment).	OECD annual exchange rates	Core / Default scenario: face value Sensitivity scenario: grant equivalent

6.4.5.1. Way forward

It seems only reasonable to ask for harmonization in relation to the exchange rate (use the OECD yearly average exchange rate). With regards to point of measurement, MS should report at the

point where data can be collected with more confidence (for most is at commitment). With regards to valuation of the instrument, it is becoming good practice to value it at grant equivalent. However, only few countries have developed capacity to do so and in that regard, most report at face value.

6.4.6. Mobilization of private climate finance

Closely linked to the discussion on definition of "mobilized private finance" above, is the definition of causality: can it be determined that a given private climate financing took place due to a public intervention? If so, to what extent? Fully? Partially?

When more than one public entity intervenes in the mobilization of private climate finance, it is necessary to attribute portions of the amounts mobilized to the specific public interventions. Several options exist, the simplest one being a pro-rata approach. Other, more complex approaches take into account the risk and the relative importance of each public intervention in attributing a portion of the private climate finance mobilized.

Finally, a third variable that may be taken into account are the boundaries to the causality and consequent attribution of mobilized private finance to a given public intervention, namely in relation to time (will only private finance mobilized at the time of the public intervention be attributed or will it be attributed throughout the project life-time?) and to the reach of the instrument used.

Table 6-6: Definitions of causality, attribution and boundaries

Author of the definition / approach	Causality	Attribution	Boundaries
OECD Research Collaborative	Take a differentiated approach by assuming blanket causality where there is a clear argument for doing so, e.g. absence of any relevant public interventions and weak enabling environment. Assign partial causality using default mobilization factors for relevant public policies where the relationship between public	*When blanket causality assumed:* either no-attribution to individual entities/interventions (aggregate estimate and collective reporting of mobilisation) or attributing based on readily available information, such as taking a pro rata approach based on the volume of funding and type of finance provided. *When causality is assessed:* - *Assessing causality for public finance*: If a risk-based approach is selected, use simple rules based on the relative risk positions of public and private finance. - *Temporal issues*: Consider private finance only within the direct scope of the activity	*For syndicated loans involving a public actor*: Account for all the private finance associated with the loan syndicate *For public investments in equity funds*: Only account for private finance at the direct fund-level. *For public guarantees*: Account for the total private finance instrument (loan, equity) to which the public guarantee applies.

Author of the definition / approach	Causality	Attribution	Boundaries
	interventions and private finance is particularly complex.	supported by the public intervention. This can include private finance invested before or after public finance was committed where appropriate (apply declining mobilization rate/tapering factor). - *Adjusting for the effects of LCR-specific public policies and/or broader country and market conditions*: Where possible, use transparent assumptions (e.g. a default factor to attribute mobilization to a policy intervention); report qualitatively on the presence/absence of indirect public interventions and policies otherwise.	
KfW	Volume based blanket causality. A clear supporting (“mobilizing”) link between the financial activity by a public sector actor and the private finance must be determined.	Volume based pro rata	The following list specifies the boundaries of publicly mobilized private finance foreseen in the methodology: Loans by private sector actors mobilized by DFI loans Loans by private sector actors mobilized by DFI equity positions Loans by private sector actor mobilized by DFI guarantees Equity from private sector mobilized by DFI loans Equity from the private sector actor mobilized by DFI equity positions Loans by private sector actor mobilized by DFI grants for financing (e. g., to cover costs of a renewable energy feed-in law or premium or emission reduction credits from the Clean Development Mechanism) Equity from private sector actor

Author of the definition / approach	Causality	Attribution	Boundaries
			mobilized by DFI grants (e. g., to cover costs of a renewable energy feed-in law or premium or emission reduction credits from the Clean Development Mechanism) Loans to the private sector generated by the revolving use of credit lines or green funds (subtract original loan to avoid double counting)
France	100% causal relationship between the public intervention and private finance	Volume based attribution	Time dimension: private co-finance at the moment of the public intervention.
Denmark	100% causality	Core / Default scenario: volume-based pro rata Sensitivity scenario 1: concessionality-based pro rata Sensitivity scenario 1	Syndicated loans: account for all private project finance. The bank in charge of syndication usually provides the majority of the project (debt) finance. We therefore argue that the lead bank has mobilised all project finance. Equity participation: account for all private project finance. This includes: the percentage of private finance at the fund level and private co-finance at project level. For instance: the GCPF has one private investor at fund level, which accounts for 9% of the total fund. If GCPF finances 10 million to a climate project, 9% is counted as mobilised private finance. If a private co-financer invests 2 million to the climate project, this is counted as mobilised private finance as well. Total mobilised private climate finance: 2.9 million. Public guarantees: total face value of the private finance instrument to which it applies. This is in line with the OECD DAC.

Author of the definition / approach	Causality	Attribution	Boundaries
			Time dimension: Only private co-finance at the moment of the public intervention.
Norway		Volume-based pro rata	

6.4.6.1. Way forward

In relation to causality, there does not seem to be enough confidence and knowledge at the time to opt for something different to blanket causality.

In relation to attribution, in order to avoid gaps or overlaps, there should be an effort to harmonize approaches, but only in relation to the participants involved in the same instrument. As it happens, that is usually the case already (more often than note, an MDB is part of such instruments and it facilitates such an agreement among participants).

With regards to boundaries, there is an interest in allowing for different approaches to be tested in order to gain more experience and develop stronger methodological guidance on the matter.

6.5. Challenges in data collection

Data for private climate finance mobilized by public interventions is not readily available and is a rather complex venture. At the very simplest form of data unavailability, these data is simply not collected in a systematic fashion and, in cases, current approaches to financing or project planning and documentation may not even be able to provide the necessary information. It seems apparent that no entity has currently established a system which allows for the regular collection of data.

There are (more or less robust) systems to collect information on developed countries public climate interventions (policy and financial) in developing countries and databases which compile and store such information. Reporting by OECD members to the OECD DAC CRS (Creditor Reporting System) is the most preeminent exercise. Current reporting by annex I countries to the UNFCCC within the context of Biennial Reports is also promoting the establishment of a system and has already allowed for the collection of data for four years (2011 to 2014).

On the other hand, while there are some (mostly commercial) databases on private climate finance, they are mostly non-transparent (in relation to some key parameters required for the purpose of estimating mobilized private finance, for example in relation to the origin of financing and in relation to the (causal) link with a public intervention) and considered to be extremely incomplete or non-exhaustive. Some of the best databases cover large mitigation projects, namely on renewable energy but for anything smaller and adaptation projects there seems to be a large gap of information.

Annex VI (section 9.6) includes figures (Jachnik et.al. 2015) providing a detailed picture of the existing databases including information on public interventions and private finance for low carbon and resilient activities.

Given the approach proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative framework, however (in which tracking private climate finance starts by identifying those public interventions that have the potential to mobilize private finance), it seems likely that centralized databases will actually not need to play a central role in this process (further on this below).

Centralized databases might, nonetheless, play an important role in the following circumstances:

- If attribution to a specific country is not a requirement (in case of collective reporting),
- For those public policy interventions with a broad policy scope (e.g. aimed at enhancing overall enabling environments or designing relevant national strategies or programmes), for which direct causality may be harder to establish and in which circumstances, the country of origin of the public intervention might not have full access to activities in the recipient country (that is particularly relevant when private finance is mobilized by a public intervention that took place long time before),
- For reporting on private finance (not only on private finance mobilized by public interventions).

Namely in the scope of the OECD Research Collaborative, in estimating private climate finance mobilized by public intervention, have analysed their respective data collection system and data availability. Generally, it can be said that, after their experiences, data on mobilized private finance is for the most part not readily available, that the most pragmatic approach is to start collecting by the public entities mobilizing private finance and that centralized data bases and the use of leverage factors are incomplete and too uncertain respectively.

Denmark noted *that there were only few programmes that could provide data on private finance that was detailed and accurate enough to include in the quantification exercise. A major part of the public climate finance could thus not be linked to private finance mobilised.[…] 63% of the Danish public finance that was deemed of relevance for this study could not deliver any data on private finance.* It noted also that *those who did deliver data did not (not always) have the correct data readily available in their systems. They had to go back to original project documents in their files (very labour intensive process) to collect the requested information. Looking back without a well-established MRV system in place is not only time consuming but also prone for inaccuracies.*

Benn et al (2016) stated that *data on amounts mobilised are often available in project documentation. However, some data are more available than others. Data on the face value of the loan guaranteed by the institution, on the total amount of private investments in syndications, and on private investments in investment funds are often available. On the contrary, data on the amount mobilised by equity or mezzanine investments are more difficult to obtain. Data on the total project cost seem also to be available, however many DFIs highlighted the low quality of these data. They mentioned that data on the total project cost were often a supplementary field in their systems, subject to the project manager interpretation of the project boundaries*.

Brown et al (2015) also noted that, specifically on mobilized private finance for adaptation activities: *given the significant limitations in using existing databases to estimate mobilized private finance for adaptation highlighted here, a practical starting point for improving data lies with the public finance providers and working to more systematically monitor private co-finance.*

Jachnik and Raynaud (2015) argue that priority efforts need to be put on improving *primary data collection […] by public finance institutions on private co-financing*. Without this improvement on primary data collection, information contained on commercial databases (such as the Bloomberg New Energy Finance) and leverage ratios (to be used as proxy in case of data gaps) will be too uncertain to be used.

Given the state of the art experience described above, it seems important to highlight that entities involved or promoting public interventions with the potential to mobilize private finance will hold the key to data collection. In order to do so, they should establish systems that are capable of regularly, consistently, transparently and exhaustively doing so.

Abbeile et al (2015) noted that, despite deficiencies, the collection of data for France's pilot testing of the OECD Research Collaborative framework was not too difficult due to the dedication of the institutions involved, but in particular due to the fact that the number of institutions managing public interventions capable of mobilizing private climate finance are only four. It may be expected that in other countries the number of relevant entities is not much larger than that in France, thus making it somewhat simple to set up a system.

In this context where it is of paramount importance for national institutions to start collecting data on mobilized private climate finance, the following steps should be implemented:

- Identify the entities that manage public interventions with the potential to mobilize private climate finance,
- Interview these entities to identify and analyse the types of public intervention instruments (policy and/or financial) and to assess accessibility of data (namely historical data),
- Train the entities on methodological issues related to tracking mobilized private climate finance,
- Establish a formal data collection system (or include data on mobilized private finance in arrangements on collection of public climate finance already in place), including the definition of data collection needs.

The table below describes the questionnaire used by France (Abbeile et al 2015) for the collection of data at project level that can be used as a basis for the definition of data collection needs. This questionnaire was used for an isolated data collection. When this information is collected together with the regular data on provision of public climate support (for the OECD DAC, for example), the relevant items below would be integrated in such collection procedures.

Table 6-7: Questionnaire for data collection on mobilized private finance

Project Information	**Information on public finance**	**Information on private finance mobilized**
Project ID	Amount committed by the entity	Co-financier 1 - Name - Country - Amount committed - Instrument
Name of the project	Amount of relevant climate finance commitment	Co-financier 2 …

Project Information	Information on public finance	Information on private finance mobilized
Country	Amount disbursed	
Date of board approval	Amount reimbursed	
Date of contracting	Financial instrument	
Total costs of project	Mitigation amount	
	Adaptation amount	
	Other public finance from other Annex I countries	
	Other public finance from non-I countries	

Source: Abeille et al (2015)

6.6. Other initiatives to track private finance / investments

Tracking private finance is no simple endeavour. But there are several organizations that do it from different perspectives, using different methodologies and with different scopes and purposes. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) have the most extensive and reputed exercise in this regards. But there are others, namely some carried out by private entities, such as the Financial Times.

The three exercises described below were chosen due to their perceived comprehensiveness and credibility and also as a representation of different approaches and scopes. Their inclusion in this report is a mere illustration of specific efforts to collect data on foreign direct investments and do not constitute a proposal to use them for collection of data on climate relevant foreign direct investment mobilized by public interventions.

The World Investment Report is a yearly exercise by the UNCTAD and is arguably the most comprehensive one. In addition to the data collection on FDI, each year the UNCTAD selects a theme over which it makes an in-depth analysis. For 2014, the theme was the sustainable development goals.

The IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey is an interesting exercise, as it tracks the origin and the recipient country of the FDI, which can be a valuable experience in relation to attribution to developed countries of climate relevant private finance in developing countries.

Finally, the Financial Times FDI report is interesting as it captures only greenfield investments (new investments in the real economy, which climate relevant investments would be expected to be) and already tracks specific investments in the renewable energy sector.

While these exercises are interesting, they are far from being directly useful for the purpose of collecting data on climate relevant private finance mobilized by public instruments. Firstly, because they lack the tools to identify the relevant public instruments and to establish the causality between such instruments and the private finance mobilized. And secondly, because these exercises do not have the tools to mark the investments as climate relevant in accordance with the relevant methodologies. Current approaches to the attribution of investments to a specific economy sector

fall very short of providing a clear signal of climate relevance. If this is very true for mitigation, it is even very much more so for adaptation.

6.6.1. The UNCTAD's World Investment Report

The 2014 UNCTAD's World Investment Report (WIR) was dedicated to investments in areas relevant to the (at the time still under negotiation) Sustainable Development Goals.

The WIR provides figures of in- and out-flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), showing which countries lead providing and which lead receiving FDI (in both cases, the US, with China second on in flows and Japan second on outflows, followed by China in third). Among other analytical results, the WIR presented FDI by private equity firms (PEF), by sovereign wealth funds (SWF) and by state owned enterprises (SOE). This indicates that the approach used can easily identify private investments (noting that many countries opt to consider as private finance the climate relevant investments made by it largest SOE).

The WIR classifies FDI by sector/industry but on a very aggregate manner, not being possible to identify through currently available information whether or not the investment in the designated sectors are climate relevant.

The following are the sectors / industry classification used by WIR[34]:

- Primary
  - Agriculture, forestry and fishing
  - Mining, quarrying and petroleum
- Manufacturing
  - Food, beverages and tobacco
  - Textiles, clothing and leather
  - Wood and wood products
  - Paper and paper products
  - Publishing and printing
  - Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel
  - Chemicals and chemical products
  - Pharmaceuticals
  - Rubber and plastic products
  - Metals and metal products
  - Electrical and electronic equipment
  - Motor vehicles and other transport equipment
  - Non-metallic mineral products
  - Machinery and equipment
  - Manufacture of furniture
  - Other manufacturing
- Services
  - Electricity, gas and water
  - Construction

[34] http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Annex-Tables.aspx [visited on July, 14 2016]

- Trade
- Accommodation and food service activities
- Transportation and storage
- Information and communication
- Finance
- Business services
- Public administration and defense
- Education
- Health and social services
- Arts, entertainment and recreation
- Other service activities

So, despite the fact that the WIR was dedicated to investing in the SDG, the methodological approach used by UNCTAD is not detailed enough to be directly relevant for the identification of climate relevant investment flows.

With regards to the methodological approach, the WIR's FDI statistics are based on a large set of information sources, namely:

- National (or, when applicable, Regional) Central Banks (in respect of the country itself and in respect of other countries)
- OECD
- IMF
- National relevant ministries (in few cases)
- National statistics offices and other related offices (in few cases)

6.6.2. The IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey[35]

The IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) is particularly interesting, because it supports the objective of developing from-whom-to-whom cross border data, complementing the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), and contributes to a better understanding of financial interconnectedness. While, this survey does not include all countries (only about 100), it allows to determine the country of origin and the recipient country of investments, show casing, at least, the net relative position of a country in relation to another. This may be of interest in case of attribution of climate relevant investments to the country of origin.

Table 6-8 below shows the CDIS Top 10 From-Whom-to-Whom 2013 Inward Direct Investment

[35] http://data.imf.org/?sk=40313609-F037-48C1-84B1-E1F1CE54D6D5&sId=1390030109571

Table 6-8: CDIS Top 10 From-Whom-to-Whom 2013 Inward Direct Investment

Counterpart Economy (Investment from):	Reporting Economy (Investment in):											
	Netherlands	Luxembourg	United States	China, P.R.: Mainland	United Kingdom	China, P.R.: Hong Kong	Germany	France	Switzerland	Singapore	All Other Economies	Total Investment
United States	997,712	774,723		76,465	389,608	42,871	94,001	86,260	98,323	97,417	1,239,719	3,897,098
Netherlands		322,325	273,884	27,721	C	78,515	207,655	123,090	213,18	69,052	1,391,157	2,706,581
United Kingdom	455,896	540,818	518,643	20,989		20,054	62,154	75,802	23,892	40,501	633,031	2,391,780
Luxembourg	693,715		201,603	4,940	C	C	161,530	133,495	161,76	19,479	717,608	2,094,131
China, P.R.: Hong Kong	15,744	23,931	5,860	1,112,242	C		642	2,243	C	25,239	66,195	1,252,096
Germany	246,134	104,871	208,841	53,450	C	5,301		85,446	28,704	15,792	429,677	1,178,217
France	166,579	72,443	226,131	20,748	C	6,981	53,584		43,124	12,129	514,441	1,116,159
Japan	64,357	3,200	342,327	147,594	80,357	25,936	21,875	14,488	3,546	55,433	350,764	1,109,877
Switzerland	234,314	123,912	209,397	11,705	62,748	8,249	59,991	81,829		29,308	251,905	1,073,357
Virgin Islands, British	40,508	C		330,624	13,680	447,918	3,241	757	C	57,611	80,432	974,772
All Other Economies	1,427,401	1,285,283	777,270	524,759	1,061,577	559,475	261,860	180,300	197,797	328,118	3,505,381	10,109,220
Total Investment	4,342,358	3,251,506	2,763,956	2,331,238	1,607,970	1,195,301	926,532	783,712	770,32	750,078	9,180,310	27,903,288

Source:

10

Participating countries are required to fill in two questionnaires, one identifying the inflows and the out flows from and to each specific country and the other on methodological choices and assumptions, thus allowing for an assessment of data quality and comparability.

Given the complexity of organizational arrangements that different entities can have, this survey proposes approaches to these more complex arrangements, such as branches, multi-territory enterprises and joint ventures.

Finally, with regards to sector or industry classification, CDIS used the International Standard Industry Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC). Like for WIR above, this classification is not sufficient to assess the climate relevance of the FDI.

The survey is conducted at national level by one single entity (it varies from country to country: in some cases it's the central bank, in others the statistics office or other entity). This entity will then have to decide which companies to include in the survey. That can be done by performing a census (sending the questionnaire to everybody – which is advisable to do only once or only at long regular intervals), an exploratory survey (to identify the relevant companies to which to send the actual survey) or by focusing on the largest firms. The size of the universe is not only relevant in terms of the number of companies included, but also in terms of the value of the transactions they are involved in.

Draft surveys are provided by CDIS Guide and can be adapted to meet local circumstances.

6.6.3. The Financial Times FDI Report 2016

The FDI Report 2016 has some interesting aspects:

- It covers only *greenfield* investments, i.e. it covers only new investment projects in the real economy (which is something to be expected of a climate relevant investment)
- It has a sector / industry classification which speaks closer to the needs related to climate relevant investments as it tracks FDI for renewable energies, distinguishing between different technologies (regrettably, that is the only sector for which good information is already available)
- It identifies the top five (corporate) foreign direct investors in renewable energy

The methodological note included in the report provides interesting insights on the value of the data produced.

"The report is based on the fDi Markets database of The Financial Times Ltd, which tracks greenfield investment projects. It does not include mergers and acquisitions or other equity-based or non-equity investments. Only new investment projects and significant expansions of existing projects are included. fDi Markets is the most authoritative source of intelligence on real investment in the global economy, and the only source of greenfield investment data that covers all countries and industries worldwide. Retail projects have been excluded from this analysis but are tracked by fDi Markets.

The data presented includes FDI projects that have either been announced or opened by a company. As companies can raise capital locally, phase their investment over a period of time, and can channel their investment through different countries for tax efficiency, the data used in this report is different to the official data on FDI flows. The data from fDi Markets is more accurate and

a real-time indicator of the real investment companies are making in their overseas subsidiaries" (FDI Intelligence, 2016).

6.7. MRV of incentives to and enabling environments for private climate finance

6.7.1. MRV of incentives

This chapter addresses current MRV of incentives to and enabling environments for private climate finance. For incentives to private climate finance, it is understood that the public policy and financial interventions by developed countries mobilize private climate finance. Enabling environments are the set of circumstances that should be found in a developing country in order to become an attractive destination for private climate finance.

The previous chapter already addresses the topic of incentives, i.e. public interventions to mobilize private climate finance. It is widely recognised that public policy interventions as well as public financial interventions play an equally important, although distinct, role in mobilizing private climate finance. The OECD Research Collaborative framework provides scope for the definition of a methodology that tracks private finance mobilized by both types of interventions.

It's noted, however that, while public policy interventions[36] have the potential to mobilize a larger array of private investments, it is much harder to track private climate finance mobilized by such policy interventions, than to track the private finance mobilized by specific public finance interventions. While the causality between the public finance intervention and the private climate finance it mobilizes can be directly and more easily established, the causality between a public policy intervention and private climate finance may be harder to establish. The reason for this is that the causality may be of an indirect nature and the mobilization may actually occur several years down the line, when effective mechanisms to assess such causality may no longer be established.

While there has been a great effort to that end, it has not yet been possible to determine with any level of accuracy the relative effectiveness of one public instrument compared to the other. This relative effectiveness could be assessed, for example, by means of estimating leveraging ratios (the amount of private finance a certain type of public intervention mobilizes) and comparing them. However, the information currently available in the estimation of such leveraging ratios is not transparent. It is also incomplete to the point that it is not recommended to be used as a proxy to estimate mobilized private finance because of a lack of actual information for a specific public intervention.

The regular use of the OECD Research Collaborative framework will overcome this problem, by allowing for the collection of actual data on each specific relevant public intervention. The compilation of such higher quality information will, in turn, allow for the estimation of higher quality leverage ratios for each type of public intervention, which can finally be used with more confidence as proxy data to fill data gaps.

[36] those that address the barriers and that promote the enabling environments

Box 2: Leverage ratios

Leverage ratios are of particular use when no actual data is available to estimate private climate finance mobilized by each specific public intervention. Given the low quality of overall data collected so far, which can be used to estimate leverage ratios or leverage factors, these are also very uncertain, not representing a viable alternative to the actual data collection. Jachnik et al (2015), argues: Where no suitable data is available, alternative options to derive approximations include conducting bottom-up estimates of private co-financing based on historical average co-financing ratios (A10.1) or a top-down apportionment of aggregated finance data (e.g. FDI) using climate-relevant coefficients (e.g. emissions or energy intensity) (A10.2). The accuracy of such approaches depends on the exact methods used, such as the quality and specificity of leverage ratios (e.g. whether they are available by country, technology, project size) or the relevance of environmental proxies. Thus, the most appropriate option is likely to vary based on what is feasible and likely to produce the most accurate estimates in the short term. However, neither of these approaches is currently developed enough for producing robust estimates.

In addition, in order to provide the right signals in terms of the effectiveness of public interventions by unit of finance (e.g. per 1 Euro or 1 USD), the OECD is recommending that donor countries estimate and report the grant equivalent value of its public financing, in addition to reporting the actual face value of the interventions. Simply put, the OECD recommends that the value of a 1USD grant is considered higher than the value of a concessional loan of 1USD and that the value of a 1USD non-concessional loan is lower than the two previous ones. While the grant equivalent value of a grant is 1, the grant equivalent value of a concessional loan is less than 1 and the grant equivalent value of a non-concessional loan is even lower. The same applies to other public finance instruments taking into account the respective inherent risk.

By estimating and reporting the grant equivalent value of its public finance interventions and by linking each such intervention to the respective private climate finance, the leverage ratio will provide a clearer picture of the actual effort put into mobilizing private climate finance, than the leverage ratio that would be calculated using face value of public interventions. In this context, the signal, the incentive to use one or the other public intervention will be more accurate.

Taking this into consideration, one may argue that the methodological framework proposed by the OECD Research Collaborative provides the grounds for MRV of incentives to private climate finance (otherwise referred to as public interventions), as well as it creates the conditions to provide public entities with the correct signals, the correct incentives, to promote one type of public intervention over the other, taking into account its respective mobilization potential, usually referred to as leveraging ratio. However, while the OECD Research Collaborative provides grounds for this, it is still in its early stages of pilot application. It will take time until the framework is widely used by developed countries and their respective public entities promoting public interventions capable of mobilizing private climate finance.

6.7.2. MRV of climate investment enabling environments

With regards to MRV of enabling environments for attracting private climate finance, the situation is somewhat different to that of MRV of incentives for (mobilizing) private climate finance described above.

The topic of enabling environments is addressed at the UNFCCC level, in particular the item of technology development and transfer.

One of the Technology Transfer Framework's pillars is Enabling Environments, which it defines as *government actions, such as fair trade policies, removal of technical, legal and administrative barriers to technology transfer, sound economic policy, regulatory frameworks and transparency, all of which create an environment conducive to private and public sector technology transfer. The purpose of the enabling environments component of the framework is to improve the effectiveness of the transfer of environmentally sound technologies by identifying and analysing ways of facilitating the transfer of environmentally sound technologies, including the identification and removal of barriers at each stage of the process*[37]*.*

In this context, promoting enabling environments equates to removing barriers to technology development and transfer, which for the greater part (if not in its entirety) correspond to the barriers to private climate finance.

It can then be said that there are several barriers to private climate finance, more generally to the introduction of climate friendly technologies or more broadly even, to financing of sustainable development.

Amin (2013) lists such key barriers:

- Policy and Regulatory Barriers
    - Policy uncertainty and complexity
    - Transaction costs (complying with policy/licensing/reporting…)
    - Land allocation, access and security of ownership
    - Enforcement of policy and pricing incentives
    - Existing subsidies and policy support for high carbon alternatives
- Market and Technology Barriers
    - Relatively high upfront cost of technology
    - Human and operational risks (lack of trained people)
    - Limitations of support infrastructure (e.g. grid infrastructure)
    - Immature supply-chain and limited capacity of project developers
    - Long term viability of many state utilities under question
    - Lack of track record of particular technology/project
- Financial Barriers
    - Country risk: defaults or other factors leading to non-return of invested capital including inflation
    - Currency risk: Exchange rate fluctuations making returns volatile.
    - Deal flow: insufficient volume commercially attractive deals for diversified investment portfolios
    - Complexity risks: difficulty evaluating multiple and overlapping risks

The 2015 European Report on Development notes that these barriers are even more acute in low income countries, where development financing needs are even more important. It notes, however, that appropriate actions can effectively overcome these challenges by addressing market, coordination and governance failures.

Under this task, four broad principles for mobilization of finance for sustainable development, which obviously apply to private climate finance, are proposed:

[37] http://unfccc.int/ttclear/templates/ttclear/templates/render_cms_page?s=TTF_ene

- Finance can promote enablers (e.g. local governance, human capital, infrastructure, green energy technology and trade), which in turn can also attract more public and private finance. This creates a virtuous circle between the enablers and finance: examples include mobile phone technology for mobile banking services, and human capital for FDI.
- An appropriate regulatory framework is of critical importance in order to attract private finance. For example, clear property rights or land titles help to mobilise private domestic finance by providing a collateral, and an improved and more transparent and efficient investment climate can unleash more finance. Enhanced competition in transport services and benchmarks in contract provision promote finance for and investment in infrastructure. Rules that create incentives for institutional investors to finance infrastructure in developing countries or green technology, rather than in liquid assets, help to channel international private finance to sustainable development purposes.
- Development of financial-sector instruments and the capacity to apply them can mobilise private resources. Blending instruments or public-sector guarantees, for instance, can enhance credit availability, which in turn leverages more private-sector finance.
- A conducive international policy environment can be critical in setting the right conditions, e.g. transparent global financial rules and standards for global finance, appropriate trade policies for investment in agriculture in developing countries (abolishing harmful trade distortionary subsidies), tax regulations for tax havens, or appropriate climate mitigation deals to set a carbon price that will mobilise climate finance.

Additionally, Amin (2013) proposes the following elements of "effective enabling environments and policy frameworks for climate finance:"

- Government leadership for creating enabling environments for scaled-up investments,
- Appropriate institutional arrangements to facilitate effective cross-Ministerial coordination,
- A clear, long term and coherent policy and regulatory framework underpinned by rule of law – aim to align investment timescales and policy timescales,
- Aligning price signals to incentivise deployment of low carbon resilient investments (may require reform of existing subsidies),
- Need to foster and establish markets to capture benefits of green growth,
- Capacity for designing, developing and implementing strategies, policies, regulatory frameworks and public financial incentives (including climate finance),
- Tracking of climate finance to enable directing finance to greatest potential impact or needs, and the transparency and accountability increases confidence of investors.

Developing countries are required by the guidelines for national communications to report on *any constraints and gaps, and related financial, technical and capacity needs, as well as proposed and/or implemented activities for overcoming the gaps and constraints*. This means that developing countries are required to report on barriers, but also on efforts made to enhance enabling environments related to financing, technology and capacity needs for the implementation of the convention. A requirement to update this information provided in the national communications is included in the guidelines for Biennial Update Reports.

An analysis of a short random set of submitted biennial update reports (Ghana, Singapore, South Africa, Vietnam) shows that there is no relevant information being submitted by developing countries on their efforts to creating enabling environments for private climate finance.

Summary reports of the technical analysis of the BURs also fail to highlight this issue as an area where capacity building in countries is required.

It can thus be said that even under the UNFCCC there is a wide array of work done on enabling environments, including the requirement by developing countries to report on the efforts to promote them. Nonetheless, the quality of the information put forward on the matter is rather low and the information is actually non-existent for most cases.

6.7.3. MRV of general (private) investment enabling environments

Establishing enabling environments for private climate relevant investments comes second to establishing environments for general private investments. If a country is generally perceived to have a difficult and complex context for private investments, this will surely not be different for climate relevant private investments. On the other hand having an overall private investment friendly environment does not automatically qualify to a friendly climate relevant private investment environment.

In these circumstances, it does not make sense to assess a country's friendliness, its enabling environment to climate relevant investments isolated from its friendliness to investments in any other non-climate relevant sector.

As should be expected, there are several exercises assessing the business environment of world economies, such as The Economist Intelligence Unit's Business Environment Rankings[38] and Forbes' Best Countries for Business[39].

The most comprehensive and reputable exercise, however, is done by the World Bank Group, namely the Doing Business Report, which is quoted and used as a basis for other exercises, including the OECD, in its Policy Framework for Investment[40].

Below, there's a short description of the World Bank's Doing Business report, namely on the indicators it measures and on the data collection process.

In addition, there's a description of the World Bank's Business Environment Snapshots, which provide a one-stop shop for accessing business environment assessments performed by different entities, from different perspectives.

Finally, in the sections below, there is an additional reference to a World Bank initiative: the Readiness for Investment in Sustainable Energy, which provides an example one step closer of how MRV of enabling environments for climate relevant investments could be set up.

Box 3: Green Bonds

Green bonds are increasing year by year. The "Bonds and Climate Change: the state of market in 2016" report indicates that there are currently USD694 billion in green bonds, an increase of USD96 billion from the 2015 report.

A green bond, like any other bond, is a fixed-income financial instrument for raising capital through the debt capital market. In its simplest form, the bond issuer raises a fixed amount of capital from investors over a set period of time, repaying the capital when the bond matures and paying an

[38] http://pages.eiu.com/rs/eiu2/images/BER_2014.pdf [visited on July 14, 2016]

[39] http://www.forbes.com/best-countries-for-business/ [visited on July 14, 2016]

[40] http://www.oecd.org/investment/toolkit/measuringprogress/ [visited on July, 14 2016]

agreed amount of interest (coupons) along the way (KPMG, 2015). A green bond is issued when the issuer (borrower) declares that the capital raised will be used in a “green” investment. While there are several guidelines on labelling a bond as a green bond, there is no authoritative source for that purpose, nor is there any verification of the green claim.

The Climate Bonds Initiative is an international, investor-focused not-for-profit organisation focusing on mobilizing the $100 trillion bond market for climate change solutions (funded by public and private organizations). The Initiative has developed a methodology to track green bonds – those with use of proceeds defined and labelled as green. In addition to these bonds issued with a green tag, the Initiative is also tracking bonds financing climate aligned bonds, which have not been issued as green. Together, these bonds are called “climate-aligned” bonds. The value mentioned in the first paragraph of this box refers to the total of climate-aligned bonds (Climate Bonds Initiative, 2015).

To track unlabelled green bonds, the Initiative “screened Bloomberg issuer data and reviewed over 1700 issuers to identify those with at least 95% of revenue derived from climate-aligned assets, based on the Climate Bonds Standard[41]. While these standards and the principles behind them provide an indicative relationship between the use of the revenues and green / low carbon / resilient investments, the definitions used are not aligned with the most commonly used definitions for climate finance proposed by the OECD DAC Rio Markers, thus making the figures on green bonds difficult to reconcile with other climate finance data gathered using more mainstream approaches such as the mentioned OECD DAC Rio Markers.

Interesting to note, in terms of the outcomes of this exercise is that the labelled green bonds account for only 17% of the total climate aligned bonds, meaning that 83% of green bonds were not labelled as such by the issuer. From this, it can be inferable that an important part of potentially climate relevant financing is taking place without any labelling or marking as such. At least climate financing which is not mobilized by a specific public intervention.

6.7.3.1. World Bank Doing Business Report

The World Bank’s yearly Doing Business Report (13th edition for 2016) measures *“the regulations that enhance business activity and those that constrain it. Doing Business presents quantitative indicators on business regulations and the protection of property rights that can be compared across 189 economies—from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe—and over time[42].”*

The 2016 report looks at 10 indicators relevant to assess a country’s business friendliness, namely: *starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency[43].*

[41] The Climate Bonds Standard and Certification against that Standard is an easy-to-use tool that allows investors and intermediaries to assess the environmental integrity of bonds. It consists of a certification process, pre-issuance requirements, post-issuance requirements and a suite of sector-specific eligibility & guidance documents. For more information see https://www.climatebonds.net/standards/about. To view the Green Bond Principles behind the standard, please see http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/green-bonds/green-bond-principles./

[42] http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2016 [visited on July, 13 2016]

[43] Market regulations have not been assessed in the 2016 edition.

To estimate these macro-indicators, 109 sub-indicators are measured for each country, which results in over 110 000 data points.

Even though the methodology is deemed to be "inexpensive and easily replicable," the process to collect data to measure these indicators is rather time intensive. It is fundamentally based on a network of over 11 000 contributors[44] that respond to a questionnaire[45] which is elaborated every year for the purpose of compiling the report. Such contributors include lawyers, accountants, judges, engineers, architects, businesspeople and public officials.

The data is collected through several rounds of interaction with the respondents. In addition to the questionnaires, written conversations, conference calls and visits by the Doing Business team are also used to collect information. The visits serve mainly the purpose of verifying data (for the 2016 report, 33 visits were made). The Doing Business team verifies all the answers provided by the respondents and therefore, the results included in the report are checked for accuracy.

The figure below illustrates the data collection process for the Doing Business Report.

Table 6-9: Data collection process for the World Bank's Doing Business Report



Source: Doing Business 2016

[44] http://www.doingbusiness.org/contributors/doing-business

[45] http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology

6.7.3.2. World Bank Business Environment Snapshots (BES)

The Business Environment Snapshots presents measurable indicators across a wide range of business environment issues and over time. This web-enabled tool compiles disparate data, indicators, and project information on the business environment for each country in an easily accessible, consistent and usable format. The BE Snapshots help development practitioners and policymakers obtain a comprehensive picture of the business environment in a particular country.

The Business Environment Snapshot is a composite of several other rankings and similar exercises, including the Doing Business Report described above:

- Economic Freedom Index (The Heritage Foundation)
- Political Risk Rating of ICRG Index (International Country Risk Guide – PRS)
- Country Credit Rating (Institutional Investor)
- Business Environment Index (EIU Global Outlook Report)
- Regulatory Quality Indicator (World Bank Group Governance Indicators)
- Control of Corruption Indicator (World Bank Group Governance Indicators)
- Quality of National BE Ranking (WEF Global Competitiveness Report)
- Doing Business Rank (World Bank Group Doing Business Report)

In this regards, the Business Environment Snapshot does not rely on the collection of primary data, rather it is a tool, a one-stop shop, to access to different ranking, measurement and analytical exercises.

6.7.3.3. World Bank Readiness for Investment in Sustainable Energy (RISE)

This new World Bank exercise is closer to the aim of MRVing enabling environments for climate relevant investments, as it provides indicators that compare the investment climate of countries across the three focus areas of the Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) initiative: energy access, energy efficiency and renewable energy[46].

RISE originates from a previous World Bank Group initiative, the Climate Investment Readiness Index, which evaluated the environment for private investment in climate mitigation and low-carbon technologies in South Asian countries—Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—compared with other emerging economies and developed regions. The index focused on renewable energy (particularly solar photovoltaic (PV), onshore wind, small hydro, and biomass) and energy efficiency (particularly lighting, appliances, and building codes).

RISE comprises 28 indicators and 85 sub-indicators encompassing the three pillars of energy access, renewable energy, and energy efficiency as well as cross-cutting indicators for topics relevant to all three SE4ALL pillars. All indicators are classified into four broad categories: planning, policies and regulations, pricing and subsidies, and procedural efficiency.

[46] http://rise.worldbank.org/

Figure 6-2: RISE Indicators



Source: World Bank[47]

[47] http://rise.worldbank.org/methodology

As an illustration, for Policies and Regulations on Renewable Energy, (sub)indicators such as incentives to grid-connected renewable energy, network usage pricing and fiscal incentives are collected. Figure 6-2 lists all the indicators collected for RISE.

As for the Doing Business Report, the information is collected via questionnaire sent to national stakeholders. All the indicators are weighted equally. A traffic light system applicable to each indicator, category and pillar to indicate distance to frontier[48] has been designed. The "frontier" being 100 points:

- A green light is reported for countries with a score of 75 or more, which are considered close to good practice on a certain indicator or a pillar.
- A yellow light shows countries that are in between green and red.
- A red light indicates that a country scores 25 or less and has a lot to improve to achieve good practice on what RISE measures.

A country receiving a green light on a pillar (energy access, renewable energy, and energy efficiency) gives evidence to the investor about the commitment and credibility of government policymaking to create an attractive enabling environment.

6.7.3.4. Way forward

There is ample experience is assessing a given country's friendliness to investment, in particular to private investment. This experience has already been expanded to assess, in a pilot phase only in 17 countries, the enabling environments (friendliness) to investments on sustainable energy (RISE).

When this has been done, it seems reasonable to expect that it should be feasible to identify a set of indicators to characterize the relevant enabling environment for climate relevant investments, both in terms of mitigation as well as of adaptation. Plenty of work on that front has already been done, including at the UNFCCC level.

Given that readiness for climate relevant investments cannot be considered in isolation from overall investment friendliness, it seems advisable that any such assessment would take into account the overall investment environment in a given country. In this regard, the climate relevant investment readiness assessment should be a subset, a spin-off of a larger investments environment assessment, such as the Doing Business Report described above, and build upon already existing relevant initiatives such as RISE.

Macro-indicators to be measured in such a specific climate relevant investments friendliness assessment could include:

- The existence of an officially approved Nationally Determined Contribution
- The inclusion of a mitigation component within the NDC
- The inclusion of an adaptation component within the NDC

[48] The "frontier" is the best case identified and is set at 100.

- The adoption of a low emissions development plan, including detailed mitigation action (with estimated emissions reduction potential)
- The adoption of a national adaptation plan with detailed adaptation measures
- Institutional capacity for implementation of climate policy is established
- Appropriate industry conditions, such as engineering expertise and the enabling infrastructure are present
- A stable financial sector with capacity to support low carbon (development) is present
- Economic instruments that translate policy targets into price incentives that make low carbon technologies more attractive are present[49]

While the collection of the data required to assess climate relevant investment enabling environments could be done via biennial reports to the UNFCCC, it does not seem feasible to adopt guidance on such collection with the required level of detail. Therefore, it is apparently more effective to undertake such an endeavour close but outside the formal UNFCCC process.

6.8. MRV of private climate finance by UNFCCC Parties

MRV of mobilized private climate finance is not yet a strict requirement in the UNFCCC reporting guidelines, and therefore only few countries are doing so. The approaches taken by those few countries that have included references to mobilized private finance in their second Biennial Report are greatly distinct and no consistency or comparability among approaches and figures can be identified from the analysis of the reported information.

In fact, most countries have been making efforts to estimate private climate finance mobilized by public interventions on pilot studies or case studies, not committing to the completeness or accuracy of the figures reported. For that reason, countries opt to not include mobilized private climate finance figures in the climate finance totals reported.

The following sections provided an account of reporting on mobilized private finance by UNFCCC parties: Member States, other selected Annex I Parties (US, Japan, Australia) and non-Annex I Parties. As can be seen, the level of sophistication and completeness of the estimation of private climate finance mobilized by Member State´s public interventions is low and the figures derived from these rather limited exercises by few MS do not allow any sort of extrapolation to an overall figure.

6.8.1. Member States

No MS has included mobilized private finance in the totals (i.e. in the tables[50]). Most are silent about mobilizing private finance, some mention that it is not yet possible to include such figures, others refer to on-going initiatives aimed at tracking and reporting mobilized private finance (either national or international such as the OECD Research Collaborative). A very small number of MS

[49] The last 4 items are from Polycarp et al (2013)

[50] Except for Spain which includes inclusion of USD 5 +14 million in table 7b, but it is not clear whether that is actually included in the totals

(ES, FI, FR, SE, UK) report a description of the public initiatives aimed at mobilizing private finance. In some of such descriptions, the amount of public finance involved is reporting and in fewer, a description of the amount of private finance leveraged is also identified.

6.8.1.1. Finland (2nd BUR)

As there are no appropriate data collection systems in place and due to confidentiality clauses related to some private sector data at the moment Finland does not estimate nor report regularly climate related private finance mobilized. Finland focuses instead at the moment to following and actively participating, when possible, to the multilateral discussions on the subject. However, in 2013 a very rough estimation was made, based on which Finland could mobilize yearly about USD 0.5–1.8 billion private climate finance to developing countries. This estimation was made using the analyses by Stadelmann and Michaelowa (2011)[51] *and should be taken only as a very initial estimation, which may not be comparable to other estimations.*

The Finnish Fund for Industrial Cooperation Ltd (Finnfund) is a state-owned company that finances private projects in developing countries by providing long-term risk capital for profitable projects. The funding modalities include ***equity investments, loans and/or guarantees****.*

During the reporting period, Finnfund provided approximately in total EUR 28 million, which can be included in Finnish public climate funding, and Finnpartnership provided approximately EUR 0.2 million. According to rough estimates, the public funding through Finnfund's climate-related projects ***leverages private funding at a level at about two to three times*** *that of Finnfund's funding for the investment, and the ratio can even be higher.*

Other climate finance and technology transfer activities […], such as the Energy and Environment Partnership (EEP), have also leveraged private finance. In the case of the EEP it has leveraged private finance at about 50% co-financing share.

6.8.1.2. France (2nd BR)

For the first time, France has estimated private climate finance mobilised through its public funding and projects in developing countries, for the years 2013 and 2014.

Total estimated private finance mobilised stood at approximately €596 million (US$791 million) in 2013 and €681 million (US$904 million) in 2014.

Key methodological choices by France to estimate the figures above include:

- *Categorization of actors based on >50% public ownership according to OECD DAC definition, with a filter extracting out French state-owned enterprises acting as "prudent investors"*
- *All private climate finance flows count (incl. domestic), but distinguish that originating from Annex I countries* (when possible)
- *Impact of TA or grants for policy support of project preparation is not included in the numbers. Guarantees not included either.*
- Point of measurement: mix of commitment (board approval) and disbursement

[51] Accounting of Private Climate Finance Types of Finance, Data Gaps and the 100 Billion Dollar Question

- Data is collected at project level, while proxies are used for credit lines
- Causality: all private finance identified (co-financing) is assumed to have been mobilised by the public intervention. When other public donors involved it is attributed pro-rata based on the share of the French public finance in the total amount of public finance for the project.

6.8.1.3. Spain (2nd BR)

Spain manages a set of public financial instruments with the potential to mobilize private climate finance:

- Fondo para la Internacionalización de la Empresa: provides direct financing to exporting Spanish companies. A single operation has been identified which mobilized USD 5 million in 2014.
- It has not been possible to estimate mobilization of private climate financing through interventions of Spain's export credit agency.
- COFIDES is Spain's development bank, providing direct support to the internationalization of Spanish companies, has mobilized an estimated USD 14 million.

6.8.1.4. Sweden (2nd BR)

Sweden has established public risk sharing mechanisms to promote climate private financing Instruments used including loans and guarantees. Sweden lists an indicative list of projects where private climate finance has been mobilized (indicating also when other public interventions have been involved). It mentions that the *leveraging is calculated for each project, following OECD DAC methodology* without providing further explanations. It stresses that the figures on private climate finance mobilized for these indicative projects are not included in the totals.

6.8.1.5. UK (2nd BR)

The UK has identified a number of instruments which are aimed at mobilizing private climate finance. It reports on the public financing involved and for one in specific, the UK Green Investment Bank, it reported on the estimated mobilized (leveraged) private finance: £200 million public financing, leveraging £360 million of private investment.

The UK is not clear on how this leveraging potential has been determined and does not mention if this figure is included in the totals.

6.8.2. Other Annex I Parties

Australia, Canada, Norway and the US do not include estimates of private climate finance mobilized by public interventions.

Some of the countries above, in particular the US, provide some brief information about the public instruments capable of mobilizing private finance, but do not provide figures for these instruments nor estimates of its leveraging potential.

6.8.3. Non-Annex I Parties

No non-Annex I Parties identify private finance mobilized by developed countries public policies.

7. Task 4: Assessment of additional thematic fields

It had been foreseen that the work to be carried out under task 4 would be discussed with DG Climate unit A2 and decided at a phone call after the workshop in February. Due to changes in the responsibilities, this was not yet discussed and determined. Therefore this task could not yet be elaborated for this draft final report. The following sections outline two tasks that are proposed under task 4.

7.1. Submission on accounting of financial resources

Article 9, paragraph 7 of the Paris Agreement includes a mandate to develop modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions. SBSTA 44 discussed this issue and invited Parties and observer organizations to provide submissions on this topic by 29 August 2016. The submissions should consider several questions outlined in the SBSTA conclusions:

(a) What are the existing modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions, and what are the challenges and information gaps with respect to these existing modalities;

(b) What accounting modalities need to be developed to serve the Paris Agreement, in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Agreement, and what are the challenges to the development of these accounting modalities and how can these be addressed;

(c) How to ensure that accounting modalities are developed in time to be integrated into the transparency framework established under the Paris Agreement.

The secretariat will compile the submissions into a miscellaneous document. In addition an in-session workshop will take place on this matter in conjunction with SBSTA 45 in November 2016. The secretariat will produce a technical paper prior to SBSTA 46 in May 2017, summarizing information from the in-session workshop and the submissions.

It was agreed that the work under task 4 should provide a contribution to this submission on modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions which could then be forwarded as an input from the Commission in the work process under EGI.

The input to the EU submission is structured in accordance with the questions outlined in the SBSTA conclusions in document FCCC/SBSTA/2016/L.5 (UNFCCC 2016) in the following sections.

7.1.1. What are the existing modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions, and what are the challenges and information gaps with respect to these existing modalities

7.1.1.1. Existing modalities

The current reporting of financial resources provided are based on the UNFCCC guidance for biennial reports as provided in decision 2/CP.17 which significantly improved the previous reporting of support through the national communications and the CTF format as updated by decision

9/CP.21. The following paragraphs describe key features of the current accounting framework applied by the EU and its Member States underpinning the reporting to the UNFCCC.

The EU support and follows the operational definition for reporting climate finance as provided by the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) in its "2014 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows Reported" which is *"Climate finance aims at reducing emissions, and enhancing sinks of greenhouse gases and aims at reducing vulnerability of, and maintaining and increasing the resilience of, human and ecological systems to negative climate change impacts*". (UNFCCC SCF, 2014)

In line with the joint statement of ministers on Tracking Progress Towards the $100 billion Goal from September 2015 in Paris (Joint Statement 2015), the EU considers mobilized climate finance to include:

- Public finance provided by governments through a variety of institutions including through the operating entities of the financial mechanism of the Convention, bilateral aid agencies, development finance institutions, export credit agencies (ECAs) and multilateral entities;
- Climate finance provided through a multitude of instrument such as concessional and non-concessional, including grants, loans, equity, and de-risking instruments, where such finance is identified as climate relevant using criteria in line with those agreed within relevant international organizations such as the OECD, IPCC, and MDBs.
- Private finance for climate-relevant activities that has been mobilized by public finance or by a public policy intervention, including technical assistance to enable policy and regulatory reform.

The accounting framework is characterized by the following principles:

- Where multiple actors are involved, the resulting finance is only counted once in tracking progress.
- Recognising the role that developing countries play in mobilizing private finance, the method only includes the share of private finance mobilized by developed countries, excluding the share of private finance that developing countries' public finance has mobilized.
- The assessment of the amount of private finance mobilized is done on an activity-by-activity basis and the reporting on mobilized private finance is associated with public activities where there is a clear causal link between a public intervention and private finance and where the activity would not have moved forward, or moved forward at scale, in the absence of the public intervention.
- The reporting framework should encourage and incentivise the most effective use of climate finance.

Other relevant aspects of the current methodologies are:

- The EU's reporting on climate finance for adaptation, mitigation and cross-cutting activities is drawing on existing definitions and eligibility criteria from relevant international organisations (e.g. the OECD DAC Rio markers, Joint MDB Typology of Mitigation Activities, and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)).

- Definitions and classifications outlined in the OECD DAC Statistical Reporting Directives underpin a consistent, comparable and transparent data collection across Member States and the European Commission. These include inter alia reporting rules and requirements for commitments, disbursements, financial instruments, exchange rates, sector codes and points of measurement.[52] The following specific definitions and approaches are particularly relevant in this context:
    - Definition of climate change mitigation: An activity should be classified as climate-change mitigation related (score Principal or Significant) if: it contributes to the objective of stabilisation of greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system by promoting efforts to reduce or limit GHG emissions or to enhance GHG sequestration
    - Definition of climate change adaptation: An activity should be classified as adaptation-related (score Principal or Significant) if: it intends to reduce the vulnerability of human or natural systems to the impacts of climate change and climate-related risks, by maintaining or increasing adaptive capacity and resilience. This encompasses a range of activities from information and knowledge generation, to capacity development, planning and the implementation of climate change adaptation actions.
    - The DAC monitors development finance through its Creditor Reporting System (CRS) using the "Rio markers". Markers indicate donors' policy objectives in relation to each activity, where every development co-operation activity reported to the CRS should be screened and marked as either (i) targeting the Conventions as a "principal" objective or a "significant" objective, or (ii) not targeting the objective. Activities marked as having a "principal" climate objective would not have been funded but for that objective; activities marked "significant" have other prime objectives but have been formulated or adjusted to help meet climate change concerns.
    - The definition to determine whether financial flow are public are those undertaken by central, state or local government agencies at their own risk and responsibility, regardless of whether these agencies have raised the funds through taxation or through borrowing from the private sector (OECD DAC, 2016).
    - The EU and its Member States use of OECD DAC definitions for financial instruments as characterised in detail by OECD DAC (2016).
    - The EU and its Member States use OECD DAC definitions for Other official flows (OOF) as provided by the OECD DAC (OECD 2016).
    - Financial instruments are usually accounted for at cash face value.

The existing modalities for the accounting and reporting of financial resources of the EU, in particular the aggregate financial resources provided and mobilized at EU level are based on

[52] OECD DAC (2016), "Converged Statistical Reporting Directives for the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and the Annual DAC Questionnaire", 8. April 2016, Document No DCD/DAC(2016)3/FINAL Available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/DCDDAC%282016%293FINAL.pdf

Article 16 of the EU Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) [53]. This Article requires annual reporting on support provided to developing countries by 30 September of Member States in the same format as used under the UNFCCC for the biennial reports to the Commission. With regard to accounting methodologies paragraph 2 of Article 16 specifies that Member States shall endeavour to provide information on financial flows based on the so-called 'Rio markers' for climate change mitigation-related support and climate change adaptation-related support introduced by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Member States are also requested to provide methodological information concerning the implementation of the climate change Rio markers methodology. Thus, the EU and many Member States are largely building on the OECD's longstanding experience in measuring and monitoring development finance and in tracking climate-related development finance through the OECD DAC Statistical Framework.

Paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the MMR requires Member States to report information on the definitions and methodologies used to determine any figures on private financial flows mobilised. As the reporting on private finance mobilized is currently under further development to enable countries to provide clear and transparent information, the EU and its Member States are also cooperating closely with the more recently established and OECD-hosted "Research Collaborative for Tracking Private Climate Finance" an open network, co-ordinated and hosted by the OECD, of governments, research institutions and international finance institutions with the objective to advance policy-relevant research related to methodologies to estimate mobilised private climate finance, collaborating across the DAC, Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), countries and expert organisations.

At EU level, for aggregate EU-28 figures on climate finance reported in 2015, OECD DAC statistics on 'imputed multilateral contributions' based on inflow data to multilateral funds and multilateral financial institutions have been used where figures are collected through the OECD DAC system based on detailed activity-level data within the statistical framework to ensure no double counting. However, such imputed multilateral contributions are not available for all climate funds, MDBs and relevant organizations. In addition, it does not include finance mobilized by the MDBs. Thus, work in the future should aim to broaden the availability of such data for more fund and institutions.

7.1.1.2. Challenges and gaps

General challenges

Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development and assessing the impacts and effectiveness of climate finance

As outlined in the 2014 Biennial Assessment report of the SCF an important area of future work is the assessment whether climate finance is helping to achieve the overarching goal of the Convention of keeping climate change within 2 degrees. It is key that not only our understanding of the financial flows related to climate activities from developed to developing countries improves, but to understand the mitigation and adaptation impacts of these financial flows. It will not contribute to achieve global climate objectives if the finance is not used effectively and efficiently. The objective expressed in Article 2, paragraph 1 (c) of the Paris agreement to make finance flows

[53] OJ, L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 13: Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on a mechanism for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and for reporting other information at national and Union level relevant to climate change and repealing Decision No 280/2004/EC..

consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development requires that the impacts on GHG emissions and climate-resilient development are tracked. Thus the main challenge for the development of accounting modalities for climate finance is that climate finance providers start assessing the impacts of mitigation finance on emissions. In addition there is a need to develop methodologies for assessing impacts of adaptation finance on resilience and effective adaptation which are much less developed and considerable further work is needed in this area. At the same time, the right enabling environments are fundamental to promote shifting finance to climate related areas, i.e. to mainstream climate finance. In this regards, MRV, including accounting of climate finance should contribute to promoting enabling environments aiming at incentivizing and facilitating climate investments.

Mainstreaming and co-benefits

In past years development assistance focused on working towards mainstreaming climate change into development planning and the related implementation of development plans and increased support to budgetary approaches compared to specific individual project activities. Such comprehensive and more holistic approach creates challenges for the monitoring of climate finance for mitigation and adaptation as it is more complicated to identify the climate-specific contributions if the support is addressing development priorities in a coherent and cross-cutting way. It is important that any accounting modalities for climate finance discussed under the UNFCCC do not disincentivise such mainstreaming activities.

Developing countries as well as developed countries have identified considerable co-benefits between activities targeting adaptation and mitigation simultaneously. Other co-benefits exist between adaptation and mitigation as well as forestry activities as recently identified in 2015 forum of the SCF. Thus there is a considerable potential for multiple co-benefits from jointly addressing several climate-related objectives into support activities and programmes. This also poses challenges for Parties in the reporting on climate finance, in particular for the separation of climate finance into mitigation and adaptation. It is important that methodologies for tracking climate finance reflect such multiple co-benefits in an appropriate way that creates incentives to enhance and use such co-benefits.

In its 2014 biennial assessment the SCF concluded that “Activities improving climate-resilience are rarely stand-alone but are mostly integrated into mainstream development interventions and business activities, for example, in the agricultural or water sectors. Due to this integration, support provided and investments in climate resilience are difficult to classify as such and therefore rarely reported as adaptation finance. Further work is therefore needed how monitoring of adaptation finance can be improved as the concepts of “adaptation” and “climate resilience” are well understood in the UNFCCC context, but not widely used in the development assistance contexts that implement activities that contribute to climate resilience.

Mobilization of climate finance

Article 9, paragraph 3 and 7 address particularly that the reporting is not only about climate finance provided, but also finance mobilized. The extent to which mobilisation of private finance happens depends on many factors, including the enabling conditions and sector-specific policies in the recipient country, the institution providing the finance, the type of instrument, and the purpose for which public finance is being made available. The measurement and reporting of mobilised private finance has only been initiated and needs to be further developed   The range of actors and complexity of interactions associated with mobilising private climate finance makes it challenging to isolate the specific mobilisation effect of each public finance intervention. Thus further

methodological work is clearly required to improve monitoring and reporting of mobilisation at the international level. More work is needed to more accurately assess and make plausible assumptions about the causal relationship between public finance interventions and the private finance they mobilize directly and indirectly. Another area of work is the attribution of finance mobilized to countries or organizations. In this context it is also essential better understanding of how to account for policy-related public interventions, as domestic policy frameworks and wider enabling environments for investment are critical drivers of investments. Also at technical level in terms of reporting formats, improvements have to be implemented to address climate finance mobilized because currently there is no table or field for reporting numerical data in the reporting tables where Parties can report financial resources mobilized through public interventions.

Specific challenges and gaps

Improved terminology

The information provided in the section on existing modalities shows that a wide range of technical definitions are already available. In its reports the SCF also provided useful proposals for consistent use of terminology for climate finance in many areas. The use and reference to terminology, definitions and approaches already available and used could further improve the existing reporting guidelines for climate finance. Similar to the reporting on GHG emissions, where most of the terminology, approaches and methodologies are outlined in IPCC guidelines, it does not seem necessary to replicate such definitions or approaches as part of guidance under the UNFCCC, but references to available scientific work and guidance could further enhance the current guidance in an efficient way.

Structure of methodological information

In Paris in decision 9/CP.21 important changes to the current reporting framework have been agreed by creating specific reporting fields for the provision of information on definitions or methodologies used for reporting information in the following reporting parameters: “climate-specific” or “core/general”, “status”, “funding source”, “activity”, “financial instrument”, “type of support” and “sector”. This change will be implemented for the reporting in the biennial reports in 2018. The resulting information should be carefully assessed to what extent it led to improved transparency on the methodologies used by Parties. Based on such assessment, it could be useful to further improve the reporting of methodological information related to the monitoring of climate finance. The reporting template could be further developed through specifying the approaches available and used by Parties which could then be selected by countries in the reporting templates. Such further development of the reporting template could also include references to OECD DAC definitions for some of the reporting categories (e.g. financial instruments) as these definitions seem to be widely used by reporting Parties. Additional explanations should be required when different definitions are used. Such approach could make the reporting more efficient and complete at the same time.

Classification of “developing country” recipients:

Under the UNFCCC reporting there is a gap in the definition of recipients for climate finance. Under the UNFCCC it could be all Non-Annex I Parties, under the OECD DAC there is a different list of ODA eligible recipients and additional concepts may be used in bilateral public development assistance. From the perspective of accounting modalities, it would be useful to clarify the list of recipients as part of the guidance under the UNFCCC.

Forest finance flows

The 2015 Forum of the SCF discussed financing of forests and participants noted that there are gaps in data and information on forest finance flows. Currently, there is no commonly agreed definition of forest finance and what qualifies as forest finance. Information on private finance for forests is largely unavailable due to the difficulty in tracking. Participants mentioned that this poses challenges to governments and investors alike, in acquiring necessary information for designing policies or making investment decisions. The current reporting guidance or reporting template does not address forest finance apart from the choice of sector in the reporting table for bilateral support and Parties do not have an opportunity to provide separate information on finance provided related to forest activities. Forest finance could either be part of mitigation, adaptation or cross-cutting climate finance. Some countries also report forest finance under other in order to be able to separately report on forest finance. There is also no clear link between coordination of support for the implementation of the activities under the Warsaw framework for REDD-plus referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70 and the work on the improvement of the transparency of climate finance. Given the importance of REDD-plus finance and other support related to forests in the context of the UNFCCC, this link should be further discussed and the EU hopes that the 2016 Biennial Report of the SCF will provide further insights in this matter.

7.1.2. What accounting modalities need to be developed to serve the Paris Agreement, in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Agreement, and what are the challenges to the development of these accounting modalities and how can these be addressed

The further development of modalities and guidelines related to climate finance should address the challenges and gaps outlined in the previous section of this submission.

Accounting modalities go beyond a transparent presentation of information because they ensure that specific principles established as part of the Paris Agreement guide the implementation of the reporting. Therefore it is crucial for the development of accounting modalities to gain a common understanding of what these principles are.

The EU believes that transparency, completeness, consistency, comparability and accuracy are the key principles that should guide accounting of both support and for mitigation action. The SCF already provided more specific guidance how some these principles apply to climate finance and this work should be further developed.

Accuracy related to GHG emissions is defined that estimates should be accurate in the sense that they are systematically neither over nor under true values, as far as can be judged, and that uncertainties are reduced as far as practicable. Thus, the concept of uncertainties plays a significant role in the assessment of the accuracy of GHG emissions. The concept of uncertainties could also be applied to finance flows provided and mobilized as different types of flows will be connected with quite different levels of uncertainties. An approach that provides uncertainties for the aggregation of information could also be further discussed related to climate finance as an methodological approach that allows an aggregation of estimates that are sometimes related to significant uncertainties without the possibility to gather more robust data by making the implicit uncertainties transparent. The identification of uncertainties also helps to prioritize data collection and efforts to improve data.

In addition to the TACCC principles, paragraph 92 of decision 17CP.21 established several additional principles relevant under the Paris agreement:

1. The importance of facilitating improved reporting and transparency over time;
2. The need to avoid duplication as well as undue burden on Parties and the secretariat;
3. The need to ensure that Parties maintain at least the frequency and quality of reporting in accordance with their respective obligations under the Convention;
4. The need to ensure that double counting is avoided;
5. The need to ensure environmental integrity

In the context of climate finance, these principles have to be further discussed and the EU therefore provides some initial thoughts on how these principles apply in the context of climate finance:

Given the considerable challenges outlined above for the tracking of climate finance, Parties will need to follow a stepwise and ongoing improvement process in the future and it is important to implement the principle of “improved reporting and transparency over time” in this context. It is important to acknowledge that additional development of accounting modalities, refined definitions or methodologies need considerable time until they are systematically implemented in the data collection systems and before data can be consistently collected as part of the routine statistical procedures. Thus, it may take several years until changes come fully into effect, in particular as for climate finance, such improvements need to be implemented across a range of countries, organisations and international financial institutions.

The need to avoid duplication in the context of climate finance needs to be considered not only from the perspective of Parties and the secretariat, but also including international finance institutions, funds as well as private stakeholders. Therefore accounting modalities should carefully assess at which level (Parties, international finance organizations) additional guidance should apply and how reporting from different entities and institutions can be brought together in the most efficient and effective way for a transparent overview of global finance provided.

Given the large number of stakeholders involved in the provision of climate finance, it is important to ensure that double counting across donors is avoided. The way this is currently implemented was already outlined related to the first question in this submission.

The need to ensure environmental integrity implies that accounting modalities take into account the impacts and the effectiveness of climate finance, and its contribution to keeping climate change within two degrees centigrade as further outlined under gaps and challenges.

In the development of methodologies, definitions and accounting modalities for mitigation, e.g. for the land-use sector, SBSTA considerably draw on scientific work conducted by the IPCC. The EU believes that also further work on methodologies and accounting modalities for climate finance require further scientific input and the work under SBSTA will strongly depend on scientific work conducted by other organizations. Consistent and coherent accounting requires consistent methodologies over a wide range of actors which can only achieved if all actors are involved in the further development of the scientific approach for tracking of climate finance. Therefore the EU believes that the successful implementation of the task under SBSTA will depend to a large extent how Parties will manage to involve important actors that provided scientific research and

developed methodologies in the past such as OECD DAC, the OECD research collaborative on tracking private climate finance, Multilateral Development Banks, the International Development Finance Club or regional development banks will be involved in this work.

7.1.3. How to ensure that accounting modalities are developed in time to be integrated into the transparency framework established under the Paris Agreement

In accordance with Article 13, paragraph 6 the purpose of the framework for transparency of support is to provide clarity on support provided and received by relevant individual Parties in the context of climate change actions under Articles 4, 7, 9, 10 and 11, and, to the extent possible, to provide a full overview of aggregate financial support provided, to inform the global stocktake under Article 14. Specific reporting requirements related to climate finance include that developed country Parties shall, and other Parties that provide support should, provide information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support provided to developing country Parties under Articles 9, 10 and 11 (Article 13, paragraph 9) and that developing country Parties should provide information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support needed and received under Articles 9, 10 and 11 (Article 13, paragraph 10). The relevant Articles to the provision of support under Article 9 are paragraphs 1, 2 and 7.

As already outlined in the previous section, it is important that the work on accounting modalities for financial resources addresses the principles outlined in paragraph 92 of decision 1/CP.1 as these are guiding the elaboration of modalities, procedures and guidelines for the enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement.

Paragraph 96 of decision 1/CP.21 requests the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) to conclude the work on the modalities, procedures and guidelines for the enhanced transparency framework under Article 13 no later than 2018. This means that any outcome of the work process under SBSTA elaborated and finalized prior to the end of 2018 can be integrated into the revised common guidelines, modalities and procedures under Article 13. As no more detailed work programme has been elaborated related to the work under Article 13 under APA so far, nor any discussion took place related to the expected outputs in terms of guidelines, modalities or procedures, it cannot yet be specified in a more detailed way how the work under SBSTA could be undertaken in a way that creates most synergies with the work under Article 13. The EU expects that the work under Article 13 will elaborate reporting guidelines, guidelines for the technical expert review under Article 13, paragraph 11 as well as modalities for a facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress. Any specific outcomes in terms of reporting requirements or reporting tables under the SBSTA work programme would feed into the work on reporting guidelines under APA.

The purpose of the framework for transparency of support also includes the provision a full overview of aggregate financial support provided, to inform the global stocktake under Article 14. In this respect the accounting modalities may also address how the reported information from a wide range of actors can be made accessible to Parties and stakeholders in a searchable way and in a way that allows transparent aggregation. The addition of information from various sources and stakeholders may imply additional accounting decisions beyond any guidance provided to Parties which should be discussed in a transparent way if such aggregate information is informing the global stocktake.

7.2. Specific proposals for the revision of the "Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the MMR"

Table 7-1 provides conclusions related to the proposals and options given as recommendations under task 2 based on the comments received from Member States on these recommendations. The table provides an indication whether and how these recommendations should be implemented in the "Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the MMR". The colour in the column conclusions follows a traffic light approach indicating in green which recommendations where supported by practically all Member States, in yellow those recommendations or proposals that were largely supported, but for which few Member States expressed concerns and using red for those proposals that were not supported by many Member States or where opposing views were expressed.

Table 7-1 Overview of recommendations related to the "Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support under the MMR"

Issue	Proposal or Options	Conclusions
1. Format of Member States replies	The same changes as agreed in decision 9/CP.21 for the CTF should be applied to the reporting tables used for the reporting under Article 16 of the MMR.	✓ Proposal implemented in technical guidance (2016)
2. Template for methodological information	**Option 1:** integrate a specific new template (covering e.g. explanations how imputed multilateral climate-specific contributions were determined). **Option 2:** integrate the template developed by the OECD joint ENVIRONET-WP-STAT Task Team on the methodological approaches for reporting.	⇨ Option 1 is preferred by more MS than option 2 ⇨ With some discussion, it is assumed, that one of these options could be implemented in the 2017 technical guidance
3. Coverage of core contributions and climate-specific finance for multilateral climate finance	**1.** If reported, core/general and climate-specific data should be mutually exclusive except where climate-specific contributions are made to specific sub-funds or dedicated programmes of the overarching institutions to which also core funding is provided. **2.** Include a list of funds and programmes as climate specific only. **3.** Indicate any multilateral fund, financial institution or UN body reported under 'other' with its name. **4.** Indicate if Member States use OECD imputed multilateral contributions (add in template suggested under 2).	⇨ With some discussion this proposal could be implemented in the 2017 technical guidance
4. Coverage of multilateral funds or development	**1.** Contributions to the UNFCCC should be clarified. **2.** Amend the reporting tables related to contributions to the Montreal Protocol	⇨ With some discussion this proposal could be implemented in the 2017

Issue	Proposal or Options	Conclusions
banks	**3.** Include additional rows in the reporting template for most frequently reported other multilateral climate change funds, multilateral institutions and other specialized UN bodies	technical guidance ⇨ Option 3 appears to be less controversial than options 1 and 2
5. Reporting on financial instruments	Request an explanation of the methodology used when loans or other financial instruments are reported	⇨ With some discussion this proposal could be implemented in the 2017 technical guidance
6. Definition of recipient countries	**Proposal [new option 1]** Use the OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries and deduct Annex I countries (Ukraine, Belarus, Turkey) **[new option 2]** Use the OECD DAC list of ODA eligible countries. **[new option 3]** Keep the difference between technical guidance and BR guidance.	× Views are opposing on the three options × Unclear if a solution can be found to implement this in the 2017 technical guidance
7. Point of measurement	Include further guidance for the use of 'committed' and 'disbursed' for loans, export credits or guarantees, including the discussions in OECD DAC	⇨ With little discussion this proposal could be implemented in the 2017 technical guidance
8. Coverage of funding sources	**1.** Member States should use the definitions for OOF as provided by the OECD DAC, or provide additional explanations. **2.** If OOF flows are reported, MS shall explain as part of the methodological information which flows are covered under OOF. **3.** If no OOF are reported, MS should indicate whether OOF flows do or do not occur. **[new option]** no change required	⇨ There is wide agreement for the three points made under this proposal; however, a new option was introduced. ⇨ With little discussion this proposal could be implemented in the 2017 technical guidance
9. Coverage of instruments reported	**1.** Include references to OECD DAC definitions for financial instruments including a list of instruments that could be reported under 'other **2.** If 'other instruments' are reported, MS shall explain which instruments are covered. **3.** If no 'other instruments' are reported, indicate whether such instruments do or do not occur.	✓ Proposal can be implemented in technical guidance (2017) ✓ The OECD adds "a new taxonomy of financial instruments has been introduced in DAC statistics (starting with 2016 data)".
10. Currency conversion rate	**1.** Add a specific field in the MMR table template for the reporting of the currency conversion rate used. **2.** Recommendation using the OECD yearly average exchange rate and link it to the source.	✓ Proposal can be implemented in technical guidance (2017)
11. Financial resources mobilized through public interventions	**1.** Add a field for numerical data in the reporting tables for financial resources mobilized through public interventions. **2.** Add a requirement that MS who report such figures should provide methodological information how mobilized resources were estimated.	⇨ There is wide agreement for the two points; however, one member state expresses need for further discussion.
12. Coverage of	**Option 1a:** Keep the current guidance.	⇨ With some discussion

Issue	Proposal or Options	Conclusions
cross-cutting and other climate-specific finance	**Option 1b:** cross-cutting should be used for 'funding for activities which are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation' only if countries cannot assign a contribution to adaptation and mitigation through the use of Rio markers. **[New Option 1b amended:]** Add at the end of 1b "or a transparent national methodology". **Option 2:** Add the following element to the technical guidance note: Countries who like to separate finance flows provided to REDD+ activities or forestry activities should report such flows under 'other climate-specific finance'.	this proposal could be implemented in the 2017 technical guidance ⇨ Option 1b (amended) and 2 appear to be less controversial than option 1a ⇨ According to the OECD it is "important to understand if the cross-cutting amounts are to be added or subtracted from the mitigation and adaptation amounts".
13. Identification of mitigation/adaptation activities and use of OECD DAC indicators	Discuss whether it is possible to develop a common approach or at least apply some elements of the marking system in a consistent way	× Views are opposing on this proposal × Unclear if a solution can be found to implement this in the 2017 technical guidance

7.2.1. Revision of the "Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the MMR"

On the basis of the evaluation in Table 7-1, the recommendations and proposals related to the technical guidance that were supported by all Member States (green) and most of those supported by many countries (yellow) have been implemented in the revised technical guidance proposed in Annex VII (section 9.7). This revised version is based on the 6 June 2016 version and the respective template provided as Annex I. As the proposed technical guidance would apply to the year 2017, it was updated accordingly. The changes in the technical guidance document include the following elements:

- The section on DAC reporting on development finance was moved to the section on "definition of financial instruments".
- A specific field for the OECD currency conversion rate was included in the template and referenced in the technical guidance.
- OECD definitions for commitments and disbursements have been added in a tablular format.
- For coverage of cross-cutting and other climate-specific finance, a new option is presented where Member States should use 'funding for activities which are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation' only if they cannot assign a contribution to adaptation and mitigation through the use of Rio markers or a transparent national methodology.
- The joint paragraph of financing source and financial instruments under section "definition" was divided into two separate paragraphs. In terms of coverage of funding sources, additional guidance for Other Official Flows (OOF) was included. This additional guidance requests Member States that they should use the definitions for OOF as provided by the

OECD DAC (OECD 2016a). If they use a national definition different from the OECD DAC definition, additional explanations should be provided by Member States as part of the methodological information. If OOF flows are reported, Member States shall explain as part of the methodological information which flows are covered under OOF. If no OOF are reported, Member States should indicate in the methodological template whether OOF flows do or do not occur.

- Concerning the use of the category “other” in the coverage of instruments reported, an explanation and specification of what is included is requested. It is also requested to indicate whether such instruments do or do not occur.
- An exception to the rule that core/general and climate-specific data should be mutually exclusive was added to core/general and climate-specific contributions through multilateral channels. In such cases where climate-specific contributions are made to specific sub-funds or dedicated programmes of the overarching institutions to which also core funding is provided, an exemption can be made. In this case, the core funding should be reported as well as climate specific funding and it should be explained how core and climate-specific contributions have been differentiated. It should also be clearly indicated to which sub-funds or programmes the climate-specific contributions are contributing.
- It is furthermore added that any multilateral fund, financial institution or UN body reported under “other” should be clearly indicated with its name.
- The numerical reporting field for private climate finance mobilized, which was added to the template, is referenced in the technical guidance and Member States should describe this in the methodological report.

Changes in the template, Annex I to the technical guidance

Annex I to the “Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the MMR” provides the proposed and revised 2017 template. Changes have been made in table 7, summary information, and table 7(a), contributions through multilateral channels. Changes to the 2016 version are indicated with grey background. Two fields and three footnotes were added to the summary information table. The changes introduced can be summarised as follows:

A currency conversion rate field was included which is linked to the OECD yearly average conversion rate. An additional field was added to indicate financial resources mobilized through public interventions. This field is non-mandatory but if filled in, Member States are encouraged to provide methodological information how those mobilized resources were estimated. For the reporting of OOF, a footnote was added asking Member States to either write “not occurring” or “not estimated”, if no value is reported.

Six United Nation bodies as well as two footnotes were added to table 7(a), contributions through multilateral channels. Climate-specific fields were blocked for the World Bank. As recitals 1-7 were indicated without the according footnotes, these were copied from the summary information table and added as a footnote. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN REDD), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) were added under Specialized United

Nation bodies. Member States are asked to indicate each fund, institution or specialized United Nation body reported under "other" with its name.

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9. Annex

9.1. Annex I: Detailed comparison of methodologies for multilateral finance

The following tables were the basis for the analysis of different methodologies used to report on multilateral climate finance (chapter 4.2.1). The information provided in Tables 7 and 7a from each Member State´s second biennial report (BR2/UNFCCC) and Article 16 of the MMR were analysed and compared. Additionally, qualitative information on methodologies provided in BRs and methodological notes submitted together with MMR reports were taken into account.

Table 9-1: Comparison of methodologies for reporting on multilateral climate finance in BRs/MMR

	core/ general	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	committed / pledged	Disbursed /Provided	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Other	Sector information provided	Sector definition based on OECD DAC	Other sector definition	ODA	OOF	other
	Coverage of core /climate-specific finance					Point of Measurement/ Status		Coverage of instruments reported					Coverage of sectors	Definition of sectors		Funding source		
Austria MMR	x	x	-	x	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x		
Austria BR	-	-	-	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-
Belgium MMR	x	x	x	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	x	x	-	x	x	-
Belgium BR	x	x	x	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	x	x	-	x	-	x
Bulgaria MMR	x	x	-	x	-		x	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-

	core/ general	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	committed / pledged	Disbursed /Provided	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Other	Sector information provided	Sector definition based on OECD DAC	Other sector definition	ODA	OOF	other
	Coverage of core /climate-specific finance					**Point of Measurement/ Status**		**Coverage of instruments reported**					**Coverage of sectors**	**Definition of sectors**		**Funding source**		
Bulgaria BR	no climate finance reported																	
Croatia MMR	x	-	-	-	-													
Croatia BR	x	-	-	-	-							x						
Cyprus MMR	no climate finance reported																	
Cyprus BR	no BR2 submitted yet (20.02.2016)																	
Czech Republic MMR	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	x					-	-	-	x		
Czech Republic BR	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-
Denmark MMR	x	x	-	x	x	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	x	x	-	x	-	-
Denmark BR	x	x	x	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	x			x	-	-

	core/ general	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	committed / pledged	Disbursed /Provided	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Other	Sector information provided	Sector definition based on OECD DAC	Other sector definition	ODA	OOF	other
	Coverage of core /climate-specific finance					Point of Measurement/ Status		Coverage of instruments reported					Covera ge of sectors	Definition of sectors		Funding source		
Estonia MMR	x	-	x	x	-	-	x	x					(x)			x	x	-
Estonia BR	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	x					-	-	-	x	x	-
Finland MMR	x	x	x	x	-	-	x	x					x	x		x		
Finland BR	x	x	x	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	-						
France MMR	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	x					x	x		x		
France BR	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	x					x	x		x		
Germany MMR	x	x	x	x	x	-	x	x					-	-	-	x		
Germany BR	x	x	x	x	x	-	x	x					-	-	-	x		
Greece MMR	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	x					x			x		
Greece BR	no BR submitted (20.02.2016)																	
Hungary MMR	x	x	x	x				x					x	x		x		
Hungary BR	x	x					x	x					x			x		
Ireland MMR	x	x	x	x			x	x					x		x	x		
Ireland BR	x	x	x	x	x		x	x					x		x	x		x

	Coverage of core /climate-specific finance					Point of Measurement/ Status		Coverage of instruments reported					Coverage of sectors	Definition of sectors		Funding source		
	core/ general	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	committed / pledged	Disbursed /Provided	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Other	Sector information provided	Sector definition based on OECD DAC	Other sector definition	ODA	OOF	other
Italy MMR	x	x	x	x			x	x					x			x	x	
Italy BR		x		x			x	x					x			x		
Latvia MMR	-	x		x	x	x	x	x					x			x		x
Latvia BR		x			x	x	x	x					x			x		x
Lithuania MMR	x	x		x			x	x					x			x		
Lithuania BR	x	x		x			x	x					x			x		
Luxembourg MMR			x	x		x	x	x					-			x	x	
Luxembourg BR	x	x	x	x		x	x	x					x			x	x	
Malta MMR	x	x	x		x	x		x					x	x		x		
Malta BR	x																	
Netherlands MMR	x	x		x			x	x					x		x	x		
Netherlands BR	x	x		x			x	x					x			x		
Poland MMR	x			x			x	x					x	x		x		

	core/ general	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	committed / pledged	Disbursed /Provided	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Other	Sector information provided	Sector definition based on OECD DAC	Other sector definition	ODA	OOF	other
	Coverage of core /climate-specific finance					**Point of Measurement/ Status**		**Coverage of instruments reported**					**Coverage of sectors**	**Definition of sectors**		**Funding source**		
Poland BR	x			x			x	x					x			x		
Portugal MMR	x						x	x					-			x		
Portugal BR	x						x	x								x		
Romania MMR	no multilateral contributions																	
Romania BR	no multilateral contributions																	
Slovakia MMR	x	x	x	x			x	x				x	x			x		
Slovakia BR	x	x	x	x	x		x	x				x	x			x		
Slovenia MMR				x			x	x					x			x		
Slovenia BR	no BR submitted (20.02.2016)																	
Spain MMR		x	x	x			x	x					-			x		
Spain BR	x	x	x	x			x	x					-			x		
Sweden MMR		x	x	x			x	x					x	x		x		

	Coverage of core /climate-specific finance					Point of Measurement/ Status		Coverage of instruments reported					Coverage of sectors	Definition of sectors		Funding source		
	core/ general	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	committed / pledged	Disbursed /Provided	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Other	Sector information provided	Sector definition based on OECD DAC	Other sector definition	ODA	OOF	other
Sweden BR	x	x	x	x			x	x					x	x		x		
UK MMR	x	x	x	x			x	x				x	x			x		
UK BR	x		x	x			x	x					-					

Table 9-2: Coverage of multilateral institutions in reporting on core/general support

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - core/general							Coverage of financial institutions - core/general							Specialized UN bodies - core/general						
Austria MMR	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	x	-	x	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	
Austria BR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Belgium MMR	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	-	x	-	-	x	x	-	x	-	-	x
Belgium BR	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	x
Bulgaria MMR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	x
Bulgaria BR																					
Croatia MMR																			x	x	
Croatia BR																			x	x	
Cyprus MMR																					
Cyprus BR																					
Czech Republic MMR	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-
Czech Republic BR	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - core/general							**Coverage of financial institutions - core/general**							**Specialized UN bodies - core/general**						
Denmark MMR	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	x
Denmark BR	x	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-
Estonia MMR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	x
Estonia BR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	x
Finland MMR	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	x	-	x		x	x	-	x	-	-	x
Finland BR	x	x	x	x	-	x	x	-	x	x	x	-	x	-	x	x	-	x	-	-	x
France MMR	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
France BR	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany MMR	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany BR	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Greece MMR																		x			
Greece BR																					
Hungary MMR							x									x		x	x		x
Hungary BR							x											x	x		x
Ireland MMR	x						x			x						x		x			x

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - core/general							**Coverage of financial institutions - core/general**							**Specialized UN bodies - core/general**						
Ireland BR	x						x			x						x		x			x
Italy MMR	x																				x
Italy BR									x	x					x						
Latvia MMR																					
Latvia BR																					
Lithuania MMR							x											x			
Lithuania BR							x											x			
Luxembourg MMR																					
Luxembourg BR	x																				
Malta MMR																x					
Malta BR																x					x
Netherlands MMR									x						x	x		x			x
Netherlands BR	x							x	x	x				x	x	x	x	x			x

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - core/general							Coverage of financial institutions - core/general								Specialized UN bodies - core/general					
Poland MMR							x								x						
Poland BR							x								x						
Portugal MMR							x		x	x			x			x					x
Portugal BR							x		x	x			x			x			x		
Romania MMR																					
Romania BR																					
Slovakia MMR																		x			x
Slovakia BR																					x
Slovenia MMR																					
Slovenia BR																					
Spain MMR																					
Spain BR	x																				
Sweden MMR							x		x	x			x			x		x			x

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - core/general							Coverage of financial institutions - core/general								Specialized UN bodies - core/general					
Sweden BR							x		x	x			x			x		x			x
UK MMR									x	x			x	x	x						
UK BR							x		x	x			x								

Table 9-3: Coverage of multilateral institutions in reporting on climate-specific support

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	Clean Technology Fund	Strategic Climate Fund	IPCC	other	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	ITL	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - climate-specific										Coverage of financial institutions - climate-specific									Specialized UN bodies - climate-specific						
Austria MMR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-		x		-
Austria BR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	x	x	-	-	-
Belgium MMR	-	x	-	x	x	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	x
Belgium BR	-	x	x	x	x	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	x
Bulgaria MMR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	x	-
Bulgaria BR																										
Croatia MMR																										
Croatia BR																										
Cyprus MMR																										
Cyprus BR																										

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	Clean Technology Fund	Strategic Climate Fund	IPCC	other	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	ITL	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - climate-specific										**Coverage of financial institutions - climate-specific**									**Specialized UN bodies - climate-specific**						
Czech Republic MMR	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Czech Republic BR	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Denmark MMR	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	x	x	x	x	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	-
Denmark BR	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	x	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	-
Estonia MMR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	x	-	-	-
Estonia BR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-
Finland MMR	x	x	x	x	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	x	-	x	-	x	x	-	x	-	-	-	x
Finland BR	x	x	x	x	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	x	-	x	-	x	x	-	x	-	-	-	x
France MMR	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	Clean Technology Fund	Strategic Climate Fund	IPCC	other	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	ITL	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - climate-specific										**Coverage of financial institutions - climate-specific**									**Specialized UN bodies - climate-specific**						
France BR	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany MMR	-	x	x	x	x	-	-	-	x	x	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	x	x	-	-	-	x
Germany BR	-	x	x	x	x	-	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	x	x	x	x			x
Greece MMR										x																
Greece BR																										
Hungary MMR										x											x					
Hungary BR										x																
Ireland MMR		x				x																x				x
Ireland BR		x				x																x				x
Italy MMR	x				x					x					x				x	x		x		x		x
Italy BR	x				x								x	x			x		x	x		x				x
Latvia					x										x											

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	Clean Technology Fund	Strategic Climate Fund	IPCC	other	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	ITL	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - climate-specific										**Coverage of financial institutions - climate-specific**									**Specialized UN bodies - climate-specific**						
MMR																										
Latvia BR					x										x		x									
Lithuania MMR															x	x										
Lithuania BR															x	x										
Luxembourg MMR	x				x						x								x			x				x
Luxembourg BR					x						x								x	x		x				x
Malta MMR																										x
Malta BR																										
Netherlands MMR	x									x			x						x	x		x				x
Netherlands BR	x											x	x	x				x	x	x		x				x
Poland					x																x	x	x			x

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	Clean Technology Fund	Strategic Climate Fund	IPCC	other	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	ITL	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - climate-specific										Coverage of financial institutions - climate-specific									Specialized UN bodies - climate-specific						
MMR																										
Poland BR					x															x	x	x				x
Portugal MMR																										
Portugal BR																										
Romania MMR																										
Romania BR																										
Slovakia MMR										x					x						x		x	x		
Slovakia BR										x					x						x	x	x	x		
Slovenia MMR	x										x								x							x
Slovenia BR																										
Spain MMR							x															x				x
Spain BR	x			x			x															x				x

	GEF	LDC Fund	Special Climate Change Fund	Adaptation Fund	GCF	UNFCCC Trust Fund for supplementary Activities	Clean Technology Fund	Strategic Climate Fund	IPCC	other	World Bank	International Finance Corporation	African Development Bank (AfDF)	Asian Development Bank / Asian Development Fund (AsDF)	EBRD	EIB	Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	International Development Association (IDA)	Other	UNDP	Montreal Protocol	UNEP	UNFCCC	Kyoto Procol	ITL	other
	Coverage of multilateral funds - climate-specific										Coverage of financial institutions - climate-specific									Specialized UN bodies - climate-specific						
Sweden MMR	x	x			x	x				x																
Sweden BR	x	x			x	x				x																
UK MMR	x				x		x			x																
UK BR	x				x					x																

9.2. Annex II: Detailed comparison of methodologies for bilateral finance

The following tables were the basis for the analysis of different methodologies used to report on bilateral climate finance (chapter 4.3.3). The information provided in Tables 7b from each Member State´s second biennial report (BR2/UNFCCC) and Article 16 of the MMR were analysed and compared. Additionally, qualitative information on methodologies provided in BRs and methodological notes submitted together with MMR reports were taken into account.

Table 9-4: Comparison of methodologies to report on bilateral climate finance (funding sources, point of measurement, coverage of instruments reported)

	Coverage of funding sources			Definition provided for funding source			Point of Measurement/ Status				Definition used for point of measurement/ status				Coverage of instruments reported							Definition provided for instrument						
	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	committed	Disbursed /Provided	Calendar Year	Fiscal Year	Definition from DAC Statistical Reporting Directives	UNFCCC terminology	national definition	definition not indicated	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other
Austria MMR	x	x					x	x							x													
Austria BR	x						x	x							x		x	x	x	x								
Belgium MMR	x	x						x					x		x	x												
Belgium BR	x	x		x				x							x	x												
Bulgaria MMR																												
Bulgaria BR																												
Croatia MMR																												
Croatia BR																												
Cyprus MMR																												

	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	committed	Disbursed /Provided	Calendar Year	Fiscal Year	Definition from DAC Statistical Reporting Directives	UNFCCC terminology	national definition	definition not indicated	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other
	Coverage of funding sources			**Definition provided for funding source**			**Point of Measurement/ Status**				**Definition used for point of measurement/ status**				**Coverage of instruments reported**							**Definition provided for instrument**						
Cyprus BR																												
Czech Republic MMR	x							x							x													
Czech Republic BR	x							x							x													
Denmark MMR	x						x								x													
Denmark BR	x														x													
Estonia MMR	x							x							x													
Estonia BR	x							x							x													
Finland MMR	x							x							x			x				x			x	x	x	x
Finland BR	x							x							x			x			x							
France	x	x		x	x		x				x		x		x	x	x											

	Coverage of funding sources			Definition provided for funding source			Point of Measurement/ Status				Definition used for point of measurement/ status				Coverage of instruments reported							Definition provided for instrument						
	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	committed	Disbursed /Provided	Calendar Year	Fiscal Year	Definition from DAC Statistical Reporting Directives	UNFCCC terminology	national definition	definition not indicated	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other
MMR																												
France BR	x	x		x	x		x	x			x		x		x	x	x											
Germany MMR	x	x					x	x							x	x												
Germany BR	x						x	x							x	x												
Greece MMR																												
Greece BR																												
Hungary MMR																												
Hungary BR	x							x							x													
Ireland MMR	x							x							x													
Ireland BR	x							x							x													
Italy MMR	x	x	x				x	x							x	x												

	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	committed	Disbursed /Provided	Calendar Year	Fiscal Year	Definition from DAC Statistical Reporting Directives	UNFCCC terminology	national definition	definition not indicated	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other
	Coverage of funding sources			**Definition provided for funding source**			**Point of Measurement/ Status**				**Definition used for point of measurement/ status**				**Coverage of instruments reported**							**Definition provided for instrument**						
Italy BR	x	x					x	x							x	x												
Latvia MMR	x							x													x							
Latvia BR																												
Lithuania MMR	x							x							x													
Lithuania BR	x						x	x							x													
Luxembourg MMR	x														x													
Luxembourg BR	x							x							x													
Malta MMR	x						x								x													
Malta BR	x						x	x							x													
Netherlands MMR	x							x							x													
Netherlands BR	x							x							x													

	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	committed	Disbursed /Provided	Calendar Year	Fiscal Year	Definition from DAC Statistical Reporting Directives	UNFCCC terminology	national definition	definition not indicated	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other
	Coverage of funding sources			**Definition provided for funding source**			**Point of Measurement/ Status**				**Definition used for point of measurement/ status**				**Coverage of instruments reported**							**Definition provided for instrument**						
Poland MMR	x							x							x													
Poland BR	x							x							x													
Portugal MMR	x							x							x	x												
Portugal BR	X							x							x	x												
Romania MMR	x														x													
Romania BR	x							x							x													
Slovakia MMR	x							x							x						x							
Slovakia BR	x							x							x						x							
Slovenia MMR	x							x							x													
Slovenia BR																												
Spain MMR	x	x						x							x	x	x	x	x		x							

	Coverage of funding sources			Definition provided for funding source			Point of Measurement/ Status				Definition used for point of measurement/ status				Coverage of instruments reported							Definition provided for instrument						
	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	Offical development Assistance (ODA)	Other Offcial flows (OOF)	Other	committed	Disbursed /Provided	Calendar Year	Fiscal Year	Definition from DAC Statistical Reporting Directives	UNFCCC terminology	national definition	definition not indicated	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other	Grant	Concessional loans	Non-concessional loans	Equity	Export credits	Guarantees/ insurance	Other
Spain BR	x	x					x	x					x		x	x	x	x	x							x		
Sweden MMR	x							x							x													
Sweden BR	x							x			x				x													
United Kingdom MMR	x							x							x			x										
United Kingdom BR	x							x							x			x										

Table 9-5: Comparison of methodologies for reporting on bilateral climate finance (identification of mitigation/adaptation activities, recipient definition, quantification of climate-specific, valorisation of instrument, currency exchange rates, level of aggregation, reporting on technology transfer and capacity building)

	OECD DAC Rio Markers	MDB Adaptation 3-step appraoch	MDB Mitigation Positive list/ IDFC Common Principles	National Definition	ODA Eligible Countries (OECD DAC list)	UNFCCC Non-Annex I Parties	Activity-level component approach	Percentage at sectoral basis	Coefficient on "Principal"	Coefficient on "Significantl"	Approach for treating overlaps	Accounting (deduction) of reflows	Cash Value	Grant Equivalent	National currency	Euro	OECD exchange rates	Other exchange rates	Activity level	aggregate or semi-aggregates	Reporting on Technology Transfer yes/no	Reporting on Capacity building yes/no
	Identification of mitigation / adaptation activities				**Recipient Definition**		**Quantification of climate-specific**						**Valorisation of Instrument**		**Currency reporting, exchange rates**				**Format of data**			
Austria MMR	x				x				x	x			x									
Austria BR	x				x				100%	40%	x					x	x		x		Y	Y
Belgium MMR	x					x		x	x	x	x						x		x		Y	Y
Belgium BR	x					x		x	x	x	x						x		x		Y	Y
Bulgaria MMR																						
Bulgaria BR																						
Croatia MMR																						
Croatia BR																						
Cyprus MMR																						
Cyprus BR																						
Czech Republic MMR	x														x			x	x		Y	Y
Czech Republic BR	x														x			x	x		N	N

	OECD DAC Rio Markers	MDB Adaptation 3-step appraoch	MDB Mitigation Positive list/ IDFC Common Principles	National Definition	ODA Eligible Countries (OECD DAC list)	UNFCCC Non-Annex I Parties	Activity-level component approach	Percentage at sectoral basis	Coefficient on "Principal"	Coefficient on "Significantl"	Approach for treating overlaps	Accounting (deduction) of reflows	Cash Value	Grant Equivalent	National currency	Euro	OECD exchange rates	Other exchange rates	Activity level	aggregate or semi-aggregates	Reporting on Technology Transfer yes/no	Reporting on Capacity building yes/no
	Identification of mitigation / adaptation activities				**Recipient Definition**		**Quantification of climate-specific**						**Valorisation of Instrument**		**Currency reporting, exchange rates**				**Format of data**			
Denmark MMR	x								100%	50%					x				x		N	N
Denmark BR	x								100%	50%									x		Y	Y
Estonia MMR	x				x																	
Estonia BR																						
Finland MMR	x								varies	varies	x								x		Y	Y
Finland BR	x								varies	varies	x								x		Y	Y
France MMR	x			x	x		x		100%	40%	x					x	x		x	x	Y	Y
France BR	x			x	x		x		100%	40%	x					x	x		x	x	Y	Y
Germany MMR	x								100%	50%	x		x	x					x			
Germany BR	x								100%	50%	x					x			x		Y	Y
Greece MMR																					N	Y
Greece BR																						
Hungary MMR																						
Hungary BR																			x		N	N

	OECD DAC Rio Markers	MDB Adaptation 3-step appraoch	MDB Mitigation Positive list/ IDFC Common Principles	National Definition	ODA Eligible Countries (OECD DAC list)	UNFCCC Non-Annex I Parties	Activity-level component approach	Percentage at sectoral basis	Coefficient on "Principal"	Coefficient on "Significantl"	Approach for treating overlaps	Accounting (deduction) of reflows	Cash Value	Grant Equivalent	National currency	Euro	OECD exchange rates	Other exchange rates	Activity level	aggregate or semi-aggregates	Reporting on Technology Transfer yes/no	Reporting on Capacity building yes/no
	Identification of mitigation / adaptation activities				**Recipient Definition**		**Quantification of climate-specific**						**Valorisation of Instrument**		**Currency reporting, exchange rates**				**Format of data**			
Ireland MMR	x								100%	50%									x			
Ireland BR	x						x		100%	50%	x							x	x		Y	Y
Italy MMR									100%	40%									x		Y	N
Italy BR																			x		Y	Y
Latvia MMR																					N	N
Latvia BR																		x				
Lithuania MMR																					N	N
Lithuania BR																						
Luxembourg MMR	x																				Y	Y
Luxembo urg BR																				x	N	N
Malta MMR																						
Malta BR																			x		N	N
Netherlands MMR	x								100%	40%	x								x		Y	Y
Netherlands BR	x					x			100%	40%	x							x	x		Y	Y
Poland MMR	x														x			x	x		N	N

	OECD DAC Rio Markers	MDB Adaptation 3-step appraoch	MDB Mitigation Positive list/ IDFC Common Principles	National Definition	ODA Eligible Countries (OECD DAC list)	UNFCCC Non-Annex I Parties	Activity-level component approach	Percentage at sectoral basis	Coefficient on "Principal"	Coefficient on "Significantl"	Approach for treating overlaps	Accounting (deduction) of reflows	Cash Value	Grant Equivalent	National currency	Euro	OECD exchange rates	Other exchange rates	Activity level	aggregate or semi-aggregates	Reporting on Technology Transfer yes/no	Reporting on Capacity building yes/no
	Identification of mitigation / adaptation activities				Recipient Definition		Quantification of climate-specific						Valorisation of Instrument		Currency reporting, exchange rates				Format of data			
Poland BR															x			x	x		Y	N
Portugal MMR	x																		x			
Portugal BR	x																		x		Y	Y
Romania MMR																						
Romania BR															x							
Slovakia MMR	x																				Y	Y
Slovakia BR	x																	x			Y	Y
Slovenia MMR																						
Slovenia BR																						
Spain MMR																					Y	Y
Spain BR	x								100%	20%	x						x		x		Y	Y
Sweden MMR	x					x			100%	40%					x		x		x		Y	Y
Sweden BR	x					x			100%	40%					x		x		x		Y	Y
United Kingdom MMR				x											x			x	x		Y	Y
United Kingdom BR	x?														x				x		Y	Y

9.3. Annex III: Detailed quantitative comparison of finance data reported for the year 2014 in the MMR reporting and the second biennial reports

The following tables were the basis for the quantitative analysis (section 9.5). Tables 7 and 7a from each Member State´s second biennial report (BR2/UNFCCC) and Article 16 of the MMR were compiled into one table. Values are compared in national currency. Czech Republic has resubmitted the BR2 tables on 14 March 2016; those are considered here. There is no table for Cyprus, as Cyprus reports empty tables only. MMR data are presented with yellow and BR2 data with blue background. Values in red script are not equal between MMR and BR2. For some Member States, corrections had to be done, such as multiplying values by 1,000 or 1,000,000. Such corrections are described in the specific country chapter in section 9.5.

Table 9-6: Austria – Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Austria 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	**Allocation channels**	**Core/ general**	**Climate-specific**				**Total (climate-specific and core/ general)**	**Total climate-specific**
			Mitigation	**Adaptation**	**Cross-cutting**	**Other**		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**11,682,354**	**1,071,198**	**0**	**252,640**	**0**	**13,006,192**	**1,323,838**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**41,485,477**	**0**	**41,485,477**	**41,485,477**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds						0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	**9,702,354**			**0**		**9,702,354**	**0**
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	**0**			**40,331,412**		**40,331,412**	**40,331,412**
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	**1,980,000**	**1,071,198**		**252,640**		**3,303,838**	**1,323,838**
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	**0**	**0**		**1,154,065**		**1,154,065**	**1,154,065**
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**71,002,910**	**6,882,195**	**21,868,146**		**99,753,251**	**99,753,251**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**71,002,910**	**6,882,195**	**21,868,146**		**99,753,251**	**99,753,251**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**11,682,354**	**72,074,108**	6,882,195	**22,120,786**	0	**112,759,443**	**101,077,089**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**0**	**71,002,910**	6,882,195	**63,353,623**	0	**141,238,728**	**141,238,728**

Table 9-7: Austria – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	9,702,354	40,331,412	0
1. World Bank	0	4,898,927	26,135,980	0
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank	0	1,693,034	12,195,433	0
4. Asian Development Bank	0	1,769,290	2,000,000	0
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	0	860,000		
6. Inter-American Development Bank	0	481,103		
7. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies (sum of figures below)	0	1,980,000	1,154,065	1,323,838
1. United Nations Development Programme	0	1,580,000		
2. United Nations Environment Programme	0	400,000		
Montreal Protocol			1,071,198	1,071,198
3. Other				
UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and ITL			82,867	252,640
Total contributions through multilateral channels	*0*	*11,682,354*	*41,485,477*	*1,323,838*

Table 9-8: Belgium - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Belgium 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Climate-specific: Adaptation	Climate-specific: Cross-cutting	Climate-specific: Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**376,108,466**	**22,040**	**12,813,595**	**41,494,353**		**430,438,454**	**54,329,988**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**376,108,466**	**22,040**	**15,063,594**	**41,494,353**		**432,688,453**	**56,579,987**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	18,600,000	22,040	**12,000,000**	40,683,549		71,305,589	52,705,589
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	18,600,000	22,040	**14,250,000**	40,683,549		73,555,589	54,955,589
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds		22,040	1,000,000			1,022,040	1,022,040
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds		22,040	1,000,000			1,022,040	1,022,040
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	305,832,100					305,832,100	
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	305,832,100					305,832,100	
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	**43,676,366**		813,595	810,804			
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	**51,676,366**		813,594	810,804			
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**8,557,943**	**18,240,097**	**13,273,725**		**40,071,765**	**40,071,765**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**8,557,943.23**	**18,240,097.40**	**13,273,724.60**		**40,071,765**	**40,071,765**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	376,108,466	8,579,983.00	**31,053,691.95**	54,768,078.32	0	**470,510,220**	**94,401,753**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	376,108,466	8,579,983.23	**33,303,691.40**	54,768,077.60	0	**472,760,218**	**96,651,752**
MMR	*Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research*	**8,000,000**						

Table 9-9: Belgium – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)
Multilateral climate change funds	18,600,000			
1. Global Environment Facility	18,600,000	18,600,000		
2. Least Developed Countries Fund			12,000,000	12,000,000
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund			1,250,000	1,000,000
				250,000
5. Green Climate Fund			40,600,000	40,000,000
				600,000
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities			83,549	83,549
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
7.1 International Partnership on Mitigation and MRV			22,040	22,040
7.2 IFAD: budget support for the "Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme"			1,000,000	1,000,000
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	*305,832,100*			
1. World Bank	148,747,082	148,747,082		
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank	33,987,573	33,987,573		
4. Asian Development Bank	7,933,541	7,933,541		
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other	*115,163,904*			
7.1 European Investment Bank - EIB	4,146,560	4,146,560		
7.2 Europees ontwikkelingsfonds (EOF/EDF/FED)	111,017,344	111,017,344		
Specialized United Nations bodies	*51,676,366*			
1. United Nations Development Programme	19,000,000	19,000,000		
1.1 UNDP: Strengthen capacity to incorporate climate change adaptation and resilience planning into National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) through the NBSAP Forum			35,000	35,000
2. United Nations Environment Programme	4,000,000	4,000,000		
3. Other	*28,676,366*			
3.1 Food and Agricultural Organization	5,426,366	5,426,366		
3.2 International Fund for Agricultural Development	8,000,000	8,000,000		
3.2 World Food Programme - Immediate Response Account	7,250,000	7,250,000		
3.3 UNESCO: Framework for Research, Education and Training in the Water Sector Phase III (FET -Water III)			105,002	105,002
3.4 UNESCO: Southeast Pacific data and Information Networking support to integrated Coastal Area Management' (SPINCAM-II)			82,940	82,940
3.5 UNESCO: Addressing Water Security: Climate impacts and adaptation responses in Africa, Asia and LAC			130,517	130,517
3.6 UNESCO: Climate Change Adaptation for African Natural World Heritage Sites			37,700	37,700
3.7 UNESCO: Enhancing Natural Hazards Resilience in South America (ENHANS)			188,500	188,500
3.8 UNESCO: Biosphere reserves as a tool for coastal and island management in the South-East Pacific region (BRESEP)			75,339	75,339
3.9 UNESCO: Caribbean Marine Atlas, phase 2			95,547	95,547
3.10 UNESCO: Ecosystem-based marine spatial planning for conservation of World Heritage Marine Sites			63,049	63,049
3.11 ICRAF: support to the world congress on agroforestry			50,804	50,804
3.12 ICRAF: Extending the Agroforestry Food Security Programme (AFSP) in Kasungu and Mzimba districts			160,000	160,000
3.13 ICRAF: Building a larger Evergreen Agriculture Network for Southern Africa			600,000	600,000
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research	8,000,000	8,000,000		
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***376,108,466***	***376,108,466***		***55,329,988***

Table 9-10: Bulgaria- Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Bulgaria 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	**Allocation channels**	**Core/ general**	**Climate-specific**				**Total (climate-specific and core/ general)**	**Total climate-specific**
			Mitigation	**Adaptation**	**Cross-cutting**	**Other**		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**25,236**	**0**	**0**	**8,975**	**0**	**34,211**	**8,975**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	**8,975**	0	**8,975**	**8,975**
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds						**0**	**0**
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	**62,184**	0	**8,975**	0	**71,159**	**71,159**
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds		**0**		**0**		**0**	**0**
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks						0	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	**25,236**	0	0	0	0	**25,236**	**0**
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	**0**					**0**	**0**
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**						**0**	**0**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**25,236**	**0**	**0**	**8,975**	**0**	**34,211**	**8,975**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**

Table 9-11: Bulgaria – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	***MMR (EUR)***	***UNFCCC (EUR)***	***MMR (EUR)***
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
7.1. UNFCCC			0	8,001.00
7.2 Kyoto Protocol under UNFCCC			0	4,315.00
7.3 International Transaction Log (ITL)			0	974.00
7.4 Montreal Protocol			0	57,868.61
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies				
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme	0	15,220.10		
3. Other				
3.1 The United Nations Convention to Combat Desesrtification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa	0	3,381.00		
3.2 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES)	0	2,600.85		
3.3 International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)	0	4,033.92		
Total contributions through multilateral channels	*0*	*25,235.87*	*0*	*71,158.61*

Table 9-12: Croatia - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Croatia 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds						0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds						0.00	0.00
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds						0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0.00	0.00
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks						0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks						0.00	0.00
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	33,018.00					33,018.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	33,018.00					33,018.00	0.00
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**						**0.00**	**0.00**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**						**0.00**	**0.00**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**33,018.00**	**0.00**

Table 9-13: Croatia – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies	33,018.00	33,018.00		
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme				
3. Other				
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***33,018.00***	***33,018.00***		

Table 9-14: Czech Republic – Table 7 Summary information for 2014[54]

Czech Republic 2014, Table 7		National currency CZK (MMR) / National currency CZK (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	172,470,000	0	0	59,521,559	0	231,991,559	59,521,559
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	192,610,621	0	0	59,521,559	0	252,132,180	59,521,559
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	59,521,559	0	59,521,559	59,521,559
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	20,140,621			19,521,559		39,662,180	19,521,559
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	40,000,000	0	40,000,000	40,000,000
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds				0	0	0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	163,470,000	0	0	0	0	163,470,000	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	163,470,000			40,000,000		203,470,000	40,000,000
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	9,000,000	0	0	0	0	9,000,000	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	9,000,000					9,000,000	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	0	31,637,691	77,080,054	2,700,000	0	111,417,745	111,417,745
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		31,637,691	77,080,054	2,700,000		111,417,745	111,417,745
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**172,470,000**	**31,637,691**	**77,080,054**	**62,221,559**	**0**	**343,409,304**	**170,939,304**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**192,610,621**	**31,637,691**	**77,080,054**	**62,221,559**	**0**	**363,549,925**	**170,939,304**

[54] The corrected BR2 tables submitted on 14 March 2016 are considered here

Table 9-15: Czech Republic – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014[55]

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (CZK)	*MMR (CZK)*	*UNFCCC (CZK)*	*MMR (CZK)*
Multilateral climate change funds	20140621	20,140,621	**19,521,559**	**59,521,559**
1. Global Environment Facility	20140621	20,140,621	9,521,559	9,521,559
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund			10,000,000	10,000,000
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds			**0**	**40,000,000**
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	163,470,000	163,470,000	**40,000,000**	
1. World Bank	163,470,000	163,470,000		
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development		0		
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other			**40,000,000**	
Specialized United Nations bodies	9,000,000	9,000,000		
1. United Nations Development Programme	8,000,000	8,000,000		
2. United Nations Environment Programme	1,000,000	1,000,000		
3. Other				
Total contributions through multilateral channels	*192,610,621*	*192,610,621*	*59,521,559*	*59,521,559*

[55] The corrected BR2 tables submitted on 14 March 2016 are considered here

Table 9-16: Denmark - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Denmark 2014, Table 7		National currency DKK = 134,1413 EUR (MMR)							
		National currency DKK							
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**1,284,523,000**	**28,918,500**	**0**	**120,701,000**	**128,000,000**	**1,562,142,500**	**149,619,500**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**1,412,523,000**	**52,175,500**	**40,000,000**	**97,455,500**	**0**	**1,602,154,000**	**189,631,000**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	**135,000,000**	0	0	**0**	**128,000,000**	**263,000,000**	**0**
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	**263,000,000**	0	0	**11,500**	**0**	**263,011,500**	**11,500**
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	**0**	0	0	**0**	0	**0**	**0**
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds	**163,000,000**	0	0	**11,500**	0	**163,011,500**	**11,500**
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	524,729,000	**28,918,500**	**0**	**59,820,000**	0	**613,467,500**	**88,738,500**
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	524,729,000	**37,925,500**	**40,000,000**	**50,813,000**	0	**653,467,500**	**128,738,500**
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	624,794,000	**0**	**0**	**60,881,000**	0	685,675,000	60,881,000
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	624,794,000	**14,250,000**	**0**	**46,631,000**	0	685,675,000	60,881,000
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**312,704,000**	**0**	**935,913,000**	**0**	**1,248,617,000**	**1,248,617,000**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**303,127,500**	**110,223,000**	**766,454,500**	**0**	**1,179,805,000**	**1,179,805,000**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**1,284,523,000**	**341,622,500**	**0**	**1,056,614,000**	**128,000,000**	**2,810,759,500**	**1,398,236,500**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**1,412,523,000**	**355,303,000**	**150,223,000**	**863,910,000**	**0**	**2,781,959,000**	**1,369,436,000**

Table 9-17: Denmark – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (1000 DKK)	***MMR (1000 DKK)***	*UNFCCC (1000 DKK)*	*MMR (1000 DKK)*
Multilateral climate change funds	**263,000.00**	**135,000.00**	**11.50**	**128,000.00**
1. Global Environment Facility - 47044	135,000.00	135,000.00	**11.50**	**0.00**
2. Least Developed Countries Fund - 47129	0.00		0.00	
3. Special Climate Change Fund - 47130	0.00		0.00	
4. Adaptation Fund - 47111	0.00		0.00	
5. Green Climate Fund - 41317	**100,000.00**		**0.00**	**100,000.00**
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities - 41316	0.00		0.00	
7. Other multilateral climate change funds - (GGGI) 47136	**28,000.00**		**0.00**	**28,000.00**
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	**524,728.90**	**524,729.00**	**128,738.00**	**88,738.50**
1. World Bank (IBRD & IDA?) - 44001+44002	436,320.00	436,320.00	43,538.00	52,545.00
			40,000.00	**0.00**
			9,007.00	**0.00**
2. International Finance Corporation - 44004	0.00		7,275.00	7,275.00
3. African Development Bank (&AfDF?) - 46002+46003	55,101.00	55,101.00	93.00	93.00
4. Asian Development Bank (&AsDF?) - 46004+46005	33,307.90	33,308.00	**24,075.00**	**24,075.50**
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development - 46015	0.00		4,750.00	4,750.00
6. Inter-American Development Bank - 46012+46013	0.00			
7. Other - ?				
Specialized United Nations bodies	**624,794.00**	**624,794.00**	**60,881.00**	**60,881.00**
1. United Nations Development Programme - 41114	346,478.00	346,478.00	20,881.00	20,881.00
2. United Nations Environment Programme - 41116	30,000.00	30,000.00	40,000.00	40,000.00
3. Other - (IFAD, ISDR, UNIDO, WFP) 41108+41315+41123+41140	248,316.00	248,316.00	0.00	
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***1,412,522.90***	***1,284,523.00***	***189,630.50***	***277,619.50***

Table 9-18: Estonia - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Estonia 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Climate-specific: Adaptation	Climate-specific: Cross-cutting	Climate-specific: Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	58,883.73	**0.00**	323,000.00	262,806.21	**0.00**	644,689.94	585,806.21
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	108,883.73	**0.00**	0.00	60,806.21	**0.00**	169,689.94	60,806.21
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	151,007.21	0.00	151,007.21	151,007.21
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds				49,007.21		49,007.21	49,007.21
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds				49,007.21		49,007.21	49,007.21
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0.00	0.00	0.00	100,000.00	0.00	100,000.00	100,000.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				0.00		0.00	0.00
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	58,883.73	0.00	323,000.00	11,799.00	0.00	393,682.73	334,799.00
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	108,883.73		0.00	11,799.00		120,682.73	11,799.00
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0.00**	0.00	**0.00**	102,000.00	**0.00**	102,000.00	102,000.00
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		74,134.00		535,204.00		609,338.00	609,338.00
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	58,883.73	0.00	323,000.00	364,806.21	0.00	746,689.94	687,806.21
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	108,883.73	74,134.00	0.00	596,010.21	0.00	779,027.94	670,144.21

Table 9-19: Estonia – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds			49,007.21	
7.1 Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol			49,007.21	49,007.21
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other: International Telecommunications Union			**0.00**	**100,000.00**
Specialized United Nations bodies	108,883.73		11,799.00	
1. United Nations Development Programme	**50,000.00**	**0.00**		
2. United Nations Environment Programme	5,000.00	5,000.00	**0.00**	**323,000.00**
3. Other		0.00	11,799.00	
3.1 UNCCD	2,877.00	2,877.00		
3.2 UNFCCC			11,799.00	11,799.00
3.3 WMO	21,335.73	21,335.73		
3.4 IAEA-TCF	29,671.00	29,671.00		
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***108,883.73***	***58,883.73***	***60,806.21***	***483,806.21***

Table 9-20: Finland - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Finland 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Climate-specific: Adaptation	Climate-specific: Cross-cutting	Climate-specific: Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**521,277,548.61**	**6,837,000.00**	**14,000,000.00**	**50,907,921.70**	**0.00**	**593,022,470.31**	**71,744,921.70**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**507,945,143.59**	**6,837,000.00**	**14,000,000.00**	**50,907,921.69**	**0.00**	**579,690,065.28**	**71,744,921.69**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	**0.00**	6,167,000.00	14,000,000.00	0.00	0.00	**20,167,000.00**	20,167,000.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	**36,025,000.00**	6,167,000.00	14,000,000.00			**56,192,000.00**	20,167,000.00
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0.00	0.00
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	197,735,059.59	670,000.00	0.00	29,834,694.62	0.00	228,239,754.21	30,504,694.62
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	197,735,059.59	670,000.00		29,834,694.61		228,239,754.20	30,504,694.61
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	**323,542,489.02**	0.00	0.00	21,073,227.08	0.00	**344,615,716.10**	21,073,227.08
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	**274,185,084.00**			21,073,227.08		**295,258,311.08**	21,073,227.08
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**499,106,839.20**	**24,020,057.81**	**10,260,341.15**	**10,146,203.91**	**0.00**	**543,533,442.06**	**44,426,602.87**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0.00**	**24,020,057.81**	**10,260,341.14**	**10,146,203.91**		**44,426,602.86**	**44,426,602.86**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**1,020,384,387.81**	30,857,057.81	24,260,341.15	61,054,125.60	0.00	**1,136,555,912.37**	116,171,524.56
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**507,945,143.59**	30,857,057.81	24,260,341.14	61,054,125.60	0.00	**624,116,668.14**	116,171,524.55

Table 9-21: Finland – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds	**36,025,000.00**		20,167,000.00	
1. Global Environment Facility	**22,025,000.00**		6,167,000.00	6,167,000.00
2. Least Developed Countries Fund	**6,000,000.00**		6,000,000.00	6,000,000.00
3. Special Climate Change Fund	**2,900,000.00**		2,900,000.00	2,900,000.00
4. Adaptation Fund	**5,000,000.00**		5,000,000.00	5,000,000.00
5. Green Climate Fund				0.00
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities	**100,000.00**		100,000.00	100,000.00
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				0.00
Subtotal				**20,167,000.00**
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development ban	197,735,059.59		30,504,694.61	
1. World Bank (WB, IBRD, IDA, IDA-HIPC, MIGA, AMCs)	116,815,254.14	116,815,254.14	13,976,020.09	13,976,020.09
2. International Finance Corporation		0.00		0.00
3. African Development Bank (Afr.DB, Afr.DF)	63,109,638.38	63,109,638.38	10,598,255.50	10,598,255.50
4. Asian Development Bank (AsDB, AsDF)	10,151,465.46	10,151,465.46	1,566,863.78	1,566,263.78
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, -TFs ODA, -TFs all, -ETC, -WBJTF)	2,700,000.00	2,700,000.00	670,000.00	670,000.00
6. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB, IDB Sp.F.)	1,487,701.61	1,487,701.61	223,155.24	223,155.24
7. Other	3,471,000.00		3,471,000.00	
Nordic Development Fund	3,471,000.00	3,471,000.00	3,471,000.00	3,471,000.00
Subtotal		**197,735,059.59**		**30,504,694.62**
Specialized United Nations bodies	274,185,084.00		21,073,227.08	
1. United Nations Development Programme (specific programmes)	43,704,171.43	43,704,171.43	3,127,500.00	3,127,500.00
2. United Nations Environment Programme (specific programmes)	6,724,427.00	6,724,427.00	1,200,000.00	1,200,000.00
United Nations Children's Fund		**49,357,405.02**		0.00
Food and Agricultural Organisation	5,014,586.22	5,014,586.22	1,337,500.00	1,337,500.00
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research	9,750,000.00	9,750,000.00	4,400,000.00	4,400,000.00
Other multilateral	208,991,899.35	208,991,899.35	11,008,227.08	11,008,227.08
Subtotal		**323,542,489.02**		**21,073,227.08**
Total		***557,337,125.85***		***71,744,921.70***

Table 9-22: France - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

France 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Climate-specific: Adaptation	Climate-specific: Cross-cutting	Climate-specific: Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**33,985,000**	**0**	**0**	**10,875,200**	**0**	**44,860,200**	**10,875,200**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**33,985,000**			**10,875,200**		**44,860,200**	**10,875,200**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	33,985,000	0	0	10,875,200	0	44,860,200	10,875,200
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	33,985,000			10,875,200		44,860,200	10,875,200
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks						0	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies						0	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**2,232,149,678**	**279,138,362**	**245,032,419**	**0**	**2,756,320,459**	**2,756,320,459**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**2,233,874,678**	**279,138,362**	**243,307,419**		**2,756,320,459**	**2,756,320,459**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	33,985,000	**2,232,149,678**	279,138,362	**255,907,619**	0	2,801,180,659	2,767,195,659
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	33,985,000	**2,233,874,678**	279,138,362	**254,182,619**	0	2,801,180,659	2,767,195,659

Table 9-23: France – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor Funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)	UNFCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)
Multilateral climate change funds				
Global Environment Facility	33,985,000	33,985,000	10,875,200	10,875,200
Total contribution through multilateral channels	***33,985,000***	***33,985,000***	***10,875,200***	***10,875,200***

Table 9-24: Germany - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Germany 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**866,596,094**	**27,006,778**	**98,000,000**	**20,619,520**	**92,000,000**	**1,104,222,391**	**237,626,298**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**866,596,094**	**27,006,778**	**98,000,000**	**20,619,520**	**92,000,000**	**1,104,222,391**	**237,626,298**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	80,607,261	8,006,778	98,000,000	1,000,000		187,614,039	107,006,778
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	80,607,261	8,006,778	98,000,000	7,392,792		194,006,831	113,399,570
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds		8,006,778		6,392,792		14,399,570	14,399,570
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds		8,006,778		6,392,792		14,399,570	14,399,570
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	785,988,833	19,000,000			82,000,000	886,988,833	101,000,000
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	785,988,833	19,000,000			82,000,000	886,988,833	101,000,000
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies				13,226,728	10,000,000	23,226,728	23,226,728
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies				13,226,728	10,000,000	23,226,728	23,226,728
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**695,266,782**	**583,414,566**	**209,453,825**	**394,172,574**	**1,882,307,747**	**1,882,307,747**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**583,414,566**	**695,266,782**	**209,453,825**	**394,172,574**	**1,882,307,747**	**1,882,307,747**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**866,596,094**	**722,273,560**	**681,414,566**	**230,073,345**	**486,172,574**	**2,986,530,139**	**2,119,934,045**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**866,596,094**	**610,421,344**	**793,266,782**	**230,073,345**	**486,172,573**	**2,986,530,138**	**2,119,934,044**

Table 9-25: Germany – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds	**80,607,261**	**80,607,261**	**113,399,570**	**113,399,570**
1. Global Environment Facility	80,607,261	80,607,261		
2. Least Developed Countries Fund			30,000,000	30,000,000
3. Special Climate Change Fund			18,000,000	18,000,000
4. Adaptation Fund			50,000,000	50,000,000
5. Green Climate Fund			1,000,000	1,000,000
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
7.1 Montreal Protocol			8,006,778	8,006,778
7.2 IPCC			294,000	294,000
7.3 UNFCCC			6,098,792	6,098,792
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	**785,988,833**	**785,988,833**	**101,000,000**	**101,000,000**
1. World Bank	526,688,833	526,688,833		
1.1 Pilot Auction Facility for Methane and Climate Change Mitigation			15,000,000	15,000,000
1.2 BioCarbon Fund Initiative for Sustainable Forest			35,000,000	35,000,000
1.3 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility			47,000,000	47,000,000
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank	181,200,000	181,200,000		
4. Asian Development Bank	78,100,000	78,100,000		
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development			**4,000,000**	
5.1 Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership Fund - Armenia Window				**1,000,000**
5.2 Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership Fund - Georgia Window				**1,000,000**
5.3 Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership Fund - Moldova Window				**1,000,000**
5.4 Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership Fund				**1,000,000**
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
1.1 Clean Technology Fund				
Specialized United Nations bodies			**23,226,728**	**23,226,728**
1. United Nations Development Programme			10,000,000	10,000,000
1.1 Biodiversity Finance Initiative			10,000,000	10,000,000
2. United Nations Environment Programme			400,000	400,000
2.1 UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate and Sustainable Energy Finance			400,000	400,000
3. Other (UNHCR, UN-Habitat, UNODC, Worldbank, WFP, WRI, UNF, GGI)			12,826,728	12,826,728
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***866,596,094***	***866,596,094***	***237,626,298***	***237,626,298***

Table 9-26: Greece - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Greece 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
			Climate-specific					
Source	**Allocation channels**	**Core/ general**	**Mitigation**	**Adaptation**	**Cross-cutting**	**Other**	**Total (climate-specific and core/ general)**	**Total climate-specific**
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**501,442**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**501,442**	**0**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**501,442**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**501,442**	**0**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	35,011	0	0	0	0	35,011	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	35,011					35,011	0
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds		0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds	35,011					35,011	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks						0	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	466,431	0	0	0	0	466,431	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	466,431					466,431	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**						**0**	**0**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	501,442	0	0	0	0	501,442	0
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	501,442	0	0	0	0	501,442	0

Table 9-27: Greece – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds	35,011			
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds	35,011			35,011
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies				
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme	466,431	466,431		
3. Other				
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***501,442***	***466,431***		***35,011***

Table 9-28: Hungary - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Hungary 2014, Table 7		National currency - HUF (MMR) / National currency - HUF (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Climate-specific: Adaptation	Climate-specific: Cross-cutting	Climate-specific: Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**2,228,716,810**	**485,417,240**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**2,714,134,050**	**485,417,240**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**2,228,716,910**	**485,417,240**				**2,714,134,150**	**485,417,240**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds		485,417,240				485,417,240	485,417,240
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	485,417,240	0	0	0	485,417,240	485,417,240
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds		485,417,240				485,417,240	485,417,240
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	1,876,400,000	0	0	0	0	1,876,400,000	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	1,876,400,000					1,876,400,000	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	**352,316,810**	0	0	0	0	**352,316,810**	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	**352,316,910**					**352,316,910**	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**740,000**	**334,307,051**	**17,049,256**	**0**	**352,096,307**	**352,096,307**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**740,000**	**334,307,051**	**15,181,636**		**350,228,687**	**350,228,687**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	2,228,716,810	486,157,240	334,307,051	**17,049,256**	0	**3,066,230,357**	**837,513,547**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	2,228,716,910	486,157,240	334,307,051	**15,181,636**	0	**3,064,362,837**	**835,645,927**

Table 9-29: Hungary – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCCC (HUF)	MMR (HUF)	UNFCCC (HUF)	MMR (HUF)
Multilateral climate change funds	**2,228,716,910**		**485,417,240**	**485,417,240.00**
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds			485,417,240	485,417,240
7.1. Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol payments for 2014				70,053,298
7.2. Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol payments for 2015				415,363,942
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	**1,876,400,000**	**1,876,400,000**		
1. World Bank	1,876,400,000	1,876,400,000		
Participation in the General Capital Increase of the IBRD		1,876,400,000		
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies	**352,316,910**	**352,316,810**		
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme	2,236,700	2,236,700		
UNEP payments for 2014	2,236,700	2,236,700		
3. Other	350,080,110	350,080,110		
UNFCCC Membership contribution	4,658,125	4,658,125		
UNCCD (Convention to Combat Desertification) payments for 2014	5,867,517	5,867,517		
UNCCD (Convention to Combat Desertification) payments for 2015	7,071,492	7,071,492		
Food and Agricultural Organization payments for 2014	158,066,691	79,349,328		
Food and Agricultural Organization payments for 2014		78,717,363		
Food and Agricultural Organization payments for 2015	172,878,135	81,610,759		
Food and Agricultural Organization payments for 2015		91,267,375		
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe	1,538,150	1,538,150		
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***2,228,716,910***	***2,228,716,810***	***485,417,240***	***485,417,240***

Table 9-30: Ireland - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Ireland 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)							
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Climate-specific: Adaptation	Climate-specific: Cross-cutting	Climate-specific: Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**75,431,805**	**37,600**	**1,900,000**	**100,000**	**0**	**77,469,405**	**2,037,600**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**75,431,800**	**37,600**	**1,300,000**	**100,000**	**300,000**	**77,169,400**	**1,737,600**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	1,469,000	0	1,000,000	0	0	2,469,000	1,000,000
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	1,469,000		1,000,000			2,469,000	1,000,000
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	32,085,000	0	0	0	0	32,085,000	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	32,085,000					32,085,000	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	41,877,805	37,600	900,000	100,000	0	42,915,405	1,037,600
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	41,877,800	37,600	300,000	100,000	300,000	42,615,400	737,600
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**1,490,000**	**20,974,000**	**9,472,500**	**0**	**31,936,500**	**31,936,500**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**1,490,000**	**20,974,000**	**9,472,500**		**31,936,500**	**31,936,500**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	75,431,805	1,527,600	22,874,000	9,572,500	0	109,405,905	33,974,100
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	75,431,800	1,527,600	22,274,000	9,572,500	300,000	109,105,900	33,674,100

Table 9-31: Ireland – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds	1,469,000	0	1,000,000	0
1. Global Environment Facility	1,469,000	1,469,000		0
2. Least Developed Countries Fund		0	900,000	900,000
3. Special Climate Change Fund		0		0
4. Adaptation Fund		0		0
5. Green Climate Fund		0		0
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities -LEG		0	100,000	100,000
7. Other multilateral climate change funds		0		0
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	32,085,000	0		0
1. World Bank	25,385,000	25,385,000		0
1.1 World Bank CGIAR Fund - Support to pro-poor agriculture	4,200,000	4,200,000		0
2. International Finance Corporation		0		0
3. African Development Bank		0		0
4. Asian Development Bank	2,500,000	2,500,000		0
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development		0		0
6. Inter-American Development Bank		0		0
Specialized United Nations bodies	41,877,800	0	**737,600**	**1,037,600**
1. United Nations Development Programme	8,500,000	8,500,000		0
2. United Nations Environment Programme	357,800	357,805	**300,000**	**0**
2.1 UNEP - Clean Technology Centre and Network		0	100,000	100,000
2.2 UNEP - GEMS/Water		0		**600,000**
3. United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction		0	300,000	300,000
4. Other	33,020,000	0	437,600	
World Food Programme	10,000,000	10,000,000		0
FAO - LEAP		0	37,600	37,600
FAO - Emergency Section	240,000	240,000		0
UN Women	1,500,000	1,500,000		0
UNAIDS	2,950,000	2,950,000		0
UN Convention to Combat Desertification	30,000	30,000		0
UNDOCO	50,000	50,000		0
UNHCR	6,100,000	6,100,000		0
UNICEF	7,900,000	7,900,000		0
UNFPA	3,100,000	3,100,000		0
WHO	1,150,000	1,150,000		0
Sub Total		41,877,805		0
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***75,431,800***	***75,431,805***	***1,737,600***	***2,037,600***

Table 9-32: Italy - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Italy 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	24,530,000.00	1,244,749.60	466,880.00	17,259,821.14	**0.00**	43,501,450.74	18,971,450.74
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	0.00	200,000.00	0.00	20,960,000.00	**0.00**	21,160,000.00	21,160,000.00
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	24,110,000.00	0.00	0.00	8,456,300.00	0.00	32,566,300.00	8,456,300.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0.00	-	-	2,553,374.42	0.00	2,553,374.42	2,553,374.42
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0.00	1,035,949.60	466,880.00	1,085,214.40	0.00	2,588,044.00	2,588,044.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	420,000.00	208,800.00	0.00	7,718,306.74	0.00	8,347,106.74	7,927,106.74
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	0.00	200,000.00	0.00	20,960,000.00	0.00	21,160,000.00	21,160,000.00
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0.00**	13,716,579.34	4,087,181.44	15,337,737.86	**0.00**	33,141,498.64	33,141,498.64
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0.00**	12,550,000.00	1,910,000.00	11,080,000.00	**0.00**	25,540,000.00	25,540,000.00
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	24,530,000.00	14,961,328.94	4,554,061.44	32,597,559.00	0.00	76,642,949.38	52,112,949.38
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	0.00	12,750,000.00	1,910,000.00	32,040,000.00	0.00	46,700,000.00	46,700,000.00

Table 9-33: Italy – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility		24,110,000.00		7,956,300.00
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				500,000.00
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
UNFCCC-Kyoto protocol				2,207,228.89
Support to the UN Secretary General's Climate Change Strategy				346,145.53
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				20,000.00
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
7.1 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development				800,000.00
7.2 IEF International Energy Forum				41,214.40
7.3 IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency				224,000.00
7.4 IILA ISTITUTO ITALO LATINO AMERICAN ISTITUTO ITALO LATINO AMERICANO				240,000.00
7.5 International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean				315,949.60
7.6 International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean				466,880.00
7.7 Bioversity International				480,000.00
Specialized United Nations bodies			21,160,000.00	
1. United Nations Development Programme			260,000.00	204,800.00
2. United Nations Environment Programme			18,000,000.00	3,025,815.22
3. Other			2,900,000.00	
3.1 Food and Agricolture Organization			0.00	2,350,931.51
3.2 United Nations Idustrial Development Organization			550,000.00	675,532.92
3.3 Regional Environmetal Centre		420,000.00	0.00	
3.4 UNESCO			0.00	1,160,003.09
3.5 International Fund for Agricultural Development			0.00	301,224.00
3.6 World Food Programme			200,000.00	208,800.00
3.7 FAO			2,150,000.00	
Total contributions through multilateral channels			21,160,000.00	21,524,825.16

Table 9-34: Lithuania - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Lithuania 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**788,053**	**105,360**	**0**	**50,000**	**0**	**943,413**	**155,360**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**788,053**	**105,360**	**0**	**50,000**	**0**	**943,413**	**155,360**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0		0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	770,000	105,360	0	50,000	0	925,360	155,360
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	770,000	105,360		50,000		925,360	155,360
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	18,053	0	0	0	0	18,053	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	18,053					18,053	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**151,636**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**151,636**	**151,636**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**151,636**				**151,636**	**151,636**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	788,053	256,996	0	50,000	0	1,095,049	306,996
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	788,053	256,996	0	50,000	0	1,095,049	306,996

Table 9-35: Lithuania – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	770,000		155,360	
1. World Bank (*International Development Association*)	770,000	770,000		-
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development *(E5P fund)*		-	105,360	105,360
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other (*European Investment Bank*)		-	50,000	50,000
Specialized United Nations bodies	18,053			
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme	18,053	18,053		-
3. Other				
Total contributions through multilateral channels	**788,053**	**788,053**	**155,360**	**155,360**

Table 9-36: Luxembourg - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Luxembourg 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	**Allocation channels**	**Core/ general**	**Climate-specific**				**Total (climate-specific and core/ general)**	**Total climate-specific**
			Mitigation	**Adaptation**	**Cross-cutting**	**Other**		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**1,389,078.00**	**5,872,700.00**	**0.00**	**7,261,778.00**	**7,261,778.00**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**872,700.00**	**3,000,000.00**	**1,389,078.00**	**5,000,000.00**	**0.00**	**10,261,778.00**	**9,389,078.00**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	**0.00**	0.00	0.00	**5,872,700.00**	0.00	5,872,700.00	**5,872,700.00**
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	**872,700.00**			**5,000,000.00**		5,872,700.00	**5,000,000.00**
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0.00	0.00
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0.00	**0.00**	1,141,170.00	0.00	0.00	**1,141,170.00**	**1,141,170.00**
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks		**1,000,000.00**	1,141,170.00			**2,141,170.00**	**2,141,170.00**
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0.00	**0.00**	247,908.00	0.00	0.00	**247,908.00**	**247,908.00**
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies		**2,000,000.00**	247,908.00			**2,247,908.00**	**2,247,908.00**
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0.00**	**6,104,635.18**	**5,963,395.00**	**19,373,506.00**	**0.00**	**31,441,536.18**	**31,441,536.18**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**6,041,386.00**	**6,375,771.00**	**19,220,143.00**		**31,637,300.00**	**31,637,300.00**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**0.00**	**6,104,635.18**	**7,352,473.00**	**25,246,206.00**	0.00	**38,703,314.18**	**38,703,314.18**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**872,700.00**	**9,041,386.00**	**7,764,849.00**	**24,220,143.00**	0.00	**41,899,078.00**	**41,026,378.00**

Table 9-37: Luxembourg – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds	872,700.00		5,000,000.00	5,872,700.00
1. Global Environment Facility	872,700.00			872,700.00
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund			5,000,000.00	5,000,000.00
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks			2,141,170.00	1,141,170.00
1. World Bank			300,000.00	300,000.00
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other *International Commitee of the Red Cross, Mekong River Commission*			1,841,170.00	841,170.00
Specialized United Nations bodies			2,247,908.00	247,908.00
1. United Nations Development Programme			247,908.00	
2. United Nations Environment Programme			2,000,000.00	
3. Other *UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women)*				247,908.00
Total contributions through multilateral channels			***9,389,078.00***	***7,261,778.00***

Table 9-38: Latvia - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Latvia 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	**Allocation channels**	**Core/ general**	**Climate-specific: Mitigation**	**Climate-specific: Adaptation**	**Climate-specific: Cross-cutting**	**Climate-specific: Other**	**Total (climate-specific and core/ general)**	**Total climate-specific**
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**0**	**45,000**	**0**	**350,000**	**0**	**395,000**	**395,000**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**0**	**45,000**	**0**	**0**	**350,000**	**395,000**	**395,000**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	**350,000**	**0**	350,000	350,000
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds					**350,000**	350,000	350,000
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0		0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	45,000	0	0	0	45,000	45,000
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks		45,000				45,000	45,000
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies						0	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**24,985**	**24,985**	**24,985**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**					**24,985**	**24,985**	**24,985**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	0	45,000	0	**350,000**	**24,985**	419,985	419,985
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	0	45,000	0	**0**	**374,985**	419,985	419,985

Table 9-39: Latvia – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds			350,000	
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund			350,000	350,000
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks			45,000	
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (pt1)			35,000	35,000
6. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (pt2)				10,000
7. Inter-American Development Bank			10,000	
8. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies				
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme				
3. Other				
Total contributions through multilateral channels			***395,000***	***395,000***

Table 9-40: Malta - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Malta 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**25,000**	**7,020**	**23,705**	**0**	**50,000**	**105,725**	**80,725**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**75,000**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**75,000**	**0**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	**50,000**	**50,000**	**50,000**
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds						**0**	**0**
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0		0	0	**50,000**	**50,000**	**50,000**
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						**0**	**0**
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	**7,020**	**23,705**	0	0	**30,725**	**30,725**
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks		**0**	**0**			**0**	**0**
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	**25,000**	0	0	0	0	**25,000**	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	**75,000**					**75,000**	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**7,020**	**23,705**			**30,725**	**30,725**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**25,000**	7,020	23,705	0	**50,000**	105,725	80,725
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**75,000**	7,020	23,705	0	**0**	105,725	30,725

Table 9-41: Malta – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. other				
Specialized United Nations bodies				
1. United Nations Development Programme	25,000	25,000		
2. United Nations Environment Programme				
3. UNICEF	**50,000**	**0**	**0**	**50,000**
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***75,000***	***25,000***	***0***	***50,000***

Table 9-42: Netherlands - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Nethlerlands 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	300,495,000.00	0.00	**0.00**	76,410,000.00	**0.00**	376,905,000.00	76,410,000.00
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	451,782,578.00	12,060,766.00	**0.00**	90,157,228.45	**0.00**	554,000,572.45	102,217,994.45
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	20,725,000.00	0.00	0.00	11,400,000.00	0.00	32,125,000.00	11,400,000.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	23,122,972.00	2,397,972.00		11,440,200.00		36,961,144.00	13,838,172.00
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	2,400,000.00	2,400,000.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4,800,000.00	2,400,000.00
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds	2,397,972.00	2,397,972.00				4,795,944.00	2,397,972.00
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	240,400,000.00	0.00	0.00	61,840,000.00	0.00	302,240,000.00	61,840,000.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	190,417,137.00			71,055,842.45		261,472,979.45	71,055,842.45
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	39,370,000.00	0.00	0.00	3,170,000.00	0.00	42,540,000.00	3,170,000.00
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	238,242,469.00	9,662,794.00		7,661,186.00		255,566,449.00	17,323,980.00
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	0.00	69,545,466.93	133,843,872.66	89,074,963.48	**0.00**	292,464,303.06	292,464,303.06
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		71,403,956.00	134,351,471.00	86,711,871.00		292,467,298.00	292,467,298.00
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	300,495,000.00	69,545,466.93	133,843,872.66	165,484,963.48	0.00	669,369,303.06	368,874,303.06
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	451,782,578.00	83,464,722.00	134,351,471.00	176,869,099.45	0.00	846,467,870.45	394,685,292.45

Table 9-43: Netherlands – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds	23,122,972	0	13,838,172	13,800,000
1. Global Environment Facility	20,725,000	0	11,440,200	11,400,000
2. Least Developed Countries Fund		0		0
3. Special Climate Change Fund		0		0
4. Adaptation Fund		0		0
5. Green Climate Fund		0		0
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities		0		0
7. Other multilateral climate change funds	2,397,972	0	2,397,972	2,400,000
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	190,417,137	0	71,055,842	61,840,000
1. World Bank		0		0
2. International Finance Corporation	7,508,800	0	9,962,676	0
3. African Development Bank	3,256,000	129,900,000	677,248	44,170,000
4. Asian Development Bank	2,242,000	0	405,802	0
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development		0		0
6. Inter-American Development Bank		0		0
7. Other	177,410,337	110,500,000	60,010,117	17,670,000
Specialized United Nations bodies	238,242,469	0	17,323,980	3,170,000
1. United Nations Development Programme	135,269,394	29,730,000	1,486,340	1,490,000
2. United Nations Environment Programme	7,124,228	7,140,000	1,424,846	1,430,000
3. Other	95,848,847	2,500,000	14,412,794	250,000
Total contributions through multilateral channels	*451,782,578*	*279,770,000*	*102,217,994*	*78,810,000*

Table 9-44: Poland – Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Poland 2014, Table 7		National currency PLN (MMR) / National currency PLN (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**9,342,872.61**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**9,139,127.84**	**0.00**	**18,482,000.45**	**9,139,127.84**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**9,342,872.61**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**9,139,127.84**	**0.00**	**18,482,000.45**	**9,139,127.84**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	350,000.00		350,000.00	350,000.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds				350,000.00		350,000.00	350,000.00
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0.00	0.00
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	9,342,872.61	0.00	0.00	0.00		9,342,872.61	0.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	9,342,872.61					9,342,872.61	0.00
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0.00	0.00	0.00	8,789,127.84		8,789,127.84	8,789,127.84
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies				8,789,127.84		8,789,127.84	8,789,127.84
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0.00**	**1,542,883.41**	**639,376.68**	**4,059,006.36**		**6,241,266.45**	**6,241,266.45**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**1,124,361.28**	**639,376.68**	**4,477,528.49**		**6,241,266.45**	**6,241,266.45**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	9,342,872.61	**1,542,883.41**	639,376.68	**13,198,134.20**	0.00	24,723,266.90	15,380,394.29
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	9,342,872.61	**1,124,361.28**	639,376.68	**13,616,656.33**	0.00	24,723,266.90	15,380,394.29

Table 9-45: Poland – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Poland Table 7a	*Total amount*			
Donor funding	*Core/general*		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (PLN)	*MMR (PLN)*	*UNFCCC (PLN)*	*MMR (PLN)*
Multilateral climate change funds			350,000.00	350,000.00
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund			350,000.00	350,000.00
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	9,342,872.61	9,342,872.61		
1. World Bank - IDA	9,208,118.00	9,208,118.00		
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other: Council of Europe Development Bank	134,754.61	134,754.61		
Specialized United Nations bodies			8,789,127.84	8,789,127.84
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme			473,145.00	473,145.00
UNCCD			218,873.72	218,873.72
UNFCCC			426,812.81	426,812.81
WMO			160,062.63	160,062.63
IAEA-TCF			2,569,630.80	2,569,630.80
3. Other:				
EPPO			295,299.73	295,299.73
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol			4,442,423.19	4,442,423.19
CITES			202,879.96	202,879.96
Total contributions through multilateral channels		***9,342,872.61***	***9,139,127.84***	***9,139,127.84***

Table 9-46: Portugal - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Portugal 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	**Allocation channels**	**Core/ general**	**Climate-specific: Mitigation**	**Adaptation**	**Cross-cutting**	**Other**	**Total (climate-specific and core/ general)**	**Total climate-specific**
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**3,469,923**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**3,469,923**	**0**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**3,469,923**					**3,469,923**	**0**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	3,387,387	0	0	0	0	3,387,387	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	3,387,387					3,387,387	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	82,536	0	0	0	0	82,536	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	82,536					82,536	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**8,359,311**	**855,005**	**0**	**0**	**9,214,316**	**9,214,316**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**8,359,311**	**855,005**			**9,214,316**	**9,214,316**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	3,469,923	8,359,311	855,005	0	0	12,684,239	9,214,316
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	3,469,923	8,359,311	855,005	0	0	12,684,239	9,214,316

Table 9-47: Portugal – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)
Multilateral climate change funds		-	-	-
1. Global Environment Facility		-	-	-
2. Least Developed Countries Fund			-	-
3. Special Climate Change Fund			-	-
4. Adaptation Fund			-	-
5. Green Climate Fund			-	-
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities			-	-
7. Other multilateral climate change funds			-	-
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	3,469,923.00	3,387,387.00	-	-
1. World Bank	1,490,000.00	1,490,000.00	-	-
2. International Finance Corporation		0.00	-	-
3. African Development Bank	1,478,108.00	1,478,108.00	-	-
4. Asian Development Bank	250,000.00	250,000.00	-	-
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development		0.00	-	-
6. Inter-American Development Bank	169,279.00	169,279.00	-	-
7. Other		0.00	-	-
Specialized United Nations bodies	82,536.00	82,536.00	-	-
1. United Nations Development Programme	39,872.00	39,872.00	-	-
2. United Nations Environment Programme		0.00	-	-
3. Other	42,664.00	42,664.00	-	-
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***3,469,923.00***	***3,469,923.00***	**-**	**-**

Table 9-48: Romania - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Romania 2014, Table 7		National currency RON (MMR) / National currency RON (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**0**	**0**	**140,000**	**0**	**0**	**140,000**	**140,000**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**						**0**	**0**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks						0	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	140,000	0	0	140,000	140,000
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies			0			0	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**140,000**		**140,000**			**280,000**	**140,000**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	0	0	140,000	0	0	140,000	140,000
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	140,000	0	140,000	0	0	280,000	140,000

Table 9-49: Romania – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (RON)	*MMR (RON)*	*UNFCCC (RON)*	*MMR (RON)*
Multilateral climate change funds				
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies				
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme				
3. Other				
Total contributions through multilateral channels				

Table 9-50: Sweden - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Sweden 2014, Table 7		National currency SEK (MMR) / National currency SEK (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Climate-specific: Adaptation	Climate-specific: Cross-cutting	Climate-specific: Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**3,572,108,526**	**45,050,000**	**15,000,000**	**74,500,000**	**0**	**3,706,658,526**	**134,550,000**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**3,651,927,334**	**45,050,000**	**15,000,000**	**74,500,000**	**0**	**3,786,477,334**	**134,550,000**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds[e]	0	**38,700,000**	15,000,000	**11,500,000**	0	**65,200,000**	**65,200,000**
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds		**45,050,000**	15,000,000	**74,500,000**		**134,550,000**	**134,550,000**
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds[f]	0	6,350,000	0	63,000,000	0	69,350,000	69,350,000
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds[f]		6,350,000		63,000,000		69,350,000	69,350,000
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	**2,876,464,054**	0	0	0	0	**2,876,464,054**	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	**2,956,282,862**					**2,956,282,862**	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	**695,644,472**	0	0	0	0	**695,644,472**	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	**695,644,472**					**695,644,472**	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**232,789,666**	**691,537,060**	**1,020,900,805**	**0**	**1,945,227,531**	**1,945,227,531**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**232,789,666**	**691,537,060**	**1,020,900,805**		**1,945,227,531**	**1,945,227,531**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**3,572,108,526**	277,839,666	706,537,060	1,095,400,805	0	**5,651,886,057**	2,079,777,531
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**3,651,927,334**	277,839,666	706,537,060	1,095,400,805	0	**5,731,704,865**	2,079,777,531

Table 9-51: Sweden – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (SEK)	*MMR (SEK)*	*UNFCCC (SEK)*	*MMR (SEK)*
Multilateral climate change funds			134,550,000	
1. Global Environment Facility			38,700,000	38,700,000
2. Least Developed Countries Fund			15,000,000	15,000,000
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund			10,000,000	10,000,000
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities			1,500,000	1,500,000
7. Other multilateral climate finance			69,350,000	
7a) Climate and Clean Air Coallition (CCAC)			3,350,000	3,350,000
7b) Nordic Development Fund			60,000,000	60,000,000
7c) UNFCCC- Trust Fund for Participation			1,500,000	1,500,000
7e) New Climate Economy			1,000,000	1,000,000
7f) IISD/GSI Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform			2,000,000	2,000,000
7h) Other climate finance from Ministry of Environment			1,500,000	1,500,000
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	**2,956,282,862.00**	**2,876,464,054**		
1. World Bank	**2,209,538,113**	**2,029,848,113**		TBC
3. African Development Bank	**609,673,785**	**709,544,977**		TBC
4. Asian Development Bank	124,791,230	124,791,230		TBC
6. Inter-American Development Bank	12,279,734	12,279,734		TBC
7. Other				TBC
Specialized United Nations bodies	695,644,472			
1. United Nations Development Programme	510,000,000	510,000,000		TBC
2. United Nations Environment Programme	32,124,512	32,124,512		TBC
3. IFAD	153,519,960	153,519,960		TBC
3. Other	153,519,960			
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***3,651,927,334***	***3,572,108,526***	***134,550,000***	***134,550,000***

Table 9-52: Slovenia - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Slovenia 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**663,490**	**0**	**663,490**	**663,490**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**533,510**	**0**	**533,510**	**533,510**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	376,200	0	376,200	376,200
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds				376,200		376,200	376,200
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds						0	0
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	0	0	157,310	0	157,310	157,310
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				157,310		157,310	157,310
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	0	**129,980**	0	129,980	129,980
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	0	**0**		0	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**596,460**	**850,710**	**156,180**	**0**	**1,603,350**	**1,603,350**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**804,000**	**180,730**	**618,620**		**1,603,350**	**1,603,350**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	0	**596,460**	**850,710**	**819,670**	0	**2,266,840**	**2,266,840**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	0	**804,000**	**180,730**	**1,152,130**	0	**2,136,860**	**2,136,860**

Table 9-53: Slovenia – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	Total amount			
	Core/general		Climate-specific	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)
Total contributions through multilateral channels			533,510	663,490
Multilateral climate change funds			376,200	376,200
1. Global Environment Facility			376,200	376,200
GEF - part for mitigation				
GEF - part for adaptation				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks			157,310	157,310
1. World Bank			154,440	154,440
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other			2,870	2,870
Specialized United Nations bodies			**0**	**129,980**
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme				
3. Other			**0**	**129,980**
			0	**660,620**

Table 9-54: Slovakia - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Slovakia 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific: Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**305,224.72**	**198,996.50**	**3,676.36**	**150,468.73**	**0.00**	**658,366.31**	**353,141.59**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**264,580.32**	**198,996.50**	**3,676.36**	**150,468.73**	**40,644.40**	**658,366.31**	**393,785.99**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0.00	198,996.50	3,676.36	25,493.73	0.00	228,166.59	228,166.59
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds		198,996.50	3,676.36	25,493.73		228,166.59	228,166.59
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds		198,996.50	3,676.36	25,493.73		228,166.59	228,166.59
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0.00	0.00	0.00	124,975.00	0.00	124,975.00	124,975.00
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks				124,975.00		124,975.00	124,975.00
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	**305,224.72**	0.00	0.00	0.00	**0.00**	305,224.72	0.00
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	**264,580.32**				**40,644.40**	305,224.72	40,644.40
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**760,370.96**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**760,370.96**	**760,370.96**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**			**760,370.96**			**760,370.96**	**760,370.96**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	305,224.72	198,996.50	764,047.32	150,468.73	0.00	1,418,737.27	1,113,512.55
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	264,580.32	198,996.50	764,047.32	150,468.73	40,644.40	1,418,737.27	1,154,156.95

Table 9-55: Slovakia – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Slovakia Table 7a	*Total amount*			
Donor funding	*Core/general*		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	*MMR (EUR)*	*UNFCCC (EUR)*	*MMR (EUR)*
Multilateral climate change funds			228,166.59	228,166.59
1. Global Environment Facility				
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund			173,975.00	173,975.00
8. Montreal Protocol Trust Fund			5,370.96	5,370.96
9. UNFCCC			25,493.73	25,493.73
10. Kyoto Protocol under UNFCCC			19,650.54	19,650.54
12. World Meteorological Organisation (WMO)			3,676.36	3,676.36
13. Other multilateral climate change funds			228,166.59	228,166.59
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks			124,975.00	124,975.00
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. SK-EBRD Technical Co-operation Fund; Projects: Kyrgyz Republic, Capacity enhancement of the Kyrgyz Civil Society Organisation Camp Alatoo regarding residential energy efficiency (II)			**0.00**	**74,975.00**
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development as a manager *Contribution to the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership Regional Fund - Moldova window*			**0.00**	**50,000.00**
6. Inter-American Development Bank				
7. Other				
Specialized United Nations bodies	264,580.32	264,580.32	**40,644.40**	**0.00**
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme	**0.00**	**40,644.40**	**40,644.40**	**0.00**
3. Other: CITES Multilateral Treaty	8,969.61	8,969.61		
4. Other: The UNCCD in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa	12,833.00	12,833.00		
5. Other: The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	217,287.71	217,287.71		
6. Other: European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization (EPPO)	25,490.00	25,490.00		
Total contributions through multilateral channels	***264,580.32***	***305,224.72***	***393,785.99***	***581,308.18***

Table 9-56: Spain - Table 7 Summary information for 2014

Spain 2014, Table 7		National currency EUR (MMR) / National currency EUR (UNFCCC)						
Source	**Allocation channels**	**Core/ general**	**Climate-specific**				**Total (climate-specific and core/ general)**	**Total climate-specific**
			Mitigation	**Adaptation**	**Cross-cutting**	**Other**		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**0**	**30,000,000**	**165,411**	**9,616,000**		**39,781,411**	**39,781,411**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels**	**16,120,000**	**30,000,000**	**165,411**	**9,616,000**		**55,901,411**	**39,781,411**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	30,000,000	165,411	8,866,000		39,031,411	39,031,411
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	16,120,000	30,000,000	165,411	8,866,000		55,151,411	39,031,411
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	0	0	0		0	0
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds		30,000,000				30,000,000	30,000,000
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	0	0	0	0		0	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks						0	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	0	750,000		750,000	750,000
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies				750,000		750,000	750,000
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**393,176,306**	**18,496,555**	**12,424,800**		**424,097,661**	**424,097,661**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**		**393,176,306**	**18,495,157**	**12,426,197**		**424,097,660**	**424,097,660**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	0	423,176,306	18,661,966	22,040,800		463,879,072	463,879,072
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	16,120,000	423,176,306	18,660,568	22,042,197		479,999,071	463,879,071

Table 9-57: Spain – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	***Total amount***			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)	UNFCCC (EUR)	MMR (EUR)
Multilateral climate change funds	16,120,000		39,031,411	
1. Global Environmental Facility	16,120,000	16,120,000	8,866,000	8,866,000
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund			165,411	165,411
5. Green Climate Change Fund				
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds			30,000,000	
Clean Technology Fund (Climate Investment Funds)			30,000,000	30,000,000
Subtotal				
Multilateral financial Institutions, including regional development banks				
1. World Bank GROUP				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank				
4. Asian Development Bank				
5. European Bank for Reconstruction				
6. Interamerican Development Bank				
7. Other				
Subtotal	**0**	**0**		
Specialized United Nations bodies			750,000	750,000
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme(REGATTA Project)			250,000	250,000
3. Other			500,000	500,000
FAO				
UN HABITAT				
UNREDD				500,000
Subtotal	**0**	**0**		
Total	***0***	***0***	***39,781,411***	***39,781,411***

Table 9-58: United Kingdom – Table 7 Summary information for 2014

United Kingdom 2014, Table 7		National currency £ (MMR) / National currency £ (UNFCCC)							
Source	Allocation channels	Core/ general	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MMR	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**1,825,600,000**	**111,690,000**	**21,000,000**	**284,610,000**	**0**	2,242,900,000	**417,300,000**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through multilateral channels:**	**1,826,000,000**	**0**	**2,500,000**	**414,800,000**	**0**	2,243,300,000	**922,790,000**
MMR	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	**21,000,000**	**2,500,000**	0	**23,500,000**	**23,500,000**
UNFCCC	Multilateral climate change funds	0	0	**2,500,000**	**414,800,000**	0	**417,300,000**	**417,300,000**
MMR	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	**111,690,000**	0	**282,110,000**	0	393,800,000	393,800,000
UNFCCC	Other multilateral climate change funds	0	**0**	0	**393,800,000**	0	393,800,000	393,800,000
MMR	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	1,825,600,000	0	0	0	0	1,825,600,000	0
UNFCCC	Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks	1,826,000,000	0	0	0	0	1,826,000,000	0
MMR	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNFCCC	Specialized United Nations bodies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MMR	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**81,240,000**	**161,320,000**	**103,770,000**	**123,720,000**	**470,050,000**	**470,050,000**
UNFCCC	**Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels**	**0**	**81,240,000**	**161,520,000**	**103,770,000**	**123,520,000**	**470,050,000**	**470,050,000**
MMR	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**1,825,600,000**	**192,930,000**	**182,320,000**	**388,380,000**	**123,720,000**	**2,712,950,000**	**887,350,000**
UNFCCC	**Total (multilateral + bilateral)**	**1,826,000,000**	**81,240,000**	**164,020,000**	**518,570,000**	**123,520,000**	**2,713,350,000**	**887,350,000**

Table 9-59: United Kingdom – Table 7a – Contribution through multilateral channels in 2014

Donor funding	*Total amount*			
	Core/general		*Climate-specific*	
	UNFCCC (£)	*MMR (£)*	*UNFCCC (£)*	*MMR (£)*
Multilateral climate change funds				**417,300,000**
1. Global Environment Facility			21,000,000	21,000,000
2. Least Developed Countries Fund				
3. Special Climate Change Fund				
4. Adaptation Fund				
5. Green Climate Fund			2,500,000	2,500,000
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities				
7. Other multilateral climate change funds				
Climate Investment Funds			372,690,000	261,000,000
Climate Investment Funds - Clean Technology Fund				111,690,000
Climate Development Knowledge Network				**21,110,000**
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks		**1,825,600,000**		
1. World Bank				
2. International Finance Corporation				
3. African Development Bank		**207,800,000**		
4. Asian Development Bank		**50,000,000**		
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development				
6. Inter-American Development Bank		**2,500,000**		
7. Other		**1,565,300,000**		
Specialized United Nations bodies				
1. United Nations Development Programme				
2. United Nations Environment Programme				
3. Other				
Total contributions through multilateral channels		***1,825,600,000***		***417,300,000***

9.4. Annex IV: Overview of 28 Member States quantitative comparison of finance data reported for the year 2014 in the MMR reporting and the second biennial reports

The following tables are extracted from the data given in Annex III. Three tables are compiled presenting bilateral, multilateral and both contributions for all 28 EU Member States[56] and as a total.

Comments and clarifications received from Member States after presenting and sharing the results of a former version of this synthesis report are incorporated in this analysis.

[56] Croatia is abbreviated as CR

Table 9-60: Total multilateral and bilateral contributions for all 28 Member States

Sum of total contributions by country (bilateral and multilateral)									
			EURO						
			Climate-specific						
Country	Report	Exchange rate to €	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
AT	MMR	1.00	72,074,108	6,882,195	22,120,786	0	112,759,443	101,077,089
AT	BR2	1.00	71,002,910	6,882,195	63,353,623	0	141,238,728	141,238,728
BE	MMR	1.00	8,579,983	31,053,692	54,768,078	0	470,510,220	94,401,753
BE	BR2	1.00	8,579,983	33,303,691	54,768,078	0	472,760,218	96,651,752
BG	MMR	1.00	0	0	8,975	0	34,211	8,975
BG	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CR	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	33,018	0
CR	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	33,018	0
CY	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CY	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CZ	MMR	0.04	1,149,083	2,799,552	2,259,890	0	12,472,644	6,208,524
CZ	BR2	0.04	1,149,083	2,799,552	2,259,890	0	13,204,152	6,208,524
DE	MMR	1.00	722,273,560	681,414,566	230,073,345	486,172,574	2,986,530,139	2,119,934,045
DE	BR2	1.00	610,421,344	793,266,782	230,073,345	486,172,573	2,986,530,138	2,119,934,044
DK	MMR	0.13	45,789,402	0	141,623,350	17,156,491	376,740,396	187,412,752
DK	BR2	0.13	47,623,069	20,135,153	115,794,253	0	372,880,119	183,552,474
EE	MMR	1.00	0	323,000	364,806	0	746,690	687,806
EE	BR2	1.00	74,134	0	596,010	0	779,028	670,144
ES	MMR	1.00	423,176,306	18,661,966	22,040,800	0	463,879,072	463,879,072
ES	BR2	1.00	423,176,306	18,660,568	22,042,197	0	479,999,071	463,879,071
FI	MMR	1.00	30,857,058	24,260,341	61,054,126	0	1,136,555,912	116,171,525
FI	BR2	1.00	30,857,058	24,260,341	61,054,126	0	624,116,668	116,171,525
FR	MMR	1.00	2,232,149,678	279,138,362	255,907,619	0	2,801,180,659	2,767,195,659
FR	BR2	1.00	2,233,874,678	279,138,362	254,182,619	0	2,801,180,659	2,767,195,659
GR	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	501,442	0
GR	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	501,442	0
HU	MMR	1.00	486,157,240	334,307,051	17,049,256	0	3,066,230,357	837,513,547
HU	BR2	1.00	486,157,240	334,307,051	15,181,636	0	3,064,362,837	835,645,927
IE	MMR	1.00	1,527,600	22,874,000	9,572,500	0	109,405,905	33,974,100
IE	BR2	1.00	1,527,600	22,274,000	9,572,500	300,000	109,105,900	33,674,100
IT	MMR	1.00	14,961,329	4,554,061	32,597,559	0	76,642,949	52,112,949
IT	BR2	1.00	12,750,000	1,910,000	32,040,000	0	46,700,000	46,700,000
LT	MMR	1.00	256,996	0	50,000	0	1,095,049	306,996
LT	BR2	1.00	256,996	0	50,000	0	1,095,049	306,996
LU	MMR	1.00	6,104,635	7,352,473	25,246,206	0	38,703,314	38,703,314
LU	BR2	1.00	9,041,386	7,764,849	24,220,143	0	41,899,078	41,026,378
LV	MMR	1.00	45,000	0	350,000	24,985	419,985	419,985
LV	BR2	1.00	45,000	0	0	374,985	419,985	419,985

Sum of total contributions by country (bilateral and multilateral)								
			EURO					
Country	Report	Exchange rate to €	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MT	MMR	1.00	7,020	23,705	0	50,000	105,725	80,725
MT	BR2	1.00	7,020	23,705	0	0	105,725	30,725
NL	MMR	1.00	69,545,467	133,843,873	165,484,963	0	669,369,303	368,874,303
NL	BR2	1.00	83,464,722	134,351,471	176,869,099	0	846,467,870	394,685,292
PL	MMR	0.24	368,661	152,775	3,153,601	0	5,907,449	3,675,036
PL	BR2	0.24	268,658	152,775	3,253,604	0	5,907,449	3,675,036
PT	MMR	1.00	8,359,311	855,005	0	0	12,684,239	9,214,316
PT	BR2	1.00	8,359,311	855,005	0	0	12,684,239	9,214,316
RO	MMR	0.25	0	35,565	0	0	35,565	35,565
RO	BR2	0.25	0	35,565	0	0	71,129	35,565
SE	MMR	0.11	30,526,357	77,627,514	120,352,132	0	620,975,017	228,506,002
SE	BR2	0.11	30,526,357	77,627,514	120,352,132	0	629,744,742	228,506,002
SI	MMR	1.00	596,460	850,710	819,670	0	2,266,840	2,266,840
SI	BR2	1.00	804,000	180,730	1,152,130	0	2,136,860	2,136,860
SK	MMR	1.00	198,997	764,047	150,469	0	1,418,737	1,113,513
SK	BR2	1.00	198,997	764,047	150,469	40,644	1,418,737	1,154,157
UK	MMR	1.35	260,455,500	246,132,000	524,313,000	167,022,000	3,662,482,500	1,197,922,500
UK	BR2	1.35	109,674,000	221,427,000	700,069,500	166,752,000	3,663,022,500	1,197,922,500
Total MMR							16,629,686,781	8,631,696,892
Total BR2							16,318,365,343	8,690,635,762

Table 9-61: Total multilateral contributions for all 28 Member States

Country	Report	Exchange rate to €	Sum of total multilateral contributions by country – EURO – Climate-specific: Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other	Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
AT	MMR	1.00	1,071,198	0	252,640	0	13,006,192	1,323,838
AT	BR2	1.00	0	0	41,485,477	0	41,485,477	41,485,477
BE	MMR	1.00	22,040	12,813,595	41,494,353	0	430,438,454	54,329,988
BE	BR2	1.00	22,040	15,063,594	41,494,353	0	432,688,453	56,579,987
BG	MMR	1.00	0	0	8,975	0	34,211	8,975
BG	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CR	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	33,018	0
CR	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	33,018	0
CY	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CY	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CZ	MMR	0.04	0	0	2,161,826	0	8,425,946	2,161,826
CZ	BR2	0.04	0	0	2,161,826	0	9,157,454	2,161,826
DE	MMR	1.00	27,006,778	98,000,000	20,619,520	92,000,000	1,104,222,391	237,626,298
DE	BR2	1.00	27,006,778	98,000,000	20,619,520	92,000,000	1,104,222,391	237,626,297
DK	MMR	0.13	3,876,094	0	16,178,169	17,156,491	209,381,907	20,054,263
DK	BR2	0.13	6,993,348	5,361,404	13,062,456	0	214,744,852	25,417,208
EE	MMR	1.00	0	323,000	262,806	0	644,690	585,806
EE	BR2	1.00	0	0	60,806	0	169,690	60,806
ES	MMR	1.00	30,000,000	165,411	9,616,000	0	39,781,411	39,781,411
ES	BR2	1.00	30,000,000	165,411	9,616,000	0	55,901,411	39,781,411
FI	MMR	1.00	6,837,000	14,000,000	50,907,922	0	593,022,470	71,744,922
FI	BR2	1.00	6,837,000	14,000,000	50,907,922	0	579,690,065	71,744,922
FR	MMR	1.00	0	0	10,875,200	0	44,860,200	10,875,200
FR	BR2	1.00	0	0	10,875,200	0	44,860,200	10,875,200
GR	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	501,442	0
GR	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	501,442	0
HU	MMR	1.00	485,417,240	0	0	0	2,714,134,050	485,417,240
HU	BR2	1.00	485,417,240	0	0	0	2,714,134,150	485,417,240
IE	MMR	1.00	37,600	1,900,000	100,000	0	77,469,405	2,037,600
IE	BR2	1.00	37,600	1,300,000	100,000	300,000	77,169,400	1,737,600
IT	MMR	1.00	1,244,750	466,880	17,259,821	0	43,501,451	18,971,451
IT	BR2	1.00	200,000	0	20,960,000	0	21,160,000	21,160,000
LT	MMR	1.00	105,360	0	50,000	0	943,413	155,360
LT	BR2	1.00	105,360	0	50,000	0	943,413	155,360
LU	MMR	1.00	0	1,389,078	5,872,700	0	7,261,778	7,261,778
LU	BR2	1.00	3,000,000	1,389,078	5,000,000	0	10,261,778	9,389,078
LV	MMR	1.00	45,000	0	350,000	0	395,000	395,000
LV	BR2	1.00	45,000	0	0	350,000	395,000	395,000

Sum of total multilateral contributions by country								
Country	Report	Exchange rate to €	EURO					
			Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MT	MMR	1.00	7,020	23,705	0	50,000	105,725	80,725
MT	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	75,000	0
NL	MMR	1.00	0	0	76,410,000	0	376,905,000	76,410,000
NL	BR2	1.00	12,060,766	0	90,157,228	0	554,000,572	102,217,994
PL	MMR	0.24	0	0	2,183,730	0	4,416,143	2,183,730
PL	BR2	0.24	0	0	2,183,730	0	4,416,143	2,183,730
PT	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	3,469,923	0
PT	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	3,469,923	0
RO	MMR	0.25	0	35,565	0	0	35,565	35,565
RO	BR2	0.25	0	0	0	0	0	0
SE	MMR	0.11	4,949,662	1,648,056	8,185,345	0	407,252,078	14,783,063
SE	BR2	0.11	4,949,662	1,648,056	8,185,345	0	416,021,803	14,783,063
SI	MMR	1.00	0	0	663,490	0	663,490	663,490
SI	BR2	1.00	0	0	533,510	0	533,510	533,510
SK	MMR	1.00	198,997	3,676	150,469	0	658,366	353,142
SK	BR2	1.00	198,997	3,676	150,469	40,644	658,366	393,786
UK	MMR	1.35	150,781,500	28,350,000	384,223,500	0	3,027,915,000	563,355,000
UK	BR2	1.35	0	3,375,000	559,980,000	0	3,028,455,000	563,355,000
Total MMR							9,109,478,719	1,610,595,669
Total BR2							9,315,148,512	1,687,454,495

Table 9-62: Total bilateral contributions for all 28 Member States

Sum of total bilateral contributions by country								
			EURO					
Country	Report	Exchange rate to €	Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
AT	MMR	1.00	71,002,910	6,882,195	21,868,146	0	99,753,251	99,753,251
AT	BR2	1.00	71,002,910	6,882,195	21,868,146	0	99,753,251	99,753,251
BE	MMR	1.00	8,557,943	18,240,097	13,273,725	0	40,071,765	40,071,765
BE	BR2	1.00	8,557,943	18,240,097	13,273,725	0	40,071,765	40,071,765
BG	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
BG	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CR	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CR	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CY	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CY	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
CZ	MMR	0.04	1,149,083	2,799,552	98,064	0	4,046,698	4,046,698
CZ	BR2	0.04	1,149,083	2,799,552	98,064	0	4,046,698	4,046,698
DE	MMR	1.00	**695,266,782**	**583,414,566**	209,453,825	394,172,574	1,882,307,747	1,882,307,747
DE	BR2	1	**583,414,566**	**695,266,782**	209,453,825	394,172,574	1,882,307,747	1,882,307,747
DK	MMR	0.13	**41,913,308**	**0**	**125,445,181**	0	**167,358,489**	**167,358,489**
DK	BR2	0.13	**40,629,721**	**14,773,749**	**102,731,796**	0	**158,135,267**	**158,135,267**
EE	MMR	1.00	**0**	0	**102,000**	0	**102,000**	**102,000**
EE	BR2	1.00	**74,134**	0	**535,204**	0	**609,338**	**609,338**
ES	MMR	1.00	393,176,306	**18,496,555**	**12,424,800**	0	424,097,661	424,097,661
ES	BR2	1.00	393,176,306	**18,495,157**	**12,426,197**	0	424,097,660	424,097,660
FI	MMR	1.00	24,020,058	10,260,341	10,146,204	0	**543,533,442**	44,426,603
FI	BR2	1.00	24,020,058	10,260,341	10,146,204	0	**44,426,603**	44,426,603
FR	MMR	1.00	**2,232,149,678**	279,138,362	**245,032,419**	0	2,756,320,459	2,756,320,459
FR	BR2	1.00	**2,233,874,678**	279,138,362	**243,307,419**	0	2,756,320,459	2,756,320,459
GR	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
GR	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
HU	MMR	1.00	740,000	334,307,051	**17,049,256**	0	**352,096,307**	**352,096,307**
HU	BR2	1.00	740,000	334,307,051	**15,181,636**	0	**350,228,687**	**350,228,687**
IE	MMR	1.00	1,490,000	20,974,000	9,472,500	0	31,936,500	31,936,500
IE	BR2	1.00	1,490,000	20,974,000	9,472,500	0	31,936,500	31,936,500
IT	MMR	1.00	**13,716,579**	**4,087,181**	**15,337,738**	0	**33,141,499**	**33,141,499**
IT	BR2	1.00	**12,550,000**	**1,910,000**	**11,080,000**	0	**25,540,000**	**25,540,000**
LT	MMR	1.00	151,636	0	0	0	151,636	151,636
LT	BR2	1.00	151,636	0	0	0	151,636	151,636
LU	MMR	1.00	**6,104,635**	**5,963,395**	**19,373,506**	0	**31,441,536**	**31,441,536**
LU	BR2	1.00	**6,041,386**	**6,375,771**	**19,220,143**	0	**31,637,300**	**31,637,300**
LV	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	24,985	24,985	24,985
LV	BR2	1.00	0	0	0	24,985	24,985	24,985

Sum of total bilateral contributions by country								
Country	Report	Exchange rate to €	EURO					
			Climate-specific				Total (climate-specific and core/ general)	Total climate-specific
			Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other		
MT	MMR	1.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
MT	BR2	1.00	7,020	23,705	0	0	30,725	30,725
NL	MMR	1.00	69,545,467	133,843,873	89,074,963	0	292,464,303	292,464,303
NL	BR2	1.00	71,403,956	134,351,471	86,711,871	0	292,467,298	292,467,298
PL	MMR	0.24	368,661	152,775	969,871	0	1,491,306	1,491,306
PL	BR2	0.24	268,658	152,775	1,069,874	0	1,491,306	1,491,306
PT	MMR	1.00	8,359,311	855,005	0	0	9,214,316	9,214,316
PT	BR2	1.00	8,359,311	855,005	0	0	9,214,316	9,214,316
RO	MMR	0.25	0	0	0	0	0	0
RO	BR2	0.25	0	35,565	0	0	71,129	35,565
SE	MMR	0.11	25,576,695	75,979,458	112,166,786	0	213,722,939	213,722,939
SE	BR2	0.11	25,576,695	75,979,458	112,166,786	0	213,722,939	213,722,939
SI	MMR	1.00	596,460	850,710	156,180	0	1,603,350	1,603,350
SI	BR2	1.00	804,000	180,730	618,620	0	1,603,350	1,603,350
SK	MMR	1.00	0	760,371	0	0	760,371	760,371
SK	BR2	1.00	0	760,371	0	0	760,371	760,371
UK	MMR	1.35	109,674,000	217,782,000	140,089,500	167,022,000	634,567,500	634,567,500
UK	BR2	1.35	109,674,000	218,052,000	140,089,500	166,752,000	634,567,500	634,567,500
Total MMR							7,520,208,062	7,021,101,223
Total BR2							7,003,216,831	7,003,181,266

9.5. Annex V: Key results of quantitative analysis of finance data reported under the MMR and in second biennial reports (multilateral and bilateral)

This chapter summarizes results from the quantitative data analysis. The tables compare the financial contributions to developing countries for the reporting year 2014 as reported in tables 7 and 7a under the MMR Article 16 at the end of October 2015 and in the second biennial report which was due by 1 January 2016 for each Member State. Annex III provides detailed comparison tables for each Member State and Annex IV shows a summary of the detailed comparison as well as the effects at aggregated EU level.

Comments and clarifications received from Member States after presenting and sharing the results of a former version of this synthesis report are incorporated in this analysis.

9.5.1. General reporting issues

- In table 7 it differs between countries and reports if the value of ´other´ is included in ´multilateral climate change funds´ or directly in ´total contributions through multilateral channels´.

9.5.2. Austria

- Reported amounts for multilateral support for 2014 in BR2 reports and in MMR reporting table are inconsistent while amounts for bilateral and regional support are consistent;
- Austria did not report any ´core/ general´ financial support in BR2 while ´core/ general´ support was included in MMR reporting. Thus the amount of € 11,682,354 of ´core/ general´ support is missing in the BR2 tables which was reported as ´core/ general´ in the MMR reporting for 2014;
- Amounts provided to Montreal Protocol are consistent between MMR reporting and BR2;
- Austria does not report any support provided to multilateral climate change funds;
- Support provided to multilateral financial institutions:
    - The support provided to the World Bank in 2014 is € 4.9 Mio in MMR reporting which is reported under ´core/ general´ whereas in the BR2 € 26.1 Mio are reported as cross-cutting climate-specific support to the World Bank. Thus, the climate-specific amount in BR2 is much higher than the core amount included in the MMR reporting;
    - The support provided to the African Development Bank in 2014 is € 1.8 Mio in MMR reporting which is reported under ´core/ general´ whereas in the BR2 € 2 Mio are reported as ´cross-cutting´ ´climate-specific´ support to the African Development Bank. Thus, the ´climate-specific´ amount in BR2 is slightly higher than the core amount included in the MMR reporting;
    - The support provided to the Asian Development Bank in 2014 is € 1.7 Mio in MMR reporting which is reported under ´core/ general´ whereas in the BR2 € 12.2 Mio are reported as ´cross-cutting´ ´climate-specific´ support to the African Development Bank. Thus, the ´climate-specific´ amount in BR2 is much higher than the core amount included in the MMR reporting;
    - ´Core/ general´ support to the EBRD and the Inter-American Development Bank is reported in the MMR tables, but not in the BR2 tables;

- ´Core/ general´ support to UNEP and UNDP is included in the MMR tables, but no amounts are indicated in BR2 tables;
- Support to UNFCCC is indicated with € 82,867 in BR2 whereas in the MMR tables a much higher amount of € 252,640 is provided for "UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and ITL";
- No sectoral information is provided for multilateral support;
- Financial instrument (grant) is provided in BR2 reporting, but not in MMR reporting.
- Austria commented that a key problem for consistency between MMR and BR reports that is not mentioned in the report is the early annual deadline of 30 September under MMR. The "imputed multilateral shares" that OECD publishes for OECD members are not available by that date. Yet these figures are the only genuinely comparable figures available. Austria therefore refrains from reporting "climate-specific" core contributions (below 100%) under MMR. We have thus treated MMR reports as preliminary reports to be updated and corrected in the relevant BRs. In this understanding consistency of data on multilateral support between MMR reports and BRs was neither anticipated nor indeed intended. We are however open to resubmitting MMR reports annually after the 30 September deadline once harmonised OECD data is available. This would ensure consistency between MMR and BR reports from Austria in the future."

9.5.3. Belgium

- Bilateral contributions are consistent between BR2 and MMR;
- Multilateral contributions are consistent apart from a subcategory for ´Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research´ in the MMR; in the BR this value is placed within ´specialized UN bodies´;
- The adaptation values differ for multilateral climate change funds;
- In MMR, value in multilateral climate change funds in 7 is different from 7a; only € 12 Mio from one fund are reported. The sum differs from the one in the BR;
- 7a is consistent. Only in the GCF, the BR2 reports one value, whereas it is split up in the MMR as € 40 Mio for ´cross-cutting´ multisectoral and € 600,000 for ´cross-cutting´. The Adaptation Fund value has also been split up under the MMR; the reason remains unclear.

9.5.4. Bulgaria

- Bulgaria reported empty tables on financial support in BR2 reporting under the UNFCCC, but reported support under the MMR. As Bulgaria is not included in Annex II to the Convention, it is not obliged to fulfil obligations pursuant to Articles 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 of the UNFCCC;
- The reported amounts of multilateral support in the MMR include contributions to the UNFCCC and the Montreal Protocol, core contributions to UNEP and other Conventions (desertification, CITES) as well as support to IUCN (which is reported under UN bodies; however IUCN is not an UN body.

9.5.5. Croatia

- The amount reported by Croatia is consistent. It includes only the UNFCCC core budget, which is reported under ´Specialized UN bodies´.

9.5.6. Czech Republic

- Reported amounts for climate-specific multilateral support for 2014 in BR2 reports and in MMR reporting table are consistent apart from 40,000,000 CZK reported as ´multilateral financial institutions including regional development banks´ - ´other´ in the BR and as ´other multilateral climate change funds´ in the MMR;
- Reported amounts for core/general multilateral support for 2014 in BR2 reports and in MMR reporting table are consistent apart from an additional 20,140,621 CZK reported in BR2 for ´multilateral climate change funds´;
- Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels are consistent;

9.5.7. Cyprus

- Cyprus reports empty tables under MMR and BR2.

9.5.8. Denmark

- Reported amounts in BR2 reports and in MMR reporting table are not fully consistent;
- Under the MMR Denmark reported finance data in 1000 DKK and in the BR CTF format DKK are reported. There is a factor of 1000 in the units indicated, however the order of magnitude of the numbers reported is the same or sometimes also the amounts are the same. This means that units are wrong in one of the reported set of tables. Comparison with BR1 reporting indicates that the units reported in BR2 tables are wrong and are indicated in 1000 DKK whereas the unit is DKK. This is corrected in the tables in Annex III;
- ´Multilateral climate change funds´: amount for GCF and ´other multilateral climate change funds´ are reported as ´core/ general´ in BR2 and as ´climate-specific´ in MMR template;
- Multilateral financial institutions: higher amount for World Bank provided in BR2 (DKK 40 Mio higher in BR2) which is also split to ´adaptation´/ ´mitigation´ / ´cross-cutting´ which was not the case for the amounts in the MMR template;
- ´Bilateral, regional and other channels´: higher amount reported in BR2, mostly due to adaptation projects included which were not included in MMR report, total amounts for ´mitigation´ and ´cross-cutting´ slightly lower in BR2 reporting than in MMR reporting;
- ´Bilateral, regional and other channels´: status reported as provided in BR2 and as committed in MMR template;
- In 7a of BR2 Denmark reports DKK 100 Mio and DKK 28 Mio under ´core/general´ ´multilateral climate change funds´ which are reported as ´climate-specific´ in the MMR;
- Values of the Asian Development Bank in 7a ´climate-specific´ are rounded in BR2;
- DKK 11,500 are reported in BR2 to the GEF which do not appear in the MMR and might be missing a factor 1000. This was not corrected.

9.5.9. Estonia

- In the MMR report, total bilateral contribution reported in summary table 7 is not the same number as the bilateral support reported in table 7b. The figure in table 7 was corrected according to table 7b;
- Estonia reports € 50,000 ´core/general´ to UNDP in BR2 that are not reported in the MMR;

- Under the MMR € 100,000 are reported as ´climate-specific´ to the International Telecommunications Union as ´other´ in ´Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks´ and € 323,000 to UNDP under ´specialized UN bodies´ which are not reported in BR2;
- In BR2 Estonia reports ´climate-specific´ bilateral contributions of € 74,134 (mitigation) and € 535,204 (cross-cutting) and only € 120,000 of the latter are reported to the MMR (in table 7b);
- In BR2 Estonia reports € 49,007.21 under ´cross-cutting´ and ´other multilateral climate change funds´ whereas in the MMR € 151,007.21 is reported under ´cross-cutting´ and ´multilateral climate change funds´;
- In total € 32,338 (´climate-specific´ and ´core/general´) are reported less in BR2 and € 17,662 more in BR2 (´climate-specific´).

9.5.10. Finland

- ´Climate-specific´ values are consistent between MMR and BR2 reporting;
- Differences in ´core/general´ can be observed for ´multilateral climate change funds´, ´specialized UN bodies´ and bilateral contributions;
- More than twice the amount is reported under the MMR as compared to BR2. This is largely due to the fact that no core/ general bilateral contributions are reported in BR2, but about 500 Mio € in the MMR report.
- Finland comments: “the UNFCCC reporting system does not allow to include bilateral core/general information in table 7b; it only has a column for climate specific. Our own computerized system includes this information in aggregate table 7. We do not see this difference as a problem, because the relevant information is always reported in the climate specific column.”

9.5.11. France

- For ´core/general´ France reports € 33,985,000 in BR2 which France did not report in the MMR table 7, but this amount was reported in MMR table 7a. Therefore table 7 was corrected to include this amount consistent with table 7a.
- € 1,725,000 of bilateral contributions is reported as mitigation in BR2 and as cross-cutting under the MMR;
- Apart from this swapping, totals are consistent.

9.5.12. Germany

- In general, amounts reported in BR2 and in MMR template are consistent;
- The amounts for ´total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels´ for ´mitigation´ and ´adaptation´ are exchanged in the BR2 report, the amount reported for ´mitigation´ is the same as reported for ´adaptation´ in the MMR reporting and the other way round for ´mitigation´; Germany confirms this confusion of values in the comment;
- Under Cross-cutting in table 7, Germany reports ´other multilateral climate change funds´ as a subcategory under the UNFCCC and as a separate category under the MMR. Values are equal;

- In table 7, Germany reports a joint value to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to the UNFCCC and four separate values under the MMR. The sum is equal;
- Germany stated in its comment that changes between MMR and BR might depend on coal activities reported in the MMR September version, which have been corrected in an updated MMR version.

9.5.13. Greece

- All values are consistent.

9.5.14. Hungary

- Multilateral contributions are consistent apart from a HUF 100 difference under specialized UN bodies, which are probably a summation or typing mistake;
- Under the MMR, almost HUF 2,000,000 more are reported in bilateral ´cross-cutting´ than in BR2.

9.5.15. Ireland

- There is likely a reporting mistake of € 300,000 provided to UNEP in either the MMR or BR2 for ´climate-specific´. MMR reports € 300,000 more than BR2. This was not corrected;
- The two reports are largely consistent but in the MMR Ireland reports € 1.9 Mio under ´adaptation´ and nothing under ´other´ whereas in the BR they report € 1.3 Mio for ´adaptation´ and € 300,000 for ´other´;
- The ´UN International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction´ is reported directly under ´specialized UN bodies´ in the MMR and only as a subcategory of ´other´ in BR2. This happens with other subcategories too.

9.5.16. Italy

- Completely different values and categories are reported for € and US$ in BR2. It seems that Italy has reported some finance flows in € and other flows in $ as that the $ column is not a conversion of the amounts indicated in € in the other column as for other countries. Adding up € and US$ values for Italy in BR2 leads to values significantly higher than in the MMR, which makes this option unrealistic. Further clarification would be needed from Italy to be able to correct the data and make them comparable to other countries;
- BR2 data were corrected with a factor 1,000,000 because the reported units were obviously incorrect;
- No ´core/general´ is reported in BR2;
- In ´climate-specific´ all values differ between BR2 and MMR;
- The overall magnitude of difference is almost € 30 Mio for ´climate-specific and core/general´ and € 5 Mio for ´climate-specific´.

9.5.17. Lithuania

- All values are consistent.

9.5.18. Latvia

- € 350,000 was reported under ´cross-cutting´ in the MMR and under ´other´ in the BR. Both as ´multilateral climate change funds´;
- Totals and all other values are consistent.

9.5.19. Luxembourg

- No ´core/general´ is reported under the MMR; the value reported as ´core/general´ in BR2 is reported as ´climate-specific, cross-cutting´;
  - Luxembourg clarified "the value reported as ´core/general´ in BR2 is reported as ´climate-specific, cross-cutting´: we noticed that Belgium recorded the GEF finance under "Core/general" in its BR2 and not under "cross-cutting" as we did for the MMR reporting. We therefore moved the GEF financing to the "Core/general" category.
- Multilateral ´adaptation´ values are consistent between MMR and BR2;
- Bilateral contributions are slightly inconsistent, as there were changes between September and December as project data became available; some "cross-cutting" actions were reallocated to "adaptation";
- No multilateral ´mitigation´ contributions are reported under the MMR:
  - Luxembourg clarified that the multilateral contributions under BR2 are amounts which are committed but only reported in italics in the MMR (1 million for SIDS + 2 millions for REDD+).

9.5.20. Malta

- Malta reports the same totals but in different categories. € 50,000 out of € 75,000 which are reported under ´core/general´ ´specialized UN bodies´ in BR2 are reported as ´climate-specific´ or ´other´ ´other multilateral climate change funds´ under the MMR whereas € 25,000 are reported in the same category;
- These € 50,000 were committed to UNICEF, in BR2 as ´core/general´ and under MMR as ´climate-specific´;
- Amounts in mitigation and adaptation are equal but reported under ´total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels´ in BR2 and as ´multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks´ under the MMR.

9.5.21. Netherlands

- Several amounts are rounded in the MMR whereas the exact value is given in BR2.
- All non-rounded values are inconsistent between MMR and BR2;
- In BR2 ´other´ is reported in subcategories whereas in the MMR everything is in a joint ´other´ category;
- There is a reporting mistake of € 292,467,298 in BR2 bilateral ´core/general´ that was corrected;
- Netherlands comment
  - final data are only available in October.

  - In the MMR we used the 2012 and 2013 OECD/DAC percentages for the calculation of the climate share of our core contributions to MDBs and climate funds, while we used the 2013-2014 OECD/DAC averages for our 2014 report to UNFCCC.
  - We noted a mistake in our IFC climate specific finance reported to UNFCCC. This should not have been 9,962,676 but 20.4% of EUR 7,508,800. We included no figure in the MMR for IFC as OECD/DAC had not yet provided a percentage indicating the climate relevance of IFC.
  - Climate-specific and core/general cannot be added up.
  - In the MMR, we furthermore combined our contributions to the African Development Bank (AfDB) and Fund (AfDF) in one figure and applied the OECD/DAC percentage for the AfDF as 'a best estimate' given that no separate OECD/DAC percentage for the AfDB was available at the time. We used the same methodology for the Asian Development Bank and Fund. However, at the time of the UNFCCC report we applied the different percentages that OECD/DAC had by then provided for AfDB, AfDF, AsDB and AsDF.
  - Both in the MMR and in the figures reported to UNFCCC we have, where possible, reported both our (total) core contribution to the multilateral organization (as registered in our financial system) as well as the climate-specific part of this core contribution (as registered in our financial system). In our view this approach is in line with the tabular format provided by UNFCCC and provides optimal transparency. We have difficulty understanding the rationale and meaning of the EU's technical guidance for the MMR in this respect, in particular: the recommendation that we should preferably report core/general contributions while we are reporting on climate finance and the notion that core/general and climate-specific data for multilateral channels should be mutually exclusive while in reality climate-specific contributions are a part of the core contribution.

9.5.22. Poland

- Some bilateral contributions in BR2 and MMR are swapped between mitigation and cross-cutting but the totals are consistent.

9.5.23. Portugal

- All values in table 7 are consistent
- In table 7a the values for multilateral financial institutions differ between the MMR report and BR2 reports, however this is a simple summation mistake in the BR2.

9.5.24. Romania

- An amount of RON 140,000 provided is reported as ´specialized UN bodies´ under ´adaptation´ and in the MMR as ´bilateral´ under ´core/general´ and as ´bilateral adaptation´ in BR2. The amount of RON 140,000 is reported twice in BR2. This is probably a reporting mistake and would need to be clarified with Romania;
- Nothing is reported in table 7a.

9.5.25. Spain

- In ´bilateral, regional and other channels´ a small share (€ 1,398) of the totals for ´adaptation´ and ´cross-cutting´ is inverted.
    - Spain´s clarification: The divergence between the overall sum recorded in MMR and in BR2 is due to the following factual mistake: an ODA grant aimed at Paraguay amounting to 1,402€ is classified as cross-cutting in the BR2 report (see page 98 of the BR2 report). This program should have been classified as mitigation, in the same way as in the MMR report (you can find this program in row 376 of tab “tabla 7b 2014 BI y REGIONAL” of the attached Excel file).
    - The remaining €4 are due to rounding errors: bilateral and regional data of the MMR report is recorded with two decimals, while data in the BR2 report is recorded rounded.
    - Spain clarified that they do not report core contributions to other multilateral financial institutions than the GEF, since the split devoted to core purposes is calculated and reported to the UNFCCC by these institutions to avoid double counting. Sweden
- Values for ´other multilateral climate change funds´ are included in the sum of ´multilateral climate change funds´ in BR2 but excluded under the MMR. Totals are equal;
- In the MMR, ´core/general´ was not transferred from table 7a to table 7. This was corrected;
- The value given to the African Development Bank differs by about SEK 100,000 between BR2 and MMR data;
- A currency conversion rate is given in the MMR and used for the values filled in; the sums are calculated separately in each currency, so that sums do not exchange with the same currency exchange rate indicated.

9.5.26. Slovenia

- € 129,980 are reported under multilateral ´cross-cutting, specialised UN bodies´ in the MMR which are not reported in the BR 2;
- Sums for bilateral contributions equal but values are distributed differently across ´mitigation´, ´adaptation´ and ´cross-cutting´.

9.5.27. Slovakia

- Values are consistent apart from a share of € 40,644 from ´core/general´ ´specialised UN bodies´ that is reported as ´climate-specific´ ´other´ in BR2;
- In table 7a in the MMR the value of ´multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks´ is split up whereas it is reported as a joint number in BR2;
- The BR2 total in table 7a for ‘climate-specific’ for ‘multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks’ is split into two subcategories in the MMR reporting.

9.5.28. United Kingdom

- Reported amounts in BR2 reports and in the MMR reporting table are largely consistent, however the allocation to institutions has changed in some cases in table 7a for the multilateral support as explained below;
- Some values differ due to rounding but sums equal;

- Under the MMR finance data are reported in Million British Pounds and in the BR CTF format British Pounds are reported. There is a factor of 1,000,000 in the units indicated, however the reported amounts, e.g. for bilateral support are the same. This means units are wrong in one of the reported set of tables. The comparison with the information in the BR2 report text where UK refers to billion £ provided indicates that the units reported in BR2 tables are wrong and are indicated in million British Pounds and not British Pounds as shown in the column headings;
- The amount reported under 'Multilateral financial institutions´ 'other' in the MMR template is reported as amount provided to the 'World Bank' in the BR2 template;
- In table 7a in the MMR template under 'Other Multilateral Climate Change Funds', three funds are differentiated 1. 'Climate Investment Funds', 2. 'Climate Investment Funds - Clean Technology Fund' and 3. 'Climate Development Knowledge Network'. In the BR2 tables, the differentiation is only to 1. 'Climate Investment Funds' and 2. 'Climate Development Knowledge Network';
- In table 7a, no support provided to ´specialized UN bodies´ is reported;
- In table 7a, the allocation of ´climate-specific´ support has changed for the same amounts reported in some cases:
    - Support provided to GEF is indicated as cross-cutting in BR2 table and adaptation in MMR table;
    - Support provided to GCF is indicated as adaptation in BR2 table and as cross-cutting in MMR table;
    - In BR2 table all support reported under 'Other multilateral climate change funds' are indicated as ´cross-cutting´ whereas in the MMR template the disaggregated amount to the 'Clean Technology Fund' is indicated as mitigation;
- The differences of the amounts indicated in table 7 arise from the differences in allocation of some amounts as explained above;
- In the MMR template the status is not always provided in table 7a, in the BR2 template it is always indicated as provided;

In the BR2 template no sector information is provided and the notation key 'not applicable' is used whereas some sector information is provided in the MMR template for 'other multilateral climate change funds'.

9.6. Annex VI: Information sources related to private finance

Figure 9-1: Information sources on public interventions for Low Carbon Resilient (LCR) activities

	Instruments and Interventions		Example datasets
Public finance	Grants		- BNEF for renewable energy projects - OECD-DAC for LCR activities - joint-MDBs* for LCR activities - IDFC* for LCR activities
	Debt		- OECD-DAC for LCR activities - joint-MDBs* for LCR activities - IDFC* for LCR activities
	Equity		- OECD-DAC for LCR activities - joint-MDBs* for LCR activities - IDFC* for LCR activities
	De-risking		- OECD DAC pilot survey +ADD DETAIL ON FUTURE DETAIL COLLECTION PROPOSAL
Public policy interventions	Regulatory Policy		- IEA *Polices and Measures Databases*: – Energy Efficiency Databases – IEA/IRENA Global Renewable Energy Policies and Measures - UNFCCC CDM/JI Database
	Fiscal Policy		- OECD/IEA Fossil fuels subsidies datasets
	Information and Innovation Policy		- IEA Energy Technology R&D Statistics - OECD Green Patent statistics

*Note: * aggregate data not reported by activity level or instrument*
Sources: Xxxx, Xxxx

Relative data availability			
	+	←→	-

Source: Jachnik et.al. 2015, p. 54

Figure 9-2: Information sources on private finance for low carbon and resilient (LCR) activities (sectoral approach)

Sector	Coverage of example activities	Example sources
Renewable energy	Wind	BNEF, 2014
	Solar	
	Geothermal	
	Small hydro; marine	
	Biomass and waste	
	Solar water heating	Mauthner and Weiss, 2012*
	Smart grids	Navigant Research, 2013*
Low-carbon transportation	Mass transit systems	Commercial databases
	Non-motorized	
	Air, rail, and maritime	
	On-road	BNEF, 2014
Energy efficiency	Supply-side	IEA, 2012 and 2014*; BNEF, 2014
	Demand-side residential	
	Demand-side commercial	
Agriculture, forestry, and land use	Reforestation	
	Lands, crop and livestock management.	
	Biofuels	BNEF, 2014
Water and Waste	Solid waste management	
	Wastewater	
Industry and infrastructure	Process technologies	
	Carbon capture and storage	BNEF, 2014
	Climate resilient infrastructure	
Other	Health	
	Capacity building	
	Education	
	Communication	

* = denotes proxy estimates.

Relative data availability			
	+	←→	-

Source : Jachnik et al. 2015, p. 55

Figure 9-3: Information sources on private finance for low carbon and resilient (LCR) activities (by type of financial instrument)

Private finance instruments	Examples	Example sources
Grants	Project and programme level grants	BNEF, OECD DAC (using US Foundations Center data)
Debt	Syndicated loans	BNEF, Bloomberg, Dealogic, FactSet, ThomsonOne, OECD (FDI)*
	Project loans	BNEF, Dealogic, ThomsonOne, Preqin Infrastructure
	Bonds (project and corporate)	Bloomberg, BNEF, Dealogic, Eikon, FactSet
	Other, e.g. microfinance, informal loans	No systematic data
Equity	Publicly traded	Not considered in this study
	Corporate-level private equity	Bloomberg, BNEF, FactSet, ThomsonOne, Preqin PE/VC, OECD (FDI)*
	Project-level private equity	BNEF, Dealogic, ThomsonOne, Preqin Infrastructure
	Other, e.g. microfinance, household investment, informal investment, enterprise reinvested earnings	No systematic data
De-risking	Insurance	No systematic data
	Guarantees	
	Derivatives	

* OECD (FDI) data is reported in aggregate as 'debt' or 'equity'.
Note: UNEP Risø CDM and World Bank PPI data on total investment is not disaggregated by instrument.

Relative data availability: + ←→ -

Source : Jachnik et al. 2015, p. 56

9.7. Annex VII: Proposal for revised 2017 "Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the MMR"

Technical guidance on reporting on financial and technology support provided to developing countries under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR)

1. Background and scope of the technical guidance

As already announced during discussions in the EGI and ECCWG, the European Commission has proposed to use the revised technical guidance, sent to Member States (MS) by the European Commission on ~~6 June 2015~~[DATE], for this year's reporting exercise, including a slightly revised common tabular format for the "UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties".

In order to facilitate the transition to the new rules on concessional loans in DAC statistics by 2018 it is recommended to report both on the old and new rules concerning concessional loans for reporting 2016 and 2017 data.

Please note that the reporting deadline for this year's exercise is advanced to 15 September, in order to allow for the aggregation of data in time for the Climate Change Conference (COP ~~22~~23), organized in November 2017, one month earlier than usually. The timely provision of data, at the latest by the reporting deadline and sooner if possible, will be of essence.

2. DAC reporting on development finance

The "good practice table for reporting", Annex I of the technical guidance, has been updated in 2016 to reflect the changes to the common tabular format for the "UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties" (tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b)) in accordance with Decision 9/CP.21 on Methodologies for the reporting of financial information by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention:

- Creating reporting fields for the provision of information on definitions or methodologies used for reporting information in the following reporting parameters: "climate-specific" or "core/general", "status", "funding source", "activity", "financial instrument", "type of support" and "sector";
- Aligning the categorization in the reporting parameter "status" of support ("pledged", "committed" and "provided") in tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b) of the common tabular format with the categorization used in other existing international methodologies ("committed" and "disbursed")

These changes reflect the need to enhance a common understanding on key terminology for reporting financial information under the Convention to facilitate transparency and comparability of information and data on support over time and across Parties.

This year ~~and in 2017~~, it is proposed to keep a descriptive separate document on the methodology used (point 3.2 below) and to populate the new reporting fields in the good practice table.

~~3. DAC reporting on development finance~~

~~In December 2014, members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) agreed on modernising the reporting on concessional loans in DAC statistics, which will become standard from 2018.1 In particular, the 2014 HLM agreed to modernise the reporting of concessional loans by assessing concessionality based on discount rates differentiated by income group and introducing a grant equivalent system for the purpose of calculating ODA figures2. During the transition period between current and new rules, it is recommended to use the same approach as the OECD and to report in 2016 and 2017 using both the new grant equivalent system and the current (2013) flow-based system.~~

4. Consolidated recommendations for MMR reporting in 20177~~6~~

1) **Format of Member States replies:** Member States are requested to use the new UNFCCC Common Tabular Formats (CTF), in accordance to Decision 9/CP.21, as the template for the MMR reporting. Annex I provides a good practice example, based on the best practices of MS in 2014 in which some additional improvements were introduced. It is strongly recommended to submit the tables in Excel format (avoid conversion to jpg, pdf etc.).

2) **Methodology:** A descriptive section, preferably in a separate document, should be added to the tables. It should provide the technical description of the data, including key definitions and methodology. Narratives, such as justifications for climate finance should be avoided. General methodological information at aggregate level or definitions should also be provided in the Excel reporting table. The information already provided in the Excel template does not need to be duplicated in the methodological report.

3) **Total data:** MS are strongly encouraged to provide totals on specific climate finance, funding type, financial instruments and sources (see Table 7). This additional information will facilitate the summing up of data at the EU level. It also reduces the risk of calculation errors.

4) **Currency:** The default should be to report in EUR and the national currency. Please indicate clearly if a different approach has been used and explain the reasons. When applicable, the exchange rate should be ~~explicitly~~ indicated in the specific field in the good practice table for reporting, Annex I. It is recommended to use the OECD yearly average exchange rate, which is also linked in the specific field.

5) **Level of detail:** MS should report as detailed as possible, preferably at programme/project level in table 7b of the UNFCCC template.

6) **Definitions:**

   a) **~~Provided /~~ committed / disbursed ~~pledged~~:** ~~In the context of the MMR, the term "provided" equals "disbursed".~~ Member States are requested to report committed funds for bilateral climate finance flows and disbursed ~~("provided")~~ funds for multilateral climate finance flows in line with OECD DAC definitions. Please indicate clearly if a different approach has been used and explain the reasons.

OECD DAC Definitions[57]

Commitment

“127. A commitment is a **firm written obligation** by a government or official agency, backed by the appropriation or availability of the necessary funds, to provide resources of a specified amount under specified financial terms and conditions and for specified purposes for the benefit of a recipient country or a multilateral agency. Donors unable to comply with this definition should explain the definition that they use.

128. Commitments are considered to be made at the **date** a loan or grant agreement is signed or the obligation is otherwise **made known to the recipient** (e.g. in the case of budgetary allocations to overseas territories, the final vote of the budget should be taken as the date of commitment). […]

129. **Bilateral** commitments comprise new commitments and additions to earlier commitments. The recording in the year reported on of cancellations on earlier years’ commitments is allowed, but only in the form of an aggregate (“bilateral, unspecified”/“sector, unspecified”) to avoid interpretation issues posed by negative commitment figures in analyses. […]

130. For **multilateral** contributions, commitments show the total amounts of multi-year agreements with multilateral institutions. For capital subscriptions in the form of notes encashable at sight, enter the total expected amount of deposits of such notes as the amount committed.”

Disbursement

“131. A disbursement is the placement of resources at the **disposal of a recipient country** or agency, or in the case of internal development-related expenditures, the outlay of funds by the official sector. Disbursement may be measured in various ways at different stages of the transfer process.

132. For financial **loans and grants**, subject to the availability of the necessary records, preference should be given to the stage closest to balance of payments treatment, e.g.

i. the payment by the source agency for goods to be shipped (or other payments to a third party on behalf of the recipient);

ii. in the case of contributions to multilateral agencies in the form of a note or similar instrument encashable unconditionally at sight at the discretion of the recipient, on issue or deposit of the note;

iii. the placement of funds at the recipient’s disposal in an account in the donor country, in the recipient country or in a third country;

iv. the withdrawal of funds by the recipient or use on his instructions of funds in an account in the donor country, in the recipient country or in a third country.

133. However, where funds are transferred to an **account in the recipient country** but held by the donor for release to the recipient on production of relevant documents, the balance of payments effective transaction is the conversion of foreign exchange, and this should be recorded as a disbursement.

[57] https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/DCDDAC%282016%293FINAL.pdf

[…]

b) **Sectors:** The OECD DAC definitions are the basis for filling in information in this field. Indicate clearly if different definitions or approaches have been used and explain the reasons for which the OECD one has not been applied. The OECD DAC purpose codes (xls, Dec. 2014) are available at: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/DAC-CRS-Code-List.xls. ~~http://www.oecd.org/investment/stats/dacandcrscodelists.htm.~~

c) Option a: **Mitigation, adaptation, crosscutting, other:** To present a transparent picture, these categories should be mutually exclusive if possible. In case of overlaps, please explain your method and rationale. Mitigation and adaptation support are defined in MMR in line with the OECD DAC definitions[58]. Crosscutting activities are those that involve both mitigation and adaptation components.

If "other" activities are reported, please provide specification. For more information on the OECD DAC definitions, see http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/48785310.pdf

Option b: **Mitigation, adaptation, crosscutting, other:** To present a transparent picture, these categories should be mutually exclusive if possible. In case of overlaps, please explain your method and rationale. Mitigation and adaptation support are defined in MMR in line with the OECD DAC definitions[44]. Cross-cutting should be used for 'funding for activities which are cross-cutting across mitigation and adaptation' only if countries cannot assign a contribution to adaptation and mitigation through the use of Rio markers or a transparent national methodology.

If "other" activities are reported, please provide specification. For more information on the OECD DAC definitions, see http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/48785310.pdf

d) **"Financing source" (ODA, OOF, other):** ~~and~~. If the "other" category is used, please specify what it includes. The OECD DAC definitions are available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/38429349.pdf

1. Member States should use the definitions for OOF as provided by the OECD DAC (OECD 2016a). If the national definition used differs from the OECD DAC definition, additional explanations should be provided as part of the methodological information.

2. If OOF flows are reported, MS shall explain as part of the methodological information which flows are covered under OOF.

3. If no OOF are reported, MS should indicate whether OOF flows do not occur' or whether OOF flows were not tracked and estimated, but do occur.

[58] 'Climate change mitigation-related support' means support for activities in developing countries that contribute to the objective of stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system; 'climate change adaptation-related support' means support for activities in developing countries that are intended to reduce the vulnerability of human or natural systems to the impact of climate change and climate-related risks, by maintaining or increasing developing countries' adaptive capacity and resilience (MMR definitions)

e) **"Financial instrument" (grant, concessional loan, non-concessional loan, other):** Member States that only provide grant financing may simply refer to OECD DAC definitions. Member States that provide loans or other financial instruments are requested to explain the methodology used (e.g. gross flows, net flows, grant equivalent, etc.) If the "other" category is used, please explain which instruments are covered and specify what ~~i~~they include~~s~~ (e.g. export credit, private, etc.). If no 'other instruments' are reported, indicate whether such instruments do or do not occur. The OECD DAC definitions are available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/38429349.pdf

In December 2014, members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) agreed on modernising the reporting on concessional loans in DAC statistics, which will become standard from 2018. In particular, the 2014 HLM agreed to modernise the reporting of concessional loans by assessing concessionality based on discount rates differentiated by income group and introducing a grant equivalent system for the purpose of calculating ODA figures. During the transition period between current and new rules, it is recommended to use the same approach as the OECD and to report in 2017 using both the new grant equivalent system and the current (2013) flow-based system.

7) **Core/general vs Climate-specific (**only **contributions through multilateral channels):**

a) **"Core/general"** refers to core contributions to the core budget of multilateral institutions "that Parties cannot specify as climate specific". In the CTF tables, Member States currently have the option to report full core contributions to MDBs and UN organisations: it is recommended to report this data.

If core/general contributions are reported, core/general and climate-specific data should be mutually exclusive, except in such cases where climate-specific contributions are made to specific sub-funds or dedicated programmes of the overarching institutions to which also core funding is provided. In this case, the core funding should be reported as well as climate specific funding and it should be explained how core and climate-specific contributions have been differentiated. It should also be clearly indicated to which sub-funds or programmes the climate-specific contributions are paid to.

b) **Climate specific** concerns contributions to multilateral climate funds and dedicated programmes managed by multilateral institutions. Please report contributions to such funds and programmes (LDCF, SCCF, AF, GCF, UNFCCC, CIFs, FCPF, etc.) as climate specific only. Core/general and climate-specific data should be mutually exclusive: funds should only be reported in one of the categories with the exception outlined under a).

c) **Other:** Any multilateral fund, financial institution or UN body reported under 'other' should be clearly indicated with its name.

d) **Contributions to the Global Environment Facility** may be reported as either core contribution or climate specific as the climate relevant part is communicated by GEF to contributing parties (exception from the above general rule).

e) **Imputed multilateral contributions in core/general finance:** Several MDBs provide estimates concerning the climate-related share within their portfolio, and attribute this back to DAC members, based on a pro-rata share of their core multilateral ODA disbursements in a given year. The European Commission will, if available on time, obtain the figures from OECD, and add these values to the amount reported under the MMR. If the figures are not

available on time before the ECOFIN Council Conclusions, they will not be included in this year's report.

Notwithstanding, Member States still have the option to report their national figures; in the absence of a common approach as described above, these figures may be used in the aggregate EU report subject to methodological feasibility.

f) **Rio Markers:** Many Member States are reporting based on Rio marked OECD DAC data, but using different methodologies and coefficients for quantifying the climate relevant part of the Rio marked activities. For the Commission's approach, please see Annex II.

In your descriptive section, please specify whether you are using Rio markers and provide information on the approach to identifying mitigation and adaptation markers and on the coefficients used. Please specify and explain any difference from the OECD DAC or the Commission methodology.

Further information on the Rio markers available here: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/48785310.pdf.

8) **Technology transfer and capacity building:** In order to get a better picture of the support for capacity building and technology transfer MS are asked to include a minimum of 10 examples (if available) for each type of support. It is recommended to give this information in a separate, easily identifiable chapter/section.

9) **Private climate finance:** ~~In order to provide a more accurate picture of climate finance flows,~~ MS are strongly encouraged to include data on mobilized private climate finance in the respective field in the template. If numerical data is reported, MS should describe the ~~along with the~~ methodology and definition used to compile such data in the methodological report.

10) **Timeliness:** For this year's exercise, given that the Marrakech Climate Change Conference (COP 23~~2~~) will be organized in November, one month earlier than usually, the reporting deadline is 15 September. This arrangement leaves very little time for the Commission to analyze and synthetize the information received in time for the Council conclusions and the COP. ~~On previous occasions, a number of Member States were late with the reporting.~~ Given the importance of this topic for the international negotiations and the timing challenge ~~presented to us this year~~ it is strongly recommended to provide your input as early as possible and at the latest by 15 September October 2016.

Annex I: Good practice template (additionally provided in xls)

Annex II: Climate action tracking (Rio markers) methodology

Annex I: Good practice template (additionally provided in xls)

Table 7: Provision of public financial support: summary information in 2016

Allocation channels	*Year*									
	European euro - EUR					*National currency* [a]				
	Core/ general [b, 1]	*Climate-specific* [2]				*Core/ general*	*Climate-specific* [2]			
		Mitigation [c]	*Adaptation* [c]	*Cross-cutting* [c]	*Other* [cd]		*Mitigation*	*Adaptation*	*Cross-cutting*	*Other*
Total contributions through multilateral channels:										
Multilateral climate change funds[e]										
Other multilateral climate change funds[f]										
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks										
Specialized United Nations bodies										
Total contributions through bilateral, regional and other channels										
Total climate specific by funding type (total for mitigation, adaptation, crosscutting, other)										
Total climate specific finance		0					0			

Currency conversion rate: OECD yearly average [a]	
Financial resources mobilized through public interventions - EUR [g]	

Total climate specific by funding source (EUR)		**Total climate specific by financial instrument (EUR)**	
ODA		Grant	
OOF [h]		Concessional loan	
Other		Non-concessional loan	
		Equity	
		Other	

1-7 Please provide information on definitions or methodologies used for reporting in the Documentation box

a https://data.oecd.org/conversion/exchange-rates.htm; please change if other currency conversion rate is used

b This refers to support to multilateral institutions that Parties cannot specify as climate-specific

c These categories should be mutually exclusive

d Please specify

e Multilateral climate change funds: Global Environment Facility, Least Developed Countries Fund, Special Climate Change Fund, Adaptation Fund, Green Climate Fund and the Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities (paragraph 17(a) of the "UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties" in 2/CP.17)

f Not listed under e)

g This is not mandatory; if you fill in this field, you are encouraged to provide methodological information how mobilized resources were estimated

h If no value is reported under OOF, please indicate either "not occurring" with NO or "not estimated" with NE

Table 7(a)

Provision of public financial support: contribution through multilateral channels in 2016[a]

Donor funding	*Total amount*				*Status: disbursed, committed b, 3*	*Funding source: ODA, OOF, Other 4*	*Financial instrument: grant, concessional loan, non-concessional loan, equity, other 5*	*Type of support: Mitigation, adaptation, crosscutting, other c,6*	*Sector d, 7*
	Core/general a, 1		*Climate-specific 2*						
	European euro - EUR	*National currency*	*European euro - EUR*	*National currrency*					
Multilateral climate change funds									
1. Global Environment Facility									
2. Least Developed Countries Fund									
3. Special Climate Change Fund									
4. Adaptation Fund									
5. Green Climate Fund									
6. UNFCCC Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities									
8. Other [e] multilateral climate change funds									
Multilateral financial institutions, including regional development banks									
1. World Bank									
2. International Finance Corporation									
3. African Development Bank									
4. Asian Development Bank									
5. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development									
6. Inter-American Development Bank									
7. Other [e]									
Specialized United Nations bodies									
1. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)									
2. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)									
3. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)									
4. United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)									
5. United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)									
6. United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)									
7. United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN REDD)									
8. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)									
9. Other [e]									
Total contributions through multilateral channels									

Abbreviations: ODA = official development assistance, OOF = other official flows.

1-7 Please provide information on definitions or methodologies used for reporting in the documentation box

a This refers to support to multilateral institutions that Parties cannot specify as climate-specific.

b In the context of the MMR, the term "provided" equals "disbursed".

c These categories should be mutually exclusive

d See the OECD purpose codes at http://www.oecd.org/investment/stats/dacandcrscodelists.htm. Codes include energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry, water and sanitation etc.

e Please indicate each fund, institution or specialized UN body reported under "other" with its name

Annex II: Climate action tracking (Rio markers) methodology

The approach used by the EU to track its provision of climate finance is based on the OECD DAC system of Rio markers.

The OECD has developed a comprehensive system for measuring aid in support of climate-related objectives. It is based on detailed project level reporting against carefully defined policy markers. A Rio marker for mitigation was introduced 1998 and in 2010 an additional marker for adaptation was introduced. There are specific guidelines from OECD DAC agreed by DAC members for scoring projects and programmes against these markers. For each Rio marker, projects and programmes are placed in three categories: a) Principal objective, b) significant objective or c) not targeting.

According to the Rio marker methodology an activity is classified as climate change mitigation-related (either marked as ‘Principal’ or ‘Significant’) if it “contributes to the objective of stabilisation of greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system by promoting efforts to reduce or limit GHG emissions or to enhance GHG sequestration.”

As regards adaptation, an aid activity is marked as relevant if it “intends to reduce the vulnerability of human or natural systems to the impacts of climate change and climate-related risks, by maintaining or increasing adaptive capacity and resilience. This encompasses a range of activities from information and knowledge generation, to capacity development, planning and the implementation of climate change adaptation actions.”

The Rio markers are policy makers, and were originally not intended for accurate quantification of flows to support policy goals. Therefore, an activity can have more than one principal or significant policy objective (i.e. it can be marked for several Rio markers; mitigation, adaptation and other Rio conventions such as Biodiversity and Desertification).

The Commission uses the following approach to “translate” the Rio marked data into estimated climate finance flows for the EU budget:

- If an activity is marked as principal for mitigation or adaptation, 100% of the support is considered and reported as climate finance;

- If an aid activity is marked as significant for mitigation or adaptation, then only 40% of the support is considered and reported as climate finance.

- To avoid double counting, any activity can only count as 100%, 40% or 0%. If an activity is marked for both mitigation and adaptation, only the highest marking will count when calculating the total climate relevant financial contributing of the activity.

Further information on the Rio markers available here: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/48785310.pdf

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doi:10.2834/422987