1.

sustainability and Effectiveness of Support provided through previous Joint Actions and Decisions;

2.

strengthening of States' Indigenous Nuclear Security Support Infrastructure;

3.

strengthening of States' Legislative and Regulatory Framework;

4.

strengthening of Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials;

5.

strengthening of States' Institutional Infrastructure and Capabilities to Deal with Nuclear and Radioactive Materials out of Regulatory Control;

6.

strengthening of States' Response and Resilience to Cyber Crime and Mitigating its Impact on National and Nuclear Security;

7.

addressing the Security of Radioactive Sources by Source Repatriation;

8.

Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threats and Nuclear Material Accounting and Control.

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supporting the implementation of the ACPPNM;

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strengthening the national legislative and regulatory framework, as well as the capacity of States to develop regional best practice exchanges, as they apply to any authority involved in security of nuclear materials either under regulatory control or out of regulatory control;

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providing States with cost-effective means to assist them in fulfilling national, regional and international obligations, and in enacting binding and international legal instruments;

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strengthening further international cooperation to establish, in conformity with the national law of each State and within the ACPPNM, effective measures for the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities.

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activities identified in INSSP in ten States relating to the implementation of obligations under the ACPPNM will be translated into concrete actions. Milestones to address the relevant issues leading to sustainable solutions for States to strengthen its national nuclear security regime will be defined. Agreed timelines and commitments will assure comprehensive implementation of the Plans;

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revision of course material: new training exercises to be developed for a better audience understanding.

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increased capacity in States to meet their obligations under the ACPPNM;

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start further development and enhancement of regulatory framework for physical protection;

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develop a guidance document for use by States to develop national capacities on regulation, review and assessment and for inspecting nuclear facilities to ensure nuclear security during the life cycle of a nuclear facility.

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assisting States in ensuring the availability of indigenous technical and scientific support, and human resource development necessary for effective, sustainable nuclear security;

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ensuring the optimal use and proper maintenance of the equipment donated by the Union during its full life cycle.

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proper maintenance is a key factor for detection and response to theft, sabotage, unauthorised access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities. Maintenance training tools for detection equipment (radiation portal monitors and hand held units) will be established. Tool mock-ups will be developed with a view to specific training on their maintenance, in addition to their correct use;

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maintenance training for the detection equipment.

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sustaining the support provided by the IAEA for the implementation of the Detection Architecture Framework;

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ensuring that training material is available and in use to sustain the training for all new concerned staff; prototype training material will be provided to Member States of the Union through the Working Party on Non-Proliferation (CONOP);

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ensuring that detection equipment can be maintained in operation by authorities in the beneficiary countries for a maximum duration.

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assisting States in ensuring the availability of indigenous technical and scientific support, and human resource development necessary for effective, sustainable nuclear security;

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harmonising alarm data, making it comparable between different equipment providers.

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assisting Regulatory Bodies in integrating data and harmonising the alarm software so that they compare data from different providers and ensure that regulatory decision making is based on correct information.;

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the Pilot tool will be delivered and tested by the stakeholders of each State. They will perform a real test exercise with the IAEA support by the way of Expert Missions. A test report of the training tool will be produced and included in the final report. Feedback from the regulatory authority to local RPM Stations will increase the efficiency of the system and will enhance the work of FLOs.

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including a training Module for the developed system as well as an interactive expert system for false alarms. The Prototype tool will be delivered and tested by the stakeholders of each State. A training Module for the developed system will be included in the system as well as an interactive expert system for false alarms. A specific test report of the training built tool will be produced and sent to the Commission. Prototype material will be provided to Member States of the Union through CONOP;

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conducting a ‘mock-up test’ in one State, running analysis and formulating change requirements, if any, based on the report of the test's results;

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harmonisation at the Regulator level, and in consequence among regulators in their regional and international cooperation, the detection of and response to nuclear and other radioactive material;

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running one functioning prototype per country;

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including a Protocol in future procurement of RPMs to include the specific requirements relevant for the software.

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strengthening the States' capacities to prevent, detect, and respond and to protect people, property, environment and society from criminal or intentional unauthorised acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control, including through regional capacity-building efforts, where available.

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activities identified in an INSSP in ten States relating to the implementation of national nuclear security regimes will be translated into concrete actions. Milestones to address the relevant issues leading to sustainable solutions for the State in nuclear security will be defined. Agreed timelines and commitments will ensure comprehensive implementation of the plans which will be implemented after cross checking with existing projects of the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence.

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increased national capacities in the beneficiary countries.

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strengthening the national legislative and regulatory framework, as well as the capacity of States to develop regional best practice exchanges, as they apply to any authority involved in security of nuclear and other radioactive materials either under regulatory control or out of regulatory control;

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providing States with cost-effective means to assist them in fulfilling national, regional and international obligations, the enactment of binding and international legal instruments and a commitment to non-binding legal instruments.

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arrangement of Expert Missions in order to identify gaps in existing laws and regulations, assisting states in adapting where necessary by making best use of European legislation existing in the relevant areas.

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using synergies with other international organisations, such as the World Customs Organisation, where appropriate;

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carrying on discussions in the involved States on their strategies and ensure support to build their national infrastructure;

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awareness building for political decision makers on the importance of appropriate nuclear security legislation and regulation;

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integration in the involved States' INSSP.

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assisting in drafting laws and regulations for countries;

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updating of laws and regulations where necessary;

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reporting identifying current status and recommendations for the legal and regulatory framework of the respective State;

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commitment by the States to implement recommendations and to host a follow up after two years;

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elaborating and assessing the outcome;

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integrating achievements in the final report.

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strengthening a State's regulatory infrastructure for the security of radioactive sources, associated facilities and associated activities, including transport;

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establishing, where applicable, national registries of radioactive sources in the selected States;

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working with States to establish and implement national strategies for managing disused sources, including repatriation to the country of origin or supplier; national secure storage pending disposal, or export for recycling or re-use or secure storage as referred to under Project 7.

Ensure source security through:

Expected results of the project:

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implementing, with due consideration to similar efforts that have been implemented so far and to ensure their continuity, Professional Development Courses (PDC) for faculty members from universities planning to implement postgraduate curricula in nuclear security to enable the faculty to teach nuclear security culture in their institutions;

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encouraging offering nuclear security culture training to various professional audiences via the NSSC or the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence located in the region;

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procuring special equipment for education and training purposes, such as real detection tools used by FLOs, to be handled and mastered by the students or trainees.

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at least 15 faculty members trained in each PDC on a topic to be determined later (list of trained faculty to be provided);

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at least two training courses to be conducted via NSSCs in the region (lists of courses and trained officers to be provided);

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teaching and training material made available at the PDCs and training events (materials to be also reviewed by representatives of the Union).

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improving the understanding in the region of the principles of nuclear security.

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ensuring the sustainability of work initiated under previous Joint Actions and Decisions and continuing the enhancement of nuclear security in Latin and Central American States.

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conducting the activities in the identified States.

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to conduct expert missions, field exercises, NTCs/RTCs/ITCs and some procurement of detection equipment in Azerbaijan, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Ukraine and other EU Neighbourhood States.

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the IAEA seeks to help build awareness and provide guidance to States to enhance their ability to prevent and respond to a range of nuclear security events. Support is focused on prevention and detection of, and response to, information security incidents that have the potential to either directly or indirectly adversely affect nuclear safety and security.

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provide international and regional training and education support for enhancing computer security awareness and capacity development;

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provide support for national capacity development in information and computer security for nuclear security regimes;

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conduct and facilitate expert meetings and forums to support information exchange and discussion on topical areas in computer security.

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provide support for the IAEA International Conference/Symposium on Computer Security in a Nuclear World in 2019 (IAEA Headquarters).

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increased awareness of computer security needs relevant to nuclear security and development of supporting materials/activities to facilitate computer security programme development and enhancement;

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increased national capacity to implement and sustain computer security as a component of the nuclear security regime;

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awareness and use of NSNS guidance and supporting activities for assistance in enhancing their State computer security as a component of their nuclear security regimes;

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global/regional information exchange on lessons learned and good practices related to the implementation of computer security within a nuclear security regime;

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improved cooperation with and between industry partners in developing technologies and services that provide a greater level of resilience against, and response to cyber-attacks;

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national training structures for building capacity in computer security within the nuclear security regime, for example assisting Nuclear Security Support Centres in developing computer security curriculums;

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facilitation of centralised information sharing to support the exchange of computer security information relevant to nuclear security stakeholders;

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conduct of the IAEA International Conference/Symposium on Computer Security in a Nuclear World.

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strengthening a State's first line of defence in the form of security for nuclear material and nuclear facilities.

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upgrading the Physical Protection of one facility in order to ensure that they meet the recommendations set out in INFCIRC/225/Rev.5;

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assessing the physical protection systems at nuclear facilities based on requests from Member States.

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secured nuclear material and facilities; helping the State to sustainably maintain the provided equipment after its installation;

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providing impact assessment of the added value and benefit of Union funds.

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helping States translate provisions of international instruments on nuclear security and of IAEA guidance into regulatory requirements for the design and operation of physical protection systems;

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providing State bodies and facilities with new concepts as well as identifying and discussing good practices on physical protection which could be beneficial for enhancement of nuclear security.

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performing and completing IPPAS missions in six States;

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conducting, on the basis of the requests already received by the IAEA, missions to Belarus, Democratic Republic of Congo, Jamaica, Lebanon, Madagascar and Vietnam.

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improving and sustaining nuclear security in the target countries;

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producing Final Mission Reports for the countries with a description of follow-up activities as part of the final report.

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continuing the support provided by the IAEA to States in enhancing national nuclear security capacities for protecting people, property and the environment from nuclear security events involving nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control. This will include the development of national capacities for managing disused sources, searching for orphan sources and, if needed, repatriating or exporting them for recycling. Depending on the urgency of the sources detected through the activities related to establishment of national inventories performed in Project 3, several high activity sources will be repatriated through this funding;

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to locating and identifying radioactive sources in circumstances which indicate a need to condition the sources and bring them to a safe and secure storage in the selected countries or repatriation to the country of origin or supplier.

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depending on the urgency of the detected sources to be repatriated through the inventory performed in Project 3, several identified sources will be repatriated.

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recipient States to be defined by the Union on the basis of a proposal by the IAEA.

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consolidation and conditioning of the sources;

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repatriation of two identified sources to the country of origin or export for recycling or re-use.

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it is proposed to continue the actions performed in previous Joint Actions and Decisions and the last Contribution Agreement pursuant to Decision 2013/517/CFSP on the following two items: Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threats and Nuclear Material Accounting and Control.

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providing basic knowledge on concepts, methodologies, and technology that conform to the binding and non-binding instruments related to nuclear security; demonstrating elements of an effective domestic NMAC system at nuclear facilities to increase the capability of Member States to detect unauthorised use or removal of nuclear material; familiarising Member States with insider threats and identifying preventive and protective measures against insider threats.

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the courses benefit Member States by providing good practices derived from guidance documents and lessons learned from experts that help Member States meet the nuclear security needs and objectives at facilities;

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NMAC: the objective of the course is to establish awareness of the need for having a domestic NMAC system in place at nuclear facilities that is effective in detecting unauthorised removal of nuclear material, especially against the non-State actor. The course will compare and contrast the elements of a domestic NMAC program with IAEA Safeguards.

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Insider: the objective of the course is to familiarise participants with nuclear security measures that address insider threats, including unauthorised removal of nuclear materials (theft), sabotage and cyber security at facilities containing nuclear material.

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Nuclear Security Series guidance documents benefit Member States by providing broad instruction on meeting the objectives of effective nuclear security regimes.

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NMAC: both NSS 25-G and NST-33 benefit Member States by providing direction on aspects of NMAC implementation including managing the NMAC system, use of records, physical inventory taking, measurements and measurement quality control, nuclear material control, nuclear material movements, detection investigation and resolution of NMAC irregularities, and assessment and performance testing of the NMAC system.

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Insider: NSS 8 benefits Member States by providing direction on preventive and protective measures against insider threats in relation to unauthorised removal of nuclear material and sabotage of nuclear material and facilities, and references the recommendations in NSS 13. NSS 8 provides general guidance regarding insider threats based on an understanding of the graded approach, defining insider threats and ways to categorise insiders, identification of targets and facility systems that need protection from malicious acts, and application and evaluation of preventive and protective measures at the facility level to address insider threats.

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activities to assist States to improve transport security engage regulators and other competent authorities with responsibility and roles in securing radioactive material in transport. Currently, training and guidance on security and safety is largely provided to Member States separately, even though in many Member States the audience is the same. The IAEA believes that by leveraging the existing safety regional networks, joint training courses could be delivered focusing on the security of materials, addressing interfaces with security and safe transport.

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production of a handbook on the safety and security of radioactive sources during transport. Such a handbook could also serve as a tool for those in the security and safety fields to have a better understanding of what the other is doing, ultimately resulting in a stronger, more efficient safety and security culture.

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conducting one ITC, one RTC and two NTCs through regional networks to create awareness of the need for security during transport of radioactive material and to provide the participants with the necessary knowledge to develop and implement national transport security requirements.

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the International Conferences on Advances in Nuclear Forensics emphasised the need to pursue regional approaches in nuclear forensics to reflect Member States' common requirements and existing capabilities as they develop a nuclear forensic capability to meet their needs as part of a nuclear security infrastructure. There has been considerable interest from African Member States as part of the development and review of INSSP to include nuclear forensics as part of the response to a nuclear security event. This interest is driven by the rapid growth in Africa that depends upon the ready access to nuclear and other radioactive materials in industry, medicine and research but is tempered by serious security threats, including terrorists who have struck in Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa.

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the IAEA will make concerted efforts to address Member States' needs by innovation, including orientation to laboratory methods. The IAEA piloted a new practical introduction to nuclear forensics training taught in nuclear forensics laboratories. The project will include an ITC for practitioners and a long residential assignment for a scientist in a leading nuclear forensics laboratory under the mentoring of the host and the IAEA.

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a significant component of nuclear forensics assistance to Northern Africa is the development of human resources, for example subject matter experts. Topics and opportunities for future nuclear forensics engagement and development (i.e. research, law enforcement, analytical capabilities, uranium mining, and radioactive source security) throughout the region will be identified. These will define implementation activities on nuclear forensics in Northern Africa. Meetings will be held in both English and French, and all documentation will be translated in French for a better appropriation by the beneficiary countries.

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in order to sustain and enhance Member States' capabilities to respond to criminal or intentional unauthorised acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material, the IAEA provides assistance focusing on the establishment of an effective national response framework. In this context, the IAEA seeks to assist Member States to detect nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control and to respond to nuclear security events by conducting advisory and evaluation missions, implementing human resource training and providing assistance in adhering to international legal instruments and/or enhance relevant national legislation, and by developing and making internationally accepted guidance available to States.

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to assist States to establish and sustain an effective national response infrastructure by planning, coordinating, implementing and monitoring results of the following activities:

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it is expected that States participating in this programme will have enhanced their national capability in responding to criminal or intentional unauthorised acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material by ensuring their ability to rapidly assess and categorise the event based on factors such as the threat, potential human and environmental consequences, economic impact and the nature of the nuclear or other radioactive material involved.

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those activities are the follow-up of those performed in Detection Field through previous Joint Actions and Decisions and the last Contribution Agreement. One of the necessary elements supporting the establishment of an effective nuclear security regime is the development of a national detection strategy. An effective nuclear security detection architecture is based on the national detection strategy and the national legal and regulatory framework for nuclear security, and is supported by a well-functioning system of law enforcement.

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focusing on the design and development of Detection Architecture, the IAEA plans to hold six expert missions and to provide detection instruments.

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donation of detection equipment in accordance with detection strategy.

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a comprehensive test report of the training built tool under point 2.2 of Chapter I to be incorporated in the final report;

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a report on current status and recommendations for the legal and regulatory framework of the respective state in Project 3, in accordance with the confidentiality requested by the beneficiary State;

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achievements under point 3.2 of Chapter I;