(1)

By Implementing Regulation (EU) No 470/2014 (2) (‘the original anti-dumping Regulation’), the European Commission (‘the Commission’) imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of solar glass originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘the PRC’ or ‘China’).

(2)

By Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1394 (3), following an anti-absorption reinvestigation pursuant to Article 12 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (4), the Commission amended the level of the anti-dumping duty imposed by the original anti-dumping regulation.

(3)

By Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1080 (5) (the ‘previous expiry review’), the Commission prolonged, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the definitive anti-dumping duty for another five years (‘the measures in force’). The individual anti-dumping duties range from 17,5 % to 75,4 %. All other companies are subject to a country-wide anti-dumping duty of 67,1 % (‘the measures in force’).

(4)

In separate proceedings, the Commission imposed countervailing duties ranging from 3,2 % to 17,1 % in May 2014 (6). By Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1081 (7) (the ‘previous expiry review’), the Commission prolonged, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council (8), the definitive countervailing duty for another five years.

(5)

Following the publication of a notice of impending expiry (9) the Commission received a request for a review pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation.

(6)

The request for review was submitted on 18 April 2025 by Interfloat Group, i.e. Interfloat Corporation and GMB Glasmanufaktur Brandenburg GmbH (‘the applicants’) on behalf of the Union industry of solar glass in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The request for review was based on the grounds that the expiry of the measures would likely result in continuation of dumping and recurrence of injury to the Union industry.

(7)

Having determined, after consulting the Committee established by Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation, that sufficient evidence existed for the initiation of an expiry review, on 22 July 2025 the Commission initiated an expiry review with regard to imports into the Union of solar glass originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘the PRC’, ‘China’ or ‘the country concerned’) on the basis of Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (10) (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

(8)

The investigation of continuation or recurrence of dumping covered the period from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025 (‘the review investigation period’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2022 to the end of the review investigation period (‘the period considered’).

(9)

In the Notice of Initiation, interested parties were invited to contact the Commission in order to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the applicants, the known Union producers, users of the product under review in the Union, the known producers in the PRC and the authorities of the PRC, known importers, users, traders, as well as associations known to be concerned about the initiation of the expiry and invited them to participate.

(10)

Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the expiry review and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings.

(11)

One party requested a hearing with the Commission services. A hearing between the Commission and Solar Heat Europe, an association representing several users active in solar heat technology, took place on 11 May 2026. The hearing concerned the review investigations, further to which they registered as interested party and raised arguments further detailed in Section 7.2.

(12)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

(13)

In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers, even though sampling of Union producers was not necessary in this case, given the small number of producers in the European Union that came forward. The sample consisted of the two Union producers listed in the review request. The two producers accounted at that moment for approximatively 70 % of the Union production and sales which is representative of the Union industry. In accordance with Article 17(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission invited interested parties to comment on the provisional sample. No comments were made. The sample consists of the following two companies:

(14)

To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation.

(15)

Two importers initially came forward, UAB Soli Tek Cells (‘Soli Tek’), and Sunerg Solar Energy (‘Sunerg’), and were sent the unrelated importer questionnaire. Following the receipt of the reply to the questionnaire from Soli Tek, it was concluded that this company is a user instead of an importer. The Commission consequently asked them to fill out the users’ questionnaire. Sunerg did not reply to the questionnaire.

(16)

To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all known exporting producers in the PRC to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation. The Commission did not receive any reply from the GOC.

(17)

No exporting producers from the PRC cooperated.

(18)

Consequently, the Commission informed the authorities of the PRC by Note Verbale of 5 November 2025 that it intended to resort to the use of facts available under Article 18 of the basic Regulation when examining the continuation or recurrence of dumping. The authorities of the PRC did not respond to the Note Verbale.

(19)

The Commission sent a questionnaire concerning the existence of significant distortions in the PRC within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation to the Government of the People’s Republic of China (‘GOC’). The GOC did not provide any reply to the questionnaire.

(20)

The Commission invited the applicants, the other Union producer, and the users to complete the questionnaires, which were made available on its website (11) on the day of initiation. The Commission received questionnaire replies from the producers (GMB/Interfloat, and AGC) and from users (Soli Tek, SOLVIS and Bisol). Deficiency letters were sent to GMB and to Interfloat, AGC, and SOLVIS.

(21)

The applicants failed to submit the macro-questionnaire despite multiple requests from the Commission services. Bisol submitted a very deficient questionnaire reply and did not reply to the Commission’s enquiries.

(22)

The Commission sought and verified all the information deemed necessary for the determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury and of the Union interest. Pursuant to Article 16 of the basic Regulation, verification visits of the following companies were carried out:

Union related sales company:

Users:

(23)

The situation of the Union industry did not allow for the verification visits to take place. Both producers have stopped production in the beginning of 2025. The applicant, GMB Glasmanufaktur Brandenburg GmbH, filed for insolvency in November 2025, and cancelled the scheduled verification visits at short notice on two occasions. The other producer, AGC, was not able to receive the Commission’s case team due to the stoppage of production. On this basis and in the absence of a dedicated association (12), a substantial share of information was not submitted and could not be verified by the Commission.

(24)

The Commission services performed remote cross-checking of the information provided by the above-mentioned users.

(25)

On 28 August 2026, the Commission disclosed the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to repeal the anti-dumping duties in force. All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the disclosure.

(26)

Following disclosure, no comments were received and no party requested a hearing.

(27)

The product under review is solar glass consisting of tempered soda-lime-flat-glass, with an iron content of less than 300 ppm, a solar transmittance of more than 88 % (measured according to AM1,5 300–2 500 nm), a resistance to heat up to 250 °C (measured according to EN 12150), a resistance to thermal shocks of Δ 150 K (measured according to EN 12150) and having a mechanical strength of 90 N/mm2 or more (measured according to EN 1288-3), currently falling under CN code ex 7007 19 80 (TARIC codes 7007 19 80 12, 7007 19 80 18, 7007 19 80 80 and 7007 19 80 85) (‘the product under review’). The solar glass subject to anti-dumping duty includes all glass fulfilling the abovementioned technical and physical characteristics, whether it is used for photovoltaic modules, flat photothermal energy collectors, furniture, to build greenhouses, or for other uses.

(28)

Solar glass can be patterned or non-patterned, with either a transparent or diffuse surface or a variety of edgeworks. There can be different patterns on both sides of the glass, or it can be just single-sided patterned. Solar glass may have drillings, and can also be printed through the application of, for example, ceramic colours. The surface of the glass may be treated using different technologies. The most common is an anti-reflective coating applied before or after the tempering process. Other technologies allow the solar glass to be coated with thin functional layers providing increased transmittance, self-cleaning, anti-soiling or hardness properties.

(29)

Solar glass is one of the components for making crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and thin film photovoltaic modules to produce electricity (‘PV modules’), as well as flat photothermal energy collectors used, for example, in generating hot water (‘photothermal modules’). It is also used for the construction of greenhouses (so-called ‘horticultural glass’ or ‘greenhouse glass’).

(30)

The product concerned by this investigation is the product under review originating in the PRC currently falling under CN code ex 7007 19 80 (TARIC codes 7007 19 80 12, 7007 19 80 18, 7007 19 80 80 and 7007 19 80 85).

(31)

As established in the original investigation and in the previous expiry review investigation, solar glass produced and sold by the Union industry in the Union and solar glass produced and sold on the domestic market of the PRC and solar glass imported into the Union from the PRC share the same basic physical and chemical characteristics and the same end uses. They are therefore considered to be like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.

(32)

During the review investigation period, imports of solar glass from the PRC continued. According to Eurostat data, imports of solar glass from the PRC accounted for about 3 % of the Union market in the review investigation period compared to 30,5 % market share during the original investigation and 9 % during the previous expiry review.

(33)

As mentioned in recital (17), none of the exporters/producers from the PRC cooperated in the investigation. Therefore, the Commission informed the authorities of the PRC that due to the absence of cooperation, the Commission might apply Article 18 of the basic Regulation concerning the findings with regard to the PRC. The Commission did not receive any comments or requests for an intervention of the Hearing Officer in this regard.

(34)

On 5 November 2025, the Commission informed the GOC that, due to the absence of any cooperation from exporters/producers in the PRC, it intended to base its findings on facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. The Commission stressed also that a finding based on facts available may be less favourable to the party concerned and invited them to comment. The GOC did not provide any comments.

(35)

Consequently, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, the findings in relation to the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping were based on facts available, in particular on those contained in the request for review and in the information provided by Eurostat. In addition, the Commission used other sources of publicly available information such as Global Trade Atlas (13) (‘GTA’), the Turkish Statistical Institute (14) (‘TurkStat’), GlobalPetrolPrices (15), the Republic of Türkiye Energy Market Regulatory Authority (16) and the Investment Office of Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye (17).

(36)

Given the sufficient evidence available at the initiation of the investigation tending to show, with regard to the PRC, the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, the Commission determined the normal value on the basis of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation.

(37)

In order to obtain information necessary for its assessments concerning the alleged significant distortions, the Commission sent a questionnaire to the GOC. In addition, in point 5.3.2 of the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited all interested parties to make their views known, submit information and provide supporting evidence regarding the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation within 37 days of the date of publication of the Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union. No questionnaire reply was received from the GOC and no submission on the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was received within the deadline. Subsequently, the Commission informed the GOC that it would use facts available within the meaning of Article 18 of the basic Regulation to establish the existence of significant distortions in the PRC.

(38)

In point 5.3.2 of the Notice of Initiation, the Commission also specified that, in view of the evidence available, a possible representative third country for the PRC in this case was Türkiye, pursuant to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation for the purpose of determining the normal value based on undistorted prices or benchmarks. The Commission further stated that it would examine other possibly appropriate countries in accordance with the criteria set out in first indent of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation.

(39)

On 30 April 2026, the Commission informed by a note on the factors of production (‘the FOP Note’) interested parties on the relevant sources it intended to use for the determination of the normal value, with Türkiye as the representative country. In that note, the Commission provided a list of all factors of production such as raw materials, labour and energy used in the production of solar glass. It also informed interested parties that it would establish selling, general and administrative costs and profits based on available information for the company Türkiye Şişe ve Cam Fabrikaları A.Ş, a producer in the representative country. No comments were received.

(40)

According to Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation, ‘the normal value shall normally be based on the prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting country’.

(41)

However, according to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, ‘in case it is determined […] that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the exporting country due to the existence in that country of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b), the normal value shall be constructed exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks’, and ‘shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount of administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’ (‘administrative, selling and general costs’ is referred to hereinafter as ‘SG & A’).

(42)

As further explained below, the Commission concluded in the present investigation that, based on the evidence available showing the existence of significant distortions in the exporting country, and in view of the lack of cooperation of the GOC and the exporting producers, the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was appropriate.

(43)

Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation defines ‘significant distortions are those distortions which occur when reported prices or costs, including the costs of raw materials and energy, are not the result of free market forces as they are affected by substantial government intervention. In assessing the existence of significant distortions regard shall be had, inter alia, to the potential impact of one or more of the following elements:

(44)

According to Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation, the assessment of the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(a) shall take into account, amongst others, the non-exhaustive list of elements listed therein. Pursuant to Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation, in assessing the existence of significant distortions, regard shall be had to the potential impact of one or more of those elements on prices and costs in the exporting country of the product under review. Indeed, as that list is non-cumulative, not all the elements need to be established for a finding of significant distortions. Moreover, the same factual circumstances may be used to demonstrate the existence of one or more of the elements of the list. However, any conclusion on significant distortions within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(a) must be made on the basis of all the evidence at hand. Moreover, the overall assessment on the existence of distortions may also take into account the general context and situation in the exporting country, in particular where the fundamental elements of the exporting country’s economic and administrative set-up provides the government with substantial powers to intervene in the economy in such a way that prices and costs are not the result of the free development of market forces.

(45)

In this regard, Article 2(6a)(c) of the basic Regulation provides that ‘[w]here the Commission has well-founded indications of the possible existence of significant distortions as referred to in point (b) in a certain country or a certain sector in that country, and where appropriate for the effective application of this Regulation, the Commission shall produce, make public and regularly update a report describing the market circumstances referred to in point (b) in that country or sector’.

(46)

Pursuant to this provision, the Commission has issued a country report concerning China (18) (‘the China Report’), showing the existence of substantial government intervention at many levels of the economy, including specific distortions in many key factors of production (such as land, energy, capital, raw materials and labour) as well as in specific sectors (such as steel and chemicals). The Report was placed in the investigation file at the initiation stage. Interested parties were invited to rebut, comment or supplement the evidence contained in the investigation file at the time of initiation of which the Report was an integral part. No comments were received.

(47)

The review request submitted by the applicants provided additional evidence on significant distortions in the solar glass sector within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b), complementing the Report. This evidence relates to various distortions and can be found in the section below from recital (49) to (76).

(48)

As indicated in recital (19), the GOC did not comment or provide evidence supporting or rebutting the existing evidence on the case file, including the Report and the additional evidence provided by the applicants, on the existence of significant distortions and/or on the appropriateness of the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation in the case at hand.

(49)

First, the evidence contained in the request included information alleging that the Chinese market is governed by systemic distortions that apply to the solar glass sector and to the entire economy. Therefore, the request established that the domestic sales prices of solar glass, as well as all the input costs (raw materials, energy, land, financing, labour, etc.) cannot be used because of distortions resulting from substantial government intervention. The GOC intervenes at all levels of the supply chain of solar glass, creating the situation where all relevant inputs are affected in one way or another by distortions from the government. In particular, the request mentioned the following elements showing the existence of significant distortions (19):

(50)

In the absence of any cooperation from China, the Commission had to rely on available information concerning the ownership structure of companies active in the solar glass sector in the PRC.

(51)

In the previous expiry review, the Commission found that the solar glass sector in the PRC was served to a significant extent by enterprises operating under ownership, control or policy supervision or guidance by the Chinese authorities. The Commission identified several major producers as State-owned enterprises, including Dongguan CSG Solar Glass under CSG Holding, Luoyang Glass and CNBM, while also noting that even ostensibly private groups such as Xinyi Solar Holdings and Flat Glass Group were subject to the broader framework of State influence and Party control (20). The review request confirmed that several of the major Chinese producers remain State-owned or State-influenced and that the two largest producers operate in a system where Party structures and State policy supervision remain embedded in corporate governance.

(52)

The GOC and the CCP maintain structures that ensure their continued influence over enterprises, and in particular State-owned enterprises (‘SOEs’). The State (and in many aspects also the CCP) not only actively formulates and oversees the implementation of general economic policies by individual SOEs, but it also claims its rights to participate in operational decision-making in SOEs. This is typically done through rotation of cadres between government authorities and SOEs, through presence of party members on SOEs executive bodies and of party cells in companies, as well as through shaping the corporate structure of the SOE sector. In exchange, SOEs enjoy a particular status within the Chinese economy, which entails a number of economic benefits, in particular shielding from competition and preferential access to relevant inputs, including finance.

(53)

As concerns policy supervision and guidance by the State in the solar glass sector, even privately owned solar glass producers are prevented from operating under free market conditions. With the high level of government intervention in the solar glass industry and an important share of SOEs in the sector, even privately owned producers are prevented from operating under market conditions.

(54)

The CCP committee monitors the company’s compliance with government policies, the implementation of CCP guidelines, the nomination of management or members of the board, and is involved in the key decisions of the company (21). The different local State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (‘SASAC’s) have the powers to effectively ensure control over the composition of the companies’ statutory bodies and SOE top managers go back and forth between SOEs and government functions. In practice, management accepts the guidance of the GOC, in exchange of which the company receives preferential treatment in business opportunities and financial advantages. The State also interferes in private companies by more indirect means, such as the policy of mergers and acquisitions to constitute champion companies, the steering of investment through control of the banking institutions and pervasive presence in the financial markets. These levers of influence allow the GOC to favour companies over others by, for example, granting preferential access to finance to those companies that are aligned with the State’s industrial policy.

(55)

The GOC also has a distorting presence in upstream companies operating both at the level of raw materials used as inputs for solar glass, and also in the supply of energy.

(56)

For example, the Sinopec Group, fully controlled by the Chinese central government through SASAC, describes itself as the ‘national production base’ of inorganic, organic and fine chemicals. It has declared its position as an instrument of Chinese economic policy and underlined its adherence to the party principles in numerous instances. As a Commission investigation confirmed: ‘In 2018, the company adhered to the guidance of Xi Jinping’s new era socialist ideology with Chinese characteristics and the spirit of the 19th National Congress of the Party, fully implemented the general requirements for party building in the new era, closely focused on the strategic deployment of building a world-class enterprise, and led by political construction, vigorously strengthen the capacity building of the party committees of directly-owned enterprises to manage the overall situation, vigorously implement the grassroots party organisation organisational improvement project, vigorously enhance the vitality of team officers and entrepreneurship, coordinate and strengthen all party construction work, and continuously improve the quality of party construction to provide a strong guarantee for building Sinopec into a world-class enterprise with global competitiveness. Unity, education and guidance of party members and cadres continue to strengthen the consciousness and consciousness of resolutely achieving “two safeguards”, and practice loyalty to the party with practical actions’ (22).

(57)

The electricity market in China is characterised by strong involvement of SOEs in all stages of the supply chain (23). Around 50 % of the generation capacity is state owned, whereas the entire transmission grid is owned by two SOEs. The strong state presence extends to the entire energy sector and out of over one hundred centrally owned SOEs currently being overseen by SASAC, 21 are in the energy sector. This is in addition to the practice of some Chinese provinces offering preferential energy prices to attract investment into the economic zones and industrial parks (24).

(58)

Several aspects of Chinese government policies also serve to distort electricity prices. The first is that the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (‘SERC’), China’s independent electricity regulator, does not set electricity prices. Rather, prices are set by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the government authority that also has authority over industrial policies. The second is that while electricity is one of the main inputs in the manufacture of solar glass, the prices of electricity are not market-based in the PRC and are also affected by significant distortions (through central price-setting, price differentiation and in direct power purchase practices). The production of natural gas in China is also regulated and controlled by the Chinese state leading to distortions through several mechanisms, since the prices for domestic natural gas are regulated by the NDRC, which publishes the prices applicable to each province in Notices, and then the local price bureaus publish a corresponding notice at the local level implementing the prices decided by the central NDRC (25).

(59)

In summary, energy prices in China are still not market-based and prices are still largely controlled by the state. The impact of these distortions consists in allowing Chinese solar glass producers to benefit from reduced energy tariffs and to lower their production costs of the product concerned when sold on the local market.

(60)

Overall, the system of planning in the PRC results in resources being driven to sectors designated as strategic or otherwise politically important by the government, rather than being allocated in line with market forces.

(61)

A number of Chinese solar glass producers (26) are recognised as national high-tech enterprises and/or enterprise technology centres national and/or local provinces level. HNTE (High and New Technology Enterprise) status qualifies the company for a 15 % (versus the standard 25 %) corporate tax rate regardless of the company’s investment type. HNTE status is normally granted by provincial tax authorities for company facilities and plants located within those provinces.

(62)

Other distortions arise from the benefits conferred under central and local government programmes for industrial or chemical parks and increasingly so-called Hi-Tech Industrial Development Areas.

(63)

The Chinese bankruptcy system inadequately delivers on its own main objectives such as to fairly settle claims and debts and to safeguard the lawful rights and interests of creditors and debtors (27). This is rooted in the fact that the Chinese bankruptcy system is characterised by systematic under-enforcement. The number of bankruptcy cases, which is very low for an economy of China’s size, points to serious issues with the enforcement of bankruptcy laws, stemming from flaws in these laws, as well as from their inadequate implementation. Moreover, the role of the State in the insolvency proceedings remains strong and active, often having direct influence on the outcome of the proceedings.

(64)

Regarding property laws, the supremacy of public ownership over the private one permeates the entire legal system and is emphasised as a general principle in all central legislation. The Chinese property law is a prime example: it refers to the primary stage of socialism and entrusts the State with upholding the basic economic system under which the public ownership plays a dominant role.

(65)

Much like other sectors in the Chinese economy, Chinese solar glass producers are subject to the regular rules on Chinese bankruptcy, corporate, and property laws. These companies, too, are subject to the top-down distortions arising from the discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy and property laws. As such, the Commission concluded that the Chinese bankruptcy and property laws do not work properly, thus generating distortions when maintaining insolvent firms afloat and when allocating land use rights in the PRC. Those considerations, based on the evidence available, appear to be fully applicable also in the solar glass sector.

(66)

The Chinese solar glass sector is also affected by the distortions of wage costs (28). Those distortions affect the sector both directly (when producing the product under review or the main inputs), as well as indirectly (when having access to capital or inputs from companies subject to the same labour system).

(67)

China has not ratified many of the fundamental conventions of the International Labour Organisation (‘ILO’), in particular those on freedom of association and on collective bargaining. Under national law, only one trade union organisation is active. However, this organisation lacks independence from the State authorities and its engagement in collective bargaining and protection of workers’ rights remains rudimentary.

(68)

Moreover, the mobility of the Chinese workforce is restricted by the China-wide household registration system, which limits access to the full range of social security and other benefits to local residents of a given administrative area. Those shortcomings lead to the distortion of wage costs in the PRC.

(69)

Access to capital for corporate actors in China is subject to various distortions.

(70)

Firstly, the Chinese financial system is characterised by the strong position of State-owned banks, which, when granting access to finance, take into consideration criteria other than the economic viability of a project. Similarly to non-financial SOEs, the banks remain connected to the State not only through ownership but also via personal relations (the top executives of large State-owned financial institutions are ultimately appointed by the CCP) and, again just like non-financial SOEs, the banks regularly implement public policies designed by the government. In doing so, banks comply with an explicit legal obligation to conduct their business in accordance with the needs of the national economic and social development and under the guidance of the industrial policies of the State. This is compounded by additional existing rules, which direct finances into sectors designated by the government as encouraged or otherwise important (29).

(71)

This results in privileged access to finance for favoured sectors and enterprises, including those active in solar-related industries. These distortions, together with the widespread role of public policy in credit allocation, affect access to capital in the solar glass sector.

(72)

Second, in the previous expiry review, the Commission found that significant distortions in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation were present and concluded that the Chinese government continued to support the solar glass sector, that solar glass was part of an encouraged industry, and that domestic prices and costs in China could not be used for establishing normal value (30).

(73)

The review request submitted that no structural changes have occurred in the PRC or in the solar glass sector that would call the findings recalled in the previous sections into question. On the contrary, the same distortive features remain in place and Chinese policy support, overcapacity (31), State influence and distortions in raw materials, energy, labour, legal framework and finance continue to characterise the sector.

(74)

Moreover, the review request showed that significant distortions in the solar glass sector continued during the review investigation period.

(75)

Finally, no evidence or arguments to the contrary have been adduced by the GOC or the exporting producers in the present investigation.

(76)

In view of the above, the evidence available showed that prices or costs of the product under review, including the costs of raw materials, energy and labour, are not the result of free market forces because they are affected by substantial government intervention within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation as shown by the actual or potential impact of one or more of the relevant elements listed therein. On that basis, the Commission concluded that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs to establish normal value in this case. Consequently, the Commission proceeded to construct the normal value exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks, that is, in this case, on the basis of corresponding costs of production and sale in an appropriate representative country, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

(77)

The investigation established a level of dumping of more than de minimis. However, a more detailed assessment was not necessary given the conclusions set out in the below section.

(78)

The investigation established that, since the beginning of 2025, there has been no production of the product under review in the Union. At the request stage, only GMB Glasmanufaktur Brandenburg and AGC Glass Europe were still operating. However, both producers ceased production in the first quarter of 2025, and the post-RIP developments confirmed that production remained suspended.

(79)

Union producers have indicated that the continuation of the measures would allow production to restart once market conditions would improve. However, throughout the investigation, Union producers were unable to substantiate that prospect. They provided no element demonstrating that market conditions would improve, nor any binding agreement, secured financing or operational plan showing that, and when, a restart could take place. The Commission was likewise given no document justifying a potential restart of production or a takeover of the relevant activity, despite having expressly offered the Union producers the opportunity to submit such evidence.

(80)

Considering the absence of any verifiable information, the Commission could therefore not establish the likelihood of a resumption of Union production within a reasonably foreseeable period following continuation of the measures.

(81)

To the Commission’s knowledge, GMB and AGC were the only two remaining Union producers of solar glass at the beginning of the RIP. During the investigation, the Commission consulted users and associations in order to verify whether any other producers of the product under review were active in the Union. Other possible producers were contacted; however, they provided no indication of any production or activity in respect of the product under review. No other producer came forward during the investigation.

(82)

The two verified users, UAB Soli Tek cells and SOLVIS d.o.o., claimed that, in the light of the foregoing, the investigation should be terminated forthwith on the grounds that the Union industry has ceased to produce the product under review.

(83)

Indeed, GMB entered into insolvency proceedings in July 2025 and, subsequently, allegedly entered in negotiations with a new investor to take over its activities.

(84)

Concerning the request from the users to terminate the investigation, the Commission noted that at that moment, given the ongoing insolvency proceedings, it would have been premature to conclude that the industry had ceased to exist on a permanent basis. Thus, the Commission did not terminate the proceeding on the basis of the absence of a Union industry. The Commission therefore decided to continue the investigation and assess all available evidence.

(85)

By the time the investigation was concluded however, production in the Union had not resumed, and the applicants provided no verifiable evidence of a potential takeover.

(86)

As a matter of fact, by the end of the RIP, the Union solar glass industry had not re-started its activities nor re-opened its factories for the production of the product under review.

(87)

In those circumstances, there is no Union industry within the meaning of Article 4 of the basic Regulation whose situation could be examined for the purposes of determining the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury, nor any production in respect of which the existing measures could continue to afford protection.

(88)

Based on the above, the Commission found that the Union industry has ceased its production activities concerning the product under review and that no verifiable prospect of a resumption exists within a reasonably foreseeable period. In the present case, in the absence of any Union production at the end of the RIP, in the absence of a Union industry within the meaning of Article 4 of the basic Regulation, in the impossibility of examining the situation of the Union industry and failing to provide any verifiable prospect of a resumption of its production, the Commission concluded that there is no likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury.

(89)

The investigation established the non-likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury, thus an analysis on causation was not necessary given the conclusions set out in the above section.

(90)

Although the finding set out in recital (88) is in itself sufficient to conclude that the measures should not be maintained, the Commission also examined, for the sake of completeness and in accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures would be against the interest of the Union. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry and of users.

(91)

As explained in Section 5, the investigation established that, the Union industry ceased production of solar glass during the review investigation period, thus, there is, de facto, currently no active Union industry.

(92)

The Union industry argued that the prolongation of the measure would restore the industry provided that market conditions improve. As mentioned in recital (79) the Commission rejects this claim due to the lack of supporting evidence.

(93)

As explained in Section 1.8, none of the information submitted by the Union producers could be verified. In the light of the applicant’s situation, and in particular of its repeated incapacity to submit the requested information and to allow the information submitted to be verified, the Commission considered that the Union industry was unable to demonstrate a continued and actual interest in the continuation of the measures.

(94)

Consequently, in the current situation, in the absence of any active production of the product under review by the Union industry and, with no verifiable prospect of resuming production, the Commission could not identify any interest for the Union industry in prolonging the measures to protect the industry against potential unfair trade practices concerning a product it no longer produces.

(95)

The users of solar glass consist of photovoltaic modules manufacturers, the solar thermal industry, and to a certain extent, greenhouses manufacturers.

(96)

All users expressed their opposition to the continuation of the measures. Users argued that in the absence of solar glass production in the Union, the measures act de facto as a tax.

(97)

The Commission carried out remote cross-checking of two users, both solar panels manufacturers. During the verification, the Commission assessed the impact of the two possible outcomes of the investigation.

(98)

The continuation of the measures would not change the situation of users. Solar glass originating in China would still be subject to anti-dumping duties. In the absence of any Union production, the Union users, however, have no choice but to import their solar glass. Maintaining the measures would therefore increase the costs on downstream users sourcing their solar glass from China without providing any benefit to an upstream industry that has effectively ceased to operate.

(99)

On the other hand, the termination of the measures would result in a direct positive impact for users’ cost of production. The investigation established that solar glass constitutes a significant share of the cost structure of solar panel producers. Solar glass amounts to approximatively 12 % to 18 % of the cost of production of standard modules. Considering the production time and the delivery from China, the Commission concluded that the users’ industry would require at least four months before benefiting from the termination of the measures, in the form of a reduction of their cost of production, ultimately resulting in higher profits or a competitiveness gain in the Union.

(100)

In a downstream market characterised by strong price pressure and narrow margins, even a slight decrease in the users’ cost of production is expected to enhance their ability to compete with imported modules.

(101)

On this basis, the continuation of the measures does not serve the Union’s interest, whereas their termination would enhance the competitiveness of the downstream solar module industry without harming any Union producers since none are active in this market.

(102)

On the basis of the above, having weighed the interests involved, the Commission concluded that there are no compelling reasons relating to the Union interest to prolong the measures.

(103)

On the contrary, the Union interest analysis, as regards the users’ interest in particular, support allowing the measures to lapse. In the absence of an active Union industry, the measures no longer serve the purpose for which they were imposed.

(104)

It follows from the above considerations that, under Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of solar glass originating in the People’s Republic of China, imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 470/2014 and extended by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1080, should be repealed. As mentioned in recital (102), the Commission concludes to the absence of a Union interest that justifies the continuation of the measures.

(105)

The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,