C_2005257EN.01000602.xml

15.10.2005

Official Journal of the European Union

C 257/6

Appeal brought on 24 August 2005 by Hippocrate Vounakis against the order made on 2 June 2005 by the Court of First Instance of the European Communities (Third Chamber) in Case T-326/03: Hippocrate Vounakis v Commission of the European Communities

(Case C-322/05 P)

(2005/C 257/11)

Language of the case: French

An appeal was brought on 24 August 2005 before the Court of Justice of the European Communities by Hippocrate Vounakis, represented by S. Orlandi, A. Coolen, J.-N. Louis and E. Marchal, lawyers, against the order made on 2 June 2005 by the Court of First Instance of the European Communities (Third Chamber) in Case T-326/03: Hippocrate Vounakis v Commission of the European Communities.

The appellant claims that the Court should:

1.	Annul the order of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber) of 2 June 2005 in Case T-326/03 (Hippocrate Vounakis v Commission of the European Communities) in its entirety;

2.	Giving judgment itself, order that the action for annulment of the Commission's decision not to include the appellant's name on the list of officials promoted to Grade A4 under the 2002 promotion procedure is admissible;

3.	Order the defendant at first instance and on the appeal to pay the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments:

In support of his appeal the appellant submits that the Court of First Instance erred in law in its definition of the decision challenged by the appellant.

The Court of First Instance wrongly held the decision challenged by the appellant to be the decision establishing the list of promoted officials, that decision consisting of a collection of individual acts of which the promoted officials are the addressees, whereas the decision challenged is the strictly individual decision not to include the appellant's name on the list of those promoted.

Since the appellant was not an addressee of the decision to promote the other officials, wrongly regarded as the challenged act, the Court of First Instance held that the second sentence of the second indent of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations was applicable and that therefore, with regard to him, although he was on annual leave until 16 September and the decision was published on 14 August 2002, the time-limit for his complaint started to run, in any event, on the date of publication of that list.

In so doing, the Court of First Instance misconstrued the first sentence of the second indent of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations since the act challenged is the individual decision not, after comparing the merits of the officials eligible for promotion, to promote the appellant and not the individual decisions to promote the other officials promoted who are not complaining about them.

Since it was part of an individual decision, it should have been ‘properly’ brought to his knowledge.

From the entirety of the arguments set out above, it is apparent that the Court of First Instance made an error of law.