Official Journal of the European Union

C 141/53

Action brought on 10 April 2009 — Dover v Parliament

(Case T-149/09)

2009/C 141/108

Language of the case: English


Applicant: Densmore Ronald Dover (Borehamwood, United Kingdom) (represented by: D. Vaughan, QC Barrister, M. Lester, Barrister and M. French, Solicitor)

Defendant: European Parliament

Form of order sought

annulment of contested decision;

measures of organisation pursuant to Article 64 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, as specified in the application;

order that the Parliament pays the applicant’s costs on this action.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By means of the present application the applicant seeks the annulment of Parliament Decision D(2009) 4639 of 29 January 2009 concerning the recovery of the parliamentary assistance allowance.

In support of his application, the applicant puts forward five pleas in law.

First, he claims that the Parliament has misinterpreted and misapplied Article 14 of the Rules governing the payment of expenses and allowances to members of the European Parliament (PEAM Rules), inter alia by seeking to impose, with retrospective effect, onerous requirements on the applicant which were never requirements on MEPs at the relevant time and by failing to identify precisely which item of expenditure is considered to have been paid unduly.

Second, he submits that the Parliament has relied on an alleged ‘conflict of interest’ with violation of the principle of legal certainty as it acted incompatibly with past custom and practice, inconsistently with its published rules, and without setting out clear and transparent standards. The applicant claims that the Parliament decision lacks any legal or factual basis.

Third, the applicant argues that the Parliament has not complied with the fundamental procedural requirements of Article 27 of the PEAM Rules inter alia regarding the prior consultation of the quaestors, justifying the ‘exceptional case’ circumstances, hearing the applicant before a decision had been taken as well as the requirement of a decision that should be taken by the Bureau.

Fourth, he contends that the defendant has sought to reclaim VAT from the applicant without having legal basis for doing so.

Finally, the applicant claims that the Parliament has referred the applicant’s case to OLAF prematurely, in breach of the applicant’s right of defence and without legal basis or justification.