(1)

On 15 September 2025, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports of PET Spunbond originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’ or ‘the country concerned’) on the basis of Article 5 of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (2) (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

(2)

The Commission initiated the investigation following a complaint lodged on 8 August 2025 by Freudenberg Performance Materials and Johns Manville (‘the complainants’), the sole known Union producers of PET Spunbond. The complaint was made on behalf of the Union industry of PET Spunbond in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The complaint contained evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation.

(3)

The Commission made imports of product concerned subject to registration by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2409 (3) of 1 December 2025 (‘the registration Regulation’).

(4)

In accordance with Article 19a of the basic Regulation, on 16 April 2026, the Commission provided parties with a summary of the proposed duties and details about the calculation of the dumping margins and the margins adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry (‘pre-disclosure’). Interested parties were invited to comment on the accuracy of the calculations within three working days.

(5)

On 14 May 2026, the Commission imposed provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of PET Spunbond originating in the People’s Republic of China by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1063 of 12 May 2026 (4) (‘the provisional Regulation’). Comments received following the pre-disclosure mentioned in recital (4) above were addressed in recitals (366)-(369) of the provisional Regulation.

(6)

Following the disclosure of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which a provisional anti-dumping duty was imposed (‘provisional disclosure’), the China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Textiles (‘CCCT’), Changde Tiandingfeng Nonwovens Co Ltd and Tiandingfeng Nonwovens Co Ltd, (referred henceforth as to the ‘TDF Group’), an Italian producer of waterproofing membranes – Matco S.r.l (hereinafter ‘Matco’), Strade Italiane E Bitumi (‘SITEB’) an association, representing Italian manufacturers of waterproofing membranes, and Valli Zabban SpA, General Membrane SpA, Casali Industria Chimica e Bituminosa SpA., and Vetroasfalto SpA. (hereinafter ‘Italian PET Spunbond users’), and by Freudenberg Performance Materials S.A.S and Politex SAS di Freudenberg Politex SRL, and Hubei Unibon Nonwovens Co., Ltd (hereinafter ‘Hubei’) filed written submissions making their views known on the provisional findings within the deadline provided by Article 2(1) of the provisional Regulation.

(7)

The parties who so requested were granted an opportunity to be heard. Hearings took place with the TDF Group, CCCT, and the Italian PET Spunbond users.

(8)

The Commission continued to seek and verify all the information it deemed necessary for its final findings. When reaching its definitive findings, the Commission considered the comments submitted by interested parties and revised its provisional conclusions when appropriate.

(9)

The Commission informed all interested parties of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to impose a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of PET Spunbond originating in the PRC (‘final disclosure’). All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the final disclosure.

(10)

Following final disclosure, the complainants, the exporting producers TDF Group and Hubei, CCCT and the Italian Spunbond users submitted comments within the deadline. The Italian Spunbond users requested and were granted a hearing. The comments submitted by the interested parties were considered and taken into account where appropriate in this regulation. They are addressed below.

(11)

As certain of the comments received subsequent to the definitive disclosure have resulted in a revision of the dumping margins and of the consequent definitive duty levels, the Commission informed all interested parties with an additional definitive disclosure of these changes, as described in recitals (37) to (42) and (57). All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the additional final disclosure.

(12)

In response to the additional definitive disclosure mentioned in the previous recital, the Commission received comments by one of the exporting producers. However, as these comments did not concern the additional definitive disclosure, they were disregarded. No further comments to that additional disclosure were received.

(13)

Matco, SITEB, and the Italian PET Spunbond users claimed that the Commission failed to notify and hear users’ arguments during the investigation, which limited their right of defence. According to the interested parties, the Commission should have issued and circulated a dedicated questionnaire to Italian and other Union users of PET Spunbond identified through the relevant industry associations in order to obtain factual information.

(14)

The Commission noted that based on Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission shall take into consideration the interests of users. However, in order to enjoy procedural rights and submit relevant data in response to the questionnaire, users should have made themselves known within the time limit specified in the Notice of Initiation. The Commission could not conduct a more in-depth analysis of the user market, including the number of jobs at risk, because users did not cooperate with the investigation by submitting questionnaire replies. The Notice of Initiation published in the Official Journal of the European Union invited all interested parties to contact the Commission and it included a link to the users’ questionnaire. The Commission specifically informed known users about the initiation. Matco and all Italian PET Spunbond users were identified as possible interested parties and were invited to be part of the importers sampling (5) as at initiation stage their function was not entirely clear.

(15)

No further comments on initiation were received after provisional disclosure.

(16)

In the absence of comments on the sampling decisions concerning Union producers, unrelated importers and exporting producers, the conclusion in recitals (15) to (19) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(17)

In the absence of any comments, recitals (20) to (22) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(18)

It is recalled that the investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025 (‘the investigation period’ or ‘IP’) and the examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2022 to the end of the investigation period (‘the period considered’).

(19)

In the absence of any comments, recitals (24) to (30) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(20)

After provisional disclosure, the Italian PET Spunbond users submitted comments claiming that the Commission made an error in considering the impact of Chinese imports only on the Union market of PET spundbond. They claimed that imported PET Spunbond that is incorporated into finished products that are exported outside the Union do is not subject to the same competitive dynamics as products intended for sale and consumption within the Union market and that the Commission should have differentiated between PET Spunbond that is incorporated in downstream products (bituminous membranes) consumed on the Union market and on the PET spundbond of downstream products that are further exported to third countries.

(21)

These users however, did not provide any evidence to base their claim in differences in the basic, chemical and technical characteristics as well as the basic uses of these products, but simply asked the Commission to assess the economic impact of the measures on the downstream market, with a specific focus on PET Spunbond incorporated into exported products. However, no proven difference in basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics permit such differentiation. Therefore, the products are like products in the sense of the basic Regulation, and the claim was rejected.

(22)

The Italian PET Spunbond users also claimed that the PCN structure used was set on the basis of price similarities and thus does not reflect the differences between PET Spunbond used for goods sold on the internal market and that used for downstream products destined for export.

(23)

As explained in recital (32) of the provisional Regulation, the PCN structure which distinguished between PET Spunbond with and without glass fibre reinforcement, reflects the material characteristics of the product under investigation and thus also reflects the different uses of these types. Interested parties failed to substantiate their claims with evidence demonstrating that Chinese imports differ materially, in terms of product quality or technical performance, from Union industry products. Nor did they provide evidence of any differences in the basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics of PET Spunbond sold for consumption on the Union market compared to that exported outside the Union, or of any characteristics or innovations that the Union industry is unable to supply. PET Spunbond is, in terms of basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics, the same product whether it is exported or sold on the internal EU market. There is no reason to take exported PET Spunbond into consideration in the PCN structure. Thus, the claim was rejected. Accordingly, their claim that the analysis of imports, market share, injury assessment and causation should be amended to reflect differences between PET Spunbond that is used for exported products and for sale on the internal market was also rejected.

(24)

In the absence of any other comments, recitals (31) and (32) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(25)

In the absence of any comments on the procedure for the determination of the normal value under Article 2(6a), the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (33) to (42) of the provisional Regulation.

(26)

The details of the existence of significant distortions were set out in Sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.5 of the provisional Regulation. In the absence of comments on the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of Article 2(6)(a) and (b) of the basic Regulation in the PET Spunbond sector in the PRC, the Commission confirmed its findings set out in recitals (46) to (147) of the provisional Regulation.

(27)

In recitals (148) to (194) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission informed the interested parties on the relevant sources it intended to use for the determination of the normal value and that it had selected Thailand as the only representative country. It also informed interested parties that it would establish selling, general and administrative (‘SG&A’) costs and profits based on readily available information for PT Multi Spunindo Jaya Tbk, a producer of PET Spunbond in Indonesia.

(28)

In response to the provisional disclosure, the exporting producer Hubei Unibon nonwovens Co Ltd (‘Unibon’) reiterated its argument to the Second note on the production factors of 9 February 2026 (hereinafter the ‘Second Note’) (6). It considered that imports of PET Chips into Thailand carry unrepresentative prices and are deemed to be special, niche (‘special grade’) qualities of PET Chips, while Chinese exporting producers are using standard PET Chips which are not comparable to the special grade PET Chips. Unibon argued to use imports of PET Chips into Indonesia instead (with a price of RMB 7,3/kg) compared to 11,1/kg for Thailand.

(29)

In response to the definitive disclosure, Unibon reiterated its arguments as to why Thailand should not be considered an appropriate representative country.

(30)

In recitals (158) and (159) in the provisional Regulation, the Commission had already addressed these arguments. In the absence of any concrete additional evidence showing that the PET Chips imported into Thailand are chemically different from the PET Chips used by the Chinese exporting producers, the argument is dismissed.

(31)

In the absence of further comments concerning the choice of representative country, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (148) to (194) of the provisional Regulation.

(32)

In recitals (198) to (238) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission informed interested parties on the relevant sources it intended to use for the determination of the normal value, with Thailand as the representative country. In Table 1 of the provisional Regulation, the Commission listed all the factors of production, the specific sources for each of the factors and the prices collected from the representative countries that it had used for the calculation of the dumping margins.

(33)

In recitals (200) to (231) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission detailed the considerations for each of the factors of production listed in Table 1 and included and addressed comments made by parties to the Second Note on the production factors.

(34)

Below the Commission has detailed all comments per factor of production made to the provisional disclosure (some of which substantially reproduced those made in response to the Second Note) and addressed each of them.

(35)

The Commission referred to recital (218) of the provisional Regulation, wherein it had accepted the claim by the TDF Group to alter the 6-digit HS Code for acrylic ester emulsions from 3903 90 to 3906 90 . At a more detailed level of classification, the Commission had subsequently used 3906 90 99 .

(36)

In response to the provisional disclosure, the TDF Group considered that, for acrylic acid emulsion, the commodity code used, 3906 90 99 (‘other’) is erroneous and instead the Commission should use 3906 90 20  (7). The claim was substantiated including with underlying documented evidence of the exact input used by the TDF Group. On that basis, the Commission accepted the claim and established the benchmark for acrylic ester emulsion on the basis of commodity code 3906 90 20 rather than code 3906 90 99 .

(37)

In response to the definitive disclosure, Unibon claimed that the acrylic acid emulsion used by Unibon is identical to that used by other Chinese producers, including TDF. It therefore argued that the Commission should also use commodity code 3906 90 20 to establish the benchmark for acrylic acid emulsion for Unibon. The Commission examined the evidence available from the verification visit, which supported this claim, and therefore accepted the use of commodity code 3906 90 20 for establishing the benchmark for Unibon. The updated benchmark value, together with the updated benchmark value mentioned in recital (42) below, had an impact in the decrease in Hubei Unibon’s dumping margin from 45,6 % to 39,8 %.

(38)

The Commission recalls that, as stated in recitals (229) and (230) of the provisional Regulation, it had used two distinctive prices for coal/coke, one for lignite coal and one for semicoke. For lignite coal, it had used price statistics from the Thai Energy Policy and Planning Office of the Ministry of Energy. For semicoke, it had used the Global Trade Atlas (GTA).

(39)

In response to the provisional disclosure, Unibon rejected the use of domestic statistics of the Thai Ministry of Energy instead of GTA for lignite coal. Unibon considered that the Commission did not give valid reasons for not using publicly available import statistics from the GTA. It disagreed with the reason for not using GTA (i.e. the main source of imports being Laos), as Laos is a WTO-Member and, according to Unibon, ‘a recognized market economy country, which ensures that the import prices are free from market distortions and fully representative of undistorted international market prices’. It found that the complainant had not provided evidence to the contrary. It further submitted that the Thai domestic statistics do not distinguish between different types of coal (contrary to the GTA), that the import volumes from Laos were significant and that Laos is neighbouring Thailand.

(40)

In recital (166) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission recalled that the import prices of lignite coal as sourced from GTA were not the most suitable basis for the valuation of this factor of production since they originate almost exclusively from one neighbouring country, Laos. More specifically, the Commission underscored that given the specific physical characteristics of lignite, in particular its low calorific value and high moisture content, long-distance transportation is generally uneconomical, with the consequence that import statistics are likely to reflect limited cross-border transactions driven by geographic proximity in captive markets rather than prices formed under broader market conditions. Accordingly, the Commission considered that the high concentration of supply from one source raised concerns as to the reliability of the import price as the most suitable benchmark. Unibon did not adduce any concrete evidence capable of putting it into question. The Commission further considered that the data available at the Thai Energy Policy and Planning Office of the Ministry of Energy represented a more appropriate benchmark in the representative country. In this regard, the fact that Thai domestic statistics do not distinguish between different types of coal (contrary to the GTA), as alleged by Unibon, is not capable of disqualifying the use of such statistics. Indeed, these statistics also covered lignite coal and were as such sufficiently representative of the value of that factor of production in the representative country. Furthermore, as explained in recital (229) of the provisional Regulation, the Thai domestic statistics reported a value which was found to be in line with the prevalent price levels for lignite coal in Southeast Asia. Unibon did not address these findings and did not adduce any concrete evidence capable of putting them into question. The Commission dismissed the claim in the definitive disclosure.

(41)

In response to the definitive disclosure, Unibon submitted further elements to argue that GTA data should be used to establish the benchmark for lignite coal. In particular, Unibon challenged the Commission’s reasoning by arguing that the limitations relating to the physical characteristics of lignite and the resulting market conditions, which led the Commission to reject the Laos import benchmark, equally apply to the Thai domestic benchmark, as lignite is subject to the same transport and geographical constraints irrespective of whether it is traded domestically or imported. In other words, according to Unibon, the prices of lignite coal both in Laos and Thailand likely formed under the same undistorted market conditions.

(42)

The Commission considered that this argument, assessed together with the previously submitted claim that, unlike the Thai national statistics, the GTA data covering import prices from Laos related exclusively to significant volumes of lignite coal, led to the conclusion that the latter data constituted the most appropriate undistorted benchmark price for the lignite coal production factor consumed by Unibon. On that basis, the Commission accepted the claim and established the benchmark using the GTA import price data for lignite coal. The updated benchmark value, together with the updated benchmark mentioned in recital (37), had an impact in a decrease in Hubei Unibon’s dumping margin from 45,6 % to 39,8 %.

(43)

In recital (230) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission explained that it had used import prices for semicoke from the rest of the world to Thailand under HS code 2704 as benchmark. In response to the provisional disclosure, the TDF Group emphasised that it uses semicoke rather than coke in its operations and that average prices of the two products are much different, coke in the PRC being roughly twice as expensive as semicoke. It considered that semicoke is a China-specific product since, inter alia, according to the TDF Group, the PRC is the largest producer and exporter of semicoke. This had not been reflected in the benchmark, which, as it is a 4-digit code, would also include products very different from semicoke and excluded imports from the PRC. It therefore submitted that the Commission should use imports under commodity code 2704 00 10 . Moreover, these prices should be adjusted downwards to reflect the difference in price between semicoke and coaking coal as applicable on the PRC market.

(44)

In response to those comments, the complainant argued that the Chinese domestic semicoke prices cannot serve as a benchmark, as they are presumed to be distorted, that import prices from Malaysia and the PRC are in the same range and that semicoke is a China-specific product and thus a clear element of the production factor distortion in the PRC.

(45)

In recital (230) of the provisional Regulation and in the Table 1 therein, the Commission showed that it had used import prices for semicoke under HS Code 2704 . The Commission accepted the claim to use 2704 00 10 instead of 2704 since 2704 00 10 better reflects the price of semicoke used by the exporting producers. However, the Commission rejected the claim to make an adjustment to its GTA-source price for any claimed difference in price between semicoke and coaking coal applicable in the PRC, as prices in the PRC were found to be distorted and, therefore, were not considered an appropriate basis for price comparisons.

(46)

In response to the definitive disclosure, TDF Group clarified that it did not intend to propose Chinese prices as a benchmark, but rather to highlight the differences in chemical composition between the raw materials used to produce coke and semi-coke and the resulting differences in their undistorted prices. TDF Group requested the Commission to adjust the undistorted price for semicoke based on either the difference between the average Thai import price under HS code 2901 12 90 and the average international price of coking coal, or the difference between the average Indonesian import prices under HS codes 2901 12 10 and 2901 12 90.

(47)

In assessing the claim, the Commission noted that from the outset the HS codes referred to by TDF Group do not correspond to the raw material concerned. In any event, as explained in recital (45), the Commission used CN code 2704 00 10 as the basis for establishing the benchmark for semicoke. This was the code reported by TDF in its questionnaire reply and the Commission considered it appropriate for establishing the semicoke benchmark applicable to TDF. During the verification visit, TDF did not raise any concerns regarding the use of this code, propose any alternative code or identify any adjustments that would have warranted further examination of the semicoke consumption. TDF raised this issue only in its comments on the provisional Regulation and submitted supporting documentation at that stage, when the Commission had limited possibilities to verify the new information against the company’s underlying records and consumption data. The Commission therefore considers that this information cannot provide a sufficient basis for revising the benchmark. On that basis, the Commission rejected the claim.

(48)

In recitals (224) to (227) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission explained the methodology for collecting prices for electricity in Thailand, with on-peak/off-peak consumption and taking into account various fixed charges. All data was collected from the Metropolitan Electricity Authority of Thailand.

(49)

In response to the provisional disclosure, Unibon took issue with the partition by the Commission of peak and off-peak electricity rates (as presented in recitals (224) to (226) of the provisional Regulation). These comments were submitted in a sensitive version containing confidential business information. The Commission accordingly addressed and rejected Unibon’s claim in an individual disclosure.

(50)

In response to the provisional disclosure, the TDF Group rejected the distribution of consumption between on-peak and off-peak hours, with 69,19 % of consumption allocated to on-peak hours. It claimed that on-peak hours should be limited to 38,69 % of all hours, as used in a recent anti-dumping investigation against inter alia the PRC (8).

(51)

The Commission, however, used the electricity consumption categories provided by the company itself in its questionnaire reply, with flat, peak and high-peak categories being ‘high-peak’. The Commission considered that the flat electricity consumption category was closer to on-peak than off-peak, e.g. the Hunan province grid considers ‘flat’ categories hours to be 7-11, 14-18 (9) which indeed fell mostly within the Thai benchmark for on-peak category 9-22. On this basis, the Commission dismissed the claim since it considered that the on-peak category, including the flat category, should fall under the corresponding on-peak category in Thailand. Accordingly, since in the present instance the Commission had access to company specific consumption data, it saw no reason to apply the alternative method referred to in the recent investigation regarding the PRC, referred to by TDF Group.

(52)

In the absence of any additional comments on the factors of production – the use of benchmarks from the representative country, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (198) to (231) of the provisional Regulation.

(53)

In the absence of comments to the calculation of the normal value, the conclusions in recitals (239) to (244) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(54)

In the absence of comments to the establishment of an export price, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (245) to (246) of the provisional Regulation.

(55)

In the absence of comments to the comparison between the normal value and the export price, and any adjustments made thereto, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (247) to (251) of the provisional Regulation.

(56)

As described in recitals (35) to (51), following claims from interested parties, the Commission revised the dumping margin for the TDF Group.

(57)

The definitive dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the cost, insurance and freight (CIF) Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

(58)

In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (260) to (262) of the provisional Regulation.

(59)

In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (263) to (272) of the provisional Regulation.

(60)

Following provisional disclosure, the Italian PET Spunbond users claimed that the injury analysis did not accurately reflect the competitive conditions in the Union because the investigation also covered imports which are to be incorporated into products destined for export outside the Union. The Commission should have conducted a segmented assessment distinguishing between EU-market-oriented and export-oriented importers/users, including a separate quantification of the economic impact of the proposed measures on each category.

(61)

As explained in recitals (20) to (23) above, these imports constitute part of the Union consumption and, as such, their effects on the loss of sales and market share of the Union industry contribute to the injury of the latter. The claim was therefore rejected. Moreover, PET Spunbond is one and the same product sharing the same basic physical, chemical and technical characteristics, regardless of whether it is directly sold on the EU market or it is used to produce bituminous membranes that are later exported. As explained in recital (27) of the provisional Regulation, PET Spunbond is essentially used as a carrier for waterproofing material (i.e. roofing) in the construction industry. In that sense, PET Spunbond used for domestic consumption and PET Spunbond incorporated into bituminous membranes for export are interchangeable as a product. Therefore, segmentation and separate injury analysis of downstream PET Spunbond users is not justified.

(62)

Following definitive disclosure, the Italian PET Spunbond users repeated their claim that the Commission should have carried out a separate assessment of injury at downstream level. They alleged that the Commission failed to take into consideration the economic distinction and competitive impact of PET Spunbond incorporated into products that are exported by the users to third countries outside of the EU. In both cases PET Spunbond has the same characteristics, but they argued that the competitive and economic impact is different. The Italian PET Spunbond users stated that they did not contest that PET Spunbond constitutes the same physical product, but rather asked to recognise that the same product may be used in economically distinct circumstances, giving rise to different competitive effects. As set out in recital (61) above, however, there is no requirement to subdivide the injury analysis according to whether importers/users are EU-market-oriented or export-oriented. There is no evidence of distinct, non-overlapping market for PET Spunbond used for export oriented downstream manufacturers. Thus, neither segmentation nor a separate injury analysis for downstream PET Spunbond users was justified.

(63)

CCCT and the TDF Group argued that the percentage increase in import volumes over the period considered should be attributed to the extremely low base at the beginning of the period considered. They noted that the evolution of Chinese import volumes closely tracked and was largely explained by changes in the overall Union consumption. They claimed that, although the market share of Chinese imports increased over the period considered, this increase could not be regarded as significant, and Chinese imports continuously remained a small proportion compared with the Union industry’s dominant position.

(64)

The data on record as shown in Tables 2 and 3 of the provisional Regulation directly contradict these claims. In the period considered, Union consumption increased by [8 700–10 600 tonnes] which corresponded to a 15 % increase, whereas Chinese imports increased by [14 200–17 300 tonnes] which corresponded to a 417 % increase. This surge in imports, which far outpaced the increase in consumption, caused the drastic increase in the Chinese market share by 352 % over the period considered. The observation that the increase in Chinese imports outpaced the increase in consumption also held true for the period of 2023 to 2024 when Union consumption increased by 40 % whereas Chinese imports increased by 191 %. Finally, the claim that the Union industry’s dominant position has not eroded as an increase of market share from 6 % to 26 % was not significant, was clearly contradicted by the data on record. The verified injury data showed that due to the presence of the Chinese dumped imports, the Union industry could not set a profitable price, and sold below its cost of manufacturing, which caused loss of profitability. The claim was therefore rejected.

(65)

With regard to import prices, CCCT argued that the Commission’s assessment of the evolution of Chinese imports in the provisional Regulation did not meet the standard of positive evidence and objective examination required by law. First, because the Commission’s analysis of price undercutting is confined to the investigation period and does not examine how prices evolved throughout the full period considered. Second, CCCT submitted that the Commission’s analysis of alleged price depression is incomplete and not supported by the evidence on record and that it failed to consider to what extent Chinese prices had any explanatory force for the Union industry’s alleged inability to raise its prices over the period considered. CCCT further argued that a comparison of the evolution of Chinese import prices and the Union industry’s profitability contradicts the Commission’s assertions about price depression.

(66)

Regarding the claim that the Commission’s analysis is mostly based on the changes in investigation period, the Commission recalled that prices decreased by more than 20 % over the period considered. Taken together with the significant increase of Chinese import volumes (+400 % over the period considered), it would clearly manifest a significant change in competitive conditions in the Union market during the entire period considered, rather than a purely demand-driven increase. As for market share, the share of Chinese imports was small compared with the Union industry market in 2022, but the market share of producers from the PRC rose significantly in recent years, from 6 % in 2022 to 26 % in 2024. These figures did not support but rather contradicted the claim that Chinese imports remained only a small proportion of the Union market. Although CCCT argued that the large increase in import volume was due to the low base of import levels at the beginning of period considered (10), the Commission also considered other injury indicators confirming injury to the Union industry, such as declining sales prices, declining profitability, and decreasing market share for Union producers.

(67)

Regarding the alleged lack of analysis of price undercutting, the comparison of the evidence set out in Tables 4 and 8 of the provisional Regulation showed the sustained and significant price differential between Chinese imports and Union industry production costs and explained why the Union industry was unable to raise its prices. Moreover, in recital (281) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission referred to the sales prices in Table 8 of the provisional Regulation, and compared those to the import prices throughout the period considered, when stating that ‘the significant price pressure caused by the low-priced dumped imports from the Chinese exporting producers, the Union industry reduced their average unit sales price in the Union by 21 % in the period considered’.

(68)

CCCT also submitted that Chinese imports were not a decisive factor in the loss of profitability and that the Commission’s analysis of price depression was therefore incomplete. CCCT argued that the Union industry’s profitability declined continuously throughout the entire period considered. By contrast, Chinese import prices fell in 2023 but then increased in both 2024 and the investigation period, which was not reflected in the profitability of the Union industry.

(69)

As explained in recital (67) above, there was a significant and sustained price differential between Chinese imports and Union products over the whole period considered, which forced the Union industry to reduce its prices to levels significantly more than the decrease in cost of production, which in turn led to a loss of profitability. The effect was particularly visible in the period 2024 to the investigation period. In 2024, costs of production were approximately 4 % below Union prices, resulting in the modest profitability as shown in Table 11 of the provisional Regulation. In the investigation period, to remain profitable, Union industry should have increased their prices in relation to 2024 by 2 % in line with the increase in costs (Table 8 of the provisional Regulation). Instead, because Chinese imports – despite the moderate increase of import prices – continued to undercut Union prices by more than 26 % (recital (280) of the provisional Regulation), forcing the Union industry to keep the same prices as in 2024 which resulted in losses. Thus, the decrease of profitability of the Union industry, despite the temporary increase in Chinese import prices, was still caused by the presence of dumped Chinese imports. The claim was thus rejected.

(70)

SITEB argued that one of the complainants had production activities in the PRC, which means that the Chinese economic environment causing injury may also benefit the complainant.

(71)

Regarding the presence of one of the complainants in the PRC, the Commission noted that this was examined during the investigation. The Chinese production activity of the Union producer was not related to the product under investigation. Moreover, even if the product was produced in the PRC and then exported to the Union, it would still be subject to duties.

(72)

In the absence of other comments, recitals (273) to (281) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed.

(73)

In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (282) and (283) of the provisional Regulation.

(74)

The CCCT disagreed that the Union industry suffered material injury, arguing that the indicators must be viewed in a broader market context. It said the fall in production reflected lower Union consumption between 2022 and 2023, the reduction in capacity was a response to weaker demand, and stable or improved capacity utilisation did not support a finding of injury.

(75)

The Commission rebutted the claim because it was not reflected in injury indicators. First, the decline in production and the reduction in production capacity correlate with increased imports from the PRC and therefore did not support the CCCT’s statement that the decline in production was primarily driven by a contraction in Union consumption, which over the period considered increased by 15 %. Capacity utilisation increased slightly, except for 2023, when it declined due to changes in the Union industry’s production organisation.

(76)

Following definitive disclosure, the CCCT maintained its position that the increase in capacity utilisation from 78 % in 2022 to 81 % in the investigation period shows that the Union industry did not suffer injury from increased imports from China. As set out in recital (286) of the provisional Regulation, this apparent increase in capacity utilisation was caused by the termination of a tolling agreement between 2022 and 2023, which ended because of the unfavourable market situation, and the increasing presence of low-price imports. The termination of the said tolling agreement caused a decrease in capacity and therefore higher capacity utilisation. The Commission considered that the termination of the tolling agreement occurred in the context of unfavourable market conditions and was therefore indirectly linked to the presence of Chinese imports on the Union market. Although this change was only indirectly caused by Chinese imports, the consequent reduction in capacity entailed a rise of the utilisation rate over the period considered, and did not alter the key element demonstrating injury, namely the production decrease over the same period.

(77)

Therefore, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (284) to (286) of the provisional Regulation.

(78)

The CCCT claimed that the Commission’s findings on sales volume and market share of the Union industry overlooked developments across the full period considered and the effect of changes in Union demand. It argued that Chinese import sales largely tracked Union consumption, and that the drop in market share from 86 % in 2022 to 63 % in 2024, with a partial recovery to 67 % in the investigation period, did not by itself show injury caused by Chinese imports.

(79)

As explained in recital (288) of the provisional Regulation, in the period considered, the market expanded by 15 % but Union industry sales declined by 10 %. As also explained in recital (64) above, this was due to the increased presence in the Union market of low-priced Chinese imports. In volume terms, Union consumption increased by approximately 10 000 tonnes During the period considered, imports from the PRC grew from [3 400–4 200] tonnes to [17 600–21 500] tonnes, while Union industry sales decreased from [50 000–60 000] tonnes to [45 000–54 000] tonnes. This meant that the increase in Union consumption was largely absorbed by the growing Chinese exports, that also captured a significant part of the Union market share held by the Union industry. The reduction in sales naturally eroded the profitability of the Union industry, as well as its competitiveness since the fixed costs of production were distributed over a smaller sales volume. Thus, the loss of sales, and consequently market share, directly signal injury of the Union industry suffered due to Chinese imports.

(80)

Therefore, Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (287) to (289) of the provisional Regulation.

(81)

In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recital (290) of the provisional Regulation.

(82)

The CCCT claimed that employment rates and productivity did not point to injury. The Commission, however, already set out in the provisional Regulation that the Union industry experienced a small decrease in employment of 2 % over the period considered. The Union industry decision was to retain its employees even in 2023, when production declined sharply due to a decline in consumption, as they consider making employees redundant a last resort. The Commission also noted that as set out in Article 3(3) and (5) of the basic Regulation ‘no one or more of those factors can necessarily give decisive guidance’, which meant that injury was determined based on all factors examined, without that requiring that all factors necessarily showed injury for injury to be proven.

(83)

In their comments to the definitive disclosure, CCCT repeated the same claim, without providing any further arguments or evidence.

(84)

In the absence of any other comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (291) to (293) of the provisional Regulation.

(85)

In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (294) and (295) of the provisional Regulation.

(86)

The Italian PET Spunbond users claimed that the fact that the Union industry was comprised of two companies distorted the prices. However, they provided no evidence to support their claim and therefore their claim was rejected.

(87)

In their submission following definitive disclosure, CCCT argued that the decline of 21 % in the sales prices of the Union industry did not show injury caused by Chinese imports. In particular, while CCCT acknowledged that prices fell, they claimed that the main decrease occurred between 2023 and 2024, when Chinese import prices rose. However, although Chinese import prices increased slightly between 2023 and 2024 (+6 %), they still remained about 40 % lower than Union industry prices and their volume more than doubled, which put an even greater pressure on the Union industry. It is also worth to mention that, as it can be observed from recitals (277) and (296) of the provisional Regulation, import prices were much lower than the unit cost of production of the Union industry. CCCT also suggested that the fall in Union prices between 2022 and 2023 may be linked to lower Union consumption. In this regard, the Commission noted however that, over the whole period considered, consumption rose by 15 %. Therefore, price competition, rather than a fall in consumption, was the cause of price depression. Thus, these claims were rejected.

(88)

In the absence of any other comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (296) to (298) of the provisional Regulation.

(89)

The CCCT claimed that the Commission failed to analyse the evolution of labour costs and their impact on the Union industry. The CCCT noted that labour costs remained broadly stable between 2022 and 2023 and then rose in 2024 and during the investigation period which according to the CCCT were due to inflation and growing seniority. The Commission analysed the evolution of labour costs in recitals (299) and (300) of the provisional Regulation. Regarding their impact, labour costs are part of the total costs of production which the Commission analysed in recital (298) of the provisional Regulation. Thus, the claim was rejected.

(90)

In the absence of any other comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (299) to (300) of the provisional Regulation.

(91)

In terms of inventories, the CCCT submitted that the low levels remain modest in relative terms and cannot be regarded as evidence of a ‘significant imbalance’ or material injury. They also claimed that the reason for the increase in inventory is the decline in consumption and exports.

(92)

Regarding this claim, the Commission underlined that the decrease in exports was in the range of 1 200 tonnes in the period considered, whereas the decrease in Union sales was almost five times higher. Therefore, the increase in stocks was more likely to be caused by the larger loss in the Union market. Secondly, the significant decrease in consumption between 2022 to 2023 (–11 %) did not cause an increase in inventory. On the other hand, between 2024 and the investigation period, consumption decreased by 8 % and stocks increased by 43 %, which clearly showed that a factor other than consumption, i.e. the dumped imports caused the increase in stocks. Another point to note was that the overall trend indicates an increase in consumption over the period considered, rather than a decrease. Considering all of the above, the Commission did not find that any correlation between the increase of inventory and the Union consumption developments.

(93)

In their comments to the definitive disclosure, the CCCT reiterated their claim that the relatively small increase in inventories fails to provide evidence of injury. CCCT argued that inventory levels of approximately 10 % of annual production are not unusual in an industry serving project-based downstream customers such as roofing and waterproofing, where order patterns are seasonal and linked to construction cycles. Firstly, the CCCT did not provide any evidence regarding the fact that inventories at the level of 10 % of annual production are normal and usual. Secondly, an inventory level of 10 % in the investigation period appears comparatively high in light of the data collected for 2022, 2023 and 2024, which showed levels of 5,7 %, 5,8 % and 6,7 %, respectively (11). Growing inventories, when assessed together with all the other parameters as required by Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, clearly confirmed the existence of injury.

(94)

The Commission therefore rejected the claims and confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (301) to (303) of the provisional Regulation.

(95)

In their submission, the CCCT argued that the Commission did not adequately explain how Chinese imports caused the deterioration in profitability, cash flow, investments, and return on investment. It also argued that the Union industry’s financial results worsened most between 2024 and the investigation period, when Chinese import volumes fell and prices rose, and that the small overall decline in investment was driven mainly by the Union industry’s own strategic choices rather than imports from the PRC.

(96)

The Commission rebutted this argument, noting that the Union industry’s injury did not begin only in 2024. Profitability fell from around 15–16,5 % in 2022 to between –0,5 % and –1,5 % in the investigation period, while the return on investment declined from 81 % to –6 % over the same period in line with the increase of Chinese imports. It is true that there was a moderate decrease in imports and increase in prices from the PRC between 2024 and the investigation period. However, these circumstances were linked to geopolitical disruptions, including the Red Sea crisis and disruption of the international maritime transport routs rather than to an improvement in market conditions. Indeed, decreasing import quantities from the PRC did not have positive impact on the profitability of the Union’s industry that further decreased in the investigation period due to the continued presence of low-priced Chinese imports as explained in recital (68) above.

(97)

Regarding investments, Chinese imports undercut the Union industry, decreased its sales and squeezed profit margins, leading to falling profitability, and decreased cash generation. In such situation, the Commission concluded that imports constrained the industry’s ability or willingness to invest, with only absolutely necessary investments being realised, such as maintenance and replacements of equipment that is end of life. Therefore, data on profitability, cash flow, investment, and return on investment completed the injurious picture of the Union industry.

(98)

In their comments following definitive disclosure, CCCT reiterated its claims that the relatively stable level of investments suggested that the injury suffered by the Union industry is limited. More specifically, CCCT submitted two sets of arguments. Firstly, the CCCT only focused on 2023 when investments increased by 18 % compared to 2022. However, CCCT ignored subsequent developments, as in 2024 investment decreased by 45 % compared to 2022, and the average of the three years (2023, 2024, IP) was still 11 % below the 2022 levels.

(99)

Secondly, according to the CCCT, the fact that the Union industry continued to invest at comparable levels throughout the period – with an increase in 2023 despite the alleged import pressure – suggests that its financial difficulties were not of the magnitude claimed. They further noted that the Commission’s classification of the investment expenses as ‘necessary’ relies on the fact that these investments were stable and non-elastic. The Commission noted that the existence of investments does not mean that the Union industry did not suffer injury. Indeed, the investments made by the Union industry were unavoidable, as they arose partly from regulatory requirements concerning the environmental impact of the production process and partly from the need to maintain existing machinery. More specifically, as stated in recital (307) of the provisional Regulation these investments, as verified by the Commission, concerned mostly maintenance and compliance with legal obligations, which explains the relative stability and inelasticity despite the worsening of the financial situation which was amply demonstrated by the negative return on investment. Lastly, CCCT did not substantiate in any way that the investments were unnecessary.

(100)

The Commission thus maintained its conclusions set out in recitals (304) to (308) of the provisional Regulation.

(101)

In the absence of other comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (309) to (314) of the provisional Regulation.

(102)

As noted in recitals (20) and (22) above, four Italian PET Spunbond users claimed that the effects of Chinese imports on injury were exaggerated and should be reassessed because they took into account PET Spunbond imports that were incorporated into exported downstream products.

(103)

As explained in recitals (21) and (23) above, these imports constituted part of the Union market and their effects on the loss of sales and market share contributed to the injury of the Union Industry. Additionaly, because PET Spunbond incorporated in bituminous membranes destined for domestic sale and PET Spunbond incorporated into bituminous membranes destined for export constitute the same interchangeable product, there was no basis for segmenting the market or conducting a separate injury analysis for downstream PET Spunbond users. The claim was therefore rejected.

(104)

The CCCT also commented that the Commission has not proven that the increase of Chinese imports at reduced prices have caused the decline of Union industry. The link between imports and injury was addressed in Section 4.3 above and in particular recital (64) thereof.

(105)

Following definitive disclosure, CCCT and Italian PET Spunbond users repeated their claims that the Commission had not adequately demonstrated the causal link between Chinese imports and the injury to the Union industry, focusing on the differences between 2024 and the investigation period, when Chinese imports and market share fell slightly but the injury to the Union industry worsened. As explained in Section 4.3 above, and in particular recital (60), the presence of Chinese imports significantly undercutting the EU production throughout the period considered, and still in the investigation period, forced the Union industry to sell at prices equal to its production costs, which in turn led to the marked deterioration in its profitability. Thus, regardless of fluctuations, the presence of dumped Chinese imports was the main cause of the Union industry’s injury.

(106)

In the absence of any other comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (316) to (320) of the provisional Regulation.

(107)

In their submission, the CCCT commented that the Commission did not sufficiently examine factors other than the dumped imports. According to the CCCT, other factors affected the material injury suffered by the Union industry, namely imports from Türkiye.

(108)

Regarding the alleged impact of imports from Türkiye, the Commission examined their effect. The information gathered showed that import prices from Türkiye were significantly higher than Chinese import prices, and that the volume and market share of Turkish exporters remained stable over the period considered. This indicates that these imports did not have a major impact on the material injury suffered by the EU industry.

(109)

Italian PET Spunbond users claimed that the injurious situation of the Union industry might have been distorted by the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the deterioration in the economic performance of the Union industry during the injury period should therefore have been assessed within this broader macroeconomic context. The main impact of the conflict was linked to energy prices and consequently production costs. As set out in recital (319) of the provisional Regulation there was a 10 % decrease in costs during the period considered from the high cost caused by the energy crisis of 2022. Despite this very considerable decrease, the injury of Union industry deepened in line with the increase of Chinese imports. Therefore, energy costs did not attenuate the genuine and substantial causal link between Chinese imports and the deterioration of the Union industry’s sales, profitability, and market share. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

(110)

Following definitive disclosure, the Italian PET Spunbond users further argued that the dumped imports were not the main cause of injury. They claimed that the negative impact of the geopolitical situation cannot be reduced to higher energy prices alone. In their view, the Red Sea crisis, increased transport costs and also inflation and higher financing costs affected sourcing conditions and supply chains and could have, therefore, contributed to the injury. Secondly, the Italian PET Spunbond users argued that a lack of innovation by the Union industry led the downstream industry to source from China. In a highly concentrated market dominated by two capital groups, the incentive to invest is minimal and therefore, the Italian PET Spunbond users submitted that the absence of innovation should also be examined as another factor contributing to the injury.

(111)

The Italian users’ claim that geopolitical disruptions caused the injury suffered by the Union industry, through factors other than the increased energy costs examined and addressed in recital (109) above, is unfounded. Italian users did not provide any corroborating evidence that factors like the Red Sea crisis, transportation costs, inflation or rising financing costs contributed to the Union industry’s injury. Furthermore, the Commission considers that the alleged impact of geopolitical disruptions, particularly the Red Sea crisis from late 2023 onwards, is contradicted by the analysis of unit production costs. As set out in recital (298) of the provisional Regulation, the unit production costs of the Union producers fell by 10 % between 2022 and the investigation period, and actually decreased by 6 % between 2023 and the investigation period, which covers the period of the Red Sea crisis. At the same time, despite the reduction of costs, the Union industry injury deepened due to the Chinese imports’ causing the combined loss of market share, production and price depression, as set out in recital (319) of the provisional Regulation. Therefore, the impact of the Red Sea crisis did not attenuate the genuine and substantial causal link between the Chinese imports and the Union industry’s injury and this claim was rejected.

(112)

Regarding the claims about lack of innovation, the Commission verified the costs of investments, research and development, and innovation when establishing the target profit. As stated in recital (334) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission examined the companies’ internal records concerning investment plans, management decisions and financial statements, and confirmed the expenses allocated to innovation. The investigation showed that investments, R&D and innovation during the period considered would have been higher if the producers had not faced the injurious effects of dumping. Therefore, the claim that a lack of innovation was the main cause of the injury was rejected.

(113)

The Commission thus confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (321) to (323) of the provisional Regulation.

(114)

The CCCT claimed that the declining export performance of the Union industry and its low export performance due to its reliance on the domestic market should not be disregarded as a factor affecting the injury situation of the Union industry.

(115)

As stated in the provisional Regulation, the declining export performance of the Union industry may have contributed to injury, but it did not attenuate the genuine and substantial causal link between Chinese dumped imports and injury to the Union industry, given its limited impact considering the export volume and value represented less than 10 % of total Union industry turnover. Secondly, the Commission highlighted that only sales made on the Union market were taken into consideration for the calculation of profitability data, so these data were not influenced by export performance.

(116)

The Commission, therefore, confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (324) and (325) of the provisional Regulation.

(117)

At the provisional stage of the investigation, the Commission distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the dumped imports.

(118)

The Commission confirmed its provisional conclusion of recitals (326) to (329) of the provisional Regulation, that the imports from third countries (other than the PRC), and export performance of the Union industry did not weaken the genuine and substantial causal link between dumped Chinese imports and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(119)

On the basis of the above, the Commission upheld its provisional conclusion that the dumped imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry and that the other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury of the Union industry.

(120)

Following provisional disclosure, certain interested parties (the CCCT and General Membrane S.p.A., Casali Industria Chimica e Bituminosa S.p.A., Vetroasfalto S.p.A. and Valli Zabban S.p.A.) argued that the Commission’s non-injurious price calculation was insufficiently explained and did not meet the WTO positive-evidence standard and ‘objective examination’ that requires the investigating authority to assess all relevant data without predetermination. They further argued that the Commission failed to justify the seven-year reference period for profitability, to disclose key profitability data in relation to project-related expense data taken as reference for R&D and innovation (‘IRI’), to explain the 0–27 EUR per tonne future-cost adjustment or to clarify the type-by-type adjustments made.

(121)

The CCCT further argued that the Commission did not disclose IRI projects, actual amounts, and information needed to calculate the 2,26 % margin.

(122)

In this regard, the Commission noted that the period of 2015-2021 was taken as a reference period to reflect the normal profitability of the Union industry before it faced injurious effects due to the presence of dumped imports in the Union market. The Commission could not disclose the specific figures on profitability of the Union industry because of the confidentiality of this information, but, nevertheless, provided below meaningful non-confidential ranges of the weighted average profitability per year of the Union industry.

(123)

The Commission was not able to disclose specific data in relation to project expenses, investment plans, management decisions and financial statements without disclosing business secrets of the Union industry. The future costs included in ‘the target price’ regarding IRI expenses and the adjustment for future costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements and ILO Conventions are stemming from the verified information of the questionnaire replies of the Union producers. In particular, the amount of IRI of 2,26 % was calculated as a difference between the actual level of IRI in the investigation period and the level it could have reached under normal conditions of competition (in the period considered). It was expressed as a percentage of turnover and added to the basic profit. Compliance costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements and ILO Conventions were based on the evidence available in the verified questionnaire reply of the Union producers and includes, among others, the purchase of pollutant emission allowance and depreciation related to environmental and social investments.

(124)

Therefore, the claims related to failure of disclosure obligations and to the violation of positive evidence principle concerning the determination of the non-injurious price were rejected.

(125)

In their submission following definitive disclosure the CCCT and Italian PET Spunbond users requested the Commission to explain the reasons for choosing a seven year period to determine a target profit and to explain why 2021 showed an exceptional level of profit, and if specific exceptional conditions applied, to exclude it from the calculation of the profitability. The Italian PET Spunbond users also claimed that the target profit was inflated by the duopolistic situation of the Union producers which meant that it was not achieved under normal conditions of competition as required by Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation.

(126)

The Commission notes that Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation does not prescribe a specific period of time for the establishment of the profit margin. Therefore, the Commission enjoys discretion in the definition of the period to be taken into consideration. The said provision provides that the target profit shall be established taking into account factors such as the level of profits before increase in imports from the country under investigation, the profitability needed to recover full costs and investments, R&D and innovation, and the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition. Against this background, the Commission considered that, as shown in the table presented in recital (122), the period prior to the substantial entry of Chinese imports in the Union market (12) was characterised by significant fluctuations in profitability. The Commission therefore considered it appropriate to extend the reference period for the establishment of the target profit to seven years. The Commission noted that the profitability table presented in recital (122) above thus captures both periods of high profitability (such as 2016, 2017 and 2021) and of low profitability (such as 2019). In other words, the average of the period chosen was intended to avoid extremes and to very conservatively reflect both the higher and lower ends of the profitability range. Accordingly, the reference period for profitability encompasses both the COVID-19 crisis and the subsequent recovery. With respect to year 2021, the profitability observed therein is in line with the values observed in 2016 and 2017. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Commission confirmed the 9,16 % basic profit presented in recitals (333) and (334) of the provisional Regulation and used in the target profit calculations. Such basic profit conservatively reflects the weighted average historical profitability of the Union industry from 2015 to 2021 and allows for cost recovery.

(127)

Furthermore, the Commission considered that the Italian PET Spunbond users did not provide any concrete evidence of anti-competitive behaviour of the two Union producers in support of their claim of regarding the duopolistic situation of the Union producers. In any case the Commission selected the period from 2015 to 2021, in view of the fact that the conditions of competition were considered normal as they were not affected by the dumped imports in that period.

(128)

In view of the above these claims were rejected. In the absence of any other comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recital (330) to (339) of the provisional Regulation. Therefore, the final underselling margin for the cooperating exporting producers and of all other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China is as follows:

(129)

Following the above assessment, and given that the level of dumping does not exceed the level of injury, definitive anti-dumping duties should be set at the level of the dumping margins, as indicated in recital (154) below, in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation.

(130)

As noted in recital (16) of the provisional Regulation, the Union industry comprises of the three complainants, which cooperated fully in the investigation and expressed their interest in the imposition of measures.

(131)

Therefore, the Commission upheld its conclusion of the recital (344) of the provisional Regulation that the measures would be in the interest of the Union industry.

(132)

After provisional disclosure, Matco (user of PET Spundbond), SITEB, the Italian PET Spundbond users and the CCCT submitted comments highlighting the negative effect of the imposition of the measures on downstream industries. It is important to note that the users’ position was not uniform, and that the Italian PET Spunbond users comments reflected the specific situation of export-oriented users. It is recalled that at provisional stage, the Polish Association of Roofing and Waterproofing Solutions expressed support for the measures.

(133)

The users claimed that imposition of the measures in the long term would restrict the choices available to the downstream market, reduce security of supply and increase the market share of the Union industry that already enjoys a dominant position in the Union market. They also claimed that the measures will harm the Union downstream industry’s capacity to export processed product for which the major component is high-quality Chinese PET Spunbond.

(134)

All users claimed that imposing definitive duties at the provisional levels would effectively exclude Chinese PET Spunbond imports from the Union market, restricting choices for downstream users and importers. Italian PET Spunbond users and SITEB argued that Chinese imports are characterised by technological differences in terms of dimensional consistency, weight uniformity and tensile strength. Italian PET Spunbond users claimed that the decision to source from the PRC was not driven by price, but rather by the need to operate with much higher quality standards which the Union industry is not able to satisfy.

(135)

As noted in recitals (21) to (23) above, the interested parties did not substantiate their claims with evidence showing that Chinese imports differ materially in product quality or technical performance from Union industry products. Neither did they provide evidence regarding differences of physical and technical characteristics of the PET Spunbond for internal consumption on the Union market and for export outside of the Union, nor regarding the characteristics or innovations the Union industry is unable to provide. Moreover, the imposition of measures will not restrict access to Chinese imports, it only adjusts the price to a fair level. Therefore, the claim that the imposition of measures would restrict the users choices of supply was rejected. Since no evidence was provided regarding the Chinese imports’ special qualities or other characteristics, a request for an end-use exemption for the export-oriented industries was also rejected as unsubstantiated.

(136)

Regarding security of supply and the related concern the users raised about whether Turkish producers have sufficient capacity to meet demand if Chinese imports are reduced, the Commission reiterated its argument that the Union industry is capable of supplying adequate quantities of PET Spunbond for Union consumption. Although the Union industry’s production volumes decreased substantially over the period considered due to the dumped imports from the PRC, the Commission observed that the Union industry underutilised its production capacity. A large part of the imports from the PRC could therefore be absorbed by the Union industry. In fact, as shown in Tables 2 and 5 of the provisional Regulation, the Union industry could essentially supply the entire Union demand with existing capacities.

(137)

The Commission also reiterated its argument from the provisional Regulation (recital 351) that PET Spunbond was imported from other third countries. These imports from third countries could represent a reliable source of PET Spunbond, which did not reconcile with arguments of limited sources of supply of the product under investigation. Third countries, such as Türkiye, had a limited presence in the Union market compared to the PRC during the investigation period. The Commission noted that imports from Türkiye were priced at the lower end of Union industry prices and significantly higher than Chinese imports. This suggested that other non-European PET Spunbond producers were also unable to compete with the prices offered by exporting producers from the PRC but could regain market share once fair trade would be ensured. Indeed, following the imposition of the provisional measures, a moderate increase in imports from third countries into the Union has already been observed on the basis of the most recent available data. Finally, the Commission also recalled that the purpose of anti-dumping measures is not to stop imports of the product concerned, but to restore fair competition. The continued presence of imports from the PRC and other third countries would prevent the Union industry from excessively increasing prices, contrary to the CCCT’s claim in its submission.

(138)

The Commission noted that the CCCT and Italian PET Spundbond users had not provided any actual evidence to support their claims of anti-competitive behaviour or referred to any proceedings examining such behaviour of the Union industry. Contrary to the claim of interested parties that preserving the Chinese imports would avoid concentration of imports and secure supply, recent geopolitical crises show that the disappearance of Union industry leaves downstream users and the Union as a whole exposed to every disturbance in the shipment of goods (e.g. Suez canal blockage). In the case of PET Spunbond, Chinese imports rose very quickly from 6 % to 26 % of market share over just the four years of the period considered. If no measures were to be imposed, and given the price advantage that Chinese imports benefit from, the market would increasingly become dependent on Chinese imports, which would expose users and downstream industries to supply risks. In the case that Union industry were to cease operations, a likely event due to the dire situation of the Union industry, the users would become almost fully dependent on Chinese imports and vulnerable to supply chain disruptions.

(139)

The users also disputed the Commission’s conclusion that the effect of duties on users would be minimal due to the limited contribution of PET Spunbond to the final product’s cost. Instead, users claimed that the measures would have a substantial detrimental impact on the competitiveness of users in export markets. According to the Italian users, the investigation was asymmetrical because it only considered the Union industry but failed to consider the injury that would be caused to Italian PET Spunbond users due to the impact on their exports competitiveness. They claimed that the measures aim to protect jobs within the Union producers while placing at risk more jobs deriving from Italian downstream export-oriented sector. However, they did not challenge the Commission’s conclusions that the measures would have minimal impact on the internal market and instead sought to dispute the conclusions regarding the impact on exports. Furthermore, the users provided neither actual evidence regarding their cost structure, nor any actual evidence to support the claim that measures would significantly impact their export sales, nor any estimation of the impact of the measures on their profitability. They also failed to admit that the impact of the measures on exports could be mitigated by the use of special customs procedures, such as inward processing, an issue litigated by the General Court (13). Therefore, claims that measures would harm users through lack of choice, supply problems, dominant position and price setting by the Union industry and impact on profits on downstream users were rejected.

(140)

Lastly, the Italian PET Spunbond users requested that the Commission sets the duration of the measures to three years and that it should perform an interim review a year after imposition. Regarding the initiation of an interim review, the Commission noted that based on the findings of the investigation, it was appropriate to impose measures for five years and that the PET Spunbond users can bring an interim review request after one year has elapsed provided that sufficient evidence is provided to the Commission, that circumstances have changed.

(141)

In their submission following definitive disclosure, Italian PET Spundbond users further developed their arguments from the provisional stage alleging an unbalanced assessment of the downstream market in the injury assessment, the irreplaceable character of PET Spundbond sourced from China due to its quality, relevant post-IP developments, excessive level of measures in terms of duties and the timing of the measures,

(142)

The Italian PET Spunbond users reiterated their argument that the Union interest assessment fails to carry out the balancing exercise required by Article 21(1) of the basic Regulation, because it allegedly does not take into account the position of the downstream market. They supported this claim by arguing that users employing PET Spunbond in waterproofing membranes destined for export to third countries would face anti-dumping duties of almost 50 % on a key production input and would therefore have to compete, in those same export markets, with manufacturers whose equivalent inputs are not subject to Union anti-dumping duties. The Italian PET Spundbond users also claimed that the Commission assessed the impact on employment for the Union producers but did not assess the employment impact on downstream users. Meanwhile if measures were imposed at proposed level, this would mean loss of 600 jobs. The users argued that the Commission may not decline to examine those factors solely because they were not provided by means of questionnaire replies.

(143)

Also, the Italian PET Spunbond users disagreed with the Commission’s statement that the EU industry is capable in replacing the supply of the product originating in China. Sourcing from other countries like Türkiye would not be an option either because of quality concerns. Chinese product is allegedly of a higher quality in relation to the product produced in the EU and Türkiye. The Italian PET Spunbond users argued without submitting supporting evidence that the particular grades of PET Spunbond produced by the Chinese exporters, in the quantities required, with the technical characteristics (dimensional consistency, weight uniformity, tensile strength) and reliability are impossible to be replaced. PET Spunbond users further claimed that market conditions that materialised after the investigation period should be taken into consideration in the injury analysis as it was done to evaluate the Union industry injury. These factors adversely affecting downstream users are freight cost, geopolitical disruptions, competition in export markets and changes in the sourcing conditions.

(144)

The Italian PET Spunbond users also argued that Commission invoked the possibility of using inward processing without adequately examining whether that customs procedure constitutes an effective, commercially viable and practically available solution in the specific circumstances of the users.

(145)

Finally, according to Italian PET Spunbond users the standard five-year duration of the measures does not adequately reflect the exceptional circumstances of the present case. Five-year duration is not appropriate in this case because the market situation is described as exceptional, rapidly evolving, and difficult to predict over such a long period. Italian PET Spunbond users emphasised the fact that these measures would affect a highly concentrated upstream market, and the likely impact on an export-oriented downstream industry.

(146)

Regarding allegedly imbalance approach in the injury analysis, the Commission noted that the substantive analysis of the questionnaire replies confirmed that the macroeconomic indicators point to an injurious situation for the Union industry, with factors such as production volume, market share and sales quantities all decreasing. The Italian PET Spunbond users did not submit any actual evidence in relation to macroeconomic indicators of downstream market (such as the effect of the measures on their production costs and employment) capable of putting into question the conclusion that measures are in the Union interest. By the same token, the Italian PET Spunbond users did not present any actual evidence regarding the link between adoption of the measures and risk of closure of the small companies. Moreover, the Italian PET Spunbond users presented internally inconsistent data regarding number of jobs, in the downstream industry, that will be lost due to the imposition of the measures. In the absence of a detailed and consistent analysis of downstream users’ profitability and raw-material costs, the claim that measures will hurt the downstream industry more than dumping hurts Union producers – who provided detailed, verified data by means of a questionnaire reply – is not substantiated and cannot be verified. The Commission also noted that when examining the Union interest it had to weigh conflicting interests: on the one hand, users were concerned about higher prices for their input materials; on the other hand, Union producers seeking the restoration of fair competition. In this regard, Article 21(1) of the basic Regulation provides for the need to eliminate the trade distorting effects of injurious dumping and to restore effective competition to be given special consideration. In this context, the fact that anti-dumping measures will increase the price of the product concerned for users does not, in the absence of actual evidence to the opposite properly submitted by interested parties, mean that such measures are clearly against the Union interest. The low prices of PET Spunbond which supported the downstream market were partially the result of dumping, which the measures are intended to remedy.

(147)

Regarding the quality and interchangeability of the product under investigation, the Commission note that the Italian users in their own submission confirmed interchangeability, similar technical characteristics and the same end-use features of the PET Spunbond from China and the one from the Union producers. Both European and Chinese Spunbond are used for the waterproof membrane by the building industry. The differences enumerated by the Italian PET Spunbond users such as consistency, weight uniformity, tensile strength could be addressed via adjustments in the machinery used in the Union producers’ manufacturing processes. Moreover, Italian PET Spunbond users did not present any evidence regarding the alleged technical superiority of the PET Spunbond imported from China.

(148)

Regarding post investigation period developments, the Italian PET Spunbond users equally did not present any actual evidence – whether by means of questionnaire replies or other submission – to support their claim that alleged post-IP developments demonstrated that the imposition of measures was clearly not in the Union interest. Accordingly, post investigation period developments cannot be compared with, and do not invalidate, the evidence gathered and verified during investigation period, thereby making anti-dumping measures manifestly inappropriate.

(149)

With regard to inward processing, the Commission noted that it is for the users, and not for the Commission, to examine all legal possibilities to improve their situation. Inward processing is one of the legal tools that may be used to mitigate the adverse effects of the measures on the downstream industry (see also recital (139) above).

(150)

On excessive level of measures the Commission explained the rationale behind the choice of the reference period to determine the target profit in recital (125). Regarding the duration of the measures, there are no material and demonstrated circumstances that would allow to shorten the measures to 18 months in the Union interest, as requested by the users. The Commission further recalled in this respect the possibility pursuant to Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation for users to request an interim review, one year after the imposition of the definitive measures, should they provide the evidence set out in that provision. Furthermore, as established in recital (351) of the provisional Regulation the security of supply of users in not compromised, since the purpose of the measures are not to prohibit imports from the PRC, but to restore the level playing field which was distorted by the dumping practices. Moreover, the demand for the PET Spunbond can also be covered by the spare capacity of the Union producers or imports from other third countries such as Türkiye.

(151)

On the basis of the above the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (345) to (355) of the provisional Regulation.

(152)

On the basis of above, the Commission upheld its conclusion that there were no compelling reasons that it was clearly not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of PET Spunbond originating in the PRC. The alleged adverse impact on downstream users did not outweigh the need to restore fair competition.

(153)

In view of the conclusions reached with regard to dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed in order to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports of the product concerned.

(154)

On the basis of the above, the definitive anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:

(155)

The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation in respect to these companies. These duty rates are thus exclusively applicable to imports of the product under investigation originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned manufactured by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from these rates and should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China’.

(156)

A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission (14). The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(157)

To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the proper application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The application of individual anti-dumping duties is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation. Until such invoice is presented, imports should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China’.

(158)

While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation, the customs authorities of Member States should carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(159)

Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume, in particular after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances, an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated, provided that the conditions for doing so are met. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(160)

To ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duties, the anti-dumping duty for ‘all other imports originating in the in the People’s Republic of China’ should apply not only to the non-cooperating exporting producers in this investigation, but also to the producers which did not have exports to the Union during the investigation period.

(161)

Exporting producers that did not export the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period should be able to request the Commission (15) to be made subject to the anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. The Commission should grant such request provided that three conditions are met. The new exporting producer would have to demonstrate that: (i) it did not export the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period; (ii) it is not related to an exporting producer that did so; and (iii) it has exported the product concerned thereafter or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to do so in substantial quantities.

(162)

In view of the dumping margins found and given the level of the injury caused to the Union industry, the amounts secured by way of provisional anti-dumping duties imposed by the provisional Regulation, should be definitively collected up to the levels established under the present regulation.

(163)

As mentioned in Section 1.2, the Commission made imports of the product under investigation subject to registration.

(164)

During the definitive stage of the investigation, the data collected in the context of the registration was assessed. The Commission analysed whether the criteria under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation were met for the retroactive collection of definitive duties.

(165)

The Commission’s analysis showed no further substantial rise in imports in addition to the level of imports which caused injury during the investigation period, as prescribed by Article 10(4)(d) of the basic Regulation. For this analysis, the Commission compared the monthly average import volumes of the product concerned during the investigation period, which was [1 467–1 792] tonnes, with the monthly average import volumes during the period from the month following the initiation of this investigation until the last full month preceding the imposition of provisional measures (October 2025–April 2026) which based on imports under the customs codes in scope, was below 1 000 tonnes.

(166)

Also, when comparing the monthly average import volumes of the product concerned during the investigation period with the monthly average import volumes during the period from the month following the initiation of this investigation up to and including the month in which provisional measures were imposed (October 2025–May 2026), no further substantial increase could be observed.

(167)

On that basis, the Commission concluded that the conditions as set out in Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation for the retroactive application of the definitive anti-dumping duty were not met.

(168)

Following final disclosure, the complainants requested the Commission to apply duties retroactively claiming that the relevant conditions, i.e. increase in volumes and decrease in price, were met. The complainants based their claim on the analysis of imports under CN codes 5603 13 90 , 5603 14 20 , and 5603 14 80 . However, according to Article 10(4a) of the basic Regulation retroactive collection of duties concerns imports of the product concerned that have been registered in accordance with Article 14(5) of the basic Regulation. The registration Regulation concerned only imports under CN code 5603 14 20 and TARIC codes 5603 13 90 70 and 5603 14 80 70. Thus, the claim by the complainants was rejected.

(169)

In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council (16), when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(170)

The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,